

A

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and the

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Arthur Donald Innes

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A HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND THE BRITISH EMPIRE

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CHAPTER I. WILLIAM III.

I. THE REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND, DECEMBER 1688-MARCH 1690

THE second flight of James II. left England without any legal government whatever. There was no parliament; there was no ministry. The nearest analogy was the position **1688.** which had arisen when Cromwell and his soldiers **The position** turned out the Rump Parliament. On that occasion **in December.** the officers of the army had acted as the supreme authority, and created the Protectorate, which provided a powerful government simply because the one organised military force in the country was behind the Protector. At the crisis of 1688 it would have been impossible for any military committee to play the part of Cromwell's army officers, or for William to play the part of Cromwell. But if there was no legal authority, nor any unauthorised Cæsar, there were at least on the one hand a general desire to reach a peaceful solution of the crisis, and on the other the Prince of Orange with an army; and there were the peers who had already been acting practically as a provisional government.

The king's flight had stopped the summoning of a parliament in legal form. William, however, immediately invited what may be called an emergency parliament, an irregular but fairly representative gathering, to assemble on 26th December, at which every one who had sat in any of the parliaments of Charles II. was called to attend; **1689.** on the hypothesis that they had been in their time freely elected members, whereas since the cancellation of the town charters the elections had not been free. To this body was added the Corporation of London. The peers assembled on 24th December, **A Convention summoned, January.**

and passed a resolution inviting William to issue writs for a Convention on the analogy of that which had recalled Charles II. in 1660, and to take over the executive control until the Convention could assume direction. The resolution was endorsed by the second chamber on the 26th; on the 28th, William accepted the invitation, and the Convention was summoned to meet on 22nd January. The elections were to be carried out under the conditions prevalent before the alteration of the borough charters.

Whigs and Tories were alike aware that in some form or other it was necessary that a government should be established with William at the head of it. But as to the form itself, **The offer of the crown.** it was no easy matter to reconcile the different solutions that were offered. The Commons showed a preponderance of Whig sentiment. They passed resolutions, one declaring that the throne had been vacated by James's flight, which was an act of abdication, while the second pronounced that it was contrary to public policy that the throne so vacated should be occupied by a Papist. The resolution of the Lords implied on the other hand that the act of abdication had not vacated the throne, but had already made some one or other, not James II., the monarch *de jure*. The majority of the Tories held the view that James was still king, and that the proper course was to appoint a regency—one of the plans which had been put forward in the days of the Exclusion Bill. Another Tory group, led by Danby and supported by many of the Whigs, claimed that the exclusion of James and his son made his daughter Mary the heir apparent; William might receive the crown jointly with her, but as her consort. It was, in fact, indisputable that Mary stood next after her father and brother in the succession to the throne, after her any heirs of her body, after them her sister Anne and the heirs of her body, and after them William as the grandson of Charles I. But to this direct rule of succession there was one insuperable objection: William did not claim the crown for himself as of right, but he declined to accept any position except that of king. If the country did not choose to make him king he would go back to Holland. The country could not afford to let him go back to Holland. Mary took the same line; she

would not accept the crown for herself unless her husband were recognised as king. Anne, perhaps through the Churchill influence, was induced to postpone her claim to that of William himself; it was not reasonable to invite William to accept a crown which would have to be resigned if his consort died before him. William himself made no unreasonable **William III.** claims. He had his work to do in Holland; it was **and Mary II.** not worth while for him to burden himself with the administration of England except as king; but it was quite right that Anne and her children should succeed in priority to children of his own by another wife than Mary. The agreement between William, Mary, and Anne was decisive. Parliament, in fact, had no option but to accept the principle that William and Mary should be made joint sovereigns, the crown continuing to the survivor, passing on the survivor's death to Mary's children if she should leave any, then to Anne and to her children if she should leave any, and then to William's children if he should survive his wife and leave children of the second marriage—not because he had been king, but because he personally stood next in succession to his wife and his sister-in-law. It was superfluous to do more towards the further fixing of the succession than to make a declaration that after all these it should go to the next Protestant heir.

It was clear, however, that if William was to be offered the crown it must be upon explicit conditions which would ensure the attainment of the objects for which the Revolution had been initiated. Yet delays were dangerous. **The Declaration of Right.** However desirable it might be to draw up a written constitution defining the position of the Crown, present necessities forbade the delay which would be involved. So a Declaration of Right was drawn up setting forth the acts of James which were condemned as contrary to the law; subject to the acceptance thereof, the succession was to be fixed in the order stated, while under the joint sovereignty of William and Mary the administration was to be vested in William. On 13th February, William and Mary, having accepted the Declaration, were proclaimed king and queen. **Since** the legal year at this time still began not upon 1st January,

but at Lady Day, the Revolution was completed in 1688, Old Style, and bears the name of that year ; although according to the New Style reckoning it took place not in the closing months of 1688, but in the opening months of 1689.

The necessities of the situation and the attitude of William had forced the reluctant Tories to forgo the principle of in-
Parliament defeasible hereditary right. Sheer impracticability
and heredi- had forced the regency scheme, which alone was
tary right. compatible with the highest Tory doctrines, out of court. Danby and his school had found an excuse for the exclusion of the infant Prince of Wales in their profession of belief that the child was supposititious ; but there was no evading the fact that it was only by parliamentary title that William could occupy the throne, except as the consort of Mary. It was only by admitting the right of parliament to set aside the unqualified rule of legitimism that the exclusion of Papists from the succession could be maintained. To that doctrine the country was committed by the Revolution Settlement. At the same time a number of Tories, headed by the earl of Nottingham, claimed that, while their principles required them to resist the settlement, they were free after the settlement had been made to act as the loyal servants of the *de facto* government. And on the other hand, there remained a not inconsiderable number of high Tories, and especially of high Anglicans among the clergy, who would not acknowledge that the king by hereditary right could cease to be king. Of the seven bishops who had made the immortal protest against the Declaration of Indulgence, six found that their consciences would not permit them to take the new oath of allegiance to the new king in contravention of the oath of allegiance which they had taken to the old king. Four hundred of the clergy, who came in consequence to be known as non-jurors, followed the example of the bishops, though all but a very few of the laymen to whom the oath was tendered accepted it as a practical duty, even though they might demur to it in theory.

The Declaration of Right had not in fact disposed of all the constitutional questions of the two last reigns ; but it finally disposed of every claim of the Crown to impose taxes without

parliamentary authority. It abolished the suspensory power, that is the power claimed under the Declaration of Indulgence to suspend the operation of the laws. It denounced the recent uses or abuses of the dispensing power by which individuals had been relieved from the operation of the law in particular cases; but it did not deny the existence of a dispensing power. It declared that a standing army might not be maintained in time of peace without parliamentary sanction. It forbade the institution of arbitrary courts, such as that of Ecclesiastical Commission; but it did not touch the law under which the judges were removable at the king's pleasure. It affirmed the right of petition, of free election to parliament, of free discussion in parliament, of frequent assembly of parliament; but it did not regulate the duration of parliament. Before the end of the year the Declaration of Right was given statutory form in the Bill of Rights. The proposal to embody in it the recognition of Sophia, the sister of Prince Rupert—her husband presently acquired a new dignity as elector of Hanover—as the next Protestant heir after William and his offspring was still rejected; but in other respects some points in the Declaration were made more definite. The king was in future to be required to make the same declaration which had been adopted in 1678 for the exclusion of Catholic peers from the House of Lords, denying Transubstantiation and other specified Romish doctrines. Marriage to a Roman Catholic was made an additional bar. The dispensing power was made applicable only to such Acts as might contain a permissive clause. But even then the questions of the judges and of the duration of parliament were left to be dealt with by later legislation. Still the Bill of Rights stands as the final charter of parliamentary rights.

**Provisions of
the Declara-
tion and Bill
of Rights.**

The Bill of Rights set the seal upon the Revolution; but much that was of importance took place between the proclamation of the new sovereigns and the passing of that statute. Manifestly the religious question demanded settlement. James had ruined himself by his attempt to set public opinion at naught by advancing Romanists to every kind of office from which English Protest-

**The new
government
and the
Noncon-
formists.**

antism had deliberately excluded them. He had tried to win over Protestant Nonconformists by extending to them in theory at least a like relief from penal and disabling statutes. The Nonconformists after some hesitation had rejected his overtures and played an active part in bringing about his downfall. It was impossible entirely to refuse them their reward ; but it was equally impossible to wipe out the hostility between Puritanism and High Anglicanism. A proposal for a Comprehension Act which would have admitted many Nonconformists within the pale was received without enthusiasm by anybody, and was presently dropped. Its place was taken by **The Toleration Act.** a Toleration Act, which in effect cancelled the Conventicle and Five Mile Acts of the Clarendon Code, and conceded freedom of public worship. That freedom, however, was extended neither to Papists nor to sectaries who denied the doctrine of the Trinity. Nor were the Test Act and the Corporation Act repealed, so that it was chiefly by the method known as Occasional Conformity, attendance at church rites specifically required under the Acts and on the occasions prescribed, that Protestant Nonconformists in general were able to hold municipal or public offices. The Test and Corporation Acts still barred them from public service, shut them out of the universities, and forbade them to hold commissions in the army and navy. The letter of the law, however, was not strictly observed, and some time later it became the practice to pass an annual Act of Indemnity for the relief of Nonconformists who had held office without obeying the injunctions of the Act. The disabilities, in short, remained, without being very rigidly enforced, while the positive penalties for nonconformity were virtually abolished.

It was almost by an accident that about the same time the annual meeting of parliament was secured by a measure which **The Mutiny Act.** was not primarily intended to gain that particular object. Charles and James had practically maintained their standing armies by subjecting the troops to martial law under 'articles of war,' in defiance of the common law ; in fact, no statutory provision had been made for the preservation

of discipline. On the accession of William and Mary the position of the regiments was extremely uneasy. They had not kept William out, and they had not brought him in. Their loyalty to the new régime was even more uncertain than their loyalty to King James. The order was given that some of them should be dispatched to the Low Countries. One regiment, Dumbarton's, composed almost entirely of Scots, mutinied and started to march for the north ; the men grumbled that they were Scots who ought not to be at the orders of the English government. They were overtaken and forced to surrender by a superior force ; but though they were hardly penalised, the parliament realised the necessity of enforcing discipline, and a Mutiny Act was passed authorising the subjection of the soldiery to martial law for a period of six months, afterwards extended to twelve. But the authorisation carried with it the implication that after the twelve months the employment of martial law would be illegal. By the simple process of re-enacting the Mutiny Act annually for twelve months only, it was rendered imperative that parliament should meet at least once in the twelve months for the renewal of the Act, without which the officers would be left to enforce discipline by the methods of the common law which would be wholly inadequate to that purpose.

We have seen that Whigs and Tories both took their share in bringing William over to England and in establishing him upon the throne. It was clear enough, however, **Whig** that Tory principles had to be strained to the **expectations.** uttermost, in a process which presented no difficulties to the Whigs. As a natural result, the Whigs were disposed to regard the Revolution as a Whig victory. They were on fairly equal terms with the Tories in the Upper House, and they were in a majority in the Lower. Generally their hostility to France was more pronounced than that of the Tories ; therefore they were *prima facie* the more useful allies for William in that policy of antagonism to Louis XIV. to which his desire for the control of England was quite subsidiary. Consequently, the Whigs expected to obtain a definite ascendancy, which they intended to use with some **vindictiveness.** The Tories in the past had

displayed no qualms in acting on the principle 'spoils to the victors, and woe to the vanquished.' The Whigs reckoned that their turn had come.

They reckoned without their host, for William had no intention of becoming the puppet or the figurehead of a party. **William and the Parties.** If he had placed himself in the hands of the Whigs, the Tories would have been turned into a solid body of Jacobites in less than six months, and it was of first-rate importance to William that the whole country, and not merely a section of it, should feel its need of him. It was only on those terms that he could bring it effectively into his European combinations. Jacobitism at its lowest power was still certain to remain a disintegrating and a trouble-begetting force; if he provoked the antagonism of the Tories at large, Jacobitism would be raised to its highest power. Active Jacobitism was hardly to be feared from the Whigs as a party. Policy, therefore, demanded that the Tories should be conciliated.

And so the Whigs found, to their extreme displeasure, that they were not to have matters all their own way. Two of the highest offices were bestowed upon Danby, the High Tory minister of Charles II. who had signed the famous letter inviting William's intervention, and upon Nottingham, who had opposed the deposition of James while acknowledging the duty of obedience to the *de facto* government. A third went to Halifax, who had led the Whigs or fought the Whigs with a total disregard of party ties, and was perhaps more acceptable to the Tories than to the Whigs. The fourth person in the leading quartette was the Whig Shrewsbury. Churchill, now for his services made earl of Marlborough, who through his wife's influence over the Princess Anne might be regarded as her representative, was, on the whole, of the Tory connection. Therefore among the Whigs reigned discontent; and yet the Tories could not be satisfied; for if William adopted a policy which really accorded with their views, half the country would have felt that the Revolution had failed of its purpose. All that William would do was to give both sides fair play, and so to preserve both from active hostility. The Whigs at least could not turn actively Jacobite without some

better reason than that William refused to sanction vindictive treatment of the Tories.

And so it fell out that when the Bill of Rights had been passed the Whigs played their trump card. They proposed a measure of simple retaliation which was to disfranchise all the Tories who had had a hand in the disfranchisement of the Whigs in Charles II.'s reign by the upsetting of the town charters. William met the proposal by a dissolution and an appeal to the electorate, which returned a Tory majority to the House of Commons. That election ensured that William should not be made into a puppet of the Whigs.

**1690.
Dissolution
and a Tory
victory.**

So ended the career of the assembly which had begun as a Convention during the interregnum, and had been transmuted into a parliament when the throne was filled again. This is perhaps the point at which we may regard the Revolution Settlement as having been completed, so far as England was concerned. William could at last hope to concentrate upon the foreign policy which was the subject he had most at heart; although the settlement of Scotland, and still more definitely of Ireland, was still far from complete. In Ireland indeed all the work was still to do. The sister kingdoms will now demand our attention.

II. THE REVOLUTION IN SCOTLAND AND IRELAND, 1688-1696

In Scotland there existed no organised body with legal authority which, like the parliament in England, could offer a strictly constitutional opposition to arbitrary government by the Crown. It had as a rule been difficult to deny that resistance was technically rebellion. More emphatically than ever, in the reigns of Charles II. and James VII., the administration had been completely in the hands of the Privy Council, while the Lords of the Articles, the committee which directed legislation, were necessarily king's men. The rebellious Covenanters were dragooned into a sort of sub-

**1688.
The position
in Scotland.**

mission till Scotland was quiescent under the tyranny. James, however, with his infallible determination to do the wrong thing, did not, when he found his throne in England threatened, take his measures to make himself secure in Scotland. That country was only held down by the presence of the troops. James elected to bring the troops over the border into England, with John Graham of Claverhouse in command. But even then, instead of entrusting operations to Claverhouse, he left the troops inactive and called Claverhouse away.

The council in Scotland was quite powerless without the troops. In December, while Claverhouse, who had just been made Viscount Dundee, was in the south trying to persuade James to let him strike a blow for the crown, the 1689.
Offer of
the crown,
January. councillors in Scotland were running away, the Edinburgh mob was rioting in Holyrood, and all over the country the Covenanters were up in anticipation of the fall of James's government. There was a general exodus to London of the nobles and gentry, who were alive to the fact that the course of events in Scotland would be determined by that in England. They followed the English example, and in January invited William to take over the administration until a National Assembly should meet for the settlement of affairs. As in England William accepted the suggestion, and recommended that a Convention should meet.

It was Dundee's intention, with James's sanction, to attend the Convention, and if that proved unmanageable to repudiate its authority and summon a rival Convention at Dundee
and the
Convention. Stirling. When the Scottish Convention met in March, James ruined his chances by addressing to it not the conciliatory letter which Dundee had recommended, but one carefully calculated to drive every waverer to the other side. Dundee, seeing that the case was hopeless, withdrew from Edinburgh, leaving behind him the conviction that he would take arms. Immediate measures were taken for defence, and on the arrival of General Mackay with Scottish regiments from Holland, dispatched north by William, the Convention at once appointed him commander-in-chief.

The Jacobites were now unrepresented. A commission was appointed of nobles, barons (that is landed gentry), and borough commissioners, which proceeded to draw up a Scottish Claim of Rights on the analogy of the English Declaration, which in its main lines it followed, but with variations. It was declared not that James had abdicated, but that he had **The Claim of Rights.** 'forfeited' the crown; also that Prelacy ought to be abolished, as being opposed to the will of the people. But whereas the English Declaration confined itself to certain rights, all of which had been claimed for more than half a century as historically inherent in parliament, the Scots claimed corresponding rights for the Scottish parliament, for which there was certainly no historical warrant. Roughly speaking, the Convention intended to claim approximately the same rights of self-government for Scotland which had been recognised in England. William was reluctant to commit himself to a suppression of Prelacy, his own views being entirely in favour of toleration; but there was no doubt as to the nature of popular sentiment in Scotland, and he accepted the Claim and the form of coronation oath which was tendered. Even before he had done so, the Convention proclaimed William and Mary; and immediately afterwards they obtained from William the ratification of their conversion into a legal parliament.

Dundee, without being in open rebellion, was procuring from James authority to act. Letters were intercepted, and an attempt was made to arrest him; but he escaped **Dundee in the Highlands.** to the north and set about the active organisation of an insurrection for which he had been preparing by communicating with sundry Highland chiefs. He knew from the precedent of Montrose that forces exceedingly formidable in the field could be raised in the Highlands; like his predecessor he counted upon the hostility of half the clans to the Argyll or Campbell ascendancy which the new order was evidently in a fair way to re-establish. He was under no illusion that he could effect a conquest by means of his clansmen—that had been sufficiently proved by the career of Montrose; but what he did hope to do was to harry and

embarrass the government and to keep its forces tied up until he could get from James the reinforcements needed for a campaign of conquest.

From the middle of April till midsummer Dundee was gathering the clansmen, raiding, and evading battle with any superior **Killiecrankie**, body of troops. James was now in Ireland, promising reinforcements; but all that arrived, in the **27th July**, was a troop of three hundred badly armed and badly disciplined Irish under Colonel Cannon. Dundee felt that if his Highlanders were to be kept together at all, a blow must be struck. Mackay wished to recover the castle of Blair Atholl in Perthshire. As Mackay advanced Dundee found his opportunity at the pass of Killiecrankie (27th July). The battle was short. The Highlanders, holding the higher ground on the hill-side, burst upon Mackay's regulars with one irresistible charge and scattered them in total rout; but a bullet killed Dundee as he was dashing forward at the head of the small troop of Jacobite cavalry. The victory itself was complete, but Dundee's fall made it entirely useless. The incompetent Colonel Cannon was no leader for the Highlanders. One after another, disgusted chiefs went home with their clansmen; **End of the rising**. Mackay, who was a capable officer, was left free to reorganise his troops at Stirling. Thence he marched upon Aberdeen, leaving the Cameronian regiment of west country Covenanters to hold Dunkeld. There they were attacked by the clansmen who remained with Cannon, but they offered so stout a resistance that the badly led Highlanders were finally beaten off. After that the clansmen lost heart and dispersed to their homes. The military danger in Scotland was at an end. In fact, even if Dundee had not been slain he could never have done much more than maintain a state of alarm and unrest, without receiving efficient reinforcements which would never have been forthcoming. Like Montrose, he would have found, as he himself very well knew, that the Highlanders, fighting under the clan system, might perform astonishing achievements, but could never be held together for the prolonged campaigning necessary to a conquest of the Lowlands.

The military danger had, in fact, been the least thorny of the principal problems with which William's government had to deal, two of which in particular were occupying the Scots parliament. William was by no means inclined to surrender what had been unquestionably royal rights before his accession. The establishment of Presbyterianism would deprive the Crown of the ecclesiastical control which it retained under the Episcopal system. The 'Articles of Grievance' which had accompanied the Claim of Right called for the abolition of the Committee of Articles, to concede which would deprive the Crown of its former control over legislation. When the parliament met in June, some weeks before Killiecrankie, it found that the king's commissioner, the duke of Hamilton, was authorised to sanction changes in the structure of the committee, but not its abolition. The king's ministers were still to form one of the groups of which it was composed. The Opposition, consisting of discontented placemen and extremists, carried a bill for the abolition of the articles. Then they went on with bills directed against the two Dalrymples, father and son, who had secured William's confidence. Hamilton refused assent to the bills, since they went quite outside his instructions. Anxious to avoid a decisive step without further orders from the king, the commissioner diverted attention to the ecclesiastical question, and gave his assent to an Act for the abolition of Episcopacy, but again found himself obliged to refuse it to measures proposed and carried by the extremists. At the beginning of August he adjourned the parliament.

The parliament did not meet again till April of the next year, 1690. Meanwhile, William was persuaded by the judicious and honest Carstaes, who won and always preserved his confidence, that however convenient Episcopacy might be to a monarchy, the Scottish Episcopalians were for the most part Jacobites. Consequently, a new commissioner, Lord Melville, was now prepared to confirm the previously rejected bills for the restoration of ejected Presbyterian ministers and the repeal of the Act of Supremacy. Even more decisive was the acceptance of an Act which substituted for the Committee of the

**William and
the Scots
parliament.**

**1690.
Agreement.**

Articles committees with an equal number of representatives from each of the three estates, lords, barons, and burgesses. For it was no longer to be necessary for legislation to be initiated through these committees; and ministers, though they had the right to attend the sittings, were not to vote. Thus the Revolution gave to Scotland what it had never had before, an unfettered parliament, and what it had only enjoyed for a short period during the last hundred years, a Presbyterian establishment.

There still remained the serious question of the settlement of the Highlands. William combined the two policies of coercion and conciliation. On the one hand, forts were **The Highlands.** planted at Fort William and elsewhere; on the other, some of the chiefs were bought over, and in the summer of 1691, when their last hopes of foreign support had vanished, an indemnity was proclaimed for all who would take the oath of allegiance before a sheriff by 1st January. It was indeed expected and in some quarters hoped that some of the chiefs would refuse to come in and that condign vengeance would then be taken on the recalcitrants; but, in fact, before the appointed day, all the chiefs had duly taken the oath of allegiance except one—MacIan, the chief of the Macdonalds of Glencoe.

MacIan in a spirit of bravado had waited to the last moment and then presented himself before the commandant at Fort **1692.**

The Glencoe Massacre. William; who, not being authorised to administer the oath, sent him off to the sheriff of Argyll at Inveraray.

Heavy snowfalls prevented him from reaching Inveraray till 7th January, when the sheriff accepted his oath of allegiance. Now, Sir John Dalrymple, the Master of Stair—his father, James Dalrymple, had been made Viscount Stair, and the heir to the peerage bore the courtesy title of Master—had a grudge against MacIan of Glencoe. Also, he stood high in the confidence of King William. MacIan's oath had been tendered after the appointed day; it had not therefore been formally accepted by the authorities at Edinburgh. Dalrymple procured from the king an authorisation to proceed against MacIan as a recalcitrant. The orders were given for the 'extirpation of that set of thieves.' There followed **an act of the**

most repulsive treachery. Captain Campbell of Glenlyon who had married the niece of the unsuspecting MacIan, who had no warning that his oath had not been accepted, arrived at Glencoe, apparently in all friendliness, with 120 soldiers. For twelve days they were hospitably entertained as guests. On the early morning of the thirteenth day, the soldiers fell upon their hosts and slaughtered them indiscriminately, including women and children, though a few managed to escape across the hills.

The official extirpation of a nest of caterans by government troops would in ordinary circumstances have created no general resentment. Atrocious as the particular circum- 1695.
stances were, they would probably never have been **The Inquiry.** brought to light if they had not provided a useful weapon in party warfare. But both William and Dalrymple had enemies enough to ensure that the affair should not be kept dark, and when once the public had an inkling of what had taken place, conscience as well as party spirit was aroused. It was not from one side only that demands came for an inquiry. The attempts to stifle them failed, and three years after the event a royal commission was appointed to investigate the matter. The destruction of Macdonald after the oath of allegiance had actually been taken, on the technical ground that the terms of the indemnity had not been exactly observed, would have been difficult to excuse in any case; the atrocity of the method by which that destruction had been effected was repulsive. The commission evidently sought to exonerate William, and, as an inevitable result, concentrated the blame upon the Master of Stair, who may or may not have known that the oath of allegiance had actually been taken. Neither he nor William had gone beyond ordering the extirpation of the Macdonalds; the method was left to the military authorities. But in spite of the report of the commission nobody was punished. Stair indeed was obliged to resign his secretaryship, but not without receiving other compensations from the king. It is palpable that William ought never to have signed the order without a thorough investigation **William**
into the case of the Macdonalds. It is palpable that **and Stair.** Stair, seeing an opportunity for destroying the Macdonalds, was

satisfied the moment he had his technical plea. It is palpable that the military subordinates felt sure that their methods would not be called in question by the superior authorities. As a matter of policy, it is quite certain that if William had given the matter the attention which it demanded, the massacre of Glencoe would never have taken place ; for he was far too shrewd not to have foreseen the actual event, which was to intensify to the utmost the hostility of the Highlands to the government, and to make ardent Jacobites of clansmen who had hitherto felt no particular loyalty to the Stuarts. For once, he was careless. Thus it was that a prince who was pre-eminently distinguished for a lenience to his personal enemies which was a frequent source of anxiety to his closest adherents, a prince who was always ready to strain toleration to its furthest limits, suffered this indelible blot to fall upon his name.

But it was entirely consistent with William's character that when the thing had been done he refused to call the more active perpetrators to account. William was not, as he is sometimes called, cruel. He took no pleasure in the infliction of pain. The course which he chose was habitually the course which his reason judged to be just ; but if it was attended by injustice he was quite unmoved. So, long before, when the murder of the De Witts had secured his position as stadtholder, he had taken the profit which it brought him and refused to punish the murderers. So, now, he refused to punish the men who had massacred the Macdonalds with what they took to be his sanction. He was not cruel, but he was remorseless. Indifference rather than magnanimity made him lenient to hostility, and even to perfidy directed against himself. Indifference, not cruelty, made him lenient to hostility and perfidy directed against others. His passions and emotions were absorbed in the one intense passion of patriotism ; he had no emotion to spare for anything or any one else unless it was for his wife. Perhaps the story of Glencoe, instead of being the most puzzling incident in his career is the most illuminating as regards his personal character.

**William's
character
illustrated.**

In England, the Revolution was effected without any civil bloodshed ; it established all the liberties which English parliaments had ever claimed under a monarchy. In **Ireland:** Scotland it was effected after one **brief campaign,** **a contrast** and had there been no Dundee there would have been no campaign. It gave to Scotland the religious system which the mass of the population demanded, and parliamentary liberties more extensive than had ever before been enjoyed or claimed. Very different was the fate of Ireland. For two years that country was the arena of civil war ; and when the Revolution was completed the religion of the great majority of the population was penalised as it had never been penalised before ; the domination of one section of the people over the rest was acutely emphasised ; and the subjection of the Irish to the English parliament was in no way diminished. In the larger island the Revolution meant the confirmation and extension of liberties ; in the smaller it intensified the disabilities of the large majority and emphasised the privileges of the minority without extending the liberties of either.

The Restoration Settlement had been a reasonably honest attempt to deal fairly with the conflicting claims which had been created by wholly abnormal conditions ; but it perpetuated what was necessarily in the eyes of the Irish the injustice which had vested the ownership of half the Irish land in alien proprietors, the followers of an alien religion. It had perpetuated the Protestant ascendancy. James, during his brief reign, had done his best to overturn the Protestant ascendancy, under the deputyship of the Papist Tyrconnel. The Revolution in England, of which the primary motive which secured to it a general support was hostility to Romanism, could not fail if applied to Ireland to strengthen the Protestant ascendancy there. There was in Ireland no loyalty to the person of a Stuart king ; but as matters stood the hopes of every Romanist centred in the failure of the Revolution. Ireland was Jacobite because Jacobitism offered the only prospect of overthrowing the Protestant ascendancy and changing the land settlement in favour of the heirs of the dispossessed owners. Before William and Mary were proclaimed king and

**Land,
religion,
and
Jacobitism.**

queen of England half the adult male population of Ireland was up in arms of a sort, and the Protestants were swept up into the fortified towns of Londonderry and Enniskillen, in Ulster.

To James, Ireland appeared of primary importance. Tyrconnel, a Strafford of shreds and patches, was to play the part which Strafford would have played ; Ireland was to be the base from which the crown of England was to be recovered. Three months after his flight from England James was in Dublin. In Ireland he was king *de facto* and *de jure* both, and the Protestants who repudiated his authority were rebels.

The English Convention urged upon William the necessity for immediate action in Ireland, even as James made corresponding protestations to Louis. But in the eyes of both **Failure of negotiations.** William and Louis, Ireland was secondary. For both of them the real battleground was on the Continent ; neither of them was willing to divert troops to Ireland. Louis gave James money and supplies and half a dozen French officers to help him in the organisation of the army ; William left a garrison at Derry, and sent an envoy to make terms with Tyrconnel, who seemed to be wavering. The envoy joined Tyrconnel, whose apparent willingness to negotiate had merely been a mask, assumed in order to gain time, and promptly thrown off. William sent a couple of regiments to Derry, but the commandant, Lundy, rejected their aid, on the ground that the place was untenable. It was his intention to surrender ; but the inhabitants were resolved to resist to the last gasp. They dismissed Lundy and entrusted the defence to men of their own choosing, a soldier named Baker and a clergyman named Walker. When James's troops appeared at the gates and called upon them to surrender, the summons was met with defiance.

Derry was blockaded and a boom was thrown across the river Foyle to prevent supplies coming in by water. The garrison **Siege of Derry.** beat back every attack, but as the weeks passed the supplies ran short. William sent a relief expedition commanded by Colonel Kirke, who had won an evil notoriety in the time of Monmouth's rebellion ; but when Kirke arrived on

the Foyle he declared his inability to break through the boom. The garrison was reduced to the last straits, but still held out grimly. At last, at the end of July, Kirke received orders so imperative that he dared not disobey them. The boom was broken, supplies were carried in to the starving garrison, and Derry was saved ; for nothing but sheer starvation could have reduced it to surrender. On 31st July the blockade was raised ; and on the same day the Enniskilleners had marched out and totally routed at Newton Butler a force which had been dispatched against them.

Meanwhile, James had summoned a parliament in Dublin. The disabilities of Catholics being suspended, the Assembly was overwhelmingly Catholic. An English parliament **The Dublin parliament.** assembled in such circumstances would have realised the wisdom of compromise. The Irish parliament was uncompromising. It declared as a matter of course for King James and for religious toleration ; even James himself could not have dared to sanction a reversal of the relations between Catholics and Protestants as such. The next step was to repudiate the whole theory of the ascendancy of the English over the Irish parliament. The principle of toleration carried with it the principle that the landowners should pay their tithes to their own church, whatever that church might be, since Catholics and Protestants were to be on an equality. But to all intents and purposes, that meant that the Church of Rome was to be re-endowed at the expense of the Established Church, since, by the fresh land settlement promulgated, nearly the whole of the land would be returned to Catholic proprietors.

For all the forfeitures and settlements since 1641 were to be cancelled. The only compensation was that offered to actual purchasers of land since the Restoration Settlement, **Its extravagant enactments.** and that compensation was to be provided by the confiscation of the land of persons who had joined in the rebellion against King James. Since practically all such persons would be in any case deprived of their land by its restitution to the representatives of proprietors in 1641, it was not easy to see what estates would be left to confiscate ; even though all

absentees who had given support to William were to be included in the category of rebels. These sweeping enactments were accompanied by an Act of Attainder, covering some 2500 persons in every rank of life. The attainted persons, however, were given the chance of returning to stand their trial. The violence of these proceedings bore its fruit in the vindictiveness of the Protestant parliament which assembled after the Irish resistance to King William had been crushed.

The indignation of the English parliament forced William to yield to the pressure of public opinion, and to dispatch to Ireland an armament which he would have much preferred to retain for use on the Continent. The command was entrusted to the old marshal Schomberg, a soldier of long experience and high reputation, in whom William had much more confidence than in any Englishman. A fortnight after the relief of Derry, Schomberg and his troops had landed on Belfast Lough; but when he started on his southward march for Dublin he found his route blocked by a larger force under Tyrconnel at Drogheda. At first an excessive caution, and then the outbreak of disease among his troops, prevented him from attacking the enemy, while he made his own position too strong for a counter attack. Nothing, therefore, was done through the winter.

In the spring of 1690, William was forced to the conclusion that the Irish trouble must be definitely settled before he could obtain freedom of action on the Continent. He resolved to carry a strong force with him to Ireland, and to conduct the campaign in person. Before he could do so, the dissolution and the general election in March had converted the majority in the Commons from Whig to Tory. Though Whig leaders, discontented and alarmed, had already opened correspondence with James by way of an insurance against accidents—a fact of which William was himself probably aware—Whig disaffection was less dangerous than the active Tory hostility which would have resulted if William had placed himself unreservedly in the hands of the Whigs. William was able to leave the administration in charge of his wife and of ministers

**Schomberg
sent to
Ireland,
August.**

1690.

**William goes
to Ireland.**

mainly Tory, with reasonable security, when he sailed for Ireland in June.

For reasons to which we shall presently revert, the French fleet was at this moment actually superior to the English fleet. To us it must appear somewhat extraordinary that Louis did not make use of this advantage to sweep the Irish Channel and prevent William's landing. William, however, himself showed the same defective appreciation of the naval situation, and took no precautions to secure his passage. As matters turned out, his neglect had no evil results. The forces were landed at Carrickfergus, all the troops in the north were collected, and William marched southward—his supplies maintained by the transports, against which no attack was aimed. On 30th June he found himself faced at the Boyne Water by James, whose troops were under the command of the French general Lauzun. On the next day William, for once setting aside the counsels of extreme caution to which Schomberg would have adhered, forced the passage of the river in the face of the enemy and routed them. The battle reflected no great credit on the generalship of either side. But the victory proved decisive, although the enemy were able to draw off without excessive losses, because James lost heart and himself hurried back to Dublin, from Dublin to Waterford, and from Waterford to Kinsale, whence he took ship for France. The battle of the Boyne secured Ulster and Leinster ; but Munster and Connaught were held by the Jacobites ; and Munster and Connaught provided four ports, Galway and Limerick on the west, and Cork and Kinsale on the south, which were open doors for French reinforcements.

Earlier in the spring, French ships had defeated an English squadron off Bantry Bay ; and the day before the battle of the Boyne the French admiral Tourville had inflicted upon the English fleet off Beachy Head the most complete defeat which it ever suffered. But still the French fleet failed to make any effective use of its mastery of the Channel, beyond making the flight of James secure. There was, however, something like a panic in England, not unjustifiable, since very

**The Boyne
campaign,
June.**

**Bantry Bay
and Beachy
Head.**

few troops had been left there, and the shores were open to invasion. William sent back some regiments from Ireland, and their arrival, coupled with the news of the Boyne, allayed the panic. The French contented themselves with a raid on the coast of Devon, after which their fleet retired to Brest. William, who had been on the point of returning, felt warranted in conducting another campaign in the west, where the **The autumn campaign.** French and the Irish Jacobites had thrown themselves into Galway and Limerick. From Galway most of the French retired altogether; but in Limerick the Irish, inspired by the indomitable Patrick Sarsfield, defied William when he laid siege to the town, cut off his convoys, captured his siege guns, and beat off an attempt to storm the walls. William raised the siege, and in September returned to England, leaving Solms and Marlborough to complete the work—Schomberg had fallen at the Boyne. Before the end of October Marlborough had captured both Cork and Kinsale.

Active operations were as usual suspended during the winter. William considered that Ireland was sufficiently secure to enable him to devote himself vigorously to concerting **1691.** operations in the Netherlands. He did not return **Athlone and Limerick.** to Ireland, where, in the spring, the military command was bestowed upon the Dutch general Ginkel. A French general, St. Ruth, was sent over by James to Galway to take command of the Jacobites, to the annoyance of Tyrconnel. In July Ginkel defeated St. Ruth at Athlone, and again at Aghrim, where the French commander was killed. Then Ginkel turned upon Limerick. It soon became evident that the place would be untenable against his guns. Sarsfield and his French colleague D'Usson saw that the best thing they could do was to capitulate, if they could secure sufficiently favourable terms. Tyrconnel was dead.

Ginkel, who wanted peace, was ready to make great concessions. The terms procured by Sarsfield were that the Irish soldiery were **Capitulation of Limerick.** to be at liberty either to remain under an amnesty as loyal subjects of King William or to depart to France and take service under the French king. Further, the

promise was given that Irish Roman Catholics were to have the same freedom of religious worship as in the reign of Charles II. All persons who were resident in garrison towns and all officers and soldiers in five specified counties were to enjoy full amnesty, with the restoration of their estates as in the time of Charles II. The amnesty was also made to cover all persons 'under the protection' of the Jacobite forces in those counties, although in a draft of the terms this last provision was accidentally omitted. No one appears to have had any doubt that the terms of the capitulation would be ratified in due course by the Irish parliament, should that be found technically necessary. It must also be remarked that in no sense could it possibly be maintained that the Irish Jacobites had hitherto been rebels. Until the capitulation of Limerick, William was not even *de facto* king of Ireland. The only pretence upon which he could have been called king *de jure* was that the English parliament had acknowledged him. Never was there a case in which it was more clear that the government was under a moral obligation of the most binding order to ratify to the full the terms upon which the garrison of Limerick had agreed to capitulate.

Yet no sooner were the victory and its fruits secured than the victors proceeded to tear up the Articles. First, the parliament at Westminster passed an Act imposing upon all office-holders and members of parliament in Ireland not only the Oath of Allegiance, which was a matter of course, but also the Oath of Supremacy and a declaration against Transubstantiation, whereby Roman Catholics were for the first time excluded from the Irish parliament which assembled a year after the Limerick capitulation at the end of 1692. A dispute with the lord-lieutenant led to its prorogation. The Irish parliament did not meet again till 1695, but from that time onwards it devoted itself to passing a series of enactments utterly destructive of the civil liberties of the whole Roman Catholic population. Papists were forbidden to teach in schools or in private houses, and children were not only deprived of instruction by persons of their parents' religion in Ireland—they might not even be sent

**The
Capitulation
torn up.**

**1695.
The Penal
Laws.**

abroad to be educated as Papists. The penalty was the forfeiture of goods and property, half of which might be claimed by the informer. No Papist might carry arms, or own a horse worth more than £5. All the Roman Catholic clergy were banished. Protestants were forbidden to marry Papists. The security of the restored estates was not allowed to hold good against the claims of private suitors. The estates of rebels not actually covered by the terms of the treaty were confiscated, though Protestant heirs were allowed to succeed to them. If a Protestant heiress married a Papist her estates passed to the Protestant next of kin. The estates of Papists were not to pass by primogeniture, but were to be divided among the children. If any of the children were Protestants, or turned Protestants, the whole of the estates went to them. Finally, the Restoration Acts of Settlement were confirmed; and, while titles might be disputed by Protestant claimants, no claim put forward by a Catholic could be heard.

Technically, the disabilities of Irish Catholics did not materially differ from those of their co-religionists in England. But in **Voe Victis**. England the penal laws, however unjust, were at least imposed upon a small minority by an immense majority; in Ireland they were imposed upon an immense majority by a small minority. For more than half a century the object aimed at was achieved. The Roman Catholic population of Ireland lay completely at the mercy of the Protestant minority. It had neither the spirit nor the power to rebel. It took no share in any of the Jacobite risings. It was deprived of every incentive to industry, and to moral or intellectual progress. After two centuries the evil then wrought is still bearing its poisonous fruit. And William, champion of toleration though he was, was content to let intolerance take its course, as he was content to leave the massacre of Glencoe unpunished, since to have insisted upon justice for the Irish would have alienated English supporters.

III. THE KING, THE ENGLISH PARTIES,
AND THE WAR OF THE LEAGUE OF AUGSBURG, 1688-1697

Like the English statesmen at the end of the seventeenth century, we have given to the domestic affairs of the British Isles precedence over the continental questions with which they were entangled; as William also gave them a reluctant precedence, in action. At no time of his life did England really hold the first place in the mind of King William. Essentially he was a continental statesman. For sixteen years he had been stadtholder in the Dutch Republic. During several of those years he had been absorbed in the struggle to prevent the toils of King Louis from enfolding his own small nation. Though Holland had held her own, and had come out of the Treaty of Nimeguen successfully enough, the Prince of Orange was under no illusion as to the ambitions of the king of France, and knew that sooner or later the struggle would be renewed. If he wanted the crown of England, to which down to 1788 his wife was heir presumptive, it was because he wished to unite the resources of England to the resources of Holland in the battle with the Bourbon.

**William
and the
Continent.**

For the first time since the loss of Normandy by King John, England was ruled by a prince whose primary interests lay on the other side of the Channel. Like Henry II. he had the instincts of a ruler; he could not be a king without playing the part of a king. As Henry saved England from the disintegration threatened by the anarchy of Stephen, William saved England from a repetition of the Great Rebellion, or at least from becoming a cockpit of warring factions. Both Henry and William strove to make the country strong and united; both succeeded. But both did it primarily in order that a strong England might serve other aims in which the people of England took no very enthusiastic interest.

**A far-off
precedent.**

Before Louis's invasion of the Palatinate in 1688, the Prince of Orange had been weaving his diplomatic webs for curbing the expected aggression of the king of France. He had drawn together the League of Augsburg, at the moment

when France had seized upon William's tiny independent principality of Orange which lay in Provence. The league had included among its signatories the emperor 1688. The League and the kings of Sweden and Spain, besides a number of German princes; theoretically it was for purposes of mutual defence. In effect it was this league which Louis challenged when his armies entered the Palatinate; though at that time it was by no means certain how far the various states of the league would be drawn into the conflict.

Louis had not grasped the situation. The fact of his invasion of the Palatinate relieved Holland from the danger of immediate invasion, and enabled William to make his expedition to England in spite of Louis's threat that Dutch intervention in England would be treated as a *casus belli*. War was at once declared between France and Holland; but Louis could not immediately fling his armies on Holland. What he could have done was to take the seas with his fleet, and prevent William landing in England. But James to the last moment retained the conviction that his own fleet, unaided by France, would prevent his son-in law's landing; and the opportunity was missed. The flight of James from England, followed three months afterwards by the coronation of William and Mary, turned England into an effective member of the League of Augsburg, the 'grand alliance.'

Now, although England and Holland were still entitled 'the maritime powers,' the French fleet was actually at the moment the strongest on the seas. Holland's fighting power was becoming exhausted, for the simple reason that she was too small to bear the endless strain of maintaining it. The English navy, powerful in the reign of Charles II. whenever it was allowed to take the seas in fighting trim, had fallen into bad hands in the latter years of that monarch. Organisation and discipline had both been deficient; and though King James, whose heart was very much in the navy, did a good deal to remedy the mismanagement of the seven years preceding his accession, the English fleet was still very far below the standard which was easily within its reach.

The fleets.

On the other hand, as long as Colbert lived that great minister had devoted himself to maritime organisation, both naval and commercial ; since he was one of the very few Frenchmen who realised the extent to which England and Holland owed their prosperity to commerce, and their commerce to strength on the ocean. In the last contest with the Dutch there had been French captains and French squadrons equal to the business of tackling Dutch squadrons even under the command of De Ruyter. Colbert's system was still at work, and in 1688 the French fleet, properly employed, could certainly have dominated the Channel.

But though Colbert's system had not been dropped, neither Louis nor his war minister Louvois had sufficiently rid themselves of the older French tradition which regarded navies as mere accessories to land forces, and looked upon the raiding of the enemy's commerce as the essential use to which the French marine should be put. It is more curious that William, long at the head of one maritime state, now the king of another, and destined presently to show a very unusual insight into naval strategy, should still at this time have been dominated by similar conceptions. The result of this predisposition on the part of the two kings was manifested in Ireland. The French were able to maintain their communications with Ireland almost without trouble. Troops and supplies passed backwards and forwards whenever Louis chose to send them, which fortunately for William was not often. When an English squadron did try to intercept the communications, it was beaten off at Bantry Bay. And yet William was allowed, without the slightest attempt at interference, to carry his troops across the Irish Channel and march to his victory at Boyne Water, although a fortnight after he had made the passage Tourville inflicted upon Admiral Herbert, off Beachy Head, the most disastrous defeat ever suffered by an English fleet, and held the command of the Channel unchallenged.

We shall find that as the war went on, the English maritime instinct showed itself in the persistent reorganisation and development of the navy, which possessed such recuperative power that even the battle of Beachy

**Neglect
of naval
strategy.**

**Command
of the sea.**

Head before long came to be regarded merely as a 'regrettable incident'; whereas when the French fleet met with a corresponding disaster scarcely in itself of greater magnitude, the recuperative power was wanting. The country's energies were concentrated on the army, not on the navy; and when the war came to an end with the Peace of Ryswick, the control of the sea had long passed indisputably and permanently to the English; with decisive results in every war in which they were engaged from that time forward. Thus although from 1688 till 1691 the command of the seas was possessed by France, she made no effective use of her advantage; almost, she might as well not have possessed it at all. Then came a brief period during which the possession of that command was in doubt; after that the English obtained the command and used it. But the opening stages of the war become intelligible only when we have realised that in actual fact during those stages England was not in the position which we are more or less unconsciously disposed to take for granted, of holding the control of the seas.

If England was to be an efficient aid in war, it was necessary for William to have adequate support from both parties in the state. In the nature of the case the Whigs could hardly afford to be Jacobites, since a Jacobite restoration could scarcely be effected except at the cost of all their political principles. It was not possible for a Whig to be at heart a Jacobite. On the other hand, at least half the Tories were Jacobites at heart, and looked upon James as the rightful king, though patriotism might require them in the existing circumstances to maintain the *de facto* government. William, therefore, could not afford to throw the Tories into violent opposition, which would have been the inevitable result of giving the Whigs a free hand. Moreover, while he was in entire accord with the Whig doctrines of toleration, the Whig political theory would have curtailed the royal prerogative, as in fact it did subsequently become curtailed after the Hanoverian succession. But William was not the man to accept the position of a figurehead. If he could not carry out his own policy it was not worth his while to be king of England. The strength

**The king
and the
parties.**

of his position lay in the fact that if he resigned the crown a Stuart restoration would be inevitable. His weakness, on the other hand, lay in the half-heartedness of his supporters. Discontented Whigs might be capable of preferring no bread to the half loaf. Discontented Tories might find their consciences importunately urging doctrines of non-resistance and Divine right. William could, in fact, do little more than hold the balance so as to prevent the discontent in either party from developing into violent hostility ; he could hope for enthusiasm from neither, and his own coldness of demeanour, his conspicuous preference for the Dutchmen whom he trusted over the Englishmen whom he mistrusted, and his disregard for the popular ornamental aspect of royalty, combined to prevent him from winning anything like affection from his English subjects. What he could win by steady justice, unfailing reasonableness, and entire freedom from vindictiveness was a reluctant respect and a sense that he was indispensable. But that did not prevent Whigs from endeavouring to stand well at the court of St. Germain, or Tories from more active intriguing to procure a Jacobite restoration upon terms.

In 1689 the war on the Continent was already in full swing. The circle of the foes of France had been completed by the adhesion of Savoy, on the Franco-Italian frontier, to what was now known as the Grand Alliance. **1690. Crown and ministers.** In 1690 William found that he must still deal with Ireland before he could betake himself to the Continent. And before he could go to Ireland his position in England had to be defined by the new parliament which met in March. The Whigs had been rebuffed, and the Tories proved ready to endorse the revolution. Parliament voted the hereditary revenue for life to William and Mary, and granted tonnage and poundage for four years. They were rewarded by a formal Act of Grace proposed by the king, which precluded further clamours from the Whigs for vindictive measures by granting complete indemnity for the past to all except a very few persons, among whom was included Sunderland ; and it very soon became evident that there was no intention of proceeding against the excepted persons without fresh cause. When William departed to Ireland Mary was left

in charge, with ministers mainly Tory to advise her. The ever uncertain Shrewsbury having resigned his secretaryship of state, Nottingham, with Danby, whom we may continue to call by his old title, though he was now marquis of Caermarthen, and was afterwards to become duke of Leeds, were the leading members of the council.

When William returned from Ireland in September, after the victory of the Boyne, he found that the parliament which was summoned in October, was still satisfactorily disposed. It showed no hesitation in voting the large forces and supplies for which William asked. The king was able to leave for Holland in January, although before his departure the existence of a Jacobite plot had been discovered. The investigation was left to Mary. The principal conspirator was Lord Preston, by whose name the plot is known. It is probable enough that in any case it would have come to nothing, since Preston's scheme required a moderation on James's part greater than either he or Louis would have been likely to sanction. One of Preston's accomplices was executed. Preston and Clarendon, the queen's uncle, who was involved in the affair, were imprisoned in the Tower for some months, but were subsequently released. No other proceedings were taken, since William himself, returning to England for a few days, was opposed to any severe measures.

The year's campaigning in the Netherlands was unproductive, though the advantage on the whole lay with the French. But when William met parliament in October Limerick had capitulated and the war in Ireland was over. Consequently the Commons were still amenable, and again voted the men and the money asked for.

The war in 1692 was to be attended by events more notable than those of the previous year. Although James's cause was lost in Ireland, the exiled king was under strange illusions as to the prospect of his return to England. His imagination multiplied the number of non-jurors among the clergy; it invented Nonconformist hostility to William because the Test Act had not been repealed. James

1692.

James plans
invasion.

had not been able to escape from his rooted conviction that the Nonconformists looked upon him and not upon William as the champion of toleration. He always believed that the fleet was devoted to him, its sometime admiral, because he was honestly enough devoted to the fleet. Then, as it happened, the Princess Anne had quarrelled with her sister the queen; her ally Marlborough had just been disgraced and dismissed from his offices, and Marlborough was encouraging Anne to make friends with her father. So James counted upon the general who was reckoned a Tory, and also upon Admiral Russell who was a fervent Whig, but had opened correspondence with St. Germain because King William was not sufficiently Whig for his views. Therefore, James thought the moment auspicious for a grand attack upon England. Louis went so far with him that he was willing for Tourville and the fleet to clear the seas for the passage of James and a French army.

William left England for Holland in March. In April James went to the Normandy coast with a view to the invasion, and issued from thence a proclamation admirably calculated to destroy his own hopes. It promised a **Before**
La Hogue. free pardon to all but a small number of persons specified. The imputation, of course, was that those few—Marlborough had taken care that his own name should be on the list—had sinned past forgiveness; but it also ensured that Danby and Nottingham would use their influence against him rather than for him. Sunderland also was on the list, even as he had been on the list of exceptions to the Act of Grace. But if the list damaged his cause by including and so alienating some who might have been wellwishers, it did so still more by not naming others who at once felt it incumbent upon them to give much more strenuous demonstrations of their loyalty to William than would otherwise have seemed to them needful. Such were Halifax and Shrewsbury, Godolphin who had reappeared in the ministerial circle, and Admiral Russell. The proclamation was most useful to the government, of which as usual Mary was left in control. They published it broadcast with comments. As for Russell, however he may have played with treason, he felt his professional reputa-

tion at stake and was quite determined to fight as vigorously as if his loyalty had never been shaken. The naval situation, too, had changed since the battle of Beachy Head. Popular indignation had given to the naval administration the vigour which was all that it needed to restore the fleet to full efficiency. There had been no corresponding increase of activity in the development of the French navy. When Tourville took the seas, Russell was already in command of an Anglo-Dutch fleet very much stronger than Tourville's Brest fleet which had not yet been joined by the squadron from Toulon.

Tourville had positive orders to fight, and in spite of the odds he engaged. Having fought creditably enough, though with no chance of success, the French ships retreated during the night with the British in pursuit. Half of them escaped in safety to St. Malo. The rest were run ashore at Cap La Hogue, where they were burnt to the water's edge, either by their own crews or by a flotilla of boats commanded by Sir George Rooke, under the eyes of James himself. Viewed by itself the disaster of La Hogue was not of an altogether overwhelming character. Fifteen ships of the line were lost, but the English had probably lost at least a dozen at the battle of Beachy Head two years before. La Hogue was actually decisive because there was not on the part of the French any vigorous effort at recuperation. The fleet was not destroyed, as it was to show even during the next year. But it had become definitely the inferior fleet, and it retrograded steadily while the English fleet progressed steadily. Consequently the decisive supremacy of British fleets dates legitimately from the victory of La Hogue.

The naval victory was not followed up at the time in any effective manner, though it had entirely put an end to any chance of an invasion. William's land campaign was again of an indecisive character, though again the advantage lay with the French. William was too late to save Namur from being captured; and not long afterwards he was outmanœuvred and suffered a defeat at the battle of Steinkirk, though his retreat was so skilfully conducted that the French commander Luxembourg practically gained nothing. In England there was much

annoyance because the English regiments at Steinkirk under a Dutch commander had fought splendidly, but were held to have been needlessly sacrificed. Also the failure to follow up La Hogue by any striking achievement was a source of displeasure.

There was, therefore, a much greater display of ill-humour in the session of parliament during the winter of 1692-3. Russell and Nottingham were quarrelling, each blaming the other for the misdirection of naval affairs. The Commons very nearly succeeded in carrying a bill for excluding office-holders from membership of the House. The Lords rejected the bill by only three votes. Both Houses, on the initiative of the Whigs, passed a bill limiting the duration of parliament to three years, though the king felt himself strong enough to veto it. For, in fact, both the Houses were aware that there could be no relaxation in carrying on the war, and so long as that was the case William could exercise in security a prerogative which had never been questioned. The session is, however, especially notable for the financial measures adopted to meet the heavy strain; measures to which we shall revert in detail at a later stage. Here it will suffice to say that one was a fresh assessment of the land tax which was soon to be the principal source of revenue, and the second was the beginning of that system of borrowing by the government out of which developed the National Debt.

The quarrel between Nottingham and Russell reached such a pitch that the retirement of one or the other became imperative; and William would not part with Nottingham. The Tory Killigrew took Russell's place at the head of the navy. Again William's campaign was successful only in the sense that he was able to prevent it from being actually disastrous. Although he was defeated in a hard-fought battle at Neerwinden or Landen, he was again able to prevent the French from gaining any material advantage. But worse than the land campaign was a maritime disaster. A great fleet of English and Dutch merchant ships sailed for the Levant, under the convoy of a war fleet which accompanied them till they were clear of Brest. Assuming that Tourville's fleet was

1692-3.
Parliament
restive.

1693.
Landen and
the Smyrna
fleet.

safe in Brest, Killigrew sent the merchantmen on, guarded only by a small squadron under Rooke's command. Tourville, as a matter of fact, and as Killigrew ought to have known, had left Brest with a considerable fleet, sailed to the Mediterranean and united with the Toulon fleet. Consequently, Rooke suddenly found himself and his convoy face to face with the whole French fleet. To fight was hopeless, and the squadron ran for Madeira, leaving the merchant fleet to its fate. Most of the ships were either captured or sunk. The French secured large spoils, and a very heavy loss was inflicted upon the Dutch and English commercial community. Nor did the English admirals make any attempt to redeem the discredit which had fallen upon them.

So when William returned in the autumn he dismissed Killigrew and reinstated Russell, in whom the country had confidence.

**Beginning
of party
ministries.**

The reinstatement of Russell involved the resignation of Nottingham, whose place was taken by Shrewsbury, in spite of his more than dubious conduct in the past. William realised that in the critical state of affairs it had become necessary to have a council who could work harmoniously together, and little as he liked doing so he now filled nearly all the ministerial posts with members of the Whig party; Danby and Godolphin alone of the Tories remaining. In so doing, he is said to have been guided by the advice of Sunderland, who had returned to England and won the king's personal favour, though his own past political record made it impossible for him to occupy any prominent political position. This was the initiation of party and cabinet government, the placing of the administration in the hands of a group chosen from the party dominant in parliament. There was no recognition of a new principle; the measure was simply one of convenience at the time, adopted to ensure harmonious working at a moment when harmony in the administration was a necessity. William always wished to choose his ministers independently of party. When the crisis of the war was over he reverted to the previous practice which custom preserved till some years after Anne's accession. Nevertheless, scarcely a dozen years had passed after the constitution of the first party cabinet at the end

of 1693 before Anne had a cabinet almost exclusively Whig, and from that time forward cabinet and party government may be said to have been permanently established.

The cabinet reconstruction effected its purpose. The Commons allowed a Triennial Bill to be defeated, and only grumbled when William himself vetoed another 'Place Bill.' The Whigs created the Bank of England, a corporation which became of signal political service to them, and though the Tories reduced the amount of the vote for the increase of the army, the numbers voted were still respectable. The place bills illustrate the difference in the position of ministers from that to which we are accustomed. Government through a party cabinet has automatically produced the feeling that ministers are appointed by parliament to control the Crown and conduct the administration in accordance with parliament's wishes. But at the end of the seventeenth century the ministers were in fact and in theory appointed to carry out the will of the Crown, by the king's own free choice; and parliament regarded them as the king's representatives, whose presence in parliament tended to give the Crown a direct influence in the assembly of which it was extremely jealous. Hence there were repeated attempts, steadily resisted by William, to exclude ministers from the House of Commons, for the same reason which led the Scots to fight against the presence of a ministerial group in the Committee of Articles.

The land campaign of 1694 was uneventful. There was much manœuvring and not much fighting. The balance, in fact, was turning against France, for the single reason that the strain upon her resources, great as they were, was more exhausting than that upon the allies. It was beginning to be apparent that the ultimate victory would rest with the treasuries which could hold out longest.

The naval record, however, marks an epoch. It had become a primary object with Louis to dominate Spain, the enemy on his rear, by the capture of Barcelona. The French fleet, concentrated in the Mediterranean, commanded the waterways and made the attack upon Barcelona practicable. William had hitherto generally

1694.

The Place Bill.

The War.

The command of the Mediterranean.

acted on the idea that the main use of the fleet was to threaten perpetual descents on the French sea-board, and so to keep large numbers of French troops constantly locked up in guarding various points on the coast—one of the uses of a fleet which we shall again find in active operation during the Seven Years' War. In pursuance of this plan, an attack upon Brest was designed; but in order to intercept the French operations in Catalonia the main fleet was dispatched to the Mediterranean under Russell. The attack upon Brest failed disastrously; there is little room to doubt that warnings from Marlborough had enabled the French to anticipate the plan of assault. Talmash, the commander, whose military reputation at the time rivalled that of Marlborough, was killed. But the appearance of Russell's fleet in the Mediterranean drove the French fleet back into Toulon, since Tourville did not venture to engage him. The intended operations in Catalonia were completely foiled; William at once realised the immense strategical value of an English control of the Mediterranean, and very much to the disgust of Russell, the king, instead of withdrawing the fleet, insisted that it was to remain at Cadiz for the winter. So long as the English fleet controlled the Mediterranean it was evident that French activity in Spain was paralysed; and for the present it was possible for English fleets to remain there because the Spanish ports were open to them.

When parliament met in the autumn the prospects of the war were better than they had ever been before, and William's popularity was proportionately raised. The Tonnage and Poundage Bill, originally granted for four years, was renewed, although an interval of a day was carefully interpolated between the operation of the old and the new Acts, in order to emphasise the fact that the renewal was not made as a matter of right. William marked the harmony now prevailing by assenting to a Triennial Bill which required the dissolution of a parliament at the end of three years, although it did not interfere with the royal prerogative of an earlier dissolution at the king's pleasure; and parliament responded to the king's complaisance by itself rejecting a Place Bill. Later

**Harmony
with
parliament.**

in the season an attack made upon Danby, now duke of Leeds, for alleged corruption in connection with the East India Company, caused his final retirement, although the case against him could not be actually proved; and for practical purposes the cabinet was now exclusively Whig.

In the last days of December, however, the king and the country suffered a very grave loss through the death of Queen Mary from smallpox. She had not only been an admirable con-

**Death of
Mary,
December.**

sort, personally popular, but wise and tactful in the conduct of administration during William's absences. While she was queen, with every apparent prospect of surviving her husband, legitimists had found it comparatively easy to reconcile their consciences to the Revolution. But when she was dead, there was no longer any possibility of pretending that the king was king by anything except parliamentary title. Fortunately the Princess Anne was content to wait her turn; but by the death of Queen Mary a curb upon active Jacobitism had been removed, and the effect was soon to be felt in the multiplication of Jacobite conspiracies. Only in one way could William have done something to provide against the dangers of the new situation—by admitting Anne to some share of political power; but this William could not venture to do so long as she was under the influence of Marlborough, in whom it was impossible to trust. There was indeed a reconciliation between the king and his sister-in-law, but no change was made in the political position either of Anne or of Marlborough. From this time, whenever William was out of England, the administration was placed in the hands of a group of lords justices who were required to refer all questions of first-rate importance to the king himself.

The war, however, in 1695 went well. In the south France was paralysed by the English control of the Mediterranean; in the northern waters she had no fleet to act. On land the death of Luxembourg deprived her of her ablest commander, whose place was very inefficiently taken by Villeroy. The great war minister, Louvois, was also dead, and his place was even more inefficiently occupied by his

**1695.
A successful
campaign.**

son. William's campaign for the first time in his career was one of actual triumph, since he succeeded in capturing Namur, which was regarded as the key fortress of the Netherlands. He was already bound to the Whigs more closely than before by the fact that he was now reigning on the basis of a purely Whig theory of the constitution. The capture of Namur gave him an unprecedented popularity in the country at large.

On his return to England he seized the opportunity to dissolve the parliament and summon a new one in which the Whigs had **A new Whig** a considerably increased preponderance. **parliament.** Ample supplies were voted, and the ministers ventured to take up the extremely prickly question of currency reform which involved the calling in of the entire currency and the issue of a new coinage. National stability and the national prosperity were emphatically demonstrated by the comparative ease with which this great reform was carried through. Nevertheless the Whigs now felt themselves in a position to demand a more marked recognition of their principles than they had attempted since their rebuff at the beginning of 1690. They compelled William to revoke the large grant of Crown lands which he had made to his favourite, the Dutchman Bentinck, whom he had made duke of Portland, on the ground that the Crown could not afford to curtail its private revenues. Their success encouraged them to demand a Treasons Bill, to prevent such malversations of justice as the condemnation of Algernon Sidney after the Rye House Plot, by requiring positive evidence of two witnesses. In the abstract, the justice of the bill was evident ; but at this particular time, William had good enough reason for objecting to anything which would weaken the power of the Crown in striking against conspiracy. He could not, however, venture to refuse his assent ; and the bill became law (January 1696).

Even at this moment the revival of Jacobite hopes was signalled by what is known as Barclay's plot. What may be **1696.** called a legitimate Jacobite design was formed, for **Barclay's** an invasion of England by French troops, a plan **plot.** which seemed to be rendered practicable by the absence of the main English fleet in the Mediterranean. The

young duke of Berwick, an illegitimate son of James by Arabella Churchill, Marlborough's sister, was sent over secretly to concert measures with the English Jacobites. The plot fell through, because the French required an English rising as the first step, preliminary to the actual invasion, whereas the English insisted that the invasion was a necessary preliminary to the rising.

But onto this scheme had been grafted an unauthorised plan which recalls the plots of Queen Elizabeth's reign, for the assassination of William when hunting at Richmond. This was the device of one of the Jacobite agents, Sir George Barclay, who gave a liberal interpretation to the instructions he had received from James; who pretty certainly had not intended to authorise assassination, though there is some presumption that he knew of the scheme before it was intended to put it into execution, and did not feel called upon to forbid it. Information of the plot was carried to Portland, and some of the conspirators were arrested. William, however, carefully abstained from pushing inquiries. Only those who were palpably connected with the plan of assassination were punished; the mere fact that many suspected persons were allowed to go free caused them to be suspected in their turn by their fellow-conspirators. After the detection of the plot neither a rising nor an invasion was possible. The whole affair had the usual effect of such plots in England, of arousing an intense popular resentment and a temporary fervour of loyalty to William. As in Elizabeth's days, an 'association' was formed for the protection of William's person as the only lawful king, to which only the most extreme adherents of Tory principles ventured to refuse their adhesion—thereby precluding themselves from all civil and military offices, and from the House of Commons.

The plot had one unfortunate effect upon the war. The threat of invasion created a demand for the return of the fleet from the Mediterranean. Its recall set free the French fleet; **An unlucky by-product.** the release of the French fleet not only reopened the French attack in Spain but transferred the duke of Savoy from the side of the allies to the side of the French king; and

the adhesion of Savoy enabled Louis by the beginning of the autumn to procure from the emperor and the king of Spain a suspension of hostilities in Italy which set free a mass of troops for operations in other quarters. In the Netherlands, however, no progress was made by either side; by the French because of the actual exhaustion of the treasury, by William because the operations in connection with the recoinage had temporarily locked up the supply of ready cash which he needed.

Meanwhile one of the Jacobite prisoners, Sir John Fenwick, while waiting trial on the charge of treason, gave information as to the past intrigues with St. Germain of sundry notable persons including Shrewsbury, Russell, Godolphin, and Marlborough. The information was no news to William, who proposed simply to ignore it. Shrewsbury, however, was so ashamed of his position that he went into retirement; and Godolphin's resignation removed the last Tory element from the administration. Both the Whigs and the king were much incensed against Fenwick, and their indignation was the greater when it was found that one of the two necessary witnesses against him had disappeared after the finding of a true bill by the Grand Jury. When it seemed certain that Fenwick would escape, the Whigs took the indefensible step of introducing a Bill of Attainder, which was passed by the Houses and sanctioned by the king. There was, in fact, no shadow of doubt that Fenwick had been guilty of treason, but there was no excuse for overriding the law by a special Act. The Long Parliament in 1640 overrode the law and struck down Strafford; but it had at least the excuse that in its eyes Strafford's life was a menace to the state. No one could pretend that Fenwick's life was of any material public importance.

Fenwick was attainted in the 1696-7 session of parliament, which showed itself as ready as any of its predecessors to provide the means for carrying on war. It was generally known that all the combatants were eager for peace, but William emphasised the necessity for a display of force to make peace negotiations effective. When the

1697.

**Advance of
the Whigs.**

session came to an end the Whig leaders had their reward. Somers, their great lawyer, and Montague, the financier who invented the National Debt and the Bank of England, were definitely associated with Russell, who became earl of Orford, as the Whig leaders. The fourth member of the group was Wharton, but public opinion was very ill-satisfied when Sunderland was at last publicly admitted to the ministry.

Peace negotiations were, in fact, already progressing, but without any formal suspension of hostilities. Since Savoy had changed sides and the English fleet had been withdrawn from the Mediterranean, France was emphatically in a stronger position. The capture of Barcelona gave Louis a further advantage. But both William and Louis were now personally eager for peace. The former did not wish to see Louis driven to the wall, while the French king was extremely anxious for a settlement with William on the approaching question of the Spanish succession. It was practically between them that the terms were settled to which the emperor and the king of Spain were obliged to accede. Nor can it be said that in the circumstances too much was conceded to France. The Treaty of Ryswick was signed by France on the one side, and by England, Holland, and Spain on the other, in September, and by the emperor six weeks later. In effect France gave up everything that she had taken from Spain since the Treaty of Nimeguen. Louis restored Orange to William, recognised him as king of England, and undertook to give no assistance to any one without exception who should make attempt against his throne. The conspicuous conclusion was that the adhesion of England to the Grand Alliance had turned the scale against France—that France was rather more than a match for the other powers without her, and rather less than a match for them with her. It is also to be observed from the English point of view that William conducted the negotiations and carried them through on his own account without reference to his English ministers.

**The Peace
of Ryswick,
September.**

IV. THE APPROACHING STRUGGLE, 1697-1702

The Peace of Ryswick was popular in England, but for reasons which did not commend themselves to William. While the war was going on he had received continuous and solid support; now that it was over, the country considered that the time had come for retrenchment, and the reduction of the standing army which it abhorred; whereas William was extremely well aware that a European question of first-rate importance was coming to the front, for dealing with which it remained as necessary as ever that the maritime powers should be conspicuously prepared to back their diplomacy by force. William had not taken his English ministers into his confidence; his real partner in these affairs was Heinsius, the grand pensionary of Holland, and his diplomatic agents were not Englishmen, but the foreign companions whom he trusted, such as Bentinck, duke of Portland, and Ruvigny, earl of Galway. The Englishmen consequently had very little understanding of the situation. Both Whigs and Tories, too, were annoyed by William's reliance upon Sunderland.

The result was that the popular hostility to the existence of a standing army so reduced the vote for its maintenance that outside of Ireland and Scotland the military establishment was brought down to 10,000 men. The Whigs indeed showed that they were not disloyal; their attitude on this question merely sprang from their ignorance of the king's motives. But when, after the prorogation in 1698, William again hurried off to Holland, although there was no campaign which required his presence, popular irritation against him increased. During his absence there was a general election, necessitated by the Triennial Act, and it was evident that the opposition in the House of Commons would be greatly strengthened thereby. The king himself was engaged in negotiating with Louis a Partition Treaty for the distribution of the Spanish dominion upon the death of the reigning king, Charles II. When it was settled, the English ministers were in effect called upon to authorise its signature

1697.

**The king's
position
weakened.**

1698.

**Growing
strength
of the
Opposition.**

without being informed of more than a bare outline of its provisions. They did so, but the proceedings did not tend to improve relations between them and the king.

When the new parliament met, it did not know of the treaty, but believed that another solution of the Spanish succession question had been arrived at, very much more to its taste. It was not angry, therefore, but captious, and displayed its temper by a further reduction of the army to 7000 men, accompanied by the demand that officers and soldiers should all be natural-born Englishmen; which meant that the king was to dismiss the Dutch Guards and the Dutch generals and other officers whom he trusted. William was so disgusted that he was on the verge of resigning the crown; but he could not afford a rupture with England, and submitted, on procuring only a modification which permitted the services of naturalised as well as natural-born Englishmen. The Commons insisted on a commission to inquire into the grants made of confiscated lands in Ireland; the king, having in spite of a promise to the contrary, made large grants to his Dutch entourage without making any reference to parliament. The Tory predominance was also displayed in attacks upon Russell and Montague. When William, as usual, left England at the close of the session, the obviously strained relations between Crown and parliament greatly increased his diplomatic difficulties.

What those difficulties were we have now to examine. The Spanish dominion included, besides Spain itself and the American colonies, the Netherlands, Naples and Sicily, Milan, and other Italian territories. King Charles was childless, and his two sisters had married respectively Louis xiv. and the Emperor Leopold. Who then was to inherit the Spanish dominion?

On the face of things Maria Theresa, the wife of Louis xiv., as the eldest sister, would hold the first claim on her brother Charles's death, passing it on to her offspring. But before she married Louis, there had been a formal renunciation on her part, though a conditional one, of her rights in regard to the Spanish inheritance. Next to her,

**A captured
new
parliament.**

**The Spanish
Succession
problem.**

**Hapsburg
and Bourbon
claims.**

a claim would lie through her sister Margaret who had married the Emperor Leopold; but in this case also a renunciation of a kind had been made. If the claims through both these sisters, claims which passed not to their husbands but to their own offspring, were to be set aside, the next claim lay with the Emperor Leopold himself, because his mother was the sister of the last king of Spain, Philip IV., and she certainly had never made any renunciation at all. To complicate further an affair already complicated enough, Margaret had borne to Leopold no son but a daughter, to whom her claim descended. On the marriage of this daughter, Maria Antonia, to Max Emmanuel of Bavaria, was made that 'renunciation of a kind' referred to above. For, after Margaret's death Leopold had married a second wife, Eleanor of Neuburg, and by her he had two sons, Joseph and Charles. Whatever rights Leopold possessed in his own person descended to his son by Eleanor of Neuburg, not to his daughter by Margaret of Spain. On the understanding that the Netherlands were in due course to come to her and her children, Maria Antonia undertook to waive her claim to the Spanish inheritance in favour of her half-brothers, the bargain being struck between her husband and her father. If, then, Maria Theresa's renunciation was valid, the legal title to the Spanish inheritance lay either with Leopold and after him with his sons, or with the children of Maria Antonia. On the other hand, if Maria Theresa's renunciation was not valid, the whole Spanish inheritance was legally hers.

But, again, whatever the technical legal title might be, wherever it might lie, Europe at large could not afford to let **Balance of power.** the whole Spanish dominion be appended either to France or to the dominion of Austria. There was indeed one tolerably obvious solution. There was a child of the Bavarian marriage, the electoral prince. The succession of the electoral prince to the Spanish dominion would not attach it too closely either to France or to Austria. That, on the other hand, was a solution which was not likely to satisfy either Louis or Leopold. Louis had a quite reasonable case for declaring that his wife's renunciation was invalid, since it had been part of an

agreement in which the corresponding clause involving the payment by Spain of a substantial dowry had never been carried out. Louis might be willing to compromise this claim, but he could hardly be expected to withdraw empty-handed. The same might be said for Leopold, who had assented to the Bavarian marriage only in view of the undertaking that his daughter would not maintain her claim to the whole inheritance. This, then, was the position of affairs at the moment of the Treaty of Ryswick. It was imperative, therefore, that the question should be settled, and settled by agreement, before the death of the king of Spain.

This, then, was the problem on which William was engaged in the spring of 1698 when his parliament was occupied with the reduction of the military establishment. It was Louis who had taken the first steps to promote a settlement. He approached William, knowing that if he could come to an agreement with the king of England, which would, as a matter of course, include Holland, the empire was not likely to offer armed opposition. His proposals were skilfully moderate. The electoral prince of Bavaria, as the candidate whose selection would least disturb the balance of power, was to be recognised as the inheritor of the lion's share; Leopold and Louis were each of them to receive a substantial compensation for withdrawing their larger claims. The maritime powers were to have security that they should not suffer by the arrangement. William finally agreed that France should have her compensation in Naples and Sicily with some Italian ports, whilst the Archduke Charles, the second son of the emperor, was to have Milan. The whole of the rest was to go to the electoral prince. It was further agreed that the elector of Bavaria should act as regent for his son, a child of five, and should be his successor should the child die without growing up and leaving offspring. It is true that the Spanish king and council recognised the electoral prince as the heir to the whole; but it appeared to Louis and to William that both the elector and the emperor would prefer to accede to the Partition Treaty; the emperor because he got something instead of nothing, the

**First
Partition
Treaty.**

elector because, according to the Spanish pronouncement, he would neither be the regent for nor successor to his son.

The Partition Treaty was known in England only to the king's confidential ministers, and not even to them in its entirety. The

1699. public at large took it as settled that the whole of
The Second the Spanish succession was to go to the electoral
Partition prince, which seemed highly satisfactory. But
Treaty. within a few months the death of the little electoral

prince in January 1699 destroyed the whole elaborate structure of the Partition Treaty. A fresh partition must be settled without delay. And William's personal difficulties in negotiating were now very much increased by his obviously strained relations with a parliament in which the Tories were predominant. Leopold, on the other hand, was likely to prove less amenable, because he had just brought a contest with the Turks to a successful conclusion. The negotiations were renewed between William and Louis. The latter promptly repudiated the suggestion of the former that the elector of Bavaria should be recognised in place of his son. Louis claimed that there could now only be a simple partition between the Hapsburg and the Bourbon. If either insisted on a title to the whole there must be war. The disappointed elector of Bavaria might have the Netherlands, and France would resign her claims on Spain and the Indies if Milan as well as Sicily and the rest of the Italian possessions were ceded to her. Spain and the Indies might go to the Archduke Charles, since the Peninsula would be effectively severed from Austria. Louis, if desired, would then exchange Milan for Lorraine. William insisted that the Netherlands must go not to Bavaria but to the archduke, on the ground that Bavaria was not strong enough to protect them. Louis agreed, but would make no further concession. It remained to approach the emperor and persuade him to accept the scheme. Leopold, however, refused his assent, and there was much indignation in Spain at the proposal for partitioning the Spanish empire without consulting Spain herself. The treaty, however, was signed on behalf of France, Holland, and England in March 1700.

Meanwhile, relations in England were becoming more strained than ever. When the parliament met in November 1699, it was evident to Montague that the ministry would be unable to control the Houses. He resigned. Both Russell and Sunderland had been obliged to retire a year earlier; the king distrusted Wharton; and the Tories and the Commons made a wholly unwarrantable attack upon Somers. Their confidence in their own strength was signalised by an attack upon William's policy of toleration, though this time they turned, not upon the Protestant Dissenters but upon the Romanists, and in effect extended to them the penal laws which by this time had been passed against their co-religionists in Ireland.

More ominous for the king was the attack following upon the report of the Commission of inquiry into the distribution of the Irish forfeited estates. It was palpable that William had made large grants, contrary to his promise, to persons whose public services had given them no title to such favour. Bills were passed for the resumption of the estates, which were to be vested in trustees who were to sell them. The purchase money was to be appropriated to the payment of public debts, and the balance, if any, was to go to the English exchequer. By a process which came to be known as 'tacking,' which had already been applied in the case of the bill appointing the Commission of inquiry, the Resumption Bill was made part of a money bill, which could only be accepted without amendment or rejected in its entirety by the House of Lords, in accordance with the principle laid down during the reign of Charles II. Nevertheless, the Lords proposed amendments. The Commons refused to consider them, as being unconstitutional. To reject the money bill was impossible, and the Lords gave way. The bill was passed. When the Commons, after a proposal to impeach Somers had been rejected, proceeded to vote an address that none but natural-born subjects of the Crown should be admitted to the king's council, William prorogued the parliament—within a month of the signing of the Second Partition Treaty.

**The Whig
ministry
tottering.**

**1700.
Attacks on
the king.**

The lords justices whom William left behind on his departure for Holland at midsummer were a dangerously weak body, among whom Marlborough was the only prominent man. Since the death of Queen Mary, the earl had come to the conclusion that Anne was certain of the succession and could bide her time; and when he was no longer suspected of dangerous intrigues, he was re-admitted to William's favour, though he hardly commanded public confidence. The situation, too, became more complicated when the young duke of Gloucester, the only one of Anne's many children who had survived infancy, died in July. Anne was already recognised by statute as William's successor, but nothing had been done to fix the succession after her.

Abroad, Leopold still refused his adhesion to the Partition Treaty. He hoped that the king of Spain, whose death was **Leopold and the treaty.** evidently near at hand, and who was vehemently opposed, as was the whole of Spain, to any partition whatever, would recognise the Hapsburg succession; and that in that event he could at any rate get better terms than those offered by the Partition Treaty. If, on the other hand, Charles should recognise the Bourbon succession, Louis was, in the first place, pledged not to accept it, and, in the second place, Leopold counted that the maritime powers would still support him substantially. But anti-Hapsburg influences prevailed with King Charles. The Spaniards were equally determined that the empire should not be divided, and that it should remain separate from both the Spanish and the Austrian monarchies. **The will and the death of Charles II. November.** Charles made a will in which he had declared that the heir of Spain was not the Dauphin, nor his eldest son Louis of Burgundy, but his second son Philip, duke of Anjou. Philip was to inherit the whole. If it should so befall that he ultimately inherited the crown of France, the Spanish crown was to pass to his younger brother the duke of Berri. If the crown of France should pass to him, then the crown of Spain was to go to the Archduke Charles, and, failing the Archduke Charles, to the duke of Savoy. If the Bourbon princes should refuse the complete inheritance, then the complete inheritance was to go to the Hapsburg prince.

Having signed the will, King Charles died, and the will was made public at the beginning of November.

William assumed that Louis would keep faith and stand by the Partition Treaty; Leopold could hardly stand out against him in the face of the combination of France with the maritime powers. But William was wrong. The prize was too tempting for Louis, who tore up the Partition Treaty and announced his acceptance of the will on behalf of his grandson Philip. It is extremely unlikely that this was the consummation to which his previous policy had been directed. Almost to the last moment the presumption was that if Charles made a will he would name the Hapsburg rather than the Bourbon his heir. Also until the last moment the presumption had been that all Europe would unite in arms to forbid the passing of the entire Spanish empire to a Bourbon. We may acquit Louis of having entered upon the Second Partition Treaty with the deliberate intention of tearing it up. But as matters stood in November the temptation was too strong for him. William, he thought, was paralysed by dissensions with his parliament; it seemed quite likely that the English would acquiesce in the terms of the will, and would not be drawn into a war for the benefit of the Hapsburg. He was under no obligation to Leopold, since Leopold himself rejected the Partition Treaty. Spain would be solidly on his side; and as it happened, he could with tolerable certainty rely on Savoy and on the elector of Bavaria, who was the Dauphin's brother-in-law and was on bad terms with the emperor.

**Louis tears
up the
Partition
Treaty.**

For a time it seemed as if Louis's stroke would be successful. The proclamation of Philip v. was received without opposition throughout the Spanish dominions. William saw his life's work of resistance to French aggression tottering. Even if the crowns of France and Spain were never to be united, the fact remained that two Bourbon princes would share between them all Western Europe, nearly all Italy, and the command of the Western Mediterranean. Possessed of the whole seaboard from the Scheldt to the Adriatic, they would be stronger at sea than the maritime powers, and would dominate the ocean

**The Bourbon
menace.**

as well as Europe. The absorption of Holland would be merely a matter of time. And yet not only were the English blind to the situation, but half the Dutch as well. William found himself faced with the gigantic task of overcoming English and Dutch opposition and persuading the emperor to agree upon a solution which would unite the powers in opposition to France.

It is clear that at the moment William hardly hoped for more than that Austria might win the adhesion of Naples, Sicily, and **William and the Tories.** Milan, and, thus strengthened, might assert her claim in the Netherlands. But also at the moment it was impossible to go to war, and neither England nor Holland in the circumstances had any alternative but to recognise Philip as king of Spain. If the Whigs had been dominant in England William might have hoped to carry them with him at once; but the Tories were dominant, and it was imperative that they should be brought over. Godolphin and other Tories were recalled to office. Parliament was dissolved, perhaps on the chance that there might be some signs of a reaction in his favour, but the new parliament was as Tory as the last. The most that William could do was to conciliate that party in regard to home affairs, and in foreign affairs to avoid all appearance of dictation.

The king met his new parliament in February 1701 with an invitation to devote their attention to the two urgent questions
1701. of providing for the succession after Anne, and of
A new Tory parliament. providing against the dangers that might arise from the Bourbon succession in Spain. The question of the succession gave little trouble. The nearest Protestant heir was quite evidently Sophia, widow of the first and mother of the second elector of Hanover, and granddaughter of James I.; for there were no Protestant descendants of Charles I. except William and Anne. The Tories, however, in fixing the succession on a foreigner, attached thereto the completion of those curtailments of the royal prerogative which found favour with the Whigs, but which they themselves would not have been willing to impose upon a king

ruling by right divine. The judges were thenceforth to be removable only on an address from both Houses of parliament instead of at the king's pleasure. Acceptance of office or emoluments under the Crown was to cancel membership of the House of Commons, though it was not to be a bar to re-election. Then came a series of provisions which were in effect condemnations of William's habitual practice. The sovereign was to be a member of the Church of England. He was not to leave the country without consent of parliament. He was not to go to war for the defence of territories which did not belong to the Crown of England. No foreigners, even if naturalised, were to be admitted to office, to the Privy Council, or to parliament, or to receive grants of lands. The provisions, however, did not apply to William himself, but only to Anne's successors ; and he assented without demur to the Act of Settlement.

The Act itself served as a partial safety-valve for Tory spite. The king's attitude of moderation and self-restraint had a markedly conciliatory effect ; and the Tories were forced to recognise that a reaction of popular sentiment was in progress. From the county of Kent came the Kentish petition, urging the Commons to vote supplies which would enable the king to show his allies that they could count on effective support. The angry Commons declared that the petition was a breach of privilege, and ordered the arrest of the persons who had been commissioned to present it. By so doing they only produced a fresh crop of petitions in a similar sense. The Tories renewed their attacks on Somers, Orford (Russell), and Montague who had now become Viscount Halifax, on account of their share in the Second Partition Treaty. In the form of the impeachment which they brought forward, their virulence overreached itself ; the managers of the impeachment, to which the Lords showed themselves hostile, did not appear on the appointed day. The Lords promptly dismissed the charges. A prorogation at mid-summer suspended the quarrel between the Houses, but by this time it was quite evident that public opinion had veered round, and become definitely hostile to the factious attitude of the Tory majority. The tide was setting in William's favour.

With a strange infatuation, Louis had in the meantime been doing his best to strengthen William's hand. He had announced **The blunders of Louis.** that Philip's acceptance of the Spanish crown did not exclude him from the French succession. On Philip's behalf, French troops occupied the barrier fortresses in the Netherlands, turning out the Dutch garrisons, a proceeding which united the Dutch in antagonism to him. He set about arranging for a French monopoly of the Spanish trade, to the exclusion of Dutch and English. He refused to consider the concession of any compensation whatever to the Hapsburg. Though William had not yet by any means carried England completely with him, it was not very difficult in these circumstances to arrange the terms of a Grand Alliance. England and Holland were not going to war, as Leopold would have liked them to do, in order to give Austria the whole Spanish inheritance. They proposed to demand adequate security for Holland in the barrier fortresses, adequate commercial concessions for the maritime powers, and only adequate compensation for the Hapsburg. Since it was unsafe, as Marlborough pointed out, to leave the Bourbons in Naples and Sicily, making them overwhelmingly predominant in the Mediterranean, the Austrian compensation should include Italy as well as the Netherlands. William had realised that in the circumstances Marlborough was entirely to be trusted, and had chosen him both to command the English troops and to conduct negotiations; a particularly wise measure, since the earl was at this time looked upon as attached to the Tory party and was intimately connected with Godolphin, whose son had married one of his daughters.

At home the balance was beginning to lean in William's favour; but more than that could not be said. It was still extremely **The decisive blunder.** doubtful whether he would get that whole-hearted support which would be needful for carrying the war to a decisive conclusion. Once more Louis came to the rescue. In September, when the powers were signing the Grand Alliance, James II. lay dying at St. Germain. By his deathbed, Louis gave him the fateful promise that he would recognise young James as king of England. The pledges of Ryswick were

forgotten in the impulse to a lordly act of generosity extremely characteristic of the Grand Monarque. The effect was instantaneous. Whigs and Tories alike were fired with wrath at the insolence of the French king who dared to dictate to England on a question which England had decided for herself. Whigs and Tories alike burned to avenge the insult to the national honour. Louis's announcement was to all intents and purposes a declaration of war; he knew it, and followed it up by a movement of troops, threatening the Dutch frontier. The proposals of the Grand Alliance were not even submitted to him.

In November William was back in England, to be greeted by a series of enthusiastically loyal addresses. Without hesitation he dissolved parliament. The Whigs came back **William's** with a smaller accession of strength than had been **victory.** anticipated; the Tories had an actual majority of four, but it was only because they had transformed themselves into a war party hardly less unanimous than the Whigs themselves. William could appeal to both parties to lay aside party differences and show a united front to the world. The Commons responded loyally. They attainted the 'so-called Prince of Wales' for assuming the royal title; they pronounced it treason to take service under him. They imposed a new oath upon members of parliament, office-holders, and others, abjuring 'James III.' They voted supplies, 40,000 men for the army, and the same number for the navy. They resolved that the allies should be called upon to maintain the war until England should receive satisfaction for the insult offered. William's triumph was complete.

He had but a short time left to enjoy it. On 21st February his horse stumbled with him and he was thrown. The injury seemed slight, and it was thought that he would soon recover. But his health was of the feeblest. On the **1702.** ninth day there were feverish symptoms. On 7th **William's** March he knew that he was dying. On the morning **death,** of the 9th he died. But he left behind him in John Churchill, earl of Marlborough, the man whom he had chosen at the last for the carrying out of his task, a diplomatist who was his equal, **9th March.**

and a soldier whose genius far transcended his own ; a man both able and willing to do all and more than all that William could have done to shatter the might of Louis of France.

V. COMMERCE AND THE NEW FINANCE

The reign of William III. is a landmark in our history for more reasons than one. First, and most obviously, the Revolution established permanently the principle of a constitutional monarchy, although it was very far from making the Crown a mere figurehead. William was not one of the kings who 'reign but do not govern.' It was not till the accession of the house of Hanover that the principal direction of affairs passed from the king to ministers who were in actual fact responsible not to the Crown but to parliament. In the second place, it was in William's reign that England was definitely drawn into the vortex of European politics. The accession of the Dutch stadtholder to the throne of England involved the country definitely in that struggle with France which was not terminated until Waterloo, although there were suspensions of hostilities of longer or shorter duration. From 1689 to 1815, England was at war with France for more than sixty-two years out of the hundred and twenty-seven. In the third place, it was during William's reign that England definitely took the place of the First Sea Power, finally distancing both France and Holland. That naval supremacy was to be a decisive factor in the whole series of subsequent wars.

Fourthly, the mercantile ascendancy became as pronounced as the naval ascendancy. France remained behind ; Holland was overtaken and passed. How far this was due to the Navigation Acts of the Commonwealth and the Restoration is a matter of dispute ; it is equally possible to find the explanation in the free hand which English trading companies were allowed as compared with those which were under the artificial control of the French and Dutch governments. The fact remains that the English mercantile marine developed

**Political
character-
istics of
the reign.**

**Its influence
on commerce
and finance.**

tremendously during William's war in spite of the enormous amount of damage wrought by the privateers which issued in numbers from the French ports even while the English navies kept the French navy inactive. Thanks to this development, the English treasury was able to bear the drain of the war very much better than that of any continental power, and even to carry through the troublesome and costly business of recoinage while the war was in progress. And this brings us to the fifth notable characteristic of the reign, the reorganisation of National Finance upon a new system of credit.

On the three first heads enough has already been said in the course of the narrative. It remains to deal with the other two which are intimately connected with each other.

As to commerce, the period is particularly significant in the development of the East India Company. Incidentally, it is to be noted that the establishment

**Commerce:
the East
India
Company.**

of Calcutta as the third and ultimately the greatest of the English trading centres or factories dates from this reign. While James II. was still king, the old factory at Hugli came to an end. The company quarrelled with the powerful Mogul Aurangzib; the English were compelled to evacuate Hugli, and assuredly at that time no one was dreaming of sending to India armies and fleets to attempt the conquest of an empire apparently **In India.** so mighty as that of the Mogul. Nevertheless, the English envoys succeeded in impressing upon Aurangzib that the English traders were a source of wealth to his empire, and that if he pursued the quarrel English ships of war would quite certainly make it impossible for faithful Moslems to make the pilgrimage to Mecca—a practice on which Aurangzib, himself a fanatical Moslem, set great store. Aurangzib was convinced, and in 1690 permitted the company to set up a new factory where Calcutta now stands, some way further down the river than the old factory. In 1695 the company was allowed to place the factory in a state of defence. To this fortified position the name was given of Fort William, in honour of the king of England.

In other respects, too, the company was passing through a serious crisis. We related in an earlier chapter how the inter-

lopers, the 'free-traders,' who wished to trade for themselves, not as the members of a joint stock company, attempted in the time of the Commonwealth to procure the abolition of the company's monopoly, though without success. When William was king, the company was vehemently assailed by interlopers who wished to share or to capture the trade, and by theorists who denounced the trade itself as contrary to the public advantage. As it happened, the company was very much in Tory hands and was a valuable asset for the Tory party. Therefore, the Whigs were the friends of the enemies of the company, and at the same time were much more closely wedded to the economic theory upon which the trade itself was condemned. The orthodox economy of the day held that that trade was bad for the country which carried bullion out of it in exchange for goods. India did not want English products, therefore Indian goods were bought with English bullion. The precious metals were carried out of the country in exchange for goods, whereas what the country wanted was more of the precious metals, more currency for paying its expenses. The apologists of the company, notably Charles Davenant, answered that while it was true that gold and silver went to India in exchange for the goods, the goods themselves were brought to England largely for re-export. From England they went to other countries, where they were exchanged for much more gold and silver than had been paid for them in India. Consequently the Indian trade did, in fact, increase instead of diminishing the supply of the precious metals in England.

The economists of the company defeated their rivals; but the company itself could not defeat its own trade rivals. During their period of ascendancy the Whigs succeeded in procuring a charter for a rival company of interlopers, who were prepared to pay a larger price than the old company for the privileges of a monopoly. But the effect was that while the new company was ruining the trade of the old, it could not step into the other's shoes, and was very soon in danger of itself becoming bankrupt. Fortunately, both sides realised the destructive character of the struggle on which they

**Economic
attacks on
the company.**

**The crisis:
1697-1701.**

were engaged, and at the close of 1701 the two companies were amalgamated under a fresh charter as the Honourable East India Company which, under the conditions of its institution, presently came to be regarded as a Whig rather than a Tory asset. But no later attempt was made to wreck it.

The wealth and strength of the English mercantile community, always convinced that its interests lay in the suppression of competition, enabled it completely to destroy all prospects of commercial progress in Ireland, and very seriously to check that of Scotland. The Navigation Acts closed the English market to goods carried in Scottish or Irish bottoms; English tariffs shut out Scottish and Irish goods which competed with home produce. Irish manufactures or products which might otherwise have competed with the English in foreign markets were suppressed or their export was prohibited; though similar measures could not be taken against the Scots, Scotland being an independent state. The Union of the Crowns had finally cut Scotland off from the privileges of French trade which she enjoyed in the ancient days of the French alliance. The quarrels of the English and Dutch had gone far to spoil her trade with Holland. The only effective form of retaliation in which the Scots could indulge was by means of a very extensive smuggling traffic with the English colonies in North America.

**Scotland,
Ireland,
and
English
commerce.**

Scotland, in short, felt that the union with England, as matters stood, was extremely detrimental to her commercial interests; and that feeling was intensified by the disastrous story of the Darien Scheme. A plan was formed, originating with some Scots in London, notably William Paterson, the real originator of the Bank of England, for the formation of a great company trading to Africa, the Indies, and America, which was to rival the East India Company. Very large privileges were included in the charter, and half the stock was to be appropriated exclusively to residents in Scotland. The Act conveying the charter was sanctioned by the commissioner Tweeddale, without being referred to the king himself, who, at the time, the summer of 1695, was in Flanders. As

**The Darien
Scheme,
1695.**

soon as subscriptions were invited in England the unreserved half of the stock was promptly taken up as well as the Scottish half. But the English parliament had hardly met in November before both Houses were clamouring against the disturbance to English trade which would be effected by the Scottish company. Addresses were presented to William, whose reply manifestly expressed displeasure at the company's proceedings; Tweeddale was deprived of his office as commissioner. The governors of the English colonies were in effect warned to place every possible obstacle in the way of the Scots. The English subscribers took alarm and withdrew; the Scots responded by sinking every penny they could raise in the speculation.

In an evil hour Paterson's plan was adopted for planting a colony on the Isthmus of Darien, in the belief that by holding **Ruin of the scheme.** that position the company would practically command the world's trade; regardless of the fact that the Spaniards looked upon Darien as their property. The scheme was, in fact, doomed to failure; no supplies could be obtained from the English colonies; the Spaniards came down on the settlement; and the whole business ended in a total collapse which had cost Scotland many hundreds of lives and more than a quarter of a million of money—a loss far more serious and inflicting far more suffering than would have been entailed in England by a loss ten times as great. All Scotland attributed the disaster to the hostile action of England, and saw in it a further proof that a king of England and Scotland would inevitably allow the interests of the smaller and poorer kingdom to be completely overridden when they infringed upon those of the larger and richer. The collapse of the Darien Scheme impressed upon nearly all Scots the conviction that the Union under existing conditions was intolerable. William himself was conscious of the reality of the grievance, and was anxious to bring about an incorporating union which would remove it; but it was not till the following reign that, in the face of the pressing danger of a separation of the crowns after the death of Queen Anne, the legislative Union of the countries became an accomplished fact.

The prolonged wars of King William's reign involved a per-

petually increasing national expenditure which the increasing wealth of the country was well able to meet, but not by the old methods. The old taxes upon land and personal property, expressed in the form of 'subsidies,' had been based upon an assessment which was entirely out of date. The subsidy was, so to speak, a unit of taxation drawn from this source. The yield of one subsidy was £70,000, of which the districts and localities into which the country was mapped out each provided its fixed quota. The amount of personal property and the value of land in each district had changed entirely; some were very much poorer than at the time of the original assessment, others were very much richer. Consequently, the taxable capacity of the former reached its limit when the burden was hardly felt in the latter. In 1792 a fresh assessment was made so that the burden might be distributed equally, with the result that a much larger amount could be raised without excessive pressure upon any one. The vanished subsidy was replaced by a land tax of so many shillings in the pound, which became the main source of revenue, the assessment of personal property proving a task too difficult for effective utility. At four shillings in the pound the land tax produced about £2,000,000. This, however, was not sufficient to meet the new demands of national expenditure.

Hitherto the year's expenditure had been met out of the year's revenue; that is, the amount intended to be expended in the year had been voted for the year, money being borrowed pending the collection of the taxes, to be repaid when the taxes came in. The Crown had got itself into debt at various times by borrowing more than the returns would meet, and additional taxation was then required for paying off arrears. But it was already being found in the second half of the seventeenth century that war was a much more costly affair than it had been in the past. The expense of a year or two of war might perhaps be borne with difficulty by spreading the taxation which was to pay for it over a slightly longer period. Charles II. on one occasion cut the knot, disastrously enough, by the Stop of the Exchequer, which had amounted almost to

**The land
tax, 1692.**

**Government
borrowing.**

a repudiation of the government's debt to the goldsmiths. But a government which could play tricks of that kind would soon find itself unable to borrow at all; and when wars went on year after year the annual taxation could by no means meet the annual expenditure.

The method devised by Charles Montague in 1692 to meet this difficulty was the creation of the National Debt. When provision had been made by taxation for so much as was practicable of the anticipated expenditure, the balance was borrowed; but not on a short loan to be repaid out of the next year's taxes. By the first plan adopted in 1692, the lenders were to receive a life annuity in return for a loan, £10 a year for every £100 lent, reduced after a few years to £7. The amount asked for and raised in this year was £1,000,000. Instead of paying back the lump, the government incurred a charge of £100,000 per annum, diminishing with the death of each subscriber to the loan, until it disappeared altogether with the death of the last subscriber. Certain duties were earmarked, and their produce was set aside annually for the payment of the annuities.

The next stage was arrived at when, instead of undertaking to pay annuities in return for the loan, the government did not pledge itself to repayment of the principal, but guaranteed a substantial rate of interest, secured upon earmarked taxes. So long as the government was stable the interest was secure, and the loan was a safe investment. Any one who had acquired government stock, but wished to recover his capital, would readily find purchasers for a stock which brought good interest and could be reckoned absolutely secure. Thus whenever a government should want money to meet an abnormal expenditure, it became possible, within limits, to obtain the amount not by additional taxation but by borrowing; although whenever money was borrowed it involved a permanent charge upon the revenue for interest, except in so far as it might be found practicable to pay off some of the debt out of surplus revenue. The soundness of the security made it increasingly easy to borrow upon terms less favourable

The National Debt, created 1692.

Its extension, 1694.

to the lender ; so that in the course of a couple of centuries the interest came down from 8 per cent. to $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and for the greater part of the period stood at 3 per cent. The government never has, in fact, had difficulty in providing for the interest, in spite of the huge increase of the debt itself, incurred partly through the powerful temptation to every government to meet exceptional outlay by borrowing instead of from revenue, and thus to throw the burden of additional taxation upon future generations, and its unpopularity upon future ministries.

The development which provided annual interest in place of annuities took place in 1694. It was accompanied by the creation of the Bank of England, a scheme suggested by William Paterson. On this occasion the amount of the loan required was £1,200,000. The subscribers of the loan were formed into a banking corporation, whose business was not trading but dealing in bullion and bills of exchange, in lending and borrowing. The bank was debarred from lending money to the Crown except under parliamentary sanction. As the annuities had been secured upon an increase in the beer duties, so the interest of 8 per cent. was now secured upon increased customs duties. Loans made to the government on this system were the 'Funded Debt,' but in addition to these there was soon a very large unsecured or floating debt, which, unlike the funded debt, commanded a very low price in the market.

**The Bank
of England,
created
1694.**

The wealth of the Bank of England made it a formidably powerful corporation. The circumstances of its creation not only placed it in Whig hands, but bound it over completely to the Whig party, or at least to anti-Jacobitism. Indeed, the whole system of the government loans tended to guarantee the solid support of the moneyed interests to the Protestant succession, because it was the general belief that if the Stuarts were restored they would repudiate debts incurred by government largely with the object of preventing their return. The Tories, among whom there was always at least an element favourable to a Stuart restoration, were proportionately antagonistic to the bank ; so also were the gold-

**its political
importance.**

smiths, who had hitherto been the principal lenders, and saw that the new institution would deprive them of that function ; so that on more than one occasion the wrecking of the bank was attempted, though the attempts were successfully foiled.

The establishment of the bank introduced paper money ; that is to say, the directors were authorised to issue bank-notes or **Papermoney**. promises to pay cash on demand which passed into ready circulation as a medium of exchange. A piece of paper which could be exchanged for gold on presentation at the bank was of the same use to its possessor as its equivalent in coins of the realm, so long at least as the bank's promise to pay could be relied upon. At the same time it was sufficient for the bank to have in its cellars gold enough to maintain an adequate margin in excess of the amount of notes that were reasonably likely to be presented at one time.

The bank had hardly been established when two attacks were made upon it. The first was the Tory invention of a rival Land Bank, which found supporters among all the opponents of the **The Land Bank** Bank of England, and especially among landholders **fiasco.** who resented the financial power of the commercial community. The basis of this amazing scheme was the assumption that land worth £100 a year was worth a hundred years' purchase, or £10,000, and could be transmuted into £10,000 in cash. On the security of land whose value was calculated on this basis, the Land Bank was prepared to lend £2,500,000 to the government at 7 per cent. The Bank of England, whose directors knew something about business, were not prepared to outbid the projectors. The formation of the bank was authorised, but the scheme was so palpably absurd that the subscription produced only a few thousands instead of two and a half millions, and the whole thing collapsed.

More dangerous was the move of the goldsmiths. In 1695 the government determined upon the issue of a new currency.

The new coinage, 1695. Since the restoration of the coinage by Elizabeth, no debased coin had been issued from the mint ; but the coin in circulation was liable not only to wear and tear in the course of years, but to actual clipping. It

had not been called in, and the result was that there was now in circulation a vast amount of coin worth infinitely less than its face value. The sound coins were hoarded or went out of the country, since within the country the purchasing power of the inferior coins was the same. In effect the purchasing power of a good shilling was no more than the purchasing power of a shilling which had only sixpennyworth of silver in it. When a nominal shilling was only worth sixpence, a shilling had to be paid for an amount of bread which was worth only sixpennyworth of silver. The cost of living rose in proportion; the money wage consequently rose also, so that the cost of production was further increased; but it did not rise in proportion to the diminished purchasing power of the coin, so that the wage-earner was poorer than before, less able to meet the cost of living. Every one suffered, but the poor most of all.

Montague was bold enough to advocate and carry through a scheme for recalling the whole of the coinage and issuing an entirely new currency, the State paying the cost. When the new unclippable coins were issued the beneficial results were immediately felt. But during the interval in 1696, while the mint was at work on the new coins, and the old coins had ceased to be legal tender, bullion was locked up. The goldsmiths seized their opportunity, bought up all the bank paper they could lay their hands on, and presented the 'promises to pay at sight' at the bank when there was no bullion to pay with. The bank declined to meet the demand, which it treated as a conspiracy; it would only undertake to pay as fast as the mint provided it with the new coin. Supported by the government, the bank weathered the storm; in three months it had in effect cleared its obligations. The recoinage cost the country nearly three millions, but it would have been worth doing at almost any price. The bank was saved, and was permanently established as a solid and invaluable national institution.

**Defeat of the
goldsmiths'
conspiracy.**

CHAPTER II. QUEEN ANNE

I. BLENHEIM, GIBRALTAR, AND RAMILLIES

THE same parliament, in accordance with a provision made at an earlier date in the late king's reign, was authorised to continue for six months of the new reign. The parties in the Commons were evenly balanced, and they continued to show the same loyalty, and readiness to work in concert, as in the hour of William's triumph and death. The alarm caused among the members of the Grand Alliance by the possibility of a change in the English policy, and the satisfaction which Louis must have felt at the removal of his most relentless opponent, were qualified if not altogether removed when it was found that no change of policy was contemplated. There was no thought in any quarter of disturbing Anne's succession ; Anne was almost wholly under the influence of the countess of Marlborough ; and Marlborough's policy was the policy of William.

The formal declaration of war was hardly postponed by the king's death, and the earl was very soon back in Holland to take up the command as captain-general of the forces in the northern area. At home the influence of Rochester, the queen's uncle, gave a considerable majority of the seats in the council to Tories, and the Whigs were but slightly represented ; a dissolution of parliament gave the Tories a solid majority in the Commons when the Houses again assembled. Marlborough, however, was the real head of the government ; Godolphin, whose son was married to one of his daughters, was his ally, and if it may be so expressed, his minister. The association of Marlborough and Godolphin with the Tories was accidental ; they stood before everything else for the war-party. Rochester and Nottingham were at

1702.

The country
parliament
united.

Autumn :
a Tory
parliament
and council.

best reluctant supporters of the war, and therein they differed from the bulk of the Tories ; there was no corresponding division in the Whig ranks ; and it followed that the tendency was for Marlborough and Godolphin to rely increasingly upon the party from which they got a warm and not a lukewarm support.

Marlborough had inherited the main features of his war policy from William, though they were modified on the one hand by his own superb genius, and on the other by the fact **Marlborough.** that he was neither king of England nor stadtholder of Holland. William could conduct a campaign without risk of impeachment in England, or of direct interference from the States-General of the United Provinces. If Marlborough disregarded public opinion in England, he might be attacked and recalled ; and in the field, his command of the Dutch armies was subject to the control of a council of Dutch civilians called field deputies. Hence, in carrying out a far-reaching programme, he was much more hampered than William had been.

At the moment when what we may call Marlborough's war opened, the battle between Austria and France was already in progress. Louis, as we have seen, had captured the very uncertain support of Victor Amadeus, duke of Savoy, whose two daughters were married or betrothed to his own two elder grandsons. Savoy gave him the entry into Italy ; and by the end of 1701 Prince Eugene of Savoy, the Austrian commander, with a relatively small Austrian force, was in North Italy, more than holding his own against the French marshal Villeroy, but in constant danger of being overwhelmed by large French reinforcements. Leopold was half paralysed, partly by the extremely defective military organisation of Austria at the time, and partly by the revolt of Hungary on his rear. **1701. Eugene in Italy.** North Italy was one of the four war areas, which **1702. Marlborough's plans.** were : first, the Spanish Netherlands with the districts lying between the Lower Rhine and the Meuse ; second, the Upper Rhine, where the French held Strasburg ; third, North Italy ; and fourth, Spain, though here as yet the allies had no effective foothold. Between Austria and the French on

the Upper Rhine lay minor German principalities, who were attached to the Grand Alliance; and, much more important than any of the others, Bavaria, which was on the point of openly joining Louis. Marlborough's immediate object was to secure the line of the Meuse, shutting the northern French army into the Spanish Netherlands, and preventing them from making a flank attack upon Holland *via* Cologne; cutting them off from co-operation with the French army on the Upper Rhine, and at the same time opening the way for co-operation between his own army and the Austrians on the Danube. This was the programme on land; but Marlborough had also grasped, as no one else had done, the naval policy of establishing the English supremacy in the Mediterranean, which would cut off France from maritime communication with either Spain or Italy.

By the autumn of 1702 the superior numbers of the French, reinforced by the able general Vendôme, had driven Eugene in **His success.** North Italy back into a defensive position behind **fulcampaign.** the river Adige. In the north Marlborough had still to prove his rank as a great commander; his position had been secured more by William's choice and his wife's influence with Anne than by his own achievements. Hampered by the Dutch field deputies, who had no idea beyond the protection of the Dutch frontier, and were mortally afraid of risking pitched battles, Marlborough nevertheless succeeded by masterly manœuvring, which quite misled the French marshal Boufflers as to his real objective, in capturing the forts on the Meuse from Venloo to Liège. His reputation was enormously raised, and his success was rewarded with a dukedom.

A naval expedition was dispatched to the coast of Spain, having as its primary object the capture of Cadiz, or, failing Cadiz, **Rooke, Cadiz,** of some other port such as Gibraltar. Cadiz had **and Vigo.** almost certainly been fixed upon by William, as being the position securing the entry to the Mediterranean, and menacing the French fleet at Toulon; the capacities of Gibraltar as a port were not yet fully known. The commander of the expedition was Sir George Rooke, who never appreciated the root idea of Mediterranean strategy. He neither liked nor under-

stood his job. He would not work in harmony with the military commander who accompanied him, the duke of Ormonde, and the attack upon Cadiz was a fiasco. He refused to attempt Gibraltar, and was on the point of making his way home again, when the news came that a Spanish treasure fleet had slipped past him to Vigo. Rooke turned upon Vigo; the boom which defended the harbour was broken through, and in a brilliantly fought engagement the escort of warships was destroyed, and the treasure fleet was burnt or sunk; though not till treasure to the value of about a million had been secured. Not much credit attached to Rooke personally for the success, as he was incapacitated by gout when the action took place. Still, in spite of the fiasco at Cadiz, the English had ample reason to congratulate themselves on the results both of the military and of the naval campaign.

The success at Vigo had the further effect of transforming Portugal from a neutral into an ally of the Grand Alliance. And this in its turn was perhaps the deciding factor in 1703. a change of the policy of the Alliance, which was 'Charles III.' adopted in 1703. The allies had entered upon the war with no intention of depriving the Bourbon prince of the crown of Spain; but they now resolved to establish the Archduke Charles as King Charles III.

In 1703 Marlborough's schemes for capturing Antwerp, pushing the French further back, securing the Lower Rhine, and opening communications with the emperor, were 1703. to a great extent foiled by the blunders of Dutch Marlborough's generals and the obstinacy of the Dutch field de- fetters. puties. He secured the Lower Rhine as far south as Bonn, but in the Netherlands themselves the Dutch took alarm, and vetoed the operations he had planned. Eugene was being pushed out of Italy by the superior force of Vendôme. The Bavarian elector definitely joined Louis, and a grand converging attack was planned by the French directed upon Vienna. The French under Villars were to advance from Strasburg and effect a junction with the elector. Vendôme was to clear Eugene out of Italy, and was then to effect a junction with the elector and Villars. The march

to Vienna would be practically open, and its capture would bring the emperor to his knees. The scheme broke down. Villars

Max Emmanuel in the Tyrol. advanced, but the elector turned aside in order to secure for himself the Tyrol which Louis had promised him ; the Tyrolese proved loyal to the emperor, and drove Max Emmanuel out ignominiously. Vendôme did not come, because the duke of Savoy changed sides at the critical moment and rose in his rear, compelling him to return to Italy instead of pursuing Eugene's retreat. Vienna was safe for the time being, happily, since Marlborough could have made no move for its defence.

The fleet and the Mediterranean. It is clear that the duke's desire was to send a powerful fleet into the Mediterranean, with, in his own mind, the ultimate intention of striking at Toulon itself. But Marlborough had not the direction of naval affairs. The fleets were not ready to sail till long after the intended date. The force ultimately dispatched to the Mediterranean was really insufficient to carry out any very great stroke ; there was no one ready to co-operate with it ; and, in fact, it did little beyond preventing the French fleet from emerging out of Toulon to operate on the Spanish coast. In the course of the summer the allies, in accordance with the terms made with the king of Portugal, declared the Archduke Charles king of Spain. Arrangements were made for Rooke to convoy him to Portugal, which was to be the base of this ' Carlist ' campaign, early in the next year.

1704. French plan of a Vienna campaign. In 1704 the crisis arrived. The French plan of campaign in 1703 had revealed the conspicuous danger. That plan, with modifications which rendered it much less complex and more apparently certain of success, was now to be put into operation. The elector of Bavaria with the French troops under Marsin, who had taken the place of Villars, lay at Ulm on the Upper Danube with the road to Vienna open. On the Upper Rhine about Strasburg lay Tallard with 35,000 men. Prince Lewis of Baden was posted on the German side of the Rhine at Stolhofen. According to the plan Tallard was to cover the advance of the army upon Vienna

against any flank attack. Eugene's force which Vendôme had pushed out of Italy was far from being strong enough to prevent the movement. The French army on the Meuse, reinforced by Villeroy, was to give Marlborough and the Dutch sufficient occupation. The Hungarians were to attack Leopold in the rear. Failure seemed almost impossible.

Nevertheless, Marlborough and Eugene, generals who never failed to work in perfect harmony, had devised their counter-stroke. They were to join hands and crush the Franco-Bavarian army. According to Marlborough's scheme there was to be a simultaneous attack upon Toulon by land and sea, by Rooke's fleet and Savoy's army. This diversion, in fact, came to nothing ; but the movement of Marlborough and Eugene developed as the Blenheim campaign.


Marlborough's counter-design.


Secrecy was of the essence of the plan. It was absolutely certain that neither the Dutch nor the parliament in England would permit, if they could possibly prevent, the departure of Marlborough from the Netherlands with his main force. It was necessary for him to make his move before the government suspected what he was doing. His ostensible design was to operate upon the Moselle, on the flank of the French army in the Netherlands. This could be understood by Dutch and English and French as designed for the protection of the United Provinces. Marlborough could work up the Rhine as far as Coblenz without arousing suspicions of his further designs. He had attached to his force sundry German regiments ; but the bulk were British. The Dutch themselves were not to take part in the operations on the Moselle, but were to attend to their own frontiers. It was only at the end of May that the fact became suddenly apparent that the duke was advancing by forced marches from Coblenz in the direction of the Danube. At Mondelsheim he met Eugene and Lewis of Baden, the imperial commander. It was arranged that Eugene should remain at Stollhofen to hold it and keep watch over Tallard. On 11th June (O.S.) Marlborough and the main army of Lewis effected a junction and threatened Ulm, from

The Blenheim campaign ; Donauwörth, June.

The BLENHEIM CAMPAIGN 1704

English Miles
0 10 20 30 40 50 100

French territory shaded thus: 



which the French and Bavarians fell back to Augsburg. Marlborough's objective was Donauwörth on the Danube, by seizing which he could interpose between the French and Vienna. Although he was much hampered by the stolidity of his fellow commander Lewis, Marlborough succeeded in forcing the Schellenberg lines which covered Donauwörth after some very hard fighting on 21st June. The elector entrenched himself at Augsburg, awaiting reinforcements, while Marlborough ravaged Bavaria and prepared to besiege Ingolstadt.

The news of Schellenberg set Tallard in motion to join the elector, marching by the south bank of the Danube, while Eugene made a parallel movement from Stollhofen on the north side. At the moment when Tallard effected his junction at Augsburg on 26th July, Eugene reached Hochstadt. Marlborough and Eugene then succeeded in getting rid of Lewis by dispatching him with a detachment to the siege of Ingolstadt. On 1st August Eugene and the duke had concentrated close to Donauwörth, while the French advancing from Augsburg also crossed to the north side of the Danube, and took up a position on the west of the marshy stream called the Nebel, between the villages of Lutzingen and Blenheim, with Oberglau in the centre, intending not to give battle but to cut off Marlborough's supplies.

**Junction of
Marlborough
and Eugene,
July.**

Marlborough and Eugene, however, resolved to force an engagement. Starting before dawn the allies moved forwards; by eight o'clock the French discovered that the allied forces were facing them with the Nebel between. Tallard with the French right held the ground from Blenheim to Oberglau. Marsin in the centre and the elector of Bavaria on the left stretched from Oberglau to Lutzingen. Eugene took the command of the allied right, who were to hold the French left in play. Contrary to custom the cavalry of both armies was massed in the centre. Midday, however, was passed before the armies were ready to engage. The elector succeeded in holding back Eugene's attack on the French left; on their right Marlborough's infantry made a series of furious attacks on the strong position at Blenheim under

**Battle of
Blenheim,
2nd August
1704.**

the command of 'Salamander' Cutts, while Marlborough was performing the difficult operation of carrying his cavalry, with some infantry to cover them, across the Nebel on the centre. Then by fierce cavalry charges he shattered the French centre, while Eugene pressed his attack on their left; and Marlborough was able to sweep up the French right. Vast numbers were driven into the Danube, cut to pieces, or taken prisoners; only a few escaped. The elector retreated or fled to the Rhine. The grand army which was to have marched to Vienna was virtually annihilated. Bavaria was lost, and for the rest of the war the French were shut behind the Rhine. In a few weeks the triumphant Marlborough was back in the Netherlands, leaving Eugene to take up the extremely difficult task of reorganising the Austrian army. The victory of Blenheim had entirely altered the character of the war (2nd August, O.S.; 13th August, N.S.).

Rooke, after taking the Archduke Charles, or King Charles III. as he was called, to Lisbon in February, received his open and his secret instructions. His business was to maintain a strong fleet in the Mediterranean, to prevent the French from capturing Nice, the port of Savoy, to engage and destroy the French fleet if opportunity offered, and incidentally to operate on the Spanish coast within the Straits, in the interests of the land campaigning, which would develop from the arrival of Charles in the Peninsula. The secret instructions gave him Toulon as the real objective. Sir Cloudesley Shovell, the commander of the Channel Fleet, was, if in time, to prevent the Brest fleet from getting to sea and joining the Toulon fleet; and, if it had already put out, was to pursue it.

The Toulon scheme was made abortive, because the duke of Savoy refused to move, choosing to remain on the defensive against the French army in North Italy. When Shovell approached Brest he found that the French fleet already had a long start of him. They got into the Mediterranean, and by faster sailing escaped Rooke, who vainly attempted to engage them, and made their way to Toulon. Rooke and Shovell, however, effected a junction at Cape St. Mary, after which they

1704.
The fleet in
the Mediter-
ranean.

proposed entering the Straits and seeking an opportunity for bringing the whole French fleet to action. In accordance with their instructions, however, they were prepared to operate on the Spanish coast on behalf of the allied kings of Spain and Portugal. They would not attack Cadiz, as was suggested, because the king could not give them the necessary co-operation by land ; but the opportunity for seizing Gibraltar presented itself. The place was weakly garrisoned and weakly fortified. Rooke prepared to overwhelm it, summoned it to surrender in the name of King Charles on 21st July, and, being defied, bombarded it for six hours on the following day, and captured it. Only a small garrison could be left to make the best of the position whose inadequate fortifications had already suffered severely by the bombardment. The French fleet came out from Toulon under Admiral Toulouse, hoping to recover it. On 13th August the two fleets met and fought each other off Malaga. Both were badly battered and both claimed the victory, but Toulouse went back to Toulon.

**Capture of
Gibraltar,
21st July.**

From that moment the effective command of the Mediterranean lay with the allies. But if Gibraltar had been won by the English for King Charles, it is tolerably clear that from the time of its capture England intended to retain it for herself. From that day to this Gibraltar has remained in British hands ; and though during the autumn and winter great efforts were made to dispossess the English garrison which was commanded by the gallant and able prince Henry of Hesse-Darmstadt, the most dangerous of them was foiled by the timely arrival of Admiral Leake's squadron. A key to the Mediterranean was secured ; and the abandonment of Tangier by Charles II. was remedied, though it was still necessary to obtain a port with larger capacities for the permanent maintenance of a strong fleet in the Mediterranean all the year round.

**England and
Gibraltar.**

Overwhelming as the victory at Blenheim had been, the next year, 1705, was almost a blank. Every move in the Netherlands designed or attempted by Marlborough was frustrated by the deliberate misconduct of the Dutch generals, which ultimately

brought its own nemesis, since they disgusted the Dutch as well as the English; the worst of them were dismissed, and, comparatively speaking, Marlborough in 1706 had a free hand. The allies, however, gained some advantage in the Peninsula, where the eccentric Lord Peterborough was sent to take command of the small English contingent. Peterborough succeeded in capturing Barcelona; and before the end of the year Catalonia, which was generally hostile to Castile, had attached itself to the cause of Charles III.

In Italy matters went badly for the allies in 1705, in which year Leopold of Austria died and was succeeded by his elder son Joseph. But in 1706 the Italian command was again assigned to Eugene. The French had no general worthy to be named in the same breath with either Eugene or Marlborough, each of whom knew that he could rely absolutely on the other to work with him in harmony and loyalty. Marlborough conceived the design of making North Italy the main field of battle for 1706, and of joining Eugene there himself with 20,000 British troops, sweeping the French out of the country, and, in concert with the fleet, seizing Toulon. Audacious as the plan was, he had almost succeeded in persuading the States-General to accede to it, when the Dutch were seized with a panic lest Lewis of Baden should fail to cover the southern frontier, and the whole scheme had to be given up. Marlborough remained in the Netherlands; but Eugene, single-handed, conducted in Italy a campaign so brilliant that in September he had relieved Turin, and as far as Italy itself was concerned, the object of Marlborough's proposed campaign was practically accomplished.

In the Netherlands the duke's freedom of action was not fettered as it had been in the previous campaign. Villeroy was enticed from his entrenchments, and Marlborough found his opportunity to engage him at the battle of Ramillies. While apparently developing his attack upon the French left and centre, to support which the French right was weakened, he transferred a mass of troops from his own centre to his own left—a movement

1706.

Peterborough
in Spain.

1706.

Eugene
in Italy.

The
campaign
of Ramillies,
May.

concealed from the enemy by rising ground—and was thus enabled to hurl an overwhelming force upon the French right, which was totally shattered. The line was rolled up, broke, and fled, the defeat became a rout, and the rout a *sauve qui peut*.

At Blenheim the heaviest fighting had fallen to the lot of the British troops; at Ramillies most of the English regiments did not come into action till late in the day, the Dutch **Results of the campaign.** having to do most of the work. But the British troops had already made their reputation; Villeroy had strengthened his own left at the expense of his right, because the red-coats at the beginning of the action were conspicuous upon the allied right. It is hardly true to say that the English regiments had not hitherto made a name for themselves in continental fighting; the Ironsides had shown their quality in 1658, and the English troops had fought magnificently under William. But it was Blenheim which made Europe in general realise that no better troops could be raised anywhere than those which came from across the Channel.

At Ramillies Marlborough had set Villeroy on the run; the next fortnight saw the French entirely cleared out of Brabant and Flanders, with the allies in possession of all the towns and forts with very few exceptions; and those few fell before the end of September. Brussels, Ghent, Bruges, Antwerp, Oudenarde, and Ostend were among the captures which followed upon the victory of Ramillies.

In Spain Peterborough had passed the winter in performing a series of surprising exploits of no very great value. Charles was in Barcelona, to which a strong French force **The relief of Barcelona.** laid siege. The Toulon fleet came out to support the besiegers, and Leake's winter squadron, till reinforced, was not strong enough to challenge it. A fresh squadron, however, under Byng, arrived from England just in time. Peterborough, who was on the worst possible terms with Charles, at first tried to divert the admirals from the vigorous relief of Barcelona, having a plan of his own for a march on Madrid. Leake and Byng, however, having a more just appreciation of the importance of Barcelona, ignored Peterborough's instructions, and

made for the beleaguered city at full speed, being convinced that not a moment ought to be lost. The moment the French fleet knew that they were coming, it retired in all haste to Toulon. The arrival of the English ships was decisive, the siege was raised, and Barcelona was saved. Peterborough was ingenious enough to pose as its saviour.

On the other side of the Peninsula Lord Galway with the Portuguese pushed back a French force under Marshal Berwick, whom we met with before in connection with Barclay's plot. About midsummer Galway entered Madrid and proclaimed King Charles. Then he moved, with the intention of joining hands with King Charles. He was, however, unable to act with any vigour, mainly on account of the character of the troops under his command. Charles and Peterborough were perpetually at cross purposes. Berwick was reinforced, the Spaniards behind Galway rose for King Philip, and when Charles and Galway at last effected a junction, they found themselves cut off from Madrid and from the Portuguese base of operations. They withdrew to Catalonia and Valencia; and both Charles and Galway were probably infinitely relieved when Peterborough announced that he had received instructions to leave Spain in order to consult with Eugene, then on the point of relieving Turin, as to measures in Northern Italy.

II. PARTIES IN ENGLAND, AND THE UNION WITH SCOTLAND

At the moment of Anne's accession, William's last parliament was still in session. On the whole there was a very slight Tory preponderance in the Commons, and a very slight Whig preponderance in the Lords. The changes made by Anne in her council were in favour of the Tories, mainly owing to the queen's predilection for High Anglicanism. When the parliament had done its work, and all doubts had been removed as to the vigour of the war-policy which was to be followed, in spite of the reluctance of Rochester and Nottingham, it was dissolved. As habitually

1702.
End of
William's
parliament.

happened during this reign, the general election endorsed the remodelling of the council ; the Tories came back with a large majority.

Although that party had as a whole endorsed the war, it had done so in the first place in a moment of excitement which had only masked its hostility to William, and its distrust of his policy as being dictated by Dutch rather than English interests. Thus it contained an element which was at heart opposed to the war altogether, and another element which, while in favour of the war, took an extremely insular view of the objects and the methods to be pursued. It disliked the army, which was associated in its mind with the army of the Commonwealth and a military dictatorship ; before long it began to brood upon suspicions that Marlborough was dreaming of playing the part of Cromwell. It held that the part of England was to confine itself to naval operations, and its theory of naval operations was that they could be directed to the destruction of French commerce, the protection of English commerce, and the appropriation of West Indian colonies. It failed entirely to grasp the conception common to William and to Marlborough of united action on the part of the allies directed to their common good, and of the co-operation of fleets and armies in the common design of overwhelming the enemy. Consequently it was inevitable that Marlborough and Godolphin, whose Toryism was at best of a very dubious type, should find themselves relying more and more on the Whigs.

**A new Tory
House of
Commons,
Autumn.**

At the outset, however, there was no breach. The country was well satisfied with the outcome of the campaigning of 1702. Marlborough's operations in the Netherlands had **War honours.** fully justified his selection for the supreme command. The success of the fleet at Vigo had more than obliterated the annoyance caused by the failure at Cadiz. Parliament applauded, though not without a side blow at the memory of King William, when the Commons declared that Marlborough and Rooke had 'retrieved' the honour of the British arms—in spite of the Whig amendment which would have substituted 'maintained' for

'retrieved.' Still, the Tories were already suspicious of Marlborough; and there were signs that they intended to magnify the doings of their own admiral, Rooke, by way of a set-off to the duke's laurels. The temporary abandonment of party spirit

**Attack on
the Whigs,
December.**

which had been achieved in the last two months of William's reign came to an end. The Tories endeavoured to give a retrospective effect to the clauses in the Act of Succession directed against the employment of foreigners in high offices of state and the granting of lands to them; the attempt was foiled by a pronouncement of the judges that the foreign peers, who were of course associated with the Whigs, could not be deprived of their rights.

The next step of the Tories was an attack upon the Dissenters, now warranted as a party move by the queen's ecclesiastical proclivities. William's Toleration Act had enabled

**The
Occasional
Conformity
Bill.**

Dissenters of an easy conscience to qualify for office by receiving the Holy Communion according to the Anglican rite, a process which was called Occasional Conformity (*i.e.* conformity for the occasion). There were, in fact, great numbers of Dissenters who, while preferring the services of the religious bodies to which they were attached, felt themselves perfectly at liberty to attend Anglican services if occasion arose, which was all that the law required of them. The Occasional Conformity Bill now introduced proposed to penalise any persons holding office who, during the term of office, attended any other services than those of the established church. At the same time the bill included in its provisions a host of minor officials who had not been touched even by the original Corporation Act. This bill was carried in the Commons in December 1702. Anglican pulpits rang with denunciations of the Dissenters and of the Latitudinarian bishops with whom William had filled the sees. The queen was in favour of the bill. It seemed likely that the Lords would give way and pass it, when the tide was turned by the appearance of a pamphlet

Defoe.

entitled *The Shortest Way with the Dissenters*. In form it urged all loyal churchmen to push the Tory and High Church arguments to their logical conclusion; but in showing

the logical conclusion, it very thoroughly exposed its grotesqueness. A reaction set in, and the Lords ventured to throw out the bill. The enraged Tories succeeded in procuring the punishment of the pamphleteer for having published a seditious libel. Daniel Defoe was set in the pillory, but only to receive an ovation from the very mob which just before had been engaged in wrecking the meeting-houses of the Dissenters.

The year 1703 brought no military or naval triumphs, but the ultra-Tories brought about a certain reaction by procuring the dismissal of Whigs from minor posts. When parliament met in the autumn, the Occasional Conformity Bill was again introduced. But this time Prince George of Denmark, the queen's husband, who was himself a Lutheran, withdrew the support which he had previously given to the bill. Anne's attitude was necessarily affected. Marlborough consequently ventured to use his influence, though secretly, against the bill. The Tories proposed to secure the bill in the Lords by tacking it to a money bill; but when it was made known that the queen was opposed to tacking, the plan was dropped and the bill was defeated in the Peers. Marlborough and Godolphin voted in support of it when they were quite sure that it would be defeated. The personal antagonism between Godolphin and Nottingham developed, and in the course of the year 1704 the Nottingham group disappeared from the ministry, into which were drawn Robert Harley, the representative of the moderate Tories, and his brilliant young friend Henry St. John; the latter, not because he was a moderate, but because he was too clever to be left outside to organise the enemies of the government. But Marlborough had not yet won. Politically his career depended upon the summer campaign. If Blenheim had been a defeat he would have been impeached and ruined. But Blenheim assured him a victory which was made more rather than less complete by the futile attempt of the Tories to elevate Rooke's engagement at Malaga into a still more glorious achievement.

1703. The
Bill again
defeated.

1704.
Harley and
St. John.

Effect of
Blenheim.

When the Tories introduced the Occasional Conformity Bill

for the third time, they committed themselves to the tacking plan, upon which they were beaten even in the Commons; and when the bill itself went up to the Lords it was rejected by a more decisive majority than before. The conduct of the extreme Tories had driven the moderates to the side of the govern-

1705.

A new parliament, mainly Whig.

ment. In the spring of 1705 the time had come for a dissolution and a general election; and this time the Tories were beaten at the polls. With a Whig majority in the Commons the government was secure; nevertheless, the ministry was not as yet exclusively Whig; though it might perhaps have been foreseen that Harley and St. John would presently find themselves compelled to sever their connection either with the ministry or with the Tory party. The war policy of Marlborough and Godolphin was confirmed. But the great achievement of Anne's second parliament was the Incorporating Union with Scotland.

The relations between England and Scotland under a single crown had never been satisfactory. A certain sense of antagonism, the result of long centuries of hostility, had remained rooted in the northern country, where it was necessarily much more active than in the south.

The Union with Scotland; earlier proposals.

There had always been in Scotland statesmen who believed that the true solution lay in incorporation. The experiment had been tried for a time under the Commonwealth, when the Scots were represented in the parliaments at Westminster instead of having a separate legislature of their own. That arrangement had come to an end with the Restoration; but at the same time the Scots were excluded from the benefit of the English Navigation Acts. The throttling of their commerce emphasised the necessity for a readjustment, and proposals for a union were submitted to a conference of commissioners from both countries in 1670. No agreement was then arrived at, but the question was again raised, on the accession of William III. William himself was always anxious for a union, but it was not easy to persuade the English of the material advantages to England of such a measure. When Scotland had postponed the question of union to the recognition of William's succession,

the English parliament showed no inclination to regard the matter as a pressing one. Their chilly attitude was resented as insulting by the Scots ; the sentiment of hostility to England was increased, and was still further intensified in the Highlands by the affair of Glencoe and in the Lowlands by the Darien disaster. The latter also emphasised once more the destructive effects upon Scottish commerce of the existing relations.

There was a growing feeling that the alternatives were either complete separation or a Legislative Union ; and while the intelligence of the country favoured the latter, sentiment undoubtedly favoured the former. William urged upon the English parliament the wisdom of giving the most earnest consideration to a project of union ; but the Tories were factiously predominant at that moment (1700), and the proposal to appoint commissioners was thrown out in the Commons. A week before William's death, when faction was hushed, he again urged the consideration of union upon the Commons ; and the parliament in the first months of Queen Anne's reign passed an Act for the appointment of commissioners to that end.

1702 ;
a Union
Conference.

Now, the Convention in Scotland which had called William to the throne continued to sit as a parliament undissolved throughout his reign. It was authorised to sit for another six months after his demise, but upon conditions which were not duly observed. Nevertheless, the High Commissioner Queensberry, knowing that the existing parliament was favourable to the Union, persuaded the queen to assemble it instead of dissolving it and calling a new parliament. The Opposition or Country party thereupon declared its proceedings to be illegal, and withdrew from its consultations. Two bills were introduced, one authorising the queen to nominate commissioners to meet the English commissioners for a union conference. The second required all office-holders to abjure the 'pretended Prince of Wales' who had taken the title of James VIII. But the Scots were now in the position in which they had been when they had proposed the Union, before accepting William as king. The acceptance of the second bill

The Scots
parliament
in 1702.

would preclude them from using in negotiations with England the threat of acknowledging James as the successor of Anne. The hostility to this measure was so strong that the parliament was prorogued after it had barely passed its first reading.

The Act for appointing commissioners, however, had been duly passed, and the conference was opened in November 1702. The Scottish commissioners were willing to **Failure of the Conference.** accept the Electress Sophia as Anne's successor, but only on condition of a satisfactory agreement with regard to trade and other matters; and over the details of this demand the conference broke down and came to an end in February. Further irritation had been caused by the extreme indifference which the Englishmen had shown to the importance of the whole question, and both in England and in Scotland there were grave doubts as to the legal authority of the parliament which had sanctioned the conference. And in the meantime, the new parliament just summoned in England was preponderantly Tory, and a new parliament summoned in Scotland put the party of the government in an actual minority, owing to the return of a considerable number of more or less open Jacobites who called themselves Cavaliers.

There were then three parties in the new Scottish parliament which met in May, after a reconstruction of the ministry which displaced a number of the old Whigs. Those who **1703. Parties in the new Scots parliament.** were called the Court party were the old Whigs who had held most closely to William. The Cavaliers were that Jacobite or semi-Jacobite element which had excluded itself from the last parliament. They were mainly Episcopalians with leanings to restoring the Stuart succession. The now greatly reduced Country party were the members of the Opposition which had been formed in support of national interests as opposed to English domination. There was a natural antagonism between them and the Jacobites, because they were Presbyterian as well as Nationalist; hence it did not seem impossible that the Cavaliers might coalesce with the Whigs or Court party in preference to the Country party; and this was what the Whigs aimed at. But when

there were three parties, no two of which were really in agreement, the almost inevitable result was that two parties combined in opposition; and the Jacobites and Country party had this in common, that to both of them the predominance of England was extremely objectionable although for different reasons. While the Court party was led by the duke of Queensberry, the other two in combination regarded the duke of Hamilton as their head; while they coalesced only to a limited degree, not because they shared a common aim but because both wanted to defeat the Court party.

Broadly speaking, the Whigs were in favour of the Incorporating Union with due safeguards for Scottish national institutions and Scottish commerce. The Nationalists, headed by Fletcher of Saltoun, did not want a union, but such a limitation of the powers of the Crown in Scotland as would make it a mere figure-head whose connection with England and with English interests would virtually be of no effect in Scotland. Without that condition, the Nationalists would insist on complete separation. And the Cavaliers wanted complete separation because they did not want to recognise the Hanoverian succession, which was involved in any form of union with England whatever.

The practical outcome was that the Scottish parliament in 1703 passed a bill which ultimately became known as the Act of Security. It provided that if before the queen's death the Estates and the Crown had not fixed upon a successor, the Estates should nominate a successor other than the successor to the crown of England.

1703-4.
**The Scottish
Act of
Security.**

It declared that no one person should be sovereign of both England and Scotland unless the English parliament should first have conceded to Scotland 'a free communication of trade, the freedom of navigation, and the liberty of the plantations,' that is, free trade in the colonies. It provided also for the arming and drilling of the population. It further provided against the continued union of the crowns unless the sovereignty of Scotland, her legislative power, and her religion, were secured. The royal assent was at the time refused; but in the next year the bill was again passed with the omission of the clause regarding

free communication of trade,' at a time when it was uncertain what would be the result of Marlborough's Blenheim campaign, which was then in progress. The royal assent to the Act of Security was given ; because, with the crisis on the Continent undetermined, Anne dared not risk the refusal of supplies for the army which would have followed upon the refusal of her assent to the Act.

A very serious situation then had arisen. Scotland was an independent state in no way subject to England, and only fortuitously bound to her by the fact that both countries shared one sovereign. The succession to that sovereign's throne in England was settled by an Act of the English parliament with the assent of the Crown ; but that Act could not touch Scotland. There was no means of compelling Scotland to adopt the same successor as England, there was nothing to prevent her from fixing the succession where she chose, even if she chose to fix it upon James VIII. If she did so, the situation would be very much like that when Scotland recognised Charles II., and the English Commonwealth was obliged frankly to put on one side all questions of legality and, for its own protection, to coerce Scotland. And now there was the additional complication that England was engaged in a great European war.

The extreme tension was removed by the victory of Blenheim and the decisive ascendancy of the Whigs in England which followed it. Unlike the Tories, the Whigs favoured a union, as according with the policy of William III. They had been prepared to give it serious attention in any case, and it was now imperative for them to do so in order to secure the Protestant succession in both countries. The first step, however, was to repudiate the idea that they were influenced by coercion, by fear of what Scotland might do. The government therefore began by retaliatory measures. They stiffened the trade barriers and took measures to place the border in a state of defence. They declared that all Scots should be reckoned as aliens until Scotland accepted the line of the succession laid down in England. But they renewed the proposal for a meeting

1704.

The resulting situation.

1705.

The English answer.

of commissioners to agree upon the terms of a treaty of Union.

During the twelve months which followed the passing of the Act of Security, it had been found necessary to set Tweeddale, an old leader of the Country party, at the head of the Scottish administration in place of Queensberry.

1705.

A commission appointed.

Tweeddale, however, had proved a failure ; various circumstances had combined to raise Scottish animosity towards England, English intervention, and English influence, to a higher pitch than ever. Consequently the commissionership was now bestowed on the young duke of Argyll, a soldier with soldierly qualities and little enough aptitude for intrigue. But he had to help him the astute Queensberry. By this time the Scottish parliament had fallen into the two main divisions of the Court party who were identified with Unionism, and the Cavaliers who were identified with opposition to the Union ; but between the two the balance was held by what had once been the Country party, a small clever group who now came to be generally known as the Squadrone Volante, who were on the whole rather favourable to the Union than otherwise. In these circumstances, a last attempt by Fletcher of Saltoun to substitute for a union his plan for limiting the powers of the Crown was rejected, and the parliament resolved to empower the Crown to name commissioners to meet those appointed for England. Excited patriots were more or less soothed by the voting of an address praying for the repeal of the English Alien Act, as a condition without which the conference would be doomed to failure. It is clear that in both countries the consciousness had gained ground that the Union was really necessary to the welfare of each ; but in Scotland the antagonistic sentiment was still so strong that observers in general rather expected that the proposal would be defeated. Men might see that the arguments for union were stronger than the arguments for separation, as a question of material prosperity ; but the knowledge gave no security that the slightest wound to the national susceptibilities would not suffice to obliterate the material argument altogether.

The carrying through of a treaty of Union, therefore, was an extremely delicate matter. Fortunately, in the autumn of 1705 the English Whigs were secure of their majority in both Houses; and no better pilot could have been found than Somers; who took the lead in procuring the repeal of the Alien Act, as he had previously taken the lead in procuring its passage. The two bodies of commissioners, thirty-one English and thirty-one Scots, were appointed in the spring of 1706 with extreme care, and a wisdom which was demonstrated by the event.

In April 1706 the commission was assembled in London. It differed from all the previous commissions in the fundamental fact that it meant business. After settling the procedure, the English put forward as the groundwork of the proposed treaty, the union of the two kingdoms with a single parliament under the name of Great Britain, with the succession to the Crown settled upon the House of Hanover. The Scots made one bid for popularity in the north by the counter proposal of a federal union with separate legislatures. This was at once emphatically negatived by the English; there must be an Incorporating Union or none at all. With those alternatives before them, the Scots accepted the English principle; probably the majority were really in favour of it, and they only made the federal proposal to mollify their constituents. The next Scottish demand was for complete freedom of trade; the demand was accepted without demur. The English proposal that taxes and trade regulations should be uniform required modification. The amount of the Scottish National Debt was only equal to that of the Scottish revenue. The English revenue was thirty-five times as great as that of Scotland, and the English Debt was thrice the English revenue; it was necessary that Scotland should not be called upon to share the English Debt. It was recognised also as reasonable that Scotland should be exempted from sundry taxes which were imposed in England, and that the land tax of Scotland should be reckoned at something less than one-fortieth of that of England. Finally, the Scots were to receive very nearly £400,000 as the

1706.
The
commission
meets, April.

**Terms of a
Treaty of
Union.**

'equivalent' for losses sustained at the hands of English trading companies. On the question of representation, the original proposal of the English that there should be thirty-eight Scots in the new House of Commons was modified, and the Scots were allowed forty-five members. In the Upper House it was impossible to admit more than sixteen out of the very much larger number of Scottish peers. Scotland was to retain her own courts of law, and the privileges and jurisdictions of the Scottish royal boroughs and of the barons (that is the landed gentry) were to be continued intact.

It remained to procure the acceptance of the treaty by the parliaments of the two kingdoms, the Scots taking precedence in point of time. The extremely delicate business of piloting the treaty through the Scottish parliament was virtually entrusted to Queensberry by his appointment as commissioner. No man knew what the Scottish parliament would do, though it was generally apprehended that the Union would not be passed without bloodshed. Besides the Nationalists and the Jacobites in parliament, the whole body of the clergy were in opposition, because of the fear that the parliament of Great Britain, in which the enormous majority would be Episcopalians, would insist on imposing Prelacy throughout the United Kingdom. To the whole body of the Cameronians, assent to the Union appeared to be an enormous betrayal of the Covenant and the National religion. The veteran Carstares, however, the trusted counsellor of William III., exerted all his influence to moderate clerical fanaticism. The Cavaliers were divided by dissensions and jealousies between their two leaders, Hamilton and Atholl. Everything, in fact, turned upon the action of the Squadrone Volante; and, as matters turned out, that group gave its support to the Union.

The articles of the treaty were voted upon one by one, though the approval of each individually was to be conditional upon the final approval of all. When the first article, enacting a union of the two kingdoms, was passed by a majority of thirty-three, the government began to feel that the chances were in their favour. The

**The position
in Scotland,
Autumn.**

**The principle
carried,
November.**

Hanoverian succession and the single parliament were approved by increased majorities. The hostility of the Church was then allayed by the passing of a special Act which so far as any Act could do, guaranteed the permanency of the National Church as established at the Revolution.

**Act for the
security of
the Church.**

Finding themselves likely to be steadily outvoted in parliament, the Opposition brought outside pressure to bear. Petitions against the Union poured in from every quarter. The government made no attempt to procure counter-petitions, of which only one was received; they contented themselves with the argument that if the petitions had represented a real national feeling, they would have been much more extensively signed than was actually the case. The sentiment of the mob, both in Glasgow and in Edinburgh, was expressed in an unmistakable manner; but the government refused to be intimidated. Then the Jacobites prepared an address demanding that the parliament should be dissolved, as having had no mandate to deal with so vast a constitutional question, but Hamilton refused to support it unless it included approval of the Hanoverian succession; consequently the address was dropped. Still, the fear of armed insurrection was so great that the government procured an Act suspending that clause in the Act of Security which had sanctioned arming and drilling.

**Popular
hostility.**

The fiscal clauses were carried with slight modifications. With the clauses providing for the representation of Scotland in the parliament of Great Britain, the Opposition came to the last line of defence. It was determined that at this point the Opposition should offer once more the substitution of an acknowledgment of the Hanoverian succession for the treaty, and on its inevitable rejection should retire in a body. That retirement might be the signal for civil war. But at the last moment Hamilton, with whom the plan had originated, refused to move the protest. The clause was carried, and a week later, on 16th January 1707, the Act confirming the treaty received the royal assent from Queensberry as commissioner, along with the Act for the Security of the Church.

**The later
clauses
carried,
December.**

It remained for the parliament to deal with the distribution of that sum of money which was called the 'equivalent,' and then with the problem of representation in the parliament of Great Britain. As to the Peers, it was resolved that in the first instance they should be nominated by the Crown, and that in the future the whole body of the Peers should elect their sixteen representatives. For the Commons, the shires were to have thirty members and the boroughs fifteen, Edinburgh having one representative while the other boroughs were associated in fourteen groups, who should in the first instance choose their representatives from the members of the existing parliament.

1707.
**Scottish
arrange-
ments for the
parliament
of Great
Britain.**

When the Scottish Act was passed, it became the turn of England. The treaty was carried through both Houses, practically without amendment, though it was coupled with an Act of Security for the Church of England; unfavourably distinguished from that in Scotland, inasmuch as the latter had imposed no religious tests disqualifying Episcopalians from office, whereas the English Act excluded Presbyterians from holding office in England. The Act received the royal assent on 6th April. As in Scotland, it was resolved that no new election was necessary. The first parliament of Great Britain contained the same English members of the House of Commons as the last parliament of England.

1707.
**The final
Act of Union,
6th April.**

It is not to be denied that bribery and corruption played a part in procuring the acceptance of the treaty in Scotland; but equally there is no doubt that all or very nearly all of the politicians by whose aid the treaty was carried were really convinced that the Union was necessary. The fact remained, however, that it was not popular in Scotland. The benefits of the commercial clauses were not immediately felt; the introduction into Scotland of new duties, discharged by an extremely objectionable class of revenue officers brought in from England, excited popular wrath. The Cameronians still regarded a pact with a prelatical nation as an unholy alliance. The Jacobites, of whom there was a far larger

**Continued
unpopularity
in Scotland.**

proportion than in England, hated the Union as a **guarantee** of the Hanoverian succession. It was always easy to discover that Scottish interests were overridden in favour of England by the **parliament** of Great Britain. For a long time to come, the **popular** aversion from the 'sad and sorrowful' Union, and the desire to see it brought to an end, were among the most effective assets of Jacobitism. It was not till Jacobitism itself had received its death-blow forty years afterwards that Scotland really made up her mind that the Union was irrevocable.

III. THE WHIGS IN POWER, 1706-1710

At the end of 1706 Louis, alarmed by the effects of Ramillies, endeavoured to make a separate treaty with the Dutch by offer-
1706. After ing them the barrier fortresses which their souls
Ramillies. desired. The allies were pledged not to make separate treaties; the Whigs had now committed themselves to the principle that there was to be 'no peace without Spain,' and Louis's attempt was foiled. But the loss of Ramillies had been followed by Eugene's relief of Turin and an almost complete exodus of French armies from North Italy.

It was Marlborough's grand scheme for this the new year, 1707, that the Austrian armies, with the duke of Savoy, should, in
1707. Marl- co-operation with the British fleet under Sir Cloudes-
borough's ley Shovell, invade the south-east of France from
plans. Italy and seize Toulon. For it had been the duke's idea from the beginning that the war was to give England Toulon as her naval base in the Mediterranean. It was his first intention himself to join with Eugene; but he soon found that he would not be allowed to leave the Netherlands. Consequently, he intended to make a diversion in the north by threatening an invasion of France in that quarter, and thereby making Eugene's task in the south easier.

Matters, however, did not go well. In the first place, the duke found himself called upon temporarily to desert arms for diplomacy. The young king of Sweden, Charles XII., had shortly before blazed upon the world, a sudden meteoric portent. His

startling victories in Russia, Denmark, and Poland were in all men's mouths ; and—he had a quarrel with the Austrian emperor. If this northern thunderbolt were launched **Charles XII.** against Joseph, the Grand Alliance would be in very evil case. Marlborough's blandishments were successful, Joseph was persuaded, though not without troublesome delays, to conciliate his alarming enemy, and the Swede was induced to leave Austria alone and plunge into the Russian campaign, in which his ambitions were for the time being shattered by the disaster of Pultawa.

But this did not end Marlborough's difficulties. The emperor, regardless of his obligations, made a private agreement with Louis for the suspension of hostilities in Northern **The emperor.** Italy, because he wanted Naples. Nor was he at all anxious, in fact, for the British to acquire such a prize as Toulon, although the capture of Toulon would have secured Naples and Sicily for him without any difficulty.

In the meantime things were also going badly for the allies in Spain. Galway from Catalonia marched upon Madrid. Only a third of his force were British troops, and a greater proportion were Portuguese. Intercepted by a **Spain :
Almanza,
April.** larger Franco-Spanish army under Berwick, he gave battle. The British and German troops fought manfully ; but Galway was incapacitated for a time at a critical stage of the battle by a sabre cut, the Portuguese ran away, and the remainder of the army were overwhelmed by double their numbers ; though Galway succeeded in withdrawing less than half the British in good order. The disaster of Almanza was really the wreck of the Austrian cause in Spain ; although it cannot be doubted that that cause never would have been successful, in face of the fierce hostility of the whole Spanish people with the exception of the Catalans.

Marlborough's grand design was destined to failure, through no fault of his, of Sir Cloudesley Shovell's, of or Eugene's, who did his best to give effect to his great colleague's scheme. With hardly any support from Austria, he had to rely upon the shifty Victor Amadeus of Savoy, who was in no haste to attend to any

one's interests but his own. Nevertheless, Eugene almost succeeded. By deceiving Tessé, the French commander in the south, as to his objective, he was able to make a dash for Toulon ; but delays, for which Savoy was responsible, enabled Tessé to get back just in time to prevent a simultaneous attack by land and sea on the great arsenal. Shovell bombarded the place, and the French actually sunk a number of their battleships in order to avoid their capture ; but Eugene was forced to retreat, and Toulon was saved. Marlborough knew that the chance would not occur again, and made up his mind that not Toulon, but Port Mahon in Minorca was the permanent naval station which must be secured for the British fleet in the Mediterranean. The duke's own intended operations in the north had been frustrated by the precarious state of affairs on the Upper Rhine, where the death of the incompetent Lewis of Baden had placed the still more incompetent Christian of Baireuth in command ; and Marlborough's own time was much taken up in getting Christian replaced by George, the elector of Hanover and the destined successor to the throne of Great Britain.

The compact between Joseph and Louis released Eugene from Italy, but the jealousy of the elector of Hanover prevented the supreme command on the Rhine from being handed over to Eugene, who, it was agreed, should, in 1708, take the command of a third army on the Moselle. The French army in Flanders was now under the joint command of Louis's elder grandson the duke of Burgundy and of Vendôme, between whom there was little agreement. Marlborough planned a rapid junction of his own army with that of Eugene, and a combined attack upon the French. But before Eugene could effect a junction a number of the captured cities in the Netherlands revolted against the Dutch domination, which was not at all to their liking. Eugene had already started to join Marlborough, but his troops were still many marches away. He himself hurried in advance to consult with the duke. Vendôme was moving upon Oudenarde, one of the towns which had fallen into the hands of the Dutch after

**The Toulon
scheme
foiled, July.**

**1708. Revolt
of Flemish
towns, June.**

Ramillies ; its capture would open the way for the French into Brabant.

Marlborough and Eugene decided that although they had the inferior numbers they could not afford to wait for Eugene's army. By forced marches they succeeded in reaching **Oudenarde,** Oudenarde before their movement was detected by **July.** the French, who were still a few miles away. It was already late in the day when they became suddenly aware of Marlborough's approach. The ground, cut up by hedges, ditches, and brushwood, was ill suited to cavalry movements, whereby the French, who were strong in that arm, were placed at a disadvantage. Before they had time to arrange their dispositions for a pitched battle, Marlborough's van was upon them, and opened an attack on their left when half the allied army had not yet crossed the Scheldt. The French might still have drawn off ; but Burgundy, without consulting Vendôme, ordered an advance, and the engagement became general. But a turning movement on the French right was decisive. Under cover of the gathering darkness, the French beat a retreat, having lost, in killed, wounded and prisoners, some 15,000 men, a number considerably increased in the course of the flight. The loss of the allies was only 3000.

The victory was decisive ; but for the fall of night it would have been overwhelming. The battle derives an additional personal interest from the fact that the Chevalier **A curious** or Pretender, as James Stuart was called by his **feature.** friends or his enemies, was fighting bravely on the French side, while the Electoral Prince of Hanover, the future George II., displayed distinguished valour on the side of the allies. Still more curious, it may be noted in passing, had been one of the features of the battle of Almanza, where the French were commanded by the duke of Berwick, son of James II. and Marlborough's sister, while the English troops were commanded by the Huguenot Ruvigny, earl of Galway.

Vendôme fell back to an entrenched position covering Bruges, which had handed itself over to the French. Marlborough conceived the daring design of leaving a body of troops to cover the

fortress of Lille, and marching with the main army straight upon Paris ; but even Eugene's audacity was staggered, and the two generals agreed to besiege Lille, the capture of which would greatly increase the practicability of an invasion. Vendôme, reinforced by Berwick, still ventured only to attack Marlborough's communications with Ostend, whence his supplies were derived. Towards the end of September General Webb, escorting supplies, the loss of which would have necessitated raising the siege of Lille, fought a brilliant action at Wynendael, beating off the attack of a French force twice as large as his own. Early in December Lille surrendered, and Marlborough was completely master of Brabant.

Even more important from the purely British point of view was the British success on the Mediterranean. While nothing of importance was going on in the Spanish Peninsula, Admiral Leake carried over General Stanhope with a small force to the island of Minorca. Port Mahon was captured, the whole island was easily reduced, and a British garrison was placed in Port Mahon, which, with its admirable harbour, remained the British base in the Mediterranean until its loss in 1756. Hitherto, in spite of the capture of Gibraltar, the British had been obliged to use Lisbon as the nearest available equivalent. In seizing Port Mahon Stanhope had acted on the urgent advice of Marlborough, who until this year had fixed more ambitious hopes upon Toulon, though for some time past Port Mahon had been attracting the attention of naval strategists.

Thus at the beginning of 1709, Louis found himself almost with his back to the wall. His treasury was exhausted, his ships could not put to sea, his generals could not stand against Marlborough and Eugene. Only in Spain his grandson's cause was holding its own. After Ramillies, he had felt his position to be so precarious that he made peace overtures upon terms which would have conceded much of the allies' demands. After the campaigns of 1708 he was ready to go much further. We must turn back to trace the course of events in England to see why peace was not made in 1709.

**Wynendael
(Sept.) and
Lille (Dec.)**

**Capture of
Port Mahon,
Sept.**

**Position
of Louis,
Dec. 1708.**

The general election of 1705 had been preceded by a ministerial reconstruction, in which Harley and St. John had displaced the Tories who were directly hostile to Marlborough and Godolphin. The reconstruction was endorsed by the electorate, which gave the Commons a ministerial majority who were preponderantly Whig; although in that majority there remained a large element who could not be definitely classed either with the Whigs or with the Tories. The Whigs were dissatisfied with the share of offices which fell to them. Their chiefs, known as the Junto—Somers, Halifax, Orford, Wharton, and Marlborough's son-in-law, Sunderland, the son of the old minister of James II., were not yet admitted to office. So, on the one hand, during the years from 1706 to 1708 the Whigs were pushing their men into office while on the other Harley was intriguing against them, employing as his instrument a lady-in-waiting, Abigail Hill or Mrs. Masham, who claimed cousinship both with him and with the duchess of Marlborough.

1706-8.
The Whigs
and the
ministry.

The Marlboroughs, conscious of their dependence on the Whigs, with difficulty induced the queen in the last months of 1706 to make Sunderland secretary of state, and to remove the extreme Tories, Nottingham and Rochester, as well as Rooke, whom the party had been in the habit of playing off against Marlborough, from the Privy Council. During 1707 Marlborough and Godolphin were realising that something like a purely Whig ministry was becoming inevitable. Their suspicions of Harley's loyalty were increasing, and the duchess was becoming unpleasantly conscious of the growing influence of Mrs. Masham. The meeting of the first parliament of Great Britain in the autumn showed that the new Scottish members were for practical purposes to be reckoned as forty-five more Whigs in the Commons. Both Whigs and Tories were attacking the mismanagement at the Admiralty, where the Whigs wanted to see Orford reinstated in place of the queen's husband, Prince George of Denmark, who was Lord High Admiral, and who was not kept in the way he should go by Admiral George Churchill, Marlborough's brother,

1707.
Cross
currents.

himself a Tory. The latter fact did not restrain the Tories, since their object was simply the wreck of the ministry. And there were good enough grounds in the failure of the Admiralty to protect British commerce from French privateers.

Then the Tories endeavoured with little success to champion Peterborough as another set-off to Marlborough; and they proposed to withdraw troops from Marlborough's command, to be employed in Catalonia. The Whigs capped this Tory enthusiasm for the war in the Peninsula by preparing a joint address to the queen from both Houses, declaring that no peace could be honourable or safe which left Spain or the West Indies in Bourbon hands. The discovery that a private secretary or agent of Harley's had been using his opportunities to sell information to the French strengthened the case against Harley. Admiral Churchill worked upon Prince George to use his influence with the queen against that minister. Harley was obliged to resign, and went into opposition along with St. John, whose place as secretary at war was taken by Robert Walpole.

Another circumstance which strengthened the Whigs in 1708 was an abortive attempt at an invasion of Scotland on the part of the Chevalier. There was to be a Jacobite rising in the north, supported by 6000 French troops. The government had ample information of what was going on. Anne was more than suspected of sentimental leanings towards the Stuart succession; but the Chevalier damaged his own cause with his sister by claiming the throne during her lifetime, and by issuing a proclamation in which he described her as a 'usurper.' In March James and his French forces put to sea; a large English squadron was immediately in pursuit. James was probably saved from capture only by storms. After three weeks at sea he got back to Dunkirk, having lost sundry ships and 4000 men. The government followed the example of William in making no endeavour to search out and punish the conspirators. The Whig position was very much strengthened. Backed by the Marlboroughs, the Junto insisted upon more Whig appointments and the admission of Somers to

1708.

Diamond

of Harley.

1708. An
attempted
invasion.

the ministry. Anne's power of resistance broke down with the death of her husband in the autumn; Somers became president of the council, and the Whigs emphasised their ascendancy by repeating their resolution that there could be no safe peace until the whole of the Spanish dominion should be restored to the house of Austria. In the spring of 1709 the ascendancy of Godolphin and Marlborough depended upon the goodwill of the Whigs who were, in fact, supreme in parliament. And the Whigs had entirely committed themselves to the doctrine of 'no peace without Spain.'

It was obvious then that France at this stage would gladly accept peace on any reasonable terms. Conspicuously, what Holland would want would be full possession of the barrier fortresses. Marlborough, as commander of both the British and the Dutch forces, saw difficulties in the way of his action if he were the sole British representative in negotiations with Holland and France for mutually satisfactory terms; and he procured the appointment of young Lord Townshend as his diplomatic colleague. But the terms upon which the allies agreed as conditions to be offered to Louis were in fact impossible. Marlborough knew it, and wished them to be modified, but he would not insist upon his own view in opposition to Whig pressure. The fatal clause was one which demanded not only that France was to withdraw her support from Philip in Spain, but that if Philip himself proved obdurate she was herself to take part in the work of ejecting him. Against that clause both Marlborough and Eugene protested; but the only modification that the instructions from England would permit was the substitution of a clause requiring the surrender of sundry Spanish fortresses which would make the further resistance of Philip impossible. Townshend persuaded the Dutch also to insist on this demand, and upon that rock the negotiations went to pieces.

The actual outcome was an Anglo-Dutch compact known as the Barrier Treaty, under which the two powers pledged themselves to insist upon the establishment of the Dutch in a score

or so of fortified towns within the Spanish Netherlands, involving rights detrimental to English trade, and exceedingly advantageous to Holland. All that was secured to Great Britain was insistence on the recognition of the Hanoverian succession, and of the British claim to the island of Minorca. There were other clauses irritating both to Prussia and to Austria, which resented the demand for Minorca; and the Barrier Treaty was vigorously utilised by the Tories as demonstrating the futility of a government which insisted on prolonging the war for the benefit not of Great Britain, but of Holland. The treaty was signed by Townshend, but not by Marlborough, who had left the diplomatic business to his colleague, while he himself was engaged on the campaign.

Louis had met the preposterous demands of the allies by remarking that, in the first place, he could not compel Philip to withdraw from Spain, and in the second, if he was to be compelled to fight some one, it should be not his own son but his enemies. Exhausted as France was she responded enthusiastically to a fresh call to arms. The command in the Netherlands was given to Villars, the one French general who was as yet undefeated. His force was drawn up within the impregnable entrenched lines of La Bassée, stretching from Douai on the south-east to the river Lys on the north-west. In June Marlborough and Eugene, having made a feint upon Villars's lines which caused him to withdraw a part of the garrison of Tournay, turned upon Tournay itself, a very strong fortress. The town was forced to surrender in three weeks, but it was not till 23rd August (O.S.) that the citadel yielded.

The operation was hardly completed when the allied army suddenly swooped south-east upon Mons. Villars at once moved out of his lines and occupied a position a short distance away from Mons, resting on Malplaquet, strongly entrenched and well covered by natural obstacles; the attack of the allies having been delayed, contrary to Marlborough's wish, to await reinforcements, while Villars took advantage of every hour to strengthen his entrenchments. The two armies were about equal in numbers. On 31st August,

however, the allies attacked. The battle was desperately fought. There was a frightful slaughter on the allied left, where the Prince of Orange led a furious attack which had not been in the least intended by Marlborough himself. The destruction fell mainly upon the Dutch troops and two regiments of Scottish Highlanders who were in the Dutch service. Orange's attack was repulsed ; but a detachment sent by a route concealed from the enemy to turn the French left drove in upon the flank at a critical moment ; and the French were finally driven from their position whence they were able to retire in good order and unpursued to the lines of La Bassée, having lost little more than half as many men as the allies. The victory was dearly bought, but it ensured the capture of Mons, which fell within a month. It must be observed that, bloody as the engagement was, it would have been very much less so but for the over-courageous blunder of the Prince of Orange, for which Marlborough was in no way responsible. The duke himself would seem to have over-rated the value of the battle, and to have believed that after it the allies could dictate their own terms ; but as a matter of fact the French almost regarded it as a victory for themselves, and were encouraged instead of disheartened by it.

Malplaquet was the last of the great battles. Marlborough found himself reviled for the loss of life which had attended a victory followed by no startling results. Exhaustion was telling upon the allies as well as upon the French, and in the campaigns of 1710 the duke confined himself to the reduction of more fortresses in Flanders. In Spain the fortunes of war went in favour of Philip, and in no other region were any successes accomplished. Negotiations for peace were again on foot, but again the conferences at Gertruydenberg broke down over the persistent demand for the evacuation of Spain—a point which Philip was now less likely than ever to yield. And before the end of the year the Whigs had fallen and the Tories were in power in England.

IV. THE FALL OF THE WHIGS, 1710-1712

Marlborough and Godolphin had broken irrevocably with the Tories, but they had never come into perfect accord with the Whigs, with whom they were in agreement chiefly on the main question of the war; and even on that point Marlborough was readier for peace than the Whig ministers, although the suspicion was sedulously fostered that he was using his influence to prolong the war for the sake of the prestige and authority which his victories brought him. Anne was listening to the insidiously respectful voice of Mrs. Masham, a soothing antidote to the tempestuous duchess against whom she was learning, if she had not already learnt, rebellion. Marlborough himself gave a handle to the enemy by endeavouring to obtain appointment as captain-general for life, a proposal in which there were many who scented the scheme of a military dictatorship. Tory pamphleteers clamoured that the war was being run by Marlborough for his own glorification, and the benefit of the Dutch or the Austrians. Why, they asked, were Britons shedding their blood like water on battlefields in the Netherlands and in capturing fortresses for the Dutch, instead of sweeping the seas, annihilating French commerce, appropriating West Indian islands, and generally using maritime power for the benefit of their own country? It was all for the glorification of one too powerful citizen! The war fever had died down and was rather quenched than rekindled by Malplaquet. And the Whigs on their side were annoyed at the slowness of Marlborough and Godolphin in giving the recognition which they considered due to their chiefs. They were at the same time alienating popular support by the extravagance of their peace conditions; and much displeasure had been aroused by the hospitality which they had extended to large numbers of Protestant refugees from the Palatinate and elsewhere by an Act to encourage their naturalisation in England.

The definite refusal of the queen to grant Marlborough the appointment for which he had asked was followed after a brief interval (in April 1710) by a scene between Anne and the

1709. The
situation
after
Malplaquet.

duchess which finally destroyed the last prospect of the restoration of the Marlborough influence. Anne never again spoke with the favourite who had tyrannised over her for so many years. But Godolphin and the Whigs had already ensured their own destruction through the most dangerous and illogical of all political agencies, religious fanaticism, or, more accurately, the passion of sectarian partisanship.

1710.

**The duchess
diamised.**

We have seen that earlier in the reign the Whigs had much ado to maintain the principle of toleration and to prevent the Occasional Conformity Bill from becoming law.

1709.

Dissent was no more popular with the mob than with Tory squires. William had kept the Church

**Sacheverell's
sermon.**

under reasonable control by the persistent appointment of bishops who were called Low Churchmen, not in the modern sense of the term, but in contradistinction to the High Churchmen in whose eyes dissent was the sin of schism. Anne's personal sympathies had always been with the High Churchmen, who had produced the non-jurors and were ever the champions of royal prerogative and of the doctrine of non-resistance. The pulpits of the clergy of this school were freely employed for denunciations of a Whig government which pandered to schismatics, and the climax was reached with a sermon preached by Dr. Henry Sacheverell in St. Paul's Cathedral in November 1709, and immediately afterwards published under the title of *Perils from False Brethren*.

Nothing, probably, would have resulted if the preacher had not made an obvious personal allusion to Godolphin as 'Volpone,' a nickname taken from Ben Jonson's play, by which the minister was popularly known. **A false move.** The sermon was itself a violent attack upon the principle of toleration, and upon all persons in authority, civil or ecclesiastical, who supported 'schism' on the plea, covert or avowed, of political expediency. Godolphin was exceedingly angry. Sunderland and other members of the Junto conceived that this kind of talk from the pulpit was dangerous, and that the doctor's sermon provided a convenient opportunity for suppressing it. The time, they thought, had

arrived for forcing the issue that the High Church doctrine logically involved Jacobitism, treason to the principles of the Revolution, to the authority of parliament, to the Hanoverian succession. It was resolved that the eloquent divine should be impeached.

The impeachment was a blunder, because it at once enabled Sacheverell to pose as a martyr, the victim of a monstrous tyranny which sought to silence freedom of speech, the heroic champion of a holy cause. After brief hesitation, Harley and the Tory leaders resolved to make the doctor's cause their own. The mob was readily aroused. The ladies were unanimous in their enthusiasm on behalf of the popular preacher. The impeachment opened at the end of February 1710. The queen herself came down to Westminster; when the doctor defended himself, the charms of his delivery brought tears to every female eye. Still, it was the plain fact that if the theories of the Revolution were true, if James was not lawful king and Anne was not a usurper, the sermon was treason. The peers by a majority of seventeen pronounced him guilty. But the government were afraid to punish him after the ebullition of popular sentiment; it was known that the queen favoured the defendant, and the sentence pronounced was the trivial one of suspension from preaching for three years. It was a penalty fairly proportionate to the unimportance of the offence, but ministers had chosen in the first instance to magnify the affair by treating it as worthy of all the pomp and circumstance of impeachment. In fact, they had made themselves ridiculous, which is perhaps the most fatal thing for itself that any ministry can do. The public at large regarded the sentence as being for practical purposes a triumphant acquittal. Church bells were rung, bonfires blazed, as on the acquittal of the Seven Bishops. The sentence on Dr. Sacheverell was the knell of the Whig ministry.

Harley always preferred to work underground and by backstairs influences. He managed the queen through Mrs. Masham. Parliament was prorogued in April, three weeks after the sentence upon Sacheverell. On the night of the prorogation the queen

1710. The
impeach-
ment,
February.

dismissed her Whig chamberlain, the marquis of Kent, who was consoled with a dukedom, and gave the office to Shrewsbury, who for many years had retired from active politics, and though supposed to be a Whig had no connection with the Junto. Among the Whigs the duke of Somerset had a small following of his own, and dreamt of displacing the Junto by a ministry of moderates. Shrewsbury's attitude was uncertain. In June the next blow was struck by the dismissal of Sunderland and the appointment of Dartmouth, a 'Hanover Tory,' to his secretaryship. In August Godolphin followed Sunderland. The treasury was put in commission, and Harley entered the ministry as chancellor of the exchequer. He was still engaged in persuading the Whigs that 'a Whig game was intended at bottom.' He wanted to keep their support at least in part. But the distrust of him grew; one after another they resigned. If Harley really wanted a coalition he had overreached himself. By the end of September scarcely a Whig remained in the ministry; all their places had been taken by Tories. And yet the House of Commons was still the Whig House which had been elected in 1708. A dissolution was obviously necessary, and the general election returned a large majority of Tories.

**Whig
dismissals
and resigna-
tions, April-
September.**

But it was not yet time to remove Marlborough. The duke had never been a party politician; had he been so, had he been the acknowledged leader of the Whigs, he could have carried them with him in 1709 in his personal opposition to the Spanish monarchy clause and the Barrier Treaty. As matters stood, since the breach between the queen and his wife, it is improbable that he could have turned the course of events by threatening resignation. And as yet, Harley did not want to be rid of him, since, even as matters stood, the allies abroad and the bank and the moneyed interests at home were taking alarm, and his dismissal might have caused a panic and a reaction. But Harley was not the master of the Tory party. The wilder spirits were thirsting for vindictive treatment of the Whigs, with whom it appeared that Harley was dallying. St. John was aspiring to the leader's

**Harley and
St. John,
September-
April,
1710-11.**

place himself. Hoping to procure overwhelming proofs of peculation on the part of the late ministry, they forced upon the government a commission to inquire into the public accounts. They overshot their mark, as Walpole, in a couple of very able pamphlets, shattered the accusations which had been brought forward, and thereby incidentally established his own reputation as the greatest living master of figures. On the other hand, a foolish attempt upon Harley's life brought to that minister a great access of popularity. St. John saw that it was not yet time to break with his leader, who was created earl of Oxford.

Just at this time a material change in the European situation was created by the unlooked-for death of the Emperor Joseph.

1711. Though he had daughters, he left no male offspring ;
Death of with the result that the Austrian succession, and,
Joseph I., as a matter of course, the Imperial crown, went to
April his brother the Archduke Charles, the titular Charles III. of Spain. The war of the Spanish Succession and the organisation of the Grand Alliance by William III. had been undertaken to preserve the balance of power by a partition of the Spanish dominion between the Bourbon and the Hapsburg claimants. In 1703, the scheme of partition had been dropped, and the Hapsburg candidate had been adopted by the allies, but with the expectation that there would be two separate Hapsburg dominions, a Hapsburg dynasty in the Spanish empire and a Hapsburg dynasty in Austria—as there had been for the last century and a half. But this was quite a different thing from a single Hapsburg dominion including both the Austrian and the Spanish empires, a scheme which had never been countenanced by William III.

The Tories could not as yet openly avow a desire for peace upon the terms that Philip should be acknowledged as king of

Secret Spain conditionally upon security that the crowns
negotiations of France and Spain should never be joined. Ox-
with Louis. ford, according to his custom, preferred working under cover. Although all the members of the Grand Alliance were pledged not to enter upon negotiations privately, overtures

were made to the French government, and secret negotiations were conducted through the year 1711. It might perhaps be argued fairly enough that in view of the conflicting interests of the allies, the only hope of peace lay in one or another of them coming to a preliminary agreement with France, and then bringing the utmost pressure upon the rest of the allies to adopt its provisions. That course would doubtless have brought charges of a technical breach of faith, but it had been followed with justification by William in the case of the Peace of Ryswick. In this matter it does not appear that the British ministry can justly be blamed.

In the year's campaigning no notable success attended either side. Eugene was sent to the Rhine, and Marlborough, outnumbered by the army of Villars, outmanœuvred his opponent and captured Bouchain. But this was all; and still the road was not yet clear to Paris. In September, conventions were signed in London between the French and the British, a part of which were then submitted to the allies as preliminaries of peace. The special terms, however, which Great Britain claimed for herself were still unpublished.

Peace pre-
liminaries
submitted,
September.

It seemed probable in England that Oxford would aim at a combination with Marlborough. That prospect determined St. John that Marlborough must fall. On the other hand, the Whigs made overtures to Nottingham, a High Tory and a High Churchman, but one who was determined in favour of the Protestant succession—a reason perhaps for his having been neglected by Harley. The Whig predominance in the Upper House remained unchanged and, in fact, a struggle between the Houses was anticipated. A bargain was struck. Nottingham opened an attack upon the peace preliminaries, which were known to be displeasing to the elector of Hanover. He repeated the old claim that neither Spain nor the West Indies should go to a Bourbon. He was supported by Marlborough and by the Whigs; the *quid pro quo* had been the promise by the Whigs that they would themselves pass a mild bill to check occasional conformity. Nottingham's resolution

Nottingham
and the
Whigs.

was carried in the Lords, but it was defeated in the Commons by more than two to one.

The rest of the Tories united in the determination to destroy Marlborough and to clear the way by an attack upon Walpole, whom no offers had successfully tempted to secession from the Whigs. He was charged with speculation as secretary at war. His vindication was so successful that the Tories could only muster a majority of fifty-seven to pronounce him guilty of corruption. When it was moved that he should be expelled the House, the majority was halved. In the final majority which ordered that he should be sent to the Tower there were only twelve.

The attack upon Walpole was followed up by corresponding attacks upon Marlborough. He was charged with receiving commissions upon the bread contracts for the army amounting to over £60,000, and with appropriating four times as much out of the sums provided for the payment of foreign troops. The duke showed that in the latter case he had acted upon a perfectly definite arrangement made with him by William and the allies, the money having been spent by him in accordance therewith upon secret service. A similar defence applied to the bread contracts. The system itself was manifestly a bad one, not because it involved dishonesty, but because it opened the door for speculation. The duke had no other allowance for secret service, and there is no doubt at all, from the excellence of that service, that his expenditure was ample and well applied. There is, in short, no doubt that but for the exigencies of party spite he would have been triumphantly acquitted. But as matters stood he was disgraced and dismissed from all his offices. The injustice turned the tide of popularity in the duke's favour, and the ministers did not dare to proceed to an impeachment. It was now certain that the peace proposals would be defeated in the Lords, and that the result of a struggle between Lords and Commons would be doubtful. The ministry took the unprecedented step of creating twelve Tory peers to secure a majority in the Upper House.

So matters stood at the beginning of 1712. Oxford and St.

John were resolved upon the peace to which they had secretly agreed, a peace in which British interests were very fully guarded ; though with by no means equal consideration for the allies. The chiefs had to anticipate that they would be charged with bad faith and with playing for their own hand. Therefore, they made it their business to fortify themselves as against the allies by procuring a series of resolutions complaining of the failure of the allies to fulfil their own obligations in the course of the war, backed by a vote of censure on the ministers and the plenipotentiary who had negotiated and ratified the Barrier Treaty. Before the end of January the peace conferences began at Utrecht ; but while they were going on the British ministers were carrying on their own private negotiations with a fully justified confidence in the procrastinating capacities of a gathering such as that of Utrecht.

1712.
Position of
ministers,
January.

The situation, in fact, became further complicated in February by the death of Louis's grandson and heir, Louis of Burgundy, and of the elder of his two children. Only a sickly baby of two stood between Philip of Spain and the succession to the French throne. Nobody expected the baby Louis to live. Nobody could admit the possibility of allowing Philip to hold the throne of Spain and succeed to the throne of France. Any mere renunciation of the French succession on his part would be hopelessly discounted by previous announcements that even if made they would never be valid. The English ministers were confident that Philip would accept the proposal they now made, that he should resign the Spanish crown in favour of the duke of Savoy, and should receive some compensation in Italy. Even that would be demanding a good deal of Austria ; but in England the Tories would at any rate be able to say that they had prevented the Bourbon succession in Spain. Their confidence was increased by the assent of Louis, though that of Philip was still necessary. At the end of May, ministers ventured to announce that peace conditions would very shortly be laid before the parliament.

Effect of
death of
Burgundy,
February.

They had indeed felt so secure that they had already been guilty of a portentous breach of faith with the allies. The duke of Ormonde, a well-meaning person but easily to be managed by more astute politicians, had been sent to the Netherlands to take the command in the place of Marlborough. The States-General had been formally advised that her Britannic Majesty intended to carry on the war as vigorously as ever until satisfactory terms of peace should be arrived at. But early in May Ormonde, who had joined Eugene, now in supreme command, received private instructions from St. John that he was to join in no siege and to fight no battle without further orders; that Marshal Villars had been notified of these instructions, and that Ormonde was to act accordingly; in other words, he was to desert the allies in the field. Ormonde accepted the iniquitous task, but being quite unskilled in dissimulation, he could not prevent the allies from very soon discovering the real position of affairs. A protest from the States-General was met by the answer that, in effect, their own disregard of their obligations had released Great Britain from the duty of respecting her engagements to them. And almost at the same moment ministers received from Spain the startling intelligence that Philip quite refused to surrender the Spanish crown.

V. THE TREATY OF UTRECHT AND THE TORY DEBACLE, 1712-1714

For the Tories the first and imperative necessity was to procure a treaty so favourable to Great Britain that whatever was discreditable in their conduct would be condoned. Otherwise, there was no clear vision among them of the policy to be pursued. Oxford, perfectly aware that St. John, who, at the beginning of July, was created Viscount Bolingbroke, was aiming at taking his place as leader of the party, was on the one side intriguing for Whig support and on the other was encouraging James to believe that he might pronounce against the Hanoverian succession. There was, in fact, a very general impression that if James would but declare

himself a Protestant the Stuart restoration would be assured. Oxford was not in the least a Jacobite, but he wanted to be prepared for emergencies. Bolingbroke, on the other hand, had made up his mind that the game to play was that of aggressive Toryism, of bidding for the enthusiastic support of the extremists, not the qualified support of moderates. He had already attacked the Whigs by a bill for investigating the grants of land made in the reign of William III., though the proposal was defeated through the rule that on an equal division 'the noes have it.' The Scots were punished for their Whiggery by the imposition of the English tax upon malt which had been expressly debarred, so long as the war should be going on, by the Treaty of Union. So great was the irritation that a demand for the repeal of the Union was barely defeated in the House of Lords. By the beginning of 1713 the situation was so critical that the government warned France that if there were further delay in acceding to its explicit demands active hostilities would be renewed.

This put a prompt end to procrastination. On 31st March (O.S. ; 11th April, N.S.) the Treaty of Utrecht was signed on behalf of France, Great Britain, Holland, Portugal, Savoy, and Prussia. The emperor still held out, along with the minor German states which would not separate themselves from him. It soon became obvious, however, that nothing could come of continuing the duel, and Charles VI. accepted at the Treaty of Rastadt, early in 1714, the terms of the peace which the rest of the allies had made at Utrecht.

The partition of the Spanish empire was accomplished. Spain and the Indies went to the Bourbon candidate, whose succession to the French throne France was most solemnly pledged in no circumstances to recognise—however slight a value might be attached to such pledges. France retained Alsace, including Strasburg ; the duke of Savoy got Sicily. The Austrian share consisted of Naples and the Milanese, Sardinia, and the Netherlands, except for the specified concessions made to Holland in respect of Barrier towns. Holland obtained military control of the line of fortified towns along the

**1713. Treaty
of Utrecht,
April.**

**Terms of
the treaty.**

frontier between the French and the Austrian Netherlands—Furnes, Ypres, Menin, Tournay, Mons, Charleroi, and Namur, as well as Ghent. France's ally, the elector of Bavaria, was restored to the dominions of which he had been bereft by the battle of Blenheim. Setting aside Great Britain, the distribution of territory at the end of the war was very much that which would have fully satisfied William when the war began. That the allies should have been dissatisfied at receiving no more after a long and exhausting struggle, in which they had been quite emphatically the victors, was natural; but the great gains of the struggle went to Great Britain.

When William and Louis made their Second Partition Treaty the crown of Spain itself was assigned to the Austrian candidate, **Gains of Great Britain.** because, in effect, William's condition for giving the Spanish share to the Bourbons was the acquisition by the British of a naval base in the Mediterranean. That condition was now fulfilled; Minorca and Gibraltar were ceded to the maritime power. The Tory pamphleteers had clamoured because naval supremacy was not used for the seizure of French and Spanish colonies in America; nevertheless that very end was attained by the treaty; for Britain acquired not only St. Kitts in the West Indies, but that perpetual bone of contention in North America, Acadia, or Nova Scotia; as well as the Hudson Bay territory, and Newfoundland, subject to the reservation of certain fishing rights. But this was not all. William had sought for his kingdom and for Holland trading concessions. Louis, in 1701, had sought to appropriate for France the monopoly of the trade with the Spanish colonies; the exclusive possession of the slave-trade had been at the outset conveyed to her under a compact known as the *Assiento*. By the Treaty of Utrecht the *Assiento* was transferred from France to Great Britain, and with it rights of trading, though under strict limitations, in the South Seas. Finally, France was not only pledged to acknowledge the Hanoverian succession, but also undertook to remove the Pretender from French territory; while Dunkirk, a nest of French privateers during the war, was to be dismantled. Great Britain at least had no cause to complain of the harvest she had gathered.

Nevertheless, she had won it at the price of national dishonour. She had forced her allies to agree to the terms so profitable to her by deserting them in the field. To this she **The price.** could indeed pretend the excuse that they had played her false by shirking their obligations and hampering her generals. But upon no pretext whatever could she excuse her base desertion of the Catalans or of the Protestants of the Cevennes, whom she had during the course of the war deliberately incited to revolt by promises of support. She was pledged up to the hilt to secure for the Catalans the political privileges of which they had been bereft. They had risen to arms and fought stubbornly throughout the war on the side of the allies on the faith of British pledges. The negotiators of the Treaty of Utrecht infamously left them to the tender mercies of Philip, who took upon them a ruthless revenge.

The Treaty of Utrecht is one of the great landmarks of international politics. It marked the final defeat of Louis's great projects of French expansion. It marked also the point at which Holland slipped finally back from her position in the front rank of the European powers. **The treaty marks an epoch.**

During the war her navy had become no more than an auxiliary of the British ; Great Britain, not Holland, secured by the peace a naval base in the Mediterranean ; Great Britain, not Holland, gained the commercial concessions which signalised the fact that she had become a long way the first of the commercial nations. Holland, in fact, had gained little by the war except security against being eaten up by France ; while the drain upon her resources had finally reduced her to the position of a minor power. And here we must also remark upon the changes that had been taking place in the north and east of Europe outside the sphere of the war of the Spanish Succession. Hitherto Russia had not counted as a power at all ; but during these years Peter the Great had been organising a great empire which was destined to play a leading part in the future. Sweden had blazed into a sudden and portentous activity under Charles XII., whose brilliant successes had been followed by scarcely less startling disasters. His name was still one ' at which the world grew pale,'

but within a very few years his star was to set for ever, and Sweden, like Holland, was to pass finally into the ranks of the minor powers.

In England the treaty was at first received, naturally enough, with popular satisfaction. It had, however, been accompanied

The concurrent treaty of commerce. by a separate commercial treaty between France and Great Britain which excited the extreme hostility of the British commercial community. In the early stages of the war, when first Portugal

joined the allies, a commercial treaty had been arranged with Portugal, known as the Methuen Treaty, under which Portuguese wines were to be admitted to England subject to duties much lower than the wines of France ; while there were to be correspondingly low duties on English goods, especially English wool, imported to Portugal. Great store was set by the Methuen Treaty, because the Portuguese trade was regarded as particularly profitable. The export of English goods to Portugal was considerably greater than the import of Portuguese goods. It followed that the balance was paid by Portugal in bullion. Because the trade increased the amount of bullion, it was held to be good for the country. Now the Tory commercial treaty proposed to place France and England in the relation of the 'most favoured nation' to each other ; that is to say, neither country was to impose upon goods from the other duties higher than it imposed upon similar imports from elsewhere. But the expansion of commerce with France would be injurious, according to the mercantile theory—the doctrine of the balance of trade. It would mean that bullion would go out of England into France ; therefore we should be injuring ourselves and benefiting France. And at the same time we should injure our trade with Portugal, through the loss of the preference on her wines, and so we should be substituting an injurious for a beneficial trade. So strong was the opposition to the commercial treaty that the Whigs were able to defeat it in parliament.

Still, the Tories considered that the opportunity was favourable for securing their parliamentary predominance. There was a dissolution, and a general election which returned a smaller

but still a very substantial Tory majority; a majority, moreover, in which there was a much larger proportion than before of the extreme partisans upon whom Bolingbroke relied to make himself leader in place of Oxford.

A general election, August.

Queen Anne's health was breaking down, and there was every probability that her successor would soon be on the throne. Parliament had settled who that successor was to be, and the country had acquiesced. Whether the old electress, the granddaughter of a king of England, survived her cousin or not, it could not be very long before her son George, the elector, would be on the British throne should the Act of Succession take effect. Still, there were large numbers of Tories who had given unquestioning support to Mary and William and Anne, whose loyalist instincts shrank from the accession of a German prince when there was a grandson of the Royal Martyr to claim the throne. If James could only have been persuaded of the converse of that proposition upon which Henry IV. of France had acted, that 'the crown was worth a Mass,' the queen herself and the whole Tory party would have declared against the Hanoverian succession. But on that point James, a much maligned person, was obdurate. He would not barter his faith even for the crown of Great Britain. Nothing would induce him to do more than to promise British Protestants their liberties. Common sense forbade a Stuart restoration on those conditions, but sentiment has been known to override common sense.

The succession: the queen and the Tories.

On the other hand, the Whigs did not want a Stuart restoration at any price. The moneyed interests believed that it would be followed by the repudiation of the National Debt. The Dissenters believed that it would mean the toleration of Popery, and even at the very best the ascendancy of a thoroughly intolerant Anglicanism. The politicians foresaw in it the restoration of vanished prerogatives, the domination of the Crown over parliament, and the total ruin of their own party. They made up their minds that it was their first business to secure the Hanoverian succession, and to ensure for

The succession: the Whigs.

themselves a monopoly of the favour of the house of Hanover, a programme to which they devoted themselves with assiduity.

The Tories suffered from divided counsels; Oxford gave no lead. He was still facing both ways, still trying to attach **Bolingbroke**. moderates from all parties to himself. There was a solid group of Hanover Tories who were determined to maintain the Protestant succession. There were large numbers of Tories whose Jacobitism was scarcely veiled. The bulk of the party were fanatically Anglican and fanatically anti-Whig, but otherwise without clear ideas. But there was one man among them, Bolingbroke, who knew his own mind. He meant in the first place to make a clean sweep of the Whigs, to oust Oxford from the leadership of the Tories, to create among the Tories themselves a solid phalanx which would obey the word of command without question, to dominate the queen. When that was accomplished he meant to choose the queen's successor. And he had very little doubt that the successor of his choice would be James, though it was not safe to admit so much as yet.

He almost succeeded. He bought Lady Masham, whose husband had been raised to the peerage, and who was angry at being in her own estimation insufficiently rewarded
 1714.
Cross by Oxford. Harley's former tool was turned into an
currents. instrument for displacing him in the queen's favour.

From top to bottom of the army Whigs were being displaced by Tories; Ormonde, its chief, was captured for Jacobitism. The Hanover Tories were uneasy. Led by Nottingham they joined the Whigs in attacking the ministry for the desertion of the Catalans, and in declaring that the Hanoverian succession was in danger. The Whigs offended the queen, but not the elector, by recommending that he should come over himself to secure his position. In the spring of 1714 Bolingbroke played his trump card, and appealed to Anglican fanaticism. He introduced the Schism Act to deprive Dissenters of the control of their own children's education, clearly a step towards the revival of the Clarendon Code. The bill was carried; in the Commons it rallied the Tories to Bolingbroke. Shortly afterwards parliament was prorogued. Bolingbroke had won the day with the queen. On 27th July she dismissed Oxford at the council

board. Before the council rose, some time after midnight, the cabinet was reconstructed, and almost every position of importance was given to some adherent of Bolingbroke who was more than suspected of Jacobite leanings, though the inscrutable Shrewsbury was still president of the council. At last Bolingbroke had a free hand.

But it was too late. In the winter Anne had suffered from a very severe illness which had almost killed her. She had never really recovered. The excitement of the scene at the council board when she dismissed Oxford was her death-blow. Bolingbroke had still all his work to do to secure the Jacobite restoration, in which was his sole hope ; but the Whigs had already done their work for securing the Hanoverian succession. They were already prepared for the crisis. Scarcely forty-eight hours after the dismissal of Oxford Anne had an apoplectic stroke. The council was summoned and was sitting, when suddenly two of the privy councillors, the Whigs Argyll and Somerset, entered to proffer their assistance and advice in the crisis. Technically every member of the Privy Council had a right to attend whether summoned or not. Bolingbroke was helpless. Shrewsbury, the president of the council, who had probably arranged the incident, welcomed the newcomers. No successor to Oxford had been appointed as lord treasurer ; failing some other appointment the death of the queen would mean his resumption of office. All Bolingbroke dared do was to propose that it should be given to Shrewsbury. The report was brought in that the queen had recovered consciousness. A deputation from the council went to her bedside ; she had enough vitality left in her to do as they desired, and handed to Shrewsbury the treasurer's staff with the words, ' Use it for the good of my people.' The deputation returned, and all the available members of the Privy Council, many of them Whigs, were immediately summoned. It was this body, not Bolingbroke's new cabinet, which took over the control. There was no possibility of resistance. Two days later the queen was dead, and George I. was proclaimed king, while none dared to raise a dissenting voice. It was not Bolingbroke, but the Whigs who had won the game by a successful *coup de main*.

La reine est
morte,
1st August.

CHAPTER III. THE HANOVERIAN SUCCESSION

I. GEORGE I. AND STANHOPE, 1714-1721

IN accordance with an earlier statute of Queen Anne's reign, the government of the country upon her death, until the arrival of

1714. King George, was vested in a body of lords justices
Accession of nominated by the elector of Hanover. When the
George I. list was opened it was found to contain the name of only one of the ministers, Shrewsbury. The other seventeen, with few exceptions, were Whig peers, though the Hanover Tories, Nottingham and Anglesey, were included. The most notable omissions were Somers—probably on account of ill-health—Marlborough, and Sunderland. Marlborough, since the death of Godolphin in 1712, had resided abroad, but it can hardly be doubted that his exclusion was due to distrust; although he was very shortly afterwards reinstated at the head of the army. It is certain that he had been seeking to make his peace with James in case of accidents, while still assuring the elector of his loyalty to the Hanoverian succession. He was, however, back as captain-general within a week of George's accession. Before the end of August Bolingbroke and Ormonde were both dismissed. On 18th September King George arrived in England.

With the single exception of Nottingham, unless we add Shrewsbury, all of the new ministry were Whigs. Townshend and Stanhope were secretaries of state, the latter
The new being distinguished both as a soldier and as a diplo-
king. matist, with an exceptional knowledge of foreign affairs. In Scotland Mar, who had been active for the Union, but had latterly been associated with Bolingbroke, was displaced as secretary of state by Montrose, and Argyll became commander-in-chief. George himself was fifty-four years of age. He was an uncom-

promising German, with a singularly unhappy matrimonial record, which was one cause of perpetual estrangement between him and his son ; he was accompanied by extremely unattractive German mistresses ; and he could not speak English, while there was not one of his English ministers who could talk German. The result was inevitable. He very soon ceased to attend the meetings of the council or cabinet, the cabinet conducted the affairs of the nation, and the way was prepared for a Prime Minister to become the acting head of the state, a change which was completed under Robert Walpole's long tenure of power.

King George had none of the attributes which tend to awaken personal loyalty. From the English point of view he was merely a figurehead, set upon the throne in order to prevent **Jacobitism**, it from being occupied by a Roman Catholic. He was there upon sufferance ; if he proved troublesome he would be no better than a Stuart, and would be sent back to Hanover. Even if he were not troublesome, his tenure of power depended upon the stolid common sense of the nation ; everything in the nature of sentiment was on the Jacobite side. To the Whigs, indeed, and to the moneyed interest, it was a matter of first-rate importance that the dynasty should be established ; that was the condition of the victory of the principles of the Revolution and of financial stability. The landed interest as such had no equivalent inducements, and Toryism as such had no affection for the principles of the Revolution. If the Jacobites had been intelligent, King George's position would have been extremely precarious. Fortunately for the Hanoverian succession the Jacobites were not intelligent. In a manner more creditable to his heart than to his head James published declarations which emphasised his own adherence to Catholicism, and implied that the late Tory ministry had been in favour of his restoration. The effect was shown when parliament was dissolved, and a new one elected in January. The Whigs were returned with a majority of a hundred and fifty in the House of Commons. In the proclamation of the dissolution the Whigs had driven home the identification of Toryism with Jacobitism. The Tory party in parliament was irretrievably ruined.

In March the Whigs opened the attack on the late ministers. Bolingbroke took fright at the seizure of some papers, and fled to France in disguise. In June the impeachment of Bolingbroke, Oxford, and Ormonde was voted. Oxford kept his head. He was confident that the case against him rested upon nothing stronger than his responsibility for the Treaty of Utrecht; and to impeach a man for proceedings which had twice been ratified by parliament was, in his eyes, an empty threat; but Ormonde followed Bolingbroke's example and fled. The Whigs gained nothing by proceedings which to the public appeared merely vindictive; there was a reaction, especially among the disorderly elements in the country, and the Jacobites abroad developed an increasing conviction that a blow for the restoration would be successful.

Now there were two conditions without which there could be no hope of a Jacobite success: military help from abroad, and thorough organisation at home as well as in James's own immediate circle. That prince was now in Lorraine. It was not unreasonable to hope for help from France; Louis's promise to recognise the Hanoverian succession was of no great value, and at this juncture Great Britain was secure of no allies. But Jacobite organisation simply did not exist, and the government in England was much better prepared for an insurrection than the Jacobites. On 1st September a fatal blow fell; Louis died. His death, leaving the infant Louis xv. king, threw the regency upon the next prince of the blood, Philip, duke of Orleans, the nephew of Louis; the old king's third grandson, the duke of Berry, having died very recently. Orleans knew that his own chances of the French crown would be extremely doubtful if his cousin, Philip of Spain, should assert his claim; consequently, his interest centred in the strict maintenance of the Treaty of Utrecht. The obvious policy for him was to support the house of Hanover in return for the British guarantee of his own rights of succession in France. Consequently, the prospect of French intervention under the regency in favour of a Jacobite restoration was exceedingly remote.

1715.

The Whig
victory.Death of
Louis XIV.,
September.

Amongst all the inept insurrections recorded in history, the palm for ineptitude must be awarded to 'The Fifteen.' Nothing had been arranged except that it was intended that Ormond should head an invasion. The earl of Mar, after blowing hot and cold for some time, had ended by turning Jacobite. He betook himself to the north, having first procured from James a commission to act as commander-in-chief of the royalist forces in Scotland; on the pretext of a great hunting-party, he collected a number of Jacobite nobles to whom his plans, such as they were, were revealed, and proceeded to proclaim James III. and VIII. on 6th September. Some of the clans came in zealously enough. A good many of the chiefs adopted the device of dividing their families; Atholl sent his eldest son, the marquis of Tullibardine, to join Mar, while he stopped at home himself, and sent such intelligence as he thought fit to the government. Mar collected a respectable force and occupied Perth, while the government occupied Stirling in force, and dispatched Argyll to collect the Campbells and other Whig clans and take the command. Mar was strong enough to have swooped upon Edinburgh, but remained where he was in stupid inactivity.

**The Fifteen:
Mar in the
north, Sep-
tember.**

In Scotland the government's position was weak, but in England it was very well prepared. A few leading Jacobites were arrested, and the rest were not slow to realise that every isolated attempt at a rising would be nipped in the bud. Ormonde sailed to Tor Bay, but meeting with no response sailed back again. In the north there was more activity. In the Scottish Lowlands some of the Tory peers got a force together at Kelso. In Northumberland what can only be called a rabble of Tory squires collected under the leadership of Thomas Forster and Lord Derwentwater. These two parties got themselves together, and were reinforced by a few troops under Brigadier M'Intosh, detached by Mar; even then they numbered only about two thousand men. They marched up and down on the Border unable to make up their minds what to do. The Englishmen would not march north to help Mar in crushing Argyll; the Highlanders objected to marching into England. At last when the eastern route into

**The rising on
the border.**

England was blocked by a few government troops they resolved to follow an evil precedent and to march—without the Highlanders—by way of Carlisle and Preston, raising the Jacobites. They raised no one, and when they got to Preston they omitted the most ordinary military precautions and surrendered at discretion; having apparently quite overrated the forces which beset them there, and having also persuaded themselves that the terms included what amounted to a promise of pardon.

On that same day, 13th November, Argyll and Mar met at the battle of Sheriffmuir, in Perthshire, when

‘We ran and they ran, and they ran and we ran,
And we ran and they ran awa’, man.’

Both sides, in fact, did more running than fighting, and there fell all told only a few hundreds. The main reason for treating **Sheriffmuir**. the affair as a government victory was that Mar chose to regard it in that light and beat a retreat. Such was the decisive battle of a campaign on which depended the crown of Great Britain. From the beginning there had never been any heart in the futile conflict. There was no fuel for a conflagration. When it was all over James himself appeared, to join the army in Scotland; but he was the last man to bring fresh heart to the disheartened. Argyll, indeed, was in no hurry to push his advantage; but the disgusted clansmen were very soon dribbling away to their own glens after their usual fashion. The Jacobite forces dwindled, and when at last after the turn of the year Argyll began to press forward, they fell back to the coast, where James was persuaded to take ship secretly and sail away again. Thus dolefully smouldered out the melancholy ‘Fifteen.’

There were a very few executions; the Scots were justifiably wrath because some of them were tried at Carlisle, a breach of **End of the Fifteen.** the Act of Union. There were members of the government, notably Walpole, who wished to strike hard; but, in fact, too many of the great families were playing for safety, doubtful what the future might bring forth and anxious to keep well with both sides, to be at all disposed to severity, which might cost them dear if there happened to be a turn of

the wheel. Caution, not magnanimity, was the motive of leniency. There was little enough in the way of ostensible results, except the making of some military roads in the Highlands, and a very ineffective measure of disarmament. But at least it had become evident that the Jacobites would have a very poor chance unless they improved their methods; and James, without further delay, showed the extreme improbability of any such consummation by dismissing the most capable of his adherents, Bolingbroke.

The rebellion was over. Two peers, Derwentwater and Kenmure, had been executed as well as between twenty and thirty commoners. Very nearly every one concerned had made most unedifying exhibitions of themselves. The judges had bullied the prisoners; the prisoners had been treated in an indecently ignominious fashion; the king's personal behaviour could hardly have been less kingly. No one came out of the affair with credit except a few of the rank and file, who had risked their lives for a cause which they believed to be righteous, and who had no responsibility for the blundering incapacity of their leaders. There are but faint glimpses of that splendid devotion which thirty years later was to shed an imperishable lustre upon a ruined cause.

But out of the 'Fifteen,' and the general sense of insecurity of which it was the symptom, there came one curious product. It created a doubt as to the possible results of a parliamentary general election. The government felt that a defeat at the polls might seriously endanger the whole Revolution Settlement. In order to avoid the risk a bill was introduced to extend the period of a parliament's life to seven years instead of three. The House elected in January 1715 claimed authority to prolong its own existence beyond the term for which it had been elected. It was not moved by an abstract conviction of the superior merits of a Septennial over a Triennial parliament, but by the concrete danger of an immediate accession of the Jacobites to power. The only precedent was in the action of the Long Parliament, which had passed a statute prolonging its own existence till it should choose to

**The
Septennial
Act, 1716.**

vote its own dissolution. The Tories, however, could hardly use the argument of unconstitutionality with effect, since when they were in power they had been contemplating a step of the same kind themselves. The bill was passed, and its immediate utility was felt through its effect on foreign governments ; since it ensured that the conduct of foreign affairs would remain for several years in the same hands instead of being subject to sharp reversals at short intervals. The Septennial Act remained in force until the changes introduced by the Parliament Act of 1911.

The accession of George I. placed upon the throne of Great Britain a monarch who lacked knowledge of and interest in the domestic affairs of his new kingdom. William III., already a continental statesman of the first rank before he came to England at all, nevertheless played a king's part in British affairs. George left British affairs entirely to his ministers. But he had a personal interest in and knowledge of foreign affairs, because although he was not a continental statesman of the first rank he was nevertheless a prince of the German empire as well as king of Great Britain. Hanover had interests of its own, and he naturally wanted to use his new kingdom in support of those interests. His ministers, therefore, had a difficult task. George's British subjects would certainly be extremely jealous of anything which could be given the colour of Hanoverianism, that is, of being dictated by the interests of Hanover rather than of Great Britain. Even if the interests of the two states happened to coincide, as on the whole they did more often than not, the mere fact that a particular policy would be productive of advantage to Hanover would lay it open to suspicion, and would provide Jacobitism with an opportunity of clamouring against the evil result of setting the British crown upon the head of a German potentate. And yet it was necessary to seek the advantage of Hanover, if it was only to secure the right of claiming a *quid pro quo* when occasion should arise.

The treaties of Utrecht and Rastadt left the European situation in an extremely complicated state. Neither Austria nor Spain

was in the least satisfied with the terms. The Emperor Charles vi. still regarded the Spanish crown as being his of right, while Philip v. still considered that the Italian territories allotted to Austria belonged to Spain. **The French succession.** Moreover, Philip, having two sons by his first wife, the daughter of the duke of Savoy, had taken for his second wife Elizabeth Farnese of Parma, a lady of vigorous temperament and strong will, who was determined that her own children should not be left out in the cold. It was certain that if Spain got an opportunity she would endeavour to recover her Italian dominions. Then there was the question of the French succession. Assuming the validity of Philip's renunciation, the next heir after the infant heir apparent was the duke of Orleans, son of the brother of Louis xiv. But it was the general opinion among French lawyers that the French crown was indefeasible, and that Philip had no power to renounce the title for himself or for his offspring. Louis xiv. was seventy-five; his sickly great-grandson was not at all likely to survive him many years. There was therefore every probability that in a very short time the question of the French succession would become critical.

For Great Britain the question of first-rate importance was the security of the Hanoverian succession. The Treaty of Utrecht had broken the bond between her and her old allies **Hanover and the Baltic.** Austria and Holland; any power with whom she quarrelled would be ready to utilise the Stuart claim as a weapon against her. Therefore, both for the Whigs and for George, it was a matter of great importance to restore the old relations with Austria and Holland—to make it in the interests of both to guarantee George's throne. But the fact that George was elector of Hanover introduced a further complication. The Baltic powers, Russia, Prussia, and Denmark, were all interested in completing the ejection of Sweden from the southern shores of the Baltic. Hanover was joined with them in a league which had all but accomplished this purpose; and Hanover's share of the spoils was to be Bremen and Verden, which would round off the Hanoverian territory by giving to it the control of the mouths of the Weser and the Elbe. On the other hand, it was

extremely doubtful whether Great Britain could be persuaded to regard this question as one in which she had a direct interest. Her relations with Sweden were friendly, and a quarrel with Charles XII. might very easily make that erratic monarch an active enemy, ready in his own interests, and for the punishment of George and his British antagonists, to apply his brilliant military talents to a Stuart restoration.

Turning once more to the south and the antagonism between Austria and Spain: Spain had this present advantage that **Alberoni**. Austria would be hampered in the defence of her territories by the war on which she was engaged with the Turks. Cardinal Alberoni, the clever statesman, who, subject to the domination of Queen Elizabeth, controlled Spanish policy at this time, was very well aware that the employment of British sea-power in the Mediterranean would turn the scale decisively; consequently, it was his present desire to conciliate Great Britain by commercial concessions which would prevent her intervention.

The man who, for six years, was the real director of British policy was Stanhope, who saw clearly that the first necessity **Stanhope's** was to re-establish those friendly relations with **policy.** Holland and with the emperor which were traditional with the Whigs, and had only been broken off during the Tory ascendancy. In this he was seconded by George's Hanoverian ministers. The isolation of Great Britain was ended in 1716 by two separate alliances with Austria and Holland. On the other hand, the British ministry declined to join the Anti-Swedish league; but since Charles XII. had, from the British point of view, transgressed the rights of neutrals by sea, a British fleet was sent to the Baltic, not to open hostilities, but to protect British shipping. The practical effect was the same. The Swedish fleet was paralysed, the Swedes were driven out of their last foothold on the south of the Baltic, and the possession of the desired provinces was guaranteed to Hanover.

Early in 1716, before the completion of the Dutch and Austrian treaties, George procured the repeal of the clause in the Act of Settlement, which forbade the king to go abroad without express

parliamentary sanction. He went to Hanover, accompanied by Stanhope, and was there joined by Sunderland ; while his son, who had been created Prince of Wales, remained in England as regent, with Townshend as acting chief minister. The outcome of this was presently to be a disruption among the Whigs. Now, Townshend found himself in disagreement with Stanhope, and the king found it very easy to believe that his son was forming, along with Townshend and his brother-in-law, Walpole, a party of his own. The disagreements reached such a pitch that early in 1717 Townshend was dismissed, and his dismissal was followed by the resignation of Walpole and several other leading Whigs. The idea of joint responsibility of ministers was coming into being.

Meanwhile, Stanhope had negotiated a new departure in alliances, with most important results. To the regent Orleans it was a matter of first-rate consequence to secure his own succession to Louis xv. ; that is to say, it was in his personal interest to prevent the union of the French and Spanish crowns. The British alliance, on terms of a mutual guarantee of the succession in both countries as laid down by the Treaty of Utrecht, was extremely desirable from his point of view. The direct result was the Triple Alliance between France, Great Britain, and Holland, which completely disposed of any present prospect of France giving aid to James ; and further procured the dismantling of Dunkirk and Mardyke which France had hitherto evaded. An indirect outcome was that when the interests of the French and British governments had become identified, and the two countries acted together by land and sea to enforce a common policy, France left naval operations entirely to the British ; and the result of this again was that France made no attempt to reconstruct a powerful navy, while the British navy became more and more decisively supreme on the seas. It now became the leading object with Stanhope to press Austria into the alliance, in which Great Britain would be the controlling power. To this end Austria was finally to resign her claims on the Spanish crown but was to be secured in her possessions in Italy, while she was to transfer to Savoy

Sardinia in exchange for Sicily ; and the duchies of Tuscany and Parma were to be bestowed upon the sons of Elizabeth of Spain, but were to be separated in perpetuity from the Spanish crown. Meanwhile, the good offices of Great Britain were to be employed in procuring a satisfactory peace between Austria and Turkey. The Quadruple Alliance, however, was not completed until the end of August 1718.

When it was realised in Spain that no commercial treaties would be allowed to detach Great Britain from her Austrian policy, and from maintaining the Orleans succession in France, Alberoni's plans changed. While he was working in France to build up a legitimist party which should overthrow Orleans, he saw in the northern complications an opportunity for striking at Great Britain. Sweden had been irritated in 1715 and 1716 by the action of the British fleet. But in 1716 George took alarm at the proceedings of his anti-Swedish ally the Tsar Peter the Great. Peter occupied Mecklenburg, and his doing so appeared to George to be a menace to Hanover. Through the greater part of the year there was in fact actual danger of direct hostilities being opened with Russia. By the representations of Austria, Peter was induced to evacuate Mecklenburg at the beginning of 1717 ; but he did so with an abiding feeling of hostility to George. Meanwhile, the Swedish minister Görtz had been at least playing with the idea of check-mating Hanover, and recovering Bremen and Verden by effecting a Jacobite restoration. The British government got wind of the plot, and in January 1717 the Swedish ambassador, Gyllenborg, was arrested in London in defiance of the recognised law of nations, and Görtz himself was arrested in Holland by the Dutch government at the instance of King George. The correspondence seized disclosed the fact that a Jacobite insurrection supported by Swedish troops was being concerted ; and these revelations were held to have justified the arrests, and greatly strengthened the British government, since there was nothing so certain to unite the country as threats of foreign intervention.

Now Alberoni had been devoting his energies to creating a new Spanish fleet. As matters stood in 1717 he perceived possibilities of uniting those long-standing foes, **Alberoni in** Charles XII. and Peter the Great, with Spain, for **1717.**

a Jacobite restoration, which would sever Great Britain from Hanover, and would, as a matter of course, unite the maritime power with Spain and with the legitimist or anti-Orleanist party in France. It is probable, however, that the queen was responsible for hurrying him into premature action, which set the Triple Alliance on its guard. The Spaniards made a sudden descent on Sardinia, and captured it in August. Austria, still tied by her Turkish war, called upon Great Britain to act on her behalf in accordance with the treaty of the previous year. But the ministers did not want a war with Spain, which, owing to the recent commercial treaties, would at this moment have been unpopular. Also they wanted Austria to be free of her Turkish war before the commencement of open hostilities.

The delay enabled Alberoni in the summer of 1718 to dispatch a fleet under sealed orders, which suddenly swooped upon Sicily. Admiral Byng, however, had already sailed **1718.** for the Mediterranean with a fleet, and with instruc- **Passaro.** tions to compel the Spaniards to cease hostilities. It is curious to observe that even at this time Stanhope was hinting at the restitution of Gibraltar as part of the price of the peace which he wished to preserve. Spain, however, was too eagerly bent on her Italian ambitions. Fortune favoured the combination. Almost simultaneously Byng with his squadron entered the Mediterranean, the Spaniards laid siege to Messina, and the negotiations with the Turks were brought to a successful issue by the Treaty of Passarowitch, which released Eugene and the Austrian battalions for operations elsewhere. Ten days later, on 11th August, Byng came up with the Spanish fleet off Cape Passaro. Spain and Great Britain were not at war, but the British admiral succeeded in making the Spaniards fire the first shot, which gave him his warrant. He fell upon the Spanish fleet, which was shattered to pieces, with hardly any loss to the victors. Tradition has attributed a mythical dispatch to Captain

Walton, who was detached to account for the shattered remnants of the Spanish navy. As a matter of fact, though his dispatch was a short one there was nothing abnormal about it, though until recent researches brought the truth to light, he was generally credited with having confined himself to the laconic remark, 'Sir, we have taken and destroyed all the Spanish ships which were on the coast, the number as per margin.'

The destruction of the fleet did not prevent the capture of Messina ; but it entirely ruined Alberoni's designs, since communications between Spain and Sicily were totally severed. The Quadruple Alliance was brought to completion, and in December 1718 war was formally declared against Spain by Great Britain. Three weeks later France followed suit, a plot having just been discovered, instigated by Alberoni, for depriving Orleans of the regency and proclaiming Philip the heir to Louis. Another blow had just befallen Alberoni. Whether Charles XII. would have actually taken part in an attempted Jacobite restoration in any case is doubtful ; but he was not to have the opportunity. At the beginning of December he was killed by a bullet while engaged on the siege of Frederikshalle in Norway. Nevertheless, the energetic minister played a last stroke. The Spanish navy was not yet annihilated, and an expedition was planned with Ormonde at the head of it to invade England. The expedition set sail, but before it met the British squadron which was awaiting it, it encountered a storm which wrecked the greater part of it. A small party succeeded in reaching the coast of Scotland and collecting a few Highlanders, but they were easily dispersed (5th June). The resistance of Spain to the combined forces of the Quadruple Alliance was entirely futile. The allies demanded the dismissal of Alberoni from Spanish soil. In December the cardinal was expelled, and in February 1720 Philip gave in his adhesion to the Quadruple Alliance, and to the terms of settlement upon which they had agreed. The duke of Savoy became king of Sardinia, Sicily became an Austrian possession, and the North Italian duchies were secured to Charles, the eldest son of Philip and Elizabeth.

**The end of
Alberoni,
1718-20.**

The Treaty of Nystad in 1721 put an end to the northern complications for the time. It secured for Russia the predominance in the Baltic Sea, very much against **Nystad, 1721.** the will of George; but before this the two main points which affected Great Britain and Hanover had been settled with Sweden. Hanover got Bremen and Verden in undisputed possession, and the freedom of the Baltic was secured to British shipping. But before this also the Stanhope administration had fallen.

The split between the two sections of Whigs had by no means wrecked the government, though it had created a powerful Whig opposition, centring round the person of the Prince of **Walpole in** Wales, whose antagonism to his father was a source **opposition.** of some public scandal. Toryism had become so completely discredited that the opposition Whigs, led by Walpole, had no qualms about fighting the government on any question which offered a chance for defeating them. No opening at first presented itself when the long suspended impeachment of Oxford was brought to a conclusion by the acquittal of the sometime minister. The two sections had also combined, when Walpole, after his retirement, piloted through the House the scheme which he had prepared as minister to provide a sinking fund for paying off the National Debt. This plan involved the reduction of the interest on the funded debt from an average of eight per cent. to five per cent., the balance of the secured interest being set aside as a sinking fund for paying off the capital debt. By borrowing from the bank, and from the South Sea Company, an association to which we shall very shortly revert, provision was made for paying off those holders of government stock who objected to the reduction of their interest.

In 1718, however, the antagonism between the government Whigs and the opposition Whigs was growing hotter. It is not a little surprising to find that when Stanhope introduced bills for the repeal of the Occasional Conformity Act and the Schism Act of 1714, Walpole himself was not ashamed to join with the Tories in an unsuccessful attempt to defeat the government. The repeal was carried in January 1719.

In that year, however, the Opposition won an important

victory. The cardinal tenet of the Whigs was the supremacy of parliament, and their main object of jealousy the royal prerogative. Nothing could have been further removed from their minds than any idea of democracy. The **Sunderland's Peerage Bill, 1719.**

Tories in the last reign had shown how the Crown could manipulate one of the Houses by the simple process of manufacturing a majority by the creation of a batch of peers. Moved by a fear that the younger George when he came to the throne might adopt this method of giving a majority in the Upper House to the opposition Whigs, Sunderland, with the entire approval of the king, brought in a bill to limit any increase in the number of peers. It provided that when the existing number had been increased by six, the Crown should have no power to create any more peerages except to take the place of such as might be vacated by lapse or forfeiture. Opposition was anticipated from Scotland, since this would preclude Scottish peers from becoming peers of Great Britain; that difficulty was to be met by raising the number of Scottish peers to twenty-five, who were to sit by hereditary right in the Upper House. The practical effect of the bill would have been to make the peerage a permanent close corporation of hereditary aristocrats, instead of a body admission to which was a natural result of distinguished public service.

There appeared to be every prospect of the bill being carried; many of the opposition Whigs were less alive to its dangers than to its merits as limiting the powers of the Crown. **Defeat of the bill.** Its defeat was due to the determination of Walpole, who induced the leaders to agree with some reluctance that it should be opposed in the Commons. There, his attack upon it was decisive. He entirely convinced the House that the country gentlemen, such as most of them were, would be for ever debarred from entering the ranks of the hereditary aristocracy, an honour which every one of them regarded as a legitimate object of ambition for himself, or his relations, or his descendants. The bill was thrown out, and the Crown retained its power of unlimited creation of peers. The bill was defeated by more than ninety votes.

For a government in modern times such a defeat would have involved resignation ; that it should do so was an idea which never presented itself two hundred years ago. No ministry which could count upon a general support of its measures dreamt of being called upon to resign because one particular measure had been rejected. The destruction of the Stanhope ministry came from another quarter ; and it did not involve the destruction of the Whig party, since the opposition Whigs themselves could provide not only an alternative government, but one which could command the widest confidence.

In the year 1711 the Tories, who had just overthrown the Whigs, were in serious financial straits. The bank was a Whig corporation from the beginning ; the East India Company since the reconstruction of 1702 had been a Whig corporation. Harley and St. John were aiming at bringing the war to an early conclusion

**The
South Sea
Company,
1711.**

by a treaty which was to secure to Great Britain the Assiento and extensive trading rights with the Spanish colonies in America. On the basis of those expectations a Tory commercial company was formed, which was to be for that party very much what the bank and the East India Company were to the Whigs. The South Sea Company was constructed to acquire from the government a monopoly of the anticipated commercial concessions, in return for which it advanced money to the government, and took over £9,000,000 of the floating or unfunded debt, the interest thereon being secured to it by the appropriation of specified taxes as in the case of the funded debt.

The actual commercial concessions obtained under the Treaty of Utrecht were by no means so extensive as had been expected ; nevertheless, the business acquired was lucrative enough to justify the existence of the company. But just at this time, not England only, but Europe in general, was seized with a speculative mania.

**The
company's
proposals,
1719.**

France plunged wildly into the schemes, not always absurd in themselves, of the ingenious Scot John Law, which were to be rendered ruinous by the scale on which it was attempted to carry them out. England plunged into the schemes of the South

Sea Company. The company came forward with a plan for taking over the National Debt, and amalgamating it with the South Sea stock. Interest at five per cent. was to be secured by government in the usual manner for seven years, after which it was to be reduced to four per cent., allowing for the establishment of a sinking fund. Again, the scheme was not on the face of it absurd. An increased trade was expected, a reasonable interest was guaranteed by government, and the company expected to reap its profits by selling its stock at a premium. To secure its privileges it offered the government £3,500,000. The bank itself was prepared to make a higher offer. The company raised its bid to £7,500,000, and the Acts conferring the desired privileges were passed. This price, £7,500,000, was certainly excessive. Of itself, the effect of it should have been to bring down the price of South Sea stock, which to this time had stood at a premium. Still, the prospects were sufficiently good to have made the investment under ordinary circumstances passably sound.

But the circumstances were not ordinary. Extravagant rumours were circulated of extraordinary discoveries and extraordinary concessions, of impossibly enormous profits which were to accrue. Neither the government nor the directors were officially responsible for those rumours. Walpole from the Opposition raised a warning voice, but no one listened to him. In the familiar language of the present day, there was a frantic boom in South Sea stock. Just before the Act of Parliament went through, the market price of £100 worth of stock was £130. A week after the Act was passed considerably over £2,000,000 had been taken up at £300. At midsummer it had gone up to between £1000 and £1100. Right and left, every one, man or woman, was scraping together every available shilling to buy South Sea stock at any price.

Then came awakening and panic. The speculative fever had given birth to an immense number of bogus companies; no scheme was too absurd to draw in a crowd of dupes. One after another the bogus companies were exploded. The public began to realise the enormity of its folly,

1720.

The bubble**The bubble
bursts.**

though it was much more disposed to lay the blame upon the wickedness of other people. At the end of September South Sea stock had dropped again to £150; those who had been scrambling to buy were scrambling to sell. But vast numbers had already been ruined, and the ruin spread. People who had had nothing to do whatever with the speculation were swept away in the general crash, because their debtors were ruined and could not pay. Wealthy men found themselves poor, poor men found themselves destitute, and all alike laid the disaster at the doors of the government and the directors who had duped them. If the public had had its way, every one who had anything whatever to do with the concern, innocent or guilty, would have been stripped of everything he possessed and at least sent to prison. There were Jacobites who hardly concealed their glee over the complete ruin of the Whigs which they anticipated, not without reason.

But the public did not turn to the Jacobites. The group of opposition Whigs assuredly had nothing whatever to do with the disaster. Walpole had denounced the whole affair from the beginning. Walpole had already the reputation of being the ablest financier in public life; Walpole was called to the rescue, to save what he could from the wreck. He was not disqualified by the fact that he and Townshend had after midsummer been persuaded to rejoin the ministry when the government began to realise what was coming. Walpole directed his efforts to providing a remedy, as a matter of greater importance than seeking vengeance; but the demand for vengeance could not be suppressed. Inquiries were instituted both by the Lords and by the Commons. Ministers were furiously attacked. Stanhope triumphantly cleared himself of any suspicion of having made profit himself or of any responsibility for the misconceptions by which the public had been deluded; but the shock and the strain had been too great for him and killed him. Sunderland proved that so far from making profit he had all but ruined himself; but the injustice of public opinion drove him finally out of public life. Aislabie, the chancellor of the exchequer, was with entire justice found guilty of

**Walpole
called to the
rescue.**

infamous corruption. Another member of the ministry, Scraggs, died, perhaps by his own hand, and his estates were sequestrated, as were those of the directors of the company. The forfeitures provided about £2,000,000 for the relief of sufferers from the disaster. The government annuitants who had accepted South

1721. Sea stock were obliged to content themselves with something less than half their promised annuities ;
Walpole's and the South Sea Company was reconstructed with
ascendancy. its £100 shares reduced to £33. Walpole became chancellor of the exchequer, with Townshend as one of the secretaries of state, and Carteret, a young man who had already achieved high diplomatic distinction, as the other. So in 1721 began the long supremacy of Robert Walpole, although for nine years it was shared with his brother-in-law, Townshend.

II. THE MINISTRY OF TOWNSHEND AND WALPOLE, 1721-1730

The reconstruction of the ministry was contemporaneous with the reluctant adhesion of Spain to the Quadruple Alliance. In the years that followed, the salient feature was the
 1721-1732. ostensible continuity of the co-operation between
Anglo- Great Britain and France, based primarily upon the
French necessity in both countries for mutual help in main-
relations. taining the Hanoverian and the Orleanist successions. As the years passed, the health of the young French king improved ; he married, and the chance of a disputed succession became increasingly remote. Consequently, from about 1730 onwards, we shall find France and Spain drawing closer together, and forming a secret agreement having as its object the achievement or the restoration of that Bourbon supremacy in Europe which had been the great aim of Louis XIV. But this secret change in French policy, which was necessarily directed in part against the British power, did not check the ostensible co-operation between France and Great Britain in relation to European affairs until the explosion which robbed Walpole of the effective control in England in 1739. Throughout these years, the intricacies

of international politics are difficult to disentangle ; nevertheless it is necessary to follow them out.

When the leadership of the Whig party passed to Walpole and Townshend, all the prominent statesmen of Queen Anne's reign of the older generation had disappeared. **Political personalities.** Marlborough, indeed, survived for some months, but he had been inactive throughout the reign of George I., and had latterly been rendered helpless through ill-health. He had already passed sixty at the time of his fall. Of the new men who were at first associated with Walpole and Townshend, the most prominent were Pulteney, who had left the Stanhope ministry along with them in 1717, and Carteret, one of the few English statesmen who have made foreign policy their first concern, and have kept their eyes fixed upon Europe and the intricacies of European politics. Antagonisms were certain to arise within this group ; and outside parliament altogether, Bolingbroke re-appeared on the scene to promote faction, and to use his best efforts for the discrediting of the government. He had been granted a personal pardon, but Walpole's determined opposition prevented him from being restored to his place in the House of Peers ; and Walpole was consequently the special object of his animosity.

In the first years of the new administration Walpole left the conduct of foreign affairs to Townshend and Carteret, who very soon found themselves following opposing lines. Carteret was readier to risk war than his colleague, and would have embroiled the country with Russia, mainly in the interests of Hanover, if the king had not proved wise enough to support Townshend in rejecting a course which would certainly have caused extreme irritation in England.

In 1723 Orleans died, and the leading position in France passed for the moment not to his son but to Louis of Bourbon, the lineal representative of the great Condé. Bour- **France,**
bon was suspected of Spanish leanings, which may **Spain, and**
have had some influence upon Spanish policy. On **Austria.**
the other hand, both Austria and Spain were beginning to take new views. The emperor was already vexing his soul over the

question of the Austrian succession after his own death, which he wished to secure for his own daughter, Maria Theresa. On the other hand, he himself had succeeded as the male heir of his elder brother Joseph, and Joseph had left a daughter, Maria Amelia. It was not easy, however, to maintain that the daughter of the younger brother should succeed in priority to the daughter of the elder brother. Hence it was the great desire of Charles to procure European guarantees for the 'Pragmatic Sanction,' the instrument by which Maria Theresa was declared his successor. Again, now that the Netherlands had become Austrian instead of Spanish, they had lost those trade privileges with the Spanish dominions which they had enjoyed when under the Spanish Crown. The commercial consideration induced him at the end of 1722 to establish the Ostend East India Company. But by old treaties, the subjects of Spain, including the Netherlands, were debarred from the East India trade. The new company, coming into competition with the Dutch and British East India companies, caused great irritation, and was protested against as a violation of the old treaties. There was, therefore, a certain ill-feeling between Austria and the maritime powers.

In the third place, there were disagreements between Spain and Austria as to the carrying out of obligations in Italy. France and Great Britain offered their mediation at a conference of the powers held at Cambrai, which continued its inconclusive sittings for three years. In the course of the negotiations Spain made a demand for the restitution of Gibraltar which was promptly refused, whereby Spain was irritated against Great Britain. Under the regency of Orleans a project of marriage had been negotiated between the young King Louis and the still younger Spanish Infanta. Orleans had doubtless anticipated that Louis would be dead before his bride was old enough to become his queen; it was a measure designed on his part to make the prospect of the Orleans succession the more secure. But precisely for that reason it was displeasing to Bourbon. In 1725 France broke off the Spanish match; and the young king was married to the daughter of Stanislaus Leczynski, who had for a short time been elective

**The quarrel
of France
and Spain.**

king of Poland and hoped to be reinstated. This was a flagrant insult in the eyes of the Spaniards, so that they were freshly irritated against France.

The result was that the mediators at the conference were ignored, and the two principals came to terms on their own account. Charles undertook to complete the investiture of the son of Philip and Elizabeth, whom it may be convenient to call Don Carlos instead of Charles, as successor to the duchy of Parma, in return for which Spain guaranteed his Pragmatic Sanction. Charles further promised to use his friendly offices to procure the restitution of Gibraltar and Minorca, while Spain conceded a commercial treaty which gave to the emperor's subjects preferential treatment as against Great Britain and Holland, and opened the American trade to the Ostend Company. **The Treaty of Hanover.** The reply of France and Great Britain was the

Treaty of Hanover, uniting those two powers in alliance with Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia—which incidentally was denounced as a Hanoverian measure though the advantages which it secured to Great Britain were much less dubious than those derived from it by Hanover. War seemed imminent. British fleets put to sea, and the Spanish treasure fleet was blockaded at Porto Bello. Plans for a Jacobite restoration were included among the projects of Ripperda, the Spanish minister who was at this time most prominent. There was general excitement and uneasiness, accompanied by trade depression in England. In February 1727 the Spaniards actually opened the siege of Gibraltar by way of reprisal for the blockade at Porto Bello, though war had not been declared. The siege was quite useless, since the British had complete command of the seas, and a British squadron occupied the harbour, securing ample supplies. The emperor became convinced of the futility of war. At the end of May 1727 he came to terms, agreeing **1727.** to a temporary suspension of the Ostend Company **Peace terms.** and the confirmation of all treaties prior to that of Vienna; though Spain still declined to be a party to the agreement. When she found herself isolated, however, she was obliged to give way.

During these years Walpole had been strengthening his personal ascendancy. Pulteney had soon gone into opposition **Townshend** when he found himself excluded from the ministry. **and Walpole.** Carteret's policy had been defeated in the cabinet ; it was certain that he and the brilliant Philip Stanhope, better known as Lord Chesterfield, could not long remain in one cabinet with Walpole. Walpole and Townshend had remained in general agreement ; but Townshend was disposed to a more active foreign policy than his colleague, who had now begun to make himself felt in that department as well as in home politics. The settlement of 1727 was in the nature of a victory for Walpole over Townshend, and from this time he dominated British policy abroad as well as at home. Townshend soon found himself unable to become the follower where he had been the leader, and in 1730 he withdrew. The two men were both **1730.** too masterful to work as colleagues. Townshend was **Townshend** not disposed to split the party by fighting for his own **retires.** supremacy, and he chose the magnanimous alternative of leaving the field clear to the rival with whose policy he was in substantial agreement, although on personal grounds they were unable to work together. But before this there had been a moment when Walpole's ascendancy appeared to be in extreme danger.

In June 1727 King George went to Hanover, accompanied by Townshend. Within ten days of his departure he was carried off by a paralytic stroke, and George II. became king. **1727.** He had at any rate served his purpose. He had **Death of** been wise enough to make no attempt at forcing **George I.** his English ministers to act upon his own personal views. He had displayed no vindictiveness, though in his own domestic relations he was vindictive. An absolute ruler in his own Hanover, he accepted his constitutional limitations in England in spite of their entire divergence from anything within his own previous experience. More than once he had recognised that the interests of his new kingdom and his old electorate were divergent, and though his heart was in the latter much more than in the former, he had given his new kingdom the precedence. He was not a great man, but he was a sensible one. Another

William of Orange would have checked the development of ministerial control. A weaker or a worse man might easily have made himself the occasion of a Jacobite restoration ; but the very mediocrity and commonplaceness of George I. made him precisely the man to give practical completeness to the principles of the Revolution.

His son had at first been associated with Walpole and Townshend, but when at last those two statesmen established themselves in the confidence of the father, the Prince of Wales had drawn away from them. Carteret and others had sought his favour by the obvious method of courting his female favourites. The new king was not too well disposed to the ministers. Townshend was absent, and Walpole was received in an exceedingly chilly fashion. It appeared that Sir Spenser Compton (who became Lord Wilmington) would be the dispenser of his favours, and that Carteret would become the leading minister. But Walpole had been wiser in his generation than Carteret. He knew long before the death of George I. that the Princess of Wales ignored her husband's moral delinquencies, which were sufficiently flagrant, because she knew perfectly well that she had more influence with him than all his favourites put together. It was to her that Walpole paid his court ; and he had his reward. A fortnight after the old king's demise the minister's disappointed rivals awoke to the fact that he was more firmly established than ever ; the queen ruled the king, and Walpole ruled the queen—not in any objectionable sense, but simply because she was an extremely clever woman, who was shrewd enough to know that if she and Walpole differed the chances were that she would find in the end that he was right and she was wrong.

The accession to power of the duke of Bourbon in France had been a disturbing factor ; although it had not produced any direct change in the relations between France and Great Britain. The time, however, had now arrived for King Louis, who had reached the age of sixteen, to declare himself of age. Bourbon was displaced, and the control of French policy passed into the hands of the aged and pacific

**Walpole,
Queen
Caroline and
George II.**

**Cardinal
Fleury.**

Cardinal Fleury, who although he was already seventy-three, continued to rule with ability and success for more than a decade, attaining his ninetieth year before he died. Fleury had no intention of breaking the English alliance ; but the circumstances had become favourable to a *rapprochement* between the two Bourbon powers. The Austro-Spanish combination was an unnatural one, because, although the two powers might work together for some specific end, nothing could really bring them into accord with regard to Italy. Queen Elizabeth at last realised with reluctance that, so long as France was not to be detached from Great Britain, it was better for her to have the Anglo-French alliance and the maritime powers favourably disposed to her in her disputes with Austria, than to have Austria with her in her disputes with Great Britain, which turned upon Gibraltar and upon commercial questions. English ministers had indeed played

1739.

**Treaty
of Seville.**

with the idea of the restitution of Gibraltar, but they had by this time become thoroughly aware that the country would never tolerate such a proposal. In 1729 the Treaty of Seville was concluded between the three Western powers, afterwards supplemented by Holland. The powers agreed that the Italian duchies should be occupied by Spanish troops ; Austria's assent was to be obtained if necessary by coercion. In return, the demand for Gibraltar was in effect implicitly, though not explicitly, waived, while French and British commercial concessions were secured, and the preference granted to the Ostend Company was withdrawn. Austria responded, upon the death of the duke of Parma which vacated that duchy in favour of Don Carlos, by occupying the

1731.

**Walpole's
diplomacy.**

duchy with her own troops, ostensibly in order to secure it for Don Carlos. But by this time Townshend had retired, and Walpole, supreme in England, dexterously made his terms with Austria. In return for the British guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, Don Carlos was installed in his duchy, which was occupied by Spanish instead of by imperial garrisons. The event signalled the fact that the unqualified rule of Walpole had begun.

We turn now to the domestic events in the period covered by

this section. Jacobitism was a recurrent cause of disturbance. Jacobite hopes were revived by the public excitement over the South Sea disaster, and were further encouraged by the birth in December 1720 of the prince who was known to the Whigs as the 'Young Pretender.' That term in fact was technically correct, being appropriate to any claimant to the throne other than its *de facto* occupant. It was, however, used with an implication that the claim was fraudulent; a theory resting upon the old myth that the 'Old Pretender' was a supposititious child; a view which had been officially preserved more in order to salve the consciences of Queen Anne and the Tory party than to satisfy the Whigs, who adhered to the principle that parliament had the right to change the succession whether the prince were legitimate or not. As a natural consequence, when the public at large ceased to believe in the myth which the name of the Pretender was supposed to perpetuate, its use became particularly offensive to the Legitimists as carrying with it an unwarrantable imputation. The Jacobites were the defeated party; no one to-day would be found to question that the ejection of the Stuarts was justifiable and beneficial; but it is equally impossible to question that the Stuarts themselves and their supporters had legitimate ground for maintaining that James had a right to the crown, and a right to try to recover it if he could. The courtesies of debate seem to require that the Jacobite terms, the 'Old and Young Chevalier,' which beg no question, should be used in preference.

1720. Birth
of Charles
Edward,
December.

The outcome of these revived hopes was a futile Jacobite plot which was discovered, and resulted in the banishment of Bishop Atterbury and two or three other persons. Practically, the affair showed not that any serious danger was to be apprehended, but the precise contrary. The unfortunate dissensions between James and his wife, Clementina Sobieski, whom he had married under romantic circumstances, seriously injured the Stuart cause, and after the separation of the royal couple, in 1725, a long time elapsed before Jacobitism again appeared as a serious menace, though it was always in

Decay of
Jacobitism.

the background as a possible instrument to be employed by foreign foes.

Walpole had come into power because of the public confidence in his financial ability. At the very beginning of the Townshend and Walpole régime he inaugurated **Walpole's commercial policy.** that policy of commercial development which it was always his primary object to promote. He adopted

the plan of reducing the duties upon exports and upon imports of raw material, which had been imposed on the general principle that imports should be discouraged as being paid for in bullion, except from countries which took greater value of British goods in exchange for what they imported. Walpole's argument was that which had been urged successfully by Charles Davenant in respect of the East India Company's trade. The importation of raw material, even if it was paid for in bullion, made possible the production in England of manufactured goods which were exported in exchange for bullion, so that in the long run the balance was rectified. On the other hand, the revenue did not suffer from the reduction of duties, because the volume both of imports and of exports was more than proportionately increased. If the duties were halved, but were paid upon thrice the quantity of goods, the revenue gained fifty per cent. These, broadly speaking, were the principles upon which Walpole reversed the

Freeing trade. time-honoured policy of maintaining high duties. No one dreamed of such a thing as Free Trade in the modern sense of the term; when Walpole became chancellor of the exchequer, Adam Smith was still unborn. Colonial products were vigorously encouraged by bounties, in order to diminish British dependence upon raw material imported from the Baltic; but the whole trend of Walpole's finance was to reduce tariffs so far as that could be done without arousing violent opposition—to increase wealth by increasing the volume of trade. Already, in 1724, he was preparing the way for the excise scheme which nine years later went near to causing his overthrow; but since he did not call his measure by the detested name of excise, it was at this early stage cheerfully accepted on its merits. Tea and coffee were allowed to be landed and warehoused and

kept in bond without paying duty, to which they became liable only upon being withdrawn from bond for the home market. The wealth and prosperity of the country advanced rapidly, and the government credit stood so high that in 1727 it could borrow at four per cent. Thirty years earlier the normal interest had been eight or nine per cent.

Scotland as yet was only beginning to feel profit from the removal of the English restrictions on her trade; she was hardly conscious of material gain. English statesmen were still inclined to pay little attention to Scottish susceptibilities. The imposition of the malt tax by the Tories in the previous reign in defiance of the Treaty of Union had reawakened demands for the repeal of the Union. The Tories had carried their bill, but, in fact, government had not collected the tax; although after the war of the Spanish Succession was over it had become legitimate to do so. It was now demanded in England that the northern country should no longer be exempted. By way of a compromise Walpole proposed to fix the duty at threepence instead of sixpence, but, if the product fell short of £20,000, to lay a charge upon the Scottish brewers to make up the balance. There was an immediate explosion of wrath in Scotland, riots broke out in Edinburgh and Glasgow, and the brewers refused to brew. They were, however, brought to reason, mainly by the management of Argyll's brother Islay and Duncan Forbes of Culloden. Still, the whole affair did a good deal to keep Scottish hostility to the Union rankling—always a strong element among the causes which fostered Jacobitism in the north.

No less was the perturbation in Ireland, though there the Hanoverian government could feel comfortably secure that there was no danger from Jacobitism. To all Irish Protestants the maintenance of the Hanoverian succession was absolutely vital, while the Roman Catholic population was too hopelessly prostrate, tied, and bound, to be a source of danger. Protestants might kick against their subordination to the British parliament, but they could not help themselves. At the first, the Irish peers had to submit when the British House of Peers

claimed to be a higher Court of Appeal. In 1719, the British parliament passed a Declaratory Act, claiming its own right to legislate for Ireland without regard to the Irish legislature ; whereas all that the Irish parliament itself could do was to reject or to pass without amendment bills already approved by the British Privy Council. In the next year the British parliament passed an Act forbidding the wearing of printed and dyed calicoes, with the simple object of protecting the woollen and silk trades in England, which were not interested in the manufacture of calico. But, as the manufacture of calicoes was one of the few Irish industries which English jealousy permitted to exist, Ireland suffered. Dean Swift, whose mordant pen had been used with great effect by the Tories in Queen Anne's reign, took up the cudgels as an Irish patriot in an anonymous pamphlet which proposed retaliation for the English Act by a complete boycott—to apply a modern phrase—of all wearing apparel coming from England.

But it was in connection with another controversy that the most terrific of that series of the dean's pamphlets, known as *Wood's* *Drapier's Letters*, were produced. Ireland had no *half-pence*. mint of her own, and the export of coin from England was prohibited. Ireland was in desperate need of a small currency. A certain William Wood in England was authorised to coin half-pence to an amount six or seven times as great as was needed ; also, sixty of his half-pence went to the pound of copper, whereas the English half-pence were only forty-six to the pound. A storm of complaint arose in Ireland that the country was being flooded with debased coinage which would drive all the gold and silver out of it. As a matter of fact, no great harm would have been done, since copper coinage was a token coinage at the best. But the business provided a stick with which to beat the government, though it was after all but a very minor instance of the high-handed manner in which Irish interests were treated in England. The excitement was so great that the British government was obliged to compensate Wood and withdraw his licence. Townshend would have enforced the acceptance of the coinage, but Walpole did not like storms of popular indignation.

The attack on Wood's half-pence was trivial enough in its origin, and was carried on with the most extravagant exaggeration. It exemplified the insignificance of the matters **Dean Swift**, upon which the popular mind will occasionally seize when a passionate sense of grievance is already in existence. It provided Swift with the opportunity of denouncing root and branch the relations between the two countries, which had the effect of transforming him from a free man in England into a 'slave' in Ireland; at so early a date he summed up the root grievance of the Irish people, that 'government without consent of the governed is slavery.' If the population of Ireland should realise that that was the real principle at stake, the struggle for independence might attain alarming proportions. That, in Walpole's eyes, was a risk not worth running for the sake of a mere punctilio.

From the time when Walpole began to claim an equal share with Townshend in the control of foreign policy, an ultimate rupture between the two statesmen became almost **1731.** a certainty. The Treaty of Hanover belonged to **Walpole** the earlier period. The treaty of 1727 was a victory **supreme.** for Walpole; the Treaty of Seville was Townshend's. Walpole, in distinction from his colleague, believed in the necessity for friendly relations with Austria, anxious though he was to avoid a breach with France. Townshend would have conceded more to the Bourbon alliance at the cost of Austrian friendship. Walpole, when Townshend retired in 1730, and his own ascendancy became complete, saved the Bourbon alliance for the time; but also he drew closer to Austria. When Townshend withdrew to cultivate turnips and promote the new scientific farming, very much to the benefit of the British agriculture, Walpole was left without a rival in the cabinet. Its members were his henchmen. His friendship with Queen Caroline ensured him the support of the king. The Opposition consisted of disappointed politicians and factions, with no common policy except the desire to overturn the ministry. Only one thing could effect his overthrow, some torrential rush of popular sentiment which should find in him an obstacle to its course, and it was a first principle with

Walpole to avoid any action which should render such a torrent ungovernable. Nine years passed before the outburst came.

III. THE SUPREMACY OF WALPOLE, 1731-1739

More than any monarch or statesman who had preceded him, Robert Walpole consciously made it the first object of his policy to develop the material prosperity of Great Britain. **Walpole and the Opposition.** To that end it was essential to avoid war abroad and commotion at home. It was also desirable to reduce restrictions upon trade to a minimum; while from the minister's own personal point of view it was essential that he should retain the control of affairs in his own hands. The Opposition concentrated upon a single point, the effort to take the control out of his hands. It had no common policy, except to unite in attacking Walpole by any methods that could stir up popular feeling against him. For nine years after the retirement of Townshend Walpole held his own. By dint of very careful steering he kept the country from going to war. Only once in England did he propose a measure which aroused violent opposition; and on that occasion the hostility aroused was itself irrational. The volume of British commerce was vastly expanded under his régime, and the material wealth of the community was greatly increased. His personal ascendancy was secured first by the establishment of his influence over King George through the confidence of Queen Caroline, secondly by the methods of corruption, and thirdly by the ejection from the cabinet of all independent elements.

With regard to bribery and corruption, it was for a long time regarded as one of the commonplaces of history that Walpole was an abnormally corrupt minister; a theory crystallised in the phrase attributed to him that **Corruption under Walpole.** 'every man has his price.' Even in that phrase he is misrepresented. 'All these men have their price,' was the contemptuous generalisation which he applied to the ranks of the Opposition in the House of Commons. Walpole was not the inventor of parliamentary corruption. The first parliament

of Charles II., known as the Cavalier Parliament, in the sixties, acquired in the seventies the title of the Pension Parliament, because so many of its members were in receipt of 'gratifications.' If anyone man could be called the originator of parliamentary corruption, it was Danby. Walpole carried the system little, if at all, further than his predecessors. Innumerable places and pensions were distributed in order to procure votes. The duke of Newcastle, who ultimately became prime minister, regarded politics as primarily an affair of jobbery; it was as a member of Walpole's cabinet that he originally developed his mastery of the art, but it was after Walpole's fall that he carried it to completion; and Newcastle himself was left far behind by the politicians in the earlier half of the reign of George III. It is not, indeed, to be disputed that Walpole employed corruption with a lavish hand; but he was neither its originator nor its grossest practitioner. And if he corrupted others, he was himself incorruptible. But the charge of corruption was one which could be clamorously employed, not without justification, by an Opposition which was indignant at its own exclusion from participation. The persistent charges of corruption year after year had the usual effect of producing a gradual conviction of the extraordinary guiltiness of the person who was so persistently accused.

Walpole's determination to avoid disturbing questions is especially exemplified in his attitude towards Dissenters. He remembered how the first Whig ministry of which he had been a member had been brought to ruin over the case of Dr. Sacheverell. Entirely convinced though he was of the injustice of imposing political disabilities on dissent, he had opposed Stanhope's repeal of the Schism Act, and when in power he steadily refused to raise the question of the repeal of the Test Act. He did not deny that the demand was in the abstract a just one; he would not yield to it, because to do so would have been to endanger the stability of his administration. He answered the appeals of the Dissenters by saying that the time was not yet ripe; they asked him when he expected that happier time to arrive, and he replied that in his own candid opinion it never would. But what he could do

Walpole
and the
Dissenters.

for the Dissenters without troubling the waters he did, when in 1727 he introduced what became an annual Bill of Indemnity for breaches of the Test Act.

The one serious commotion arose over the Excise Bill of 1733. It has already been remarked that Walpole's grand object was **Walpole's** to increase material wealth by the expansion of **Excise Bill.** commerce. The old theory of the State regulation of commerce had been that it was the business of the State to direct commerce into the channels most productive of national strength. Walpole saw that, broadly speaking, everything which increased the material wealth of the country *ipso facto* increased the national strength. The country which was richest could buy what it did not produce; if forced into war, the ultimate victory would fall to the nation whose treasury could longest endure the heaviest strain. Great Britain was to be made strong by being made wealthy. Here as elsewhere it was not Walpole's part to enforce schemes which would excite the alarm of people less long-sighted than himself. He removed burdens and fetters, but only when he could persuade the commercial community that they were burdens and fetters; but this was what he failed to do in the famous case of the Excise Bill.

Walpole wanted to draw commerce to England, to make London the mart of the world. To this end he proposed to extend the **The battle** principle which had already been applied with en- **of the bill.** tire success in 1724 to tea and coffee, and to tax tobacco and wine not when they entered the ports, but when they were withdrawn from the ports for sale within the country; the goods being kept in bond at the ports, where they could be re-embarked without paying duty, or withdrawn on payment of duty. This method would dispose of various complications in the form of drawbacks, rebates, and allowances which opened the door to speculation and fabrication of accounts; it would diminish smuggling; it would attract an increased trade and would benefit the revenue so that the land tax could be reduced to a shilling—an important point in Walpole's eyes, since it would conciliate the landed gentry. But the name of 'excise'

was detested in the country. The Opposition saw their opportunity. They denounced the measure as 'a plan of arbitrary power.' The country was about to be flooded with an army of officials who would invade every household. Everything was going to be taxed, bread and meat in particular. A complete panic was worked up. It was in vain for the ministers to point out that the proposed system was to be applied only to tobacco in the first instance, and then, if it worked satisfactorily, to wine and spirits; in vain to insist that the whole great army of excisemen would number no more than 126. Chesterfield, as yet a member of the cabinet, worked against the Excise Bill as zealously as Pulteney, the leader of the Opposition. Walpole was informed that the soldiers were on the verge of mutiny, having become persuaded that the price of tobacco would rise. Walpole bowed to the storm. He was as convinced as ever that the measure would be entirely beneficial; he was aware that he could still command a parliamentary majority in its favour; but he was aware also that the bill could not become law without bloodshed; and he withdrew it. At a general election a year afterwards his majority was hardly diminished; but if he had not withdrawn the Excise Bill he would have been turned out of office, a fate which did not actually befall him till 1742.

Walpole took his revenge on the disloyal members of the ministry. Chesterfield was dismissed, and a like fate befell several of his allies who held other government **Dismissal of ministers.** posts, in particular a number of officers in the army. In modern times, no member of the cabinet could, like Chesterfield, set himself in opposition to a government measure. Chesterfield's dismissal is a landmark in the history of cabinet government, of the principle of solidarity in the cabinet. It emphasised the doctrine that publicly at least all the members of the cabinet must be of one mind, though Walpole's action, then and long afterwards, was commonly denounced as monstrously dictatorial and vindictive.

If the general election of 1735 did not materially affect the balance of parties in the House, it brought into the Opposition, already reinforced by Chesterfield, recruits of whom the most

notable were George Lyttleton and William Pitt, at this time a cornet in Cobham's Horse, otherwise the King's Dragoon **William Pitt** Guards. As in the days of George I. the Whig opposition had gathered round the pennon of the then Prince of Wales, owing to the personal antagonism between father and son, so now the enemies of the ministry made a figurehead of the eminently unsatisfactory heir to the throne, Frederick, Prince of Wales. That young man had been brought up in Germany **The Prince of Wales.** by his grandfather's orders, and only appeared in England after the accession of George II. He was on the worst terms both with his father and his mother. There had at one time been a scheme of a double marriage with the royal house of Prussia; the Crown Prince, afterwards Frederick the Great, was to have married the English princess Amelia, while Frederick was to have married the Prussian princess Wilhelmina. The intention had been in part to detach Prussia from its adherence, which at that time was very close, to Austria, and to draw it more closely to Hanover. The project, however, broke down, and the fact of his remaining unmarried increased the friction between the Prince of Wales and his parents. A bride was at length found for him in the Princess Augusta of Saxe-Gotha, whom he married in 1736; but the marriage itself provided fresh causes of dissension, owing to the prince's dissatisfaction over the inadequate provision made for him. The Opposition group, who called themselves 'Patriots,' took up the cause of the prince in the House of Commons; especially the young men whom Walpole in contempt referred to as the 'boys.' When the matter was on the point of coming before parliament, the king, at Walpole's instigation, offered to secure him his allowance of £50,000, and also to settle a jointure upon the princess. The prince refused; he wanted £100,000. The House, **The prince and his parents.** which before had been prepared to support the Opposition motion for a grant, changed its mind, and the prince had to content himself with his £50,000 and the jointure, payable to the princess only on his death. The zeal of Pitt in the prince's cause caused him to be dismissed from his cornetcy, and twenty years passed before the

king forgave him—years during which, it must be admitted, Pitt's conduct was scarcely calculated to win the royal favour. The dissensions between the prince and his parents became only the more acute when Frederick, at the eleventh hour, hurried his wife away by night from Hampton Court to St. James's Palace, just in time to prevent his eldest child from being born under the same roof as her grandparents.

The year of the prince's marriage—1736—was signalised by an event which showed the extreme unpopularity of the government in Scotland. The Scots detested the whole 'preventive' system which had been introduced into that country after the Union. Two smugglers were caught and condemned to death. One of them made his escape in broad daylight. The second was duly hanged, amid demonstrations from the populace of Edinburgh, which induced Porteous, the officer in command of the town guard, to order his men to fire on the crowd, some of whom were killed. Porteous was thereupon himself tried and condemned to death, but was reprieved for further inquiry. Thereupon an organised mob stormed the prison, dragged Porteous out, and hanged him; after which they dispersed quietly to their homes. Walpole and the queen, who had granted the reprieve as the king was abroad, proposed to take very severe measures for the punishment of the city of Edinburgh, where the authorities took no active steps for penalising the rioters. Largely owing to the efforts of Argyll, the penalties were modified, but the whole affair was a symptom of the popular aversion from the Union, and its conclusion only served to intensify that feeling.

Towards the end of 1737 a notable personality passed out of British politics. Queen Caroline died. It was she who had established Walpole in the confidence of the king; it was she who had taught him the art of managing the king by carefully beguiling him into a belief that he was himself the originator of schemes which he would have denounced with indignation if they had been submitted to him point blank as his minister's proposals. George was the most loyal of men, and the queen's death did not sever him from

**The Porteous
affair, 1736.**

**Death of
Queen Caro-
line, 1737.**

Walpole; but it did lay him open more than before to side influences which had counted almost for nothing while Caroline was alive. The strength of Walpole's position was materially shaken by her death, because it became more difficult for him to persuade the king to adopt his own views. For throughout the years of Walpole's ascendancy the king, if left to himself, would have done precisely the things that Walpole did not wish to be done; and the queen had been the most effective agent in making him believe that the things that Walpole wished were the things that he wished also. And she had done so even when her own instincts were on the king's side, not on Walpole's.

Now, in 1738, a crisis arrived in which Walpole had need of every imaginable support if he was to carry his own wishes to a successful issue. We must turn to foreign affairs during these years in order to understand the character of the approaching crisis.

In 1731 the ambitions of Elizabeth Farnese had been so far satisfied through the intervention of France and Great Britain that her son Don Carlos was established in the duchy of Parma and was guaranteed the succession to the duchy of Tuscany; Walpole having made it his special object to remain in co-operation with France and to preserve friendly relations both with Spain and with Austria. But neither Austria nor Spain was happy. The emperor had by no means completed the circle of guarantors for his Pragmatic Sanction. France had not given the guarantee, and the attitude of various states of the empire was dubious. The elector Charles Albert of Bavaria was the son of Max Emmanuel by a second marriage, and he had himself married Maria Amelia, the daughter of the late Emperor Joseph. It was difficult to assert that the claims of Maria Theresa, the emperor's own daughter, were stronger than those of his elder brother's daughter to the Hapsburg inheritance; and the house of Bavaria also had other claims to that inheritance in respect of its descent from an earlier emperor, Ferdinand II. Thus one of the electoral princes was himself the direct rival of Maria Theresa and her future husband, Francis, duke of Lorraine, for the Hapsburg

**1731. The
European
situation.**

inheritance and the imperial crown. Charles VI. had secured the elector of Hanover and the king of Prussia, whose father had blossomed into that dignity from being elector of Brandenburg. But the electors of Saxony, Cologne, and the Palatinate had not given in their adhesion. Elizabeth Farnese, on the other hand, was still hankering for Naples and Sicily. There had been no overt change in the policy of France, but she had, as a matter of fact, been drawing steadily closer to Spain, as the possibilities of a union of the French and Spanish crowns grew more remote; and she was even now contemplating a family compact between the Bourbon princes which should create a Bourbon supremacy in Europe, in the first instance at the expense of Austria and ultimately at that of Great Britain.

The flame which was to fire a European conflagration was lighted in Poland. The throne of that elective monarchy was occupied by Augustus the Strong, elector of Saxony, who, largely through Russian support, had some years before displaced Stanislaus Leczynski, the father of the queen of France. The question was on the point of arising, who should succeed Augustus the Strong. Augustus wanted his son, another Augustus, to follow him on the Polish throne. Stanislaus wanted to recover the throne from which he had been ousted, and procured promises of aid from France. The sudden death of the elder Augustus at the beginning of 1733 brought on a crisis. Stanislaus hurried to Poland and got himself elected by the Polish diet; but Russia regarded the Saxon candidate as her own protégé. Stanislaus did not suit the emperor, because of his connection with France, and there was no difficulty in getting another guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction from Augustus in return for Austrian support. Fleury, not without reluctance, found himself compelled to give the French king's father-in-law the support of the French arms, while Austria was already in arms against him.

The declaration of war between France and Austria, in October 1733, was perhaps hardly required to bring to completion the first family compact, the 'Compact of the Escorial,' between the two Bourbon powers in November. The treaty was intended

1733. War of
the Polish
Succession.

to be a secret one, but its terms were betrayed to the British envoy at Madrid, and Walpole was forthwith placed in possession of them. The Bourbon scheme was to deprive Austria of her Italian possessions, sowing the seeds of discord between her and Great Britain ; since Fleury reckoned, with justifiable confidence, that Great Britain would not go to war on behalf of Austria. When Austria should be partly disabled and wholly estranged from Great Britain, the Bourbons were to turn upon the maritime power, which, being isolated, and also controlled by the pacific Walpole, could then be prevailed upon, perhaps without fighting at all, to yield to the Bourbon demands. In the meantime, however, there was to be no rupture with Great Britain.

Up to a certain point Fleury's calculations were justified. Charles Emmanuel of Savoy and Sardinia was drawn into the Bourbon alliance. Spanish troops overran the south of Italy, where the Austrian domination was unpopular, and Don Carlos was proclaimed king of Naples and Sicily. The diet of the empire resolved to support the emperor, and Hanover was required to supply its contingent of the imperial armies. Nevertheless, Walpole refused to allow Great Britain to be embroiled. The continental armies exhausted the blood and the treasure of the continental powers, while Great Britain was husbanding her resources in both kinds. Both George and his queen would have plunged the country into war in support of the empire and against the Bourbon combination ; but the queen yielded to the minister, and the king was taught to believe that the minister's policy was his own suggestion. Walpole would only play the part of intermediary. The war of the Polish Succession was brought to an end by the Treaty of Vienna in 1738. The outcome was that the Bourbon Don Carlos was acknowledged as Charles II. of Naples and Sicily, and the duchy of Parma was handed over to Austria. By an ingenious juggle the duke of Lorraine gave up Lorraine and took Tuscany instead. Stanislaus gave up the claim to Poland, and took instead the duchy of Lorraine. On his death Lorraine was to go to France, thus

The Bourbon family compact, October.

Walpole keeps clear of war.

End of the war, 1738.

rounding off her possessions in that quarter. The emperor got his candidate on to the Polish throne; and if he lost Naples, he got the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, which had hitherto been refused by France; he got Parma; and he secured Tuscany for his son-in-law, which in effect gave Austria a consolidated territory in the north of Italy.

It was only to a limited extent then that the Bourbon alliance had achieved its object. Lorraine was a substantial gain for France; Naples and Sicily, in place of Parma and Tuscany, were a substantial gain for Spain; but Austria was very far from being crippled. Moreover, if she was resentful of Great Britain's abstention from supporting her actively in the war, the resentment did not amount to a complete alienation, since it was to the pressure from Great Britain that she owed the recovery of Parma and Tuscany. And further, the financial strain of the war had told upon both France and Spain, while Great Britain had been expanding her commerce and piling up wealth, and was certainly in no worse position for facing a struggle than she had been before the war of the Polish Succession opened.

Now when the Family Compact was signed in 1733, hostility to Great Britain held a very prominent place in it. Not only was it a standing grievance with Spain that the maritime power was in possession of Minorca and Gibraltar, and that Elizabeth's Italian policy was thwarted and hampered by the attitude of Great Britain to Austria; there were also perpetual causes of friction over the abuse on the one side of the commercial privileges which Great Britain had acquired from Spain, and the questionable legality on the other of the high-handed methods by which the Spanish authorities sought to counteract the proceedings of British seamen. But it would certainly appear that Fleury regarded hostility to Great Britain as quite secondary; the Bourbon ascendancy on the Continent occupied the first place in his mind. It is obvious that if there was to be a direct struggle between the Bourbon powers and Great Britain that struggle would have to take place on the sea; yet no attempt whatever was made to prepare for a maritime contest. France had deliberately

**Aim of the
family
compact.**

neglected her navy when she had been working as the close ally of Great Britain ; nothing was done to make up for that neglect. Alberoni had sought to resuscitate the Spanish navy ; but his efforts had been brought to nought and had not been renewed. Walpole has been blamed for his peace policy on the ground **Walpole and the compact.** that he ought to have supported Austria vigorously in order to prevent the development of the Bourbon power ; but his peace policy in itself was entirely justified. When war did come, Great Britain, owing to that policy, was infinitely better able to bear the strain of a long war out of her own resources than any continental power ; she was able to subsidise her own allies, so that they also could endure the strain of a war which but for her wealth would have exhausted their resources and brought them to their knees. So far, the peace policy was sound ; but it was incomplete. It required to be supplemented by positive preparations for war, the organisation of army and navy so as to be in immediate readiness for war. It was here that Walpole failed. Both he and Fleury were calculating on the other's predilection for peace. Each knew that a contest was coming, but each hoped to accomplish his ends by diplomacy ; and neither made the preparations which, in the event of diplomacy failing, would bring an armed struggle to a decisive issue. Diplomacy did, in fact, fail, and the struggle was not brought to a decisive issue till twenty years had passed.

The end of the war of the Polish Succession had in effect been a foregone conclusion some time before its formal termination **Spain and England.** by the Treaty of Vienna in 1738. As the pressure and interest of the war grew less, Spain became increasingly insistent upon her grievances against Great Britain. Under cover of the commercial treaties, a vast amount of illicit traffic was carried on with the Spanish colonies by British shipping. The Spaniards claimed the right of searching British ships on the high seas. The British denied that right, and claimed also that the Spanish officials treated peaceful and harmless merchantmen with an intolerable violence. In England the Opposition fixed upon the friction with Spain as providing a suitable opportunity for embarrassing the minister. Popular

indignation was already running high over the stories of outrages to British seamen. The Opposition called for a committee to investigate the complaints. Some years before a certain Captain Robert Jenkins had told how the Spanish *Jenkins's ear*. preventive officers had boarded his ship and cut off his ear. He was now brought before the committee to repeat his tale, which was probably true. Asked what he had done when his ear was cut off, he replied with dramatic effect that 'he had commended his soul to God and his cause to his country.' The story of Jenkins's ear was but one among many, but it took hold of the popular imagination; and the war which broke out eighteen months afterwards is commonly known as 'the war of Jenkins's Ear.' Fiery resolutions were passed in condemnation especially of the right of search. Walpole very properly sought for a peaceful solution by an adjustment of claims and counter-claims. There was at the same time a current dispute as to the boundaries of the recently established British colony of Georgia and the Spanish colony of Florida. In January 1739 the governments agreed upon the convention of Pardo. The Spaniards were to pay £95,000, and the question of right of search and of the Georgian boundary were to be referred to a commission.

Then the Spaniards put in a demand for £68,000, which they declared to be due to them from the South Sea Company under the Assiento. The company repudiated the claim.

1739.

The Opposition fell upon the convention; Pitt denounced it with vehemence; Walpole's majority

Failure of negotiations.

in the Commons fell to twenty-eight. Walpole tendered his resignation, but George refused to accept it, and the minister remained at his post. Most of the Opposition adopted the futile policy of seceding from the House to mark their indignation. Popular opinion was with them. Spain, on the other hand, reverted to a more uncompromising attitude and explicitly insisted upon the right of search. War with Spain had now become inevitable, and in October was formally declared; but still Walpole did not resign.

Declaration of war, October.

His hand had been forced. He hated the war; he believed that it would result in disaster; he believed that France would

join with Spain, and that Great Britain was not strong enough to fight them single-handed. But the king was vehemently opposed to his retirement ; he, who had been so successful a peace-minister, suffered from the not unusual conviction that his own hand was the only one which could successfully steer the ship of State. A master of navigation among shoals and quicksands, he was not the helmsman for a storm ; nevertheless, he remained at the helm.

CHAPTER IV. THE INDECISIVE STRUGGLE

I. THE COMING CONFLICT

WHEN war was declared between Great Britain and Spain in October 1739, what had occurred ostensibly was merely that two powers had lost their tempers, and had begun to fight each other over trading questions which concerned no one but themselves, and, with a little common sense, could have been settled without any fighting at all. Nevertheless, it was but the harbinger of a world-wide conflagration. During sixteen out of the next twenty-four years the nations were doing their best to tear each other to pieces. In the course of the struggle the motives and the combinations of the various powers changed very considerably. But two features persist throughout. Prussia was fighting to establish her position permanently as one of the first-class European powers; Great Britain was fighting, at first unconsciously but afterwards consciously, to secure, not her position in Europe, but her oceanic and trans-oceanic empire. These two struggles are inextricably mixed up with each other and with a renewed attempt to establish a Bourbon supremacy in Europe. It will be well, therefore, to enter upon the story of the struggle with as clear a conception as possible of the real situation and of the issues which were at stake.

Primarily, then, we have an Anglo-Spanish duel over the Spanish right of search, which is on the face of it the last phase of the ancient quarrel between Elizabeth's mariners and Philip of Spain. It is the old story of the determination of English traders to trade at their own will with the Spanish possessions in America whether the Spaniards liked it or not, and of the determination of the Spaniards to shut the British out of that trade as much as they possibly could.

But beyond that conflict lay its assured development into a struggle with France, the other Bourbon power, for transmarine dominion. No one, perhaps, grasped the fact at the time. It is so easy to recognise it to-day, that some modern historians have credited the British people of Walpole's day with an instinctive perception that the time had arrived for the British and the Bourbons to settle by the arbitration of the sword which of the two was to be supreme in America and in India. It is exceedingly improbable that either the Opposition politicians who forced on the war or the public who urged on the politicians were aware of so much as the existence of an Indian question. It is most improbable that many, if any, of them realised that there was a North American question of real significance. They went to war with Spain over the right of search, and took their chance of having France on their hands as well, not because she was a colonial power, but because she was the head partner in the Bourbon firm. Colonists in America might know that the delimitation of Georgia and Florida was a very minor matter in comparison with French ambitions. Servants of the East India Company might anticipate that sooner or later there would be conflicts between French and British as rivals in seeking favour and concessions from the native princes. But the politicians in London, Paris, and Madrid had their eyes fixed upon the West Indian and South Sea trade and the European balance of power. The struggle with France in America was inevitable, because the French in America were planning to extend their southward course from the great lakes, in the rear of the British colonies, to the mouth of the Mississippi, which would have entirely cut off the British from any further expansion. That a struggle in India was inevitable is much less obvious. In the nature of things there was nothing to ensure that either the British or French trading company in the Peninsula would find itself under the direction of a governor whose ambitions soared to the acquisition of political power instead of confining themselves to the immediate pursuit of dividends. But for the personality of François Dupleix the struggle there might have been indefinitely postponed. Neither

the politicians nor the public at large in Britain, in France, or in Spain realised that a struggle was inevitable, or even that it would be the outcome of the Anglo-Spanish war.

France was in no hurry to join with Spain in her war with Great Britain. Fleury had contemplated no such sudden assault; the Spanish partner had broken away, **France and England.** just as the British people had broken away from **England.** Walpole's control. On the face of things it was possible that Spain and Great Britain were to be left to fight out their quarrel, France intervening for the protection of her Bourbon ally only in the way of diplomatic pressure. The prolongation of the duel would have forced her to arms; but even so in a straightforward fight conducted by sea there was little probability that the British would get much the worst of it.

But there was to be no such straightforward duel. France and Spain were both too keenly interested in purely European questions to concentrate exclusively on a maritime **The** war; and among continental questions, that of the **Pragmatic Sanction.** Austrian succession was imminent. It was true that all the great powers and half the electoral princes had guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction. But excuses, however meagre their plausibility, are always forthcoming for invalidating such diplomatic pledges when national interests are affected. The dismemberment of Austria was so very much in the interest of the Bourbon powers that they would have very strong inducements to ignore their pledges, at least if the other guarantors did not stand stoutly and uncompromisingly by the Pragmatic Sanction. Within eighteen months of the outbreak of the Anglo-Spanish war it had become a mere appendage to the war of the Austrian Succession. The ball was set rolling by Prussia.

A hundred years earlier, in the days of the Thirty Years' War, Brandenburg had been merely one, and not the first, among the major German states. In the Thirty Years' War **Prussia's growth.** it had played no very distinguished part; but the 'Great Elector,' Frederick William, succeeded his father as elector before the end of that war; and his diplomacy increased the territorial possessions of Brandenburg at the Treaty of

Westphalia. . But the possessions of Brandenburg were scattered; the margravate itself was completely separated from the duchy of East Prussia which actually lay outside the borders of the empire. It was the business of the Great Elector's life to gain access to the Baltic, and to make his territories continuous. He was not altogether successful, though he achieved much in the desired direction. Brandenburg, when he died, was a much more powerful and a much better organised state than it had been in the first half of the seventeenth century.

The Great Elector had been succeeded by his son Frederick, who followed his father's policy, though with less vigour. He,

Frederick I. however, succeeded in rising from the rank of an
and elector to that of a king, a title granted to him by
Frederick the Emperor Leopold in order to secure his adherence
William I. at the moment when the war of the Spanish Succession was imminent.

He took his title from his Prussian duchy instead of from Brandenburg, in order to avoid the elevation of one of the states of the empire into a kingdom. Frederick I., king of Prussia, was succeeded by his son Frederick William I. In Frederick William's policy there were two root ideas; one, loyalty to the emperor, the other the military organisation of Prussia. His wife was the sister of George II., and we have seen that George attempted unsuccessfully, through the scheme of a double royal marriage, to attach Prussia as a German state more closely to Hanover, and to detach it from a too subservient loyalty to Austria. In spite of extremely inconsiderate treatment on the part of Charles VI., Frederick William was obstinately loyal to the emperor to the end of his days. He had done little towards the extension of his dominion; the great gap still remained between Prussia and Brandenburg. But he had organised and drilled, drilled and organised, his army, without using it to fight, until he had worked it up into a military machine of extraordinary perfection.

Frederick William had guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction, and he would have held to his pledge. But he died on the last day of May in 1740, and was succeeded on the Prussian throne by Frederick II., a prince with much larger ambitions, of much

higher and more varied ability, and of infinitely less scrupulosity. Within five months, in October, Charles VI. died, leaving the Hapsburg succession, in accordance with the Pragmatic Sanction, to his daughter, Maria Theresa, the wife of Francis, formerly of Lorraine, and now duke of Tuscany. A week later died the Tsarina Anne of Russia, leaving the throne to a minor ; an event which it was anticipated would prevent Russia from active intervention as a guarantor of the Pragmatic Sanction. That instrument applied only to the Hapsburg inheritance itself, not to the imperial crown. Spain and Sardinia might use the opportunity to assert once more claims upon Austrian possessions in Northern Italy ; but the one defensible claim, apart from that of Maria Theresa, to the Hapsburg inheritance, was that of the elector of Bavaria, Charles Albert, who was also a candidate for the imperial dignity in opposition to Francis of Lorraine. A direct attack upon Austria was in the circumstances feasible only if some of the great powers repudiated their guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction ; indirectly, it might be made by supporting the candidature of Charles Albert for the empire. This was the European situation in the last days of October 1740.

From Europe, then, we turn to the other two fields which were about to become the area of conflict between France and Great Britain : North America and India. And first North America.

In the previous volume we followed the story of the planting of English colonies along the whole eastern seaboard from the river Kennebec on the north to the river Savanna on the south, involving the absorption of the Dutch colony, which after the Treaty of Breda became the English colony of New York. This range of colonies had been completed in 1732 by the plantation of Georgia between South Carolina and the Spanish colony of Florida ; the whole group forming the ' thirteen colonies.' To these the Treaty of Utrecht had added the districts hitherto disputed with the French, Acadia or Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and the Hudson Bay Territory. On the St. Lawrence, up to Lake Ontario, the French had established their colony of New France or Canada. The

**Death of
Charles VI,
1740.**

**The French
in America.**

Treaty of Utrecht had not laid down boundaries with definiteness, and a large portion of Acadia was still in dispute. The British colonies had not pushed inland beyond the range of the Alleghany mountains. Far to the westward French explorers had struck the river Mississippi, and traced it down to its mouth in the Gulf of Mexico, where they had established the colony of Louisiana. Here they had done little enough in the way of occupation. The colony centred round New Orleans in the south. It was, however, the object of the French to connect Louisiana with Canada by a chain of forts, to be established along the basin of the Ohio, which, with the Mississippi, would thus become a permanent limit to the westward expansion of the British colonies. The basin of the Ohio was as yet unoccupied, though the French claimed it by right of discovery.

At this time the Canadian outposts were at Fort Niagara between Lake Ontario and Lake Erie, and at Crown Point on Lake Champlain. The outpost of Louisiana was at Fort Chartres, some fifty miles below the confluence of the Mississippi and the Missouri, and a hundred miles above the confluence of the Mississippi and the Ohio. The French population of the two colonies was very much smaller than the British population of the thirteen colonies ; but the French organisation was military, and the British organisation was not. The thirteen colonies had no common government, and each of them was much more intent upon its own immediate interests as a self-governing state than upon comparatively remote interests affecting the whole body—a glance at the map will show that the prospect of a direct collision between the French and the southern colonies was not imminent. The general attitude of the colonies to each other bore some resemblance to that of the ancient states of Hellas. They required the pressure of some common overwhelming danger to force them into any common activity for the common good. In the north the borderland between Canada and the New England colonies was occupied by Indian tribes with whom in general the French were on more friendly terms than the British, although the Iroquois, ‘ the five nations,’ counted as allies of the British.

**The French
and the
British
Colonies.**

Lastly we turn to India, where an analysis of the conditions requires a greater amount of retrospective detail.

Theoretically the whole Peninsula was under the dominion of the Mughal emperor, the 'Great Mogul'; but we should be under an entire misapprehension if we regarded that empire as in any conceivable sense a homogeneous state. Never at any period of its history was India a homogeneous state. In race, in lan-

India: a survey of the past—the Aryans.

guage, and in religion it was no less diverse than the continent of Europe, even as its area is very much that of Europe minus the Russian empire. Geographically it falls into two divisions, the Northern and the Southern, broadly distinguished as Hindustan and the Deccan; the river Nerbudda serving approximately as a dividing line between the two. The invasions of the Aryans during a period vaguely extending from 3000 B.C. to 1000 B.C. established in the north-west, as it would seem, an almost exclusively Aryan population. The extension of the Aryan conquests down the Ganges planted in the Ganges basin a much more mixed population, where the Aryan element prevailed in the upper classes and the pre-Aryan or Dravidian in the lower, until we reach the Lower Ganges, where the predominant element becomes Mongolian, and the genuine Aryan element is small. It was only to a very minor extent that the Aryan element penetrated into the Deccan at all. **Hinduism**

But the Aryan religion, modified by the hereditary **and caste.** priestly caste of Brahmins into what is called Brahminism or Hinduism, became the dominant religion of the whole peninsula—without expelling the primitive native cults which it absorbed, and by which it was in its turn modified. The total result was the development of the system of caste. Here we need not attempt to discuss the historical development of caste; but according to Hindu theory it rests primarily upon the distinction between the three divisions of the pure-blooded or 'twice-born'—the Brahmins, the priestly or learned caste, the Kshatriyas or Rajputs, the royal and military caste, and the Vaisya or agricultural caste; and the altogether inferior caste called sudras. The fundamental principle of caste is the prohibition

of intermarriage. Within the great castes there arose infinite subdivisions ; there are now innumerable castes which claim to be Brahmin, and innumerable castes which claim to be Rajput ; different degrees of rigidity apply to the prohibitions of intermarriage ; but the fundamental fact remains that the Hindu is determined above all things to do nothing which shall degrade him from his caste, because caste is not merely a matter of social position in this life but is essentially bound up with the life to come.

Caste, resting upon a religious sanction of the most unpromising type, was and is itself the basis of the Hindu social system ; but apart from this the popular religion of the Hindus is the most comprehensive system of polytheism that has ever existed. Every kind of deity or dæmon has found entry into the Hindu pantheon, and the ordinary Hindu in the accepted sense of the term is a worshipper of idols even while the religion of the higher grade devotees is the most remote from materialism and idolatry that could well be conceived.

Then upon Hinduism entered Mohammedanism. First came the Arabs who never accomplished more than the establishment of border kingdoms in the Punjab, the north-western corner of India, which is watered by the Indus and its tributaries. About the year 1000 A.D. Mahmud of Ghazni began a series of terrific incursions, sweeping up vast treasures and destroying countless temples and idols, insomuch that the 'image-breaker' became one of his titles. Mahmud himself did not organise a dominion, but after him other Mohammedan conquerors came down through the passes of Afghanistan, and presently established Mohammedan empires which usually centred in Delhi, and extended with various contractions and expansions from the mountains to the Lower Ganges. The Hindu population of India was not converted, save in a very small degree, to Mohammedanism. The empire builders were chiefs of Turk or Afghan blood, whose followers were for the most part Turks and Afghans, and who established a military supremacy over the much larger Hindu population. Thus Mohammedan dynasties established themselves, resting

upon Mohammedan armies, by degrees all over India, in the Deccan as well as Afghanistan. Hindu and Mohammedan did not combine, because to the Mohammedan the Hindu was an idol-worshipping infidel, and to the Hindu the Moslem was a sacrilegious outcaste. To the Hindu the Mohammedan was always an alien conqueror.

While Henry VIII. was reigning in England, the greatest and the most attractive of the conquerors, Babar, flung himself upon Hindustan from Afghanistan. On his father's **The Mughals**, side Babar was a Turk, descended from the famous Timur or Tamerlaine ; on the mother's side he was a Mongol, or Mughal, descended from that other equally famous conqueror Genghis Khan ; hence the name of the Mughal dynasty, anglicised as the Moguls. Babar's life was too short for the real establishment of his empire ; that was the work of his grandson Akbar, whose reign coincided almost exactly with that of Queen Elizabeth in England. Akbar was the first great Mohammedan ruler who endeavoured to fuse his subjects into one people ; the first who made no distinction between Hindu and Moslem. In his half century of rule he established his dominion over all Hindustan, and over a small part of the Deccan, the greater part of which was under the sway of Mohammedan dynasties. During the first half of the seventeenth century Akbar's son and grandson continued to act upon Akbar's lines.

But then came the fanatical Mussulman Aurangzib, who, on the one hand, strove throughout his reign to extend his dominion, so that before his death the greater part of the Deccan owned his sway ; and, on the other hand, **Aurangzib and the Mahrattas**, revived in all its bitterness the feud between Hindu and Mussulman. In two ways Aurangzib prepared the dissolution of the Mogul empire. By rousing Hindu hostility he had given the Hindu chief Sivaji the opportunity of posing as a champion of Hinduism, and of creating in that character the practically independent ascendancy of the Mahratta race, which, issuing from its fastnesses in the Western Deccan, subjected a great portion of the Deccan and of Central India to the domination of a Mahratta confederacy. In the second place Aurangzib,

again departing from the statesmanlike methods of his great-grandfather, broke up the dominion, which had become altogether too large and unwieldy, into satrapies or vice-royalties, provinces so large that in the absence of a very strong central government each governor was able to make himself to all intents and purposes an independent prince. The sovereignty of the successors of Aurangzib became more shadowy than the sovereignty of the Austrian emperor in the rest of Germany. Even in Aurangzib's own day the seeds of disintegration were so obviously present that a European observer had remarked that Turenne with 12,000 men could make himself master of India.

Aurangzib died in 1707, and thirty years after his death the Mogul empire was to all intents and purposes not an empire but a collection of great principalities, whose rulers professed to recognise the sovereignty of the Mogul when it happened to suit them to appeal to law, but who otherwise went their own independent way. None of the ruling Mohammedan dynasties had existed for so much as fifty years. The Ganges basin, below Agra on the Jumna, was divided between the nawab wazir of Oudh and the nawab of Bengal and Behar. A great prince, the Nizam ul Mulk, at Haidarabad, was viceroy of the whole Deccan, of which the eastern portion, called the Carnatic, was ruled by a nawab who was his lieutenant-governor. At Puna was the peshwa, the head of the Mahratta confederacy, nominally the minister of Sivaji's descendant, actually the master; as the mayors of the palace had been in the later days of the Merovingians. Four other great chiefs exercised a general control over the Mahratta confederacy, the Gaekwar in Gujerat, Holkar at Indur, Sindhia at Gwalior, and the Bhonsla at Nagpur. The geographical position of these several seats of authority sufficiently indicates the wide extent of the Mahratta ascendancy. The other princes mentioned above were all Mohammedans; the Mahrattas were Hindus, whose acknowledgment of the Mogul's sovereignty was even more perfunctory than that of the Moslems. In Rajputana a group of Rajput princes ruled each one over his

**The Mogul
empire in
solution.**

own domain in virtual independence. As for the Mogul himself at Delhi, the last shattering blow was dealt to his power by the devastating invasion of the Persian Nadir Shah, who, in 1739, sacked Delhi, massacred half its inhabitants, and carried off the world-famed peacock throne.

On the fringe of the great peninsula were the factories or trading-stations of the commercial companies of four European powers. The Portuguese had been first on the scene; **The Europeans in India.** at one time they had dominated the Indian seas, but their power was departed, and in effect they held nothing but Goa on the west coast and a port on the Persian Gulf. Next had come Dutch and English, but the Dutch company had devoted its energies to the Spice islands; in India itself it had little but the station of Chinsurah on the Hugli and Negapatam in the south, though it held Trincomali and the island of Ceylon. The English had three factories—at Bombay on the west coast, at Fort St. George or Madras, and at Fort William or Calcutta on the Hugli. The French also had three positions—at Mahé on the south-west coast, at Pondichery on the south-east coast a hundred miles below Madras, and at Chandernagur on the Hugli close to Calcutta. There was also another British military station at Fort St. David, immediately to the south of Pondichery. French and English alike were merely trading companies, not provided with armies, but having a mere handful of soldiers to afford them a sort of police protection. They had no territories. Their base of supplies was in England or France, to be **French and British.** reached only by a voyage round the Cape which generally occupied some six months—it might be a little less and it might be a great deal more. The French had the advantage of a naval station at the Mauritius, the Isles of France and Bourbon, between India and Africa; the English had the advantage of a much more extensive marine and a much larger navy. The French were on a better footing with the natives. The companies were commercial rivals, but neither of them had hitherto bethought themselves of a dream so wild as that of acquiring territorial dominion. It was an understood thing

that if the governments at home fell out, and France and Great Britain went to war with each other, the companies in India would treat each other as being outside the quarrel, and would continue the pursuit of dividends. British statesmen and French statesmen at home had no more thought of trying to set up a territorial dominion in India than the companies.

But there was one dominant fact in the situation. If the peace should be broken, if an actual struggle should arise between **sea-power**. French and British in India, the victory was absolutely bound to go to the country which exerted its sea-power most effectively. Should Great Britain so choose, and should no unexpected disaster intervene, her navy would inevitably secure her a victory in such a contest. If the French in India challenged the contest it was incredible that the British navy would not sooner or later intervene. But the Frenchman who did, in fact, challenge the contest either omitted that fact from his calculations, or reckoned on the chance of the naval intervention coming too late ; which is very nearly what occurred. But we must leave Dupleix, his schemes, and their outcome, to a later section.

II. THE WAR OPENS, 1739-1745

Walpole was almost alone in his reluctance to engage upon the war with Spain. Most of his colleagues as well as the king, **1739.** the Opposition, and the country at large, plunged **Walpole** into the conflict with light hearts, satisfied that **and the war.** the struggle with Spain would be merely a war of plunder, a spoiling of the Egyptians. Walpole was convinced in his own mind that war with Spain would mean war with France as well ; but that possibility had been before him for at least six years. During those six years it ought to have been a serious part of the business of his government to place in a state of thorough organisation the great navy, which ought to have been ready not only to hold its own single-handed against the fleets of France and Spain, but to sweep the seas irresistibly. Under a minister who understood that side of his business, the

British fleet ought to have been able to bring Spain to her knees before France could intervene, seeing that the latter country was by no means in readiness to undertake a maritime war. As a matter of fact, there was never from beginning to end any doubt of British naval superiority; but almost from beginning to end mismanagement and lack of organisation prevented that superiority from being given anything like full effect.

At the first moment, however, the cheerful anticipations of the war party seemed likely to be fulfilled. By midsummer 1739 it was already certain that a declaration of war was imminent. Reinforcements were sent to Admiral Haddock's squadron in the Mediterranean, a Channel fleet was made ready, and Admiral Vernon, one of the Whig Opposition, was dispatched with six ships of the line to the West Indies. War was actually declared in London on 23rd October; a week later, Haddock had captured a couple of Spanish treasure ships, and on 21st November Vernon captured the West Indian port of Porto Bello on the Isthmus of Darien, the news of which success was received in March with wild acclamations of joy; but Vernon did nothing more.

In the late summer, the ministers learnt that although there had been no declaration of war between France and Great Britain, a French fleet had been dispatched to the West Indies. A great effort was accordingly made, and a fleet was prepared which included thirty-three sail of the line and some eighty smaller vessels, carrying 10,000 soldiers under the command of General Wentworth. The force joined Vernon at Jamaica in January 1741. Meanwhile, Commodore Anson had started with a small squadron of six ships, on what was to be his voyage round the world, but was at first simply a disappearance into the unknown. The West India force employed itself upon an attempt to capture Cartagena. Wentworth and Vernon mismanaged matters completely, each of them laying the blame on the other; an assault failed; when a siege was attempted Wentworth's men died of fever like flies. In a few weeks the siege was raised. In July, Wentworth, with the remnant of his troops, made an equally

1740.**Opening
successes.****1741.****Cartagena
and Santiago.**

ineffective attempt upon Santiago in Cuba. The great effort had produced nothing but a shocking loss of life. Vernon had not even attempted to bring the enemy's slightly inferior fleet to an engagement, and there was nothing whatever to show for it all except the quite unimportant capture of Porto Bello. The French fleet, it should be remarked, had been acting under explicit engagements to Spain; but the French government claimed that they were only 'auxiliaries,' and that the sending of a contingent to the Spanish fleet did not provide a *casus belli*. Nominally, Great Britain and France still remained at peace with each other. The same curious doctrine was applied in the continental war which began at the end of 1740, and in which Dutch, French, and British all took part, the French on one side and the Dutch and British on the other; but only as auxiliaries, and without being technically at war with each other.

The deaths of the Emperor Charles VI. and the Tsarina Anne in October 1740—at the moment when the great British expedition was sailing to join Vernon—gave the young Frederick of Prussia his opportunity. Frederick William, at the very end of his life, had been tricked by the emperor over his claim to the duchy of Berg. His son Frederick had no compunction in taking advantage of the critical position of Charles's young heiress. The possession of the province of Silesia, bordering on Brandenburg, was of immense strategic importance to Prussia, necessary to her, in fact, if she was to attain to that supreme position among German states at which she had been aiming ever since the days of the Great Elector. A girl of twenty-three was on the Austrian throne, but her title was challenged by the elector of Bavaria. If the powers who had guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction stood by her, the elector would have no chance. But as matters stood, she would certainly not be supported by Spain, probably not by Russia, and France was more than likely to discover some pretext for supporting Charles Albert, at least in his candidature for the imperial crown, if not in his claim to the Hapsburg inheritance.

Frederick resolved to strike first and argue afterwards. In December he suddenly marched his troops into Silesia and offered

Maria Theresa terms. If she would cede Silesia to him, he would support her husband's candidature for the empire, and would maintain her claims to the Hapsburg inheritance against the elector of Bavaria. Maria Theresa had no intention of purchasing his support at such a price. She refused to treat as long as there was a Prussian soldier in Silesia. In the spring an Austrian army marched into the province, but was completely defeated at the battle of Möllwitz, which at once established the reputation of the Prussian soldiery, though not as yet of the king himself.

Frederick occupies Silesia, December.

As yet the only war actually in progress on the Continent was that between Austria and Prussia, in Silesia. The high-spirited queen had no thought of giving way to the entirely inexcusable aggression of Prussia. But Möllwitz changed the situation. No one had supposed for a moment that Frederick would be able to make good his demands by force of arms; Prussia in the past had not distinguished herself from the military point of view, and the value of Frederick William's organisation had not been revealed to the world any more than the military genius of Frederick William's son. But now it was recognised on all sides that Prussia was going to be a heavy weight in the scales. The anti-Austrian party, wherever an anti-Austrian party existed, was greatly encouraged. Fleury in France had been inclined to the plan of supporting Charles Albert in his candidature for the empire while maintaining the Pragmatic Sanction; but now that policy gave way to the schemes of Belleisle, whose idea was to dismember Austria and manipulate German territory so that it should be distributed among several princes in mutual rivalry, none of whom would be able to make head against France. France herself was looking to the Netherlands as her reward. Spain and Sardinia were both ready enough to snatch more Italian territory from Austria. While Vernon and Wentworth were wasting ships and lives in the West Indies and on the Spanish Main, Belleisle was negotiating with Frederick.

**1741.
Marshal Belleisle.**

In June an agreement had been reached. Frederick should be guaranteed his conquest in Silesia, and his vote was to be

given to Charles Albert. Sardinia and Spain would make their attack in Italy, and France, acting as an auxiliary, would supply men and money to the elector of Bavaria in support of both his claims, though no one intended him to obtain the Hapsburg inheritance entire. In August a French force had joined the elector; in September another French force was across the Lower Rhine to prevent any action on the part of Hanover and Holland. Incidentally, French diplomacy involved Sweden and Russia in a separate contest, which kept the latter from intervening in the affairs of Western Europe; as otherwise she was likely to do, since the Austrian party was for the moment in the ascendent. The capture of Linz on the Danube by the Franco-Bavarian army opened the way to Vienna, and induced Augustus of Saxony and Poland to join the league. Only in one quarter was there encouragement for Maria Theresa. She boldly appealed to her Hungarian subjects, whose chivalrous sympathies were aroused for the young queen, and who adopted her cause with enthusiasm, in spite of their traditional hostility to the house of Hapsburg.

But at this stage there came temporary relief. Frederick was playing for his own hand, as indeed were all the parties in that quarrel. He completely distrusted France, and he made a secret treaty with Austria, the Treaty of Klein-Schnellendorf. In order to release the Austrian army, Silesia was to be ceded to him, though there was still to be a show of the conquest being effected by force of arms. Belleisle, who was also playing a double game, diverted the Franco-Bavarian attack from Vienna to Prague. Maria Theresa had escaped the most serious danger, although immediately afterwards Frederick repudiated the secret treaty, and made a fresh private treaty with Bavaria and Saxony for the further dismemberment of Austria.

What had England and Hanover been doing during this year, apart from those naval operations against Spain which have already been described? A fierce attack upon Walpole's conduct of affairs was made by the Opposition at the beginning of 1741. In both Houses the attack was completely defeated. In

the country there was a strong feeling of sympathy for Maria Theresa ; but Walpole was intensely anxious to avoid an open breach with France, and George, as elector of Hanover, was jealous of Hapsburg ascendancy in Germany. Both the king and the minister were anxious to persuade the queen to secure her own position by conceding Frederick's demands. In the summer George went to Hanover. Alarmed by the presence of the French army in Westphalia, he signed in September a treaty of neutrality for Hanover which roused much indignation in England. The Treaty of Klein-Schnellendorf, and Maria Theresa's assent to the cession of Silesia, were largely due to the persuasions of the British envoy and to the scotching of her hopes of Hanoverian support by George's treaty of neutrality.

But in England these things told against the government instead of for it. When parliament met, after a general election, it was found that the ministerialists had only a very slight majority. Matters had been made worse by the news of failure in the West Indies, and by the loss of many merchant vessels. The Mediterranean fleet appeared not to be strong enough to face the French and Spaniards in that sea. When the ministers met the House, the first business was to deal with election petitions which were habitually treated simply as questions of party. Four ministerialists were immediately unseated. In January a direct attack upon Walpole was defeated by only three votes. A week later ministers were beaten by one vote on another election petition question. Walpole accepted a peerage—the earldom of Orford—and resigned ; though he still retained the ear of the king.

The formation of the new ministry was entrusted to Pulteney by Walpole's advice. The reconstruction was very limited. Carteret became 'secretary for the northern department,' which meant virtually that he was foreign secretary. Two prominent members of the Whig Opposition, Wilmington and Sandys, joined the cabinet ; the 'Boys' remained outside ; so for the present did Chesterfield. It was

**Attitude of
George II.**

**1742.
Resignation
of Walpole,
January.**

**Carteret's
ministry.**

not a case of the transfer of power from one party to another ; the new earl of Orford did not go into Opposition ; his personal supporters still generally supported the new ministry ; but a considerable contingent of those who had hitherto been in Opposition now gave their votes for ministers. The point of primary importance was that Carteret, whose foreign policy appealed strongly to the king, became for the time dictator in foreign affairs.

While Walpole was making his last stand in the British parliament, affairs had been going not unfavourably for Maria Theresa.

The war on the Continent. The Austrian forces recaptured Linz, and though Charles Albert was duly elected as the Emperor Charles VII., he found himself driven out of Bavaria. Frederick conducted a brief and futile campaign in Moravia ; and while Spanish troops were landed in Italy the effect was to force over to the other side the king of Sardinia, whose ambitions in Northern Italy clashed with those of Spain. In 1742 the junction of the Sardinian and Austrian forces in Lombardy swept the Spaniards back.

The vigour of Carteret's administration was promptly felt in England ; the Mediterranean fleet was reinforced, and blockaded Toulon ; and in August, Commodore Martin appeared in the bay of Naples with three ships. That force proved sufficient to prevail upon Don Carlos, king of Naples, to pledge himself to neutrality. The commodore gave him half an hour by the watch, or according to another account, two hours, to sign, on pain of a bombardment ; and he signed—though he nourished in his heart a lasting resentment against the power which had compelled him to do so.

On the demand of Maria Theresa, British and Hanoverian troops were assembled in Flanders to protect the Spanish Netherlands against a possible attack by France ; though it became necessary for Great Britain to pay the Hanoverian troops in order to prevent George from disbanding them—much to the wrath of the Opposition. Carteret's diplomacy, however, was strikingly successful. In June he negotiated the Treaty of Breslau between Frederick and Maria

Carteret's diplomatic successes.

Theresa, by which the queen definitely ceded the greater part of Silesia, and Frederick undertook forthwith to withdraw all his troops from Bohemia; and in October he succeeded, after Lord Stair had failed, in inducing the Dutch to assist in subsidising the queen, and to furnish a contingent of 20,000 men to the army of defence in Flanders. In November the Treaty of Westminster arranged that George and Frederick should mutually guarantee each other's territories. Immediately after the Treaty of Breslau, Saxony followed suit and signed a treaty with Austria. Before the end of the year the French had been compelled to evacuate Prague, which they had captured in the previous November; and Austria was once more in complete possession of Bohemia.

The command of the assorted troops of auxiliaries in Flanders had been entrusted to Lord Stair, who, if he had had his own way, would have used them for a direct invasion of France. George, however, held fast by the theory that the countries were not at war—the British and

1743.**The army in Flanders.**

Hanoverians were only auxiliaries who could only act in defence of their ally. Stair was not allowed to move. In the spring of 1743 French forces were collecting on the Meuse and the Moselle, with Bavaria as their objective. Whatever Stair might plan, he was as completely tied and bound by his instructions from England as Marlborough in the past had been by Dutch control. George himself intended to take the command, and in the meantime Stair was required to take up his position at Aschaffenburg on the Maine, while the French general Noailles was concentrating at Speier on the Upper Rhine. The responsibility for the situation when George actually arrived to take over the command from Stair in the middle of June was not Stair's but the king's. But for his orders, repeated and positive, Stair would not have been at Aschaffenburg at all. While he was there the French were able to cut off his supplies; and after a brief delay George found he had no choice but to fall back to Hanau, passing through Dettingen.

Noailles made his dispositions in such a manner that the allies ought to have been caught in a trap at Dettingen and annihilated or forced to surrender. But his scheme was foiled by a false

move of Grammont, who had been placed in an impregnable position blocking the march of the allies. Instead of remaining **Dettingen.** there, he advanced to the attack. By the desperate valour of the British regiments, what ought to have been a crushing defeat was turned into a definite victory. Both the king and his second son William, duke of Cumberland, distinguished themselves by the valour they displayed. Grammont's forces were completely routed; and the 'Pragmatic army,' as it was called, successfully made its way to Hanau. Luck and pluck, with no generalship at all, had saved it from annihilation, and had paralysed the French army for further operations. Dettingen is notable as being the last fight in which a king of England took a personal part. Stair, whose own plans had been overruled beforehand, who had not commanded on the withdrawal to Hanau, who had again been overruled when he urged the pursuit of the routed French, and whose proposals now for an active campaign were once more overruled, resigned in disgust and went home. There was no braver soldier in the army than King George, but as a strategist he was wholly devoid of audacity. Stair's place was taken by the old and now incompetent General Wade.

It was now the object of Carteret and George to reconcile Maria Theresa with the emperor, who, so far from having any reasonable prospect of acquiring Hapsburg territories, had now very little hold even upon his own Bavarian dominion. The plan of the 'project of Hanau' was the withdrawal of Charles's claims to the Hapsburg inheritance, his restoration in the electorate of Bavaria which was to be erected into a kingdom, his recognition as emperor, and the provision by Great Britain of subsidies which should enable him to maintain that dignity; in return for which he was to sever himself from France. But in England these proposals smacked of Hanoverianism. Carteret's position was weakened by the death of his ally, Lord Wilmington, the nominal head of the government, whose place in the cabinet was taken by Henry Pelham, the brother of Newcastle and the nominee of Newcastle and Walpole. If the Hanau plan had been carried through,

**The Treaty
of Worms.**

George would, in effect, have taken the leading place among the princes of Germany. But Carteret found the opposition in the cabinet too strong. The Treaty of Worms in September was instead directed to the close alliance of Sardinia and Austria, partly at the expense of Austria, and the expulsion of the Bourbons from Italy. Maria Theresa's assent was only obtained with considerable difficulty. But the treaty had the further effect of causing the Bourbons to renew the Family Compact in a more aggressive form. Moreover, Frederick of Prussia took alarm when he saw that the Treaty of Worms did not include any guarantee of the maintenance of the Treaty of
1744. France declares war.
Breslau. For the moment he did not show his hand. But in the spring of 1744, the old fiction, under which half the troops engaged in the war hitherto had posed as auxiliaries, was finally abandoned, and war was declared by France and Spain against the allies. Before midsummer a new treaty of alliance was made between France, Prussia, and the emperor. In the early autumn Frederick was again attacking Bohemia.

Before the actual declaration of war, a naval action had been fought in the Mediterranean which showed the disastrous extent to which the British navy had fallen a prey to indisciplineline. Although the British fleet was slightly superior to the combined French and Spanish fleets
Matthews in the Mediterranean.
which it engaged, the practical effect was that the British retreated. The admiral, Matthews, was cashiered, and no less than eleven of the captains were court-martialled. The story is significant of the reasons which prevented the British naval ascendancy from having that decisive effect which it ought to have ensured.

Also before the declaration of war, the fact that there was to be a direct struggle between France and Great Britain was demonstrated by the reappearance of a scheme for a French
An abortive Jacobite invasion.
invasion with a Stuart restoration as its object. Charles Edward, the eldest son of the *soi-disant* James III., had just completed his twenty-third year. In him the Jacobites were concentrating the hopes which had been so

persistently chilled by the uninspiring character of his depressed and depressing parent. Jacobite agents had collected the most promising if delusive reports as to the attitude of the people of Great Britain towards the idea of a restoration. The stock clamours of the Opposition against Hanoverianism, the popular grumblings against the government, gave rise to the mistaken idea that the clamourers and the grumblers would accept a Stuart restoration at least with equanimity if not with enthusiasm. These legends took effect at the French court, and an expedition was planned which was to be headed by the ablest general in the French armies, Maurice of Saxony (an illegitimate son of the old Augustus the Strong of Saxony and Poland), commonly known as Marshal Saxe. While Saxe was waiting with the transports a fleet sailed from Brest, but it would assuredly have fallen a prey to Admiral Norris with the Channel fleet if it had not been dispersed by a storm, which also sunk several of the transports at their anchors. This was the last move which finally destroyed every shred of pretence that the French and British governments were not at war.

The operations of the year were singularly futile. The French under Marshal Saxe strengthened their position on the border of the Netherlands ; elsewhere such advantages as were gained by either side in one field were compensated by losses in another. Frederick's campaign in Bohemia was unproductive, and he discovered that the French had no intention of giving him active assistance. In January 1745, the Emperor Charles Albert died, whereby both France and Prussia were deprived of the pretence that they were fighting on his behalf. Maria Theresa seized the opportunity to force a reconciliation upon the young elector of Bavaria, a lad of eighteen who was in no position to attempt the enforcement of his dead father's claims. He recognised the Pragmatic Sanction, and promised his support to Francis of Lorraine in his candidature for the imperial crown.

Meanwhile, at the end of 1744, Carteret's position had become untenable. The Pelham section practically forced him to resignation ; Walpole, for whom the king sent, recommended

1744-5.
Indecisive
campaigning.

that course. Carteret retired just after succeeding to the earldom of Granville, and the Pelhams proceeded to reconstruct the ministry on the 'broad-bottom' basis. Several of the 'patriots' were admitted to office, though Pitt still remained outside for two reasons, one being the king's antipathy to him, and the other his own determination to accept no minor posts. The Pelham or 'broad-bottomed' ministry succeeded Carteret's in the last month of 1744. But having ousted Carteret, instead of adopting a new line of policy it went on as before; and the men who in Opposition had thundered against Hanoverian measures, found themselves subsidising foreign princes and working for the benefit of Hanover as inevitably as Carteret himself. Hanover itself, however, was compelled to abandon the theory that it was still neutral, and to join in the war as a principal, because until it did so it was useless to urge that course upon Holland which had remained professedly neutral, while supplying its contingent of 'auxiliaries.'

1744.**The broad-bottomed ministry, December.**

The practical transfer of Bavaria to the Austrian side was promptly followed by the adhesion of Saxony to the Hapsburg cause. Saxony and Austria were agreed in their determination to break up the power of Frederick of Prussia, to whom the French would render no assistance, since they in their turn were bent on the conquest of the Netherlands for themselves. For the first half of the year (1745), our own interests centre in the campaign of Fontenoy. The duke of Cumberland, though he was only four-and-twenty, was nominated captain-general of the British forces at home and abroad. With him was associated the old Austrian general Konigsegg. Marshal Saxe, the French commander, laid siege to Tournay; Cumberland made a bold attempt to relieve it. The French force considerably outnumbered that of the allies, and Saxe was an incomparably superior general to Cumberland. Nevertheless, the indomitable courage of the British regiments enabled them to carry the French position, though only to be forced to retire again because the Dutch troops failed to support them. The allies were obliged to beat a steady and thoroughly

1745.**The Fontenoy campaign.**

well-ordered retreat ; the losses on the two sides had been about equal. But Cumberland failed to relieve Tournay ; Saxe received large reinforcements, Tournay itself was surrendered in June, and the fall of Ghent, Oudenarde, Ostend, and other places followed soon after. The allies received no reinforcements ; on the contrary, several British regiments and Cumberland himself were very soon required on the other side of the Channel to deal with a sudden danger, more imminent than the aggression of France in the Netherlands.

A few days after the French victory at Fontenoy, Frederick defeated an Austrian army at Hohenfriedberg. Again the British government turned to the idea which had dominated **Treaty of Dresden.** ministers since the very outset of the war, of bringing Frederick into the alliance by a guarantee of his position in Silesia. Frederick, who was already hard put to it from want of funds, was very well inclined to peace since the French operations were in no way calculated to help him. Nevertheless, it was only by a threat of the withdrawal of British subsidies, on which Maria Theresa was largely dependent, that the queen was driven to a reluctant acquiescence before the end of the year. Silesia was guaranteed to Frederick, and he on the other hand recognised the election of Francis of Lorraine as emperor, which had taken place in September. The Treaty of Dresden once more withdrew Prussia from the alliance with France.

Meanwhile, the British fleet had done something to redeem its character in the Mediterranean, where it was again dominant.

But the only substantial success of the year was **Capture of Louisbourg June.** achieved on the other side of the Atlantic, where a British squadron commanded by Commodore Warren, and accompanied by 4000 troops, not regulars, but raised in the colonies, captured the French fortress of Louisbourg. Louisbourg stood on the island of Cape Breton, and guarded the entry to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Much care and money had been spent by the French on the fortifications, and the capture was hailed with acclamations. Great Britain, in spite of her absorption on the Continent, was beginning to wake up

to the fact that there were other continents where great issues were at stake. But five days before the capture of Louisbourg the Young Chevalier had started upon his great adventure.

III. THE FORTY-FIVE, 1745-1746

The high-water mark of the chances of a Stuart restoration had been reached at the beginning of 1744 ; for the single reason that then and then only was France prepared to initiate a Jacobite insurrection. Always the Hanoverian government had the supreme advantage of **The Jacobite position.** controlling the regular military forces in Great Britain. An armed rebellion in which volunteer Jacobite levies could make head against the government forces could never have had any chance of success without a remarkably thorough organisation supported by an outburst of enthusiasm for the cause. Jacobites in England never suffered from the illusion that a successful revolt could be accomplished without very material aid in troops, military supplies, and cash from France. English Jacobites, with very few exceptions, were not ready to rebel without a reasonable prospect of success ; and they saw no reasonable prospect of success without the support of French troops. The attempt of 1744 was really conclusive. It showed how infinitesimally small was the chance of a French force successfully effecting a landing in England. James himself, never sanguine, abandoned all hope, even as the French abandoned all intention of employing French troops to do anything more than secure the triumph of an already victorious cause.

In 1745 the position of the house of Hanover in England was infinitely stronger than it had been in 1715. The dynasty had been established for thirty years, and under it the country had attained to a material prosperity without parallel. The interests not only of the commercial community, but of nearly all the great families were engaged on the Hanoverian side. Except the Roman Catholics, no religious body had reason to expect that it would gain anything from a restoration. The old doctrines of passive obedience

The Hanoverian dynasty.

and non-resistance had sunk into being mere pious opinions, not inspiring forces. English Jacobitism had nothing to fall back upon, except the tradition of personal loyalty to the legitimate line.

In Scotland the position was somewhat different. Popular dislike of the Union was very far from being dead, though it was much less keen than had been the case thirty years before. In the Highlands the old hostility to the Campbell ascendancy, the old royalist traditions connected with Montrose and Dundee, were still active. Half the clans had only submitted first to King William and then to King George because the government forces were too strong for them; and the Highland chiefs could raise levies much more formidable than any bands which English Jacobites could hope to muster among their tenants and personal retainers. The disarmament after the 'Fifteen' had been anything but thorough, and had affected the Whig clans who had obeyed the regulations a good deal more than the Jacobite clans which had strenuously evaded them. In the Lowlands, dislike of the Union counted for almost as much as dislike of a Romanist king. The prevalent sentiment was anti-Jacobite, but was tempered almost to the point of indifference by the feeling that a Stuart restoration would put an end to the Legislative Union. Nevertheless, in Scotland as in England, the leading Jacobites were convinced that no insurrection could be successful unless supported by French troops.

But there was one man who was resolved to attempt the impossible at all hazards, and whose daring almost achieved success. Charles Edward Stuart was endowed with all that personal magnetism which distinguished so many members of his family, and the lack of which had been so fatal to his father. In defiance of all the dictates of prudence, in defiance of all warnings that the Jacobites would not rise, he resolved to make his venture, to throw himself upon the loyalty of the clansmen, and to raise the Stuart banner in Scotland while the military forces of the Crown were engaged in the Netherlands campaign. Secretly he borrowed money and purchased arms—troops were not available. These were em-

**1745.
Prince
Charlie lands
in Scotland,
June-July.**

barked upon two ships, the *Doutelle* and the *Elizabeth*. On 22nd June he went aboard the *Doutelle* at Nantes with the comrades who were afterwards known as the 'Seven men of Moidart.' On 5th July the *Doutelle* and her consort set sail. Off Ushant they met a British ship of war with which the *Elizabeth* had an engagement so fierce that both vessels were crippled. The *Elizabeth*, which carried most of the supplies, had to make her way back to France, but the *Doutelle* escaped, and on 25th July the prince landed in Moidart on the west coast of Inverness-shire, where the Jacobite Macdonalds and Camerons were predominant.

His immediate reception was discouraging. The chiefs were Jacobites, but they were not disposed simply to run their heads into a noose. Macleod of Macleod and Macdonald of Sleat refused to move, and wrote urging him to withdraw. Other chiefs came to dissuade him from the enterprise by word of mouth, among them Donald Cameron of Locheil and Macdonald of Clanranald; but those two were not proof against the personal fascination of the prince who declared that he would go on by himself, even if all those failed him in whose loyalty he had placed his trust. Both the chiefs declared that the adventure was doomed to disaster; but that if he was bent on going forward they would follow him. Locheil's adhesion turned the scale. One after another chiefs came in. There was not one of them all who had been prepared to rise under such conditions, but they could not resist the appeal to their loyalty and generosity. Even as it was there were few enough, for the northern clans would not stir. On 19th August the prince raised his standard at Glenfinnan; but it was with not much more than 1000 men at his back that Charles started on his adventure.

The government had had warning of Charles's intentions, but made light of it; which, considering the apparent hopelessness of the project, is scarcely surprising. Sir John Cope was lying at Edinburgh with 1500 men when the news reached him of Charles's presence in Moidart. On the day when Charles raised his standard, Cope started on a march for the north, intending to cut him off from the northern clans. Charles marched to intercept him, but Cope, fearing the clansmen

The standard raised, August.

The march to Edinburgh.

in their own glens, evaded him and marched to Inverness. The Jacobites left Cope to his own devices, and marched through Perthshire to Perth, which was reached in the first week of September. Here King James VIII. was proclaimed, and several new adherents joined the standard, including the duke of Perth and Lord George Murray, the most capable commander in the prince's train. He was one of the Atholl family, and must not be confused with the prince's secretary, James Murray of Broughton. At Perth the army was organised, the chief command being given to Lord George Murray and Perth. On 13th September Charles had crossed the Forth. On the 16th he was close to Edinburgh, and a party of dragoons which had been sent out to Coltbridge to check the advance was seized with a panic at the appearance of the Highlanders, and galloped to Dunbar, thirty miles off, at the top of their speed; whence the inglorious encounter was nicknamed 'the canter of Colt Brig.'

Edinburgh Castle was sufficiently garrisoned, but the town was in two minds. The gates were closed, and a deputation was sent to parley with Charles. A party of Lochiel's men who had gone out to see if there was a chance of capturing the gates saw the deputation returning in a carriage a long time after midnight, and when the gates were opened to admit the city fathers the Highlanders dashed in, overpowered the guard, and proceeded to take possession of all the city gates. A few hours later Charles entered the city and took up his quarters at Holyrood, after formally proclaiming James VIII. at the town cross.

Meanwhile, Cope had done his best to get back by sea from Inverness, and though too late to intercept the advance in Edinburgh, he was disembarking at Dunbar while King James was being proclaimed. On the 20th he had pushed up to Prestonpans, close to the city, while Charles had marched out to meet him, each of the forces numbering about 2000 men. A bog lay between the two armies, but, in the early morning of the 21st, a guide conducted the Jacobite troops by a path over the marsh. The movement was concealed by a heavy mist, and the Highlanders were able to form up on firm ground

**Charles in
Edinburgh,
September.**

**Prestonpans,
21st Sep-
tember.**

undiscovered. Then they fell upon Cope's camp, and in less than ten minutes the whole of the government forces were in headlong flight. Such was the victory of Prestonpans to which the Highlanders gave the name of Gladsmuir. Apart from the garrisons in Edinburgh and Stirling castles practically no Hanoverian troops were left in Scotland.

For nearly six weeks Charles remained at Holyrood, holding his court, winning the hearts of the ladies who were much more Jacobite than their menkind, endeavouring to raise money and troops, and hoping for some signs of a general rising. No signs were forthcoming. By the end of October, the government had got back some regiments from Flanders, and old General Wade had a force of several thousand men at Newcastle. It was only with great reluctance that the Highland chiefs were persuaded to consent to an invasion of England, on the chance that a march through the west would raise the English Jacobites in that country.

Charles was now at the head of a force of not quite 6000 men, half of them clansmen fighting under the personal command of their chiefs. On 3rd November the march began. Wade was tricked into a belief that the invasion was to be made by way of Newcastle; in fact, the old route of Scottish royalists and Jacobites was followed, and Carlisle was captured before Wade appreciated the situation. Although a considerable number of Highlanders had already gone home, the council of officers reluctantly yielded to the prince's urgency and agreed to continue the march. It must be remembered that they had one and all regarded the insurrection which they had joined as a forlorn hope, very unlikely to succeed. But sheer audacity was the only conceivable road to success. Sheer audacity had up to the present point been successful. Unless they advanced there would be no glimmer of a chance of any rising on the part of the English Jacobites. Sheer audacity carried the day; if the prince went forward the chiefs would go with him, and most of the clansmen would at any rate go with the chiefs. The army marched through the western counties, preserving an admirable discipline; but virtually no English

**The march
to Derby,
November.**

Jacobites joined it. Wade was still in the north; an army was being formed at Finchley Common to cover London; Cumberland had returned and was taking up the command of a third force in the western Midlands to cut off the invaders from Wales, where there were many Jacobite gentry. He was evaded as Wade had been, and on 4th December the force reached Derby.

When the news reached London two days later there was a general panic in the capital; there was a run on the bank which

Retreat decided on, 5th December. is said to have saved itself from closing its doors only by adopting the dilatory plan of counting out

sixpences in payment of the demands. The day of panic was known as Black Friday; but the alarm was superfluous. The council of officers at Derby had faced the situation, and informed Charles point blank that to go further would be sheer madness. So, upon any rational method of calculating chances, it would most certainly have been. Here was a force of less than 5000 men in the heart of a country which had shown no disposition whatever to give it support. On its rear and its flank were two armies composed of regular troops, each of them twice its size. In front, 130 miles off, was the capital, and between the prince and the capital there was still another force much more than sufficient to give battle to the irregular Jacobite levies. Nevertheless, there did remain the possibility that sheer audacity would triumph, that the army at Finchley would break up in panic, that London would declare for the prince. Charles was right in the conviction that to march on London offered him a chance and the only chance. Every man in his army who knew anything about war was equally convinced that the chance, if it existed at all, was infinitesimal, and that practically to march on London would be to court annihilation. On Black Friday, 6th December, the army started on its march, not to London, but to the north. Yet even at this stage there were numbers of the clansmen who would have infinitely preferred advancing to annihilation to a retreat, and who were only mollified, when bidden to retrace their steps, by being told that they were marching to fight the enemy.

When Cumberland, who was at Coventry, learnt that the

Scots were retreating instead of advancing he started in pursuit ; but Lord George Murray, fighting a rear-guard action, beat off the pursuers at Clifton, near Penrith. On 20th **The march to Glasgow.** December Charles was over the border again. On the 26th he was at Glasgow, and here reinforcements joined him, including some hundreds of Scottish and Irish soldiery from the exiled regiments in the French service, so that the actual force under his command was considerably larger than it had ever been before. Cumberland's pursuit had been delayed, partly by the check at Clifton, partly by contradictory instructions received from the government ; and when once the retreating force had a fair start of him his chance of overtaking them was small. Then he received a summons south, due to rumours of an intended French invasion. Wade resigned, as he should have done long before, and the command of the northern army was entrusted by Cumberland to the fire-eating General Hawley.

Depression had been increasing among the Jacobite forces ever since the retreat began. It was perhaps lightened by the fresh accessions of strength at the end of December. **1746.** Charles determined to attack Stirling Castle, which **Falkirk,** he proceeded to blockade, till he learnt that Hawley **17th January.** was approaching with some 8000 men. On 17th January there was a sharp engagement at Falkirk, in which Hawley was defeated and was forced to fall back to Edinburgh.

The rumour of a French invasion proved to be a false alarm, and on 30th January Cumberland arrived in Edinburgh to take up the command again. On 1st February Charles once more yielded to pressure from his officers, raised the siege of Stirling, and retreated into the Highlands, where he occupied Inverness and captured Fort Augustus, which lies half way between the capital of the Highlands and Fort William. Fort William itself, however, repulsed the attack of Lochiel. Cumberland did not attempt to follow, but directed his march to Aberdeen—a good base for further operations in the Highlands, because supplies could be brought thither by sea. By the end of March he had a well-provided force of nearly 10,000 men, while, as soon as he could advance on Inverness, a naval force was ready to

keep in touch with him along the coast ; and in the meanwhile the prince's army, living in a barren country, was very short of supplies which there was no money to buy, and dissensions were rife among the leaders.

On 8th April Cumberland began his march ; on the 15th the prince's force of perhaps 5000 men was lying at Culloden Moor. **Culloden,** when news was brought that Cumberland was only **17th April.** some twelve miles off at Nairn. A night attack was attempted, but delays occurred, and it was broad daylight when the Highlanders were still a couple of miles away from Cumberland's camp. There was nothing to be done but to fall back to Culloden again. Thither Cumberland followed them. Half-starved and worn out by their long futile march the Highlanders were roused in the early morning of the 17th with the announcement that Cumberland was almost upon them. After some exchange of cannon shot, in which the enormous advantage lay with Cumberland, the centre and right of the Highlanders charged their opponents with the claymore. They shattered the first line and rushed on against the second ; but Cumberland had anticipated and prepared for this method of attack. The second line was drawn up three deep and met the charge with a terrific fire, which broke the rush. The English infantry charged in turn, sweeping their opponents back. On the Highland left, the Macdonalds, who had not charged, fell back. But the duke was able to bring his cavalry into play, turning both flanks of the Highlanders. The second line of the prince's army, consisting chiefly of the Lowland regiments, broke without actually coming into action. The prince was forced from the field, but though he escaped with his life the Stuart cause was irrevocably lost on the fatal field of Culloden. A thousand of his followers lay dead on the field, as many more were taken prisoners, all the cannon and the whole of the baggage were captured.

A savage slaughter was ordered by Cumberland. Young James Wolfe, who thirteen years later was destined to win **Cumberland.** perishable fame on the Heights of Abraham, received instructions which caused him to return the audacious reply that he was ' a soldier not a butcher,' a name which for

ever after clung to the duke. The savagery with which Cumberland pursued his business of reducing the Highlands to order is an indelible blot on the fair fame of a man whose career was in all other respects honourable.

For five months Charles remained a fugitive in the Highlands and islands, sheltered in secret caves and humble cottages for the most part, shielded by the splendid loyalty of **The fugitive.** wild Highlanders, men and women, to any one of whom his betrayal would have brought a fortune. At last, in September, he succeeded in reaching a small French vessel which landed him in safety on the coast of Brittany. But the star of the Stuarts had set for ever. A passionate tradition of fervent loyalty has preserved the name of 'Bonny Prince Charlie' in the Highlands; the annals of the White Cockade have a pathetic fascination which, almost alone, redeems the dreary materialism of the first half of the eighteenth century.

Four Scottish peers who had taken an active part in the insurrection were captured. Tullibardine, whose earlier attainder had transferred his dukedom of Atholl to his brother, **The penalty.** died in the Tower. Cromartie was ultimately pardoned; Kil-marnock and Balmerino were beheaded, the latter stoutly adhering to the Jacobite cause even to the last. Simon Fraser, Lord Lovat, had not taken the field, but he had spent his life in crafty betrayals of both sides, and means were found to bring him to the block by an impeachment. Murray of Broughton, who till his capture had served Charles well enough, saved his own life by turning informer; but for which Lovat would have escaped his well-deserved death. Of the prisoners taken in arms, one in every twenty was executed, to the number of about eighty; the rest were transported. In the Highlands, Cumberland continued his ugly work for some three months, despite the protests of the Lord President Duncan Forbes, to whom he referred contemptuously as 'that old woman who talked to me of humanity.' As a matter of fact, the government owed an enormous debt to Forbes, whose influence had been the prime factor in keeping the northern clans from joining the insurrection. It would have been well now for the credit of both Cumberland and the govern-

ment if they had taken the advice of the shrewdest statesman in Scotland, who understood both Highlanders and Lowlanders better than any other living man. Unhappily, his counsel was followed only to a very limited extent, with the result that the Highlands were not really pacified for a long time to come.

Still, the government measures were effective in destroying the capacity of the Highlands for again supplying a base for armed **Measures in** insurrection. The military danger in the Highlands **Scotland.** arose from the clan system, and the passionate devotion of the clansmen to their chiefs. They were now crippled by a new disarming Act, stringently enforced with heavy penalties. The outward and visible sign of clanship and of the opposition between Highlander and Lowlander, the wearing of the clan tartan and the kilt, was destroyed by an accompanying Act prohibiting its use. To English statesmen it appeared that the Scottish rising had been made possible by the 'heritable jurisdictions,' the survival north of the border of the feudal powers of local magnates, overriding the ordinary law, which had long disappeared in England. Although their preservation had been guaranteed by the Act of Union, an Act was now passed which abolished them. But as a matter of fact, they had already very nearly fallen into desuetude in the Lowlands, and it was only to a very limited extent that they were the basis of the power of Highland chiefs, whose jurisdiction and influence rested upon immemorial custom and sentiment dating from a time long before the introduction of Norman feudalism into the kingdom of Scotland.

Of much more real importance than the feudal abolition of heritable jurisdictions were two other factors. A number of the **Effects on the** chiefs who had escaped abroad were attainted and **clan system.** their estates forfeited. The new tenants holding from the government were not the chiefs of the clans. For a long time the clansmen, with an amazing loyalty, struggled to pay the rents which they regarded as still due to their exiled chiefs, even while they were forced to pay them also to their new landlords. Other chiefs were forced by impoverishment to sell their lands, and their former dependents also found new

landlords. In course of time loyalty to the absentees broke down under the tremendous strain. At the same time, the ordinary machinery of law was extended over the Highlands as it never had been before, and the population slowly learnt to look to the law for protection, when it was no longer possible to appeal to the chief of the clan. The new landlords, too, planted new tenants on the soil who had nothing to do with the clan tradition, and thus by degrees the entire clan system was broken up and vanished.

It was only at a later date that a plan was adopted which perhaps did more than anything else to reconcile the Highlanders. This was the raising of kilted regiments, which were **Highland regiments.** embodied in the British army, and, fighting side by side with Englishmen and Lowlanders, not only satisfied the martial ardour which found no scope under the new conditions, but created a new sense of common nationality quite compatible with the old sense of separate nationality; not a unification, but a simultaneous sense of unity and duality, a sense that duality did not preclude unity. Some time before one such regiment had been raised among the Whig clans, the regiment known as the Black Watch, which rendered magnificent service at Fontenoy. Duncan Forbes, before his death in 1747, urged the wisdom of extending that very successful experiment; but some years were to pass before the British government dared to act upon his advice.

The 'Forty-five' was the last throw of the Jacobites. The gallant lad who had led the forlorn hope degenerated into a drunken debauchee. With the disappearance of the **The end of Jacobitism.** last prospect of a Stuart restoration disappeared also the last prospect of a revocation of the Union. Scotland settled down into acceptance of the Union as an accomplished and permanent fact, and from that time the development of her material progress became extraordinarily rapid.

IV. HENRY PELHAM, 1746-1754

Since the end of 1744 the Pelham group—Henry Pelham and his brother the duke of Newcastle, with their personal allies—**1746.** had dominated the ministry. They had not, how-
The Pelhams. ever, succeeded in bringing into it all the men whose support was desired. In February 1746 they proposed alterations which would have admitted Pitt. The king refused, and there was a short trial of strength. George invited Pulteney, who had practically committed political suicide by accepting the earldom of Bath, to form a ministry, with Granville as secretary of state. The whole Pelham group resigned; Bath and Granville found their task a hopeless one, and the Pelhams returned to office on their own terms; Pitt consenting to facilitate the arrangements by accepting a minor office. Three months later the death of the paymaster of the forces made it impossible for George to refuse him the succession to that office. His advancement was signalled by his lending immediate and vigorous support to the concession of large subsidies for Austria, Sardinia, and Hanover, though hitherto his fiercest rhetoric had been directed to the denunciation of the Hanoverian character of such measures.

The critical position of the Austrians in Italy in the winter of 1745 had been one of the contributory causes to the unexpected
The war in 1746. acquiescence of Maria Theresa in the treaty with Frederick by which he was once more withdrawn from the number of the combatants. The termination of the war between Austria and Prussia released Austrian troops for the Italian campaign in 1746. The Bourbon progress in Italy was immediately checked. The death of Philip v. of Spain soon after midsummer set on the throne his elder son, Ferdinand vi., the son of his first wife. The power which his second wife, Elizabeth Farnese, wielded, at once disappeared. Ferdinand was extremely anxious for peace and domestic reforms, and he had no enthusiasm for his stepmother's ambitions on behalf of her own sons, his stepbrothers. Spain at once withdrew from the war in Italy, the object of which had been to provide a

dominion for the younger of Elizabeth's sons, Don Philip. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, Great Britain, still engaged in the Jacobite contest, could play no effective part till after midsummer. In the meanwhile, Saxe had captured Brussels, Antwerp, and Mons. A strong naval expedition was planned for the St. Lawrence, to be supported by a great force of colonial levies; but the preparations were delayed till too late in the year. The fleet having been equipped, it was decided that it must do something; so it was dispatched, taking 5000 troops with it, to attack L'Orient in Brittany. Nothing was gained by the attempt, since the British general came to the conclusion that the place was impregnable, and the expedition returned home ignominiously. Meanwhile, the forces which had been sent to Flanders proved insufficient to turn the scale in the fighting; Saxe continued to absorb the Netherlands, and inflicted a sharp defeat on the allies at the battle of Raucoux. In India, where fighting had been taking place, to which we shall presently return, Madras was captured by the French in the same year.

In 1747 Cumberland returned to take up the command in the Netherlands. Another battle was fought against the superior forces of Saxe at Lauffeldt; like Fontenoy, it **Operations** resulted in a defeat, but also like Fontenoy, it **in 1747.** reflected infinite credit upon the courage and discipline of the British troops, though very little on the military capacity of the duke. Once more the campaign was entirely favourable to the French, who by the end of the year were in all but complete possession of the Austrian Netherlands. On the other hand, the British navy was in a fair way to recover from the demoralisation which had made it so much less effective than it ought to have been in the earlier years of the war. In May, Anson, the hero of the voyage round the world, and Warren, the hero of Louisbourg, shattered a French squadron off Cape Finisterre; and in October, Hawke, who as a captain had distinguished himself by his conduct in the battle which had led to the cashiering of Admiral Matthews, broke up another French fleet off Belleisle. The squadron which was destroyed by Anson had been on its way to carry reinforcements to India,

whither a much needed British squadron was dispatched at the end of the year under Admiral Boscawen.

All the European powers, however, with the exception of Austria, were by this time weary of the war. Maria Theresa, if she could have had her will, would not have made peace without getting at least some compensation for the cession of Silesia ; but she could not fight without allies, and all her allies were now bent on peace. It is true that George, Cumberland, and Newcastle, who was exceedingly jealous of his brother, were still hopeful of military glory. George was always inclined to bellicosity ; but nearly all the ministers and most of the country were disposed towards peace. When Cumberland arrived in Holland. in February 1748, he found there was no reasonable prospect of the allied forces being approximately sufficient in number to deal effectively with the great army still commanded by Saxe. France was ready for peace, but Saxe did not delay his operations on that account. Cumberland changed his view. A congress of the powers had already been convened to meet at Aix la-Chapelle ; French and British rapidly agreed upon terms. So far as those two powers were concerned, all conquests were to be restored, and there was to be a return to the *status quo ante bellum*. Don Philip was to have Parma and Piacenza, which was displeasing to Austria and Sardinia. Prussia was to be confirmed in the possession of Silesia, which was extremely displeasing to Austria. On the other hand, France, though she had in effect conquered the Austrian Netherlands, gained nothing at all.

The king of Sardinia might grumble, but he would not support Austria in carrying on a contest in which, without British support, she was certain to be defeated—both in the Netherlands and in the Mediterranean the help of the maritime powers was a necessity to her. Austria and Sardinia had no choice but to accept the arrangement. The one power which had definitely gained by the war was Prussia ; Frederick had secured the province for the sake of which he had started the conflagration ; but even this was at the expense of the ineradicable hostility

1748.

**The Peace
of Aix-la-
Chapelle.**

of Maria Theresa, who also felt herself bitterly aggrieved by the action of Great Britain. Great Britain had gained nothing and lost nothing; the exchange of Madras for Louisbourg left her in the same position in relation to France as before. The question for the sake of which she had first plunged into the war, the Spanish right of search, was entirely ignored. The supremacy of her navy had been confirmed, but not very substantially increased. Practically, it might be said, that all the blood and treasure expended in eight years of fighting had resulted in nothing but the acquisition of Silesia by Prussia. And it was certain that the acquiescence of Austria and the satisfaction of France were merely temporary. Frederick was certain to find himself forced sooner or later into a desperate struggle to preserve what he had won; and France and Great Britain had not yet come to grips over the real issue between them. There had only been a foretaste of the coming struggle in India and America. During the eight years of peace which followed the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle that contest was advanced a stage further both in the East and in the West.

We must now turn back to see what had actually been taking place in India. In 1741 François Dupleix had been transferred from Chandernagur to the governorship at Pondichery, the headquarters of the French company in India, as Madras was the headquarters of the British company. French and British were jealous of each other, and the governors would have been not unwilling to come to blows when a declaration of war should give them the opportunity, if they had not received very positive instructions to maintain the peace from their directors at home. But Dupleix went a great deal further. He was a man of imagination and ideals. He saw that Europeans, if they used their opportunities, could at least acquire great influence with the country powers, but that the first condition of an effective French ascendancy was to get rid of European rivals. He was determined to drive the British out of India. While the British sat still he laid his plans. He cultivated the friendship of the powerful nawab of the Carnatic, Anwar ud-Din. He concerted a scheme with

**India :
François
Dupleix.**

La Bourdonnais, the French commandant at Mauritius. Nothing overt could be done in any case until a definite declaration of war between Great Britain and France.

When that declaration came there was no available squadron at Mauritius to help him, and he wanted that squadron. So, at the instigation of Dupleix, who anticipated an attack from Governor Morse, Anwar ud-Din sent a warning to Madras that no hostilities would be permitted. In 1746 a small British squadron under Commodore Peyton appeared off the coast of Coromandel and threatened Pondichery. Intervention by the British navy was a very different thing from a mere collision between the traders in India. But in the meantime La Bourdonnais had succeeded in getting a squadron together ; he also appeared and challenged Peyton, who, after an engagement in itself indecisive, retired to Ceylon. La Bourdonnais proceeded to Madras. Morse invited Anwar ud-Din to forbid an attack upon Madras as he had forbidden an attack upon Pondichery. Anwar ud-Din ignored the request ; La Bourdonnais attacked Madras, which surrendered, but upon condition that the place should be ransomed for a substantial sum. Dupleix, however, claimed that La Bourdonnais had exceeded his powers, and, asserting his own superior authority, proceeded to occupy Madras in defiance of the terms of the capitulation ; La Bourdonnais who felt that his own honour was implicated could only withdraw. The British from Madras were held in Pondichery as prisoners of war.

Anwar ud-Din expected Madras to be handed over to him ; to his surprise, Dupleix showed no inclination to fulfil his expectations. He sent an army to eject the audacious Frenchman. The Portuguese in the past had made use of native soldiers commanded by European officers. Dupleix also had drilled companies of natives after the European fashion, with French officers to command them. Whether he invented the 'sepoys' or not, he gave the first unmistakable demonstration that sepoys with a stiffening of Europeans were a match for very much larger bodies of native levies. A force

**Fall of
Madras,
1746.**

**Dupleix's
sepoys.**

of less than a thousand men, three-fourths of whom were sepoys, put the nawab's army of ten thousand utterly to rout. Dupleix had revealed the instrument by which the Europeans were to make themselves masters of India.

The French prestige was immensely raised; Dupleix had signally defeated the English, whose credit was at a correspondingly low ebb. The nawab did not want to see all his enemies gathered against him in alliance with the Frenchman, whom he made no attempt to overwhelm. In 1747 the British garrison in Fort St. David defied the French attack, which was renewed in 1748. Now, however, Boscawen, who had sailed from England in the previous November, appeared on the scene; the French had to abandon their attack on Fort St. David, and to devote all their energies to holding Madras—where they had been improving the fortifications in the interval—to which Boscawen proceeded to lay siege. The operations, however, were badly managed; the time of the periodical tempests called the 'monsoon' was arriving, and the Coromandel coast provided no adequate harbourage for a fleet. Boscawen was obliged to withdraw his ships. Had the war continued there can be no doubt that he would have returned to the attack after the monsoon, and that he could hardly have failed to be successful. But the necessity was removed by the news of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, accompanied by the orders for the restitution of Madras to the British. To the native mind, which naturally could not appreciate the real causes of the restitution, something at least of the enormous and extremely valuable prestige which Dupleix had acquired was lost, though it still stood considerably higher than that of the British. And prestige was all that Dupleix had so far gained.

Open hostilities were precluded by the peace between Great Britain and France. But it appeared to Dupleix that the circumstance was favourable to aggression by indirect methods, since so long as there was peace between the European states the British navy would not come into play. Dupleix in the first instance had calculated, not without justification, upon a superiority of the French ships in Indian waters.

**Operations
in 1747 and
1748.**

Peace, 1749.

**Dupleix's
new plans.**

He does not seem to have realised that the superior power of the British navy was certain to make itself felt in Indian waters in the course of time, and that when it did so it would be able to counteract any successes which he might have achieved; nor does he seem to have realised that no European power could establish a lasting ascendancy in India without possessing the command of the sea. All that appeared to him to be requisite was that the British should not have an actual preponderance while fighting was going on. So he set about fresh schemes for establishing a French ascendancy while the British fleet was out of action. The first plan had been to begin by clearing the British out of the way, and to go on by establishing French influence with the native powers. Now the plan was to establish that influence on the basis of the prestige already won, and then to make it the instrument for the ejection of the British rival.

The apparent feasibility of the scheme was due to the disorganised condition of the Mogul empire. Dupleix had not to deal with long established states, dynasties which **His calculation.** commanded the traditional loyalty of their subjects, kingdoms with definite boundaries, but with provincial governors, who at the best were trying to establish dynasties where there was no legally recognised right of succession. Wherever succession should be in dispute, the French might intervene on one side or other, and by establishing their own candidate could secure a permanent influence at his court. If the British also should choose to intervene, that would give the opportunity for fighting and beating them indirectly. If they should not intervene they would cease to count altogether. Either way, the experience of the last contest justified Dupleix's anticipations of a decisive French predominance being acquired. If those anticipations had been fulfilled at the time, it may still be doubted whether Great Britain would have acquiesced in the repression of the East India Company; if she brought her naval power into play she would be able to recover her position. **Its defect.** Dupleix's plan was vitiated by his failure to recognise that whatever temporary success might attend his efforts, the ultimately decisive factor would be sea-power. Isolated

from the European base, the handful of Frenchmen could not maintain a lasting ascendancy. With free access from the Western base, the handful of Englishmen would receive the reinforcements and supplies which would enable them to retrieve their position. As a matter of fact, even before sea-power was brought into play, Dupleix's anticipations were not destined to be realised, though at the outset it seemed likely that they would be.

Dupleix found his opportunity in the position of the nawab of the Carnatic, and in the extreme old age of the most powerful prince in India, the Nizam at Haidarabad. From 1710 to 1740 three generations of one family had been nawabs of the Carnatic. They had been able and popular rulers. But in the third generation there had been strife between the young nawab and his brothers-in-law. One of these brothers-in-law, Chanda Sahib, had been captured and held to ransom by the Mahrattas. Then the nawab had been killed by the other brother-in-law, the Nizam thought the time had come to interfere, and by him the old general Anwar ud-Din had been appointed to the nawabship. Chanda Sahib and his kinsfolk had always been on particularly good terms with the French. On the other hand, in 1748, the relations between Dupleix and Anwar ud-Din had been more than strained by the Madras affair. Chanda Sahib was still a prisoner with the Mahrattas; he and others were of opinion that he had a right to the nawabship to which, but for his captivity, he would doubtless have been appointed. Dupleix set him at liberty by paying the ransom, with intent to setting him on the throne of the Carnatic in the place of Anwar ud-Din.

Precisely at this moment the old Nizam died. A son, Nasir Jang, who was on the spot, promptly proclaimed himself Nizam; but a grandson, Muzaffar Jang, announced that the succession was his by appointment of the suzerain at Delhi. The two pretenders, Chanda Sahib and Muzaffar Jang, supported by Dupleix, made common cause for the ejection of the two *de facto* rulers. Dupleix found warrant for espousing their cause in the Mogul's authority. In July 1749 a contingent

The nawabship in the Carnatic.

The Nizamship.

of French and sepoys under the French general Bussy defeated and killed Anwar ud-Din at the battle of Ambur. His son, Mohammed Ali, escaped south to Trichinopoli and proclaimed himself nawab of the Carnatic. Then Nasir Jang, who knew that he would be the next object of attack, took the field and entered the Carnatic, and the British authorities at Madras, waking up to the situation, sent Major Stringer Lawrence with a small contingent to join him. Lawrence had previously distinguished himself by the skill and courage of his defence of Fort St. David in 1748.

Dupleix opened negotiations with Nasir Jang, who captured the person of his rival and nephew. The assassination of Nasir Jang virtually made Chanda Sahib master of the Carnatic; and though Muzaffar Jang was also assassinated, the Nizamship was secured to a kinsman, Salabat Jang, who was practically the nominee of Bussy. Dupleix in the meantime procured for himself the Mogul's nomination to the nawabship of the Carnatic, which was to be transferred to Chanda Sahib as the Frenchman's faithful ally and servant. The new Nizam withdrew to Haidarabad, attended by Bussy, while Dupleix and Chanda Sahib turned their attention to the destruction of Anwar ud-Din's son, Mohammed Ali, at Trichinopoli, in the beginning of 1751. It seemed absolutely certain that in a few months Dupleix would be supreme, both at Haidarabad and in the Carnatic.

The whole situation was completely revolutionised by the genius of Robert Clive, admirably supported by the courage and confidence of the recently appointed governor of Madras, Saunders. Robert Clive had gone to Madras as a writer or junior clerk in the service of the East India Company. He had shown exceptional courage as a volunteer when Madras was besieged, and had been transferred to the military side at his own desire. He now conceived the idea of seizing Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic. By so doing a diversion was almost certain to be effected which would relieve the pressure upon Trichinopoli. Saunders resolved to take the risk, and dispatched Clive with every available man

1749.

**The contest
re-opened.**

1750.

**Successes
of Dupleix.**

1751.

**Clive
at Arcot.**

upon his audacious expedition. With two hundred whites, three hundred sepoys, and eight officers, of whom only two had ever been in action, Clive made his dash upon Arcot. A panic seized the troops which were in the place. They fled without striking a blow, and Clive occupied the citadel, which he promptly prepared as best he could for a siege. The effect produced was precisely what he had anticipated. A large force was detached from Trichinopoli, and 10,000 men proceeded to beleaguer the little garrison of 500. For seven weeks Clive and his men held the place with indomitable courage, though their rations were running very low. Then the besiegers made a desperate assault in force. After furious fighting they were beaten off. The besiegers withdrew, and Clive sallying forth in pursuit scattered them at Arni. The defence of Arcot had already created such admiration among the natives that Clive was now joined by some of the Mahrattas, and another defeat was inflicted upon the enemy at Kaveripak.

Clive's brilliant exploit at Arcot marks the definite moment of change. Stringer Lawrence, who had been sent home, reappeared in India, and in company with Clive marched to the relief of Trichinopoli. Not only was the relief effected, but the French and native troops were manœuvred into a position where they were driven to surrender. Then Chanda Sahib was murdered, and there was no one to pose as a rival to Mohammed Ali, who was firmly established on the throne of the Carnatic, where he was little more than a puppet in the hands of the British (1752). Still Bussy virtually controlled the Nizam at Haidarabad. For two years Dupleix, defeated in the field, endeavoured to regain the French ascendancy chiefly by diplomacy; but in 1754 the too ambitious governor was recalled to France by directors who did not like to see their profits swallowed up and converted into war debts. A governor was appointed who could be relied upon to give his attention strictly to business, eschewing politics; and the French and British East India Companies amicably agreed to abstain from further intervention in the affairs of the native powers. Nevertheless, there can have been no doubt

1754.
The fate
of Dupleix.

in any mind that a fresh outbreak of war between France and Great Britain would certainly be followed by a renewal of the struggle in the Indian arena.

In America no effective stroke had been dealt after the capture of Louisbourg until the end of the war, when that fortress was
America : restored to France. There, as in the East, the con-
1748-54. trolling factor was naval ascendancy. In spite of the dissensions between the British colonies, it was not to be believed that they with their two millions of inhabitants would permit themselves to be cooped up and cut off from expansion to the west by the infinitely smaller number of Frenchmen in Canada and Louisiana. Still, for military purposes, the French organisation was very much the better ; it was at any rate necessary for the British to cut Canada off from substantial aid from France. The French continued their programme of planting forts so as to connect the Mississippi with the great lakes and to hold the basin of the Ohio, a process which would confer upon the French the actual claim of occupation. In 1753, a British party was sent with young George Washington, afterwards the leader in the War of Independence, to plant a fort on the Upper Ohio. The French expelled the British from a position which they claimed as their own property and turned into Fort Duquesne. Washington, through no fault of his own, had to capitulate at Great Meadows. At the same time, it was manifest that the Canadian French were stirring up the French of Acadia, who were now British subjects, to revolt, or at least to be prepared for revolt. The position was so threatening that in 1754 Benjamin Franklin was urging a scheme for the federation of the colonies, whereby they should be enabled to act as a single force for the common defence. The spirit of particularism prevailed ; each colony was too jealous of the idea of surrendering any fragment of its own separate independence. But what followed belongs to the period after the death of Henry Pelham, the period when France and Great Britain were once more driving in the direction of a desperate conflict. In the present chapter we must confine ourselves to the period of Henry Pelham's life.

In England the Pelham administration was completely established after the crisis at the beginning of 1746. The action of ministers at that moment had been another long step in the direction of establishing the principle of cabinet solidarity. By standing together, the group had been enabled to compel the king to accede to their demands, and to admit to office ministers to whom he had a strong personal objection. The Pelhams had now united a body of men who left the Opposition devoid of men of first-rate or even second-rate ability, and secured an unfailing majority in the Commons, as well as in the Lords, in support of the cabinet. It must be remarked, however, that it was still quite possible for individual ministers to denounce cabinet measures, though hardly to set themselves in opposition to ministerial policy. Thus, in 1751, Pitt opposed a reduction of the navy from 10,000 to 8000 men, which was proposed and carried by Pelham mainly to gratify the king and the duke of Cumberland; though in this case it should rather be said that the ostensible object of diminishing the numbers of the navy was to enable the numbers of the army to be increased.

**England :
effect of
the crisis
of 1746.**

The period of Pelham's administration from the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle to his death was not distinguished by domestic legislation of an exciting character. In fact, it might be said that the prime minister's one object was to keep the machine running with as little friction as possible, but also with the minimum of effort to keep the machine itself in repair. Pelham had considerable skill in the art of harmonising the differences among his colleagues. He managed to keep a very mixed team together, with a success which abler men might have envied; but it was chiefly because he was a timid follower of the cautious Walpole, and was above all things anxious to avoid the stirring up of trouble.

**Henry
Pelham.**

The two or three measures which stand out during the era of the 'broad-bottom' administration were, from a party point of view, of an uncontroversial character. The first of these was the successful establishment of the consolidated government stock, ever since familiarly known as

**Consols,
1751.**

'consols.' The interest in respect of £50,000,000 of the National Debt was reduced in 1751 to $3\frac{1}{2}$, and then to 3 per cent., and in the next year a group of several separate loans was also consolidated into 3 per cent. stock—a notable proof of the financial prosperity of the country, since even with the reduced interest the government stock stood at a premium.

A different interest attaches to another measure for which Lord Chesterfield was responsible. This was the adoption of the Gregorian Calendar, which was already in use in most of the countries in Europe. The system which

**Reform of
the Calendar,
1752.**

Julius Cæsar had established was so far inaccurate that in the course of the centuries a rectification of eleven days became necessary. Hitherto, also, the official year had begun with Lady Day, instead of on the 1st January. Much confusion had been caused for a long time by the fact that the practice varied, the months of January, February, and March being sometimes recorded as if they were the first three months of the year beginning on 1st January, and sometimes as if they were the last three months of the year which on that basis had ended on 31st December. Also, those who followed the authorised calendar in England counted as the first of each month the day which their continental neighbours were calling the 12th; so that for more than half a century we have to be careful in noting whether any given date is O.S. or N.S. (Old Style or New Style). In 1751, therefore, a bill was passed adopting the New Style as from 2nd September 1752. Eleven days were dropped out of the reckoning, so that that day became 13th September; and thenceforth the official year began on 1st January. The preservation of the correct relations between the official year and the solar year is now practically preserved by striking each century year out of the number of leap years.

The only other measure which calls for notice is Lord Hardwicke's Marriage Act. Hitherto it had been possible for runaway couples to get themselves united by marriage in the precincts of the Fleet prison, and by other devices, a system which had not infrequently been used by adventurers to entrap unsuspecting young women into surreptitious marriages. After Lord Hard-

wicke's Act, any clergyman who performed the marriage ceremony without either previous publication of banns or the production of a marriage licence was heavily penalised in England. The runaway couples had to post to the Scottish border ; once in Scotland, where the penalties did not apply, they could get themselves married under Scottish law ; and the blacksmith at Gretna Green was the usual agent whose good offices were sought by eloping couples.

**Hardwicke's
Marriage
Act, 1753.**

Finally, we have to note the disappearance from the scene of the Prince of Wales, who had ceased to be a factor of any importance in politics as soon as the Pelhams succeeded in absorbing into their ministry whatever talent had hitherto associated itself with Leicester House.

**1751. Death
of the Prince
of Wales.**

'Since it's only Fred,
Who was alive and is dead,
There's no more to be said,'

was the conclusion of the rhyme which immortalised the popular appreciation of his personal insignificance. Frederick's young son George, afterwards George III., became the heir apparent ; but the political importance of the duke of Cumberland was somewhat increased by his own nearer proximity to the throne.

In 1754 Henry Pelham died, and his brother Newcastle became the head of the ministry.

CHAPTER V. THE DECISIVE STRUGGLE, 1754-1763

I. DRIFT, 1754-1757

HENRY PELHAM's abilities had been by no means of a first-rate order, but he had possessed the art of managing the House of Commons and his colleagues. Newcastle's personality was much less adaptable; he was more self-asserting, and was at the same time palpably less competent. By his whole-hearted cultivation of the methods of jobbery and corruption he had made it impossible for any one to manage parliament in antagonism to himself; but he commanded neither the respect nor the confidence of colleagues who were attached to him mainly because they could not afford to break with him, such as Henry Fox. The duke, in fact, chose to keep the control in his own hands; although he had no clear conception of policy or of the methods by which any particular policy should be given effect. The leadership of the House of Commons was entrusted to Sir Thomas Robinson, one of the negotiators of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, chiefly because he was not a man of ability. From the government benches Pitt and Fox criticised the government; Fox was presently quieted by offices of more emolument than power, and Pitt once more went into Opposition. Practically, the government drifted towards that war with France which could not long be avoided, but without making any effective effort to control the circumstances in which the war should take place, or any adequate preparations for the conflict when it should come. Happily for Great Britain, statesmanship was as conspicuously lacking in the counsels of Versailles as in the counsels of Westminster.

When war did come a complete revolution had taken place in the combinations of the powers. The traditions of almost

three-quarters of a century had united the maritime powers with the Hapsburg in hostility to Bourbon aggression, except during the period when Bourbon aggression was held in check by the mutual antagonism of the Bourbon powers. Ever since the Revolution the one persistent fact in foreign politics had been the alliance of Great Britain and Austria. Since 1740 the hostility between Austria and her new German enemy Prussia had made France and Prussia natural if also distrustful allies. Between Prussia and Great Britain there had been no positive hostility; but there was an obvious presumption that if there were a renewal of the conflicts between France and Great Britain and between Austria and Prussia, Austria and Great Britain would be combined on one side, France and Prussia on the other, unless each pair of combatants fought out its own duel, irrespective of the other pair. Even from the day when the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was signed, there could have been no doubt in any man's mind that before very many years were passed Great Britain and France, Austria and Prussia, would be fighting. But no one could have anticipated at that date that France would be in alliance with Austria, and Great Britain with Prussia.

**The
Diplomatic
Revolution,
1749-56.**

No one, that is, except the exceedingly able statesman who was mainly responsible for bringing about the diplomatic revolution, Kaunitz, the Austrian minister. Kaunitz was bent, like Maria Theresa herself, upon recovering Silesia for Austria, restoring the Hapsburg hegemony in Germany, and reducing Prussia from the position which she had just won at Austria's expense. Russia also was hostile to Prussia, partly on account of her aspirations on the Baltic, but still more effectively because of the bitter personal animosity towards Frederick of the Tsarina Elizabeth, whom he had annoyed by sarcastic reflections on her character. Saxony also would view the suppression and partition of Prussia with unqualified satisfaction. But to Kaunitz it appeared that the alliance of France would be more useful than the alliance of Great Britain in a conflict with Prussia. Hanover was attached to Great Britain, and George was certain to be very much afraid of the consequences to

**The schemes
of Kaunitz.**

Hanover of an attack upon Prussia. Moreover, throughout the last war, George, in his double capacity as king of Great Britain and elector of Hanover, had persistently urged upon Austria the cession of Silesia to Frederick. There was certainly no probability that his British ministers would be readily drawn into taking an energetic part in the suppression of Prussia. On the other hand, if France could be persuaded to attach herself to the circle of Prussia's enemies, her military assistance would obviously be very much more useful than that of Great Britain. Whereas, if France maintained her alliance with Prussia and used her armies against Austria, her hostility would be more dangerous than that of Great Britain. In short, for the purposes at least of a war with Prussia, for which the British fleet would be out of action, France would be a more useful ally and a more dangerous foe than the maritime power. Kaunitz devoted his energies to procuring the alliance of France; and his success in doing so was a triumph of diplomacy.

French tradition was entirely opposed to the alliance, entirely opposed to the Austrian supremacy in Germany, and bound up **France.** with the idea of the absorption by France of the Austrian Netherlands. And yet this complete reversal of French policy was effected by the skill of Kaunitz. There was a very common dissatisfaction in France with the policy which had issued in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle; a disposition to hold the policy itself to blame, instead of the inefficient diplomacy which had done so little for France in spite of her military successes. As for the Prussian alliance, both countries during the war had worked for their own separate ends with very little consideration for the advantage of the other. At critical moments Prussia had deserted France, and France had left Prussia in the lurch. The connection was one of pure expediency, in which sentiment played no part. It was not difficult perhaps to make even the expediency of the alliance appear doubtful in France.

Still, it is more than possible that Kaunitz would have failed to achieve his end if he had had only men to deal with. But very conveniently for him, the king had fallen entirely under the

influence of the lady who bore the title of Madame de Pompadour. At the best of times, personal intrigues had more than enough to do with keeping French politics in a state of unsettlement ; with the Pompadour's caprices interfering in every department of state, a settled and intelligent policy was further out of reach than ever. Kaunitz as Austrian ambassador at Paris secured the influence of the favourite, who was extremely angry with Frederick, for reasons of a kind similar to those which actuated the Tsarina. Not all at once, but by degrees, Louis was enfolded in the meshes which the Austrian was spreading for him. Nor can we altogether leave out of count one other purely personal factor, the superstitious imagination of King Louis, which taught him to believe that he could make his peace with Heaven and square the account of his private immoralities by uniting with the Roman Catholic power for the destruction of Protestant Prussia. His attitude indeed was not without its odd counterpart in that of the people of England, who presently succeeded in developing an enthusiasm for Frederick as the ' Protestant hero,' which the patron of Voltaire must have found highly entertaining.

But the Protestant hero himself was extremely uneasy. He was very well aware that Austria and Russia were planning his destruction. He wanted to have France on his side, and to keep alive the hostility between her and Austria. He did not want to be drawn into the coming contest between France and Great Britain, because he wished to reserve his energies for his own defence against the Eastern powers. He was not much afraid of being attacked by Great Britain, which had taken no part against him in the war of the Austrian Succession ; but it became gradually clear to him that France was leaning towards Austria, that he would find in her at best a half-hearted ally, and that she would expect him to dissipate the energies which would require concentration by attacking Hanover in her interests. France and Great Britain were certainly going to fight, and on the seas France was certainly not going to get the best of it. In the circumstances he decided that alliance with Great Britain would serve him better than alliance with France.

In January 1756 the Convention of Westminster was signed, under which Prussia and Great Britain guaranteed the 'neutrality of Germany.' No foreign troops were to be

1756.

Two treaties, allowed to enter Germany; which meant in effect
January-May.

that each power would support the other against a French or Russian invader of Prussia or Hanover. On 1st May France and Austria signed the first Treaty of Versailles, ostensibly a defensive agreement, by which each of the powers undertook to support the other if attacked, but which implied no open breach between Austria and Great Britain. The colonial and maritime quarrel was expressly outside the terms of the contract.

Both Great Britain and France had drifted into the position in which they now stood. Until the last moment the Newcastle

ministry had not contemplated a breach with

1755-6.

Great

Britain and

Prussia.

Austria. Though not disposed to a direct attack upon Prussia, they wanted to preserve the Austrian alliance, while George was particularly anxious for the security of Hanover against a Prussian attack in alliance with France. That is to say, in 1755 it was still anticipated that the old alliances of France and Prussia, Austria and Great Britain, would hold good. But George tried in vain to persuade Austria to send 25,000 men to the Austrian Netherlands, while he actually concluded a bargain with Hesse for the supply of 12,000 troops for the defence of Hanover. The reply of Kaunitz clearly meant that Austria had no intention of taking a friendly part in the direct quarrel between France and Great Britain which was rapidly drawing to a head. Nevertheless, still with the protection of Hanover in view, Great Britain concluded with Russia a treaty by which she took into her pay 50,000 Russian troops, who were to march to the defence of Hanover in case it should be attacked—a very convenient subsidy for Russia, which intended in any case to join Austria in attacking Prussia. But when George found Frederick ready not to attack, but to protect Hanover on the terms of the Treaty of Westminster, the Russian alliance at once became meaningless. The Tsarina's wrath was aroused, she was transformed into an enemy, and gave a ready assent to the Treaty of Versailles.

Meanwhile, the Anglo-French quarrel had been drawing to a head in America. When Franklin's proposal for a federation of the colonies in 1754 had been negatived, the governor of Virginia, Dinwiddie, considered that it was time to appeal to the Home government for support against the French aggression which had been so sharply emphasised by the establishment of Fort Duquesne. In response to the appeal, General Braddock was dispatched to Virginia with two regiments of regulars. Theoretically, these movements in the colonies did not involve a declaration of war between the mother countries ; they affected only a local dispute as to the ownership of a debatable territory. Four months after Braddock sailed, 3000 French troops were dispatched to Canada. Admiral Boscawen was sent off in pursuit, but the French reached the St. Lawrence first, and the English squadron succeeded only in capturing two out of the eighteen French ships which had sailed. Before the end of the year letters of marque had been issued to numerous privateers which swept up a number of French merchantmen.

Braddock's operations were disastrous. He marched with his regulars against Fort Duquesne in July ; but though he understood something of the tactics of European fighting, he knew nothing whatever about fighting in the backwoods. His troops were ambushed by a smaller force of French and Indians, and were cut to pieces ; the general himself, whose courage was unimpeachable, was mortally wounded. Although a body of colonial troops, commanded by William Johnson, defeated a French force and secured the fort of Oswego, the whole position on the American continent at the end of the year was exceedingly ominous.

Between the signing of the Treaty of Westminster in January, and that of the Treaty of Versailles in May, events of importance had taken place. There had been a disposition at the French court to decline the Austrian overtures, to leave Prussia alone, and to fight the British on the sea and in North America. A very heavy naval expenditure was designed, and vigorous naval preparations were in progress

1755.

America.

**Braddock's
disaster,
July.**

1756.

**Alarm in
England.**

The British government had information in January and February that an invasion was being designed, and that the Toulon fleet was being made ready for an attack upon Minorca. The efforts of France to secure the support of Spain were futile. King Ferdinand had no intention whatever of being dragged into a war. In March other reports of the same nature were received. By way of preparation for the impending war the government had arranged for the importation of Hessian troops. When in March Pitt brought in a Militia Bill, which would have provided for the training of an army of reserves, 60,000 strong, and got it passed by the Commons, Newcastle procured its rejection in the other House. Both Houses, however, addressed the king to procure Hanoverian troops to resist invasion.

In April, a squadron, under Admiral Sir John Byng, a younger son of George Byng who had destroyed the Spanish fleet at Passaro, was dispatched to the Mediterranean for the defence of Minorca; both Gibraltar and Minorca were still very inadequately garrisoned. Before Byng reached Gibraltar the French fleet had sailed from Toulon for Port Mahon. On 19th May the British admiral found the place already invested. With thirteen sail of the line and five frigates, he fell in with the French squadron of twelve sail of the line, heavier ships than the British, and five frigates. Byng's leading ships, under Admiral West, engaged the French van in a running fight; but the rest of the fleets hardly came to close quarters; Byng gave up the idea of attempting to destroy the enemy's naval force, and retired to Gibraltar. He had come to the conclusion that he was not strong enough to raise the siege of Port Mahon, and that it was better to secure Gibraltar than to risk an engagement which in his judgment was likely to be followed by the capture not only of Port Mahon, but of Gibraltar as well. A month later Port Mahon capitulated.

Now there is no doubt that the government ought to have been able to send a fleet larger and better manned than that which was commanded by Byng, though they had acted under a reasonable belief that they had to guard against a descent upon England itself. There is also no doubt that

almost any other British admiral than Byng would have fought the French fleet. Lord Anson certainly had no doubt that Byng's squadron was competent to beat the French fleet. The news from the Mediterranean filled the ministry with alarm lest Gibraltar should follow Minorca, and the populace with fury at a naval failure so humiliating. There was, in fact, every probability that the popular rage would vent itself on ministers. Newcastle was terrified, and determined that the general indignation should be concentrated upon the admiral. Byng and West were both brought home under arrest. It was at once made clear, however, that West had done his duty, and he was released; Byng was reserved for trial. From America there came in September the unwelcome news that the French under their brilliant leader Montcalm had captured the forts of Oswego and Ontario.

These disasters were in themselves almost sufficient to destroy the ministry. Matters were made worse for Newcastle, because his most brilliant supporter in the House of Commons, William Murray, insisted on being appointed Lord Chief-Justice, and retiring to the Upper House as Lord Mansfield. Then, in October, Henry Fox, the ally of the duke of Cumberland, declared his intention of resigning. Newcastle suggested to the king that Pitt should take Fox's place. George did not want Pitt, to whom he had never been reconciled, and who, he thought, would ignore the interests of Hanover. Pitt had led every attack on the mismanagement of ministers; the country was beginning to turn to him as the one man who could save it—a truth of which he was himself thoroughly convinced. But he also knew that he could only save it in effect as dictator, and he flatly refused to join in the same ministry with Newcastle. Yet he himself had no personal following worth consideration numerically in the House of Commons.

**Fall of the
Newcastle
ministry,
November.**

A way out of the *impasse* was found through the formation of a ministry by the duke of Devonshire. Newcastle, Fox, and the Chancellor Hardwicke resigned. Several members of the Newcastle ministry were retained. The control of foreign affairs

lay with the two secretaries for the 'northern' and 'southern departments.' Holderness remained secretary for the northern department, which was responsible for the greater part of Europe; Pitt was secretary for the southern department, which included the Mediterranean states and—fortunately—the colonies and India. But Pitt was the virtual head of the administration, in which places were found for his three brothers-in-law, Lord Temple and George and James Grenville.

The new ministry was formed in November 1756. But already Frederick of Prussia had struck the blow which transformed the duel between Great Britain and France into a battle involving all Europe. Before the Convention of Westminister he had known of a secret treaty between Austria and Russia for the dismemberment of Prussia. The Treaty of Versailles was certain to mean that France would join the circle of his enemies. There was no doubt in his mind that Saxony would also be added—that the four powers were only waiting till they had all brought their military preparations up to the point when they could crush him completely by a sudden common declaration of war. Frederick had not scrupled, sixteen years before, to throw his armies into Silesia without declaring war, when he had, in fact, no excuse except that he wanted something to which he had no right. He was not the man to wait, and, for the sake of a diplomatic punctilio, to permit himself to be destroyed. He resolved to strike at once, and to offer his justification afterwards. He judged correctly enough that the justification would be found in the ministerial archives at Dresden. Also, he calculated that if he swooped upon Dresden, Saxony would be immediately and permanently paralysed, and that from Saxony he could make his spring upon Austria before she or her allies were ready for him, without the danger of a flank attack from Saxony. At the end of August he suddenly marched over the Saxon border and advanced upon Dresden.

Swift and irresistible as was the attack, Frederick's immediate military object was foiled. The small Saxon army was quite unable to meet the much larger Prussian force in the field; but

there was no disposition to an unconditional surrender; it was rapidly concentrated in an impregnable position resting upon Pirna, some distance to the south of Dresden. There week after week it held Frederick at bay, hoping for succours from Austria. Saxony gained nothing, but to Austria the delay was invaluable; though the Austrian government was much annoyed with the Saxons for not falling back and joining the Austrian forces. But while Frederick was held in check at Pirna, Browne, the commander of the force on the frontier, was able to reorganise it. After a month's delay he advanced to the relief of Pirna. Frederick with the bulk of his force checked but did not defeat him at Lobositz. But he was too late. Before he could relieve the Saxons at Pirna they had been practically starved into surrender. Augustus of Saxony had to retire to his Polish kingdom. Saxony lay at the mercy of Frederick, who occupied Dresden, and was able to make public the documents which proved the existence of the suspected conspiracy for the dismemberment of Prussia. But the delay had destroyed all chance of taking Austria by surprise. On the other hand, the officers of the Saxon army were obliged to give their parole not to serve against Prussia, and the rank and file were compelled to serve in Frederick's own army.

**Autumn :
the
campaign
in Saxony.**

Frederick's intended campaign in Bohemia had to be postponed; but his action in opening the attack hastened the formal completion of the alliance of his enemies by the second Treaty of Versailles in the spring of 1757. France, very conveniently for Great Britain, committed herself to the Prussian war; the military party had won the complete ascendancy. Already, in anticipation of the European war, they had in effect prevented the dispatch of any large number of troops to Canada, and had induced the government to concentrate upon the army instead of upon the navy—upon the struggle which concerned France only in a very minor degree, instead of upon the duel with Great Britain. That Frederick had followed the wisest course in striking before his enemies could combine against him is past question; but by

**1757.
The effect
on France.**

so doing he had drawn France upon himself, and thereby rendered an invaluable service to his ally.

That ally was not yet in a position to play her part. Newcastle as well as Pitt was aware that the British battleground **Fate of Byng,** was not in Europe, but in America. George had not **January.** yet risen to that conception. Months were still to elapse before the Pitt dictatorship, so necessary to the British empire, was to be an accomplished fact. But for the moment the mind of the public was filled with the trial of Admiral Byng. The court-martial opened on 28th December. New articles of war had been drawn up in consequence of the inadequate performances of the fleet during the last war; and among them was one the precise object of which was to prevent commanders from evading battle, as it was at any rate supposed that they had been doing, and as Byng certainly did before Port Mahon. The article was unjust enough. Through an error of judgment, certainly not from lack of personal courage, Byng had not, in the judgment of the court, done his best either to relieve Port Mahon or to support West when he engaged the French. The court had no option but to condemn the admiral to death under the articles, though it subjoined to its verdict a strong and unanimous recommendation to mercy. No mercy was to be shown, for the king and people were too angry to see that the law itself was unjust. Pitt, to his own credit, braved unpopularity by advocating the cause of Byng. He failed, and the admiral was shot—'to encourage the rest,' according to Voltaire's sarcastic comment. But, as a matter of fact, it is difficult not to conclude that the effect was to discourage the rest from following his example. The death of Byng was a warning to British admirals that it would be better for them to take risks than to avoid them. And thenceforward they took them.

In February 1757 Pitt's Militia Bill was again introduced, and was passed in a modified form which provided for a trained reserve of 32,000 men. On Pitt's initiative, two **Dismissal of Pitt, March.** Highland regiments for foreign service were raised, largely from the clans which, twelve years before, had joined the Jacobite rising; their value was to be shown ere

long on the Heights of Abraham. Supplies were also voted for a force which was to carry out the obligations of the Convention of Westminster and prevent a foreign army from entering Germany—in other words, to hold the line of the Weser and block the invasion of Hanover and Prussia by a French army advancing from the Lower Rhine. The command was to be given to Cumberland, who made it a condition that Pitt, to whom he was personally hostile, should be dismissed. Cumberland's ally in the House of Commons was Henry Fox, whose earlier association with Pitt had been finally broken in 1755, when Fox had surrendered his principles for the sake of office. Pitt was still by no means acceptable to the king, and it appeared that his popularity had been shaken by his disinterested defence of Byng. The formation of a new ministry was privately entrusted to Fox. No warning was given to Pitt. On 1st April Cumberland took his departure; before the week was out Temple and Pitt were dismissed, and the two Grenvilles immediately resigned.

But the dismissal of Pitt did not lead to the formation of a new ministry; it produced only chaos. A mere return to the thoroughly discredited Newcastle administration was out of the question. Pitt's popularity revived in full flood. Cumberland was generally disliked, and it was known that he was the prime cause of the minister's dismissal. Public opinion was demonstrated when one after another of the great towns presented Pitt with the freedom of the city. Popular instinct had recognised the man who alone could give the nation leadership and breathe life into it; the nation was sound at the core, though the dry-rot which pervaded the government had generated something like a panic. The nation clamoured for Pitt, while the politicians vainly attempted to form a series of combinations, each one more hopeless than the last.

At last the 'Great Commoner' realised that there was only one way in which the country could be saved—a coalition between himself and Newcastle; for the simple reason that while Newcastle was incapable of governing himself, he could and would wreck any government from which he was excluded. In June the coalition

**Chaos,
April-June.**

**Coalition of
Pitt and
Newcastle,
29th June.**

was formed. In effect Pitt demanded, what was absolutely necessary, that he should have a free hand in controlling the conduct of the war, while Newcastle was to enjoy an equally free hand in the distribution of places and all that manipulation of backstairs influences which his soul loved and the soul of Pitt loathed. The coalition was a combination of the most extreme opposites, of the fervent idealist and the grubbing materialist, of the statesman who scorned intrigue and the politician to whom jobbery was the breath of life. But it was a combination necessary to the State in the circumstances of the time, and it produced the administration which made the British empire.

II. WILLIAM PITT, 1757-1760

It was more than time for a clear brain and a strong hand to seize the control. On 1st May, while chaos was reigning in England, the second Treaty of Versailles between Austria and France was signed. From the French point of view it was, in fact, an amazingly foolish treaty, entirely in the interests of Austria. France was to devote herself to crushing Prussia, which was to be partitioned chiefly between Austria and Saxony, though Sweden and the elector palatine were to have a share if they joined the league. Only when Austria was once more in full possession of Silesia was France to be rewarded by the possession of sundry towns in the Austrian Netherlands. The rest of the Netherlands were to be given to Don Philip of Parma, and Austria was to get her equivalent by having Parma and Piacenza transferred to her—a possession, in fact, much more useful to her than the Netherlands, from which she was separated by the whole of Germany. But if the bargain was a bad one for France, it was also very bad for Prussia, because it exposed her definitely to the French attack. To Great Britain, indeed, it meant the concentration of French energies upon the war in Europe instead of on the seas and in America; but it meant at the same time an increased probability that her one ally would be completely crushed,

1757.

**The situation
in May.**

and it became all the more necessary that she should give vigorous support to Frederick.

And Frederick needed all the support he could get. Russia was moving against him or preparing to do so on the east, Austria on the south, France on the west. Saxony **Frederick** was *hors de combat*, but beyond Saxony the princes of Southern Germany were joining the anti-Prussian league. Sweden from the north might take part in the attack. Only on the west lay Hanover and Cumberland's composite army on the Weser to fend off the direct French attack. Against this mighty circle of foes Frederick had only his own Prussians and some reluctant Saxons to give battle. His Prussians, though relatively few, were the best trained troops in Europe, and he himself was far the most brilliant of living generals; but apart from this he had no advantage except the possession of the 'interior lines'—that is, he was at the centre of the semi-circle, and could with comparative rapidity transfer his main force from point to point on the circumference. He was to owe his preservation to the skill, the audacity, and the swiftness with which he used the same force to strike deadly blows in quick succession now against one enemy and now against another; although it was never in his power to remain long enough in any one quarter to follow up the blows he struck.

When Pitt's great administration was being formed in England, Frederick had just won a brilliant success, only to be followed by an apparently overwhelming disaster. Before **Prague and** Russians or Austrians or French were ready to **Kolin, June** strike, he had in May suddenly flung himself upon Prague, shattered an Austrian force, and driven it into the city. But Prague proved to this campaign what Pirna had proved when Frederick attacked Saxony in the previous year. It offered an obstinate defence which enabled a second Austrian army to gather and march to its relief. Frederick, rendered over-confident by his successes, turned from Prague with half his force to fight the new army at Kolin. In spite of his rashness and the superior numbers of the enemy, Kolin might have been a victory, but for some blunders on the part of subordinates and

the fierce valour of some Sax troops which had not been included in the capitulation of Pirna, owing to their absence at the time in Poland; it was turned into a disastrous defeat. Frederick had to retreat in haste into Prussia, though the Austrian commanders lacked the energy to follow up their victory.

The news of Kolin reached England in July; not very long before there had arrived from India the intelligence of the **A gloomy massacre of the British in Calcutta by the nawab moment.** of Bengal, Suraj-ud-Daulah, some twelve months earlier. That ghastly outrage had already been avenged by Robert Clive at the battle of Plassey, but the report of his doings did not arrive till long afterwards. The outlook was very black indeed at the moment when Pitt was holding his celebrated interview with the king who had so stubbornly opposed his ascendancy. 'Sir,' said the minister to the king, 'give me your confidence and I will deserve it.' 'Deserve my confidence,' replied the king, 'and you shall have it.' Both promises were carried out with unfailing loyalty. The confidence was given in full measure and deserved in full measure.

Hitherto there had been no definite conception of the principles upon which the war was to be waged. Pitt's conception was **Pitt's war clear.** Great Britain's own real weapon was to be **policy.** the navy. Her direct blows against France were to be struck by the navy or in Canada. In Europe her battles were to be fought for her by Frederick; Frederick, by engaging France on the Continent, was to help Great Britain to win her triumphs on the sea and in another hemisphere. Frederick, then, must be vigorously supported by the supply of that of which he stood most in need, money; but the drain upon his armies must also be minimised by troops which should hold the French in play on the west, and by constant combined naval and military operations on the French coast which should keep masses of French troops perpetually locked up in garrison for the defence of the ports and to prevent the landing of an army of invasion. But it was some time before the new naval and military strategy could be organised so as to have full effect;

before the product of the former system or want of system could be obliterated.

Both on the Lower and the Upper Rhine, French armies were collected, the former to deal with Cumberland, the latter to join forces with the imperial troops of South Germany. The French marshal d'Estrées crossed the Weser. On 26th July, Cumberland with his force of Hanoverians, Brunswickers, and Hessians, gave battle at Hastenbeck. The fight itself was indecisive, but the duke fell back to the north across the Aller to Stade, near the mouth of the Elbe, to preserve the communications by sea with England. There is reason to believe that in so doing he was acting upon his father's orders instead of following his own inclination to fall back eastwards and join forces with Frederick, who had just made his way back from Kolin. D'Estrées was superseded by the incompetent Richelieu, a court favourite, a wit, and a brave man, but no general. Cumberland, however, allowed himself to be manœuvred into a cul-de-sac at Klosterseven, and was there forced to capitulate on 10th September. The Hanoverian troops were to be permitted to go into winter quarters; the rest of the German troops were to be disbanded. Richelieu assented to Cumberland's desire that the arrangement should be called not a capitulation but a convention. Neither of the generals bore in mind the important distinction between a 'capitulation' and a 'convention,' that the former is technically within the powers of the general in the field, whereas the latter does not become actually valid until sanctioned by the government; that is, the government may not repudiate a capitulation, whereas it is technically free to repudiate a convention. The convention had been arranged through the good offices of the king of Denmark. The duke believed himself to have been acting in accordance with his father's instructions. But there was an explosion of wrath in the country; George was furious, and declared that Cumberland had acted without powers, and had disgraced himself; and the convention was repudiated. The duke resigned all his offices, refusing with an admirable dignity to put forward the very

**Hastenbeck
and Kloster-
seven,
10th Sep-
tember.**

**Cumberland
disgraced.**

complete defence which would have transferred the obloquy of the proceedings to the father who had insulted him instead of to himself. Once more Pitt showed his magnanimity by taking the part of the man who had done more perhaps than any one else to keep him out of office. But Cumberland's public career was ruined. It was partly due to Pitt himself that the command of the army in Hanover was placed in the very efficient hands of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick.

In other quarters, too, the tale of failures was increasing. In America Montcalm captured two more British forts. A British **Other** squadron under Holburne sailed for the St. Lawrence to co-operate with the British commander-in-chief Lord Loudoun against Louisbourg. Loudoun decided that the attempt was hopeless, and Holburne's squadron was so badly damaged in a hurricane that only a portion of it was able to make its way home again; whereas a French squadron succeeded in reaching Louisbourg. Another small French squadron evaded the blockading British fleets and escaped to Indian waters. Finally, a strong naval and military force, which was sent under General Mordaunt and Admiral Hawke to capture Rochefort failed ignominiously because the commanders could not or would not co-operate; Mordaunt being undoubtedly the real delinquent.

At the close of the year, however, the prevailing gloom was brightened by the brilliant achievement of the king of Prussia.

Frederick's After the disaster at Kolin he reorganised his forces.
victories at The French marshal Soubise from Alsace joined the
Rosbach imperial German troops on the south and advanced
and Luthen, upon Saxony. A Russian army entered East Prussia,
November and the isolated province of the Prussian kingdom, and
December. defeated Frederick's general Lehwald at Gross-Jagersdorf. Swedish troops from Stralsund were threatening Prussian Pomerania. Frederick chose Soubise as the enemy with whom he must first deal. Leaving the duke of Brunswick-Bevern to watch the Austrians under Daun, the king marched into Saxony. But Soubise was not to be drawn into an engagement. Then a cleverly conducted Austrian cavalry raid was carried up to Berlin

itself. A movement of Frederick's for the protection of the capital enticed the army of Soubise to move from its position. Frederick seized his chance of forcing an engagement; and although outnumbered by two to one, routed the enemy's forces in the brilliantly fought battle of Rossbach (5th November). The attack from the south-west was ruined. The Russian general retired from East Prussia under the impression that the Tsarina was dying, and that a complete change of Russian policy would follow the accession of the new Tsar. Lehwald was released to attack the Swedes and drive them back into Stralsund. But in the meantime the Austrians had resumed their activity, forced Bevern back into Silesia, and captured the important towns and forts of Schweidnitz, Breslau, and Liegnitz, taking Bevern himself prisoner. Nevertheless, Frederick, marching from Rossbach with troops full of a renewed confidence in themselves and their chief, succeeded in forming a junction with the troops which Bevern had commanded, brought the Austrians to an engagement, and won on 5th December the most brilliant of all his victories at Leuthen.

With the next year, 1758, Pitt's system was beginning to come into full play. George's pusillanimous desire to neutralise Hanover was counteracted, as it had been in the previous war, by Pitt's resolve to take the Hanoverian troops into British pay. A heavy subsidy was provided for Frederick. Ferdinand of Brunswick, the new commander, proved himself thoroughly capable of dealing with the French forces under their incompetent generals and pushed them back over the Aller, the Weser, and finally, the Rhine, inflicting upon them a severe defeat at Crefeld; after which he was reinforced by the British troops—which had hitherto been denied him—to the number of nearly 10,000 men.

1758.
**Ferdinand of
Brunswick.**

The policy of blockading French ports was developed, and that of creating diversions by descents upon the French coast was carried on with energy, though with little enough apparent success. In May a large force of soldiers and ships attacked St. Malo, but accomplished nothing of any importance. In August another expedition

**Develop-
ment of Pitt's
system.**

attacked Cherbourg, destroyed the fortifications, captured guns and stores, and did a good deal of damage to the harbour. But a renewed attack upon St. Malo in September was completely repulsed with heavy loss. This whole group of enterprises has been severely criticised. From the days of Drake's Lisbon expedition, such operations involving the joint action of soldiers and sailors were repeatedly rendered futile by the mutual jealousy of the services, their failure to agree upon a concerted plan, and their common incapacity for understanding what it was reasonable to expect from the other partner. At Rochefort, at St. Malo, and even at Cherbourg, comparatively little loss was inflicted on the enemy, at a very heavy cost; a gibe passed current that we were 'breaking windows with guineas.' It must be remembered, however, that the main intention in all these cases was to divert French troops from the armies on the Rhine, to keep numbers of them locked up at every point where a sudden attack might possibly be delivered by the power whose naval superiority enabled it to strike when and where it thought fit. Frederick the Great himself fully recognised the value of these diversions, and actually suggested the policy; Anson, the highest naval authority of the day, approved of them. But because the advantage which accrued from them was only indirect and therefore not easily recognisable, while they habitually failed in achieving their ostensible objects, they naturally invited condemnation *prima facie*. The fact, however, is manifest that the French armies on the Rhine accomplished nothing in 1758. Though their failure is attributable more to inefficiency in their commanders than to insufficiency in their numbers, it is at least probable that if their numbers had been increased and their commanders had not been made nervous by perpetual uncertainty about the point which would be selected for the next blow, they would have given more trouble to Ferdinand of Brunswick.

In America also the vigour of Pitt's administration displayed itself. There Pitt planned a triple attack. Loudoun was recalled. Jeffery Amherst, with the young general James Wolfe as second in command, was appointed to the military leadership

of an expedition against Louisbourg with which a squadron under Admiral Boscawen co-operated. This was preceded by a squadron which was sent to blockade Louisbourg, and to prevent the entry of reinforcements from France. Hawke destroyed a fleet of transports which was being prepared at Rochefort, while the Mediterranean squadron prevented the sailing of a fleet for America from Toulon. The second attack was to be made from the south on the Upper St. Lawrence by way of Lake Champlain and Ticonderoga, under General James Abercromby; while a third colonial force was directed to the west against Fort Duquesne on the Upper Ohio. **Plan of campaign in America.**

The expedition under Amherst and Boscawen succeeded in its object, and Louisbourg was captured on 27th July. Fort Duquesne was also captured, to be rechristened Fort Pitt (subsequently Pittsburg). Abercromby's expedition, however, met with disaster. Without waiting for his guns, he delivered a frontal attack on the entrenched position at Ticonderoga, where the defenders were thoroughly protected by a strong abattis, from behind which they poured a withering fire upon the attacking troops. The assault was completely repulsed with very heavy loss, and Abercromby retreated; so the plan of campaign as a whole for the year was frustrated. The captures of Louisbourg and Fort Duquesne, and the restored effectiveness of the maritime supremacy, were the palpable gains of the year; bringing an encouragement which had been heralded earlier by the news of Clive's amazing triumph at the battle of Plassey in Bengal in the summer of 1757. **Partial success.**

On the Continent Frederick was still holding his own, though he was doing little more. He had gained nothing by a campaign in Moravia in the earlier part of the year. In August he was obliged to quit Moravia by the renewed advance of the Russians, against whom he gained a very hard won victory at Zorndorf on the Oder. From Zorndorf he had to dash back, to check the Austrian advance into Saxony, where he experienced a defeat at Hochkirchen at the hands of Daun. The Austrian, however, did not push his advantage, and **Frederick's fortunes.**

before the end of the year Frederick had reorganised his forces without losing any more ground.

The next year, 1759, was a bad one for Frederick, for every great engagement was draining the life-blood of Prussia, while 1759. his opponents still had great hosts to draw upon for the reinforcement of their armies. But for Great Britain it was the 'wonderful year,' the year of victories, although there was a striking recuperation in France through the accession to power of the able minister Choiseul; and the French armies were placed under the command of the best available officers instead of court favourites.

Even in Germany, a full share of the honours fell to the British soldiery with Ferdinand. The French under the command of **The Minden campaign, July-August.** Contades and Broglie pushed forward across the Rhine, captured Frankfort, defeated Ferdinand at Bergen, forced him back, and captured Minden on the Weser, on the Hanoverian border. A battle and a victory were absolutely necessary if Hanover was to be saved; but Contades was in a position where it was impracticable to attack him. Ferdinand, though with a smaller force, detached 10,000 men to force Contades from his position by falling on his communications. Contades thereupon advanced, under the impression that he could overwhelm his opponent. But Ferdinand by the disposition of his troops successfully lured Contades into a carefully prepared trap. Mainly by the splendid courage and discipline of the British infantry regiments, which advanced under a heavy fire and completely routed three successive charges of the French cavalry, the French were driven back; and but for the wholly inexplicable conduct of Lord George Sackville, who commanded the first line of British cavalry and abstained from charging in spite of repeated orders, the French would have been cut to pieces. As it was, Ferdinand won a very decisive victory, though the enemy escaped annihilation. Sackville was subsequently cashiered; but the failure of one man to do his duty was of no account as compared with the magnificent conduct of the British soldiery. The battle of Minden (1st August) was a shattering blow to the French army.

But Minden paled in comparison with the triumphs which followed. Pitt had resolved upon the conquest of Canada in this year, and, on the other hand, Choiseul had resolved upon the invasion of England. The British conquered Canada, but the French did not invade England. On the contrary, their navy was wiped off the seas. However well directed, however energetic Choiseul's preparations might be, it was in vain to collect transports and flat-bottomed boats, men and supplies, for use in England, so long as British fleets made it impossible to reach the British shores.

**Choiseul
plans an
invasion.**

As always, the two main French fleets lay at Brest and at Toulon; transports were waiting at Havre, at Rochefort, and elsewhere. Admiral Hawke kept watch over Brest and the Channel, Boscawen in the Mediterranean; and yet Pitt could spare twenty-two ships of the line for the campaign in Canada, and four for Indian waters. Until August the business was one mainly of watching and waiting, though Rodney was detailed to bombard Havre in July, without achieving any important results. Boscawen, however, was obliged to withdraw to Gibraltar from his watch over Toulon to repair some of his ships. The French admiral La Clue slipped out of Toulon, hoping to evade Boscawen and to effect a junction with the Brest fleet. A heavy haze almost enabled him to succeed, but one of Boscawen's look-outs sighted the French fleet, and Boscawen started in pursuit with fourteen sail. Five of La Clue's twelve ships ran for Cadiz. One of the remaining seven fought a desperate fight with the British ships as they came up, and delayed the pursuit of the rest. Nevertheless, of the others, Boscawen ran four ashore at Lagos, two of which he captured and burnt two. This action was, in fact, a breach of neutrality, as Lagos was in Portuguese territory; but it broke up the Toulon fleet.

**Boscawen at
Lagos, August.**

Still Choiseul hoped that the Brest fleet would be able to effect an invasion of Scotland, though on a smaller scale than the great invasion originally projected. The scheme was ruined by Hawke. Hawke's base for guarding Brest was Tor Bay. When a westerly gale was blowing no

**Quiberon, 20th
November.**

squadron could come out of Brest, and Hawke, driven from the open sea, could ride safely in Tor Bay. The French ships would not venture out. To the British public it appeared that nothing was happening, and the admiral was being burnt in effigy just at the moment when his weary watch was ended and he was achieving a particularly brilliant victory. A westerly gale had driven Hawke into Tor Bay in the first week of November ; it had also enabled a French squadron from the West Indies to make its way into Brest. The gale dropped, and Conflans, the French admiral at Brest, slipped out of harbour and sailed south, apparently with the intention of picking up a body of troops at the Morbihan, with a view to invasion of the British shores. Giving chase to a small British cruising squadron, they came in sight of Hawke's fleet, which had put out from Tor Bay at the first possible moment. The wind was rising to a gale, and Conflans made for Quiberon Bay, an exceedingly difficult piece of water, where he hoped to get into safety himself, while the pursuing British, if they entered the bay, would run a tremendous risk of going to pieces on the reefs. Hawke, however, took the risk. His van overtook the French rear, and in the furious fight which followed, with all the terrific accompaniments of a raging storm, five of the twenty-one French ships were taken or sunk. Seven made their way into the Vilaine, where four of them were wrecked. Nine escaped for the time, some into Rochefort, the rest into the Loire.

For practical purposes, the French navy was annihilated. The remnants of the Brest and Toulon fleets were scattered in various ports, two or three here and two or three there, without the faintest chance of coming out again. Two British ships ran on the shoals of Quiberon and were lost ; but in the course of the year the British had taken and added to their own fleet twenty-seven French ships of the line. In its effects Quiberon was the most decisive naval battle that had been fought since the Armada, because it gave to the British not merely the supremacy but an absolutely unqualified mastery of the seas. From that moment only a comparatively small naval force was needed to keep the French


The French fleet wiped out.

ports in a state of blockade ; the rest of the fleet was free to operate where it would. Hawke's consummate naval strategy had first paralysed the French fleet ; his splendid audacity and his seamanship, and the daring and seamanship of his captains, destroyed it.

Two months earlier, the genius of Wolfe had struck the decisive blow in Canada. Pitt had chosen the young general for his task with remarkable courage and insight, though **Canada :** it must be noted that King George also realised the **James Wolfe.** great qualities which were hidden under an unpromising exterior as well as by eccentricities of manner. Wolfe was one of the few men who had made a scientific study of his profession, and could cheerfully reply when asked how he had devised a particularly successful tactical development, that he had 'got it from Xenophon.' But he was as far removed as possible from the popular *beau sabreur* or the conventional martinet, though he had fought at Dettingen when he was sixteen and served under Cumberland at Culloden. His health was bad ; he had the insignificant chin which commonly denotes incapacity, and he was occasionally capable of the gasconading which naturally inspires distrust. But wherever he had been Wolfe had displayed courage both physical and moral, capacity, and common sense, combined with originality. Wolfe was chosen for the command which in the previous year had been entrusted to Amherst. Amherst, the senior officer, took the command from which Abercromby had been recalled after his failure at Ticonderoga.

As before, the attack upon Canada must be made by three advancing columns. Wolfe, supported by a squadron, was to attack Quebec, pushing up the St. Lawrence ; **Plan of the** Amherst, in the centre, was to move upon Montreal **campaign.** from the south by Lake Champlain. The third column, corresponding to that which had captured Fort Duquesne in 1758, was to follow the western route by Fort Niagara and Lake Ontario. It was hoped that the three columns would converge upon Quebec. The programme, however, could not be carried out in full. General Prideaux, with the third column, captured Niagara ;

Amherst succeeded in securing Ticonderoga and Crown Point ; but not till it was too late for either force to hope to reach Quebec in time, since with the approach of winter the St. Lawrence would be blocked with ice, and the naval squadron would necessarily be withdrawn.



The last and almost trivial reinforcements from France had reached Canada early in the year, having escaped just before the blockade of the French coast had been made completely effective. At the end of May the British squadron, under the command of Sir Charles Saunders, reached the St. Lawrence; at the end of June it had carried Wolfe and his army up to Quebec. Montcalm, with 5000 regulars and 10,000 militia, besides Indians, elected to stand on the defensive against Wolfe, with his ships and his troops, who numbered something under 9000. The position, in fact, appeared almost impregnable, at least without

**Wolfe and
Saunders
before
Quebec,
June.**

a very much larger besieging force. Wolfe could not invest Quebec ; the cliffs on the south and west could hardly be scaled ; on the east the space between the rivers St. Charles and Montmorenci, where Montcalm's camp lay, was too strongly entrenched to permit of a successful attack. The mouth of the St. Charles itself was secured by a boom. Wolfe encamped his forces partly on the north of the St. Lawrence, east of the Montmorenci, partly on the Isle of Orleans, under the guns of the squadron, which, of itself, sufficed to prevent any conceivable prospect of French reinforcements arriving from France. A portion of the squadron with some of the troops was detached under Holmes to force its way up the river above Quebec and there maintain a perpetual threat of a landing ; to prevent which Montcalm, in turn, had to detach a column under Bougainville.

But Wolfe had an apparently insoluble riddle before him—the problem of attacking a force numerically superior, thoroughly well equipped, under a very able commander, behind apparently impregnable fortifications, and with the knowledge that on the approach of winter the siege would have to be raised. For two months the riddle remained unsolved ; Montcalm was not to be enticed from his entrenchments ; a direct attack upon them was beaten off. Wolfe himself fell ill ; his dispatches home were despondent. A letter written on 2nd September, which was received in London on 14th October, produced a general impression that he had no hope of bringing the enterprise to a successful conclusion. Two days later London broke into a delirium of mingled triumph and sorrow ; for the news had come that Quebec was taken, and that Wolfe had fallen in the hour of victory. The two dispatches were published in the same gazette.

The riddle had been solved. Wolfe had submitted to his brigadiers alternative proposals for an attack from the east. The brigadiers had submitted a counter proposal for landing a force twelve miles up the river and attacking from that side. This suggestion was partly actuated by an impression that Amherst would very shortly arrive, and that a junction with him could be effected.

Wolfe's difficulties.

A plan of attack, September.

Wolfe, having recovered sufficiently to make some investigations for himself, decided to adopt the brigadiers' plan of making the landing above Quebec, but he rejected the landing-place they had chosen, and with it their theory of the attack. He selected instead a point much nearer to Quebec, where he hoped to get his forces on shore and to reach the Heights of Abraham, the plain in front of the town of Quebec, thrusting at the enemy's centre and severing Montcalm from Bougainville, while Bougainville and his detachment were unaware of what was going on.

During the next few days the camp was shifted from the position on the east of the Montmorenci to the southern side of the St. Lawrence above Quebec. Four thousand men were secretly embarked on Holmes's ships. On 12th September Saunders opened a fierce bombardment, as though in preparation for an assault upon Montcalm's camp between the St. Charles and the Montmorenci. Holmes's ships, on the other hand, moved up the river, drawing Bougainville away to the west, while Montcalm had massed his troops on the east to resist the expected attack. In the small hours of the morning of 13th September, Wolfe with his 4000 men dropped silently down the river. They were carried past the intended landing-place, but disembarked under the Heights of Abraham, which were accounted so secure that no watch was kept at the foot though there were sentries at the top. A party of volunteers led the way in scaling the Heights, the rest of the troops following; the sentries at the top were surprised and rushed. When the dawn broke the troops were already forming line on the plateau.

The news was carried to Montcalm, whose troops were hurried out and formed up under the walls. Of the British there were a little over 3000, since the whole body had not scaled the Heights; the numbers of the French are uncertain, but were certainly greater, possibly as much as double. The British were drawn up in two lines, the French in a single line which, at about nine o'clock, swung forward down the intervening slope, firing as it advanced. The British with steady discipline reserved their fire till the French were thirty yards away. Then a terrific

The plan in operation, 12th-13th September.

Victory

volley brought the French to a standstill, and at a second volley they broke and fled, the British charging upon them with bayonet and claymore, the pursuit ceasing only when it was stopped by the fire from the ramparts of Quebec. Wolfe received his third wound, a mortal one, at the moment of ordering the charge, and 'died content.' When Bougainville hastened up he found the battle already won. Montcalm, too, had received his death wound, though he survived till the next morning. The French governor broke up what had been Montcalm's camp and fled. On the 17th, the fourth day after the fight on the Heights of Abraham, Quebec capitulated.

The fall of Quebec and the battle of Quiberon were decisive of the contest in America and on the seas; Quiberon indeed was the more decisive of the two, since, even if **A comment.** Wolfe had failed, the destruction of the French fleet would have ensured the renewal of the attack in strength to which the French, unreinforced, must have ultimately succumbed. Wolfe's achievement exemplified the possibility of perfect and triumphant co-operation between the two services; it was also in itself one of those brilliant strokes which have staked everything upon audacity; and while designed and carried out with the utmost skill on the part both of Wolfe himself and of Admiral Saunders so as to minimise its risks, must still have ended in disaster if the surprise had not been complete. The Seven Years' War more than any other exemplifies the brilliant results achieved by accepting tremendous risks, such as those which Hawke took at Quiberon, Wolfe at Quebec, Clive at Plassey, and Frederick times without number.

Only by taking such risks was Frederick able to save himself from destruction. Sometimes as at Kolin he failed and almost ruined himself. So it was with him at this time. **Frederick's difficulties.** A few days after Minden, and while Wolfe was still vainly seeking the solution of his riddle, Frederick flung himself at Kunersdorf upon the Russians who had advanced to the Oder and were about to effect a junction with Daun's Austrians. After opening a successful attack, the Prussian king attempted to do too much with his already exhausted troops against the

stubborn foe who greatly outnumbered him. The result was a crushing defeat. It appeared that the Prussian army was hopelessly shattered. Nevertheless, the Russian commander, probably once more in the expectation of a change of policy at headquarters, and Daun with his natural incapacity for activity, made no further movement until Frederick had recovered from his temporary despair, and had once again reorganised his broken forces. But Kunersdorf had in effect enabled another army to push into Saxony and occupy Dresden, and Frederick was to suffer yet another disaster when a column dispatched by him to cut the Austrian communications was overwhelmed by superior numbers and compelled to capitulate at Maxen.

The year 1759 had been disastrous for France ; upon her had fallen the three blows of Minden, Quebec, and Quiberon. Choiseul attempted two diplomatic moves. The death of Ferdinand of Spain had given the Spanish throne to his half-brother Charles III., Don Carlos of Naples, who thereby vacated his Neapolitan throne in favour of his second son, Ferdinand. Unlike his half-brother, Charles hated England, for he had bitter recollections of his interview with Commodore Martin in the previous war. Choiseul had hopes now of bringing Spain into the alliance against Great Britain. At the same time, he endeavoured to enter upon a separate negotiation with Pitt which should part Great Britain from Prussia. Instigated by France, Charles intimated that Spain could not look with equanimity upon the progress of the British arms in America. Pitt, who was not in the least afraid of Spain, contented himself with suggesting that Great Britain's doings in America were no concern of Spain's. As for separate negotiations with France, Pitt would not have dreamed of deserting the ally to whom he already owed so much, even if he had not been convinced that the preservation of the power of Prussia was a political necessity. He was willing to negotiate in conjunction with Frederick ; but upon no other terms.

In England the triumphs of the last year had established Pitt's ascendancy so completely, that unprecedented supplies were voted for the war without a murmur. It was only the lavish

supplies of British gold which maintained on the west of Prussia the force which, ably handled by Ferdinand, could still continue to hold back the still greatly superior numbers of the French armies. It was only British gold which enabled Frederick to keep in being his own Prussian force in spite of the fearful depletion caused by the desperate struggle which had now entered upon its fourth year. Through 1760 Frederick's enemies were slowly pressing upon him more closely. He induced the Russians to fall back by a trick; at Liegnitz in Silesia, in August, and at Torgau in Saxony, in November, he struck, and struck hard at the Austrians; but his victories were no longer crushing blows; they were only sharp reverses for the enemy, checks which held back the advancing tide which threatened to overwhelm him.

**1760.
The struggle
in Germany.**

But the other tide, of British successes, swept on almost unimpeded. In India the French received the *coup de grâce* at Wandewash. The British contingent with Ferdinand won fresh laurels at Emsdorf and Warburg under the leadership of Elliott, later distinguished for his great defence of Gibraltar, and Granby, who had already distinguished himself at Minden, and became in England a popular hero—as witnessed by the number of inns which adopted ‘The Marquis of Granby’ as their sign. In Canada the triumph of Wolfe was completed by Amherst.

**British
successes.**

The organisation of the campaign for the year was left in Amherst's hands. Though the British were in possession of Quebec, Amherst still had to fight his way into Canada. The French, who had concentrated at Montreal, hoped that before Amherst could arrive from the west, or a squadron from the east, they themselves would be able to recover Quebec, which was occupied by General Murray, one of Wolfe's brigadiers, with a force which now numbered less than 4000. The French advanced to the attack with quite double that number of men, at the end of April. Murray came out to fight them, but was driven back with heavy loss on 28th April. A siege began, but in less than a fortnight the first frigate of an approaching British squadron appeared

**The Canadian
conquest
completed.**

on the scene. The waterway was clear of ice. A week later the French were in retreat. On the 18th May the British squadron was at Quebec. The French at Montreal had indulged themselves in illusive hopes of reinforcements from France; the reinforcements succeeded in sailing, but were duly cut off by a British squadron in July. Meanwhile Amherst had worked out his own plan of campaign against Montreal. Murray was to advance from Quebec, another force under Haviland by Amherst's old route *via* Lake Champlain, and a third column under Amherst himself from the west by Lake Ontario. The converging move was carried out with such consummate skill and accuracy that the three columns arrived before Montreal simultaneously on 6th September. The united force was overwhelming, and the French governor had no choice but to capitulate. On 8th September the conquest of Canada was completed. The French population were by the terms of the capitulation guaranteed liberty of religion and security of property. The troops were to lay down their arms, and to be conveyed back to France, pledged not to serve again against Great Britain in the course of the war.

In October, when Pitt was in the zenith of his glory, George II. died suddenly, and his young grandson, George III., reigned in his stead. The change was to prove fatal to the ascendency of the Great Commoner, whom the old king had supported with an admirable loyalty ever since the reconciliation, in spite of the long antecedent years of dislike and distrust. Before we turn to the story of the new reign we have still to give the account of the great achievements which, in the last four years of the old king's life, established the British East India Company as a territorial power in India—achievements to which it has hitherto been possible to make only incidental reference.

III. CLIVE, 1755-1760

Although the French recalled Duplex in 1754, when his place was taken by Godeheu, it was still far from certain, at least as far as appearances were concerned, that his schemes were

destined to be obliterated. If the nawab of the Carnatic was in the grip of the British, Bussy was still supreme at the superior court of the Nizam, who had bestowed upon the French the coastal district above the river Krishna, known as the 'Northern Sirkars,' for the support of his forces. The new French governor made a compact with Saunders at Madras, by which it was agreed that the companies should abstain from further hostilities. It looked as if the condition of balance between the French and British was to be maintained.

1755.
The situation
in India.

Clive, after his successes, had returned to England, ambitious of taking an active part in home politics. Fortunately enough, he was foiled, since, although he was elected to parliament, he was unseated on petition. He enjoyed, however, the full confidence of the directors and of the government, and in 1755 he returned to India with instructions from the directors that Bombay was to form an alliance with the Mahrattas in order to check the increasing power of Bussy, which was causing them considerable anxiety. But in the meantime Godeheu and Saunders had made their compact of abstention from interference in native politics ; and the Bombay authorities, feeling bound to respect the compact, would take no action. Instead of proceeding against Bussy, Clive, in conjunction with Admiral Watson, who was in the Indian waters with a small squadron, and with the Mahratta authorities at Puna, destroyed a piratical confederacy which had recently been established by the sea-robber Angria at Gheriah on the west coast. Though the demolition of this dangerous nest of pirates was entirely the work of Clive and Watson, Gheriah itself was handed over to the Mahrattas, and Clive went on to Madras where, in June 1756, he took over the command of Fort St. David.

1756.
Clive's return
to India.

Meanwhile, the disruption of the Mogul empire had been progressing. Three times since Nadir Shah's great invasion Ahmed Shah Durani, who had made himself master of Kabul, followed in the footsteps of Nadir Shah and swept over the north-west of India, where government had ceased to

Ahmed Shah.

mean anything more than the collection of tribute for the Afghan. The Afghan tribe of Rohillas had established themselves in Rohilkhand on the north-west side of Oudh. The Mogul's nominal wazir or minister, Safdat Ali, had established himself in Oudh itself as nawab, and reigned there with very little respect for his suzerain at Delhi. Another minister and soldier, Ali Vardi Khan, had secured for himself as nawab the two Lower Ganges provinces of Behar and Bengal. The Mahratta confederacy had been growing in strength; the peshwa at Puna had secured a general recognition as its head, and its western chief, the Bhonsla at Nagpur, otherwise known as the Berar raja, dominated the greater part of Central India, levying *chauth* or blackmail from less powerful princes, and carrying his incursions into Bengal itself. There was hardly a pretence of recognising the existence of any central authority.

In 1756, the old and able Ali Vardi Khan died and was succeeded by his grandson, Suraj-ud-Daulah. He was a youth, half mad and wholly bloodthirsty, brought up in the harem—an extreme example of the worst type of Oriental monarch. He conceived himself to be almost omnipotent. In Bengal, during the earlier struggle between French and British, Calcutta and Chander-nagur had kept the peace; Suraj-ud-Daulah had no comprehension of the events which had been taking place in the Deccan, and looked upon the British as a mere settlement of traders whom he might treat as he liked. With a view to a possible renewal of the French contest, some fortifications had been perfunctorily raised by Drake, the British governor of Fort William. Suraj-ud-Daulah ordered their demolition; Drake protested; the nawab conceived that he had thus obtained a sufficient excuse for taking possession of the British settlement. From his capital at Murshidabad he marched an army upon Calcutta. Drake and some of his company fled in haste down the Hugli; others remained to offer a short but hopeless resistance. On 21st July Fort William was taken, with a hundred and forty-six prisoners. They were all herded together in a chamber where there was barely room for them all to stand up,

1756.

**Bengal: The
Black Hole,
July.**

ventilated by nothing but one small grating. Then the nawab forgot them. Next morning he remembered his prisoners, the door of the prison was opened, and within it were found twenty-three with the life still in them and one hundred and twenty-three corpses. That was the story which reached Madras in August, and London only in the following year.

The Madras authorities acted. They had Clive, and they had Admiral Watson's squadron at hand. Nine hundred white troops and as many sepoys with the five ships of war reached the mouth of the Hugli on 15th December. On 2nd January 1757 the nawab's garrison at Fort William surrendered. A week later Clive seized the fort at Hugli. The nawab sent a great army to wipe out the foreigners ; Clive's offers to negotiate were ignored. Clive marched against the nawab's forces, fought them on 5th February, and retreated again to Calcutta, having failed to carry the enemy's position. The enemy, however, had had more than enough, and hurried back to Murshidabad, where the nawab was seized with panic and promptly offered terms. A treaty was made, reinstating the British in all their privileges, with promises of compensation for their losses.

**1757. Clive
and Watson
at Calcutta,
January.**

Clive, according to his instructions, should now have returned to Madras. But the report had just arrived of a declaration of war between France and Great Britain. Suraj-ud-Daulah began to intrigue with the French at Chandernagur, and with Bussy who was 300 miles away in the Northern Sirkars. Clive and Watson saw that if they left Bengal their work would have to be done all over again ; the French must be removed from Chandernagur. On 23rd March the British attacked Chandernagur and captured it, taking 500 prisoners. The blow at once decided Bussy that the Deccan would be a more fruitful field for his operations than Bengal.

**Chander-
nagur
taken,
March.**

Still the problem remained for Clive—should he return to the Deccan, where a conflict with the French was certainly now impending, or should he remain in Bengal, where he could still hardly doubt that his departure would be the signal for Suraj-

ud-Daulah to fall upon Calcutta again. The problem was solved for him. Great lords of the nawab's court were filled with

The Omichund plot. terror for their own lives by the frantic caprices and the bloodthirstiness of the young ruler. A conspiracy was set on foot to overthrow Suraj-ud-Daulah and to make his commander-in-chief, Mir Jafar, nawab in his place.

The conspirators rested their hope of success on the co-operation of the British. They opened negotiations with the British. To them the fall of the treacherous and sanguinary tyrant would mean the security of their position in Bengal. Clive entered into the plot, still maintaining ostensibly amicable relations with Suraj-ud-Daulah. The go-between was a Hindu named Amin Chand, anglicised as Omichund. Terms and conditions were practically settled, when Omichund suddenly put forward a demand for an impossibly enormous reward for himself, amounting to more than a quarter of a million. To refuse would mean

The Red and White Treaties. the betrayal of the whole design. Clive stooped to an enormous act of deception. Two copies of the treaty were prepared, one on red paper the other on white. The red treaty, which included the clause embodying Omichund's stipulation, bore the signatures of the Calcutta Council, of Clive, and of Admiral Watson. But the white treaty, which omitted the Omichund clause, was signed by the native conspirators. When Omichund saw the red treaty he was satisfied—the white treaty he did not see. Nor did he know that Admiral Watson had refused to take part in the fraud, and that his signature, the absence of which would have been fatal, had been forged.

To the day of his death, Clive maintained that he had acted rightly ; that he was dealing with men who were entirely without the European conceptions of truth and honour, men who would hesitate at no lie, no fraud, no treachery ; that in the existing crisis there was no course open but to fight such men with their own weapons. To the Oriental mind, what he did presented itself not as the monstrous iniquity which it would have been under Western conditions, but as a clever trick which would be justified by success. Watson himself, though he would

not put his hand to the sham treaty, was so far demoralised by the atmosphere that he allowed the forging of his own signature to pass without protest. On no other occasion did Clive deviate from the straightforward path, but the British had not yet learnt the fundamental principle upon which their Oriental dominion was to rest, that the Western moral standards must be maintained in all dealings even with Orientals.

In this case, the deviation from Western standards was accompanied by entire success. The treaty was completed upon 19th May. At once Clive dispatched to the nawab a statement of British complaints and an announcement that he was coming with his men to Murshidabad to lay these matters before the nawab's durbar or council. This was to all intents and purposes a declaration of war. The nawab gathered a huge army and moved towards Calcutta, while Clive marched out with his whole force numbering 1100 Europeans, twice as many sepoy, and ten guns. Five days after the dispatch of his letter, Clive had seized the fort and granary of Katwar. The critical moment had come. Some 60,000 men were moving against him. Mir Jafar, with 20,000 men, was to desert and turn his arms against the nawab on the day of battle; but there were rumours that Mir Jafar had turned faint-hearted and could not be trusted. The monsoon had set in. If Clive entrenched himself where he lay, time was more likely to bring Bussy to the support of the nawab than to bring to his own aid the extremely untrustworthy Mahrattas with whom negotiations had been opened. Retreat would certainly mean ruin, advance might mean annihilation. For three days he hesitated, then called a council of war—the only one he ever did call—to which he communicated his own opinion, adverse to an advance and in favour of waiting. Of the eighteen members of the council of war, eleven agreed with him, while seven were in favour of taking the whole risk. The decision seemed to have been made; but an hour's solitary meditation changed it. Clive made it known that he had resolved to advance at all costs. On the next morning, 22nd June, the force marched forward to Plassey, where it

passed the night with the nawab's huge host a short distance away.

Clive had his men drawn up with the Europeans in the centre, and the sepoys on the wings. Accompanying the nawab's huge force there was a small band of some fifty Frenchmen. At eight in the morning cannonading began, and went on for some hours without marked result.

**Battle of
Plassey,
23rd June.**

There was no movement on the part of Mir Jafar. Without such a movement Clive had not intended to make an active attack ; but early in the afternoon one of his officers saw the French shift from their position, which he immediately seized. Clive turned the whole of his artillery fire on the enemy's guns, threw them out of action, and led his whole line forward ; whereupon the nawab's army turned and fled with such promptitude that only some hundreds of them were slain, and the victors lost no more than seventy men. The nawab reached Murshidabad, but was caught while trying to escape thence in disguise, and was secured by Mir Jafar's son, who murdered him.

Such a victory in Indian warfare would normally have been followed by massacre ; nothing of the kind was permitted.

**Effect of
Plassey.** Four days after the battle of Plassey Mir Jafar was proclaimed nawab. But Clive, the miracle-worker, was regarded by all the natives without exception as the real conqueror and lord ; the new nawab was merely his servant. Before the terror of his name armies melted away. No one dreamed of disputing his supremacy, least of all Mir Jafar. Whether he had meant to do so or not, Clive, in fact, had made himself responsible for the rule of Bengal and Behar. He had no official authority, but his behests were law ; and it was well for Bengal that it was so, for his hand was outstretched to protect the natives decisively from the violence and the extortions which would have been the natural accompaniments of a successful rebellion and a change of dynasty.

When Omichund discovered how he had been duped, the shock was too much for his brain, and he became hopelessly crazed. Mir Jafar was obedient, though he might secretly resent the master's control. The nawab of Oudh thought for a moment

that he might make profit for himself out of the commotion in Bengal; he dispatched an army, but when his invasion was reported Clive promptly took the field, and Shuja Daulah's troops did not wait to meet him. The British officers with Clive gave him unanimous and loyal support, ignoring sundry foolish re-arrangements which the directors in London at first thought fit to order. Clive remained in Bengal as dictator.

Since the news of the declaration of war, which had arrived in the spring of 1757, active operations had begun in the south. The French had sent out a new governor-general, **1758.** Lally-Tollendal, son of one of the Irish Jacobites **Lally in** who had defended Limerick. Lally was a man of **the Carnatic.** great talents, but of a most impracticable character, who drove his subordinates to mutiny and could work with no colleague, while he was totally incapable of understanding the natives, whose prejudices he violated at every turn. The one hope of the French lay in the diplomatic and military talents of Bussy, who had made himself hardly less supreme at Haidarabad than was Clive in Bengal. Lally ordered Bussy with his troops to leave Haidarabad, thereby entirely losing control over the Nizam.

In May 1758, a month after he had reached India, Lally had captured Fort St. David. He then attacked Tanjore, hoping to obtain large supplies by its capture; but the French **1759. Siege** squadron which had succeeded in bringing him out **of Madras** retreated upon the arrival of a British squadron **raised,** which threatened Pondichery, and compelled him to **February.** return thither in order to keep his headquarters secure. Then, reinforced by Bussy's troops from Haidarabad and the Sirkars, he attacked Madras; but there Lawrence was in command and held him at bay until the appearance of the British squadron in February 1759 produced a panic among Lally's troops and compelled the French commander to beat a hasty retreat to Pondichery.

The Nizam's cession of the Sirkars to Bussy should have been invaluable to the French as a source of revenue for war purposes. To this Clive in Bengal was fully alive. He himself could not quit Bengal; but no sooner was it apparent that Bussy was to

be withdrawn from the Sirkars than preparations were made for dispatching from Bengal every available man to seize for the British the Sirkars and the town of Masulipatam. Forde at Masulipatam, Clive took the risk of practically denuding Bengal April. of white troops, and depending in effect on his own personal capacity and prestige to retain his control there. Colonel Francis Forde, the officer chosen to command the expedition, did his work brilliantly. If Bussy had been allowed to remain at Haidarabad, Forde's task might have been impossible. As it was, the Nizam made no movement to defend the Sirkars until it was too late. Masulipatam fell in April ; the Nizam adopted the natural conclusion that the star of France had set, cancelled the cession to Bussy, and ceded the captured district to the British. Forde returned in triumph to the Hugli.

The Oudh wazir's plan of invading Bengal at the end of 1757 had collapsed at the sound of Clive's name. Moved perhaps in part by the knowledge that British troops had departed from Bengal, the wazir again, early in 1759, Bengal : Clive's relief of Patna. prepared for an invasion. This time he was acting in conjunction with the Shahzada, Shah Alam, the heir apparent of the Mogul at Delhi. The prince had quarrelled with his father and had ambitious schemes of his own. Mir Jafar, on the one hand, was frightened and was anxious to submit ; on the other, the Shahzada was making large offers to Clive for British assistance in his schemes. But the Mogul himself denounced his son's proceedings as rebellion. Clive perceived the immense political advantages which would accrue from acting as the supporter of the sovereign in such circumstances. He ignored the terrors of Mir Jafar. The city of Patna offered a determined resistance to the invader. Clive had only four hundred Europeans available ; but with these, six times as many sepoys, and some of the nawab's troops, he marched to the relief of Patna, covering the distance of four hundred miles in twenty-three days. The Shahzada's troops did not wait to fight ; they scattered, and the prince himself fled hastily. Clive himself was rewarded with what is known as his *jaghir* or estate,

the quit-rents of the districts which had been conferred on the company on Mir Jafar's accession.

These events brought no comfort to the nawab himself, who did not enjoy his position as a mere subordinate of the masterful Englishman who insisted upon decent government. The French had failed ; but it occurred to him that something might be done with the Dutch who had a factory at Chinsura on the Hugli, and were not at all pleased with the revolution which had made their trade rivals masters of Bengal. He opened an intrigue with them, and they were rash enough to listen to his proposals. In October, Dutch ships with troops on board arrived in the Hugli, ostensibly with no more dangerous intentions than the protection of their own interests. Clive, however, had no doubt that they were acting in collusion with the nawab. Still, there was no quarrel with the Dutch, and he would have found it extremely difficult to justify any action against them had they not themselves been the aggressors. But when the Dutchmen seized some English ships his course was clear. Forde, who had now returned from Masulipatam, was at once sent against Chinsurah, and three armed East Indiamen were sent down the Hugli to deal with the seven Dutch ships. Both actions were successful ; the factory and the ships were captured, and the Dutch had to petition the victors to protect them against the nawab's son, who had meant to co-operate with them until the sudden success of the British changed his view of the situation. The episode was concluded by a treaty, the Dutch apologising, paying compensation, and agreeing thenceforth to keep no more than 125 soldiers in Bengal.

**The Dutch
episode,
October.**

The achievement of 1759, the dispersion of the Shahzada's army, the capture of Masulipatam, and the suppression of the Dutch, made Clive feel that at last he could safely leave Bengal himself. In February 1760 he departed for England. Before he left, the decisive blow had been struck in the Carnatic against the French. During 1759, after the failure before Madras, Lally's operations had been ruined by the condition of his own troops. The loss of the Sirkars deprived him of the necessary funds ; officers and men were

**1760.
Wandewash,
February.**

unpaid, in rags, half-starved and mutinous. Clive had sent down from Bengal a brilliant young officer, Eyre Coote, one of the seven who had boldly urged the advance in the famous council of war before Plassey. Coote captured Wandewash, which had been in French occupation. Lally, with his forces depleted by the dispatch of detachments southward to procure supplies, attempted to recover Wandewash. There a battle was fought in which the native contingents took no active part; the fighting was done by the French and British, who between them numbered some 4000 men, the French being the more numerous. The victory was complete, and Bussy who was present was himself taken prisoner. After that, though Lally still fought on, the struggle was quite hopeless, and the conquest was completed by the capture of Pondichery in January 1761.

Meanwhile, after Clive's departure, one more attempt was made upon Bengal by Shah Alam, the former Shahzada, who had just succeeded to the imperial throne of Delhi. Again, **Shah Alam again.** in conjunction with the nawab-wazir of Oudh, he invaded Behar. Again his troops were dispersed by two officers trained in Clive's school and Clive's methods, Colonel Calliaud and Captain Knox.

IV. BUTE, 1761-1763

From the moment of the accession of George III. the power of the great war minister began to wane. The young king had been brought up amidst influences which taught him to hold his grandfather in contempt. His mother had never ceased to urge him that when his turn came he was to 'be a king.' The doctrines formulated in Bolingbroke's *Patriot King* had been ceaselessly instilled into his soul; the ideal of a monarch ruling as a beneficent autocrat had been perpetually set before him. In every leading European state the limitations on the power of the Crown were so slight that each was practically an autocracy. Only in Great Britain the king's control was fettered by the power of parliament; and the power of parliament was not itself what it professed to be—a

free expression of the will of the people—because parliament had become a machine manipulated almost entirely by a few Whig families. It was manifestly impossible to set up in Great Britain an autocracy of the continental type, the type which Strafford, Charles I., and James II. had attempted to achieve in England with results so disastrous. The new scheme of monarchy was to transfer the manipulation of parliament from the Whig families to the Crown.

The Whig system had been concentrated in Newcastle; it was only by a coalition with Newcastle that Pitt had been able to achieve and give effect to his own tremendous ascendancy, and then only because a crisis had arrived in which Newcastle himself had been obliged to recognise that nothing but Pitt's ascendancy could save the country. That crisis had passed; and the policy of George may be summed up as the intention of ridding himself of Pitt and taking Newcastle's place as the arch manipulator of parliamentary majorities. To that **Bute.** end the instigator and the first agent was the earl of Bute, a Scottish peer who had established a supreme influence with the dowager Princess of Wales, who herself exercised a supreme influence over the mind of the young king; a man of whom the shrewd old king had remarked that he would make an excellent ambassador at a court where there was nothing to do. He had some pretensions to literary and artistic culture, and imagined himself to be a statesman.

There was much in the young king's favour. George I. had been an unqualified German. George II. was thirty years old before he ever came to England, though, compara- **The king's** tively speaking, he succeeded in identifying himself **advantages.** with his British kingdom. George I. came into the country as a foreigner to keep out the lineal representative of the royal family, who was a young man not without promise. George II. for twenty years of his reign was threatened with a possible subversion of his throne in favour of the Stuarts. But George III. was born and bred not a German but an Englishman, who 'gloried in the name of Britain.' The dynasty had been established for all but fifty years; under it the country had not only enjoyed

unexampled prosperity, but at the moment of George's accession had reached an altogether unprecedented height of glory and dominion, while the Stuarts were hopelessly discredited, and their restoration had become almost unimaginable, certainly past plotting for seriously. Finally, the prince was reputed to be a pattern of the religious propriety and the domestic virtue which have always appealed with special force to the English middle classes.

Bute was at once brought into the privy council and the cabinet, explicitly as the king's *alter ego*, the man who knew George's whole mind, practically the channel of communication between the king and his ministers. **Pitt's Prussian policy.** He declined, however, the secretaryship of state which the king offered him, preferring not to be hampered by a portfolio. Pitt and Newcastle were the two obstacles that stood obviously in the way of that royal ascendancy at which George and his favourite aimed. The desire to be rid of Pitt involved the desire to be rid of the war which gave him his ascendancy. On the question of the war it was possible at least to divide the cabinet. Pitt throughout had grasped and acted upon the principle that the empire was to be won in Germany as well as on the seas and on the American and Asiatic continent. Great Britain had provided vast sums in order to enable Frederick to maintain his defence, and Pitt was as resolute as ever to maintain that policy. But there were other politicians who conceived that enough had been done for Prussia, who trembled at the enormous expenditure and the swelling National Debt, and who would have devoted British energies exclusively to the pursuit of British interests—unconscious of the importance to British interests of maintaining Frederick, and of the moral obligation to stand by the ally whose stubborn resistance had already done so much to secure the British victory. On these lines it was possible to develop in the government circle a peace party antagonistic to Pitt. In little more than twelve months the great minister had fallen.

Choiseul was playing at negotiating for a separate treaty while, in fact, aiming at a renewal of the Family Compact and the entry

of Spain into the war as an active ally of France. The true object of negotiation was to gain time in order that Spain might intervene effectively. Pitt was not in the least deceived, nor would he at any price make terms which involved any desertion of Frederick. The representations of the Spaniards as well as of the French convinced him that they were in collusion. Meanwhile, British successes continued. While the Austrians continued to progress in Silesia, Ferdinand again proved himself more than a match for the French on the west, and British troops led by Granby again distinguished themselves, notably at the battle of Wellinghausen. A British expedition captured Belleisle, off the French coast, an acquisition barren enough in itself, but valuable as being an actual fragment of French soil, for the restoration of which French honour would be willing to pay a very high price. In the West Indies, Guadeloupe had been captured before; Dominica was now added to the spoils. Presently from India came the news that Lally had surrendered at Pondichery. There was a feeling that enough had been won, that France had already been brought to her knees, and that it was wasteful and dangerous to continue a vast war expenditure merely for the benefit of Prussia. Pitt, on the other hand, knew that Choiseul did not consider that France was on her knees; that, on the contrary, he would encourage negotiations, but merely for the purpose of gaining time. He urged that war should at once be declared against Spain. In spite of his urgency, war was not declared; the treasure fleet from America reached Spain. Pitt, in October, declared that he would be no longer responsible for the direction of affairs unless he were the actual director, and he resigned. His brother-in-law Temple followed suit. The arrival of the treasure fleet gave Charles III. what he wanted; the renewed Family Compact was made public. Pitt's foresight was indisputably demonstrated, and on 2nd January 1762 war was declared against Spain. Immediately afterwards, Spain attacked Portugal, which had stoutly refused to join the anti-British alliance.

It became at once apparent to Frederick that he could no longer

1761.
Choiseul
and Spain.

British
achievements.

Pitt's
resignation,
October.

count upon honestly energetic support from his ally. A happy accident strengthened his position, for his enemy the Tsarina **1762.**

Elizabeth, whose anticipated death had already **Frederick.** served so often to check the advance of Russian armies, did actually die. Her successor, Peter III., was Frederick's enthusiastic admirer, at once reversed her policy, restored East Prussia to the Prussian king, withdrew his troops, and set about negotiating an alliance with Frederick himself. Bute, who some time since had accepted the secretaryship of state, and now obviously controlled the government, withdrew the Prussian subsidy because Frederick, who entirely distrusted him, would not commit himself to a definite statement of the terms upon which he would agree to peace.

It was now Newcastle's turn. He, with most of the cabinet, had opposed Pitt on the Spanish question, in the belief that war **Fall of** with Spain could be averted; still he and some **Newcastle.** of his ablest colleagues, with whom Cumberland was associated, were opposed to the desertion of Frederick. When Bute and his partisans in the cabinet insisted on an insufficient vote for carrying on the war in Germany, Newcastle resigned. Very much to his credit he entirely refused any reward for the long services in the course of which his immense personal expenditure, in what he at least conceived to be the interests of the state, had reduced his income by not less than three-quarters. The ministry was filled up with second-rate or third-rate politicians, who were looked upon as secure supporters of the king—among them George Grenville, who was not, in fact, by any means a king's man, but wanted peace at any price, because he was terrified by the huge war expenditure.

The intervention of Spain necessitated the continuance of the war. The change in Russia's attitude saved Frederick, in spite **The war** of the withdrawal of the British subsidy, and in **on the** spite of another Russian court revolution. **Peter III.** **Continent.** was deposed and subsequently murdered; his wife Catherine succeeded him on the throne, and for a moment seemed inclined to revert to Elizabeth's policy. The Russian army which had joined Frederick in Silesia was ordered to withdraw; but

the general was in no haste to move, the Austrians were unaware that they had only Frederick to deal with, and he was enabled to win at Burkersdorf a battle which practically restored his mastery of Silesia. The British troops had not been withdrawn from Ferdinand's army, and he again conducted a successful campaign against the French in which once more Granby rendered distinguished service.

Even Pitt's opponents had claimed to support the policy of vigorous naval warfare. In this field it is probable enough that the actual plan of operations for the year had **More** emanated from Pitt who, despite his resignation, **captures.** abstained from attacks upon the government. Martinique was captured; an expedition to help the Portuguese swept the invading Spaniards out of Portugal. In August the extremely valuable island of Havana was taken, and in the next month a British squadron which had been dispatched to the Pacific captured Manilla and took possession of the Philippine Islands.

Bute was more anxious than ever to make peace. The English people were not, and although at the general election in 1761 there had been a vast expenditure on bribery, and no **Bute's man-** stone had been left unturned to secure the govern- **agement.** ment a majority in the House of Commons, Bute was still doubtful of carrying the Chamber with him. With the populace Bute was violently unpopular, partly as the adversary of Pitt, partly because he was a Scotsman, partly because his intimacy with the princess dowager gave rise to scandalous rumours which were without any real foundation. A violent and scurrilous warfare was waged in the press, which was heavily subsidised by both sides. Neither Pitt nor Newcastle was to be won over by any sort of bribe, but Bute succeeded in purchasing the services of Henry Fox, who was given the leadership of the House of Commons in place of Grenville, who with all his faults was not to be made an instrument of corruption. Fox had no such scruples, and a majority for peace was secured. In November peace preliminaries were signed.

France and Spain had learnt that the continuation of the war meant merely that the Spanish colonial possessions would fall

a prey to the 'tyrant of the seas.' If Prussia was exhausted, so also was Austria, and it was now certain that the Tsarina, though she might not actually support Frederick, **1763. The Peace of Paris,** would not revert to Elizabeth's policy. All that **February.** Great Britain would demand on Frederick's behalf was that the French should withdraw from the German territories of which they were in occupation. In fact, to Great Britain the peace was a tremendous triumph. It is true that she could have very well demanded and obtained much more than she claimed, since as matters stood it was obvious that the longer the war went on the greater would be her acquisitions. Still, magnanimity on the part of a triumphant victor is a sound policy, provided that it is recognised as magnanimity. Unfortunately in this particular case it was quite obvious that magnanimity was not its characteristic; that the government did not claim more, because they were afraid to claim more.

When the Peace of Paris was signed at the beginning of 1763 the prizes of Great Britain were magnificent enough. India was hers; there the French were to have nothing but trading stations, no posts which could be turned into bases for political or military activity. Canada was hers; France had no footing on the North American continent except in Louisiana, and she resigned Louisiana itself to Spain by way of compensation for the loss of Florida which Spain surrendered in exchange for Havana. Minorca, the only territory captured from her during the war, was restored in exchange for Belleisle. Senegal in Africa, and four West Indian islands, all of which she had conquered, remained in her possession. Yet, if conquest gives a title to possession, Great Britain was entitled to a great deal more, which she surrendered without claiming anything in return. She restored Guadeloupe, Martinique, and Santa Lucia in the West Indies, and Goree in Africa. She conceded the fishing rights in Newfoundland, which were to remain a source of trouble and friction until the end of the nineteenth century. She restored the trading stations in India, which according to the theories of the time was at least unwise from the commercial point of view. And finally, she restored the Philippines to Spain,

although the Spanish intervention had been a piece of wholly unwarrantable aggression, and she did so without claiming any compensation at all. If Bute and Bedford, who was at this time his strongest ally in the pursuit of peace at any price, had had their way, still more would have been surrendered ; but even in the new cabinet there were members who refused to go all lengths.

A few days after the signing of the Treaty of Paris, Frederick signed with Austria the Treaty of Hubertsburg. He had won that for which he had fought. He had retained the **Peace of Hubertsburg**. whole of the territory of which he had been in possession when the war began. Upon that fact the government rested its extravagant pretence that he was indebted to their successful diplomacy. As a matter of fact, British diplomacy had done for him practically nothing.

The peace was glorious only in the sense that the war had been so triumphant, its fruits had been so immense, that it was impossible to avoid retaining the most substantial of **What Great Britain lost**. its gains. What the diplomacy of the government did was to give up as much as it dared ; to make manifest that it did so from no creditable motives ; to leave France, rankling under the consciousness of defeat in the field, hankering to recover her losses and to take vengeance on the victor, and yet taking to herself a modified consolation out of her success in snatching from the clutches of an unscrupulous and grasping foe enough to prove that her own superiority in the arts of diplomacy had not deserted her. As for Prussia, Frederick never forgot what he regarded as his ally's perfidious desertion. The Peace of Paris confirmed Great Britain in the possession of the empire of East and West which Pitt had won for her. It left her also without a single state on the Continent which did not look upon her with unfriendly eyes, save only Portugal. She had wantonly thrown away the friendship of Prussia, she had failed to conciliate France or Spain or Austria. The gain that the peace had brought was the mighty work of Pitt which Bute could not undo ; for all that it failed to do, for all the positive harm that it did, the responsibility lay with the government which had thrust Pitt on one side.

CHAPTER VI. THE ERA

I. THE TIME-SPIRIT

THE age of rationalism came in with the Restoration. The ebullient paganism, the irrepressible delight in sheer human energy, in life and strength and beauty which gave **The Restoration Era.** birth to the mighty Elizabethan poetry, had long passed away. Its emotional forces had been first absorbed in the struggle between the passion of loyalty and the passion for freedom, or in the religious and moral fervour of Puritanism. With the Restoration came the reaction. Emotional fervour was exhausted ; every kind of idealism lost its power of inspiration. Puritanism became formalism, appropriated by the uncultured. The new generation produced no heroic figures, no Eliot and no Strafford, no Montrose and no Cromwell. If it had produced them it would not have known what to do with them. It was tired of tense emotions, though it could work itself up into fits of wild excitement. But as through the period of storm and stress men had been guided by their hearts much more than by their heads, in the new era they were guided by their heads, not by their hearts. Reason displaced feeling. The change was favourable to scientific progress, to the development of criticism, of analysis, of a standard of style in prose and in verse ; but it was destructive of all poetry founded upon the deeper emotions, of all drama which penetrates behind the superficialities. It reduced tragedy to rhetoric, and it gave rise to a comedy unmatched in the intellectual quality of wit, but almost devoid of the sympathetic and emotional quality of humour, and unreal because it was not only irresponsibly unmoral, but was deliberately antagonistic to the root principles of morality.

The extravagance of the reaction worked itself out approximately by the end of the century. The drama of King William's reign was essentially the drama of the Restoration, **The new century.** as the early Jacobean drama was essentially Elizabethan. It did not survive the attack of Jeremy Collier, because Puritanism, itself exhausted, no longer excited active hostility, and the public was recovering its moral balance. The literature of the stage after Anne's accession was not indeed distinguished by any very elevated standard, but it became at least less aggressively indecent, though it must be admitted that at the same time it lost most of its pungency.

The viciousness of the drama, however, had not been in any way an essential part of the new rationalism, since there is assuredly no contradiction between reason and morality. It was merely a by-product of the collision between Rationalism and Puritanism. Throughout the greater part of the eighteenth century rationalism continued to prevail over idealism, the critical over the creative spirit. Dryden, who died **The literary kings.** in 1700, was very soon succeeded by Pope. When Pope died, in 1744, Johnson's ponderous foot was already on the lower rung of the ladder by which he was to rise to the position of literary autocrat. Each in the eyes of his contemporaries was the first of living poets, however posterity may cavil at bestowing that title upon any one of them. Widely as they differed, the literary work of all the three had the common characteristic that its appeal was directed not to the emotions, but to the brains of the cultured public. But lyric poetry must appeal to the emotions, as also must the drama, though that does not of course preclude them from an intellectual appeal as well. Appealing only to the intellect, or at the most to emotions which are not vital, the poets of the new era could be neither great dramatists nor great lyricists; nor, for the same reason, could they produce great epics. When modern criticism denies to them the title of poets, the underlying assumption is that verse must be either lyrical or dramatic—that it must, in short, be emotional—in order to qualify as poetry. Setting aside Johnson as being the leading figure in the second part of the century,

this hypothesis entirely disqualifies Pope, and almost but not altogether disqualifies Dryden. And the same criticism applies to all but a very small proportion of the output of English verse between the English and the French Revolutions.

Now whether Dryden and Pope are to be recognised as poets or not really depends on our definition of the term 'poetry.' If **concerning** the material in which they wrought was not the **poetry.** material of poetry at all, their works were not poems. If, on the other hand, a consummate master of versification, even within limited forms, is entitled to the name of poet, both Dryden and Pope were great poets, because within the limits which they set themselves they were unsurpassed as artists in verse. Each in his own way perfected verse as an instrument for expressing what he sought to express. But what they both aimed at, what all the verse-writers with few exceptions, 'the mob of gentlemen who wrote with ease,' aimed at, was not emotional but intellectual expression; and this was the fundamental characteristic of the age of reason. Hence poetry was almost confined to the satiric and didactic fields which in one view do not fall within the poetic area; or to what we understand by minor poetry, which may be charming, tender, graceful, humorous, witty, but never great, because it concerns itself only with the things which are superficial and accidental, not fundamental and essential.

As a satirist in English verse Pope stands second only to Dryden; his mastery of his instrument was so consummate **The Augustan** that the extremely shallow didactics of the *Essay on Age.* *Man* passed muster as profound philosophy. When he turned to minor verse, he achieved that masterpiece in dainty mock-heroics, the *Rape of the Lock*. In his perfections and in his limitations he summed up the characteristics of the English Augustan age, or at least of cultured society in that age. It could play delightfully. It could think in epigrams. It could feel and it could sting superficially. But it was superficial in everything. Too shallow for a vital sincerity, it mistook artificiality for art and conventions for fundamental principles, a neat antithesis for an eternal verity, manners for morals. It was

a society which could not produce poetry in the deeper sense, because it was a society which neither had nor wished to have ideals. Yet the Augustan age was not undeserving of its name. It was an age in which a Mæcenas and a Horace, or, if we extend the limits of the Augustan era in Rome, a Cicero, a Tacitus, or a Juvenal, would have found themselves entirely at home ; an age of critical culture such as that which produced the best Roman literature, though not of inspiration, such as those which gave birth to the Athenian dramatists or the Elizabethans.

The unheroic character of the time is most conspicuous in the political field. Very few men were ready to die for any Cause imaginable. Half the Whigs were in correspondence with the Stuart court, and very few Jacobites were willing to take the risks of their convictions. It was the same lack of strenuousness which pervaded literature. Nevertheless, the downward course which had accompanied the reaction of the Restoration was stayed. Literature was directed into cleaner channels. Morality raised its head again, and was no longer treated as an object of contempt. Addison and Steele engaged themselves upon the side of virtue. Corruption had not reached the heart of the nation. Even the comedies of Congreve and Wycherley painted a society which took its tone from the court of Charles II., and was becoming less debauched when Mary and William were on the throne. The improvement was still more marked in the reign of Queen Anne, and the society pictured in the pages of the *Spectator* is something very different from the society of the Restoration dramatists. The *Tatler* and the *Spectator* set a new mode, and proved that literary accomplishment need not be monopolised by indecency ; that it was possible to be clean and wholesome without loss of intellectual quality. The court of the German sovereigns who succeeded Queen Anne was as destitute of morality in the narrower use of that term as the court of the Merry Monarch himself ; but its depravity was not equally contagious because it was conspicuously vulgar and unintellectual. Under its influence society grew coarser, but the coarseness of vice repelled the intellectual elements.

If an age which is rationalistic, an age which is anti-emotional, is hostile to the production of great poetry because great poetry **Prose.** is in its nature emotional, that does not preclude it from being great in prose. Dryden has been called the creator of English prose ; there were masters of individual prose styles before him, but he was the first who set a style. Of Addison it has been said that every one who desires to write English should give days and nights to the study of the *Spectator*. Steele and Addison between them created the short essay. Pamphleteering was elevated into a fine art by Daniel Defoe and Jonathan Swift. In the hands of Dryden and Addison literary criticism achieved a like development. Defoe and Swift created prose fiction of which Bunyan had been in some sort the unconscious precursor ; and Addison, in the 'De Coverley' papers in the *Spectator*, suggested the novel of character.

The work of Addison and Steele belongs to the reign of Queen Anne, in which appeared also Defoe's *Shortest Way with the The masters. Dissenters* and some exceedingly characteristic work of Swift's—the *Tale of a Tub*, the *Battle of the Books*, with sundry extremely effective onslaughts upon the Whigs and Marlborough and their conduct of the war. The star of Pope arose, and, before the reign was over, he had published the opening of the translation of the *Iliad*, which established itself as an English classic, but was accurately and finally placed by the great scholar Richard Bentley—'A very pretty poem, Mr. Pope, but you mustn't call it Homer.' But Pope lived and continued to write, a recognised king of English letters, for thirty years after Queen **Defoe.** Anne's death. Defoe struck a new field and began his astonishing production of fiction with the immortal *Robinson Crusoe* in 1719, when he was not far short of sixty. No man has ever surpassed that great writer in his extraordinary capacity for giving to inventions the appearance of convincing records of personal experience. The *Journal of the Plague Year* would carry with it an absolute conviction that it was a record of what Defoe had seen with his eyes and heard with his ears, had it not been an ascertained fact that at the time of the appalling visitation he was not six years old. Hardly less convincing is the

Memoirs of a Cavalier. Unlike these two, *Moll Flanders* was avowed fiction; but it is as realistic as the pencil of Hogarth, whose work first attracted public attention after the accession of George II.—the first of her sons whom England can claim as a great painter. Swift again proved himself the most terrific of pamphleteers with the *Drapier Letters* in 1724. Two years later came *Gulliver's Travels*, which have achieved an extraordinary and unique position as at once a scathing satire upon humanity and a nursery classic.

The adventures of Gulliver can scarcely be classified as a novel, though they are a triumphant and prodigious achievement in fiction. Defoe's novels found no imitators. **The** But from 1740 onwards, the novel definitely took **novellists**. its place as one of the recognised forms of English literature. Samuel Richardson, a bookseller, led the way with the publication of *Pamela* in 1740. Like Addison, the good bookseller desired to make his appeal to the fair sex at least as much as to men, and to do so primarily as a moralist, but with fiction as his medium. *Pamela* and its successors, *Clarissa Harlowe* and *Sir Charles Grandison*, achieved a vast popularity which is to be accounted for by the supreme inanity and wearisomeness of the only fiction which had hitherto been available for feminine perusal. Richardson's novels were exceedingly prolix; *Clarissa* appeared in eight volumes and *Sir Charles Grandison* in six; from a modern point of view, that is, they are ponderous and tedious, sentimental and aggressively didactic; but in *Clarissa*, at least, the portrayal of the heroine's character is a piece of work deserving of the highest praise, and it was hardly possible to be prolix enough for condemnation by a generation which remembered the *Grand Cyrus*. It was not, however, the merits, but the weaknesses of *Pamela* which inspired Henry Fielding to write *Joseph Andrews*, and to employ the novel for the masterly delineation of every aspect of society from the highest to the lowest that came within his very wide ken, with a virile fidelity and gigantic humour which entitle him to be regarded as the true progenitor of the English novel. Six years later, in 1748, came Tobias Smollett's

Roderick Random, and in 1760 the *Tristram Shandy* of Laurence Sterne.

Pope forged for the versemakers of his day fetters which they were for the most part willing enough to wear. A very mild rebel **Hints of the romantic.** was James Thomson, the author of *The Seasons* and of *The Castle of Indolence*, who refused to be bound by the couplet, employed blank verse and the Spenserian stanza, and was a genuine lover and observer of nature. Not till almost the middle of the century did the *Odes* of William Collins and Thomas Gray appear to prove that in England the lyric spirit still lived, though in the latter at least in very academic guise. Spontaneity had been driven almost out of existence by cultivation, regulation, refinement upon refinement, until wholly artificial canons had made it seem impossible that anything springing from a natural impulse should at the same time be artistic. Only in Scotland there persisted that appreciation of the homely and familiar which, wedded to musical language and quite spontaneous in expression, is the peculiar heritage of Scottish song, and reached its consummation in Robert Burns only when Johnson himself was dead, and Pope had been more than forty years in his grave. But the recognised men of letters were not the authors of those songs, though the poetry of the Scot James Thomson had more of nature in it than the work of his English contemporaries. Scottish song for the most part was born of the soil, and never got into print unless it was captured and edited by the bookseller Allan Ramsay, or actually written by him.

In the Church, too, rationalism conquered. Toleration was a part of the political creed of William of Orange and the Whigs. **The Church.** Whenever the Whigs were in the ascendent, the episcopal sees were filled with latitudinarian bishops who repudiated the high ecclesiastical doctrine which produced the non-jurors, and was inextricably involved with legitimism and Jacobitism. Like the moderates of the Scottish kirk, the latitudinarians in England contented themselves with preaching what in Scotland was termed a 'cauld morality,' basing it upon human reason and enlightened self-interest, which lacked the

motive force both of Puritanism and of Anglo-Catholicism. However reasonable it might be, it was not inspiring, and was wholly unspiritual and wholly unsatisfying. As the political materialism which was concentrated in the person of Walpole would have ended by killing the national life had it not been inspired anew by William Pitt, the materialism of the Church would have destroyed religious faith had it not also derived a new inspiration from John Wesley.

At the outset of his career a High Churchman of a pronounced type, strict in the observation of ceremonies, given to fasting and ascetic practices, Wesley founded at Oxford, **John Wesley**, where he held a fellowship at Lincoln College, a small society of devotees who were the objects of very general ridicule. But it was not till he was five-and-thirty years of age that, in 1738, he was seized with that passionate conviction of sin and of assured salvation through the sacrifice of Christ which is called conversion. From that moment he began his career as a preacher. His conversion had been only just preceded by that of his younger brother Charles, and of Whitefield. There was **no** intention of secession from the Church, but the intensely emotional preaching which was the product of an intense religious emotion was surprising and disturbing alike to the rationalism and the formalism, to say nothing of the indifferentism, in which the Church was then hidebound. The name of Methodist, originally attached in derision to Wesley's Oxford Society, was appropriated to the group of preachers who renewed the appeal to the emotions of their audiences and insisted passionately upon the immediate personal relation between the individual soul and the God who had created it and had given His Son to die for its salvation. Orthodoxy closed pulpit after pulpit to them, though in their doctrine there was nothing which contradicted the formularies of the Church. In 1739 they found a solution in the beginning of field-preaching, and of the establishment of chapels of their own which were not intended to displace the churches, but in effect to provide themselves with pulpits since the parish pulpits were closed to them. In the field-preaching, the moving spirit was Whitefield. The Wesleys were both

reluctant, but when they appealed for guidance to the drawing of lots after scriptural precedent, the lot decided them in favour of the new departure. Ultimately the irreconcilability of the Wesleyan methods with the system of the Established Church caused complete separation. The extravagance of their emotional appeal was repellent to most cultured minds ; but their influence upon the uncultured classes was enormous, and was indirectly felt even among the cultivated. With all that there was of grotesqueness and of extravagant superstition mingled in the movement, it is no exaggeration to say that the Wesleys made religion once more a vital force in the life of the English people.

The faith which moves mountains is altogether different from, though it may be associated with, a reasoned belief, the intelligent acceptance of particular dogmas. Rational belief is an affair of the head, not of the heart, a walking by sight not by faith. Faith, however, may be paralysed by intellectual difficulties, and the clergy of the eighteenth century were not on the whole unsuccessful in their generation in their efforts to reconcile orthodoxy with the claims of human reason. They failed indeed to treat the Christian creed as being much more than a tenable formula, but more than this can hardly be demanded of the application of reason to religion. In the field of scientific and philosophic inquiry, however, an age dominated by rationalism is likely to be active. The scientific advance at the close of the seventeenth century almost amounted to a revolution ; but its greatest strides were made just before the accession of William III., when the *Principia* of Isaac Newton was given to the world, and Boyle was laying the foundations of modern chemistry. Still, after Newton, though a vast amount of invaluable work was done, the period was not distinguished by further great generalisations in the field of natural science ; nor was it till the second half of the century that scientific inquiry was directed to those extremely practical applications which brought about the industrial revolution and the enormous development of manufacture.

At the same time, those studies which are covered generally

by such terms as philosophy or mental and moral science received much attention. Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding* may be called the starting-point of the peculiarly English school, as his *Treatise on Government* formulated the political theory of the British constitution after the Revolution. The third Lord Shaftesbury propounded his doctrine of a 'moral sense' in man. While Anne was on the throne George Berkeley, afterwards Bishop of Cloyne, made the most remarkable of English or Irish contributions to philosophy with the publication in 1709 of his *New Theory of Vision*, with a charm of style not commonly associated with abstruse reasoning. Berkeley's Idealism is further developed in his later works, most notably perhaps in his *Alciphron* (1732). Both Berkeley and his great successor, Bishop Butler, directed their arguments to a great extent to the refutation of the Deists and the defence of the supernatural character of Christianity as a revealed religion. This in particular was the aim of Butler's *Analogy*. But the importance of Berkeley in the history of philosophy, and of Butler in the special branch of ethics, is not essentially bound up with this particular controversy. Butler, like his contemporary Hutcheson, and Shaftesbury before him, dwelt in his *Sermons* upon disinterested and benevolent impulses as motives to moral conduct, in opposition to the school deriving from Hobbes which reduced all morality to an enlightened self-interest.

In the history of philosophy, however, it may be questioned whether the first place among British writers, at least before the second half of the nineteenth century, should be given to the Irishman Berkeley, or to the Scot David Hume, whose views were first enunciated in his *Treatise of Human Nature*, which he described as 'An attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects.' Portions of this work, which fell almost flat on its publication, were afterwards developed in the *Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding* and the *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*. Hume, if any one person can claim the title, was the founder of the doctrine of the Association of Ideas; and in ethics was

the true begetter of the utilitarian philosophy, although the phrase most intimately connected therewith, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number,' appears to have been coined by Hutcheson.

In another field also, Hume occupied a position of the first rank. Before him there had been English chroniclers of contemporary events and compilers of chronicles of past events, and Sir Walter Raleigh had embarked upon a history of the world. But with the exception of Clarendon and his *History of the Great Rebellion* there had in effect been no other historian in the larger sense of the term, and Clarendon's history dealt only with the period of his own lifetime. Hume was the first who approached the writing of the history of England in the philosophic spirit, the first of the great British historians. The six volumes of his *History of England*, issued between 1754 and 1761, were written from a point of view strongly favourable to monarchism, and at a time long before the modern unearthing and collating of invaluable records; which have completely destroyed the authority of his work, but not his value as a classic nor his title to rank as one of the greatest of British historians as well as the first.

Finally, we may observe that during this period, letter-writing, like pamphleteering, was developed as a fine art; the most distinguished practitioners of which were perhaps Lady **Letters and memoirs.** Mary Wortley Montague, Lord Chesterfield, and the inimitable trifier, Horace Walpole, whose memoirs also, with those of Lord Hervey, gave a complete picture of the court, the politicians, and the polite society, under the first two kings of the house of Hanover

II. TRADE, INDUSTRY, AND AGRICULTURE

The note of the era which we are now reviewing was its lack of idealism and of enthusiasms; but its devotion to material **Material prosperity.** interests helped to make it one of very general material prosperity. Although the country was at war in one half of the seventy-five years which it covers, its

tangible wealth was enormously increased, especially in comparison with that of other nations. At the moment of the accession of William of Orange, the volume of Dutch trade still perhaps exceeded that of Great Britain. At the moment of the Peace of Paris British trade had entirely distanced that of every competitor. In every British war France was no less deeply engaged, and in nearly all both Spain and Holland, as well as the rest of the Netherlands. The effect in every case was the transference to Great Britain of a portion of the trade of her rivals, because, whenever war was going on, her command of the seas tended to give her the monopoly of oceanic trade. However severely her commerce might be raided, the commerce of France and Spain suffered more, and that of Holland not less; while the strain of the endless struggle so exhausted Holland that she had already fallen far behind by the time of the Treaty of Utrecht, and was without the power of recuperation. The conspicuous proof of the country's wealth lies in the simple fact that almost without effort she bore the strain of the war-taxes, and was able at the same time to provide her allies with subsidies without which they could not have continued the struggle. During these three generations Great Britain became the mart of the world; after the lapse of another generation she was rapidly becoming its workshop as well.

As yet, however, she was not making rapid strides as a manufacturing nation. There was some multiplication and extension of minor industries, partly the outcome of the Huguenot immigration due to the persecuting policy of Louis XIV. in France. But wool and woollen goods were still her staple home products for export. Even the growing cotton trade was kept in check by burdens of legislation imposed for the benefit of the woollen trade, which feared the displacement of woollen by cotton goods. The carrying trade tended more and more to fall into her hands with the expansion of her marine; but perhaps the main source of her increasing wealth was the fact that she was the channel through which the products of Asia and America reached the markets of Europe. The great expansion of manufacture awaited the invention of

machinery driven by power, that is, by some other agency than the muscles of men or animals.

Industry in the first half of the eighteenth century presents very much the same characteristics as in the seventeenth.

Earlier industrial regulation. Under the old mediæval system trade had been confined practically to a limited number of large towns, where it was subject to regulation and

supervision by the gilds, because in mediæval society it appeared at least that regulation and supervision were conditions necessary to security. Membership of a gild was a condition without which no one could practise a trade independently within those areas where it was in effect possible to practise a trade at all. The old system had begun to give way when increased security, and the accumulation of wealth which could be borrowed or hired for trading purposes, made it possible for traders to set up for themselves outside the regulated areas, in places where they could work in freedom from the gild restrictions. The Elizabethan Statute of Apprentices preserved the ring-fence which encircled a number of trades by forbidding anybody anywhere to set up as a master on his own account until he had served his apprenticeship, and by fixing a sort of property qualification as a condition of apprenticeship. But practically the

Development of spinning and weaving. businesses of spinning and weaving became open; and in the course of the seventeenth century most cottages had their spinning-wheel, and most farms

their loom, which materially added to the income of the cottar and the yeoman, in greater or less proportion according to their nearness or distance from the great marts. In other words, the spinning and weaving industries did not involve the congregation of the workers in the large towns. The stage had been reached when competition took the place of regulation for ensuring the quality of work; bad work and inferior goods meant loss of employment and custom; it was not necessary to the consumer's protection that the quality of the particular goods provided should be secured by official supervision. On the other hand, it had not yet become necessary to collect the workers together in spots where power for driving machinery

was readily procurable ; because with rare exceptions no other power than that of the worker's muscles was brought into play, and his own machine could be planted by his own hearth. The spinning and weaving were for the most part either by-occupations of the cottar or the yeoman or copyholder, or else in suitable neighbourhoods they employed most of his time, his agricultural occupations forming his by-employment. This, however, applied mainly to wool and woollens ; the colonies of Huguenot silk-weavers, for instance, being engaged exclusively in that particular trade.

The process of enclosure, of the appropriation of common lands and the conversion of arable land into sheep-runs, had practically come to an end in the sixteenth century. **The open field.** In the seventeenth century there had been very little improvement in the processes of agriculture. More than half the land under cultivation was still worked on the old open-field system, which, though modified, had not been very materially altered since before the Norman Conquest. The farmer, that is, did not occupy a continuous holding of so many acres in extent which he cultivated according to the best of his judgment. His holding consisted of a number of strips of land, not contiguous, but mixed up with the strips of a dozen other holders, all of whom sowed the same crops at the same time, in the same section of land. Enclosure in one of its forms had meant that landlords made it their business by exchange or purchase, or by less justifiable methods, to secure for themselves contiguous strips so as to get substantial contiguous areas which they could treat after their own fashion, whether for cultivation or for pasture. But the open fields were controlled by common work, and every one, whether he liked it or not, was obliged to do as his neighbour did. The system involved much wastage of time and labour, and was perfectly calculated to throttle enterprise of any kind. Outside the area of the land thus under regular cultivation were the common lands, where the occupiers of the estate had rights of common, and the cottar could take up a very small plot for his own cultivation. Within the cultivated area the system still prevailed which divided it into three

portions, each of which was left fallow every third year after having carried succeeding crops of wheat and barley in the two previous years. The yeoman, copyholder, or small tenant-at-will, who occupied his few acres, could extract from them little more than a bare subsistence, since, even if he would, he could not have turned them to the best account, and was preserved from penury through the by-employments with which he supplemented his farm work. But as a net result, though he could save little without extreme economy, he made what was on the whole a reasonably comfortable living.

In the eighteenth century, however, agricultural improvements were introduced by enterprising landlords who paid attention to the improvement of the soil, to manuring and draining, and the development of the cultivation of roots and grasses; notable among them being Lord Townshend, who acquired the nickname of 'Turnip Townshend' on that account. Still the average cultivator would not be beguiled from the ancient ways, and the yeoman who had it in him to be enterprising was still forced along the beaten track by his conservative neighbours. Enterprise was possible only to the landlord; and once again landlords became anxious to increase the amount of land under their own management, whereby they could render it profitable from their own point of view, besides benefiting the community at large by making it more productive. Year by year during the first half of the century occasional Enclosure Acts were passed whereby considerable additions were made to the areas under their direct control, while a like process was carried on without the intervention of legislation by the method of private bargaining with occupiers, and holders of rights of common. But the second period of active enclosure, which transformed the whole face of agricultural England, did not set in with vigour until George III. was on the throne, even as the Industrial Revolution which created a new England of towns and workshops belongs to that reign.

But while the reigns of the two first Georges gave presages

of the approaching rural revolution, they were also not wholly without presages of the coming Industrial Revolution, in which coal, iron, and mechanical invention were to be the great factors. The iron industry was in its infancy; **iron and coke.** only those iron-fields were worked which were within easy reach of the wooded districts where charcoal could be obtained for smelting. But before the middle of the century the Darbies had discovered and applied at Coalbrookdale a method of employing coke for blast furnaces which promised to supersede the use of charcoal; and an immense advance was made with the coke blast furnace, employing water-power, invented by James Smeaton, and adopted at the Carron ironworks, near Stirling, in 1760.

Hitherto the agency of natural forces had scarcely been employed as driving power, except for the grinding of corn by windmills and watermills instead of handmills. The possibilities of steam had only been so far discovered and utilised as to be applied somewhat ineffectively and at great cost to pumping in mines. Even less possible would it have been to predict the future of electricity, though that was already engaging attention. But a step was made towards increasing production in the industry of weaving with John Kay's invention of the fly- **The fly-shuttle.** shuttle, patented in 1733. At that date the allied industry of spinning had outgrown weaving in its productive speed; that is to say, the spinners were producing yarn faster than the weavers could work it up. The fly-shuttle was a machine which enabled a single weaver to work a double width of cloth, and thus to double his output. This began the race between spinning and weaving, since obviously the next step was to discover some means by which the spinner should be able to meet the increased demand for yarn. Although the spinning-jenny of James Hargreaves, which multiplied the individual spinner's power of production **The spinning-jenny.** eightfold, was not invented till 1764, it still belongs to the earlier rather than the later era, because like the fly-shuttle it was worked by hand, not by power. It was only when the control of water and steam was achieved and applied to the service of man that the Industrial Revolution really came to birth.

Down to the middle of the eighteenth century, then, no very marked change had taken place in the face of the country.

Town and country. Slowly no doubt the town population was growing relatively to that of the rural districts. At the

beginning of the century only one-fifth of the entire population was urban ; at the end it had risen to one-third ; but the change in the last quarter of the century was rapid, and in 1760 the rural population must still have been more than three-fourths of the whole. The Elizabethan Poor Law had certainly tended to prevent the migration of labour from one district to another.

Poor Law. The Restoration Law of Settlement had increased the difficulty of movement, and with one exception this was the only material modification that had taken place since the accession of the Stuarts. The man who could find no employment in his own neighbourhood and set out to find another neighbourhood where his labour would be in demand, might be and generally was, by the authority of the law, sent back to his own parish or hundred, because the new parish in which he attempted to settle declined to be responsible for him as for one of its own poor. The one other modification referred to is the Workhouse Act of 1723, when some further provision was made for finding work for the unemployed. The inevitable danger of providing relief for

Workhouses. the destitute, without attaching conditions, is that of pauperising the people—supplying, that is, an inducement to the idle to prefer dependence on charity to honest work. The law of 1723 ensured relief to the destitute, but only on condition of their entering the parish workhouse, where they were given work to do if they were capable of doing it. The abolition of out-relief relieved the poor rate, and offered no attractions to the wilfully idle ; but, on the other hand, the conditions caused a stigma to attach to the receipt of poor relief which led numbers of those who would have been in every respect proper objects of such relief to endure any privation in preference to ‘ coming on the parish.’ Here again there was a revolution approaching, entirely pernicious in its character ; though the intentions of its perpetrators were wholly benevolent.

CHAPTER VII. GEORGE III. AND THE WHIGS

I. THE SITUATION IN 1763

GEORGE III. from the moment of his accession had before his eyes one supreme object, to 'be a king'—to recover for the Crown effective supremacy in the State. All the **The king's** questions which arose, until that object seemed to **aim.** have been gained by the formation of Lord North's ministry, were judged by him from that single point of view according to their bearing upon that single aim. The obvious old methods of attempting to over-ride or defy the will of parliament by the exercise of the royal prerogative were out of date; the time when it had been possible to dream of employing them with success had long gone by; no one, whether an autocratic minister or the king himself, could hope to govern unless he could rely upon a parliamentary majority. It was necessary therefore for the king to acquire in the House of Commons a secure majority which should be at his own beck and call. To attain this end he had to create a party of his own, for which a nucleus was to be found in the old Tories who for half a century had been entirely excluded from political power, discredited by their association with Jacobitism. That association had come to an end, and the Tory could with a clear conscience, for the first time since 1688, apply to the king who was now on the throne the sentiment of loyalty which could no longer attach itself to the 'king over the water.' The Tory element, however, did not suffice for the king's purpose; it was not strong enough to provide a majority, or to break up the Whig connection--which was the first condition of success.

The existing system in effect placed the control of parliamentary majorities in the hands of a few Whig families. Even the

counties were to some extent dominated by the influence of Whig magnates ; in a large number of boroughs the representatives were the nominees of a Whig magnate ; **The Whig oligarchy.** in others the electors were practically the town council, since there was no uniform franchise ; and there were many town councils which were quite prepared to sell a seat to the highest bidder—who might be either a wealthy individual ambitious of parliamentary honours, or a candidate backed by party magnates with long purses. As long as the great Whig families held together, they could control the votes in a sufficient number of constituencies to be sure of a parliamentary majority. The great Whig families were held together by sharing the spoils of office, and it was by lavish expenditure and judiciously directed patronage that Newcastle had made his own alliance necessary to any one who sought to conduct the government.

Now George might have attacked the system itself ; and he might have done so in alliance with Pitt, to whom the system was an abomination. It was only by sheer intellectual and moral ascendancy in quite abnormal circumstances, and by making terms with the system itself, that the great minister had attained to effective power in the State. The system had for a long time kept him out of power, made it impossible for the man of genius who could not control votes to reach a dominant position. But George did not want to substitute a permanent Pitt dictatorship for the Whig system ; he wanted to be the controlling power himself. It had already been proved that the system was too strong for Pitt himself to be able to ignore it, and it would have proved too strong to be ignored by a coalition of Pitt and the king. If the system was to be got rid of at all, it must either be through a reform which cut at the roots of it by reforming the franchise and making the members of the House of Commons the real representatives of a free electorate, or else by breaking up the Whig connection ; in which case the system would probably only re-emerge in a new form. Pitt clearly had the idea of a reform of representation ; but again, what the king wanted was not a parliament which expressed the will of a free

electorate instead of the will of a coalition of magnates, but a parliament which would take its orders from the Crown. He looked, therefore, to the breaking of the Whig connection and the re-emergence of the system as an instrument in his own hands; and in this second part of his scheme, at least, he could not hope for Pitt's co-operation.

Hence it was in the first instance his wish to break up the Whig connection without employing Pitt, and hence again Bute's first effort was directed to the overthrow of Pitt, and to the detachment of Pitt's personal following from the great Whig coalition. The second blow was struck with the fall of Newcastle, the head-centre of the system. The Whig party was thrown into a state of complete disintegration; and out of this disintegration the king intended to construct a party of his own and a system identical in principle with that which had been broken down, but under his own control. The difficulties he encountered in working out his problem provide one leading feature in the story of the first decade of his reign. This was the struggle which in fact controlled the fluctuations of ministries.

The second feature of the epoch is the attempt of parliament to control the freedom of the electorate through an extravagant interpretation of the privileges of the parliament itself. It was unfortunate that the standard-bearer of freedom should in this case have been not a Hampden nor an Eliot, but a person so disreputable that it was really difficult for decent persons to associate themselves with him even in a just cause, difficult to persuade decent people that a cause could be just which had so disreputable a champion. The cause, in fact, was bound to win in the long run; important though the victory was, the strife attracted a wholly disproportionate amount of public interest; disproportionate because there were other questions demanding solution, problems vitally affecting the British empire, which demanded the most careful attention, the most deeply considered treatment; whereas the attention they received was casual and intermittent, and their treatment was reckless and haphazard.

These problems lay outside the island of Great Britain. The first, of very old standing, was presented by Ireland, always neglected in England until it reached such a pitch **The greater problems.** of disturbance as to compel some perfunctory attention. Next, a very new one, was the problem of India, a problem whose existence had hardly as yet been realised. To India must be added Canada, where happily the tact and ability of the successive governors, General James Murray and Sir Guy Carleton, gained the loyalty of the French inhabitants in spite of ill-advised and ill-considered instructions from London. Ireland, India, and Canada affected the course of events and of politics in England so little that we shall treat of them separately. The third problem, that of foreign relations, will demand only incidental mention, since Great Britain in effect continued to tread that path of isolation to which Bute had directed her steps. The fourth, the biggest of all the problems, the one most fraught with pressing difficulties, the one which demanded at once the most delicate handling, the most thorough analysis, the keenest insight, and the sanest judgment, was the problem of the American colonies, which forced itself upon the politicians at Westminster at every turn, and at nearly every turn was signally mismanaged. Since it is thus inextricably bound up with the account of those issues which have been referred to as the two first of the leading features of the period treated in this chapter, we must begin by attempting to elucidate the character of the problem itself.

In earlier chapters of this work we traced the foundation and multiplication of the colonies on the North American seaboard **The thirteen colonies.** until they numbered thirteen, from the four colonies on the north forming the New England group to Georgia on the south. Akin to the New England group was the next group of four, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. The five southern colonies, Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia, are to be distinguished from the eight northern colonies as the Plantation group, the area of great landed estates devoted largely to the growing of tobacco, cotton, or other produce, chiefly for export, and culti-

vated mainly by slave labour, chiefly of negroes, partly of convicts. Every colony or state was for ordinary purposes self-governing, having an elected assembly, and a governor and an administrative council which had not yet become responsible to the legislature to such an extent as was by this time the case in Great Britain. The governor's powers of intervention were regarded in the colonies with a resentment of the same kind as that which had been inspired by the exercise of royal prerogative under the Stuarts in contravention to the will of parliament. Further, we observe that the landed gentry of the Plantation colonies had the general character of a landed aristocracy, extremely tenacious of its own rights, and not abnormally considerate of obligations to other communities or other classes in its own community. In the northern colonies, on the other hand, mainly of Puritan foundation, more industrial, more mercantile, more democratic in their original structure, the atmosphere was that of Puritan middle-class democracy, rather than that of landed aristocracy.

Broadly speaking, Great Britain adopted towards her colonies an attitude different from that of any other foreign state. To the Spaniard, colonies were Crown property; to the French and Dutch they were assets of the State, **Mother country and colonies.** controlled by the State, for the benefit of the State, with only a practically necessary minimum of management left in the hands of the colonists themselves or of their commercial directors at home. The British colony, on the other hand, was left in the main to take care of itself, to develop its own prosperity, and to fight its own battles, always provided that its interests did not clash with those of the mother country; that if the interests of the two did clash those of the colony must give way completely. The mother country did not claim a right in ordinary circumstances of exploiting colonies for her own benefit, but she treated it as a matter of course that, wherever a question of conflicting interests arose, the mother country dictated the answer to the question.

The particular form in which the mother country found it convenient to legislate for her own interests against the interests

of the colonies was that of commercial regulation. Until the restoration of Charles II. in 1660 colonial trading was almost unrestricted. But when the Commonwealth Navigation Act was modified at the Restoration, new limitations were imposed. The Commonwealth Navigation Act had restricted the carrying trade to British (including colonial) ships, and the ships of the country in which the imports were produced; the object being to encourage British shipping. But at the Restoration direct trade between the colonies and foreign countries was forbidden; they had to import from England or at least by way of England, and to export to England. In practice, though not in set terms, the carrying trade was monopolised by English shippers. Duties were imposed at the American ports in the interests of the British mercantile community—the 'English' community until 1707, and after 1707 'British,' not in the full imperial sense, but in the restricted sense applied to the island of Great Britain. The colonists were also forbidden to manufacture for themselves sundry classes of goods with which the English producers wished to supply them. By this system of trade regulation, directed in the interests of the mother country, the colonial trade was somewhat hampered, and would have been seriously fettered if British governments, notably that of Walpole, had not been intentionally lax in the enforcement of the law. An immense contraband trade was deliberately allowed to grow up; the front doors were officially bolted and barred, but the back doors were left on the latch. Walpole's attitude had been simply the reflection of his attitude to Nonconformity. He wanted to foster and expand the trade of the colonies; he regarded the regulations as being in themselves a mistake, but he knew that their removal would create an outcry in the British mercantile community; and therefore instead of removing them he went as far as he could in the direction of suffering their evasion. Nor did it occur to his immediate successors to depart from that characteristic policy.

The colonies then had a common theoretical grievance. Their self-government was liable to be interfered with by governors whom they had not themselves chosen, although

such interference was unusual. Their trade was restricted by laws which the mother country had imposed in her own interests, although those laws were enforced with laxity.

But there were two facts which had hitherto restrained the colonies from determined protest. **Reason of colonial acquiescence.**

First, the mutual jealousies of the separate communities prohibited any effective combined action on their part. In the second place, and partly on account of the said jealousies, the colonists were dependent upon the mother country for defence against French aggression. They could not afford to quarrel with her, because if the French government intervened actively to support the pretensions of the French colonies—while the French colonists had the power of France behind them—the British colonists needed at their own backs the counteracting power of Great Britain and the British navy; the more because their mutual jealousies prevented them from concerting common measures of defence, as was conspicuously demonstrated in 1754, when Franklin's federation scheme fell through.

But the situation was completely changed by the Seven Years' War. The French had no longer a foothold in the North America continent; in the eyes of the colonials, a French menace no longer existed; they no longer **A changed situation.**

required British fleets and regiments. But the old grievances were there unmodified; not pressing upon them acutely, but present, although the old reasons for submitting to them had vanished. On the other hand, there was a lively sense of indebtedness to the mother country, and especially to William Pitt. The changed conditions called for a readjustment of the old relations, and it should have been the business of a wise statesmanship in England to utilise the sentiment of gratitude in basing a readjustment upon the spirit of mutual sympathy. Unhappily, the task fell not to the sympathetic statesman whom the Americans enthusiastically admired, but in the first instance to a political pedant entirely devoid of sympathetic imagination.

II. THE GRENVILLE AND ROCKINGHAM MINISTRIES, 1763-1766

Although Pitt on his retirement had patriotically abstained from hampering the government, he denounced the Peace of

1763. Paris in parliament with uncompromising vigour.

Bute. The peace was extremely unpopular, both because

so much had been given up that might have been legitimately secured, and because, at least in some quarters, there was a sense that the government's treatment of the king of Prussia had been distinctly discreditable. The other proceedings of the administration did not counterbalance the hostile sentiment evoked by the peace. In parliament, Bute was master of the situation; his majorities were secured. The principle of party vindictiveness was applied with unparalleled effrontery and universality. Leading Whig noblemen on the Opposition side were deprived of their dignified offices. From Newcastle himself down to mere excisemen, there was a general clearance of every one who had received a place by favour of the Whig ministers. Vindictiveness, as always, bred vindictiveness and irreconcilability.

Bute had filled up his ministry with incompetent persons; perhaps the most incompetent was the chancellor of the ex-

The cider chequer, Sir Francis Dashwood, who raised a loan
tax. upon terms by which supporters of the ministry

pocketed more than ten per cent. of the whole amount. To provide revenue, he succeeded in imposing a tax of four shillings a hogshead upon cider, to be levied by way of excise. There was no justification for selecting one particular branch of industry to be the victim of taxation; the cider districts were infuriated, and the popular indignation was excited by the application of the detested excise in an aggravated form. Bute found the

Bute position too intolerable; he hoped that by being
succeeded by out of office he might cease to be the object of
Grenville, popular execration, while still retaining the control
April of the administration in his own hands. He re-

signed, accompanied by Dashwood, having arranged that George Grenville should be at the head of the administration as first

lord of the treasury and chancellor of the exchequer. He was under the mistaken impression that he would find Grenville a pliant tool, as well as an indubitably capable official. Bedford, though even more responsible than Bute for the Peace of Paris, was personally hostile to the favourite and declined to join the cabinet. In April parliament was prorogued, the king in his speech, which was of course put in his mouth by ministers, having dwelt chiefly upon the glories of the peace, and with supreme audacity claimed credit for the benefits secured by the king of Prussia.

John Wilkes, the member for Aylesbury, was a clever libertine, an adventurer with a passion for notoriety, who had adopted journalism as a means to the gratification of his **Number** craving. Having no particular principles he had **forty-five.** adopted the popular side, and issued a paper of his own called the *North Briton*, mainly devoted to scurrilous attacks upon the Scots in general, and upon Bute in particular. Immediately after the prorogation of parliament the forty-fifth number of the *North Briton* appeared. It contained a virulent attack upon the king's speech, which it charged in effect with making gross and scandalous misstatements. Every one knew that the king's ministers, not the king personally, were responsible for the words put into the king's mouth, but George took the accusation as a personal insult to himself, and required ministers to prosecute the offender. Halifax, one of the secretaries of state, issued a general warrant which, without giving names, ordered the arrest of the author, publishers, and printers concerned with the production of the obnoxious pamphlet. Under the warrant more than forty persons were arrested, including Wilkes himself, on the publisher's statement that he was the author. His papers were seized and he himself was sent to the Tower. His ally Lord Temple was refused permission to see the prisoner. On a writ of *habeas corpus*, however, he was brought before Justice Pratt, Chief Justice of the Common **Justice** Pleas. Pratt pronounced that as a member of **Pratt.** parliament Wilkes was by privilege of parliament immune from an action which could only be brought upon a charge of treason,

felony, or breach of the peace, none of which could be imputed to No. 45. Wilkes was set at liberty, amid popular demonstrations. Pratt pronounced that although precedents existed, general warrants were illegal. Several of the persons arrested brought actions against the persons who had arrested them, and recovered heavy damages. Wilkes himself brought actions against the two secretaries of state; but one of them, Egremont, died, and the other, Halifax, discovered and employed legal methods for deferring the hearing of the action indefinitely. Wilkes proceeded to issue a reprint of No. 45.

Before parliament met again in November the ministry had undergone some reconstruction. In fact, it was not strong enough for George's purposes. He acceded to what was perhaps Bute's suggestion that Pitt should be invited to join the ministry, but Pitt would not come back without some at least of his old colleagues.

**The Bedford-
Grenville
ministry,
September.**

The negotiations broke down, and George turned to Bedford, who was not eager for office, but was piqued by the information that one of the conditions put forward by Pitt had been that neither Bedford nor any one else responsible for the peace should be admitted. Bedford in turn made it a condition that Bute should not only hold no office, but should withdraw from the capital. Galling though this condition was, it was accepted; and the Grenville ministry became in September the Bedford ministry. Lord Shelburne, originally introduced by Bute, retired to attach himself to Pitt, and the new ministry was discredited by the admission of the earl of Sandwich—a capable administrator, but a notoriously depraved character who had formerly been associated with Dashwood and with Wilkes in a flagrantly profligate society known as the Medmenham Brotherhood.

Parliament had no sooner assembled than the attack upon Wilkes was renewed. It was opened in the Lords by Sandwich,

**Renewed
attack on
Wilkes.**

who produced a profane and obscene paper, written by Wilkes and dedicated to himself in the days of their intimacy, entitled *An Essay on Woman*, a parody or burlesque of Pope's *Essay on Man*, and of the notes

thereon which had been written by Bishop Warburton. The thing had been printed only for private circulation, not for publication at all ; nobody could possibly imagine that Sandwich had been actuated by any care for the public morals in informing against his brother of Medmenham. But the use which had been made of Bishop Warburton's name made it possible, with a violent strain, to pretend that the essay was a breach of the privileges of the House of Lords. On that basis the Lords petitioned the Crown to command the prosecution of Wilkes. On the same day the Commons voted, first, that No. 45 was a false and seditious libel which should be burnt by the common hangman ; and, secondly, that privilege of parliament did not protect the author. Pitt, who denounced Wilkes himself in the strongest terms, opposed no less strongly the abrogation of privilege. The House, usually exceedingly jealous of its own privileges, was ready to sink them in order to punish Wilkes. Wilkes retired to Paris, having fought a duel with another member in which he was himself wounded ; and when summoned to the bar of the House sent a medical certificate to show that he could not attend. The Commons declined to accept the certificate, and on 19th January pronounced his expulsion. The Court of King's Bench convicted him for the republication of the ' seditious libel,' and, as he was not present to receive sentence, declared him an outlaw.

1764.
Wilkes
outlawed,
January.

So closed the first act in the drama of ' Wilkes and liberty.' The action of the government had been in plain terms a vindictive attempt to prevent free speech and free criticism, excusable only on the plea that the particular criticism had been particularly offensive. By bringing in the entirely irrelevant *Essay on Woman* at the instance of a minister whose morals were notoriously no better than Wilkes's own, they conclusively showed that they were actuated not by a sense of public duty, but by exasperation and a desire for vengeance. And in order to remove any possibility of a doubt that these were their real motives, they proceeded to penalise those of their ordinary supporters who had voted against them

Government
vindictive-
ness.

on the Wilkes question. General Conway and Colonel Barré were deprived of their commands. The Wilkes quarrel was by no means trivial in itself. Freedom of speech, freedom of criticism, freedom from the pretence that governments may override the law, as in the case of general warrants, whenever circumstances make it convenient to them, are essential to any form of government which is not fundamentally despotic. The affair of Wilkes created an amount of excitement which was superfluous only because the ultimate outcome of the contest was in fact a foregone conclusion. Very different was the next contest in which the government found itself engaged.

The enormous expenditure on the war, the expansion of the National Debt, and the depletion of the treasury, inspired the economists with the alarm which had made the Peace of Paris possible. Bute's ministry, in its search for new sources of revenue, had even been reduced to inventing the unpopular cider tax. George Grenville's pathetic entreaties that the House would 'tell me where' else a tax could be imposed had elicited from Pitt the sarcastic murmur, 'Gentle shepherd, tell me where,' which had affixed to the minister the nickname of the 'Gentle Shepherd.' But if Grenville had failed for the time to discover a substitute for the tax upon cider, he and his colleagues at least lighted upon an existing source of revenue which had been sadly neglected. If the revenue laws were properly enforced in America it appeared that something substantial would probably be realised. Steps were taken to put a stop to the contraband traffic, to ensure that the goods landed in America paid their proper toll; and to this end the vessels of His Majesty's navy were employed to supplement and strengthen the normal preventive service. It was all quite legal; but it was extremely annoying to large numbers of worthy citizens in the colonies who had been accustomed to take for granted that the laws against contraband traffic were only intended to be partially observed, and might be profitably broken with an easy conscience, provided the thing were not done too ostentatiously, by persons who were otherwise irreproachably law-abiding.

1763. In
search of
revenue.

American
contraband.

Ministers in England were troubling their minds with the 'Gentle Shepherd's' question, unhampered by fears of causing irritation in remote dependencies; just as they had ignored the irritation in the cider districts. It presented itself to the mind of George Grenville that reason and equity demanded that the colonists, who were the chief gainers by the great war, should pay their share of the expenses. The argument was quite sound; the rivalries of the British and French colonists had been the principal cause of the war, which had put an end to the French rivalry and left the field clear to the colonists, while nearly the whole of the cost had fallen upon the mother country. It was a clear indisputable fact that the colonies were under a moral obligation to make a substantial contribution. Still there was an item in the account which was left out of the reckoning. The overthrow of the French was, after all, not a gratuitous service to the colonies. It was in the nature of a return, a compensation for the subordination of the political liberties and the commercial interests of the colonies to the political authority and the commercial interests of Great Britain. The balance of debt was, after all, not so heavily in favour of Great Britain as it appeared on the Grenville balance-sheet.

The colonies should help to pay for the war.

The colonies, then, were under this moral obligation. In a corrupt world, moral obligations materialised in pounds, shillings, and pence are apt to dwindle down. A man of another temper than George Grenville might have dreamed of making a stirring appeal to colonial gratitude, to the warmth of sentiment which had been aroused, to the generosity of a generous people who had been generously helped without thought of reward. But Grenville did not trust in American generosity, and there were substantial reasons for distrusting it. Such an appeal would have to be made to the states individually; every state might respond warmly in words, but each one would probably ask at once to what extent its neighbours intended to respond in cash. Each one would consider that its neighbours were under a heavier obligation than itself. Each would adapt its views of handsome behaviour to a

The appeal to sentiment discarded.

criterion fixed by some one else. Massachusetts would see no reason why it should contribute more than Carolina; the Carolinas would see no reason why they should be expected to contribute so much as Massachusetts. George Grenville conceived that the ultimate response to an appeal for contributions of which the amount should be assessed by the colonists themselves would be meagre.

Yet money must be obtained from the colonists. Not only did they owe a debt for the past, but it was necessary to continue the expenditure on their behalf. It was true that the French had been beaten out of America, but they would certainly try to get back there. The Indians, too, were threatening to become a more serious menace. The colonists had already proved their own incapacity for undertaking their own defence; the time had come when it was necessary to establish an imperial standing army in America. The colonists were not at all likely to see the necessity, and would certainly offer no voluntary contributions for its maintenance. Their argument was obvious. The subordination of colonial to home interests was the standing equivalent for whatever protection the British might extend to the Americans. Grenville's most fatal blunder was his assumption that that subordination was not a *quid pro quo*, something for which the colonists were entitled to an equivalent, but a condition inherent in the relation between mother country and colonies.

Dismissing the idea of voluntary contribution, Grenville conceived that he could legally enforce contribution by way of taxation. And again within the strict letter of the law he was right. All the colonies were established under charters; under all the charters the Crown retained the power of taxing the colony. The power had never been exercised with the object of raising revenue; according to the technical distinction, all the imposts laid upon the colonies had been exacted not to raise revenue, but by way of regulation of trade; just as in the old days the imposition of Customs in England had been treated not as a means of raising revenue for the Crown, but as a part of the royal

1764. Taxation to be imposed for revenue.

prerogative of regulating trade. Walpole had once been urged to provide revenue by taxing America, but that shrewd statesman had been far too wary. The wealth that would accrue to Great Britain from the development of colonial trade and the colonial market was in his eyes worth a great deal more than any sums which could be collected in the way of taxation. Nor was it in his eyes politic to arouse a spirit of hostility which it would not be easy subsequently to allay.

Grenville forgot the prudence of Walpole. The law permitted the taxation of the Americans; the law therefore should be utilised for that purpose. Some fresh imposts were ordered to be levied at the ports in 1764. It was also proposed to impose a stamp tax; to require, that is, that all legal documents should have a government stamp affixed to them, the price varying according to the nature of the instrument. On this proposal, however, the colonists were invited to express opinions, and to suggest any alternative method of raising the money required which appeared to them adequate; meanwhile, for a year the scheme was to be held in suspense. Benjamin Franklin, who was resident in London as agent for sundry colonies, discouraged the scheme, though he could suggest no alternative but an invitation to the colonists for voluntary contributions. No other satisfactory suggestion was forthcoming, and in March 1765 the Stamp Act was passed without a division of the House of Lords, and by a sweeping majority in the House of Commons. Hardly any one appears to have attached any significance to it in England; although Barré delivered an impassioned protest against it in the Commons, introducing a reference to the Americans as the 'Sons of Liberty,' which afterwards became a catchword.

In America the affair did not appear to be so trivial. Law and precedent together had made it extremely difficult to protest against impositions enforced for the regulation of trade. The new impositions might be warranted by law, but from precedent at least they had no support. In practice taxation was a new thing—the term taxation having the specific meaning of impositions

1765. The
Stamp Act.

No taxation
without
representa-
tion.

for revenue purposes. In this sense the old impositions had not been taxes; whereas it had been carefully explained that the new impositions were taxes. The most flagrantly unprecedented of them was the Stamp Tax, because it was doubly unprecedented; it was not only a tax, but an inland tax. Hitherto there had been no inland impositions; those that had been levied were levied at the ports. In Walpole's day the British public had fallen into a frenzy because the minister proposed to extend inland taxation, and used the name of excise. So now the irritation, long latent but recently roused anew by the vigilant suppression of smuggling, received a fresh incentive. The Americans found new burdens hitherto unheard of being laid upon them; in amount trivial enough, but in principle, from the American point of view, monstrous. Was it not a fundamental principle of British liberties proclaimed by the Bill of Rights, resting upon the Petition of Right, based upon Magna Charta itself, that there should be no taxation without representation? Yet a parliament in which America was unrepresented was imposing taxation upon America. No technical appeal to charters and laws could override a fundamental principle of the constitution. At last Grenville had given the old grievance a shape which supplied the Americans with a handle.

The trouble was immensely aggravated by a factor of which it is difficult for us to realise the importance—the remoteness of the colonies. Wolfe's dispatches from Quebec had taken six weeks to reach London. A naval squadron, unimpeded by transports, had taken eleven weeks to reach the American seaboard; though this was noted as an abnormally long time. When three months elapsed between the writing of a letter and the receipt of the answer, there was time enough for the answer to have become quite out of date and inappropriate. This was a definite practical difficulty of a kind easily ignored by a generation to which the telegraph has become a matter of course. But apart from this, America a hundred and fifty years ago was further off than New Zealand to-day, more difficult to visit, less known by personal observa-

tion, and infinitely less familiar through the press. When we consider how little the average Englishman knows even now about Australasia, how few people would probably give a correct reply off-hand if asked to name the capitals of New Zealand, New South Wales, Queensland, and Victoria, we may be the less surprised at the portentous ignorance of the colonies which prevailed in Great Britain—when the information that Cape Breton was an island could come upon a prime minister with the charm of a new discovery. A sea voyage in the eighteenth century was not to be undertaken even by the wealthiest as a mere pleasure trip. Even in the twentieth century mutual misunderstandings are fostered by distance; in the eighteenth century the difficulty of reconciling such misunderstandings was a hundred-fold greater.

The immediate purpose of the Stamp Act was to provide for the proposed standing army of ten thousand men. It was followed up as a matter of course by the extension **American** of the Mutiny Act in America, with the require- **anger.** ment that the colonies themselves should provide quarters for the troops. The Act was to come into operation in November. The colonists were extremely angry; the more so because their opinion on the proposals had been asked only to be ignored. The lead in the opposition was taken by Boston, the capital of Massachusetts, the chief of the New England group. Massachusetts was hit the hardest by the suppression of contraband traffic. It was the headquarters also of the Puritan tradition which prided itself on its passion for political liberty. The town's meeting at Boston passed a resolution that parliament had no right to tax the colonies without their consent. The Assembly followed the example of the town's meeting, and gave the lead to five other colonies which petitioned against the tax. In the Virginian Assembly Patrick Henry made allusions to Charles I., obviously containing an adroitly veiled menace.

On the initiative of Massachusetts, representatives from each colony were invited to attend a general congress which assembled at New York in November; nine of the thirteen colonies were represented, and the rest sent sympathetic messages. The

congress passed addresses to the King, to the Lords, and to the Commons, declaring their loyalty, but protesting against the Act. Outside these strictly constitutional methods, but still within the letter of the law, associations were formed to enlist the sympathies of the British mercantile community by threatening its pockets. No British goods were to be bought; the Americans would wear out their old clothes or array themselves in homespun; they would make for themselves what they had hitherto purchased from British makers, or would go without. Demonstrations, however, were naturally not confined to the law-abiding. Rioters destroyed government buildings and government property; officials who had been appointed to distribute the stamps declined or resigned office, conscious that if they did not do so they would be subjected to mob violence. When the stamps themselves arrived, they were seized and were nearly all destroyed. The British parliament had made its law, but obviously the enforcement of it was to prove more than difficult. So much at least the Americans had demonstrated before the end of 1765.

Meanwhile, however, changes had been taking place in England. The formation of the Bedford administration, at the end of 1763, had by no means given the king what he wanted. **The king and Grenville.** It was true that the old Whig combination was broken up, and that he had got nominees of his own and of Bute into the ministry; but at the head of it were Bedford and Grenville, its indispensable members, and they, not the king, were masters of the situation. It was not that Grenville differed materially from the king in his views of policy, but that he took upon himself to lecture the king at every turn, and generally treated his royal master in the same spirit of tactless pedantry which made him so impracticable and exasperating in his other political relations. George chafed under the burden.

The climax arrived in 1765. At the beginning of the year the king fell ill, showing symptoms of that mental derangement by which the later years of his life were overshadowed. He recovered, but the event made him anxious to make due pro-

vision for the government in case of his incapacitation or death. He had married in 1761, and he had an infant son and heir; it did not seem sufficient to assume that in such circumstances his consort would become regent; consequently a bill was prepared which was to limit the choice of a regent to members of the 'royal family.' The question arose whether this included the king's mother, the dowager Princess of Wales, or only the queen and persons who stood in the line of succession as descendants of George II. Ministers conceived that if the Princess of Wales should become regent Bute's ascendancy would be restored, which was the last thing they desired. They wished, therefore, to exclude the princess from the list of persons eligible for the regency, and they obtained George's assent to the omission of her name by warning him that if it were included the House of Commons would certainly make matters a great deal worse by formally striking it out. The Lords passed the bill with the name omitted; whereupon the Commons expressly inserted it. It was made to appear that George had wished to exclude his mother, against the wishes of the Commons.

The Regency Bill.

George was furious, and appealed to his uncle the duke of Cumberland for help. Cumberland proposed to apply to Pitt. Pitt was prepared to form an administration on terms which would have been accepted; but unfortunately he had made up his mind that he would not take office without Temple. Temple declined, and the whole negotiation fell through. Cumberland could find no one to undertake the business; and the king was forced again to subject himself to Grenville and Bedford on their own terms. In their triumph they adopted towards him an attitude so intolerably overbearing that he appealed to Pitt once more; the appeal failed for the same reason as before, and George found himself with no alternatives save utter subjection to Bedford and Grenville, or an official reconciliation with that Whig 'connection' which it had been his primary political object to defeat.

**Failure of
appeals to
Pitt.**

So in the middle of July a Whig administration was formed under the leadership of the marquess of Rockingham. Rockingham and the duke of Grafton, who took one of the secretaryships, were

still young men without administrative experience—gentlemen, sportsmen, politicians only from a sense of duty. Newcastle now brought little strength with him; General Conway had no real force of character; there were, in fact, no true elements of efficiency in the whole group, although behind Rockingham there was the genius of his private secretary, Edmund Burke. The ministry was well-meaning, entirely honest, not without common sense, but altogether unimpressive; and no one was more alive to its weakness than its own members, all of whom would have hailed the accession of Pitt to their numbers with unfeigned satisfaction. Under his leadership they might well have made a great administration; but without a convincing leader they were doomed to only a brief tenure of power. They had been brought into the position by Cumberland; and at the end of October Cumberland died. As Whigs of the ‘connection’ George disliked and distrusted them; and the few ‘King’s Friends,’ followers of his own who had been included in the ministry, were really a hostile and embarrassing element among them.

Parliament did not meet again for business until January 1766. So far no active steps had been taken for dealing with the trouble in America; but ministers had learnt that Pitt was entirely opposed to the enforcement of the Stamp Act, and consequently they had resolved on its repeal. Pitt was at no pains to conceal the small account in which he held the members of the new government, but he gave them their cue. The home government had full authority to legislate for the colonies, but it had no right to tax them. From outside parliament, petitions against the Stamp Act were pouring in from the merchants of the great towns whose market in America was closed, and whose customers in America were withholding payment of their debts. Rockingham announced that the king was in favour of the repeal of the Stamp Act; the King’s Friends put it about that the king was opposed to repeal. Rockingham, who had spoken in perfect good faith, on the strength of George’s own words, sought an explanation from the king, who said that he was opposed to repeal, though a

**The
Rockingham
ministry,
July.**

**1766.
Repeal of
the Stamp
Act.**

repeal would be better than simple enforcement. What he wanted was modification. The ministers, however, went through with the bill for the repeal of the Stamp Act ; but accompanied it by a formal Declaratory Act asserting the legal power of the British parliament to impose taxation on the colonies. Pitt opposed the Declaratory Act, because he regarded any such taxation as unconstitutional, on the ground that the colonies were not represented. At the present day the meaning which is apt to be attached to the word representation is by no means the same as that attached to it a century and a half ago. The phrase ' No taxation without representation ' is now generally used as if it meant that only persons endowed with the franchise may legitimately be taxed. In 1765, only a fraction of the population of the British Isles enjoyed the franchise ; but both Pitt and Burke, the two most powerful and uncompromising advocates of the constitutional doctrine, would have claimed without hesitation that the members of parliament represented the masses as well as the electors. Even this form, however, of indirect representation was wanting to the American colonists. On Chatham's principle, no constitutional means could exist for compelling the colonies to contribute to the imperial revenue unless they sent representatives to Westminster. There were not wanting theoretical advocates of the inclusion of members for the colonies in the House of Commons. But when we observe that even at the present day one of the obstructions to all schemes of imperial federation is to be found precisely in the difficulty of retaining in one centre for parliamentary purposes representatives from the overseas dominions, and realise also how very much less difficult it would be to-day than in the days when George III. was king, the impracticability of such a solution at that time becomes convincing. The plain truth was that imperial obligations could not be enforced upon the colonies without ignoring the maxims on which the principles of political liberty had been formulated in Great Britain. The real truth, that the general principle holds good though the formula is not universally applicable, was really implied in the course taken

**The
Declaratory
Act.**

**The question
of repre-
sentation.**

by the government, of asserting the actual power of taxation as a right that could not be resigned, even at the moment of pronouncing that no such emergency had arisen as would alone warrant its exercise.

The repeal of the Act was accompanied by general rejoicings both in America and in England. But the harm had been done. **Failure of the repeal.** The whole principle of British control had really been dragged into the arena. Before Grenville's unfortunate measure, the practice which rested upon unbroken precedent would have been extremely difficult to challenge; now it invited investigation, criticism, repudiation. The repeal of the Stamp Act very soon lost the colour of a generous concession to sentiment, and was regarded in America as a victory, a concession wrung from the reluctant mother country, really because she did not dare to refuse it. The Declaratory Act merely meant that she would return to the attack whenever she felt it safe to do so. It is true that if the British parliament had continued to act in the spirit of the Rockinghams, the train which had been kindled might possibly have been quenched. But when a little later the British parliament deliberately provided fresh fuel, the good that had been done by the Rockinghams was distorted into evil.

Weak as the ministry was, its measures were continued upon sound lines. The question of general warrants was practically settled. The cider tax was repealed. Walpole's principles were applied to the recognised imposts at the American ports, and, a large reduction of duties diverted a great quantity of the contraband trade into legitimate channels, so that the customs receipts were greatly increased. Still the government was conscious of its own weakness, conscious of Pitt's hostility and the king's. It became known that Pitt was ready to take office without Temple, but also that he would insist on a reconstruction which would involve Rockingham's resignation. Rockingham wanted Pitt as an ally, but did not choose to retire in his favour; and in this he was supported by several of his colleagues. Others, including Grafton and Conway, were ready to sacrifice Rockingham

End of the Rockingham ministry, July.

to Pitt. In July the disintegration of the cabinet had gone so far that the king no longer hesitated, and he invited Pitt to form a new administration.

III. THE GRAFTON MINISTRY, 1766-1770

The hopes which had centred in the Great Commoner were destined to be grievously disappointed. Pitt's opportunity had come for forming a government which ignored party ties and connections. Edmund Burke described the result in his great speech on American taxation delivered some years later. There were Whigs of the Rockingham connection, personal followers of Pitt, King's Friends; men who had been scarcely on speaking terms with each other, men who were united by no common principles whatever. The group which remained definitely outside was the Bedford, together with one section of the Rockinghams. There was a general disposition to submit to Pitt's leadership, since every one knew that he was a giant amongst pigmies. But even pigmies dislike an ostentatious insistence upon differences of stature. Pitt was naturally arrogant and overbearing in manner, contemptuous of lesser men, the most difficult of colleagues. His natural deficiencies of temper and tact were aggravated by his sufferings from gout, which later prostrated him so completely that he became unable even to discuss business of any sort, however imperative. His great popular power had always been based upon the public conviction that he was entirely disinterested, a belief fully warranted by his refusal in the days when he was paymaster-general to appropriate the immense perquisites which, according to universal practice, fell to the holder of that office; yet his hold on the popular imagination had been slightly weakened when he accepted a title for his wife, though not for himself, on his retirement from office; and now his popularity suffered a serious blow when it was announced that he had accepted for himself the earldom of Chatham, and could no longer be idolised as the Great Commoner. Hitherto his strength

1766.
The new
ministry,
July.

The earl
of Chatham.

had lain in the mastery which his eloquence exercised over the House of Commons; that power vanished with his retirement to the House of Lords. All these circumstances combined to rob him of the supreme authority, both in parliament and with the nation outside parliament, upon which were based the calculations of all those who had anticipated his acceptance of office with enthusiasm. Even at a very early stage, his high-handed ejection from office of one of the Rockingham remnant caused the immediate resignation of those members of that section who were not personally attached to him, including Admiral Saunders, the able successor of Lord Anson at the Admiralty. The places of the ministers who resigned were taken chiefly by members of the group of King's Friends.

What Chatham might have accomplished if he had retained his physical and intellectual powers we can only guess. What **Chatham's intentions.** he intended to do we have means of judging. A ministry under his control would assuredly have dealt boldly and sympathetically with the grievances of the Americans. It is more than probable that Chatham and Clive between them would have brought the government of the territories newly acquired by the East India Company under the direct control of the Crown. It is likely that he would have taken in hand actively the Irish question, which a revival of the political spirit in that country was now pushing into a new prominence. It is certain that he contemplated a reform of representation in Great Britain, which would at least have reinforced the independent section of the electorate by adding to the number of the county members; for the counties were in the pockets neither of magnates nor of corporations. Quite certainly he would have devoted himself to the reorganisation of a European league, jealous of the recrudescence of danger from the revived Family Compact.

No single one of all these measures materialised in the hands of the ministry which bore at first the name of Chatham, and later that of the duke of Grafton. With only one of them was Chatham able even to make a beginning. The political combination which he sought to form was one of the whole group of

the Northern powers,—Russia and Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland. It was a combination which would have delivered Great Britain from her isolation, and would have checkmated the designs of the Bourbon powers, which were now possessed with the determination to fit themselves for a renewal of the contest with Great Britain. The scheme, however, was less obviously to the advantage of the other European powers concerned. There was one obstacle in the way which Pitt failed to surmount, and which, even if he had been able to prolong his efforts, he would probably have found insuperable. This was Bute's legacy, the unconquerable distrust of Frederick of Prussia. In Chatham himself Frederick had entire confidence; for Chatham he had the highest admiration. But he had learnt an unpleasant lesson. Five years ago Chatham had fallen when apparently in the zenith of his power. The result had been, from Frederick's point of view, a flagrant desertion of her obligations by Great Britain. The same thing might easily happen again. An alliance with Chatham was one thing; but the adoption of a policy which was likely to leave Prussia stranded as soon as the domination of Pitt's personality should cease, for whatever reason, did not commend itself to Frederick. He had no reason to fear hostility from France except on the ground of his being an ally of Great Britain. The friend he wanted was Catherine of Russia; the external object on which he was concentrating, apart from the business of recuperation and administrative organisation, which demanded his close and continuous attention, was the appropriation of Polish territory which isolated one part of his dominions from the rest. A partition of Poland satisfactory both to himself and to the Tsarina was to him a matter of greater importance than the resuscitation of dangerous Bourbon ambitions. Frederick rejected Chatham's overtures for a northern alliance; and what he refused to Chatham there was no faintest chance of his conceding to any one else.

It is to be observed, in connection with the whole outlook in European politics, that in 1765 the Emperor Francis, the husband

of Maria Theresa, died, and was succeeded in the imperial dignity by their son Joseph II., who was now also associated with his **Joseph II.** mother in the government of the direct Austrian dominion. Joseph was a man of ambitions, an idealist, an enthusiast with considerable intellectual endowment, to whom the Silesian question did not appeal as it had appealed to Maria Theresa ; consequently his appearance as a prominent actor on the political stage very materially modified the international antipathies and rivalries upon which continental diplomacy had turned since the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle.

Chatham accepted office and his peerage in the summer of 1766. Before three months of 1767 had passed, his gout had incapacitated him, and the heterogeneous ministry which he had collected was left to follow its hap-hazard way without a leader. Before the blow fell there had occurred an episode of some constitutional interest. At the end of September, when parliament was not in session, the government had by its own authority forbidden the export of corn, because two successive bad harvests had caused a serious shortage of grain, and forced the price up to forty-nine shillings—a rise which was accompanied by much distress and some bread riots. There was statutory power for imposing such an embargo when the price reached fifty-three shillings, but not before. No one as a matter of fact had any doubt that the prohibition of export was a necessary measure ; but when parliament met some six weeks later it was objected that ministers in such circumstances ought to have summoned parliament at once, instead of acting upon their own authority. Chatham himself took the straightforward ground that the circumstances had made immediate action imperative, without pretending that the course taken was strictly legal. But Lord Camden—formerly Chief-Justice Pratt—defended the government on the extremely injudicious plea that there had been nothing worse than ‘a forty days’ tyranny,’ an observation which, coming from a Whig, invited scathing comment from the Opposition ; and the dignity and prestige of the cabinet suffered.

**The Corn
Order in
Council,
September.**

The effacement of Chatham, still the nominal chief, at the end of March, virtually left the individual ministers to go their own way. The old difficulty of finding sources of revenue, the legacy of the war expenditure, was still active. Chatham had undoubtedly expected that the acquisition of Bengal could be turned to account by the imperial treasury. His disappearance left the control to colleagues who did not share his views, and could now act according to their own lights. The chancellorship of the exchequer had fallen to Charles Townshend, brilliant, witty, personally charming, but quite without ballast. Townshend proposed to raise the land tax from three shillings, at which it then stood, to four. A four-shilling land tax was regarded as a burden upon the land scarcely justifiable except in actual time of war. The landed interest threw out the money bill. Townshend at an earlier stage had boasted that he could raise from America a revenue sufficient for the maintenance there of the standing army. Defeated on the question of the land tax, he proposed to make good his boast; and, relying upon the Rockingham Declaratory Act, imposed customs duties at the American ports upon six articles—glass, paper, painter's colours, red and white lead, and tea. Only the last was of any serious commercial importance. To make the thing the more grotesque, Townshend's arrangement would have actually cheapened tea to the American consumer, because while threepence was to be paid at the American port, where nothing had been paid heretofore, there was a rebate of a shilling granted on the duty which had to be paid at the British port, through which the tea had to pass before it could go to America at all. If the imperial revenue gained, it would only be on the principle, which has often enough proved a sound one, that high duties defeat their own object, that low duties pay better, because of the multiplication of goods consequently passing through the Customs. The American would not suffer, because he would get his tea cheaper.

1767.
Chatham
in eclipse,
March.

Charles
Townshend.

The tax
on tea.

But the American would pay directly at the American port,

instead of indirectly at a British port. A tax was being imposed upon the American at American ports for the purposes of the **American** imperial revenue, and avowedly for those purposes; **indignation.** which was precisely the course of action which the Americans had denounced as being unconstitutional, although the Declaratory Act had taken the other point of view. It mattered nothing that the whole revenue expected to be raised was no more than £40,000; the colonists were once again given their chance of proclaiming that the fundamental principles of the British constitution had been violated, that when a principle was at stake it made no difference whether the sums involved were large or small. As long as the Declaratory Act was to be looked upon merely as a dead letter, a formal expression of a pious opinion only intended to save the face of the government, it had been allowed to pass. But here it was being brought into play without even the pretence of a necessity brought on by a grave emergency. That was sufficiently shown by the paltry amount which the tax was expected to raise. From the American point of view, the right of the government at Westminster to impose the tax at all must be flatly and uncompromisingly repudiated.

America was in a blaze of indignation at once. The latent spirit of antagonism to the assertion of the British ascendancy **Mutual** in any shape or form had not been destroyed by **irritation.** the repeal of the Stamp Act; even the overt expressions of satisfaction had been accompanied by a stolid resistance both in Massachusetts and in New York to the quartering there of British regiments in accordance with the Mutiny Act. The new measures by resuscitating the constitutional grievance prepared the way for translating the latent sentiment into an active energy. And in England the insufficiency of the American recognition of the concession made by the Rockinghams was already causing a revulsion of the feeling which had at first made the public favourably inclined towards the colonists.

Having done all the mischief he could Charles Townshend died in November. His place as chancellor of the exchequer was taken by Lord North (son of the earl of Guildford), a man

who regarded it as his first duty to carry out the king's wishes. Endowed with no great abilities and no keen insight, his kindness and good humour were entirely imperturbable, and no amount of abuse, however shrewdly directed, availed to penetrate his armour-plated placidity. It was his weakness, we are told, that his affections

**North
succeeds
Townshend,
November.**

over-rode his judgment, and he surrendered his own opinions to please those persons of whom he was fond. A vain effort had already been made by Grafton, when Chatham's incapacity had become too painfully manifest, to strengthen the government by a Rockingham alliance. An equally vain attempt had been made by Rockingham to form an alliance with the Grenville group, who saw that no partnership was possible so long as their views and those of the Rockinghams on the American question were flatly contradictory. Grafton was looked upon as the recognised head of the ministry, which was slightly modified in order to admit some members of the Bedford circle.

In America the new Act came in force in November. The Boston merchants at once renewed their non-importation agreements; and immediately after the New Year the Massachusetts assembly addressed a circular letter

**1768. Effects
in America.**

to the rest of the colonies emphasising the need of united action and successfully smoothing away obstacles to co-operation. As the year 1768 advanced the breach between mother country and colonies was widening. Governor Bernard at Boston complained that he had no authority, and could have none without a vigorous backing from home. In New York, where the two parties were equally balanced, the British or Tory party obtained a temporary ascendancy. In Boston there were riots, hardly checked by the arrival of a couple of regiments in September, although the appearance of two more in the following January (1769) prevented further disturbances for the time.

Meanwhile, there had been a general election early in the year in England. The government retained its solid majorities. In the early autumn the Bedford faction procured the dismissal of Shelburne, who, clinging to Chatham's views, was the one active member of the cabinet who was in clear opposition to its

American policy. The cloud which had settled down upon Chatham's powers was lifting. The administration of which he was nominally the head had discarded every feature of his own policy; a month after Shelburne's dismissal he expressed his disapproval by resignation. In December Bedford showed how blind ministers had become to counsels of moderation by moving for the revival of a long obsolete statute of Henry VIII. which would enable the trial of offenders in America to be transferred to the Law Courts in England. The proposal was only intended to frighten the colonists; as it was impossible to carry it out in practice, it merely had the effect of irritating them.

Virginia and Carolina associated themselves with New York and Massachusetts in the non-importation agreements. The effect of those agreements on British trade was so serious that the government, in 1768, attempted conciliation. Grafton, in fact, was half-hearted over the whole business, and wished to withdraw the new taxes altogether; but though Camden and Conway were with him they were outvoted in the cabinet. It was resolved that conciliation should be carried to the extent of dropping five of the six taxes and retaining that upon tea. Seeing that the number or importance of the taxes themselves was entirely beside the question, this astonishingly futile proposal had in the eyes of the colonists no colour of conciliation; it struck them merely as a feeble attempt at a pointless compromise dictated not by good-will but by weakness. The position was in no way strengthened by a letter addressed to the colonies by the secretary of state, Lord Hillsborough, announcing that government did not intend to impose any further taxes for revenue. The colonists pushed the advantage they seemed to have gained, and again in answer to the demands of Boston the government withdrew Governor Bernard and half the troops. The colonists became more convinced than ever that ministers were actuated only by their own weakness.

The plain truth was that Townshend's taxes had created an impossible position. The Stamp Tax had been imposed in one

**Changes in
the British
ministry.**

**1769. The
tea tax alone
retained.**

year, and repealed in the next without producing the impression of an unqualified surrender. The process could not possibly be repeated if the British government was to retain any show of authority at all; while on the other hand, the colonies could not submit even to the least of the new taxes without surrendering their whole case, or admitting that they were not strong enough to stand up for their rights. No sovereign less mighty than an Edward I. or an Elizabeth could have given to a withdrawal in such circumstances the colour of magnanimity, of an act of grace; for no British ministry would it have been possible except for one dominated by Pitt at the zenith of his prestige. For the colonies it was equally impossible to yield so long as they believed that they could make their resistance good. The feeble attempts at conciliation could only strengthen them in that belief.

By the summer of 1769 Chatham's health was restored. His hostility to the ministry was obvious. Grafton, who had drifted with his colleagues mainly from the lack of the vigour necessary to impose his leadership on them, found himself very much in disfavour with the great man whom it had always been his inclination to follow. Camden and others were encouraged to a more open dissent from their colleagues. It was not possible to form a united Opposition out of groups so diverse as the Rockinghams and Grenvilles, with their antagonistic views on the leading question of the day; yet their forces, combined with Chatham's personal following, could render the position of the government extremely uneasy. Other events, to be recorded below, had been taking place since the beginning of 1768 which were still more ominous for the government than its American troubles.

When parliament met in January 1770 it seemed extremely probable that the ministry would be overthrown. Nevertheless, when Chatham and Camden, himself still a member of the cabinet, opened the attack in the House of Lords, their amendment to the address was defeated by an overwhelming majority; and the address itself was carried in the Commons by almost two to one. So far as the Houses

**The
dilemma.**

**Reappear-
ance of
Chatham.**

**1770.
Resignation
of Grafton.**

were concerned, matters did not look as if ministers were likely to be defeated. Grafton, however, was conscious of his own weakness. Camden's conduct made it imperatively necessary that he should be dismissed. His dismissal was followed by the resignation of Granby and Dunning. Grafton could find no one to accept the vacated chancellorship except Charles Yorke, a son of the great Lord Chancellor Hardwicke. Yorke himself was only pressed into the service with extreme reluctance, which was so aggravated by the reproaches of his Rockingham associates that his acceptance of office was followed within three days by his death—possibly from natural causes, possibly, as popular rumour proclaimed, by his own hand. Grafton, despairing of the task of the cabinet reconstruction, resigned.

But George had no intention of submitting himself again to the Rockinghams or the Grenvilles, or to Chatham, whose whole views of the political situation were now opposed to his own in every respect. For some time past his will had really been the controlling force in the administration ; he believed that the time had come when he could dominate parliament altogether. He summoned North to form a new administration. North was ready to obey orders. The vacancies could be filled up from the King's Friends. The parliamentary majority was under control. North became official head of a government which took its orders from the king. It was not long before it became evident that the king's ten years' struggle for power had brought him a complete victory. With no ministers of ability even approximately first-rate, with all the richest talent of both Houses gathered in the Opposition, the king's will guided the destinies of the country for more than ten years disastrously but continuously, yet always with parliament as its instrument, and with ministers who commanded parliamentary majorities as its agents.

We must turn back, however, to review another series of events which had been taking place during the last two years, the revival of the contest with Wilkes and certain incidents on the Continent. The last may be briefly dealt with. Great Britain was too much taken up with private concerns to pay adequate

**Formation
of North's
administra-
tion.**

attention to what was going on in Europe. The island of Corsica had been for some time in subjection to the Genoese. The Corsicans revolted, sought to drive the Genoese out of the island, and under their leader Paoli appealed to Great Britain to deliver them, offering to place themselves under her dominion. Great Britain declined the offer, and on the other hand the Genoese, finding Corsica an exceedingly troublesome possession, ceded the island to France. Although Admiral Saunders and Edmund Burke, the one from a professional point of view, the other as perhaps the most clear-sighted politician of the time, both protested with energy, Britain allowed the transaction to pass. In 1769 Corsica became a French possession, and Napoleon Bonaparte was born a French subject.

**1769. French
annexation
of Corsica.**

The general election in the spring of 1768 brought Wilkes back to England, to which he had only paid a brief visit since his outlawry. Although still technically an outlaw, he stood for the city of London, which rejected him, and then for Middlesex, which returned him with a large majority. He at once made it obvious that he intended to revive his rôle of demagogue, a plan which would probably have been quietly scotched by the grant of a free pardon and the disregard by the government of any further advertisement on his part. Instead of this, the government chose to give him all the advertisement it could. Shortly after his election he surrendered to his outlawry. Acclaiming mobs accompanied him to prison, and wild riots were anticipated. Weymouth, one of the secretaries of state, who was almost as hostile to Wilkes as the king himself, had the troops ready to suppress violence; when riots actually broke out, the troops, after being roughly handled, fired on the mob, killing five men and wounding several more. To the Wilkites, of course, the incident was easily represented as a massacre. The mob's clamours for the liberation of the popular champion were not calmed when Lord Mansfield reversed the outlawry on a technical point, but pronounced sentence of a heavy fine and several months' imprisonment in respect of the charges for not answering to which Wilkes had originally been outlawed.

**1768. Wilkes
redivivus.**

Wilkes from prison issued, with libellous comments, for public edification, copies of the letter in which Lord Weymouth had instructed the magistrates to call in the military. When parliament met, Barrington, one of the King's Friends, moved that Wilkes should be expelled the House. The expulsion was carried, although it was pointed out that it was without any justification, except the old stories of which a new House of Commons had no business to take any cognisance. Wilkes was promptly re-elected for Middlesex. The House, not to be foiled, declared that the election was void, and that Wilkes was incapable of being elected to sit in the existing parliament. It was within the power of the House to expel or to unseat a member, but no one had ever before professed

The Middlesex elections. 1789. that it could of its own will pronounce any one incapable of election. Logically, the vote of the House involved the claim that a majority could forbid the election of any individual obnoxious to it. The electors of Middlesex who had chosen Wilkes objected to being disfranchised; they asserted their rights, and elected him the third time. Again the House annulled the election, and not without difficulty a new candidate, a Colonel Luttrell, a person of more notoriety than credit, was induced to present himself for election. For the fourth time Wilkes headed the poll with a huge majority; but the House ignored the votes which had been cast for him, and declared that Colonel Luttrell was duly elected.

Something over a twelvemonth had been passed in the struggle, and so far as the seat in the House was concerned the king had won a definite victory. But both he and the government had damaged themselves badly in the eyes of the public; the House of Commons itself had lost credit by its extravagant assertion of privileges for which there was no precedent, in defiance of the rights of electors. Wilkes himself, on the other hand, though he had lost his seat, had gained a much greater notoriety than he would ever have achieved on the floor of the House of Commons, and the power he was able to wield through his unbridled pen, in the character of a victim of oppression and a champion of popular liberties, was infinitely increased.

Effect of the battle.

Wilkes, moreover, had the satisfaction of recovering £4000 damages in the suit against Lord Halifax which had for so long a time been successfully evaded, and his extensive debts were paid off for him by subscribers who would never have dreamed of spending a penny for his benefit on his own merits. The city of London proceeded to give expression to the popular sentiment by electing him an alderman while he was still in prison. The third act of the play was to be played after the formation of North's ministry.

IV. INDIAN AFFAIRS, 1760-1770

When Clive left India in February 1760 the struggle with the French was already practically at an end. Twelve months afterwards Pondichery itself was in British hands; **The Peace** the Peace of Paris confirmed the victory and the **of Paris.** terms, which only allowed the French to retain trading stations in India on condition of maintaining no armed force and abstaining from every kind of political intervention. Except for a brief moment, some score of years afterwards, when a French squadron threatened to play a decisive part in the struggle between the British and the native power of Mysore, and again at the end of the century when Napoleon formed designs which never materialised, though the fear of them influenced British policy, France ceased to count as a factor in the story of the British advance in India. But British dominion, British ascendancy even, had not as yet been established except in a fraction of the Peninsula.

The British were indeed masters of Bengal and Behar—the Lower Ganges basin—from a point some way below Benares to the Bay of Bengal; yet in that great province **The British** they were without any true legal status. North **position.** of the river Krishna they were in occupation of the great belt of coast territory called the Sirkars, granted to them by the Nizam. The nawab of the Carnatic was their puppet; the Nizam at Haidarabad feared but did not love them, and except for his **fears** was quite independent of them. About Madras, and

about Bombay on the west coast, they owned but a very small patch of territory. There was no continuous land communication between the three areas, and no common subordination of the three governments or presidencies to any central authority on the spot. For the British had embarked unconsciously on the career which was to involve them in the gradual absorption of the Peninsula, most often involuntarily by the impelling force of circumstances, not rarely quite against their own wishes, sometimes, but seldom, with expansion as a deliberate aim. It may indeed be affirmed that in the whole series of governors-general all except two assumed office with the intention of refusing to be beguiled into any expansion of the company's territories; those two being Mornington and Dalhousie, both of whom started with a conviction that the extension of British control would be for the benefit alike of British and natives.

In 1760, however, there was no governor-general. Bombay stood apart; it had not yet been sucked into the political **No dominant power.** vortex. Madras managed or mismanaged its own affairs, irrespective of Bengal; Bengal, *mutatis mutandis*, did likewise, irrespective of Madras. And the native powers developed after the fashion of oriental dominions upon the ruins of the Mogul empire, accounting the development of the British power as merely another example of what was going on amongst themselves. Despite the awe inspired by Clive personally, the native potentates would probably have agreed that if any general empire succeeded that of the Moguls it would be that not of the British but of the Mahrattas, unless some new conqueror followed the footsteps of the old invaders through the Afghan passes.

At the moment of Clive's departure, the question between the Afghan and the Mahratta appeared to be on the point of settlement by dint of sword. For twenty years past **Mahrattas and Afghans, 1761.** Ahmed Shah, the Durani king of Kabul, had swept periodically over the north-west; though he had established his government over it only in the sense that a military viceroy collected tribute. On the other hand, the Mahrattas had been developing their national organisation

under the guidance of the great peshwa, minister, mayor of the palace, at Puna, Balaji Rao. The eyes of the Mahrattas were turned not to the European invader from the sea, but to the Asiatic invader from Afghanistan. It was from him that the empire was to be wrested. The gage was thrown down when the peshwa's brother, Ragonath Rao, marched into the north-west and mastered districts which the Afghan regarded as his own. In 1761, Ahmed Shah came down in his wrath ; from every quarter the Mahrattas gathered their hosts ; on the stricken field of Panipat their vast army was shattered to pieces. The campaign was said to have cost them two hundred thousand men. If the Durani had been anything more than a very brilliant fighting chief he could have made himself effective master of half India ; as it was he merely marched back to Afghanistan, leaving the north-west a prey to anarchy ; nor did any other Afghan invader thereafter appear as a competitor for dominion in India. But the victory of Panipat stemmed the tide of Mahratta expansion ; many years passed before the Mahratta power recovered from the blow which it then received. Another strong power was enabled to develop in the south, while the footing of the British was becoming more secure, and by the time that the Mahrattas were prepared to challenge the British as their rivals for a general supremacy the outcome of such a struggle was already a foregone conclusion.

The power which profited most from the overthrow of the Mahrattas at Panipat was that of the able and ambitious soldier Haidar Ali, who raised the comparatively insignificant kingdom of Mysore into a conquering military power. Mysore was one of those Hindu kingdoms which boasted a royal house some centuries old, but had been actually ruled for two or three generations by hereditary mayors of the palace. Haidar, a successful Mussulman captain of mercenaries, raised himself to the position of chief of the Mysore armies, whence it was an easy step to overturn the ruling raja, seize the control of the state, and hold it in the name of an incapable or infant representative of the royal house, and finally to drop all disguise, depose the legitimate monarch, and assert himself as

**Haidar Ali
of Mysore.**

sultan of Mysore. Long before he took this last step, however, Haidar had been persistently absorbing into the Mysore kingdom outlying territories of Mahratta chiefs, portions of the Nizam's dominions, and such minor principalities as were brought within striking distance by each advance he made.

Haidar was not only an exceptionally able soldier; he was also of an extreme shrewdness. He had no desire whatever to

Haidar and the British, 1761-70. challenge the British; it was not through contest with them that he hoped to extend his dominion.

When he did come into collision with them it was in consequence of a collision with the Nizam, who called the British to his aid. Madras, in fact, was drawn into a war with Mysore, which was brought to an end by a treaty in 1769; but in the course of that contest Haidar Ali formed from his experiences a very low estimate of the administrative and diplomatic abilities of the Madras government, without losing his respect for the abilities which might be displayed in the field by British officers in spite of the difficulties habitually placed in their way by the superior authorities. At the end of the decade, Haidar's attitude to the British was one of latent hostility, tempered by a desire to retain their goodwill for the sake of their support in conflicts with the Mahrattas, who were a more immediate menace to his ambitions than the British.

For by that time the Mahrattas, headed by Balaji's successor, Madhu Rao, had recovered from the shock of Panipat, had

Mahratta progress, 1760-70. re-established their ascendancy up to the Jumna and the Ganges, and virtually held in the hollow

of their hand the nominal sovereign of the Mogul empire. The check upon their further consolidation was born of their own internal dissensions, which generated among them what would have been called a civil war if such a term could be applied in a community so loosely organised.

Having described the general situation as it developed between 1760 and 1770, we can now turn to the specific field where in fact, though not in form, British dominion was most effectively planted, the province of Bengal and Behar.

Vansittart, the official chief whom Clive had left behind him

in Calcutta, was a well-meaning person ; but he entirely failed to control his subordinates. In fact, the officials of the company found themselves in an altogether unprecedented position. It was so easy to fill their pockets at the expense of the natives, and even incidentally of the company itself, that to the great majority of them the temptation proved irresistible. There was no one to call them to account, no native dared to resist them, and their own native agents made too much profit for themselves to be dangerous. Officially they claimed for the company a trading monopoly, and immunities from every kind of impost or restrictive regulation. Unofficially individuals claimed those rights for themselves. As servants of the company they were very badly paid ; it was understood that they could rectify deficiencies by a little private dealing. The natural consequences were that in Bengal they were more interested in accumulating wealth for themselves than in promoting the prosperity of the company. Officially the officers of the company were without any responsibility for the government ; they would neither rule themselves, not allow the native government to rule. The unfortunate Mir Jafar failed to satisfy the company's claims upon him, and was presently deposed in favour of his son-in-law Mir Cassim, who undertook to satisfy the company's demands.

Mir Cassim was both able and of an independent spirit. He set about a successful financial reorganisation, but at the same time he determined to rid himself of the British 1761-3. **The British in Bengal.** tyranny, and of the British monopoly. Still, in 1763. **Mir Cassim.** order to meet his obligations to the British until he could openly challenge them, he had recourse to the ordinary methods of extortion. Ellis, the head of the British factory which was now established at Patna, believed or imagined that the position there was in danger, and attempted to take forcible possession of the city ; thereupon the indignant nawab descended upon Patna, and seized the British residents. The Council of Calcutta declared war upon him, announced his deposition, and dispatched troops to Patna. Mir Cassim massacred his prisoners and fled into Oudh. Mir Jafar was restored to the titular nawabship,

but survived only a short time, and was succeeded on his death by a son who was a minor. From this time there was hardly any pretence of recognising the nawab's authority.

The Oudh nawab, Shujah Daula, incited by Mir Cassim, now made his last attempt to challenge the British. He prepared **1764. Buxar**, for an invasion. The company's troops were placed **October.** under the command of Major Hector Munro. The situation was dangerous, for resentment was running high; the sepoys were mutinous, and if they had revolted the handful of white men in Bengal might have been wiped out. Munro nipped mutiny in the bud by seizing the ringleaders and putting them to death by blowing them from guns—a form of execution not in itself cruel, but terrible to the Mohammedan soldier, because of his peculiar beliefs concerning his material resurrection in another life. Having crushed the mutiny, Munro marched against Oudh, and inflicted upon the nawab a decisive defeat at Buxar, between Patna and Benares. The battle in effect might have been to Oudh what Plassey was to Bengal. It placed the province at the mercy of the British. On the other hand, had Munro been defeated the British would in all probability have been driven out of Bengal. But the British did not take possession of Oudh; Buxar finally confirmed what had been won at Plassey, but it had the further effect of enabling Clive on his reappearance in India to transform Oudh, which had hitherto been a menace to Bengal, into a permanent defence, a barrier against aggression from the west.

The state of affairs in Bengal, the chaos of the administration, and especially of the finances, created so much perturbation at **1765. Clive** headquarters in London that the company took the **returns to** wise step of sending Clive out to India to take **India, May.** matters in hand. Buxar was fought and won in October 1764. In May 1765 Clive landed in India for the last time as governor, with virtually unlimited powers. Great as had been the services rendered by him in the past, no period in Clive's career is more honourable to him than that of his third sojourn in India. He had to 'cleanse the Augean stable,' to organise government, to lay down a policy for the future.

All that it was humanly possible for one man to do in the twenty months from May 1765 to January 1767 Clive did ; all that he did was right, and all that he did could have been done only by a man utterly fearless and indomitable, clear-headed and farsighted, acting with no thought save for the public good.

The Augean stable was cleansed. The root of the evil lay, first, in the absence of responsibility of the company ; secondly, in the position of the company's servants. Clive **Clive's reforms.** saw the immediate necessity of giving the company's servants a remuneration which should at least set them above the necessity of using their position as a means to enriching themselves by illegitimate methods. The company's servants were forbidden to trade privately, and were debarred from the practice, which had arisen naturally enough, and indeed inevitably, of receiving presents from the native magnates. The system was liable to such scandalous abuse that it had to be stopped. The civilians, shut out from their royal road to immense wealth rapidly acquired, were enraged, but their anger did not turn the governor a hair's-breadth from his course. Justice and common sense required that they should have legitimate compensation ; the valuable salt monopoly which had been conferred upon the company was appropriated by Clive to the provision of adequate salaries. In the earlier days the soldiers had rightly enough been granted double pay—'double batta' ; there was now no warrant for such expenditure, and Clive announced that double batta should cease. The officers, imagining that they were masters of the situation, promptly resigned. Clive was ready for that emergency, accepted the resignations, appointed fresh officers, and arrested the ring-leaders. The rest for the most part came to their senses and were then reinstated. The Bengal army was reorganised with an establishment of three thousand European troops and a proportionate number of sepoy regiments.

Clive realised that no government was possible in Bengal except that of the British themselves. He could not create a constitution ; but he procured for the company a **The Diwani.** legal status. The Mogul Shah Alam was still admittedly the

legal sovereign of all India, although he was actually little better than a refugee at the court of the Oudh wazir. In August 1765 Clive made a formal agreement with Shah Alam by which the Mogul conferred upon the company the *diwani* of Bengal and Behar; the official authority, that is, to collect and administer the revenues of the provinces. At the same time, he obtained from the Mogul a formal cession of the Sirkars, the provinces which had already been granted by the Nizam, who was technically only one of the Mogul's viceroys. The continuity of British territory was almost completed by an agreement with the Mahratta Berar raja, who was in possession of Orissa between Bengal and the Sirkars. Proprietary rights in Orissa, technically called 'zemindari' rights, were ceded, Clive agreeing on behalf of the company to pay the *chauth* or tribute claimed by the Mahratta chief. By the treaty with Shah Alam the company acquired a definite status as a territorial power, under the Mogul, and holding its authority from him.

At the same time a step was taken which associated the company still more intimately with the supreme authority. **Clive's Oudh policy.** After Buxar the British had retained the districts of Allahabad and Korah, a portion of Oudh which was of great strategic importance. Clive now recognised Shujah Daula as sovereign of Oudh under the Mogul, and restored the Allahabad district to Oudh, with the proviso that it was to be handed over to Shah Alam himself. Clive had seen all along that extensive and almost unlimited conquest was possible; but he was also satisfied that it would be an immense blunder. To organise government in the regions already acquired was a task more than sufficient for the capacities of the company. The annexation of Oudh would have been according to oriental ideas an entirely legitimate consequence of the battle of Buxar. Clive's insight recognised that Oudh as a strong and friendly state interposed between Bengal and the western Mahrattas would be much more valuable than as an extra British province easy to conquer but difficult to hold and to govern. The maintenance of Oudh as a buffer state became from Clive's time an integral portion of British policy; and almost the one merit

of the Oudh dynasty was its consistent loyalty to the relations established in 1765.

Similarly, in Clive's view it was the business of Madras to maintain the Nizam at Haidarabad as a friendly power interposed between the British and the Mahrattas. The Berar raja, whose domain interposed as a wedge between the Ganges and Madras areas, was to be treated in a friendly spirit so as to prevent the possible concentration of Mahratta energies upon hostility to the British.

**The Nizam
and the
Bhonala.**

These were the broad lines of the policy laid down by Clive. Nevertheless when he left India for the last time at the beginning of 1767 he had not been able to complete his work **After Clive.** by creating a fully organised government of Bengal; he left the presidencies without any common central authority nearer than London; some of his work was actually undone by the directors, and the Council in Bengal still failed to act up to their responsibilities. The company's servants continued to be inadequately paid; the salt monopoly was in part diverted from the objects to which he had assigned it, and consequently the company's servants continued to engage in private trade and to receive presents. The company did not organise the revenue department, but left the management of it to native officials, with only a very perfunctory supervision by European officers. The army was entirely under the control of the British; but they made no attempt to take upon themselves the administration of justice. The company continued to find that its own profits fell very far short of its anticipations. The Madras authorities blundered over their treatment of the Nizam and of Haidar Ali. The portentous misrule of the years between 1760 and 1765 was not indeed repeated; the worst of its features had been removed; but misrule and mismanagement still prevailed to such an extent that in the next decade the British parliament found intervention necessary, and the peculiar policy which it adopted had the effects that we shall see in following the career of Warren Hastings.

V. IRELAND: TO 1770

In earlier chapters we have remarked upon the pitiful state of prostration to which Ireland was reduced after her resistance **A survey.** to the Revolution had been crushed. Never at any period of her history had she experienced quiet and firm government, equal laws enforced with an even hand, justice dispensed as a matter of course. Always, since the reign of Henry II. in England, the supreme authority in the island had been the deputy of a foreign prince; exercising, for some centuries, an alien control within a limited area, outside of which the central government could only make its existence felt after a very spasmodic fashion. Under the Tudors the English supremacy had gradually asserted itself all over the island, which was partly colonised by adventurers who were apt to treat the native Irish as outer-barbarians. The colonisation was renewed by the plantation of Puritan soldiery upon the soil. The climax was reached when after the Revolution the penal laws deprived the Catholics, who were three-fourths of the population, of every semblance of political liberty, all but disqualified them from owning property, and denied them the power of educating their children, except as Protestants. Through the first half of the eighteenth century the prostration was complete; nor did it apply only to the Catholic population. The Nonconformists, chiefly Presbyterian, who formed so large a proportion of the whole Protestant population, especially in the north, suffered from the same political disabilities as their brethren in England. Full political rights were consequently enjoyed only by a fraction of the whole population; and even those rights fell a long way short of the rights of the free electorates in Great Britain.

It is unnecessary here to recapitulate the social grievances under which the Roman Catholics suffered as Roman Catholics. **The political conditions.** They were powerless to act, almost powerless to complain. In the political field, Catholics were excluded, Protestant Nonconformists were partially disabled; seats in the legislature and all administrative offices were confined

to one small class. But further, the functions of the legislature itself were limited, and the administration was not responsible to it as had come to be the case in England. The Irish parliament had no power either to initiate or to amend legislation; it could only suggest. If its suggestions, known as 'heads of bills,' were approved by the Privy Council of Great Britain, that body drafted a bill based upon them, but modified to suit its own views, and such bill was then introduced in the Irish parliament to be accepted or rejected as it stood. The Irish parliament in itself was not only, as concerned the Commons, elected on a very limited franchise out of a still more restricted number of eligibles; all the evils of the electoral system in Great Britain were still more rampant in the sister island. Numbers of constituencies returned their members at the dictation of a small number of magnates; other seats were frankly purchasable. In England, the current prices for purchasable seats at the general election of 1768 ranged from £1000 to £5000. Irish prices were not so high, because the demand was less keen; but the same system prevailed with the same shamelessness. In fact, however, it was not till the closing years of the reign of George II. that there were any signs in Ireland of an active revival of political interest.

The third of the permanent outstanding grievances of Ireland was that of her agricultural and industrial conditions. With the exception of the linen trade, all her industries, **Industry** apart from the land, were deliberately suppressed, **and the land.** throttled, if not actually prohibited, in order to prevent competition with the trade of Great Britain—or rather of England, since the policy in its completeness dated from a time long before the Union with Scotland. Virtually the population were compelled to subsist upon the soil, because apart from the soil there was no occupation by which they could make a living. From the soil rightly turned to account a living could have been made; but it was not rightly turned to account. Almost the whole of the land was owned by big Protestant landlords, of whom a large proportion had estates in England and were habitual absentees. Those big landlords had no personal interest in their estates or

in the people who lived upon them ; the estates were merely properties from which they expected to derive a substantial and secure income, and were leased to tenants, usually at not unreasonable rates. But the tenants sublet their holdings, and subtenants sublet them again, habitually at rack rents, that is, at the highest rent they would fetch ; so that the actual occupier paid—when he did pay—more than the soil could possibly afford. The peasant, having nowhere else to turn to, was in effect bound to the soil on whatever terms his immediate landlord chose to be satisfied with. The occupiers had nothing to spend ; or if having anything they spent it on the land, they were promptly called upon to pay increased rents. The situation was aggravated by the development of grazing and enclosures, the appropriation of common lands—as in England under the Tudors—which had formerly helped to provide means of subsistence, and the appropriation of large tracts to the breeding of sheep and cattle instead of to cultivation. There was thus virtually no employment for the agricultural labourer ; the peasant was the cottier with a potato patch ; the land which was not leased to cottiers at rack rents was taken up by the graziers who found the business more profitable than agriculture, and if they were Roman Catholics had a better chance of retaining in their own hands more than the third of the actual profits, which was all that the law allowed them. The peasant had no remedy at law, first because he could not afford to appeal to the law, and, secondly, because all those who administered the law belonged to the class against whom the appeal would be made. In the eyes of the peasant the law itself was the oppressor ; and wherever that is the case the popular conscience is on the side of the law-breaker.

About the beginning of the reign of George III. the popular hostility to the law began to organise itself. Its motive was **Whiteboys**. neither political nor religious, but was definitely agrarian. The first objects of the attack were enclosures and enclosers, and the unfortunate cattle, to make room for which human beings had been thrust on one side. Bands of marauders, known as ‘Whiteboys,’ from the white shirts and cockades

which they wore, broke down enclosures, houghed cattle, and took condign vengeance on any one who sought to interfere with their proceedings. In a very short time it was found that the law was powerless against them, because no evidence was procurable, whereas any one who disobeyed their behests very promptly paid the penalty. The 'Whiteboys' were the first of those agrarian organisations which for considerably more than a century made it their business to set the law at defiance. They rose in the south and west, where Protestants were comparatively few; but it seems clear that there was no definite connection between Catholicism and the agrarian movement.

The political inertia was intensified by the fact that there was no law limiting the life of a parliament. The parliament summoned at the beginning of the reign of George II. **The** was the parliament which was still in being when **Undertakers.** he died. The mere fact that the accession of a new king entailed the summoning of a new parliament provided at last an outlet for the dissatisfaction which had long been simmering. The ordinary government of the country was carried on not by the lord-lieutenant, who usually spent only six months out of two years in Ireland—the period during which the Irish parliament was also sitting—but by the group of influential magnates who were known as the 'Undertakers,' the Irish equivalent of the 'Whig connection' in England. In some respects therefore there is a clear parallelism between the constitutional struggle in England in the first decade of George III.'s reign and the parliamentary contest which arose in Ireland. Just as George sought to break up the 'Whig connection' which paralysed him in England, so he sought to break up the power of the Undertakers in Ireland. As the Whigs stood for the principles of the Revolution in antagonism to any increase in the powers of the Crown, so the Undertakers stood for the principle of self-government. But the Undertakers' self-government and the Whig principles of liberty meant to each the domination of a narrow oligarchy; and so in the one country Chatham was as zealous to break up the 'Whig connection' as the king himself,

and in the other country there was a popular party hostile to the Undertakers.

The signs of resurgent political activity were at once apparent. The new Irish parliament was prompt to assert the British doctrine that money bills could originate only in the House of Commons; sound constitutional doctrine for Great Britain and the parliament of Great Britain, but, like the American claim that taxation and representation are inseparable, not readily to be conceded to His Britannic Majesty's subjects outside of Great Britain. For some years the English Privy Council persisted in sending money bills to Dublin, which the Dublin parliament rejected, substituting money bills of its own. The Irish parliament clamoured for a Septennial bill to rectify one of the many parliamentary anomalies; and it clamoured for a Habeas Corpus Act of which England had enjoyed the benefit for the better part of a century. It could get neither.

Pitt between 1761 and 1766 had shown sympathy with the demands of the Irish as he had sympathised with the attitude of the Americans. But whatever his plans for 1767. A new departure. Ireland may have been when he was called to the head of the government in 1766, they were wrecked by the breakdown of his health. In 1767 a change was inaugurated on which George himself had for some time been insisting, chiefly no doubt with a view to diminishing the power of the Undertakers. Lord Townshend, the brother of Charles Townshend, himself the original ally of Pitt in the introduction of the Militia Bill, and afterwards one of Wolfe's brigadiers in the Quebec campaign, was sent to Ireland as viceroy, with the novel condition that he was to remain in constant residence. The new rule was ominous for the Undertakers, but it was at least calculated to imply that the lord lieutenant would treat his functions seriously. The intention was conciliatory, because George was contemplating an increase of the standing army in Ireland, to be paid for out of Irish resources; not because Ireland needed an increased standing army—it had remained undisturbed during the 'Forty-five and the Seven Years' War—but because George wanted

more troops, and his subjects in Great Britain would object to being asked to pay for them.

The new viceroy seemed likely to be personally popular; moreover he gave out that favourable consideration was being given to the more pressing demands of the Irish— **Cross security of tenure for the judges, a Septennial Bill, purposes.** and a Habeas Corpus Act. Also there was to be an end of the distribution of pensions, by which, in Ireland as in England, the government had been in the habit of buying support. The Irish parliament promptly passed what were called 'heads of bills' (the form taken by their suggestions for legislation), applying to Ireland the English rule that the judges should be removable on addresses from the two Houses of parliament. The English Privy Council, however, had no intention of granting such power to the Irish parliament. They required that the Irish Privy Council should join in any address for the removal of the judges, and that the judges should also be removable upon addresses from the parliament of Great Britain. That was not what the Irish parliament wanted, and the bill was at once thrown out. Irritation, not conciliation, was the outcome.

It became the more imperative to allay the popular feeling by meeting the demand for limiting the duration of parliament. A period of eight years was substituted in the bill for the seven years of the parliament of Great Britain, **The Octennial Act. 1768.** because the Irish parliament only sat for six months in alternate years. The measure had the desired effect of calming public feeling; still the Octennial Act did not suffice to reconcile the Irish parliament to the army augmentation. The army bill was defeated, though only by a small majority. The life of the parliament having expired under the new Act, there was a general election: Townshend found himself better supported in the new parliament. Nevertheless the refusal in England of a Habeas Corpus Bill met with prompt retaliation in the rejection of a money bill sent over from England; on the old plea that money bills ought to originate in the Irish House of Commons. Satisfied with this assertion of its own rights, the Irish parlia-

**Close of
Townshend's
administra-
tion.**

ment proceeded to vote supplies on its own account, and to show its goodwill by passing the Augmentation Bill. The particular object of conciliation having thus been attained, the parliament was immediately prorogued. The expectation that its compliance would be rewarded by further concessions was bitterly disappointed. Still, through a reversion to the evil practice of corruption by the distribution of pensions and places, Townshend was able to secure an actual majority when the Houses again met in 1771. In short, the method by which George had at last achieved his ascendancy in England was repeated in Ireland; corruption by the Crown was to defeat the Undertakers as it had defeated Newcastle and the Whig connection.

CHAPTER VIII. THE KING AND LORD NORTH

I. BEFORE THE STORM, 1770-1775

THE repeal of the American duties was carried in parliament under Lord North's auspices in March 1770. Precisely at that time irritation in Boston, which had taken the form **1770. A lull in America.** of mobbing the soldiers whose numbers had been reduced, led to an affray in which a few soldiers who had been attacked fired upon their assailants, five of whom were killed and some others wounded. A Boston jury tried the case with perfect fairness and virtually acquitted the soldiers; nevertheless the 'Boston Massacre' became a convenient text for agitators. The announcement that the tax on tea was to be retained destroyed whatever beneficial effects might have been anticipated from the repeal of the other duties; and although the non-importation agreements broke down except in respect of tea, and there was a lull in the active displays of antagonism to the government, that antagonism was sedulously kept alive and took an increasingly firm hold upon the minds of the Americans. For a time, however, public attention in Great Britain was withdrawn from the colonial question, which was commonly supposed to be smouldering out.

Some excitement was created by foreign affairs, which for a moment seemed likely to involve Great Britain in another war. The French annexation of Corsica had been received **1769-71. The Falkland Islands.** with British remonstrances, which were so palpably intended not to materialise in action that France and Spain began to feel confident that no vigour was to be expected from the British ministry. Both those countries had for some time been devoting themselves steadily to reconstructing their fleets; while the British fleet had been seriously

neglected in spite of the considerable sums which had been voted for its maintenance. In 1764 and 1765 the French and the British had occupied respectively the two islands of the Falkland group in the neighbourhood of the Straits of Magellan. The French then handed over their island to Spain. In 1769 a small Spanish squadron laid claim to the British island, a claim disputed by the captain of a British warship. Both sides agreed to refer the question to their respective governments, but in the interval the Spaniards took possession, going so far as to detain another British warship for some time. Manifestly Spain was reckoning upon French support and intended her action to be a challenge. The British ministry, however, at once made it perfectly clear that, however unimportant the islands themselves might be, the Spanish methods would not be tolerated. Louis did not intend to go to war, and dismissed Choiseul, who probably did. The Spaniards, left to themselves, were not at all prepared for a duel, and gave way on all points at the beginning of 1771. There was temporary activity in the dockyards and in the recruiting of additional sailors. Still the government failed to produce the impression that they were likely to conduct a vigorous foreign policy.

From their own or from a purely British point of view, however, they could not be blamed for their inaction, when during 1772. the next year Frederick and Catherine began the
The first partition of Poland. business of partitioning Poland by appropriating the provinces which each of them particularly desired. Neither Russia nor Prussia was a power whose aggrandisement was likely to injure Great Britain, and both were more likely to check than to advance the power of the allied Bourbons. In fact, nothing but an abstract objection to political brigandage would have warranted protest or interference; the victim, Poland, fulfilled no useful function as an independent state, and no one would have been disposed to protect her except from motives of self-interest. So a great part of Poland was partitioned for the first time, Austria taking her share as the third power whose boundaries marched with those of the despoiled kingdom.

In the English parliament, interest again centred in matters connected with John Wilkes. The Middlesex election had forced into special prominence the anomalous character of some of the powers of the House of Commons in dealing with elections. It made conspicuous, what every one had known for a long time, that whenever election questions came before the House they were made the subject of a simple party vote instead of being dealt with on their merits. There was no question, nor had there been any since the days of James I., that the House of Commons was the only body which possessed authority to deal with such matters, and the practical result was, that the majority in the House was frequently able to add to its own numbers and to over-ride the choice of constituencies by unseating a member. There was hardly a pretence of listening to the evidence in cases of election petitions; the majority of the Commons voted in favour of the candidate who belonged to their own party. To George Grenville, who was in effect leader of the Opposition in the representative chamber, belongs the credit of procuring the Act which delegated the decision on election petitions to a committee of fifteen sworn to give judgment in accordance with the evidence. Grenville, who was already suffering from mortal disease at the time when he was planning and carrying the Act, died very shortly after it was passed.

The city of London, which had chosen Wilkes for one of its aldermen, and for its lord mayor Beckford, a violent partisan of Chatham, was vehement in its advocacy of the cause of the members whom the House had refused to admit. It attacked the government and the king with remonstrances couched in language which was conspicuously unseemly, though by no means unwarrantable. But Chatham failed to procure the support of the Rockinghams when he supported the demand of the city for a dissolution. The ill-feeling in the city was further exemplified in the battle which was now in progress for the freedom of the press. For half a century past the House of Commons had been in the habit of asserting its privileges by attacking criticisms of its proceedings

**The city
and the
government.**

in the public press as scurrilous and seditious libels, and by persistent efforts to prevent the publication of its debates. In fact, while criticism was of an extremely malignant character, as exemplified, for instance, in the savage invective of the *Letters of Junius*, there was a feeling that the Law Courts were being

1770. used for the punishment of libels on behalf of govern-
Juries and ment, and with the real intention of prohibiting free
libels. comment. Great excitement therefore was caused

when, upon a prosecution of a bookseller for selling the unknown Junius's *Letter to the King*, Mansfield as Lord Chief-Justice laid it down that the jury had to decide only on the fact of publication, not on the question whether the matter published was libellous, that being the judge's affair. It would appear that in this vexed question, legal opinion recognises that Mansfield's interpretation of the law was sound. But the immediate effect was to cause juries to ignore evidence and decline to convict. It was not till twenty years later, however, that the right of the jury to decide on the character of the libel was established by an Act of parliament at the instance of Charles James Fox. Chatham supported by Camden demanded a declaratory Act to that effect in 1771; but their motion found practically no support.

The publication of debates in the Houses of parliament was unquestionably a breach of privilege. In the days when freedom
Publication of speech within the walls of parliament would have
of debates. been seriously hampered if the individual utterances of members had been reported outside, the secrecy of debates was almost a necessity. Those days, however, were long past. The public wanted to know what was said in parliament, and the prohibition did not prevent the publication of reports which could never be called authentic and were often flagrant misrepresentations; the writers whereof sheltered themselves under the transparent pretence that their accounts of parliamentary proceedings were not and did not purport to be anything but fiction, or at most the embodiment of rumours. On a member complaining of one of these reports, the House ordered the arrest of the printers. The press took the matter

up, and its comments led to the arrest of half a dozen more printers, in spite of the determined opposition of Burke and other members of the parliamentary Opposition. Then the city magnates played their part. Two of the arrested printers were promptly discharged when brought before Aldermen Oliver and Wilkes, on the ground that there was no crime charged against them. A third, on being arrested by a messenger of the House, gave the messenger in charge for assault. Lord Mayor Crosby—Beckford was now dead—discharged the printer, Miller, and held the messenger to bail. The House summoned Crosby and Oliver as members, and also Wilkes, to attend. Wilkes refused to attend except as member for Middlesex. The House did not venture to cross swords with him again, but Crosby and Oliver were committed to the Tower, where they were ostentatiously visited by several of the Opposition leaders. The House had scored a technical victory, but at such cost to its own prestige that it did not again venture to challenge public opinion, which so manifestly resented its attitude that there was no further interference with the publication of debates, though in this case also a long time elapsed before such publications were formally sanctioned.

1771.
**The House
and the
aldermen.**

The king and queen were models of connubial propriety: unfortunately the same thing could be said of hardly any other prince of the House of Hanover. Scandals in connection with the marriages of George's two younger surviving brothers, the dukes of Cumberland and Gloucester, brought about the Royal Marriages Act of 1772: an Act by which no marriage can be legally contracted by any member of the royal family without the consent of the sovereign, before the age of twenty-six, or after that age without a year's notice to the Privy Council, enabling parliament to forbid such marriage if it thinks fit to do so. The bill was opposed, as claiming for the Crown and the royal family a distinctive position for which there was no historical justification; a position consonant with continental ideas of royalty, but not with those of Great Britain. The real significance of the measure, however, lies in

**Royal
Marriages
Act, 1772.**

the fact that from it dates the growth of the antagonism between the king and Charles James Fox, Henry Fox's son ; a young man who had hitherto supported the king and the king's government, of which he was destined to be the most fiery opponent.

In the same year inquiries were on foot as to the position of the East India Company ; inquiries which had momentous

**1772. The
East India
Company's
tea.**

results with regard to India itself, but which also had an incidental influence on the progress of affairs in America. It is only to this particular aspect of the matter that we advert at this point. The

company was in serious financial straits. To relieve those straits it was desirable to facilitate the sale of the immense stock of tea in its warehouses. To that end it was resolved that the whole of the duties payable at the British ports should be returned by way of drawback on re-export ; the drawback previously allowed on re-exportation to America having been three-fifths of the whole amount. It was in consequence of this rearrangement that three ships carrying consignments of tea arrived at the harbour of Boston in December 1773.

In the meantime American dissatisfaction instead of smouldering out had remained very much alive. It was true that the

**America :
the Gaspee.**

non-importation agreements in general had been dropped ; but what we should now call the boycott

of tea had been stubbornly maintained. In 1772 a royal schooner, the *Gaspee*, employed in the preventive service, having run upon some shoals, was boarded and burnt ; and the perpetrators remained undiscovered, though their identity must

**1773. The
Hutchinson
letters.**

have been widely known. In 1773 the breach was widened by the publication in America of a number of letters which had passed some years before

between Governor Hutchinson of Boston, Bernard's successor, the Chief Justice Oliver, his brother-in-law, and Whately, George Grenville's private secretary in London. Hutchinson and Oliver, both supporters of the British government, had expressed their views of the situation with the natural freedom of private correspondence, in terms which, when made public, excited the intense indignation of the Americans. Demands were at once

formulated in strong language for their removal, although it could not be said that there had been any actual impropriety in the letters, viewed as entirely unofficial communications. On the other hand, the publication aroused a corresponding storm of indignation in England, because it implied a gross breach of honour on the part of some one. That correspondence had on Whately's death come by some unknown channel into the hands of Benjamin Franklin in London. According to the British point of view, Franklin, who had sent the letters to America, must have known that they would be published in spite of his own formal instructions to the contrary, and his connivance at their publication was utterly inexcusable in view of the circumstances under which they had come into his hands. Franklin accepted the responsibility for what he had done, and when the petitions for the removal of Hutchinson and Oliver were laid before a committee of the Privy Council a violent attack was made by the solicitor-general, Wedderburn, upon Franklin, who never forgave the insults to which he listened with an unmoved countenance.

In the midst of the excitement over the Hutchinson letters the East India Company's tea ships arrived in Boston harbour. Vessels dispatched to other ports had not been **The Boston** allowed to unload, and took their departure: at **tea-party.** Boston the consignees of the tea were the governor's sons; the governor forbade the ships to leave until the duty on the tea had been paid. On 16th December a great meeting was held, energetic speeches were delivered, and when the meeting broke up large crowds gathered at the docks; where a party of some fifty men, arrayed as Red Indians, boarded the ships and pitched all the tea chests overboard. The proceedings were conducted without other violence, to the applause of the crowd. A much more outrageous, if a much less impressive, expression of the popular feeling occurred six weeks later when a preventive officer was tarred and feathered.

Temper was rising in England as well as in America. The popular sympathy, which had been extended to the colonies and had applauded the repeal of the Stamp Tax eight years

before, had long been alienated, and there is no doubt that the British public at large was entirely in favour of penalising the colonists who set the law at defiance. General Gage, **1774. Penal measures.** the governor of New York, reported his opinion that firmness would soon restore order. The king and his ministers determined upon coercion, and in March 1774 a series of coercive measures was introduced. In Massachusetts the government was removed to Salem from Boston ; the port of Boston was to be closed until the town made compensation to the East India Company for the tea they had destroyed. A second bill suspended the Massachusetts charter, increased the powers of the governor and the nominated council, and prohibited town's meetings. A third bill removed trials on capital charges for acts done in the execution of the law to Great Britain or Nova Scotia. A fourth provided for the quartering of troops in the colony. All the bills were passed by overwhelming majorities in both Houses, despite the opposition of Burke and Chatham. From prudential rather than conciliatory motives Hutchinson was recalled, and Gage, who retained his appointment as commander-in-chief, was made governor of Massachusetts.

Such stringent measures would doubtless have been effective if the Americans had not already committed themselves to the struggle with their whole souls. Undoubtedly **American feeling.** there was a party which was deliberately directing American sentiment towards separation ; but probably the majority of Americans, like George Washington, did not desire separation unless they should find that it was the only condition upon which they could retain what nearly all Englishmen, placed in the same position, would have called their liberties. But on that head American opinion was solid, if not unanimous ; there was to be no surrender. The loyalists, the Tories as they were called, were comparatively a small minority, and were subjected at least to social persecution. The feeling had taken too deep a root to be stamped out by any coercive measures ; and it was curiously intensified by the one entirely commendable Act which was passed in 1774, an Act dealing not with any of the thirteen colonies, but with Canada.

There was in Canada only an exceedingly small British and Protestant population, numbering perhaps about one in two hundred of the whole. The French had not been **Canada** dispossessed ; they remained in occupation of their lands and in full enjoyment of religious liberty, in accordance with the terms of the cession. The English language, however, and the English laws had been enforced ; the government was what we may call the government of a Crown colony ; in which the population had no share—no grievance as far as they were concerned, since they had been equally without a share in it when they were French subjects. The British settlers, however, began to demand an Assembly, which, on the principle of excluding Roman Catholics in accordance with the law in England, would merely have meant the establishment of a small British oligarchy in the midst of a large French population, in the place of Crown government ; while the French population was restive under the imposition of English laws and customs in place of those to which it was attached both by habit and by national feeling.

It was upon the advice of the governor, Sir Guy Carleton (afterwards Lord Dorchester), that the Quebec Act was introduced to reorganise the government of the colony. **1774. The** The Act provided that the old tithes and dues **Quebec Act** should continue to be paid to the Roman Catholic clergy, Protestants being exempted from such payment. The French civil law and the English criminal law were to be established. There was not to be an elective assembly ; but there was to be a legislative council nominated by the Crown, while taxation was to be the function of the British parliament.

The Quebec Act aroused fresh alarm in the colonies, partly because it displayed no tendency towards popular government, but insisted upon the powers of the Crown, partly **Its effect in** because it not only recognised but re-endowed **the Colonies.** the Roman Catholic Church. New England and the northern colonies had the Puritan tradition ingrained in them ; in the southern colonies the tradition was that of the Cavaliers, but of the Cavaliers who had carried the Test Act—anti-Romanist no less than anti-Puritan. It is curious to observe that in Eng-

land a measure so emphatically liberal on the religious side was warmly approved by the party which was so thoroughly illiberal in its treatment of the Americans, and was denounced by Chatham and the Whigs on the basis of the Whig tradition of 'no popery.' Even the 'no popery' cry, however, failed to arouse any strong popular hostility to the measure in England, and the Quebec Act was duly passed. It was not only in itself a wise measure; it also secured the unswerving loyalty of the Canadian population in the troubles to come.

In England, no one believed that the Americans would fight. It was anticipated that the resistance in Massachusetts would be easily put down, and that the rest of the colonies would give it no support. Boston port was duly closed on 1st June, and no direct resistance was offered at the moment. But it was only because the resolution of the colonists was to take a more formidable and impressive shape than that of sporadic attacks upon the military. The sense of unity, of the common interests of the colonies, had at last become a reality. Only Massachusetts had been penalised; but the other colonies recognised that the quarrel was their own. Among them Virginia took the lead. Her assembly of burgesses decreed that 1st June, the day of the closing of Boston port, should be set apart as a day of fasting and intercession. When the governor dissolved the assembly, its members continued their meetings, and agreed that a general congress should be summoned. In Massachusetts more than half of the members of the executive council, now nominated by the Crown instead of being elected by the assembly, refused appointment. From all over the country supplies poured in to the Bostonians whose port had been closed.

One after another, the colonial assemblies gave their adhesion to the proposal for a Continental Congress, which met at Philadelphia on 5th September. Of the thirteen colonies Georgia was the only one that was not represented. George Washington, who was one of the delegates, still believed that no one desired separation in itself. But the resolutions of the Congress offered no hope of a com-

**The
Continental
Congress,
September.**

promise being accepted. It was pronounced that all Americans should support Massachusetts in resisting the penal acts. A non-importation agreement was adopted. The repeal of the five Acts was demanded. A Declaration of Rights was drawn up detailing the unconstitutional treatment to which the colonists had been subjected, after the precedent of 1688. It was resolved that the Congress should again assemble in the following May, that the Canadians should be invited to send delegates, and that in the meantime a petition to the king and an address to the people of Great Britain should be sent to England. At the same time the loyalty of the colonies to the Crown and the empire was emphatically affirmed.

While Congress discussed, Massachusetts was acting on its own account. Gage cancelled the writs for the Assembly which should have been summoned in October; but the **Massa-** elections were held and its members transacted **chusetts.** business, under the name of the 'Provincial Congress,' as if they had been a legally appointed assembly. They organised a militia, who were known as the 'minute men' because they were to be ready to meet at a minute's warning. Officers were appointed, a committee of supplies, and a committee of safety. In response to their appeal, other colonies began to form similar military bodies. New York was the only one of the colonies which dissociated itself from the proceedings of Congress.

In England there was a dissolution, and a new parliament was summoned to meet on 30th November. George was satisfied to find that his majority in the House of Commons **England bent** was larger than before. The ministers and the **on coercion.** nation had gone too far to recede now, even had they been disposed to do so. Burke, Chatham, and the rest of the Opposition still in effect proclaimed that the Americans were in the right, that the obnoxious Acts were in themselves unjustifiable and ought to be repealed; but neither the ministers nor the nation would listen to such arguments. Chatham moved for the recall of troops, but was defeated. Petitions came in from several great commercial centres; they were ignored. Chatham himself was again incapacitated by an attack of the gout. North intro-

duced bills to cut off the New England colonies—to which others were afterwards added—from commercial intercourse, by way of retaliation for the non-importation agreements. Additional troops and additional sailors were voted. To these measures North added a proposal which was intended to be conciliatory, but served no particular purpose except that of increasing the violence of the extreme anti-American section, who regarded anything that savoured of concession as a betrayal. The Conciliation Bill offered to exempt from taxation for purposes of revenue any colony which would undertake on its own account to pay what the British parliament would accept as an adequate contribution for common defence. In the eyes of the colonists and their supporters in England the real intention of the bill was to introduce dissension among the colonists, and thereby to render coercion the easier. North himself and at least a large section of the party probably intended honestly enough to open a door to reconciliation, but party spirit was already running far too high to permit the honesty of the attempt to be recognised ; only its futility was palpable.

II. THE WAR WITH THE AMERICANS, 1775-1778

The sword was drawn on 19th April 1775. Gage in Massachusetts had at last realised that the colonists would fight unless the British forces were considerably augmented. He had applied for reinforcements in addition to the four regiments which were at his disposal. The Americans were collecting arms and military stores of all kinds, and were drilling everywhere. At Concord, some miles from Boston, they had a dépôt of arms. On the night of the 18th Gage sent a party of troops to seize the stores. On the morning of the 19th, as the troops were passing through Lexington, there was a collision with a party of the local militia, when some shots were fired, and a few of the colonials were hit. The soldiers marched on to Concord, where they found that part of the stores had already been removed. They destroyed the remainder, though not without some more fighting, and on the way back

1775.
Lexington,
19th April.

they were fired upon repeatedly, the colonial marksmen keeping under cover. By the time the soldiery got back to Boston there had been something over two hundred casualties, the Americans having suffered about half as many.

This skirmish of Lexington opened the war ; encouragingly for the colonials, who were taught by it conclusively that in some circumstances at least they could hold their own against the regulars. The battle served as a general call to arms, and within a few days several thousand men were encamped before Boston. The Continental Congress reassembled on 10th May, assumed the functions of a regular government, rejected Lord North's proposals, and nominated George Washing- **War.** ton as commander-in-chief and head of the continental army at Boston (17th June). In the meanwhile a body of volunteers under the command of Ethan Allan and Benedict Arnold, acting with the consent of the Massachusetts committee of safety, surprised and captured the forts of Ticonderoga and Crown Point, commanding the direct route to Canada. On the other hand, considerable reinforcements for Gage were being dispatched from England, and before the end of May Generals Clinton and Burgoyne arrived with two thousand more soldiers. Thus strengthened, Gage proclaimed an offer of pardon to any of the rebels who would come in with the exception of Samuel Adams and John Hancock ; but the proclamation met with no response.

Before Washington could arrive to take up the command the first really important engagement of the war had taken place. Boston is on the south side of the river Charles ; on **Bunker Hill,** the north is Charlestown. Close by are two heights, **16th June.** Bunker Hill and Breed's Hill. To anticipate an expected movement on Gage's part, the colonials occupied Breed's Hill and entrenched it. Three thousand British troops were sent to storm the position, which they succeeded in doing, but only after heavy loss and two severe repulses. Though an actual victory for the British, the battle of Bunker Hill demonstrated more decisively than Lexington the capacity of the colonials for facing the attack of regulars. So far as moral effects went, Bunker Hill was a colonial victory.

Still an attempt was made by the Americans at reconciliation. Congress sent to England what was known as the 'Olive-branch petition.' The authorities in England, however, had now come to the natural conclusion that they would not treat with open rebels except on terms of complete surrender. George refused to receive the petition. Bargains were entered upon for employing German mercenaries in the American war. Congress itself discounted its olive-branch by taking measures for the invasion of Canada. In the autumn the capture by the Americans of the fort of St. John was followed by the surrender of Montreal; and Sir Guy Carleton, who had less than a thousand men under his command, made ready at Quebec for a siege. At Boston the place of General Gage was taken by General Sir William Howe, to whose brother Lord Howe the naval command was entrusted. The American volunteer army was willing enough to fight, but was painfully lacking in discipline and in the proper sense of subordination. It was only with extreme difficulty that Washington managed to hold his men together in their lines.

The American attack upon Canada during the winter was disastrous to them. An expedition was dispatched under Benedict Arnold against Quebec, marching from Maine through an exceedingly difficult country. It succeeded in joining hands with a force under Montgomery coming down the St. Lawrence from Montreal; but the whole of the supplies and equipment were in terribly bad condition. A desperate attempt to storm Quebec on 31st December was completely repulsed. Still the besiegers hung on obstinately, although the French Canadians, after some hesitation, definitely sided with the government and refused supplies to the rebels. Even when reinforcements arrived in the course of the spring the besiegers were unable to make any impression on Carleton's defences. When the ice broke up and the St. Lawrence became navigable, reinforcements came to Carleton early in May. In June the siege was raised, and Canada was evacuated by the invaders.

Meanwhile, Howe at Boston was hardly an improvement upon

General Gage. Washington, as the spring came on, prepared for an attack upon Boston itself. Howe, like Gage before him, was of opinion that from a military point of view it was a mistake to remain in Boston at all, but the evacuation had been forbidden for political reasons. **Boston evacuated, March.**

In March Washington seized Dorchester heights. Howe failed to dislodge him, and before the end of the month the British force was compelled to withdraw by sea to take up its quarters for the time being at Halifax in Nova Scotia. It was the evacuation of Boston which enabled Washington to send reinforcements to the army before Quebec, although that was a move from which no advantage resulted to the insurgents.

When Howe retired from Boston the war had been going on for eleven months. It is scarcely possible to doubt that if it had been conducted by the British with any real vigour or system, matters would by this time have looked very ill for the insurgents. **A bad beginning.** The continental army, as the American troops were called, was enlisted only for short terms, its composition was amateur in the extreme, its officers had little control over their men, and it was extremely difficult to keep the men themselves from going home when the fancy took them. The men in fact thought themselves as good as the officers, which in private life many of them were; the officers were jealous of each other, and nearly all of them were jealous of the indomitably patient chief, who, by his remarkable control over himself, yet managed to maintain the control over them also. But the British generals made no plans and struck no blows. A decently efficient naval squadron could have controlled the whole seaboard, but the squadron which was in American waters during the first twelve months of the war was quite insufficient. The truth was that, when the government had made up its mind that the rebellion was to be put down by force, it ought without further delay to have made an overwhelming demonstration of military power. Nowhere else was it threatened with war; it had a fleet which a dozen years earlier had been able to sweep the ocean at its will; and yet it lacked the energy or the intelligence to provide either a military or a

naval armament which could venture upon a bold offensive. The result was that by the early summer of 1776 the colonials, instead of feeling that they were fighting a desperate battle against great odds, were full of a confidence inspired not by their own efficiency, but by the inefficiency of their opponents; and that confidence was hardly weakened by the fiasco of the Canadian expedition. And in the meantime every month that the war dragged on embittered feeling on both sides; and in America the party which had all along been working for separation was on the point of sweeping the board.

Early in June Congress was discussing and approving a declaration of independence, proposals for a definite federation, and resolutions in favour of seeking foreign alliances. On 4th July it issued the famous Declaration of Independence, which was signed by the representatives of twelve out of the thirteen colonies, New York being the only abstainer. The colonists had thrown away the scabbard, and had definitely pronounced that the time for reconciliation on any terms whatever was passed—that they had severed themselves for ever from the British empire. With the Declaration of Independence an entirely new situation had arisen. The attitude previously adopted, of readiness to return to the position as it had been before 1763, was entirely abandoned. Explicitly the war was no longer a war waged for the preservation of their just rights by British citizens; it was avowedly and uncompromisingly a war of separation.

Meanwhile, however, the extremely efficient admiral, Lord Howe, had arrived at Halifax with a fleet; and before the end of June General Howe and his forces had been landed at Staten Island in front of New York, which was now to take the place of Boston as the military centre. Thither Washington had already transferred the army from Boston. New York was selected as the point of British attack, apart from military reasons, on the political ground that it was the state in which the two parties of the colonists were most evenly balanced. There was a brief delay before the attack opened. North was never able to free himself

The Declaration of Independence, 4th July.

The Howes before New York, June.

from the belief that the colonial resistance would collapse from its own inherent weakness at an early date. The Howes had a commission of a limited character to make proffers of reconciliation. A proclamation was issued again offering pardon to those who would come in ; Howe sought to negotiate with Washington personally, but the negotiation broke down because Washington refused to treat except in his official capacity ; while Howe was not authorised to recognise that he had any official capacity at all.

Hostilities then were renewed towards the end of August. The Americans were driven out of their position on Long Island into New York itself. Then there was another futile discussion between three commissioners from Congress, Franklin, John Adams, and Routledge, and Lord Howe, who met them unofficially. Nothing came of it. In the middle of September, Washington was compelled to evacuate the city ; and then, in a series of operations, to abandon one entrenched position after another until finally he was pushed over the Delaware river. Clinton made a diversion in the New England states, and Carleton advancing from Canada seized the fort of Crown Point on Lake Champlain. The successive reverses had reduced Washington's troops to a dangerous state of demoralisation, and again it can hardly be doubted that if Howe had followed up his successes with vigour, the continental army would have been broken up altogether.

Conquest was within the grasp of the British commander. That conquest would have served any useful purpose may be doubted. The Americans would indeed have been unable to take the field again in force so long as the country was in military occupation ; but Great Britain could not permanently remain in military occupation, and there could be no doubt that as long as the old grievances remained the colonists would have taken the earliest opportunity of renewing their defiance. Conquest, in short, except as a preliminary to a complete reconstruction of the relations between the mother country and the colonies, would have served no satisfactory purpose ; and there is no sign that any such reconstruction was contemplated in England.

But the government had committed itself to the position that conquest was necessary ; and on that hypothesis it was mere folly to abstain from making the conquest complete and decisive at the earliest possible date. Of that precise folly General Howe was guilty. Perhaps he imagined that the demoralisation caused by the autumn campaign might be trusted to do his work for him without any more fighting. At any rate when Washington had been driven over the borders of New Jersey into Pennsylvania, the British general considered that he had done enough, and relapsed into complete inactivity ; whereas Congress took the strongest line that it was possible for it to take, refused to listen to the complaints of jealous officers, recognised the astonishing ability with which Washington had made the best of his almost impossible position, and instead of curtailing his powers extended them.

In the general plan of campaign it had been intended that Carleton with the British forces from Canada should secure the line of Lake Champlain, and descend the Hudson to effect a junction with Howe. But Lake Champlain was held by Benedict Arnold's fleet ; it was late before Carleton, in spite of immense energy, was able to launch a fleet on the lake which destroyed that of the Americans. By the time that the British had been able to capture Crown Point it was too late in the year for further operations, and Carleton retired. It was singularly unfortunate that Lord George Germaine, known at the battle of Minden as Lord George Sackville, had joined the government and succeeded in turning the king's mind against Carleton. In the next year Sir Guy found himself superseded in the military command by General Burgoyne, and immediately resigned his Canadian governorship.

Howe, satisfied with what he had done in November, scattered his forces over a very extensive line, hoping thereby to give confidence to the loyalists of the district. Washington was left to pull his demoralised troops together, and to give them fresh heart by a forward movement which ought to have been impossible. Before the end of December he had struck at Clinton on the Delaware ;

**General
Howe's
inaction.**

**Sir Guy
Carleton.**

**1777.
Washington
in New
Jersey,
January.**

and early in the year 1777 had driven the British in from New Jersey to New York and Rhode Island.

Howe remained persistently inactive. The general plan of campaign for the year was on the same lines as before ; Burgoyne with the troops from Canada was to come down the Hudson and join hands with Howe ; and having thus completely severed the southern from the northern colonies, the two generals were to overwhelm Washington's army. Howe, on the other hand, had a scheme of his own for seizing Philadelphia ; a plan which was well enough in itself, provided that its execution did not interfere with the combined operations ; which unfortunately was its effect. If the thing was to be done at all, it should have been early in the year, so that the force to co-operate with Burgoyne could be detached for that purpose by the time that he was ready to move.

**Incompatible
plans of
campaign.**

Howe intended to carry his force from New York by sea to Delaware Bay, and so to advance upon Philadelphia from the south—the Congress, it may be remarked, removed itself from Philadelphia in anticipation of the event. But his forces were not ready for embarkation until late in July. He left Clinton at New York with 8500 men, whereas it was necessary to have a much larger force to co-operate properly with Burgoyne ; and he himself departed with 14,000 men. But the difficulties of Delaware Bay forced him to carry on south to the Chesapeake Bay, and August was almost over before he had landed at its head, at the Elk river. In the course of September Howe defeated Washington, who had advanced to meet him, at Brandywine Creek, and occupied Philadelphia. But Washington still lay between him and New York, and in the first week of October made an attack upon Howe, which was repulsed. The British general, apparently quite heedless of Burgoyne, sent for 4000 of Clinton's troops. He was able to drive back the defeated American commander, who established himself for the winter at Valley Forge in a very unsatisfactory plight, while the British at Philadelphia were in comfortable quarters.

**The
Philadelphia
campaign,
July-
November.**

Meanwhile, however, Howe's Philadelphia campaign had completely ruined the concerted operations. Burgoyne had started **Saratoga**, in June. On 6th July he was at Ticonderoga. But **17th October**. he was no sooner on the march again than his troubles began. He could only struggle on slowly and painfully through a hostile and difficult country. Clinton was paralysed, the more completely when so many of his troops were called away by Howe. Burgoyne was **drawn** at Saratoga into a trap from which there was no escape, and was there compelled to surrender with his entire force on 17th October.

Burgoyne had done his best to carry out his orders, and effect a junction with the force which he believed to be moving up to meet him. Clinton did what he could with the **General** force at his disposal. The disaster must be laid **Howe** upon Howe's shoulders. He knew of Burgoyne's **responsible.** movement, and he should have known that, except as part of a combined movement, it could not succeed. He let the combined movement go, in order to carry out his private plan of securing Philadelphia. Apparently the only sort of excuse that can be offered is that he believed Burgoyne to be marching through a friendly country, whereas the country was extremely hostile, and believed also that his own capture of Philadelphia would raise all the loyalists in arms and produce a loyalist reaction. He was wrong on every point; and he made it impossible for himself to redeem his error by only starting after Burgoyne's march had begun, and then by persisting in his plan, although it involved the further delay of going on to the Chesapeake instead of to Delaware Bay.

The disaster was a serious one, but even the surrender of five thousand men need not have been in itself fatal. It was fatal **French** because it let loose a new enemy upon the British. **sympathy** For some time past American commissioners had **for America.** been in Paris, where they were made much of and applauded as heroes in the cause of liberty by a court where liberty was theoretically very much in fashion; a court which had not yet begun even to imagine that the subject was a dangerous one for itself. The 'sons of liberty' in America were hostile

to the tyrant power of England. From the moment the war began, the French sympathies had been all on the side of the colonists. Turgot, the finance minister, was opposed to intervention. In his shrewd view, the colonies were in the first place certain to win in the long run, while in the second place, if they did not win, they would continue to be a source of weakness rather than of strength to the British empire. Nothing then would be gained for France by interfering on their behalf; besides which, French finances were by no means in the condition necessary for the conduct of a great war. On the other hand, Vergennes, the vigorous minister who had succeeded Choiseul, was eager to intervene, not openly, but in the way of lending secret and 'unauthorised' help, at least until such time as a decisive blow could be struck, and struck in conjunction with Spain. Spain was waiting her opportunity to attempt the recovery of Gibraltar, as soon as Great Britain should seem to be too thoroughly involved to offer effective resistance. And if France or Spain, or both, should discover an opportunity for intervention, there was no European power which had the slightest inclination to draw the sword on behalf of Great Britain.

Until the disaster of Saratoga, however, although money and supplies had been finding their way from France to America, and although French volunteers were offering their swords to Washington, more to his embarrassment than to his advantage, the presumption had continued to be that the American resistance would collapse of itself. Saratoga produced the immediate impression that the colonials had a distinct prospect of proving the winning side, a prospect which foreign intervention might turn into a certainty. For the French government, then, the news of Saratoga was decisive. It arrived in the beginning of December; Vergennes at once informed the American commissioners that France was prepared to make an alliance, which was formally concluded at the beginning of February. If France went to war with England, neither of the parties was to make peace with the common enemy except by mutual consent or until the independence of the United States

**Effect of
Saratoga
in France.**

**1778.
A Franco-
American
treaty.**

was formally recognised by treaty. As to conquest, whatever might be captured in the West Indies was to go to France, while Canada was to go to the United States. The fear that Canada might again become the menace that it had been before the Seven Years' War was minimised—a fear which had weighed considerably with a good many Americans against proposals for a French alliance. The treaty was published by France in March (1778).

In England, ever since the war began the Opposition had persistently denounced it; but they remained in a minority so **Chatham**. hopeless that for a time the Rockingham group adopted the futile plan of secession. In 1777 Chatham had once more appeared to take the lead. The presence of the American commissioners in Paris, and the manner in which they were lionised, was sufficient proof that it was necessary to be ready to engage in a struggle with the Bourbon powers. Chatham was equally urgent that the grievances of the colonists should be redressed unconditionally, and that the nation should concentrate on resistance to the Bourbon menace. Ministers still tried to delude themselves and the public into believing the formal denials of any hostile intent on the part of France. But by the beginning of 1778 it was impossible to remain blind any longer. In February, **Characters,** North made a last desperate attempt at **the crisis.** conciliation, but although his offer amounted to little short of a complete surrender, it was too late. The Americans, with France behind them, would now take nothing short of complete independence; for they believed, not without reason, that the French fleet was now far stronger relatively to the British than it had been at any time during the century. If the British lost control of the sea, the Americans would have the game in their own hands. North himself was in despair. He was under no illusion as to his own abilities, and urged the king to call Chatham to the head of the government. Still the king refused, though he is credited with having contemplated dropping the American quarrel in order to devote the whole energy of the nation to war with France. Whether Chatham himself, even in the plenitude of his powers, could have saved

the situation is more than doubtful. It is conceivable that the man to whom the Americans owed and acknowledged so deep a debt, the man who twenty years before had delivered them from the French menace, the man who had consistently and unfailingly championed their cause from the very outset, might have won back the loyalty which had still been dominant even four years earlier. The man who had saved the British empire once when no other man could have done it might have saved it again.

But it was not to be. Chatham was old, worn, exhausted with disease. On 7th April, the duke of Richmond, acting for the Rockinghams, moved a resolution in favour of withdrawing all the forces from America. Chatham was brought into the House to oppose the motion.

**Chatham's
last effort,
April**

Convinced though he was that, as concerned all the causes of the quarrel, the Americans were in the right, he was equally convinced that at whatever cost the disruption of the empire was not to be permitted, the claim to independence was not to be allowed. Desperately ill though he was, he answered Richmond in a speech which was at times barely audible. Richmond responded; Chatham attempted once more to rise and reply, but fell back, stricken with apoplexy. It was his last effort. On 11th May the great empire builder was dead.

As a dictator he had been superb; as anything but a dictator he was impossible; and English political conditions made any dictatorship impossible except in the presence of what was felt universally to be an overwhelming crisis. Such a crisis had arrived. If life and health had been granted to Chatham, his dictatorship might have been forced upon the country even in despite of George. Two years, one year, earlier, it might have been possible for him, though for no other man, to have reunited the empire. In 1778 it is scarcely possible to believe that even he could have achieved that end. With his death vanished the last fraction of a chance. Great Britain was left to struggle through what was perhaps the most desperate crisis in her career under the guidance of mediocrities. She did win through, torn, bleeding, maimed—

**Effect of his
death, May.**

but unconquered except so far as she was conquered in the victory of her own sons ; unconquered, and destined ere long again to prove her right to stand among the mightiest nations of the earth.

III. AT BAY, 1778-1783

The French intervention entirely changed the character of the war. Until 1778, it ought to have been easily within the competence of the British government to conquer the colonies in the military sense—to shatter their armies, annihilate their commerce, and suppress all armed resistance. It was in a different sense that Chatham's statement was true, that the colonies could not be conquered. The conquest could have been effected, but it could not have been preserved without the perpetual maintenance in America of a standing army considerably larger than the whole normal peace establishment. Chatham's contention was absolutely sound, since the expectation of retaining the Americans as loyal subjects of the British Crown upon those terms would have been absurd. But it would not have been in the least absurd to believe that with reasonable vigour and tolerable skill at military headquarters, the Americans could have been compelled by force of arms to accept terms dictated by the British. They had not been beaten after three years of fighting, because Admiral Howe's squadron was too small to blockade the coasts, and because General Howe never followed up his successes, and by sheer mismanagement ruined the combined movement of 1777, which ought to have given him the complete mastery, instead of ending in the disaster of Saratoga.

But down to 1778 the war was simply a duel between the colonists and the mother country. From 1778 onwards the mother country had on her hands France, the pressing danger that Spain would be joined to France, and after 1779 the actual alliance of Spain with her other enemies. In 1763 she had nothing to fear from French and Spanish fleets ; the case in 1778 was very different. Both France and Spain had spent the interval in reorganising their fleets and bringing

them up to a high standard ; Great Britain had plenty of ships, but only a fraction of them were fit for service or manned with crews. The French intervention was practically decisive as far as America was concerned ; it transformed Great Britain's attempt to subjugate her own recalcitrant colonies into a desperate and doubtful struggle to preserve her own position as a first-class power.

The effects were felt immediately. In accordance with the conciliation bills which North carried in February, commissioners were sent out to treat with the Americans. They **In America.** on the other hand were stiffened by the news of the French alliance, and in effect refused to treat except on condition of the withdrawal of the British fleets and armies, or the recognition of their own independence—two practically equivalent propositions, since the concession of either would have involved the concession of the other as a corollary.

But this was not all. France was ready to act. Two squadrons were soon ready to take the seas, one under D'Estaing for American waters, the other under D'Orvilliers to **Operations** 'contain' the British channel fleet. General Howe **in 1778.** was recalled, without any reluctance on his part, and the chief command was conferred upon Clinton, with instructions to withdraw from Philadelphia and to concentrate in New York. The retreat was accomplished successfully, though not without considerable difficulty and some sharp fighting. Admiral Howe with great skill brought back the convoys from the Chesapeake and carried them up to New York a few days before the arrival of D'Estaing's squadron at Sandy Hook ; and the Frenchman, though his strength was approximately double that of Howe, did not venture to attempt an attack, but, having failed in his specific object of catching Howe in the open and cutting off the convoys, withdrew. Meanwhile Keppel in the home waters could put to sea with only twenty ships of the line, and engaged D'Orvillier's fleet, which was of equal numbers, in a battle off Ushant of an entirely indecisive character. Before the end of the year D'Estaing, who had retired to Boston harbour, withdrew to the West Indies, again leaving the actual

control of the American coast to the British. The concentration at New York was followed by a dispersion. Under orders from home, Clinton dispatched an expedition to the Southern States under Cornwallis, and he was further weakened at the end of the year by the withdrawal of four thousand men for Barbadoes in the West Indies, and the departure with them of Admiral Hotham's squadron; the West Indies having now become the French point of attack. Washington was correspondingly relieved, though he had some difficulty in preventing Congress, in its elation, from following the British example, and reducing his forces before New York in order to send a fresh expedition to Canada.

The arrival of Hotham's ships at Barbadoes enabled Barrington, who was the admiral in command there, to seize the strategically valuable island of St. Lucia a few days before the appearance of D'Estaing who, though in superior force, again would not venture to attack. In the first half of 1779 D'Estaing captured the islands of St. Vincent and Grenada, but missed an opportunity for engaging, with greatly superior force, the British squadron; which under the command of Byron, who had superseded Barrington, attacked under a mistaken impression as to the size of D'Estaing's fleet, but withdrew when the error was discovered.

By 1780 then, nothing more of a decisive character had occurred in the American area. Clinton at New York, and Washington **Spain** in New Jersey, were neither of them able to strike **declares war.** an effective blow at the other. In the West Indies the French retained, but did not make use of, their naval superiority. Cornwallis in the Southern States was more than a match for any forces which could take the field against him, but could practically do nothing more than control the district in the immediate neighbourhood of his army. But for Great Britain the outlook had become more serious, because in the summer of 1779 Spain declared war; the combined French and Spanish fleet in the European waters outnumbered the British fleet; and Spain turned her attention to the immediate object of her own desires, Gibraltar, the prolonged

siege of which was commenced. In 1780, Guichen arrived in the West Indies to reinforce and take command of the French fleet, while Admiral Rodney joined the British fleet, having thrown reliefs into Gibraltar and destroyed two minor Spanish squadrons *en route*. Rodney succeeded in bringing Guichen to an engagement off Dominica ; but his captains did not understand his novel plan of attack, mistook the meaning of his signals, and so deranged his scheme that the battle was indecisive, instead of being a crushing blow to the French force in the West Indies. The opportunity did not recur, and the French predominance in ships was somewhat increased by further reinforcements.

**Gibraltar
besieged and
relieved.**

**1780. The
West Indies.**

Clinton also was able to strike a sharp blow by sending an expedition south which captured Charleston, taking a very large number of prisoners ; but this was counterbalanced by the arrival from France of reinforcements for Washington, under the command of Rochambeau, which compelled Clinton again to withdraw the troops from Charleston, and further to reduce the forces with which Cornwallis was seeking to dominate the south. The result was that the resistance in that quarter became increasingly active ; and although Cornwallis dispersed the American troops at Camden in August, he was obliged to fall back in order to maintain his communications with the coast. In the north the Americans passed through a critical period, owing to the treason of one of their ablest commanders, Benedict Arnold, the leader of the former expedition against Canada. His resentment at what he regarded as the unjust treatment he received led him to enter into correspondence with the British. In the course of this intrigue a young British officer, Major André, was captured in civilian attire within the American lines, carrying treasonable letters of Arnold's. In spite of strong representations made to Washington, André was hanged as a spy. His unhappy fate excited extreme sympathy, but Washington's action in the matter cannot be impugned. Arnold himself succeeded in escaping, and received a commission in the British army.

**The
American
Continent.**

**Benedict
Arnold.**

In the autumn Rodney himself with a part of his fleet was in the North American waters, whither he had come in pursuit of **Rodney**. Guichen, who with a considerable portion of his fleet had left the West Indies. Guichen's destination, however, was Europe. Rodney's appearance, therefore, produced no important effect, apart from the fact that for the time being the British were in complete control of the sea in the north. In Rodney's absence, a French squadron at Newport and the British squadron under Graves at New York were sufficiently equally matched to make the British control precarious. Before the end of the year Rodney withdrew again to the West Indies, partly to prevent the risk of that portion of his fleet which he had left behind under Hood being overwhelmed, and partly because of a fresh complication which had arisen.

This was a declaration of war between Great Britain and Holland. During the great wars of the middle of the century **The Dutch** the neutral powers had complained much of the **join the war**. British doctrines as to the right of search and the seizure of enemy's goods carried on neutral ships. Now that Great Britain was in difficulties the Baltic powers united in a league, which was known as the Armed Neutrality, to maintain the rights of neutrals. The league was joined by Holland. It was ascertained that correspondence was passing between Dutch authorities and the Americans, which in the eyes of the British government constituted a sufficient *casus belli*. In fact Holland's enmity was not very alarming, because there was no possibility of Dutch fleets now combining with the French. But the intervention of Holland gave the opportunity for seizing the Dutch island of St. Eustatius in the West Indies, a place of great wealth.

1781. St. Eustatius. It was captured accordingly by Rodney in February 1781. Unfortunately the admiral was so earnestly engaged in securing the booty that the new French squadron under De Grasse was able to effect its junction with the rest of the West India fleet, because Hood, Rodney's subordinate, was not in sufficient strength to prevent it. Later in the year Rodney himself was obliged to go back to England leaving Hood in charge. Though Rodney was a brilliant chief, the substitution of Hood

certainly in itself had done no harm ; but again Hood's force was quite inadequate to deal with the French fleet upon equal terms.

The reason for this inadequacy lay in the immense preponderance of the hostile fleets in European waters, and in the continuous pressure upon Gibraltar, which had been unrelieved since February 1780. The old danger of an attempted invasion of the British shores revived. Thus it was that when De Grasse sailed for the West Indies in March 1781, the British admiral, Derby, having failed to intercept him, was unable to pursue because he was under the immediate necessity of carrying reliefs to Gibraltar and Port Mahon. In fact no ships could be spared for the West, because of the preponderance of the enemy in the European waters ; though it is curious to observe that in whatever force the French and Spanish fleets might be collected, they never attempted to force an engagement with the smaller squadrons of the British. In the course of the year, however, the Dutch were practically disabled by a hard-fought action off the Dogger Bank with a British squadron under Admiral Sir Hyde Parker. The engagement was quite in the traditional style of the Anglo-Dutch battles. It could hardly be claimed that the British got much the best of the fight ; but it practically prevented the Dutch from again taking the sea in force.

**The fleets
in European
waters.**

But the moment was at hand for the French fleet to take action of a decisive character, the explanation of which lies in the operations on the American continent. At the end of 1780 Cornwallis had decided to march through the Southern States from South Carolina to the Chesapeake, so as to join hands with Clinton at New York and deal a decisive blow at Washington. Though a British detachment under Tarleton was defeated in January at Cowpens, Cornwallis pushed forward, and on 15th March inflicted a severe defeat at Guildford Court House on a force which outnumbered his own two to one. His column, however, was only a small one. His advance was but a slow struggle ; Clinton would not reinforce him, and it was not till the end of May that he effected a junction in Virginia

**Cornwallis,
in the south.**

with a column under the command of Arnold which brought the number of his troops up to five thousand. Clinton believed that Washington was preparing for a grand move on New York. The result was that as Cornwallis was making his way northward he received instructions in June to occupy Yorktown at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay, and to remain there on the defensive. Washington, however, was in a position to strike either to the south at Cornwallis or at New York itself. He concerted with Rochambeau and De Grasse a plan for falling upon Cornwallis in overwhelming force while Clinton was deceived into believing that New York was to be the object of the grand attack. The plan was completely successful. In July the American army was concentrated as if for an attack upon New York. Soon afterwards Cornwallis, in accordance with his orders, established himself in Yorktown; the assumption being that the sea communication with New York would be kept open. It was not kept open. De Grasse sailed from the West Indies; Hood pursued him with a smaller force, expecting to form a junction with Graves at Chesapeake Bay. But De Grasse, arriving first, drew Graves out of the bay; and he as well as the French squadron from Newport got back into the Chesapeake while Hood was effecting his junction with Graves at Sandy Hook. Consequently when Graves and Hood got back to the Chesapeake they found De Grasse there before them in superior force, in a position which completely cut off Cornwallis from assistance, and from which he could not be dislodged. In the meantime Washington had marched for Yorktown leaving a sufficient force to mask Clinton, who was still anxiously awaiting the delivery of the grand attack upon New York itself—confirmed in his expectations by misleading dispatches which had been written with the express intention that they should be intercepted. Yorktown was thus completely invested, without hope of relief, and on 19th October Cornwallis was compelled to surrender.

The fall of Yorktown was decisive so far as concerned the American War of Independence. The British had no foothold

anywhere except in New York itself, and they had lost the command of the sea, without which there was no possible prospect of a recovery. So completely had the naval situation been reversed since the Seven Years' War that while the French and Spanish were in superior force both in American and in European waters, the French had been able to detach also to Indian waters, under Bailli Suffren, a squadron which was there about to prove itself slightly superior to the British naval force in those seas.

After
Yorktown.

In 1782 then the interest of the war becomes entirely naval. The war for Great Britain had resolved itself at last into a desperate struggle not for empire, but for political existence, against the Bourbon powers; and at the moment all the omens seemed to be in their favour. Peace could not have been obtained except on the most ignominious terms, terms to which no Briton would have dreamed of submitting, from the stubborn king who would have fought to the last gasp down to men who had not only denounced the war from the beginning, but had openly proclaimed their satisfaction at British defeat. Against the Bourbons the nation was ready to drain the last drop of its blood. No matter what political party might be predominant, the ministry would be a fighting ministry so far as France and Spain were concerned. The administration was now completely discredited by a long series of disasters; North at last succeeded in persuading George to accept the resignation which he had tendered repeatedly. The Whigs came in under Rockingham's leadership, but with the Chatham section of the party strongly represented; yet the Rockingham policy would have been North's. Probably the event of the war would have been the same if there had been no change, though matters in relation to the Americans themselves were simplified by the accession to power of the party which had always acknowledged, and urged the recognition of, the fundamental justice of their claims.

1782. North
gives way to
the Whigs,
March.

But with the change of ministry came a change in the fortunes of war. Before North's resignation in March, Minorca had fallen; but in April the tide turned. During the winter De

Grasse and Hood had returned to the West Indies from the Chesapeake, but Hood could not and De Grasse would not force a decisive engagement. Both were awaiting reinforcements. In February Rodney returned to the scene to take the chief command. It was known that a great Spanish fleet was to sail for the West Indies, join De Grasse, and overwhelm the British. On 8th April De Grasse sailed from Fort Royal in Martinique for Cap Français in Hayti, where he was to be joined by the Spaniards. Rodney started from St. Lucia in pursuit. Next day his van overtook the French off Dominica, while his rear lay becalmed; but De Grasse did not use his opportunity, preferring to continue on his course. But his progress was slow. On the 12th Rodney again caught up with him off the island known as The Saints. In the engagement which followed it had apparently been Rodney's intention to follow the usual practice of engaging the whole of the enemy's fleet along the whole line; but an opportunity occurred for tactics which the fleets had discarded for a century. Rodney in the leading ship pierced through a gap in the enemy's line, followed by the next five ships. The seventh ship, which was followed by the rest of the fleet, crossed the line at another gap. By this movement of 'breaking the line' the French line of battle was completely disorganised, and the French centre was crushed before their van could come into action. De Grasse himself with his flagship was captured after a hard fight; four more ships of the line were taken; according to Hood, if Rodney had chosen to pursue, he might have captured almost the whole fleet. The victory was not in fact in itself an overwhelming one; but its moral effect was decisive. The prestige of the British navy was restored; in France and Spain as well as in England the conviction was established that the maritime power was still invincible upon the seas.

That conviction was confirmed in the Mediterranean. The siege of Gibraltar was now in its third year. Twice relieved, it had held out stubbornly under its indomitable commandant Sir George Eliott, defying the blockade and answering the

repeated bombardments with a fire as fierce as the enemy's and more destructive. In the summer of 1782 preparations were made for an overwhelming attack. In September the great bombardment opened from sea and land. **Gibraltar unconquered, September.** For four days it continued. On the fifth day, ten battering ships entered close in and the fire was redoubled. But the battering ships themselves were destroyed by the fire from the fortress. Nine of them blew up, and still there was no sign of slackening in the defence ; the enemy had struck their stroke and it had failed. The blockade was continued ; but a month later a final relief was skilfully effected by Lord Howe, who had resigned his command in 1778 on account of his strong opposition to ministers and their policy, but resumed it after North's resignation. The relief was the last act of the war, except in Indian waters, where hostilities continued until they were terminated by the definitive peace in 1783.

Peace had been in the air ever since Rodney's victory. The British government negotiated separately with the Americans represented in Paris by Franklin, and with France herself. Their ends were facilitated by their own readiness to acknowledge the *fait accompli* of American Independence, and by the American consciousness that unless a separate agreement were arrived at, the French would do their best to secure the fruits of victory for themselves at the expense of their allies. The preliminaries of the American treaty were signed on 30th November. Therein the independent sovereignty of the American states was recognised, and a line passing through the great lakes and the basin of the Mississippi was agreed upon as forming their boundary. The British can hardly be blamed for failing to protect the loyalists in America. That group had throughout been the object of the fiercest animosity of the dominant party ; if the war had been continued, the British would still have been unable to afford them military protection, and they would only have been treated the more rancorously. Many thousands of them found refuge in England ; ten thousand 'United Empire Loyalists' were

**Peace with
America,
November.**

provided with lands on the Upper St. Lawrence, and twice as many were planted in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.

Peace preliminaries with France and Spain were signed in February 1783, though the definitive Treaty of Versailles, which did not vary from them materially, was not completed till September. The condition of French finances in fact compelled the acceptance of terms with which the British in the circumstances had no reason to be dissatisfied. In the West Indies the *status quo* was restored except for the cession of Tobago to France. In Africa, France recovered Senegal and Goree, which she had lost in the Seven Years' War. Spain kept Minorca; and Holland, when peace was made, received back what Britain had taken from her in the Indian seas, with the exception of Negapatam. The total result was that Great Britain lost a large portion of her empire, which set up for itself as an independent nation, and also lost Minorca, but nothing else that was of importance; while neither France nor Spain gained anything that was of material value. France by her encouragement of the American doctrines of liberty precipitated her own Revolution, hardly less than by the heavy war expenditure, which intensified the financial chaos and the intolerable burden of taxation upon her unprivileged classes. For Great Britain the strain had been cruel; but Warren Hastings had saved her position in India, the sources of her wealth remained to her, and the genius of the younger William Pitt enabled her fully to recover her financial equilibrium. And she had learnt once for all the lesson that colonies, if they are to become a permanent source of strength to the empire, must not suffer any curtailment of the full rights of British citizenship.

IV. INDIA, 1770-1784

Admirable as was the work accomplished by Clive during his last administration, he had not been able to establish a satisfactorily organised government of the British dominion in India. The official recognition of the company in Bengal, as *diwan*,

administrator of revenue, had provided it with a legal status, but not with a governmental system. Practically the Bengal Council was obliged to entrust the revenue administration to native officials, subject to some supervision of a not very expert character, by British officials called 'collectors.' The law courts were still in the hands of the officers of the puppet nawab; while the collectors themselves were more intent on amassing wealth than upon safeguarding the interests either of the company or of the native population. 'Nabobs' continued to return to England with disorganised livers and distended purses which enabled them to buy an undue share of the control of the political machine; while in India a devastating famine in Bengal, one of those disastrous visitations with which even the highly organised government of the twentieth century finds it so difficult to deal, brought home to the public mind the inefficiency, and worse than inefficiency, of the unorganised government in 1770.

**The position
in 1770.**

The consciences of directors in England, made tender by their financial embarrassments, became uneasy; and in 1772 they appointed Warren Hastings, governor of Bengal, to investigate, reconstruct, reorganise. In the past he had been distinguished as an able administrator, and one of the few who had loyally upheld the well-meaning Vansittart in his efforts to restrain the misrule before Clive's last visit. The conscience of parliament as well as of the directors was disturbed. It was not pleasant to feel that the British had made themselves responsible for the government of a large region, and were conspicuously failing to act up to the responsibility. Nor was it pleasant to find the East India Company coming to the government to ask for financial assistance instead of being in a position to make a substantial cash return to the government for its privileges. A parliamentary inquiry was instituted; the nabobs in general and Clive in particular were fiercely attacked. Clive defended himself so successfully that a proposed vote of censure was transformed into a resolution recognising the magnitude of his services. But the inquiry resulted

**1772.
Warren
Hastings.**

**The parlia-
mentary
inquiry.**

in the first attempt to provide something like a constitution for the government of the great dependency.

Lord North's Regulating Acts, passed in 1773, were by no means a successful effort. The system they set up very soon proved **The problem.** unworkable. But there was no precedent to which the constitution-builders could turn for guidance. Since the days of the Roman empire, it had not fallen to the lot of any civilised power to take upon itself the government of a vast population wholly alien in race, in creed, in customs, in laws, and ideals, accustomed to be ruled by the sword, yet possessed of a civilisation rooted in a past more remote than that of the English themselves. The experiment therefore was not successful, but by its very blunders it prepared the way for a re-organisation logically indefensible but astonishingly successful in its working.

Hitherto His Majesty's government had asserted no control over the proceedings and methods of the East India Company.

1773. North's Regulating Acts. It had been claimed for the latter that they held their possessions in India from the Mogul, and that intervention on the part of the Crown would be a violation of their chartered rights. The officials in India had been simply servants of the company, which made all the appointments, and gave instructions as to policy which its servants disobeyed at their peril. The plea that government interference would be a violation of the charter was now brushed aside on the general principle of the supremacy of parliament over all British subjects.

The purpose of the Regulating Acts was twofold: the re-organisation of the government of the company at home and **The management in London.** of the government by the company in India. The ultimate control still remained with the directors and proprietors in London, but the qualification of proprietors was raised from £500 to £1000 of stock; and in place of the annual reconstitution of the court of directors, only one-fourth of the number were to retire in each year in rotation. The patronage remained with the company, except as laid down in the second part of the Acts, and a substantial advance was

at the same time made to the company to preserve it from bankruptcy.

The constitution-making was contained in the second part. The governor of Bengal was to be at the same time governor-general of all the three presidencies. Bombay and Madras each retained its own governor and council, but all questions of war and peace and alliances belonged to the governor-general in council, who was still responsible for his acts to the government of the company at home. At the same time a divided authority was created in India itself. The administration was in the hands of the governor-general and a council of four members, whose decisions were arrived at by a majority vote, the governor-general's vote counting for no more than that of each of his colleagues, except that he had also a casting vote when opinions were equally divided. His judgment could in consequence be systematically over-ridden if opposed by three members of his council. In the first instance, the governor-general and the four members of council were appointed not by the directors, but by the government. But beside the executive authority the Act set up a new judicial authority, a High Court of four judges appointed by the Crown, who were able to claim that they were not servants of the company at all, were not subject to the executive authority, but were responsible to the Crown and the Crown alone. In this body the chief justice was Sir Elijah Impey. The governor-general appointed was the then governor of Bengal, Warren Hastings; but only one of his council, Barwell, was an experienced servant of the company; the other three, Philip Francis (commonly reputed to be the author of the *Letters of Junius*), Monson, and General Clavering as military member, were apparently selected to express the prevailing distrust of the experienced Indian authorities.

Hence when the judges and the new members of council arrived in India in October 1774, there ensued a prolonged period of perpetual conflicts of authority. The judges claimed that they were in India to administer English law in the name of the Crown, and with no responsi-

**The adminis-
tration in
India.**

**Conflicting
authorities.**

bility to the executive, whose acts and whose officers they could call to account. The executive found itself perpetually impeded and crossed by the judicial body; and 'the triumvirate,' Francis, Clavering, and Monson, systematically set themselves in opposition to the governor-general and his one supporter Barwell. Hence we must bear in mind that the rule of Hastings in India falls into several distinct periods. The first is that when he was governor of Bengal, from 1772 till October 1774. In the second period, which lasted till Monson's death in September 1776, the triumvirate were in the majority, and made a point of over-ruling Hastings. During the next twelve months, Hastings on the whole predominated; the council was equally divided; but it was claimed by Clavering that Hastings had resigned, and that he himself was governor-general. Then Clavering died, Wheler arrived to take Monson's place, and Eyre Coote to take Clavering's. Thus after 1777, although the new members of council were by no means warm adherents of Hastings, opposition to him was no longer systematic; and for the remainder of his governor-generalship his will predominated. The contest between the executive and the judiciary was brought to an end in 1780, by a compromise to which we shall revert later. We shall now proceed with the story of Warren Hastings, which may be more conveniently treated under two separate aspects: the administration of the British territories, and the relations between the British and the native powers.

It was the first task of Hastings as governor of Bengal to make the *diwani*, the financial administration, a reality. The principal source of revenue was the land, which was divided into large estates or districts called *zemindaris*; the *zemindar* we may describe provisionally as the landholder, who was responsible for producing the amount of revenue at which the land was assessed. Hastings appointed a committee to inquire into the whole question of land tenure, made a new provisional assessment for a period of five years, suspended the native officials pending inquiries into charges which had been brought against them, and appointed British collectors or district officers; at the same time

**Hastings
in Bengal.**

1772-4.

The Diwani.

district courts of justice were appointed with European magistrates, and a court of appeal at headquarters; whereby the foundations of an administrative system were laid down.

But the process had raised up a host of enemies against Hastings. With the arrival of the new members of council and the judges, the Regulating Acts came into force, and the triumvirate at once showed the extravagance of their hostility to the governor-general.

**1775. The
triumvirate
and the
begums.**

A new nawab, Asaf ud-Daulah, at this moment succeeded to the throne of Oudh. The old nawab's mother and widow, the '*begums*,' claimed that the royal treasures had been left to them. The new nawab, thus despoiled, could not meet the obligations due from him to the company; yet, since Hastings supported his claim against the begums, the council took the side of the ladies and guaranteed them in possession of the treasure. A prominent native Brahmin, Nanda Kumar, commonly known as Nuncomar, who had various grudges against the governor-general, saw his opportunity for an attack, and preferred charges against him. The council encouraged Nuncomar, and insisted that the charges should be heard at the council board. Hastings refused to preside at his own trial, and prepared to bring a charge of conspiracy against Nuncomar. In the nick of time a native, Mohun Persad, who had a long-standing lawsuit against the Brahmin, discovered his opportunity for bringing a charge of forgery against his enemy before the new court of justice which administered English law. By that law, forgery was a capital crime; though in the eyes of orientals it was a venial offence. After a trial conducted with scrupulous fairness, Nuncomar was condemned and was duly executed, neither his friends on the council nor his enemy Hastings raising a finger to help him. There is no evidence whatever that the charge was suggested or the trial instigated by Hastings, or that the judges, who were unanimous, could reasonably have arrived at any other conclusion than that Nuncomar was guilty; yet for generations the diatribes of partisans and historians hostile to Hastings made the world at large believe that the whole affair was a conspiracy between

the chief justice and the governor-general. The myth, however, has been thoroughly exploded in comparatively recent times by Sir Fitz-James Stephen's exhaustive examination of the story.

Nuncomar was executed in June 1775. The personal charges against Hastings collapsed with the disappearance of this one

1775-77. most untrustworthy witness; but the triumvirate

Perversity of continued their course. They abolished the new
the council district courts of justice and reinstated the nawab's

officers. They controlled the relations with the Mahrattas in defiance of the governor-general's judgment. Monson died in 1776; but six months after the arrival of the council Hastings had sent home a provisional resignation, afterwards cancelled, to his agent in London. But the resignation was laid before the directors, and early in 1777 instructions were received at Calcutta, appointing Clavering to act provisionally as governor-general. Hastings repudiated the whole transaction, and the judges bore him out, pronouncing that he, not Clavering, was governor-general. The *impasse* was ended by Clavering's death, and the arrival of fresh instructions confirming Hastings in his post.

Hastings, now predominant, was able to carry out his own policy. He established his board for the examination of land tenures, and a thorough revision of the assessment.

1777. He arranged for the maintenance of a military
Hastings force for the defence of Oudh, to which end the
reorganises. revenues of the Benares district of Oudh were assigned to the

company—the beginnings of the system which came to be known as that of 'subsidiary alliances.' The antagonistic authorities of the executive and the judiciary were now reaching a stage so acute as to produce a deadlock in the government. Hastings was even forced into an alliance with his enemy Francis, to resist the impossible pretensions of Impey who was his personal friend. Ever since their arrival, the judges had been

The contest acting up to their own theory of their position,
with the very much as if they had been appointed with the
judges. primary object of discovering and punishing misconduct on the part of the administration. Every officer up

country found himself liable to be hailed before this new tribunal by any one who thought fit to bring a charge against him however frivolous. At last the council gave orders that the processes of the court should be disregarded ; the court fulminated writs against the council and every one who should obey them. The situation was impossible ; the only conceivable **1780.**

escape from it was by some compromise which **The solution.** should induce the judges to act as officers of the company. The council had restored the criminal jurisdiction of the nawab's courts, but had left the civil and fiscal jurisdiction with the company's district officers. Hastings separated the civil and fiscal functions, appointing civil magistrates, and proposed to set up a supreme court of appeal at Calcutta, of which he invited Impey to become the chief. Impey accepted ; in his new capacity he had effective supervision of the district courts in his hands ; and the deadlock was removed. The fact that he was offered and accepted, provisionally, a salary as chief of the *Sadr Adalat*, as the new court was called, has been made the basis for further diatribes against the unfortunate chief justice.

The transfer of Benares to the British made Cheyt Singh, the raja of Benares, a vassal of the company, which took the place of the Oudh nawab as his overlord. In 1778 the **Benares. 1778-81.** financial embarrassments of the government, involved in a war with the Mahrattas, were heavy. Cheyt Singh's loyalty was doubtful ; and Hastings demanded from him an increased contribution of £50,000, which was paid. In the second year there was delay in the payment. When the demand was repeated in the third year it was not paid. Hastings, believing that the raja was acting with treasonable intent, imposed upon him a further fine of £500,000, and proceeded in person to arrest him in his own capital. The population rose, and cut up the military escort of Hastings, who had to beat a hasty retreat to Chunar, where he remained while he summoned troops to suppress the insurrection. That end was achieved with little difficulty, and though Cheyt Singh himself escaped, a new raja was established. Hastings would appear to have been acting technically within his rights throughout ; but there can

be no question that his demands, and especially the fines, were excessive, and could be excused, if at all, only on the ground of extreme financial necessity.

The Benares insurrection took place in the latter half of 1781. While Hastings was at Chunar he was visited by the Oudh

**The Oudh
begums.
1782.**

nawab, whose subsidies were very much in arrear. Asaf ud-Daulah stated his case: with the best intentions he could not possibly meet his obligations

while so large a proportion of the State treasure and revenues was held by the begums under the guarantee of the British government. If the British would permit him to take possession of the wealth to which he was certainly entitled, he could discharge his debts. There had never been any doubt in the mind of Hastings that the nawab's claim was just; the situation had been created entirely by the perversity of the triumvirate. It was not difficult to conclude that the guarantee which had been given to the begums might legitimately be cancelled, especially as those ladies were very strongly suspected of having fomented the Benares insurrection. Hastings authorised Asaf ud-Daulah to take possession of the treasure by force. He omitted to impose conditions; the seizure was accompanied by normal oriental processes of cruelty and violence; but the subsidies were paid. The company, not Hastings, reaped the advantage, at a time when cash was very much wanted. But by this time Francis had gone home and was working his hardest in England to injure the governor-general. The affairs of Cheyt Singh and the Oudh begums provided invaluable opportunities for charges of extortionate tyranny; the court of directors censured Warren Hastings; and the governor-general tendered his resignation, and returned to England at the beginning of 1785.

More space has been given to these episodes than their intrinsic importance demands, because very largely upon them have been based the popular impressions of Hastings as a tyrannical pro-consul, and of his methods as typifying the iniquitous aggression by which the British dominion in India was established. There remains another episode which falls under the same category; but it belongs to the story of

**Foreign
policy.**

the more definitely external relations, to which we have now to turn.

The principle of policy laid down by Clive on his departure from India was that the British should seek no further acquisitions of territory, though conquest was undoubtedly **The Rohillas.** within their power, but should aim at preserving **1770.**

a balance of power between the native states, and, so far as possible, amicable relations with all of them. But with regard to the Bengal presidency in particular, it was taken as essential that Oudh should be maintained as a substantial buffer between the British province and Mahratta aggression on the west. It was in pursuance of this policy that Hastings as governor of Bengal took part in the Rohilla war. By 1770 the Mahrattas had recovered from the blow dealt them at Panipat; Sindhia was again over-running the north-western districts from Agra to Delhi, and was pushing across the Jumna to the Ganges. This brought the Mahrattas in contact with the Rohillas, who occupied the district of Rohilkhand, on the west of Oudh and on the north-east of the Ganges. The matter was the more threatening, because the Mogul Shah Alam, whom the British had established at Allahabad, placed himself in Sindhia's hands, and would have ceded the Allahabad district itself to him if the British had not themselves reoccupied it and restored it to the Oudh nawab, Shujah Daulah. The Rohillas were Mohammedan Afghans who had established their mastery over the Hindu population by the sword within the last forty years.

The Rohillas themselves were a serious menace to Oudh, a menace which would become still more serious if they should become friendly with the Mahrattas. Shujah Daulah **1773. The** wanted Rohilkhand, but he could not eject the **Rohilla War.** Rohillas without British help. He submitted to Hastings plausible pretexts for giving that help. He had aided the Rohillas in repelling a Mahratta incursion; they had engaged to pay him forty lacs of rupees (£400,000) for his assistance, but had not done so, and were intriguing with the Mahrattas. If the British would help him, he would pay them the forty lacs. In 1772 the East India Company was in great straits for want of

money ; the nawab's rupees would be of the greatest service ; but besides this, the strengthening of the barrier against the Mahrattas was of the utmost importance. The Rohillas were in Rohilkhand by right of the sword, and of nothing else ; there was no moral reason against their expulsion by the Oudh nawab. Hastings assented to Shujah Daulah's proposal, and sent the company's troops to co-operate with him. The Rohillas were expelled, and Rohilkhand was annexed to Oudh, while the British received the promised consideration for their services.

From the oriental point of view there was no sort of doubt of the legitimacy of the whole operation. From the western point **A comment.** of view it was true that the Rohillas had no direct quarrel with the British, but they constituted a very appreciable danger to a British ally, whose preservation was of vital importance to the British themselves. In view of the precarious position of the British in India, and of the fact that the Rohillas were merely a group of alien conquerors, Hastings clearly had full justification for assisting his ally in their expulsion. The point in respect of which he cannot be acquitted of blame is, that no adequate precautions were taken to ensure that western instead of oriental methods of warfare should be adopted. Consequently the suppression of the Rohillas was effected with all the normal accompaniments of an oriental conquest, in spite of repeated protests on the part of the British commander. Hastings was to show again in the case of the Oudh begums his one grave deficiency. He had not learnt the great principle of the British ascendancy, that the European must not only himself act up to European moral standards at all costs, but can only actively co-operate with orientals upon the condition that they act up to the same standards.

Hitherto we have dealt almost exclusively with those operations of Hastings in which his conduct requires defence, and the **The saviour of India.** defence itself sometimes falls considerably short of a complete justification, though in every case it suffices to clear him from the more rancorous charges which have been brought against him. We have seen him engaged rather in a desperate struggle to procure an absolutely necessary revenue

from legitimate sources if possible, but by methods which sometimes transgressed the border-line between the legitimate and illegitimate. We have still to see how almost single-handed he saved the British dominion in India from destruction at the hands of great native powers, in spite of difficulties created by the blundering folly and incapacity of the governments at Bombay and Madras, and the deliberate thwarting of his policy by his own council, at a time when Great Britain was distracted by her struggle with the American rebellion and then with the Bourbon powers.

In 1772 Madhu Rao, the son and successor of the great Balaji in the office of peshwa, died. He was succeeded by his brother, who also died within the year. A posthumous child was expected, but Ragonath Rao, otherwise called Ragoba, the brother of Balaji, sought the peshwaship which the ministers at Puna intended to confer upon the infant when it should be born. The attitude of Sindhia, Holkar, and the Bhonsla on the question was dubious. Ragoba appealed to the British at Bombay for support, offering them in return Salsette and Bassein, which they were desirous of possessing. When the infant was born in April 1774, Sindhia and Holkar declared for the regency at Puna; nevertheless the Bombay Council accepted Ragoba's proposals, and signed the Treaty of Surat in March 1775; although the separate presidencies were expressly debarred from making alliances. Hastings himself was entirely opposed to the action of Bombay, but he was also aware that since the treaty had been made the government ought to stand by it. The triumvirate took a different view as a matter of course, and although the Bombay troops, acting on behalf of Ragoba, had already inflicted a defeat on the Mahratta force, the Calcutta Council repudiated the Surat treaty, and made on their own account the Treaty of Purandar with the Puna regency, in March 1776. Ragoba was thrown over, and Bombay had to be contented with Salsette alone. In the course of the next eighteen months the arrival of the French adventurer, St. Lubin, at Puna, where he was warmly welcomed, was an alarming

1774.

Bombay
and Ragoba.1775. Treaty
of Surat,
March.1776. Treaty
of Purandar,
March.

symptom. At the end of 1777, Hastings was at last predominant at Calcutta. The course of events in the western hemisphere emphasised the danger of a revival of intimate relations between the French and the native powers in India. In 1778 France was actually at war again with Great Britain, and before the end of that year Hastings had authorised a new treaty with Ragoba which he was prepared to support by an expeditionary force from Bengal.

To that end he had established amicable relations with the Bhonsla, and the commander Colonel Goddard had advanced a considerable distance through friendly territories in January 1779 when news reached him of a disaster. Bombay, instead of awaiting his arrival, had tried to strike on its own account, and had dispatched a force against Puna, which only narrowly escaped being cut to pieces, and had been compelled to make the convention of Wargam with Sindhia, which was a practical surrender of all the Bombay demands. The situation was saved by the brilliantly vigorous action of Goddard, who made a swift dash upon Surat, frightened the Gaekwar into remaining neutral, and restored the British prestige in the west. At the beginning of 1780 Goddard, having agreed with the Gaekwar to secure to him the lordship of Gujerat in independence of Puna, captured Ahmedabad, which lies within that province, scattered the forces of Holkar and Sindhia, who was temporising, and secured the western districts on the north of the Nerbudda. His operations were to some extent assisted by a diversion effected in Sindhia's dominions by a small column dispatched by Hastings for that purpose under Major Popham.

Madhava Rao Sindhia was a particularly acute statesman who was aiming at raising himself to the real leadership of the Sindhia. Mahrattas; and he had not made up his mind on the important question of the strength of the British power. At this time it would seem that he hoped to break up that power, and to reap the profits, but did not wish as yet definitely to commit himself to the attempt. In fact he never did commit himself to it, because he never found an opportunity which

promised sufficient security of success ; and he wished to retain the chance of cementing an alliance with the British as an alternative to overthrowing them. As matters now stood, he would probably have definitely adopted a peace policy, but for a new storm which descended upon the British.

Haidar Ali in Mysore and the Nizam at Haidarabad, both of them conceived with justice that they had been badly treated by the Madras government, which had given incompatible pledges to each of them, and then sought to excuse itself from carrying out its pledges to either.

**The Nizam
and Haidar
Ali.**

To each of those powers the danger from the Mahrattas had appeared so pressing in the early years of the decade that neither of them cared for an open rupture with the British. But when the Mahrattas became engaged in their own internal feuds too deeply to take combined aggressive action, Haidar had used his opportunity to consolidate his own power at their expense. When the British gratuitously involved themselves in the Mahratta complications it occurred to the Nizam that the southern powers might combine against them. The convention of Wargam at the beginning of 1779 confirmed him in this view. Haidar on the other hand had already opened communications on his own account with the French at Mauritius, France and Great Britain being now at war. His hostility to the British was intensified by their seizure of the French port of Mahé, which he regarded as being under his protection, since it lay within the coastal territories over which he had extended his rule. The grievance was the greater because the Madras authorities had sent their troops across what was indubitably Mysore territory. So the Nizam found everything ready for putting his scheme in execution. He himself and Haidar were to deal with Madras, and the western Mahrattas with Bombay, whilst the Bhonsla would prevent intervention from Bengal.

Haidar accepted the rôle of protagonist, and in the summer of 1780 swept down from the Mysore mountains into the Carnatic with the vast army which he had been organising for years past. Madras was soon paying the penalty for its sins and for the general corruption of its government. It had made no prepara-

tions to meet the deluge which ought to have been foreseen. Haidar swept the Carnatic, cut up one column under Baillie, and drove back another, which had advanced under the once brilliant leader Hector Munro, in precipitate flight to Madras. For the moment it seemed as if the British would be wiped out of the southern presidency altogether. But neither the Bhonsla nor the Nizam had moved as yet; in the west, Goddard's prowess inspired the Mahrattas with discretion. In the north, Popham's small column startled all India by successfully surprising Sindhia's mighty fortress of Gwalior, which had been reputed impregnable. To Sindhia, to the Bhonsla, and to the Nizam this brilliant feat was convincing. All of them began to turn their minds to an accommodation with the British. Hastings in Bengal made swift preparations to remedy the disastrous blunderings of Madras; even before the end of the year reinforcements under the veteran Eyre Coote were dispatched to the south.

Any lingering doubts in Sindhia's mind were removed by the vigorous activity of Goddard and Hartley in the Puna region, and by a brilliant action fought by the little column, in the command of which Popham was succeeded by Bruce in April 1781. Eyre Coote's arrival in Madras completely changed the situation there. Hampered though he still was by the wretched mismanagement of the Madras authorities, and his consequent lack of supplies, he was able to take the field in the early summer, and to inflict two defeats upon Haidar, who knew that he had now met his match. Moreover a new governor arrived at Madras, Lord Macartney, who took matters in hand with vigour, and improved the general position during the winter by seizing the two Dutch ports of Negapatam in the south, and Trincomali in Ceylon. In the meantime Hastings had not permitted even the insurrection of Benares to disturb his course of action; and even while he was at Chunar his negotiations with Sindhia finally secured that potentate's goodwill in the further negotiations which still remained to be conducted with Puna. By the peace which was at length arranged with

**1780. Haidar
invades the
Carnatic,
July.**

**Capture of
Gwalior.**

**1781. British
successes.**

the Mahrattas, the British finally abandoned Ragoba, but remained in possession of Salsette and Bassein.

Haidar, however, was still unconquered. In the western hemisphere the British fortunes were at their lowest, for Yorktown was surrendered in October, and the balance of naval superiority still seemed to lie with the French. In 1782 Admiral Suffren arrived in Indian waters with a squadron which under his brilliant command proved a fraction more effective than that of the British commodore Hughes. Four stubbornly contested battles were fought by sea in the course of the year, in none of which could either side claim a definite victory. But Hughes could not prevent his opponent from landing reinforcements, and capturing Gudalur and Trincomali, which he found a more serviceable port than any that was available for Hughes. On land neither Haidar Ali nor Coote could succeed in winning a decisive victory. Then Coote's health broke down completely; but on the other hand Haidar died, leaving his throne and the command of his troops to his equally ambitious and active but much less able son Tippu Sultan. Haidar's death decided the Puna government to agree to the definitive peace; nevertheless the issue of the Mysore war still seemed

**Tippu
Sultan
succeeds
Haidar Ali.**

doubtful when the veteran French commander Bussy was able to land in India, and Suffren was still at Trincomali. The certainty, however, that peace between France and England was immediately impending, presently followed by the news that the preliminaries had actually been signed, prevented further operations on the part of the French during 1783.

**1783-84.
Peace.**

If Hastings had enjoyed a free hand there can be little doubt that Tippu would now have been soundly beaten. But the attitude of the directors had now become so hostile to the governor-general that he was unable to control the Madras authorities, with the result that in 1784 they concluded a peace with the Mysore sultan very much upon terms which he might have dictated if he had been the conqueror, or had at least proved himself distinctly the superior; with the result that he became firmly convinced that he had in fact been the victor.

When Hastings left India in February 1785, an experienced Indian official, Sir John Macpherson, was appointed to act as governor-general *ad interim*. Warren Hastings had done his work. He had saved India. He had taught the Mahrattas and the Nizam that the British, so long at least as a strong man was at the head of the government in India, were not to be beaten even though they might suffer reverses. He had won the respect of all the native powers, of almost the whole British community, and more than the respect of the population of Bengal; and he had laid the foundations of the Indian Civil Service. He returned to England to find himself denounced as a tyrant and extortioner with all the thunders of Burke and the lightnings of Sheridan. Eleven years earlier his mighty predecessor Clive had gone to the grave, struck down by his own hand, the victim of the melancholia partly induced by the bitterness of the attacks made upon him. Those two, through good and evil report, had fought and won Britain's battle in India, and had established the ascendancy which in course of time was to spread all over the peninsula the *Pax Britannica*—perhaps the most astonishing political achievement the world has known since the establishment of the *Pax Romana*.

V. GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND, 1770-1784

Although the ministry of Lord North is condemned by posterity for its conspicuous failure in all the essentials of a capable and intelligent government; although it was responsible for destroying all prospect of a reconciliation between the mother country and her colonies; although when it had gone to war, it transcended the records of all previous governments in its mismanagement of the military situation; although in home affairs it achieved nothing but technical victories over opponents whose cause finally triumphed in their despite; the fact remained that it was a strong government in the sense that it was irresistible in parliament, that its general policy commanded the approval of the electors, and that its majorities were unshaken at the general election of 1774 and

even of 1780. The Opposition was in fact too much divided to agree upon a common ground of attack, apart from the entirely unpopular line of its antagonism to the government's American policy, until the crisis brought about by the Saratoga disaster which exposed the essential weakness of the administration. During those eight years therefore, parliamentary and domestic affairs in Great Britain call for no more detailed attention than they have already received.

In Ireland, however, the revived political energy was increasingly active. Townshend in the last years of his administration had secured the power but not the popularity of **1772.** the government by an utterly shameless use of **Harcourt** those methods of corruption which in England had **viceroys.** transferred the control of the electorate from the Whigs to the Crown. Nevertheless when Lord Harcourt succeeded Townshend at the end of 1772 he found a powerful Opposition led in parliament by Henry Flood, and resting upon what had begun to take the character of a national sentiment. No immediate cause of friction arose, but Harcourt soon found it advisable to recommend a measure calculated at once to relieve the severe financial strain and to conciliate Irish feeling.

In Ireland there was no land tax ; the new scheme was that of imposing a tax of two shillings in the pound, not upon the whole of the land but upon that of absentee land- **The Absentee** lords. It has already been observed that vast **Tax.** estates in Ireland were owned by English magnates who never set foot in the island, but expended the revenue which they drew from it not in Ireland, but in England. The system of absenteeism was for obvious reasons extremely injurious ; a tax upon absentees was regarded upon all hands in Ireland as obviously just ; magnates who for their own convenience disregarded their responsibilities as Irish landowners might legitimately be required to provide compensation in cash. But its justice did not appeal to the absentees themselves. The proposal was strongly opposed by the Rockingham group in England, whose personal interests were largely involved, and by their foremost intellectual champion Edmund Burke.

According to the argument, it was unjust that the absentees should be penalised for giving the preference to their English over their Irish estates, and for residing in the country where their greater interests lay. The tax would force them to reside in Ireland and to desert their public duties in England. It would emphasise the false doctrine that Ireland was separate from Great Britain, and would encourage a war of retaliation much less injurious to Great Britain than to Ireland itself. It is extremely difficult to believe that any important section of the absentees would have elected to reside in Ireland instead of in England, in order to avoid paying the tax. It was to be imposed not as a penalty but as a legitimate method of obtaining compensation for injuries from which Ireland suffered, and would continue to suffer, under the absentee system. As for the 'false doctrine,' that Ireland was separate from England, the whole existing system of commercial regulation rested precisely upon that assumption, denied the identity of British and Irish interests, and subordinated the interests of Ireland to those of Great Britain. Chatham and his followers asserted the principle, which Burke himself applied to the American colonies, that it lay with Ireland to direct her own taxation. The position of the Rockinghams, however, appealed to the whole landed interest. It was obvious that the measure would meet with vehement resistance in England and would probably be rejected. Harcourt perceived that such an event would greatly aggravate the sentiment in Ireland which was so strongly opposed to British control; disastrous results might follow if Ireland followed the line which was being followed in America. He endeavoured therefore, while publicly advocating the measure on behalf of the Irish government, to procure a vote adverse to it in the Irish parliament. An impression was sedulously fostered that the absentee tax would soon be expanded into a general land tax. The resident landholders took alarm; and when a resolution in favour of the tax was introduced in parliament, and formally supported from the government benches, it was defeated.

The failure of the absentee tax then involved no direct quarrel.

The American crisis and its development into the War of Independence prohibited any such active opposition to the government as would have created an appearance of disloyalty. Flood himself accepted office. At the same time, the similarity of the Irish and the American grievances necessarily fostered in Ireland a widespread sympathy with the Americans, and made it more dangerous for the British government to turn a deaf ear to Irish complaints. When Flood joined the Irish government the leadership of the reforming party devolved upon the earl of Charlemont and Henry Grattan.

At first, however, no practical advance was made towards removal of grievances. Agitation in Ireland was for the time directed rather to the demand for free trade. But just as the landed interest in England had proved an insuperable barrier to the absentee tax, the mercantile interest in England offered a strenuous resistance to commercial concessions. In 1778, when North himself was disposed to go to considerable lengths for the sake of conciliation in view of the American situation, all that could be obtained was the inclusion of Ireland in the benefits of the Navigation Acts. In the same year, Grattan procured the first relaxation in the penal code which weighed so heavily upon his Roman Catholic fellow-countrymen. The law which conveyed the inheritance of a Roman Catholic's estate to any one of his children who might elect to turn Protestant was repealed. It may be remarked, however, that the whole tendency for some time past both in Ireland and in England had been to connive at the evasion of laws whose original excuse had been the hypothesis that a Romanist might almost be presumed to be a Jacobite. When Grattan's bill was passed in Ireland, an analogous measure was passed for England in the British parliament.

The latter measure was a mild enough concession to the spirit of toleration; but when in the following year, 1779, it was proposed to extend it to Scotland, the extravagance of the 'no popery' sentiment in that country immediately made itself

**Influence of
the American
quarrel**

**1778.
Commercial
relaxations.**

**Catholic
relief.**

felt—so strongly that the measure was abandoned. Its defeat excited the bigoted Protestants of the southern country to demand its repeal for England. The crazy Lord Gordon Riots. George Gordon set himself at the head of the movement, a huge petition was signed, and in June 1780 Lord George marched to Westminster at the head of a great mob, which broke loose from all control, and held London in terror for three days while it sacked chapels, destroyed property, and finally broke into Newgate prison which was in part burnt down. The rioting was only suppressed when the king took upon his own shoulders the responsibility for ordering out the soldiery.

Both for England and for Ireland, the situation had been changed by the French declaration of war. From 1778 onwards, Chatham being dead, the whole Opposition in England was coming into line with the demand for concentration upon the French war, and the immediate recognition of American independence. It was recognised that policy was directed not by the king's ministers but by the king himself, whom the ministers obeyed often in direct opposition to their own judgment. Parliament was controlled by means of the corrupt system of distributing pensions and sinecure places at the public expense. That system had been satisfactory enough to the Whigs in the days when they themselves controlled it; it was not so satisfactory when the control was in the hands of the king. Hence arose the cry for 'economic reform,' the abolition of the abuses of expenditure, in respect of which a vigorous agitation was started in the country, and which was embodied in Burke's bill for Economic Reform, introduced in February 1780. Although in theory the bill commanded the assent of the House, it was destroyed in committee because in its details it struck at too many personal interests. The Opposition were again divided upon the question of what ought to be done. Fox was demanding parliamentary reform, annual parliaments, and the addition of a hundred county members. Burke was opposed to any material change in the representation; Richmond

in the House of Lords took a line similar to that of Fox, but still more advanced. In the Commons, however, when John Dunning introduced his famous resolution, that 'the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished,' it was carried. King George gave his answer to the Dunning resolution by springing upon the country in September a general election, on which enormous sums were expended, and which kept the ministerial majority unimpaired. The election is otherwise noteworthy because William Pitt, Chatham's second son, who was now only in his twenty-second year, was one of the new members. Burke lost his seat for Bristol, but another was found for him by Rockingham at Malton.

The general election confirmed the North administration in office. The disasters of 1781, however, capped by the surrender of Yorktown, proved fatal. North had been discredited by the issue of a large loan which, like Dashwood's loan in 1763, was so engineered that the lenders made out of it a profit little short of a million: of which one half was said to have gone to the pockets of supporters of the government in the House of Commons. The king struggled hard to persuade North to remain in office, for if North went a Whig ministry was inevitable; and in preference to accepting the Rockinghams, George was all but prepared to retire to Hanover. But within six months of the fall of Yorktown the ministerial majorities had disappeared. The king was forced to accept North's resignation and the construction of a new ministry, which had Rockingham at its head, but included both wings of the Whig party, and notably Chatham's old supporter Lord Shelburne, on whose support George's own hopes were fixed. Pitt, though little more than a boy, declined any office of less than cabinet rank, and remained for the time outside the ministry, though he had vigorously denounced the war and associated himself with some of the more advanced Whig doctrines.

The second Rockingham administration came into power in March 1782. Three months had hardly passed when Rockingham

died, and George was able to make Shelburne prime minister. In the interval acute disagreements had arisen. Shelburne

The Rocking- had an abnormal capacity for inspiring distrust;
hams and he was looked upon by most of the Whigs as the
Shelburne, king's representative in the cabinet, in association
March-July. with the Chancellor Thurlow, the one member of

the North administration who by George's express desire was admitted to the new ministry. Shelburne too did not see eye to eye with his colleagues on the question of acknowledging American independence; though none even of the most ardent advocates of peace were ready to yield to the Bourbons, especially after the news of Rodney's victories in April. Burke's new bill for economic reform abolished many abuses, but was less stringent than his former bill, owing to the attitude of Shelburne and Thurlow. Pitt proposed parliamentary reform as the true remedy for the evils under which the country was suffering, but his motion in spite of Fox's support was defeated. Of all the ministers Fox was the hottest in his antagonism to Shelburne. The quarrel between them was brought to a head because Shelburne was responsible for colonial and Fox for foreign affairs, so that one was conducting negotiations with the American commissioners in Paris, while the other was treating with the French themselves—an impossible position when neither of the two had the confidence of the other. When Rockingham died, Fox declined to serve under Shelburne. Burke, Sheridan, and other leading members of the party associated themselves with him, though only one other member of the cabinet resigned. Pitt, who had attached himself to Shelburne, entered the cabinet as chancellor of exchequer. There were now three parties in the House, the ministerialists whose cohesion was extremely dubious, Fox's Whigs, and North's followers. But before Fox's resignation the Rockingham ministry had passed the Act which gave to Ireland the independent legislature which is known as Grattan's parliament.

It has already been remarked that in Ireland as in England, the declaration of war by France changed the situation. Popular sympathy with the colonies was one thing, disloyalty in the

face of a foreign foe was another. Troops had been withdrawn from Ireland for the American war; there was pressing danger that France would select Ireland as an objective for invasion. Quite spontaneously a movement sprang up for the formation of a large volunteer force; it was zealously encouraged by men of all parties; the lead was taken by Charlemont; the Catholics, no less than the Protestants, although they were themselves debarred from carrying arms, were liberal in providing money. Emphatically the movement was loyalist; but it was equally obvious that it might assume a very different aspect. Government viewed it with alarm, but to suppress it officially was out of the question. Moreover any such attempt would have aroused to the utmost the resentment of the entire population.

1778.**Ireland: the
volunteers.**

In plain terms the fact that had to be recognised was this, that however successful the official government might be in controlling the parliamentary vote, Protestant Ireland was thoroughly bent upon its demands for freedom of trade and legislative independence. Irish Catholics had no effective means of expressing their opinions, and could not in any case resort to force; the volunteer movement had unexpectedly placed in the hands of the Protestants a military force which, if it should be turned against the government at a moment when all its resources were needed for fighting the combination of the Americans and the Bourbons, would enable the Irish leaders to dictate their own terms. When the Dublin parliament met at the end of 1779, Flood from the government benches joined with Grattan in demanding free trade and also the relief of Irish Protestant dissenters from the Test Act. The British government dared not maintain its resistance; the test was withdrawn, and the commercial restrictions were almost entirely removed.

1779.**Commercial
and other
concessions.**

The victory gave fresh confidence to the popular leaders; while the viceroy Buckingham was aware that the strength of the government could only be maintained by the most profuse corruption. In April 1780, it became manifest that even in the Irish House of Commons the feeling in favour of independence

was almost unanimous, even though members might vote against their convictions. A sort of test question was provided by the

1780. The introduction of the Mutiny Bill. As matters stood
Irish Mutiny the British parliament had extended the Mutiny
Bill.

Act to Ireland on its own authority, in accordance with the Declaratory Act which had affirmed the power of the British parliament to legislate for Ireland. In Ireland the legality of that claim was repudiated; magistrates were prepared to act upon the doctrine that in Ireland no Mutiny Act whatever was in force. The introduction in the Irish parliament of an Irish Mutiny Bill created a dilemma. If the bill were rejected in England, the magistrates would act upon the doctrine that the military in Ireland were merely civilians, and it would be impossible to enforce military discipline. If the bill were accepted in England that would be tantamount to acceptance of the Irish doctrine. The British government in fact evaded the dilemma by altering the Mutiny Bill, so as to make it perpetual instead of annual. It was no longer a mere substitution of an Act of the Irish parliament for an Act of the parliament at Westminster; and beyond this, the Irish intention had been to gain for the Irish parliament the precise power which the English Mutiny Act had gained for the English parliament, of being able to threaten refusal of its renewal—a power which vanished when the Act was made perpetual. Nevertheless the government succeeded in procuring a majority to pass the Act in Dublin.

At the end of 1780 Lord Carlisle succeeded Buckingham as viceroy. In the course of 1781, the most serious fears were
1781. Irish entertained of a French invasion in the south of
loyalty. Ireland: the volunteers made a fresh and convincing demonstration of their loyalty, many thousands of the men of the north enrolling themselves for the defence of the south. Broadly speaking, the foreign danger made strongly for loyalty, and thus practically strengthened the hands of the government. When at the end of the year the news arrived that Yorktown had fallen, the feeling that the government must be supported at all costs was so strong that some of the Opposition leaders

suspended their intended demand for independence, in order to give their loyal addresses the utmost possible force. Grattan himself would have joined the demand for redress of grievances to the expression of loyalty, but the majority against him was overwhelming, and was not one which had been artificially manufactured.

Nevertheless, the case for the Nationalists was emphatically strengthened by the loyalty they had displayed, and outside of parliament there was no inclination to relax the energy of the demand for legislative independence. If the Americans had already practically assured their independence by fighting for it, there was the more reason why the Irish should receive the measure of independence which they demanded without any diminution of loyalty. In February 1782, there was a great gathering of the representatives of Ulster volunteers at Dungannon. The volunteers it must be remembered were all Protestants with an interest in the maintenance of the Protestant ascendancy, but Grattan had especially associated himself with the cause of justice to the Catholics. The meeting at Dungannon affirmed the principles of legislative independence and of limiting the Mutiny Bill; to these demands it added another for the relaxation of the Penal Code, at the instance of Grattan; and beyond this it took significant measures for perfecting the volunteer organisation. Several volunteer meetings in other parts of the country endorsed the proceedings of the volunteers of Ulster.

The moment was propitious. A month after the meeting at Dungannon North's ministry had fallen. The Rockinghams had all along been committed to the main constitutional principles upon which the Irish demand was based. The claim for legislative independence was conceded. By the repeal of the Declaratory Act the parliament of Great Britain surrendered its claim to legislate independently for Ireland. The legislative control both of the Irish and of the British Privy Councils was abolished. The Mutiny Act was limited to two years. Until the Legislative Union of 1800, Grattan's parliament ruled in Ireland with unrestricted legis-

**1782.
Volunteers
at Dun-
gannon.**

**Grattan's
parliament
established.**

lative powers. The British Acts of 1782 which gave this independence were confirmed in 1783 by a further Renunciatory Act, demanded by Flood and others in opposition to Grattan, which expressly resigned the claim of the British parliament to legislate for Ireland; since Flood argued that the simple repeal of the Declaratory Act did not amount to a positive repudiation of the principle.

The last stage of the war, the relief of Gibraltar, the negotiations which arranged the peace preliminaries, on the one hand, with the Americans, and on the other with France and Spain, belonged to the period of Shelburne's ministry. But though Shelburne enjoyed the king's confidence, the government was not strong in parliament. It was attacked on the one side by Fox and his associates, and on the other by North's followers. It was evident that some reconstruction would be necessary, and it was generally anticipated that either Shelburne would discard his colleagues of what had been the Rockingham group, and would coalesce with North, or that he himself would be forced to retire, and the Fox party would return to power in association with the Rockinghams. What actually happened was that Fox and North coalesced. It was an amazing combination. For years North had ruled simply as the king's instrument; Fox was distinguished by his pre-eminent hostility to the royal power. North was a Tory, Fox was the most democratic of prominent statesmen. Yet the two united to shatter the Shelburne administration, and when Shelburne's continuation in office proved finally impossible in February 1783, they were able to force the famous coalition ministry upon the extremely reluctant monarch. Pitt and Richmond went into opposition along with Shelburne, flatly refusing to have anything to do with North; while a figurehead was found for the coalition in the person of the duke of Portland.

It was Fox's very definite intention to put an end to government by the king; but the nature of the extraordinary coalition which had been formed, and which shared no common political principles, practically prohibited the carrying out of any definite programme. Though Shelburne

**Shelburne,
July 1782-
February,
1783.**

**1783. The
coalition.**

had been overthrown by the carrying of a vote of censure on the terms of the peace, his supplanters made the definitive peace in September upon practically identical terms. In the House of Commons ministers commanded an overwhelming majority; yet the fact that their union was incomplete was shown when a new parliamentary reform bill was introduced by Pitt, and was defeated in spite of the support given to it by Fox. But the two groups were in solid union when Fox in the autumn introduced a new bill for the government of India, a question which recent events had forced into a foremost place.

During the second Rockingham ministry parliament was already turning its attention to the Indian question, and passed resolutions for the recall of Warren Hastings. The directors would have acted upon the resolutions, **Need of an India Act.** but the court of proprietors was loyal to the governor-general, and its decision was final. There was no one in England capable of presenting the case for Hastings, who was generally condemned by public opinion, since his enemies were both active and able. When the coalition ministry was formed in 1783, Henry Dundas, who had held office under North but was now allying himself with Pitt, introduced an India Bill, of which the primary object was to confer very greatly increased powers upon the governor-general, but to give that office to some nobleman whose established prestige would make his position a very different one from that of a servant of the company personally unknown in England. The government, however, promised a bill of their own in the autumn, and that of Dundas was withdrawn. The proposals of Fox, prepared largely in consultation with Burke, took the form of two bills which were introduced in November.

The scheme recognised the national responsibility for the dominion in India. It vested the control in a board of seven commissioners, nominated by parliament to hold office for four years. If vacancies occurred during that time they were to be filled up by the Crown. **Fox's India Bill, November.** At the end of the four years a new Board of Commissioners was to be appointed by the Crown. A subordinate board, nominated by parliament from the larger proprietors, was to direct com-

mercial affairs ; vacancies in this board were to be filled up by the proprietors. All patronage was to be vested in the supreme board, and the bill further proposed to abolish presents and monopolies, and to lay down sundry administrative regulations. As an administrative scheme, the serious defect of the bills was probably to be found in their failure to recognise the necessity for leaving an adequate latitude of action to the governor-general in India ; but in England a different line of attack was followed.

The directors in the first place found themselves completely shelved, and raised an indignant outcry against the breach of **Opposition to the bill.** their charter. If this bill should become law no chartered company could from thenceforth feel secure in its privileges. The antagonism of the entire commercial community was roused. The Crown and the political Opposition allied themselves with the commercial opposition, but also had their own grounds for attacking the bills. Unwisely the seven commissioners nominated in the bills were all members of Fox's party. For four years the whole of the valuable Indian patronage would be a party perquisite ; it would be used, it was argued, to secure the unqualified support of the ' nabobs ' ; the unqualified support of the nabobs would secure to the party the complete control of the electoral machine ; the whole thing was in fact a plan devised in order to establish ministers permanently in power. As long as ministers were in power they would have the appointments to the Board in their own hands and would utilise it as a party instrument ; and as long as it could be utilised as a party instrument it would secure to the ministers their parliamentary majority.

In the House of Commons the bills were carried by overwhelming majorities ; outside of parliament the feeling was strongly hostile, owing to the alarm of the commercial community and the effect of the arguments of the Opposition. The attitude of the Lords was doubtful, and in the circumstances the king adopted the extremely unconstitutional course of influencing the vote of the Lords by making it known that he would treat every vote cast for the bill as an act of hostility to himself. The proper

Defeat and dismissal of the coalition.

constitutional course for the king at that time would certainly have been to dismiss his ministers, appeal to the country, and abide by the country's decision. By the course which he did actually adopt George procured instead the defeat of the obnoxious bills in the House of Lords. Then in turn the wise and constitutional course of ministers would have been to insist upon a dissolution and to appeal to the country against the dangerously unconstitutional action of the Crown. What actually happened was that within twenty-four hours of the defeat of the bill George dismissed his ministers, and invited Pitt, who was not yet five-and-twenty, to form an administration.

Pitt, with a self-confidence which was superb because it was justified by the event, though at the moment it appeared preposterous, accepted the task. His cabinet consisted, besides himself, entirely of peers; significantly enough he would not offer a place in it to Lord Shelburne. He himself stood alone in the Commons. The ejected ministers scoffed. They reckoned that with their great majority they could paralyse the new government and force Pitt to resign, whereupon George would be obliged to reinstate them. They would not demand an appeal to the country; which caused the country to believe that they expected to be defeated at the polls, and made that event all the more probable. Pitt fought his battle with amazing coolness and skill. Fox ought to have made the issue turn upon the Crown's unconstitutional use of influence; Pitt made it to turn upon the ministers' unconstitutional claim to force themselves upon the Crown. Fox ought to have posed as the champion of constitutionalism; had he done so his case would have been a very powerful one. He threw it away, and by enabling Pitt to adopt that rôle himself made his adversary's case very much the stronger. Pitt was not ready for an immediate dissolution; he wanted time to bring home to the electors the nature of the struggle, and to win their confidence.

Pitt takes
office,
December.

For three months, from 19th December 1783 to 25th March 1784, the spectacle of the young minister fighting single-handed against all the most experienced and brilliant orators and debaters

of the day appealed to the sporting instinct of the public ; the Opposition majorities dwindled ; outside parliament the tide set **1794. Pitt's** steadily in favour of Chatham's son. When Pitt **triumph.** did dissolve, the Opposition lost a hundred and sixty seats, and Pitt was returned to power with the biggest majority on record at his back.

CHAPTER IX. THE YEARS OF PEACE

I. AT HOME, 1784-1792

AT the end of the tenth year after the death of George II. it appeared that his grandson had emerged as decisively the victor in the struggle which he had been waging to restore the supremacy of the Crown in the body politic. **The Crown's domination.** George III. had made himself the master of parliament, which obeyed his behests for the next twelve years—a record without any precedent since the accession of the house of Stuart. He had won his victory by capturing the control of the electoral machinery through the purchase, by one means or another, of the bulk of the influences inside and outside of parliament which were open to corruption. Thus after the tenth year he had been able to rule through a group of ministers whose political insight was singularly defective, but who were by no means devoid of parliamentary talents, while they were unanimous in their subserviency to the Crown. Behind all this, however, lay the vital fact that public opinion in the country was blind enough to endorse the royal policy.

The actual truth was that no government could stand for long unless it had a substantial mass of public opinion at its back. Public opinion had forced the elder Pitt upon George II. in spite of all the corrupt influences that could be brought to bear. During the first ten years of George III.'s reign, public opinion had never been sufficiently pronounced to control the fate of ministries; during the next ten years it was definitely on the king's side; so that after the dissolution in 1780 the king's supporters retained their solid majority. When during the next year it turned definitely against the ministerial policy, the king was reluctantly com-

pelled, in March 1782, to accept the resignation which North pressed upon him. The fall of North's ministry proved that it was impossible for the king to retain permanent control of the government in defiance of public opinion, in spite of all the illegitimate machinery at his disposal, just as the fall of Newcastle's ministry in 1766 had demonstrated the same truth with regard to the Whig connection. The lesson was emphasised by the general election of 1784. Public opinion was determined to sweep away the coalition and was strongly disposed to take the risk of placing its confidence in the younger Pitt, who found himself in the new House of Commons with a majority of more than a hundred and sixty behind him. The Opposition was shattered to pieces.

It was the confidence inspired by Pitt during the first three months of 1784 which brought about the debacle. The king had defeated his enemies, but it was to Pitt that he owed the decisive character of the victory. There was to be no return to the conditions of 1770. **King George, Pitt, and the public.** George himself knew that he had found in his young minister not a servant but an ally; one who would not be coerced into a policy of which he disapproved; one who also, like his father before him, sought to establish a government 'broad-based upon the people's will,' not upon the successful employment of corruption. The only alternative to the alliance was the return to power of a body of politicians in whose creed hostility to royal influence was a fundamental article. For his ally, subserviency to the Crown was in no sense an article of faith as it had been with North and the King's Friends; nor would he be persuaded to subserviency for the sake of remaining in office. For office for its own sake, and the emoluments appertaining to it, Pitt cared as little as his father, though he was intensely ambitious of power. The king's dream of an autocracy carried on through parliamentary forms was dissipated. Pitt, not the king, was the real master of the situation. If the two had not remained in substantial accord, George would have been driven back to the old position of struggling to buy a predominant parliamentary party of his own. If they had not been in substantial accord

with the country, the ministry would again have been broken up. But on the main points, the king, the minister, and public opinion remained in general agreement, and Pitt with one brief interval remained at the head of the government until the day of his death.

Pitt, however, was a statesman of a very different type from Chatham. In certain respects he was more nearly akin to Walpole. If in some ways he was autocratic, yet **Character-** among his political aims there were many which he **istics of Pitt.** placed in the category of *adiaphora*, things indifferent, desirable in themselves, but not fundamental. The modern practice which requires the acceptance by a majority in the House of Commons of every measure introduced by ministers was still in the remote future. Adverse votes, even on questions which might have been regarded as of first-rate importance, were not regarded as involving resignation. Pitt would have been more than astonished by the suggestion that the career of a ministry ought to be terminated by a snap vote procured by a cleverly engineered surprise. He did not consider that he was called upon to resign because measures which he advocated were defeated, except where he considered himself definitely pledged (as in the case of Catholic Emancipation for Ireland in 1801), so long as the broad lines of his policy commanded the general approval of the House and the country. What he did require as a condition of his partnership with the king was, that George should not use the royal influence against his own measures. To a straightforward defeat by straightforward opposition, he adopted the same attitude as Walpole, when that minister found that he could only carry the Excise Bill in the teeth of popular feeling. He let the question drop.

The nine years which passed between the beginning of 1784 and the beginning of 1793 occupy a rather curious position in our history; curious because they seemed to be **The Pitt** preparing for developments which were suddenly **paradox.** thwarted by the catastrophe of the war with France, and of which the resumption was postponed until a time when all the conditions had been completely changed. During those years

Pitt's policy was on the lines of what came in the nineteenth century to be called Liberalism. As Locke had provided the Revolution Whigs with a text-book of constitutional theory, so Adam Smith had just provided a new text-book of economic theory, which was already threatening the ascendancy of the old mercantile doctrine, the doctrine to which orthodox Whigs had been as closely attached as to the principles of the Revolution. Pitt was the disciple of Adam Smith, and was zealously engaged in translating the theory into practice, until all the normal economic conditions were turned completely upside down by a war which paralysed the operations of commerce: he had been in his grave for more than a dozen years before Huskisson again began to follow upon the same paths. Pitt began his public life as a parliamentary reformer. In this course he was checked at the outset; but he would assuredly have resumed the rôle if the French Revolution and its consequences had not inspired nearly all the educated elements of society with the conviction that any encroachments upon privileges, any concession of power to the unenfranchised elements, would mean red ruin and the breaking-up of laws. Not till more than twenty years after his death did parliamentary reform again come within the range of practical politics. Pitt had begun his career as an advocate of peace; he was fated to guide the destinies of the country during the most tremendous war in which she had ever been engaged. Of all the projects with which he associated himself in the years when he was a peace minister, only one made continued progress, unchecked by the French war. In the year after his death, British participation in the slave-trade was abolished.

The political aspects of the nine years now coming under review fall under three heads which can most conveniently be treated **1784-93.** in separate sections—domestic affairs, the affairs of greater Britain, and foreign relations. Domestic affairs again fall into two divisions, the first general, the second financial or commercial, which again we shall find it convenient to treat consecutively in separate sections. Postponing therefore the consideration of Pitt's finance, we proceed now to the general record.

Apart then from the financial reorganisation necessitated by the late war and by ministerial incompetence, the main business of the session of the new parliament in 1784 was the passing of a new India Bill, shaped by Pitt and his lieutenant Henry Dundas, to take the place of the measure which had brought the coalition to ruin. In spite of the opposition of Fox and Burke, Pitt's bill was passed with huge majorities. The details, however, belong to our Indian section. Another matter which occupied much public attention was the affair of the Westminster election. There had been two government candidates for the two seats in the constituency, but Fox, standing as an Opposition candidate, had achieved the second place in the polling. A scrutiny was granted by the high bailiff. Weeks and months passed, the scrutiny was still incomplete, and Fox could not take his seat for Westminster, though he could appear in the House as member for another constituency which had returned him. When Fox petitioned for an order to the high bailiff to make the return, Pitt was ill-advised enough to oppose. He persisted in maintaining that attitude until March 1785. The general opinion had decided long before that such treatment of a political opponent who had already been badly beaten was unwarrantably spiteful; the House refused to obey Pitt any longer and gave the desired order, the majority against the prime minister being just short of forty.

**Domestic
affairs, the
Westminster
election.**

From the time of this parliament, the practice of beginning the winter session in the last months of the year, hitherto customary, was discontinued, and it became the rule that the new session should begin after the New Year. In 1785, Pitt for the last time came forward as the advocate of parliamentary reform. It was a subject with which Chatham had almost certainly intended to deal when he entered upon his last administration. In 1770 he had been defeated in his advocacy of a measure for largely increasing the representation of the counties, when he had warned the House that if it did not itself soon take in hand the reform of representation it would be 'reformed with a vengeance' from

**1785.
Parliament-
ary reform
defeated.**

outside. Yet the subject had again fallen into the background. There was no real popular outcry except in such moments of excitement as that engendered by the Wilkes agitation. The Commons generally were hostile to the movement, because there were too many members who owed their seats to the owners of pocket boroughs, or to judicious methods of corruption, for a majority to be willing to be forced to fight for their seats. The magnates who controlled pocket boroughs did not want reform. Such constitutionalists as Burke were afraid that any change would destroy what they regarded as the legitimate preponderance of the landed interest; they had confined themselves to the advocacy of what was called Economic Reform, the abolition of illegitimate methods of controlling votes. When the Rockingham ministry was formed, Pitt had moved a resolution in favour of parliamentary reform, which was defeated, although supported by Fox. When the coalition was in power he had again raised the question only to be defeated once more. He now proposed that a number of decaying boroughs should be disfranchised but should receive compensation, and that other decaying boroughs should have the option, if they fell below a certain standard, of surrendering their claim in return for compensation. It was estimated that by this means about a hundred representatives could be given to populous towns which were at present unrepresented, to the counties, and to London and Westminster, whose population entitled them to an increase in the number of their members. The franchise was to be extended to copyholders and householders. Fox, however, though an advocate of parliamentary reform, refused to support the bill, because he objected to the principle of buying out the rotten boroughs—a principle which Pitt himself disliked, and had introduced chiefly as a means to removing opposition to the bill, which was duly defeated by a majority of seventy-four. The question excited so small a degree of popular interest that neither Birmingham nor Manchester, towns which were without representatives, were moved to petition in favour of the bill.

The same question was agitated in Ireland. In that country it was complicated by the proposal of the eccentric bishop of

Derry for the extension of the franchise to Roman Catholics, a plan which was approved by Grattan, though it did not find general favour among the Protestants. The real uses of the volunteer movement had disappeared; the danger that it might be employed improperly for political purposes was emphasised by the demand of the bishop and of Flood, that a volunteer convention should be held in Dublin to formulate their demand in a manner which should impress the Dublin parliament. Charlemont did his best to ensure the predominance of the moderate element in the Convention.

**1783-4.
Parliamentary reform
in Ireland.**

But the whole proceeding was a serious blunder. The Irish House of Commons had precisely the same reasons as the British House of Commons for objecting to reform itself, and in a still greater degree. The appearance of Flood and some other members on the floor of the House in their volunteer uniform was a challenge which could not fail to be taken up. Flood presented his bill, which was promptly rejected, and was again defeated when brought in for the second time in March 1784. Parliamentary reform vanished from the field of practical politics for more than forty years.

Pitt's defeat in 1785 on the question of parliamentary reform was followed in the same year by a second rebuff, this time in relation to Ireland. In that country the fight for independence, though it had actually been conducted with a loyalty and sobriety somewhat remarkable in view of the American example, had inevitably given encouragement to the more disorderly and disaffected elements. The independence of the legislature did not counteract this tendency, as was shown by the proceedings in 1783 which have just been described. The relations created by the establishment of Grattan's parliament were by no means satisfactory, because in some respects too much and in others too little had been conceded. On the one hand, the Irish Executive continued to be appointed by and responsible to the Crown under the advice of English ministers, instead of being responsible to the Irish legislature. On the other hand, legislative independence was accompanied by fiscal

**Irish
relations.**

independence. Just as England and Scotland before the Union of 1707 found their commercial interests clashing, very much to the detriment of the poorer country, so now there was nothing to prevent the parliaments of Great Britain and of Ireland from passing mutually hostile commercial legislation. The mere fact that it would have been extremely unwise of Ireland to establish tariffs or bounties detrimental to English commerce was no security against the thing being done; nor was there any security that Great Britain would not now treat Ireland as England had treated Scotland before the Union. Ireland, in fact, had been delivered only from the grievance of legislative control; the persistence of executive control and the risk of fiscal friction still left to her inducements to press for such a complete severance as America had achieved, and as Scotland had only been prevented from claiming by the Union of 1707. The Viceroy Rutland was already of opinion that an incorporating union was the only alternative to complete separation within a short time.

In Pitt's view, the fiscal relations were the most serious difficulty, as they had been the most serious difficulty with Scotland

**1785. Pitt's
proposed
commercial
treaty.**

at the beginning of the century. The commercial concessions made by Lord North had removed many restrictions imposed by the British parliament upon Irish trade, but had not established free trade between the two islands. There were still prohibitive tariffs against the import of Irish manufactures, though the embargoes upon Irish exports to and imports from the colonies and foreign countries had been removed. Pitt proposed not an incorporating union, but a perpetual treaty of commerce establishing complete free trade between the two countries. Whether or not the commerce of Great Britain would be benefited by such an arrangement, the benefit to Irish commerce would certainly be immense. It was right, therefore, that Ireland should pay a reasonable price. The American analogy suggested what that price ought to be. Now that Great Britain had resigned all fiscal control over Ireland, the same difficulty might arise with Ireland as had arisen with the colonies; there was no means

of compelling Ireland to make her fair contribution to the naval defence of the Empire. The price, then, was to be the payment by Ireland of a fixed contribution, which was to be appropriated specifically to imperial defence by the imperial government. This fixed contribution was to be drawn from the anticipated increase in the hereditary revenue of the Crown, derived from customs and excise, so that it would be directly proportioned to the development of Irish commerce, which it was the primary object of the proposed treaty to procure.

It was expected that there would be considerable opposition in Ireland to the proposal upon two grounds: one that the contribution to the imperial revenue had too much of the appearance of a tribute, the other, **Reception of the measure.** that Irish manufacturers would be prevented from protecting their industries from the irresistible competition of Great Britain by the imposition of duties. The proposals were, however, carried in the Irish parliament with a modification stipulating that the contribution to the navy should only be such surplus of the hereditary revenues, in time of peace, as remained when Irish expenditure had been met out of revenue. In England, however, resolutions in favour of the proposals were no sooner introduced than the British commercial interests both in England and in Scotland were up in arms, declaring that Free Trade with Ireland would ruin British commerce because of the comparative cheapness of Irish labour.

It was evident that Pitt's proposal would never be carried. After three months' interval a fresh set of resolutions was introduced by Pitt, intended to conciliate the British **1785.** opposition. In effect the Irish parliament was to **Alteration and rejection.** be compelled to adopt all legislation for the regulation of trade which might be enacted by the parliament of Great Britain, while sundry limitations were attached to the importation of goods to Ireland, and the exportation of Irish goods to British colonies, though in other respects British trade regulations were not to differentiate between the two countries. Fox denounced the new proposals as being the purchase of Irish slavery at the price of English commerce. Pitt nevertheless

succeeded in carrying his resolution. But the change transformed the Irish acceptance of the former proposals into passionate hostility. Grattan was not prepared to purchase commercial concessions at the cost of the newly-won fiscal freedom. Since Pitt's primary object had been the conciliation of Ireland, it was obviously useless to go on with the scheme, even if the government had been strong enough to carry it in the face of bitter opposition; and the whole proposal was withdrawn.

The leading features of the two following years, 1786 and 1787, were the establishment of Pitt's Sinking Fund, the initiation **1786-87.** of the impeachment of Warren Hastings, and the commercial treaty with France, all of which will be dealt with elsewhere. The year 1787 is also noteworthy as the first in which the evils of the slave-trade were mooted in parliament, and a committee of inquiry was appointed—to the great indignation of that portion of the commercial community which was interested in the traffic.

In 1788 occurred an incident which for a time seemed likely to bring about the fall of Pitt. The king's brain gave way and he became temporarily insane. It was doubtful **1788.** whether he would live, and whether, if he lived, he **The Prince of Wales.** would recover his sanity. Arrangements for a regency became an imperative necessity. The Prince of Wales, following the precedent of his grandfather and great-grandfather, was on very ill terms with the king. He had long been ostentatious in his alliance with Fox. His private life was as conspicuous for indecency and debauchery as was his father's for its extreme propriety. He had married secretly a Roman Catholic lady, of unimpeachable virtue, a Mrs. Fitzherbert, yet he had instructed Fox, who acted in perfect good faith, to give the rumour an unqualified contradiction. His extravagances had already compelled him to obtain from parliament a grant of £160,000 for the payment of his debts. Yet there could be no doubt that, according to constitutional practice, the heir to the throne being of age must be the regent. It was no less certain, that as soon as he should be regent, the ministry would be dismissed, while it was probable that Fox would be joined

by a sufficient number of Pitt's nominal following to carry on the government. The royal favour was still a material element in the distribution of parties.

There was a chance, however, that the king's illness might after all be brief. Pitt claimed that, while the Prince of Wales was the proper person to appoint as regent, it was **The** necessary that the appointment should be made **Regency Bill** by parliament, and accompanied by express limitations to his powers, which might otherwise be so exercised as to embarrass the government seriously if and when the king should recover. Fox was rash enough to assert that the prince had an indefeasible right to the regency. But if he had a right to it, it followed that parliament had no right to limit his powers without his own consent, just as it could not restrict the royal prerogative without the consent of the Crown. Fox, a terribly bad tactician, enabled Pitt to assume the rôle of the champion of the rights of parliament and to denounce the most advanced of Whigs as the champion of the prince's prerogative. The House of Commons supported Pitt. Fox spoke as if a change of ministry were an assured matter, and Pitt's desire to limit the powers of the regency were intended merely to embarrass his successors. But a further question was involved for which no precedents could be adduced. An Act of Parliament required the royal assent, and the king could not give his assent, being incapacitated. Pitt proposed that a commission should be appointed with authority to affix the Great Seal to the bills. The proposal was carried in both Houses. The limitations proposed placed the charge of the king in the hands of the queen, and forbade the regent to make peers, or to bestow any offices or pensions except during the royal pleasure—that is, if the king recovered, he could cancel any offices or pensions bestowed in the interval. These restrictions, however, were to be made in the expectation of the king's early recovery, and in the contrary event were to be subject to revision.

The king's breakdown had occurred on 5th November 1788; the terms of the regency were accepted by the prince at the end of January. The Regency Bill was formally introduced early

in February, was passed by the Commons, and had reached an advanced stage in the House of Lords, when it was announced, **1789. Fate of the Bill.** on 19th February, that the king was convalescent. The proceedings were suspended, and three weeks later George was able to announce that his health was restored. The crisis had passed. Its effect was to establish relations much warmer than heretofore between the king and Pitt. The whole episode had a somewhat absurd epilogue; for the Irish parliament, anxious to emphasise its own independence, sent over an address inviting the prince to assume the regency without imposing any limitations. But when the commissioners with the address arrived, they were too late, for the king had already recovered.

With the assembly of the States-General in May the curtain rose upon the terrific drama of the French Revolution. On **1789-92.** 14th July, the Bastille fell, and from that time interest concentrates upon the events in France, until the declaration of war in February 1793. During those years the domestic events of interest were few. A general election in 1790 confirmed Pitt's majority. In 1791 some relief from annoying disabilities was extended to Roman Catholics. From 1791 onwards a persistent campaign was carried on against the slave-trade, but though Pitt supported the agitation he declined to make Abolition a government measure. In 1792, Fox at last procured an Act of Parliament which definitely gave to juries the right of deciding on libels which twenty years before Lord Mansfield had declared to belong to the judges. After 1792 there was an end to all legislation except such as was of a reactionary and repressive character.

II. PITT'S FINANCE, 1784-1792

We turn now to Pitt's financial record, the policy which, aided by the industrial revolution which was now in progress, enabled **Pitt's finance.** the country to recover from its exhaustion at the end of the last war so completely that in a still more exhausting war Pitt became the paymaster of Europe. As we have already noted, the publication of Adam Smith's *Wealth of*

Nations in 1776 provided him with a new text-book of economic principles which had been in some respects foreshadowed by Walpole, though only in that minister's own carefully veiled fashion ; for Walpole had been the last man to avow principles the enunciation of which would have stirred commercial orthodoxy to its depths. Commercial orthodoxy regarded the mercantile theory as axiomatic ; and Walpole would never have dreamed of calling the theory in question. According to that doctrine, we may remind ourselves, it is the business of the State so to regulate trade as to direct it into the channels which increase the strength of the country. The strength of the country is increased by a trade which exchanges goods for treasure, and diminished by a trade which exchanges treasure for goods. The strength of the country is also increased by making it self-supporting, independent of supplies from foreign countries ; by the development of industries which provide health-giving employment ; and, in the case of an island like Great Britain, by the expansion of its marine so as to provide it with the most valuable material in time of war. Conversely the country is weakened by a commerce which tends to increase the strength of rivals by giving them treasure for goods, encouraging in them the development of healthy industries, independence of external supplies, and an expanding marine. From these premisses it followed that it was desirable to obtain a market for our own products, and to shut out from our own markets those products of foreign countries which it was able to produce for itself, of foreign countries which did not in return open to us a still better market for our own goods, of foreign countries such as France with which we were liable to be at war, while the commerce with them would help them to accumulate the resources which are the sinews of war. From this theory also had sprung the Navigation Acts, on the hypothesis that they would expand the shipping of England and contract the shipping of Holland. A natural accompaniment of the theory, though not a necessary conclusion from it, was the normal belief that a heavy taxation of imports was at once desirable commercially and productive of revenue.

**Adam Smith
and mer-
cantilism.**

This last proposition was not bound up with the mercantile theory. Walpole had seen the fallacy, and had enlarged the **The Walpole precedents.** revenue by the reduction of tariffs which increased in greater proportion the amount of the goods upon which the duties were paid ; while it also increased correspondingly the market for British goods. But Walpole himself did not venture to touch duties upon goods which entered into competition with British products, and no one was more strenuous than Walpole in his denunciation of the proposed commercial treaty of the Tories with France in 1713 ; a treaty which was held up to execration partly as an abrogation of the popular Methuen Treaty with Portugal, and still more because it was believed that in the balance more goods and less treasure would come from France into England than would go from England into France.

The new doctrines of Adam Smith cut at the root of the whole mercantile theory. According to this view the exchange of goods **The new view.** for treasure over the whole field would adjust itself automatically. If money went out of the country, *ipso facto* a demand for money would be created. Money prices would fall and British goods would be cheapened. Being cheapened, the demand for them in foreign markets would increase, and money would come back to England in exchange for the increased export. Treasure in fact was not essentially distinguishable from any other kind of goods ; that it appeared to be so was merely the fictitious result of its being employed as the standard and medium of exchange. To regulate trade at all was an error ; it should not be forced into channels directly productive of strength unless under certain exceptional circumstances ; because if left to itself it would follow the channels most productive of material wealth to the individual trader, and therefore to the aggregate of traders ; and for practical purposes material wealth would be converted into actual strength, accumulated wealth in general, not treasure in particular, being the sinews of war. The prosperity of other countries was not to be deprecated ; the more they prospered the better would be the markets open to us, and our own prosperity would be pro-

portionately greater. All taxation was a restriction upon trade, and therefore an evil checking the production of wealth ; an evil necessary indeed for the provision of revenue, but in general admissible only for that particular end. These were the general principles of the new doctrine, though exceptions to the general rules were recognised.

A general and immediate acceptance of a body of views contravening the established doctrine and practice of centuries was not to be looked for. The commercial world still had a whole-hearted belief in protection, and a sincere terror of competition ; as was shown clearly enough when Pitt, with larger ideas in his mind, endeavoured to establish freedom of trade with Ireland. The mercantile community then forgot that its prosperity had been in no degree diminished by the concession of Free Trade to Scotland. The idea that healthy competition may stimulate industry rather than retard it was not immediately acceptable, and hardly became so until the industrial developments in the ensuing half century had given to Great Britain in addition to her commercial ascendancy an even more unqualified manufacturing supremacy. When Great Britain had become the workshop of the world her manufacturers ceased to fear foreign competition, and became enthusiastic free-traders, though the great agricultural interest which found itself undersold by foreign competitors remained fervently protectionist ; whereas in 1784 the Industrial Revolution was still only in its initial stage, and competition was feared by the manufacturer as well as by the landowner. But in other respects Pitt was able to act broadly in accordance with the precepts of Adam Smith.

To Pitt as to Walpole finance was the dearest interest of statesmanship, and it was the success of Pitt's financial measures which, more than any other single aspect of his policy, secured the popularity of his administration. When he came into power he found himself faced by a huge National Debt (which had about doubled since 1760), and chaotic financial conditions which year by year produced a heavy deficit. There were innumerable taxes, but they had been imposed upon no system at all. Pelham, like Walpole, had

1784.
The financial
situation.

acted upon the principle that low duties upon goods for which there is a demand are more productive than high duties ; but Pelham's successors, at their wits' end for revenue, had piled up the duties again, so that in 1784 the duty upon tea was no less than 119 per cent. Upon foreign spirits also the duties were enormous; with the result that great quantities of the heavily taxed goods were brought into the country by smugglers without paying any duty at all.

Pitt in his first budget of 1784 took the bold step of making a heavy reduction of the duties upon tea and foreign spirits. That
The 1784 budget. upon tea was brought down from 119 to 12½ per cent. Since it was not to be supposed that nine times as much tea as before would immediately find its way through the customs, or that there would be a corresponding increase in the legitimate importation of foreign spirits, it was necessary to find some fresh sources of taxation. This was effected partly by the imposition of an increased window tax. There was already a tax upon windows ; every house must have windows ; under Pitt's tax every house which had from seven to ten windows paid a shilling a window, and those which had more than ten paid half-a-crown a window, while cottages, which were a most windowless, paid nothing. The burden of the tax consequently fell upon the comparatively well-to-do, while it was a cheap tax to collect because the amount payable by each house could be ascertained by the simple process of counting the windows from outside. A number of small taxes were also imposed upon articles of finery or luxury, from racehorses to ribbons, which hurt no one, but even in the aggregate brought no very substantial return.

These measures, however, did not suffice to meet the immediate necessities, and Pitt was obliged to raise a loan of £6,000,000.
A reform. But in doing so he introduced a reform of great importance. The loan was thrown open to public tender and the lowest tender was accepted ; whereas under North's ministry in particular Dashwood's precedent had been habitually followed, and loans had been raised by private contract among supporters of the government who were allowed to pocket very substantial

profits. At the same time Pitt adopted the principle of funding as much of the unfunded debt as was possible—that is to say, of transferring the unsecured debts of the government to the consolidated stock with interest secured on a specified portion of the revenue.

The Budget of 1784 was so far successful that, in the next year, there was every promise that the revenue would soon balance expenditure, and that before long the **Budget of** minister would be able to give shape to his favourite **1785.** project of beginning to pay off the National Debt out of revenue. Meanwhile the remainder of the unfunded debt was funded, and some additional taxes were imposed, notably one upon domestic servants, graduated according to the number employed; though this proved extremely unpopular so far as concerned female servants.

In 1786 Pitt's great end had been achieved. The revenue would exceed expenditure approximately by £1,000,000, and it might be assumed with certainty that it would **1786.** continue to increase as smuggling, already greatly **The Sinking** reduced, would continue to diminish. Pitt then **Fund.** introduced his bill for a Sinking Fund, to be formed by setting aside annually £1,000,000 out of the revenue. Walpole had instituted a Sinking Fund, but it had been practically a dead letter, because no government when in want of funds had scrupled to raid it for expenditure. Pitt's fund was to be reserved exclusively for the discharge of the National Debt. It was to be placed in the hands of a Board of Commissioners, to whom £250,000 was to be paid quarterly. They were to invest that money to the best advantage, and also the interest upon it. Accumulating in this way at compound interest the sum would in a few years swell to such dimensions that the National Debt could be paid off. The plan was satisfactory enough so long as there were surpluses out of which the fund could be maintained, or even so long as the government could raise loans at a rate of interest lower than that which was received by the Board. But it was not perceived that in time of war the increased expenditure would necessitate the raising of loans at a

rate of interest higher instead of lower ; that in effect the money paid into the Sinking Fund would be money borrowed at those higher rates, and that consequently the State would be, broadly speaking, borrowing money at a high rate of interest that it might invest it at a lower rate in order to pay off the debt of which the interest was lower. Pitt, in fact, did not anticipate that there would be such a war ; when the war did come, he realised that the continued payment into the Sinking Fund was actually bad finance ; but he went on with it because, however illogically, it gave confidence to the public which had not awakened to the fallacy, and the preservation of confidence appeared to be worth the price paid for it. Still, economists are by no means disposed to regard that excuse as sufficient, and there can be no question at all that the price paid was a very heavy one.

Much less dubious, though much more virulently criticised at the time, was the commercial treaty with France which Pitt laid before parliament in 1787. Here most definitely the old mercantile doctrine was thrown overboard, as the Tories had sought to throw it overboard in 1713. French and British had each been in the habit of excluding or almost excluding the trade of the other country from their markets. The treaty which Pitt negotiated, and which was actually signed in September 1786, established what was comparatively free trade between the two countries. The prohibitive tariffs in general were reduced, while for the most part the goods of either country were placed on the 'most favoured nation' footing, that is to say, the duties imposed were no higher than the lowest imposed upon the same kind of goods imported from any other country. Protectionist interests were not alarmed because the French products did not compete with home products ; moreover it soon became manifest that what was called the balance of trade would not be unfavourably disturbed as had been anticipated in 1713, because there was a greater demand for British goods in France than for French goods in Great Britain. Pitt dwelt upon increased commercial intercourse as tending to generate good feeling between the countries.

1786-7.

**The French
commercial
treaty.**

It is curious to find the most fiery opposition emanating from Fox, on the ground that France was the irreconcilable foe of Britain, and Britain should by no means adopt a policy which tended to increase the prosperity of her rival. Not many years were to elapse before Fox adopted a very different attitude towards France. But it is quite clear that if the old mercantile doctrines had not already lost much of their hold upon public opinion, hostility to the treaty would have been strong and widespread, whereas as a matter of fact it commanded general acceptance. In this as in everything else the war when it came brought a reaction. Belligerents are apt to make everything secondary to the grand object of inflicting as much damage as possible on the opponent, and French and British each bolted and barred their doors against the other; but when for peaceful emulation was substituted a commercial struggle *à outrance*, a desperate effort on each side to ruin the other, it was upon France that the greater injury fell.

In the same year in which parliament debated the French treaty, Pitt set the finishing touches to his financial methods. The vast miscellaneous swarm of heterogeneous customs treaties was systematised as well as the excise, not with the object of increasing or diminishing the actual amount of the duties, but for the very necessary purpose of simplification; for the existing complexities made it an extremely laborious task for the ordinary merchant to work out with accuracy the amount of the duties he was called upon to pay. The result was not an increase of revenue, but a very considerable economy in expenditure, a substantial reduction of the working staff required, and the abolition of a number of wholly superfluous appointments which were practically sinecures.

**The country
and the
treaty.**

**1787.
Simplifica-
tion of
customs.**

III. THE EMPIRE, 1785-1793

Fox's India Bill wrecked the coalition; inevitably it was Pitt's first duty to provide his own solution of the problem offered by the great dependency. Pitt's India Act 1784. fixed the system of government which with only minor modifications remained in force until 1858. The India Act. For administrative purposes its most marked departure from Fox's scheme was its recognition of the necessity for endowing the governor-general with very large discretionary powers. This also had been the leading feature in the abortive India Bill introduced by Dundas and withdrawn in the early days of the coalition. Those features of Fox's Bill which had aroused such violent opposition at home were removed.

As under North's Regulating Act, the supreme authority on the spot was vested in the governor-general in council, who were also the governor and council of Bengal; The governor-general and his council. the Madras and Bombay presidencies having each its own governor and council. But, besides the governor, there were now to be not four other members of council but three, one being commander-in-chief, in each presidency. The commander-in-chief in Bengal stood in much the same relation to the other two commanders-in-chief as the governor of Bengal to the other two governors. Since the governor had a casting vote, he could not be over-ruled except by a council unanimously opposed to him. Practically no future governor-general was in danger of the fate of Hastings, who found the control taken out of his hands by his colleagues. In the first form of the bill a large latitude was allowed to the governor-general. But before the post, for which Cornwallis was chosen, was accepted by him, he insisted that that latitude should be still further extended, and that he should have authority in emergency to act upon his own responsibility without consulting the council. The new Act, moreover, avoided the blunder into which North had fallen, of setting up beside the executive a judiciary responsible only to an entirely different authority. In India itself there was to be no divided control.

In England, however, the Act set up two authorities, the East India Company and a Board of Control directly responsible to parliament. To these two authorities the governor-general was responsible. The main limitation on his powers was that he was enjoined to make no alliances without having first obtained their sanction. The directors of the company issued to him general instructions; he might for sufficient reasons, known to him but not to them, disobey those instructions; but if he did so he would have to justify his action to them and take the risk of being recalled. The Board of Control represented the national sense of responsibility for the conduct of the Indian government. The head of the board was a minister of the Crown, and the *personnel* of the board changed with the change of ministry. Its authority was supreme. It had access to the correspondence of the directors, and a general power of supervision; and the governor-general could neither be appointed nor recalled without its approval; patronage remained for the most part in the hands of directors, but even in this field they were hardly able to resist pressure from the Board of Control. The first president of the Board of Control was Henry Dundas, who utilised his position to inundate India with his own countrymen; which was a cause of some irritation and jealousy, but in fact provided the Indian government with a considerable number of particularly efficient administrators, while it materially helped Dundas himself to form the Scottish members of the British House of Commons into a compact body of unfailing supporters.

**Board of
Control, and
the company.**

The appointment of the first governor-general under the new régime was delayed. It was intended to act upon the principle that he should be, not an official whose experience was restricted to India itself, but one versed in public affairs, of recognised capacity, judgment and weight, who would have no reason to fear responsibility. The first intention was to appoint Lord Macartney who was governor of Madras; but the selection was not approved; and the government was able to withdraw the offer when Macartney required as a condition of acceptance

**1786.
Cornwallis
governor-
general.**

larger powers than the Act provided. This, however, did not prevent the government from conceding those larger powers to Lord Cornwallis. No better appointment could have been made, for without being in any sense a genius, Cornwallis was like Wellington 'rich in saving common sense,' clear-eyed and cool-headed, just and sincere, at home alike in the camp and in the council chamber; a man in short to be absolutely trusted, while his social position made him careless of favour or disfavour.

Before Cornwallis left England, Warren Hastings had arrived. He became at once the object of attack. The generous indignation of Fox and Burke had been roused by the tales of wrong poured into their ears by the detractors of Hastings; tales which in their sympathetic imagination acquired a still more lurid character. Pitt, whose susceptibilities were less excitable, declined to join the attack, and was as a matter of course accused of attempting to screen Hastings. Burke formulated a series of charges. The first dealt with the Rohilla war. Pitt sat silent; Dundas declared that that question was already a *chose jugée*, since after the facts were known Hastings had been appointed governor-general; the House repudiated the charge. It was generally believed that the government intended to support Hastings and oppose an impeachment; but when the second charge was brought forward, dealing with the Benares affair, Pitt surprised both his followers and his opponents by supporting it, on the ground that while Hastings was warranted in his demand for money and troops, the fine he had imposed was excessive and tyrannical. He carried with him a sufficient number of supporters to make a majority against Hastings. Pitt's change of front seems to require no very elaborate explanation. Avowedly he had not examined the evidence as to that particular charge until just before the debate. When he did examine it, it appeared to him convincing, and he spoke and voted accordingly. He never had the slightest intention of acting as a partisan of either side.

Other charges were then introduced and accepted. The impeachment was resolved upon in May 1787; and in February

1788 the trial of Warren Hastings before the peers was opened. It provided the occasion for much magnificent rhetoric then and afterwards ; it brought almost to bankruptcy the man who, whatever else he had done, had worked not for his own enrichment but for that of the company. But after the magnificent initial display public interest dwindled. The Lords sat to listen to the charges at increasingly prolonged intervals ; for thirty-five days in the first year, not half as many in the next ; and finally delivered their verdict seven years after the impeachment began. Hastings was unanimously acquitted on every count of the indictment.

Cornwallis arrived in India in September 1786. Macpherson in the interval had discharged his task successfully enough ; Sindhia had seized the opportunity of the departure of Hastings to try the metal of the acting governor-general, but not finding him at all malleable made haste to resume his attitude of diplomatic friendliness. In the south, the Mysore sultan, having as we have seen made peace with the British, very much to his own satisfaction, was at war with the Puna Mahrattas, and with the Nizam, each of whom was endeavouring to make a cat's-paw of the other. The new governor-general gave Tippu a very strong hint that British intervention would not be to his advantage, which brought him to a more pacific frame of mind, and the hostilities were promptly terminated.

The powers bestowed upon Cornwallis, his personal character, and the respect in which he was universally held, enabled him to undertake the work of organising the administration upon a healthy basis, with an authority and a security not enjoyed by his predecessors. No private influence, however weighty, prevailed with him to give appointments to incompetent or untrustworthy persons. He succeeded, where Hastings had failed, in forcing the company to give to their officers adequate salaries which raised them above the necessity of increasing their means by illegitimate methods. He definitely established the system of separating the revenue branch of the civil service from the judicial ; and he placed the criminal jurisdiction in the hands of British

1788-95.

The trial

India, 1785-6.

1787-92.

Administra-
tive reforms
of Cornwallis.

instead of native courts of justice, while continuing to administer Mohammedan law to the Mohammedans, Hindu law to the Hindus, and an equitable compromise where both Mohammedans and Hindus were concerned.

The name of Cornwallis is perhaps most definitely associated with his permanent land settlement in Bengal. This was a subject which had engaged the serious attention of Hastings. On the basis of the inquiries instituted by his predecessor, Cornwallis completed the assessment of the whole presidency for revenue purposes, and declared that that assessment was to be permanent. In other words, the whole profit of improvement and development was to go to the holders of the land. Further, the position of the *zemindar* was made permanent; he was treated as the owner of the soil with free powers of alienation, very much as if he had been an English landowner unrestricted by the law of entail. In fact the *zemindar* in the past had not been the owner of the land in the English sense; he had enjoyed the revenues of an estate conferred upon him during pleasure, subject to his payment to the government of the amount at which his estate was assessed; he had been primarily a government official, appointed to collect the land revenue of the *zemindari* or *zemindari* district which was farmed out to him. The land itself was held originally by various tenures as the property of a hereditary landowner, or of the *ryot*, the actual cultivator of the soil, or of the village community; the *zemindar* was an alien imposition, though his creation might have dated back for a couple of centuries, or more, and his rights had tended to become hereditary in practice if not in theory. Following the English analogy, Cornwallis made the position of the *zemindar* permanent, as though he had been the real landowner, in order to give him security of tenure and a consequent inducement to expenditure on the development of his estate without any danger that the government would raise his assessment on the strength of his own expenditure and improvements. At the same time the security of tenure of his tenants was safeguarded in accordance with what was understood to be the law and custom of the

country. Later it came to be understood that the *zemindar* as such was for the most part a middleman between the government and the real proprietors of the soil, although no doubt in many cases the *zemindari* had been granted not to some one from outside, but to a hereditary landowner. In the later settlements outside Bengal, the *zemindar* comparatively speaking disappeared, and the government dealt directly with the *talukdar*, the *ryot*, or the village community.

Cornwallis was thoroughly imbued with the sound doctrine, derived from Clive, that the British ought not to aim at extension of territory. But like most of his successors, **Tippu,** he found extension of territory forced upon him. **sultan.** In his case, Tippu of Mysore was responsible for the necessity. That potentate aimed at making himself supreme in Southern India, and his experience with the Madras government had taught him to hold a low opinion of the British capacity for counteracting his ambitions. The Nizam, on the other hand, wanted to use the British for the curbing of his dangerous neighbour. Under an old treaty, the Nizam had **The Nizam.** agreed to cede to Madras a district known as the Guntur Sirkar. Cornwallis pressed him to carry out the cession; and he replied by inviting the British to carry out on their side another obligation under a former treaty of the Madras government, to recover for him certain districts of which he had been robbed by Haidar. The situation was embarrassing, since the British government had recognised Haidar as the owner of those districts since the obligation had been incurred.

Cornwallis, therefore, agreed to provide the troops promised under this earlier treaty for the Nizam's protection, but with the stipulation that they were not to be used against **1789-92.** any ally of the British—Tippu's name not being **The Mysore** included in the list of allies. If, then, the Nizam **campaigns.** chose to declare war on Tippu, he could use the troops; but the British themselves would not have declared war. Tippu, however, regarded the excuse as sufficient, and attacked Travancore, which was under British protection, at the end of 1789. A campaign against Tippu was then a necessity. Haidarabad

and Puna both allied themselves with the British, though with no intention of relieving them of serious work. The campaign conducted in 1789 by General Meadows was unsuccessful. In 1791, Cornwallis himself took the command, but again without success, owing chiefly to the extremely dubious behaviour of the Mahrattas. In 1792, however, Cornwallis again took the field. This time the campaign was decisive, Tippu was forced to submit, and, in accordance with the invariable law of oriental warfare, was required to cede large districts, which Cornwallis divided, not unequally, between the British, the Nizam on the north-east, and the Mahrattas on the north-west. Even this, however, as we shall see, did not suffice to teach Tippu the necessary lesson.

But in 1792, war with France was impending, and in the next year Cornwallis was recalled, not because he was not wanted in India, but because he was wanted in England.

1793. Sir John Shore, who had been of immense service
Shore to him in working out the land settlement, had in
governor- the meanwhile visited England; and Cornwallis was
general. sufficiently impressed by his capacity and by the enlargement of his ideas, consequent upon his visit to England, to name him as the one Indian official to whom the governor-generalship might be safely entrusted; and Shore consequently succeeded to that post.

The American War of Independence had torn the thirteen colonies from the British empire, and created the United States **Canada** of America. These colonies, however, had not been accompanied by those in the northern portion of the continent, which had been taken from the French, or had in the past been in debate between British and French. Thither great numbers of the loyalists betook themselves, after the recognition of American independence, preferring to remain under the British flag. They were planted chiefly in New Brunswick and in Upper Canada; with the result that in Upper Canada or Ontario, where the French had not spread, the population was British and Protestant; whereas in Lower Canada there was only a sprinkling of British and Protestants among a French

and Catholic population. In the new region the provisions of the Quebec Act were inappropriate; and consequently, in 1791, the Canada Act was passed, separating the colonies of Upper Canada or Ontario and Lower Canada or Quebec. Each was governed upon the old colonial lines; each now received its own legislature, with an elective and a nominated chamber, and a governor, who with his executive council was responsible, not to the colonial legislature, but to the Crown. In both the Canadas there was a spirit of strong hostility to the new American Republic, which was to bear its fruits later. In French Canada the hostility was traditional; in Upper Canada it was the obvious consequence of the conditions under which the colony had been planted with loyalists, who had left their southern homes out of attachment to the British name, and to escape from the vindictiveness of the Republic.

In another region of the globe altogether, these years witnessed the first beginnings of another great British expansion. Spaniards and Dutch had in past centuries occupied the archipelagoes which lie close to the south-eastern shores of the Asiatic Continent; but there had been very little exploration of the Southern Pacific. In 1768, Captain Cook began his series of voyages to the unexplored regions. In 1770 he traced the eastern coast of Australia, proclaimed the British sovereignty there, and gave the country the name of New South Wales. For some years it remained unoccupied. Discovery without occupation was not recognised as giving an effective title to possession, and it was still open to French or Dutch or Spanish, to plant themselves in Australia. Neither they, however, nor the British, were immediately attracted thither.

The recognition of American independence, besides depriving the British empire of a vast region, presented it with a new accidental problem. Hitherto the plantations had supplied a field for the deportation of convicts; that field no longer existed after 1783. A suggestion was put forward, that the continent which Captain Cook had discovered should be utilised for the purpose; and in 1787

1791. The
Canada Act.

Australia:
Captain
Cook, 1770.

Formal
annexation,
1788.

the experiment was tried of dispatching thither a consignment of seven hundred and fifty convicts, in charge of a body of marines, with Captain Phillip as governor. In January 1788, the expedition landed in Botany Bay, hoisted the British flag, and took possession of Australia for the British Crown. Within a week of the landing, some French ships appeared on the scene. It is possible that if Phillip had been only seven days later Australia would have been annexed not to the British, but to the French dominions. If the importance and value of Australia had been realised, such a French occupation would no doubt have been only temporary, and the war would have transferred the continent to the British. But its value was not realised, and it is more than possible that it was only this very narrow margin of time to which we owe the incorporation of Australia in the British empire.

IV. GREAT BRITAIN AND EUROPE, 1784-1793

When William Pitt came into power in 1784, Great Britain, exhausted by her struggle, was in no position to intervene actively in European politics, which were highly complicated. France and Spain, both of them also exhausted, were also indisposed to activity. Maria Theresa was dead, and Joseph II. in Austria was inspired on the one hand with ideas of a beneficent amelioration of the condition of his subjects, at the hands of an autocratic but benignant father of his people, and on the other hand, with ambitions more directly tending to increase the power of Austria. The Russian Tsarina had for years past been extending the power of Russia; a few years before she had in conjunction with Prussia and Austria effected the first partition of Poland, by which each of those powers had substantially extended its territories at the expense of that distracted country. Also her successful wars with Turkey had brought within sight her cherished ambition of establishing herself as a naval power on the Black Sea as well as the Baltic. Frederick of Prussia since the desperate struggle of the Seven Years' War had devoted himself primarily to avoid-

**Europe
in 1784.**

ing foreign quarrels and compromising alliances, while his energies were given up to a systematic organisation of his own kingdom; until the opportunity occurred for consolidating his dominion, increasing its revenues, and strengthening it for defence, by joining in the partition of Poland in 1772. Austria was in alliance with Russia on one side, and with France on the other, while France was in alliance with Russia and Spain, but both Great Britain and Prussia were without allies.

So far as Great Britain was concerned, the region where trouble seemed likely to arise was in the Netherlands. The Dutch were in possession of their barrier towns in **Austria and the Austrian Netherlands**; and lest Antwerp **Holland** should become dangerous to them, they enjoyed by treaty the control of the Scheldt, which was not open to navigation by the ships of other powers. Joseph succeeded in forcing the Dutch to evacuate the barrier towns, but when he tried to compel them to open the Scheldt, Great Britain might have found it necessary to interfere if France had not done so. The closure of the Scheldt was maintained and guaranteed by France, under the Treaty of Fontainebleau in 1785. So long as Antwerp was in Austrian hands, this was in the interests of France, while if it should fall at any time into the hands of France, that city with an open port would become a menace to England. England was also affected by another of Joseph's schemes, that of exchanging the inconveniently remote Netherlands, of which Austria could make very little use, for Bavaria, which lay on her own border. This design was also frustrated, not by England, but by Prussia. Frederick the Great, who viewed the scheme with extreme disfavour, procured an alliance for the integrity of Germany among the German princes, including King George as elector of Hanover, which was known as the *Fürstenbund*, which checkmated Joseph.

In Holland the Republican or anti-Orange party was in the **ascendent**, and leant, as it always had leant, to France, whose influence was increased by her recent intervention. Pitt was inclined either to a Prussian or to an Austro-Russian alliance in order to hold France in check, but was foiled in both projects.

The death of Frederick in 1786 placed on the throne his nephew Frederick William II., a monarch who lacked both the political and the military genius of his uncle. The new king
1788. was the brother-in-law of the stadtholder, William
The Triple of Orange. The French and Republican party in
Alliance. Holland at this moment won the upper hand; a close alliance between France and Holland seemed threatening, when an insult to the Prussian king's sister induced him to negotiate an alliance with Great Britain for the restoration of the stadtholder. France was not prepared to intervene in arms in face of this combination; she retired; and the result was the re-establishment of the Orange or English ascendancy in Holland, and a Triple Alliance (1787) between Prussia, Great Britain, and Holland. It is noteworthy that the Anglo-French commercial treaty was ratified by the British parliament at a time when it was by no means impossible that the affairs of Holland would bring about a renewal of the French war. The Triple Alliance in 1788 terminated for the time the isolation of Great Britain.

In 1789, at the moment when France was absorbed in the initial stage of the Revolution, an Anglo-Spanish quarrel arose.

1789-90. As a result of Captain Cook's explorations on the
Nootka west coast of North America, a settlement of British
Sound. traders had established itself at Nootka Sound, near Vancouver island. The Spaniards considered that western North America belonged to them up to a much more northerly latitude, although they were not in occupation. They were still full of their time-honoured jealousy of British attempts to trade with their American colonies, which themselves resented the restrictions upon their commerce imposed from Madrid. The Spanish government also had an exaggerated belief in its own power and in the readiness of France to come to its support, being quite unconscious of the straits into which the French monarchy was falling. There was accordingly a repetition of the affair of the Falkland Islands. A Spanish frigate seized British ships in Nootka Sound; when compensation was demanded by the British government it was refused. Spain insisted on her own untenable claim, which rested upon no better basis than that

a Spanish ship had reached Nootka Sound four years before Captain Cook. Twelve months after the seizure, the British government having in the meantime obtained promise of support from the other members of the Triple Alliance, the facts were laid before parliament. Immediate preparations were made for war. The French government was disposed to support its ally ; but by this time, May 1790, the French National Assembly was master of the situation. It declined to go to war. At the end of six months Spain had completely realised that the unfortunate French monarchy was a broken reed, and that the French National Assembly was more likely than not to pierce any monarchical hand that leaned upon it. Even at this early stage the French Revolution had broken the Family Compact, whereby a complete change of front on the part of Spain was necessitated. Since she could no longer face British hostility, she sought British friendship instead, and conceded the whole of the British demands.

Great Britain then had come satisfactorily out of the negotiations for the French commercial treaty, the Dutch complication, and the Nootka Sound affair. Pitt was less successful in his last serious attempt at intervention on the Continent before the outbreak of the great war. In 1788-90. **Britain and Prussia**
1788 the intervention of the Triple Alliance prevented the destruction of the kingdom of Sweden by Russia and Denmark, which would in effect have made Russia supreme in the Baltic ; whereby Catherine was irritated. She was now in alliance with the Emperor Joseph for the furtherance of her own designs against Turkey. Frederick William wished to turn to his own account in Poland the embarrassment of Austria in the Turkish war, Joseph's hands being further tied by a revolt in the Netherlands against the Austrian supremacy. The British government, however, did not feel called upon to plunge into a war for Prussian aggrandisement ; the alliance was one for defence. The death of Joseph at the beginning of 1790 gave the Austrian and the imperial crowns to his extremely able brother, Leopold II., hitherto grand duke of Tuscany. The attitude of the British government was unchanged, the more because it

desired the secure establishment of the Austrian power in the Netherlands lest they should be drawn to seek the protection of France.

Frederick William was annoyed, and Pitt was disposed to conciliate him by acceding to his wishes in another quarter and checking the aggrandisement of Russia. Chatham

1790-1. **Pitt, Prussia,** had seen in the still young and growing strength of **and Russia.**

Russia a valuable counterpoise in Europe to Bourbon aggression; he had moreover no sympathies with the Ottoman power. But now the expansion of Russia had been so vigorous that Chatham's son took alarm. If Catherine were able to place a powerful fleet in the Black Sea as well as in the Baltic, Great Britain would have to take account of the Russian navy in the Mediterranean as well as in northern seas. The Russian menace, which perpetually dominated the minds of British statesmen during the nineteenth century, was already looming on the younger Pitt's horizon. At the end of 1790 the Russian troops under Suvarov were overwhelming the Turks. Prussia called for intervention; and in the beginning of 1791 Pitt laid before parliament proposals for armaments to be dispatched both to the Baltic and to the Black Sea, and an ultimatum was sent to St. Petersburg at the end of March.

But the country did not share Pitt's views. Fox and Burke thundered denunciations against the Turks; the true policy

1791. for Britain was alliance with Russia; a Russian **Pitt's defeat.** fleet in the Mediterranean was to be desired,

not feared; a Russian war would be ruinous to the Baltic trade. In the cabinet Pitt's colleague and cousin, Lord Grenville, was opposed to his views. Though Pitt's majorities in the Commons were not substantially reduced, he realised that the sentiment of the country was against him, and in April the ultimatum to Russia was withdrawn. Catherine got her way, and by the Peace of Jassy, in the beginning of 1792, obtained the frontier she desired. At the same time Pitt's withdrawal had filled up the cup as far as Frederick William was concerned, and he resolved to substitute an Austrian alliance for that with Great Britain. A few weeks later, on 1st March, Leopold II. died, and

was succeeded by his son, who after the imperial election became the Emperor Francis II.

During the past two years events had been moving rapidly in France. Since the accession of Louis XIV., almost a century and a half before, England had established and elaborated a constitutional monarchy, which vested the supreme political control in the hands of parliament, finally deprived the executive of the power of overriding the law, and secured to all citizens of the Empire an equal title to the protection of the law. Privileges remained. Disabilities attached to certain religious professions; the whole vast class of hired workmen were without parliamentary representation; and the copyholder or small tenant had no vote, though his interests were fairly well represented by the votes of the yeomen. Still the bourgeoisie and the small agriculturalist had a voice in the government of the country which could not be neglected. Socially, indeed, class distinctions were strongly marked, but their sanction was customary, not legal; the borderland between class and class was indefinite, and social barriers, if difficult to pass, were not insuperable. There was no hereditary noblesse; the peerage was accessible to any distinguished commoner, the children of peers were themselves commoners, and the inheritance of nobility was restricted by the law of primogeniture. Such exemptions or reliefs from taxation as existed were not the privileges of the powerful, but relaxations in favour of the poorest classes.

**1789. Social
conditions
in Britain.**

On the Continent, however, both the political and social development had followed upon a very different line, of which France presented the archetype. Under the rule of the cardinals in the second quarter of the seventeenth century, the Crown had won its battle with political feudalism. Government was concentrated in the hands not of any kind of parliament, but of the Crown. The executive could override the law, and the law was administered in the interests of the powerful. The noblesse formed a hereditary class, to which admission from outside was almost impossible; while the children of the nobles remained noble from generation

**social
conditions
in France.**

to generation. In France the nobility and the clergy were virtually immune from taxation, whereas in England they paid precisely the same taxes as their neighbours, and birth carried with it no legal privileges at all except the right of the eldest son or nearest male heir to succeed to the title. The whole burden of taxation fell upon the labouring and trading classes, and most heavily upon the peasantry, who were subject not only to special taxes but to servile obligations such as had virtually disappeared in Great Britain as far back as the fifteenth century. The ruinous wars initiated by Louis XIV., and continued through the eighteenth century, had rendered altogether crushing a burden of taxation which would have been intolerable even if the noblesse and the clergy had borne their share. For years before the French Revolution, French thinkers and writers had been protesting against the existing system with biting satire, with merciless logic, or with emotional rhetoric. Some had held up to admiration the balance of political powers in Great Britain and the fusion there of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements. Others contrasted the social order with a mythical Golden Age before the strong had made laws for the enslavement of the weak, and dwelt with enthusiasm upon natural rights, the rights of man, of which man had been for the most part robbed by the tyranny of society.

Unconsciously enough, the ruling classes of France had given the most active encouragement to revolutionary ideas by their attitude in the American War of Independence. **France and the American War.** Deaf to the mutterings which heralded the coming cataclysm, they developed a lighthearted enthusiasm for the American doctrines of liberty and natural rights, which had been derived, in part at least, from the French philosophers; without a suspicion that such doctrines were destructive of the very foundations of the political and social structure of which caste privileges were the essence. By plunging into the War of Independence, France at the same time carried the financial strain to breaking point; and her government woke up to the absolute necessity of reform only when the point had been reached when any attempt at reform would certainly be

swept away in revolution, a complete subversion of the whole political and social structure.

The doom of the old order was sealed by the resolution to summon the States-General, an assembly of the three estates, nobles, clergy, and commons, to find an answer to the problems which one after another of the king's ministers had failed to solve. From the meeting of the States-General, in May 1789, events moved swiftly. The determination of the third estate that there should be not three chambers, two of which could override the third, but a single chamber of all the estates, gave to the third complete predominance. The Paris mob wrecked the Bastille, the fortress prison which typified the old order. The States-General resolved itself into a 'national' or 'constituent' assembly for the construction of a new system based upon the rights of man. Great Britain at first looked on with mildly qualified approbation. Ardent spirits, like Fox, rejoiced enthusiastically. Conservative spirits, like Burke, took alarm. But the average man saw the French engaged in a rather laudable effort to achieve at one blow the emancipation from feudal and monarchical tyranny which England had achieved for herself by centuries of dogged persistence. It was reprehensible but hardly surprising that the effort should be accompanied by disorders and excesses. If the peasantry in the country districts broke out in savage insurrections against the seigneurs, burnt their châteaux, and murdered aristocrats, it was very shocking—but such things could not happen in England.

But in France the pace grew faster. The National Assembly abolished all feudal institutions, and numbers of the nobility took flight from France; the *émigrés* were soon engaged in clamouring for foreign intervention. The new constitution practically vested all power in the Assembly. The king became virtually a prisoner in Paris. The most advanced group, known as the Jacobins, became predominant in the Assembly. Lafayette, a fastidious enthusiast, once the popular hero, was losing his influence. Mirabeau, the Titan, who had led the third estate to victory,

**1789:
Birth of
the French
Revolution.**

**1789-91.
The
Constituent
Assembly.**

might just conceivably have succeeded in combining monarchical with popular government under his own control ; but while he was striving desperately to gain the confidence of the Crown, he was struck down by death in March 1791. The king in despair fled with his family from Paris in June, hoping certainly to escape over the frontier, and designing probably to appeal to his brother-in-law the Emperor Leopold, and the king of Prussia, to restore him to a real throne. But at Varennes, just within the frontier, he was recognised and detained, and was escorted back to Paris. On the discovery of his flight, the Assembly suspended his royal functions ; and it kept them suspended until his formal acceptance of the new constitution in September.

In the Assembly, which had hitherto professed itself loyal to the monarchy, the voices which demanded its abolition and the establishment of a republic grew louder and more numerous. On the other hand, the *émigrés*, the most aggressive of whom had gathered at Coblenz, were also waxing more clamorous in their demands for foreign intervention. What the *émigrés* wanted was the restoration of the absolute monarchy and the old régime in an intensified form. For them Leopold had no sympathy, but the suspension of the monarchy forced him to propose that the powers should refuse to recognise the French government until the monarchy was restored. In concert with Frederick William, who, deserted by Great Britain in his designs against Russia, was seeking the Austrian alliance, the emperor issued from Pilnitz a declaration in favour of armed intervention if the powers would agree to act together. The certainty that at this date Pitt would not be persuaded to intervene accounted for a step much less aggressive in fact than in appearance, because it really committed him to nothing. Moreover, the acceptance of the constitution by Louis at once warranted the withdrawal of the declaration.

But the indignation of France had been aroused. Also the new constitution in France provided for the dissolution of the National Assembly, and the election of a new Legislative Assembly, to which none of the members of the old Assembly

were to be eligible. When the new Assembly met, the republican element in it was predominant. Among them the wing who were known as the Girondists; the literary republicans, were as yet the stronger party. To the Girondists it appeared that a patriotic war, a defiance of the insolent dictation of foreigners, would consolidate the nation; and almost at the moment of Leopold's death, in March 1792, war was declared against Austria, in the expectation that a French invasion of the Netherlands would be welcomed by the population which had so recently been in open rebellion against Austrian supremacy.

**1791. The
Legislative
Assembly.**

**Declaration
of war,
March 1792.**

Throughout this whole period, Pitt and the British government had maintained the attitude of aloofness from affairs in France. Pitt himself had at first believed in common with the majority of his countrymen that the outcome of the upheaval in France would be the establishment of constitutional liberties after the British model. But as the French Revolution developed, a feeling of great hostility towards it was excited in England, a feeling which received a tremendous impulse from the publication of Burke's *Reflections on the French Revolution* at the end of 1790. Burke had held a leading position among the Whigs as an advocate of the reform of palpable abuses and as a devotee of the principles of liberty, as they were embodied in the existing constitution of the kingdom of Great Britain. But essentially he was a conservative, a believer not in change but in development, in the steady adaptation of the existing system to changing conditions, not in the substitution for it of something which had not grown up naturally, however logically perfect and complete it might appear. He saw France engaged in destroying the system which, whether bad or good, had arrived by natural growth, and endeavouring to set in its place an academically devised system which had no roots in the past. Such a process was in his eyes doomed in any case to failure. It was doubly doomed when effected by violence, which openly set at naught the most hallowed traditions, and even the funda-

**The British
attitude.**

**Burke's
Reflections,
1790.**

mental principles of morality and religion. It had been suggested with a certain cynicism that the power of France would be ruined by the Revolution, which should therefore be viewed with satisfaction by the British. Burke replied that the example set by France was fraught with more danger than was to be feared from her arms. With a striking prescience he warned his readers that far greater excesses were in store than any which had hitherto been perpetrated, and pointed to a military dictatorship following upon anarchy as the inevitable outcome of the Revolution. Rightly enough he insisted that English liberties were not the product of the pursuit of abstractions such as the hypothetical rights of man, but of a practical insistence upon the preservation of definite rights established by precedent and confirmed by long custom.

An immense influence was exercised by Burke's famous pamphlet ; British insularity resented the presentation in other quarters of French ideas as worthy of British admiration ; and the British passion for law and order was thoroughly aroused by the subversion of law and order on the other side of the Channel. If less stolid souls were fired with enthusiasm for ideals which seemed to them to be the righteous motives of the upheaval in France, the British public at large was more moved by the palpable unrighteousness of the acts in which it was issuing. And besides all this, while men with advanced ideas in the higher ranks of society were expressing a dignified approbation or even a fervent admiration for democratic ideals, there were not wanting in Great Britain, to say nothing of Ireland, agitators who were seeking to kindle in the breasts of the masses a fierce conviction that they, too, were the victims of a monstrously iniquitous system, and that they, too, if they put forth their strength, could overthrow that system. It does not appear that such ideas did take root either widely or deeply among the working classes, but there was at least sufficient cause for grave anxiety. British respectability was becoming seriously alarmed before the end of 1791 ; before the end of 1792 the alarm was degenerating into panic, and from the time of the September massacres,

**Hostility
to the
Revolution.**

panic dictated the attitude of the government towards every attempt to give voice to any popular grievance.

In the spring of 1792, however, Pitt was still serenely confident that there were no war clouds in the horizon—that Great Britain would continue an unconcerned spectator of the European conflict which France deliberately challenged. The declaration of war between France and Austria was soon followed by the declaration of war between France and Prussia. French troops were massed on the Netherlands frontier. The French minister of war, Dumouriez, revived, and popular opinion endorsed, the old theory of Richelieu and Louis XIV., that France was entitled to her natural boundaries,—boundaries fixed by Nature when she made the continent of Europe, namely, the Rhine, the Alps, the Pyrenees, and the sea; a theory which involved her absorption of Savoy, as well as of the Rhine provinces and the Austrian Netherlands. Sardinia, therefore, was added to the circle of her enemies. But when French troops invaded the Netherlands they were ignominiously expelled, the soldiers having no confidence in officers who were aristocrats.

**1792. The
European
war begins.**

The Paris mob invaded the Tuileries, insulted the queen, Marie Antoinette, and forced Louis to wear the red cap of liberty. In July, the duke of Brunswick, who had been placed in command of the Prussian army, issued a proclamation which stirred the fury of the whole French people. In August, the royal family escaped from the Tuileries and placed themselves under the dubious protection of the Legislative Assembly; the mob sacked the Tuileries and massacred the Swiss Guard who stood to their posts with magnificent loyalty.

The extremists, headed by Danton and Robespierre, captured the Commune, the government of Paris, and in effect held the national government in their own hands, completely dominating the Assembly. Prussian troops crossed the frontier, and captured Longwy and Verdun. Paris believed that the royalists were organising an insurrection and a massacre. The Commune, in a house-to-house visitation, swept together and flung into prison an immense number of

**The
September
massacres.**

suspects. When the news came that Verdun had fallen, while the peasants of La Vendée were in open revolt on the side of Church and King, there followed that systematic slaughter of the suspects known to history as the September massacres. But in the meantime, Dumouriez, who was reckoned as a Girondist, had taken up the command at the front ; a new spirit pervaded the French troops, a spirit of confidence ; and at the cannonade of Valmy the Prussian attack was repulsed, an event which proved to be a decisive turning-point in the **The Republic proclaimed.** military operations. On 21st September, the life of the Legislative Assembly came to an end, and its place was taken by a new National Convention, overwhelmingly republican, which opened its career by proclaiming the republic and the abolition of the monarchy.

In England the tide of public opinion was rising higher and higher against the French, while on the other hand the friends of the Revolution were organising societies, ranging from the orderly 'Friends of the People' to the **Portland Whigs support government.** 'London Correspondence Society,' which associated itself with the French Jacobins. Their agitation produced in May a counter-proclamation against seditious writings issued by the government. Burke's association with Fox had been broken off long before, and the Portland Whigs, the bulk of the Whig Opposition, now joined Burke in supporting the government, which on the suspension of the French monarchy in August withdrew its ambassador from Paris. Yet Pitt still believed that war might be averted.

That hope vanished rapidly after the establishment of the Convention. Both Prussia and Austria were neglecting the French war, and giving their attention to a fresh **Autumn : French successes.** partition of Poland, in conjunction with the Tsarina, which was completed at the beginning of 1793, leaving to Poland only a small remnant of its former territory. The Prussian troops fell back over the French frontier ; French armies advanced upon the Rhine, where they captured Maintz and Frankfort on the Maine ; a French army entered Savoy, the annexation of which to France was proclaimed ; and

Dumouriez in the Netherlands defeated the Austrians at Jemappes, drove them out of the country, and was welcomed with open arms by the population.

The Convention then adopted the attitude which destroyed all hope of prolonging the peace. It declared that the navigation of the Scheldt was to be opened, in defiance of the old treaties, guaranteed by France herself as lately as 1785, and again by Great Britain as well as by Prussia in 1788. It announced that all districts occupied by French armies were under the protection of the Republic, that, in them, all privileges were abolished, and the previously existing governments were at an end. Great Britain could not possibly tolerate the opening of the Scheldt, which would have converted Antwerp into a French naval port, and a serious menace to the British maritime power in the North Sea. Moreover, apart from her direct interest in Antwerp, it was impossible for her or for any one else to admit that France had a right to tear up treaties on the ground that they contravened what she was pleased to call natural rights.

Only one thing was needed to raise popular indignation to a point at which the demand for war would become irresistible, even if Pitt had still been disposed to resist it; and that was provided when the French Convention put 'Louis Capet' on trial for his life, and sent him to the guillotine in January 1793. It was no longer possible to believe, as it had been at least until October, that France was in arms against foreign intervention. France was in arms to extend her own dominions, and avowedly to give military support to any of the peoples which should emulate her own example and rise against their monarchical government. Pitt's attitude on the question of the Scheldt was uncompromising, and on 1st February the French Republic declared war upon Great Britain.

**The Scheldt
to be opened.**

**1793.
Regicide,
January.**

**War,
1st February.**

CHAPTER X. THE WAR WITH THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

I. FEATURES OF THE WAR, 1793-1802

THE war which opened in 1793 was brought to an end technically by the Peace of Amiens in 1802. In reality that peace was a mere suspension of hostilities, and the struggle was again renewed in the next year, to be again suspended in 1814, and finally brought to its decisive conclusion on the field of Waterloo in 1815. In many respects, however, there is a marked difference in its character before and after the Peace of Amiens. The period from 1793 to 1802 is sufficiently complete in itself to justify the selection of the latter date for the close of the present volume ; we are ringing down the curtain not between the acts of a single drama, but between two plays, distinct like the three parts of a trilogy. In one respect also a definite climax had been reached with the Legislative Union of Great Britain and Ireland ; a climax which, at the moment of writing, appears certain to have its precise counterpart in the climax of the ensuing volume with the passage of the Home Rule Bill under the recent Parliament Act.

Pitt's war with the French Republic, the Republic which was technically in being from the outbreak of hostilities to the Peace of Amiens, was neither a war of aggression, nor a war for empire, nor a war for an abstract idea. Apart from the fervour of his patriotism, which he inherited from his great father, Pitt's aims and objects were essentially practical. He did not seek war ; to the last moment he persisted in his belief that war could be avoided, that Great Britain could stand on one side, and leave France whether as a monarchy or as a republic to fight out her own quarrel with the continental

powers. But he found himself in a position in which, from his own point of view, war was forced upon the country by her direct responsibility for maintaining a treaty which France claimed the right to tear up, though she had herself insisted upon it only eight years before. Such obligations are often enough cynically ignored when they clash with the national interests of the moment, when some plausible ground of evasion can be suggested ; or they may be honestly set aside on account of changed conditions, which could not have been taken into the reckoning when the obligation was incurred. But in this case the moral obligation was very clearly backed by the national interests. For a century it had been an axiom of British policy that the ports from Dunkirk to the Texel could not be allowed to fall under the control of France. In the circumstances of 1793, the opening of the Scheldt would mean an immense acquisition of maritime power by France immediately, and would further secure as a consequence her complete political predominance in Holland itself, and her effective control of the ports of Holland. The opening of the Scheldt was the crucial question on which it was impossible for Pitt to give way, and which forced Great Britain into war, with the enormous mass of public opinion behind him.

Public opinion, however, more than Pitt himself was influenced by positive hostility to the French Revolution. The excesses of the Paris mob, the flaming denunciations of Burke, **Popular support.** the September massacres, and finally the trial and death of the king, had convinced four-fifths of the people of England at least of the diabolic origin of the French Revolution, and of the utter ruin of all social order as the inevitable corollary of its success. Pitt went to war against the Republican government of France exactly as he would have gone to war against Louis XIV. in similar circumstances ; because the foreign policy of the French Republic was being conducted on the same aggressive lines, with the same intent of extending France to her natural boundaries, the same arrogant assertion of her right to ignore engagements, and a still more presumptuous assumption of the French title to intervene in the domestic politics of other

nations. But the people of England were actuated in at least an equal degree by hatred of the Revolution itself, as interpreted by the September massacres, and the fear of all that it seemed to them to mean. And that hatred and fear grew more intense and ineradicable with the progress of the Reign of Terror.

Nor was the conduct of that section of the Whigs who remained in Opposition calculated to allay the popular feeling.

The Fox, in the grip of his grand idea of liberty and
Opposition. justice, could see all that there was of right and very little that there was of wrong in the doings of France. She was the champion of the Great Cause, and her splendour in that character blinded him to the fact that she was pursuing a policy of greed and aggression even while she flaunted the banner of the Cause, precisely after the precedent of the most absolute of her kings. He saw that in the first instance she had turned against the European powers because they threatened gratuitous intervention in her own private concerns ; he did not see that France was claiming precisely that right for herself which she had resented so fiercely and so justly when claimed for themselves by the European monarchs. The Whigs acclaimed French successes against the Allies, and openly deplored French defeats. When a country is plunged into war, her people will not tolerate the attitude of the citizen who applauds the victories of her enemies because in his private judgment the enemies have the better case. In short, the line adopted by the Opposition destroyed even such influence as they might have exercised with the body of the people ; they were heard, because they made a noise ; but they were not listened to ; they added fuel to the flame instead of quenching it.

On the other hand, even from the British point of view the war did not retain its character of being directed to the resistance of French aggression. The princes of Europe
Outcome of avowedly made it a war of counter-aggression, a
the first war. war by which France was to be stripped of the territories she had acquired, and was to be forced to reinstate the Bourbon monarchy. The triumph of the Allies would have riveted the chains of the old system more firmly than ever ; the Allies did

not triumph, and when peace again reigned on the Continent in 1802 France was indisputably the most powerful state in Europe. Her victory, however, was not complete, and it was only in part the victory of the Revolution. It was not complete, because Great Britain was not only undefeated, but had strengthened her hold upon India, established her naval supremacy more decisively than ever, and almost monopolised transmarine commerce, besides enormously developing her own industrial resources, while those of every country on the Continent were crippled. It was not the victory of the Revolution, because though France was still a republic in form, government had been effectively transmuted into the despotism of the First Consul, though he had not yet assumed the imperial title. And yet the Revolution had been so far victorious that there was no longer any country in Western Europe whose government could afford to regard the popular will as a negligible quantity, and in France herself, when the Bourbon monarchy was restored thirteen years afterwards, the absolutism and the privileges of the *ancien régime* could not be reinstated.

Of the war itself there are two main phases clearly distinguishable. The first ends at the close of 1797 with the Treaty of Campo Formio and the British naval victory at Camperdown, coinciding with the *coup d'État* of Fructidor. From that time the personality of Bonaparte becomes predominant, and the brilliant young general of the Republic has already fixed upon England as the enemy whose destruction must be compassed. At the outset of the first period there is a general coalition of all the western European powers against the French Republic, a coalition whose members gradually drop away till Great Britain and Austria are alone left, and finally Austria, by the Treaty of Campo Formio, leaves her obstinate ally isolated. Already, however, one extremely critical period has been passed, and the British naval superiority has been confirmed. The second period witnesses the Egyptian expedition of Bonaparte, the decisive naval victory of the Nile, a new European coalition, Bonaparte's return, the *coup d'État* of Brumaire, the disruption of the coalition, and the second

isolation of the maritime power whose fleets were now irresistible, followed by the Peace of Amiens.

At the beginning of 1793, Pitt when he entered upon the war had no doubt whatever that it would be of short duration.

The vital strength of France. Since, as was notoriously the case, France had been almost bankrupt in 1789, it seemed incredible that she should not be on the verge of bankruptcy in 1793 after four years of convulsions. Yet year after year passed, and the expected bankruptcy was always a little further off in the future until it disappeared out of sight altogether. A similar erroneous conviction had possessed the continental powers when the English cut off the head of King Charles I. and set up the Commonwealth. Whatever the crimes committed by the French people, France was permeated with that patriotic enthusiasm which made her sons ready to pour out their blood like water in her defence. The Republic offered advancement to any one who proved himself worthy of it so long as his loyalty was unimpeachable, and her forces were soon under the command of men chosen on Cromwell's principle of demanding only that they understood their work thoroughly, and had, *mutato nomine*, 'the root of the matter' in them. The organisation fell into the hands of a consummate master with an unflinching eye for ability, Carnot. Inefficiency, or any suspicion of inefficiency, met with an exceedingly short shrift, and incompetence once displayed was allowed no chance of redeeming itself. The result was that the republican armies, instead of being routed by troops who were treated as machines and led by noble amateurs, drill-sergeants, or men whose abilities were paralysed by traditional conventions, were habitually victorious.

The Allies, on the other hand, suffered in the first place from the almost unflinching defect of coalitions, the lack of unity in design, and of co-operation in execution. Each **Weakness of the Allies.** wanted the spoils which were to be its own particular share to be the primary objective upon which it directed its own individual energies. None of them grasped the great principle upon which both Marlborough and William III. had always striven to act, of concentrating their common energies

upon crushing the common foe instead of dissipating them upon the individual pursuit of their separate interests. Prussia was thinking more about Poland than about France, and Austria could not afford to withdraw her own attention from the same quarter. In the second place, while the rank and file of the allied armies were without enthusiasm, their commanders were chosen from the aristocratic circles, regardless of their incapacity. Those of them who had military experience were hidebound by the traditions of the Seven Years' War, when Frederick's fighting machine had been an extremely successful innovation. They forgot that Frederick's men fought with enthusiasm under a captain who never hesitated to take terrific risks, and they transformed the rules of thumb into principles of the military art. Consequently, when they were faced by generals who discarded the rules of thumb whenever they interfered with the carrying out of an effective stroke, they found themselves surprised, outmanœuvred, and defeated.

Moreover, Pitt in England was very far from being a great war minister. In two respects, indeed, the mighty Chatham was reincarnated in his son. The younger Pitt, like his **Pitt and his father.** father, was a patriot who prized the national honour above all other things. Nothing would make him desert an ally or yield upon any point in which the national honour was concerned. And, like his father, he could and did imbue others with the patriotic passion and the courage of his own indomitable personality, and with a convinced reliance upon him as a leader. But here the resemblance ceased. The elder Pitt was the greatest of war ministers because he grasped the great strategic principles, made the whole of the operations concerted parts of a great scheme, taught his subordinates and colleagues that what must be done could be done, and because he ignored everything but fitness in the appointment of the men entrusted with the task of carrying out his plans, who in their turn were left by him the largest possible freedom of action in their operations compatible with the part played by those operations in the main scheme.

But as an organiser of war the younger Pitt was altogether

out of place. Great peace ministers, such as he and Robert Walpole, prepared the country to bear the strain of long and costly wars by fostering the development of the national wealth. Pitt, indeed, differed essentially from Walpole, in that he fought his very hardest when he found war forced upon him ; but, like Walpole, he had failed to utilise the years of peace for bringing up to a fighting standard the organisation which the last war had proved to be so disastrously inefficient.

Nor did he understand its needs. His father had taken into his own hands the supreme control of every department, as well as the planning of the whole system of operations. The younger Pitt was devoid of the strategical grasp which could plan a system of operations, and he did not attempt to bring the departments under his personal control. The War Office was left virtually in the hands of Henry Dundas, who in this field was an entirely incompetent amateur ; and no change was made in the system which made birth and influence the sole considerations which controlled military appointments. The salvation of the country lay with the navy, with its infinitely superior tradition of regarding capacity as a better qualification for command than birth. Unlike the army, the navy was from the outset efficient, though even here there was plenty of room for improved organisation, and it was deprived of half of its effective power for a long time by the lack of any strategical direction at headquarters. From these preliminary considerations we may turn to the story of the struggle itself.

II. THE FIRST COALITION, 1793-1797

We may open the story with a brief outline of the course of events controlling the government within France itself. The establishment of the Republic and the beheading of Louis XVI. had been the joint work of the literary republicans called the Girondists, who were the intellectuals, and of the extreme section of Jacobins known as the Mountain, led by Danton, Robespierre, and Marat.

1793-7.
Course of
events in
France.

Ever since the beginning of the Revolution, it had been the rule that in each new Assembly the doctrines which in the last had been counted extreme became the doctrines of the Moderates of the centre. In the Legislative Assembly the Girondists had been accounted as of the extreme party: in the new Convention they soon found themselves occupying the position of the old Constitutionals as the party of moderation in rivalry with the extremists of the Mountain. For some months there was a struggle for supremacy. The Mountain succeeded in establishing the small secret committee of supervision, known as the Committee of Public Safety. In June 1793 the Mountain won the upper hand, the Girondists were driven out of office, and the Committee of Public Safety, which included Danton, Robespierre, and Carnot—Marat had been assassinated—virtually formed the government, with unlimited power. With the victory of the Mountain set in the Reign of Terror, when suspects of every kind, sort, and description were arrested and imprisoned by hundreds and thousands; and then month after month the tumbrils carried to the guillotine what it is hardly an exaggeration to call a daily hecatomb of victims condemned by the revolutionary tribunal at Paris. Similar scenes took place in the provinces. Danton began to incur odium as an 'indulgent'; yet the revolting excesses of the Hébertists caused Robespierre to join with Danton in crushing them before he turned upon his nobler colleague and established his own complete supremacy, in March 1794. Already, however, Paris and France were becoming nauseated; even within the Committee of Public Safety, no man felt that his own head was safe on his shoulders. A plot was organised at the end of July. Robespierre fell, and the Reign of Terror was ended. The Convention re-
covered the control of the government. Within
a year the executive control was placed in the hands of a committee of five, called the Directory, Carnot the 'organiser of victories' still being one of them. Again within six months there was a struggle between the Directory and the Legislature. The Directory called in to its aid the young artillery officer,

**The Reign
of Terror,
July 1793-
July 1794.**

1794.

Thermidor.

Napoleon Bonaparte, and was secured in power by the *coup d'État* of Vendémiaire in October 1795. Bonaparte established his own ascendancy, though nominally as a servant of the Directory, by securing the supremacy within that body to his own allies, in the *coup d'État* of Fructidor in September 1797.

When the war opened then, the Girondists had not yet been overthrown; officially they were still in the ascendent. Hitherto the Republic had been at war only with Prussia, Austria, and Sardinia; now Spain and Holland, where the stadtholder was still at the head of the government, followed the British lead. The Bourbon king of Sicily also joined the coalition. While the Girondists and the Mountain were struggling for the supremacy in the French government, the French arms were not being successful.

British troops joined the Austrians in the Netherlands in May. The French were driven within their own frontier, and Maintz was recaptured. A Spanish army invaded Roussillon, Vendée was still in a flame of insurrection, and Brittany followed suit when the Girondists fell. In the south Lyons and Toulon were both in revolt as Royalist strongholds. A British fleet under Lord Hood was sent to blockade Toulon; which the Royalists surrendered, along with the fleet in the harbour, on the promise that it was to be held for 'Louis xvii.'—the young dauphin was still living a prisoner—and was to be restored at the end of the war. But Louis, count of Provence, the next brother of the late king, was not permitted to enter the place. Great Britain was not committed to a Bourbon restoration on the lines demanded by the *émigrés*.

The campaign in the Netherlands opened the way to Paris; but the allies did not push their advantage. Austria wanted to recover Alsace and Lorraine; Prussia would not help her except at the price of her agreeing to the Prussian theory of the partition of Poland, which was not at all to Austria's liking. King George's second son, the duke of York, who had been placed at the head of the British troops, wanted to secure the British share of the spoils, and marched off

to Dunkirk. But in the meantime, the French in spite of their dissensions were answering the call to arms with enthusiasm. In August a universal conscription was established, and Carnot began his great work of military organisation. In September, Houchard compelled York to raise the siege of Dunkirk, and in October Jourdan drove back the Austrians at the battle of Wattignies. On the Rhine also the French defeated the Austrians, and the Prussians evacuated the greater part of the Palatinate. In December, an English expedition was dispatched to support the Vendéan revolt, but the insurgents were unable to co-operate and the expedition accomplished nothing. Before the end of December, Toulon in the south was recovered for the Republic. Hood's squadron had for a long time rendered ineffective its siege on the land side by the republicans ; but a young artillery officer, Napoleon Bonaparte, was allowed to carry out a plan which enabled him to command the city with his guns. Finding that the place had become untenable, Hood had to content himself with taking off a large number of the royalists on his ships, and destroying or carrying off something less than half of the French fleet within the harbour, leaving the rest to the Republicans.

**Progress of
the French,
September-
December.**

At the opening then of 1794 the Allies had no reason to be proud of themselves ; but the Reign of Terror was in full career, and Pitt was supported by the country in refusing to negotiate with the existing government of France, the course urged upon him by the Whigs. The view was that that government had put itself outside the pale, and that it would still remain impossible to trust any French government until one should be established which should have at once a decent promise of permanency and a decent air of acting upon the recognised principles of international morality. The Opposition could muster only some dozen votes in the House of Lords, and less than sixty in the Commons.

**1794.
Pitt will not
seek peace.**

But the campaigning of the second year was no more creditable than that of the first. Frederick William, who was thinking much more about Poland than about France, would have with-

drawn his troops altogether if the British, with some help from the Dutch, had not agreed to pay for the sixty thousand men who were eventually placed nominally at their disposal, but practically under orders to do nothing—orders which they diligently obeyed. Austria made some show of co-operation with the duke of York. The Allies were defeated at Turcoing in May, and at Fleurus in June, and the French took possession of Brussels. Then in answer to the British and Dutch representations the Austrian ministër remarked that the Netherlands were of importance to Great Britain and to Holland, but of no use to his master. The Prussians took their pay and refused to move. In the autumn the Austrians were driven over the Rhine, the subsidy to Prussia was withdrawn, and both the German powers gave their exclusive attention to Poland. York, who was a very poor general, was driven back out of the Netherlands across the south of Holland, over the Maas, and then beyond the Waal. Pitt, much to the king's chagrin, insisted that the duke must be recalled, and the Anglo-Dutch armies placed under a single control. York found better employment for his respectable abilities in the military administration at home, which improved considerably under his management. In the south the republican armies after the capture of Toulon had assumed the aggressive against Sardinia on one side and Spain on the other, forced the passes into Piedmont, and crossed the Pyrenees into Catalonia.

In the whole year there was only one substantial success to record. The British fleet maintained its tradition. The practical value of the capture of three or four islands in the West Indies was small, because, whenever the backs of the British were turned, the inhabitants resumed their French allegiance. Hood in the Mediterranean captured Corsica; but the most notable event was Howe's victory of 'the Glorious First of June,' off Ushant. The French were expecting a great convoy of provision ships from America, of which they were sorely in need, the country having suffered from bad harvests. The admiral who was placed in command of the Channel fleet—he was now not far short of seventy—sailed in

**Howe's
victory,
1st June.**

May, primarily with the intention of cutting off the convoy. A French fleet of about equal numbers sailed from Brest to protect it. Howe succeeded in forcing two partial actions with the French admiral, whose business was primarily to see that the provision ships got to port. Then on 1st June he brought on a general engagement, and won a complete victory, capturing six ships and sinking a seventh, while the remainder escaped for the most part in a desperately crippled condition. A myth long prevailed concerning the *Vengeur*, the ship which was sunk. It was proclaimed in France that her crew had preferred death to surrender, and had gone to the bottom with her, refusing to strike the flag. As a matter of fact she did strike her flag, though it was only after she had been hopelessly crippled in a heroic contest; and the bulk of her crew were taken off by the British, though there was not time to rescue them all. The British victory was a very grave disaster for the French fleet, but the specific object with which Howe had sailed was not attained, since the provision ships got safely to port. Still the victory had the immense additional value of preserving the national self-respect, which was being endangered by the futility of the performances in the Netherlands. To the French, however, the moral value of the *Vengeur* myth was hardly less.

Very shortly afterwards the group known as the Portland Whigs, who had broken with Fox long before without becoming avowed supporters of the government, definitely attached themselves to the ministry. Portland himself was appointed to a third secretaryship of state; and other members of the group were given office, Wyndham becoming secretary at war, while Earl Spencer took the place of Pitt's elder brother, the earl of Chatham, at the admiralty.

Portland
Whigs
join the
government.

At the close of 1794 the Republic was triumphing over its enemies everywhere except on the seas. Even in the insurgent districts in La Vendée, Brittany, and Normandy, order was being restored by the wisdom, justice and firmness of Hoche, the most brilliant of the Republican generals, and perhaps the most entirely admirable figure

Winter :
Spain and
Holland.

among all the persons who came into prominence in the course of the Revolution. The Spanish court, guided by the influence of Godoy, paramour of the infamous wife of the imbecile king, Charles IV., was already negotiating for the transfer of the Spanish alliance to France. During the winter, when Holand became ice-bound, Pichegru overran the country while the Anglo-Dutch troops could offer no resistance, and got possession of the ice-bound fleet at the Texel. The stadtholder took flight to England, where of his own authority he conveyed temporarily to Great Britain the possession of the Dutch colony at the southern extremity of Africa, lest it should fall into the hands of the French.

A little later, after a merely formal resistance, Cape Town was occupied by the British—an acquisition of very substantial value because of its position on the route to India. But for France it only meant that the Cape remained as it had been before, in hostile hands. The practical effect of the overrunning of Holland was that the republican anti-Orange party became completely predominant, and transformed the ally of Great Britain into the 'Batavian Republic' under the ægis of republican France, which had by this time absorbed the acquiescent Netherlands as a portion of French territory. The Tsarina completed the final partition of Poland, to her own satisfaction at least, and to that of Prussia, while Austria was at the most conciliated by the share allotted to her. In April Prussia gave up the pretence of continuing the French war, and signed the Treaty of Basel: for ten years to come she persisted in the attitude of neutrality, for which she paid the penalty at Jena. The Treaty of Basel was shortly followed by a formal treaty between France and Spain. Only Austria returned to a more active participation in the war, persuaded thereto by the huge subsidies from Pitt, British gold being no longer diverted to Prussia.

There were no counteracting successes. A final attempt was made on behalf of the Vendéans by a force of French *émigrés* who were carried to Quiberon Bay by a British flotilla. The attempt was an ignominious failure: the *émigrés* were

**1795. The
coalition
dissolved.**

overwhelmed by Hoche, and most of the prisoners were put to death by the order of Hoche's civilian colleague, though a number of *émigrés* and insurgents were allowed to escape on the British ships. La Vendée ceased to be a serious menace to the republican government. **The Quiberon expedition.**

Even by sea the British failed to make effective use of their ascendancy. Admiral Hotham in the Mediterranean considered that he had 'done very well' in capturing a couple of French ships when the indignant Commodore Horatio Nelson declared that the whole Toulon fleet ought to have been destroyed. Hood's brother, Lord Bridport, commanding the Channel fleet, had lost his former brilliancy and vigour, and allowed the Brest fleet to escape him in June. Naval energies were in fact being frittered away in a futile capture of sugar islands in the West Indies, a meaningless business which in the course of the war cost tens of thousands of lives and swallowed up a vast amount of money for no practical purpose. Pitt was still suffering from his persistent conviction that France was on the verge of a financial collapse which would force her to submission. Yet in fact the establishment of the Directory in October gave promise of a firmer and more enduring government than she had enjoyed since the beginning of the Revolution. The revived activities of Austria were attended with some success, and the French armies of Pichegru and Jourdan which crossed the Rhine in the autumn were pressed back again; but in North Italy the Austrian arms met with a serious reverse at Loano, in November.

The *coup d'État* of Vendémiaire had one result on which no one could have calculated. The services of Bonaparte were rewarded, though he was only six-and-twenty, by his appointment to the command of the French army in Northern Italy, at the opening of 1796. **1796. Bonaparte in Italy.** The amazing achievements of his Italian campaign at once raised him to the foremost place among living commanders, and prepared the way for his personal domination of France. Bonaparte's triumphs in Italy provided the principal feature of the war in 1796. By a victory at Montenotte he prevailed upon

Sardinia to withdraw from the alliance to which it had hitherto adhered. His victory at the Bridge of Lodi gave him possession of Milan, and drove the Austrians into Mantua. Naples was frightened into neutrality, and all the North Italian ports were closed to the enemies of France. The Austrians made gallant and persistent attempts to recover ground; but only to suffer repeated defeats at the hands of Bonaparte; and the battles of Arcola in November and of Rivoli in January 1797 drove them back out of Italy. This disastrous campaigning was, however, to some extent redeemed by the success of the Archduke Charles, who foiled a converging movement of Jourdan and Moreau directed upon Vienna, and compelled those generals to fall back behind the Rhine.

The British Mediterranean fleet was materially improved, when its command was entrusted to Admiral Jervis in place of the incompetent Hotham. But its operations were restricted by the closure of the Italian ports, and in August the situation was changed when Spain followed up the treaty of 1795 by an offensive and defensive alliance with France, whereby the Spanish as well as the Dutch fleet was placed at the French disposal. In the face of this imminent danger, Jervis, before the end of the year, was ordered to evacuate the Mediterranean itself, and Corsica was abandoned.

Through the year, Pitt had been making overtures for peace. The captures effected by the fleet gave Great Britain something to offer, and it was possible to treat the Directory as a responsible government. There were, indeed, some grounds for nervousness lest the French successes should induce Austria to make separate terms for herself; but Pitt's overtures did not mean the desertion of his allies, for the essential condition put forward was the restoration of the Netherlands to Austria, to be purchased by the restoration of what Great Britain had won. Negotiations broke down through the mutual distrust of the two governments, neither of which believed that the other was sincere in its proposals; nor is it easy for the British historian to come to any conclusion save that the real responsibility for the failure lay with the French, although Fox

and the Opposition in England took a different view. In fact, it was anticipated in France, as it was feared in England, that Great Britain would be deprived of the command of the sea by the combination of the French, Spanish, and Dutch fleets, when the last of these should be ready to take the sea. More blows to Austria, such as those which Bonaparte had been dealing, would bring her to her knees ; and before the negotiations were actually broken off the death of the Tsarina Catherine and the accession of Paul I. removed the immediate possibility which was then threatening that Austria would be reinforced by Russian troops. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the Directory preferred going on with the war to surrendering the Netherlands.

The depression in England was perhaps greater at this point than at any other moment of the war. The order for the evacuation of the Mediterranean implied on the part of the government a consciousness of insecurity which was of itself extremely alarming. Happily, however, confidence was restored by the brilliant action fought by Admiral Jervis off Cape St. Vincent on 14th February. A Spanish fleet of twenty-seven sail of the line sailed from Cartagena for Cadiz. After they had passed the Straits, they were sighted by Jervis, who was cruising off Cape St. Vincent with only fifteen ships. If the Spanish fleet should succeed in forming a junction with the French at Brest, the united forces might well be overwhelming. It was imperative, therefore, to break up the Spanish fleet at once, if the thing could be done. Ten of the Spaniards were well to leeward of the other seventeen, running for port. Jervis, whose fleet was in first-rate order, under first-rate officers, attacked the main fleet. A portion of it tried to get away and join the leeward squadron: Nelson on the *Captain* disregarded the signal, left the line of battle, headed off the retiring ships, engaged them, and supported by Troubridge on the *Culloden*, threw the whole Spanish line into confusion, and captured two of their ships. Although the leeward squadron and several other ships succeeded in making their escape, the victory was decisive, because

1797.

**Battle of
Cape St.
Vincent, 14th
February.**

it proved that the Spanish fleet, however numerous, was of very small account for fighting purposes. The admiral's approval of his commodore's independent action was emphasised, when Nelson was gazetted a rear-admiral at the same time as Jervis himself was created Earl St. Vincent.

A few weeks earlier, fortune, not skill, averted a very grave danger. Ireland, loyal as it had been in the last war, had since become extremely disaffected. Irish disaffection provided a fertile soil for the seeds of the French revolutionary propaganda. Half the country was in fact ripe for rebellion. The Directory designed an invasion of Ireland with a large force under the command of Hoche himself. A powerful fleet sailed from Brest; Bridport, in command of the Channel fleet, was not on the watch; all went well with the expedition till it was nearing Bantry Bay, when a gale set in; the ships were driven off, the landing was effectually prevented, and more than a third of the whole squadron was lost, the remainder struggling back to Brest in a badly battered condition. It is to be remarked, however, that contrary to all expectation, the Irish made no sign, either in Munster or in Dublin, of any inclination to insurrection when the French fleet was off the Irish coast.

Nevertheless the crisis was by no means passed. The Spanish fleet at Cadiz was still too large to be left unblockaded. Bridport had failed to intercept the fleet from Brest, either on its way to Ireland or on its return. The Dutch fleet in the Texel was believed to be in a forward state of preparation, which made it necessary for a squadron under Duncan to remain on the watch in the North Sea. Bonaparte had driven the Austrians out of Italy, and was himself over the Austrian border in Carinthia moving toward Vienna. At this critical moment the fleet at Spithead mutinied. The mutiny was nothing more or less than a very thoroughly organised strike, conducted with remarkable discipline and order. The men suffered under intolerable grievances, which they had long been doing their best to get remedied in a perfectly legitimate manner. Their complaints were ignored, and they

Hoche's

Irish

expedition.

The mutiny

at Spithead,

April

were the more disgusted because the corresponding grievance in regard to the pay of soldiers had been recognised and remedied. At last, in despair, the men, acting completely at one, altogether declined to obey their officers, and took the control of the ships into their own hands. The admiralty took alarm and sent a commission to meet the men's delegates, who stood firmly by their demands, which were in themselves absolutely reasonable. The government yielded on all points, and although there was a delay long enough to excite the men and cause a fresh mutiny, discipline was thereafter perfectly restored. The only dubious question was as to the wisdom of yielding to the men's demand, that a number of officers who had been guilty of flagrant tyranny should be removed.

But the mutiny at Spithead, which began in the middle of April and ended in the middle of May, was followed by a second mutiny on the ships at the Nore. In this case it appears clear that an element was at work, much more dangerous than that which had inspired the movement at Spithead. The crews, mainly made up by the pressgangs, included a large number of disaffected Irishmen, gaol-birds, and the lowest class of seafaring men ; and among them were educated or half-educated propagandists of the ideas of the French Revolution. In short, the lawless element at Spithead had been held very thoroughly under control by the men themselves ; at the Nore it was in danger of predominating ; the cooler and more respectable of the men were dragged into the mutiny a good deal against their will ; two of the ships' crews only joined under compulsion. Again the admiralty commissioners met the mutineer delegates to inquire into the grievances, and found the men's leaders making impossible demands, affecting not their own status but that of the officers, to the serious detriment of discipline. All but two of the vessels of Duncan's squadron at Yarmouth joined the mutineers at the Nore. It is not easy to guess what would have happened at this juncture if the Dutch fleet had come out of the Texel. Duncan with a fine audacity sailed off with his two ships to watch the Texel, and to produce by elaborate signalling the

**The mutiny
at the Nore,
May.**

impression that the rest of his fleet was just below the horizon. Whether his attempted deception succeeded or not, the Dutch fleet did not come out. The government presented an obstinate front to the mutineers; the shore forts were prepared to give the men a hot reception. It was made clear that no terms would be offered. The crews from Spithead, now thoroughly loyal, denounced the conduct of the mutineers. On one ship after another, the loyal section gained over adherents till they were in the decisive majority, and one after another returned to its obedience. Finally, the ship which had the ringleader, Parker, on board surrendered itself at Sheerness. The government was wise enough to act on the assumption that the men had been for the most part led astray; and in the end less than twenty of the ringleaders were put to death. The men had submitted exactly two months after the beginning of the first mutiny at Spithead.

In the meantime, Bonaparte's advance upon Vienna had caused the Austrians to agree to preliminaries of peace at Leoben in April. Pitt, in spite of strong opposition within the cabinet, opened negotiations for a separate peace with the Directory, upon terms which amounted to the recognition of the French sovereignty in the Netherlands, and the restoration of all British conquests, except the Cape and Trinidad. The Directory was divided. But the fate of the treaty was sealed when the *coup d'État* of Fructidor in September secured the power of the trio hostile to Britain, and the actual ascendancy of Bonaparte. The negotiations collapsed. A few weeks later, the Dutch fleet at last came out of the Texel; and Duncan, with a fleet now thoroughly loyal, shattered it in a stubbornly fought battle at Camperdown, on 11th October. The naval crisis was at an end. But within a week later the isolation of Great Britain was completed by the definitive Treaty of Campo Formio.

**Camperdown
and Campo
Formio,
October.**

III. PITT, BONAPARTE, AND WELLESLEY, 1797-1802

At the close of 1797, the French Republic might well have been proud of the success which it had achieved. It had passed through the days of the Terror. It had little to fear from the monarchists within its own borders ; the last *coup d'État* had struck a decisive blow against the small group of able men whose loyalty to the Republic was doubtful. It was as yet unconscious of its approaching overthrow and the coming establishment of Cæsarism by the man who had just confirmed the supremacy of the Directory. The old dream of the old monarchy, the dream of extending French territory to the natural boundaries, was practically accomplished ; what had been the Austrian Netherlands were now a part of France. So also was Savoy. Moreover, beyond her own borders, France had established in practical dependence upon herself the Batavian Republic in Holland, and the Cisalpine Republic in Northern Italy, while the Swiss Republic was hardly more independent. She was in possession of Corfu in the Adriatic ; the goodwill of Austria had been more or less secured in the treaty by the appropriation to her of Venice ; and French influence was supreme in the minor German principalities of the Rhineland. Only one power was still in arms against her, Great Britain ; and the prostration of Great Britain was the object upon which the Directory and Bonaparte were bent.

The success
of the French
Republic.

Ostensibly, then, for many months after the Treaty of Campo Formio, the energies of the Republic were directed in accordance with the whole series of precedents to preparations for a great invasion of England. The destruction of the Dutch fleet at Camperdown as a matter of fact made the plan impracticable ; but, again, in accordance with precedent, the threat compelled the British to retain their fleet in full strength in the Channel, while Jervis had to keep watch over the large if not otherwise formidable Spanish fleet in Cadiz. As yet ships could not be spared for a fleet in the Mediterranean.

1797. A plan
of invasion.

By Bonaparte, however, the preparations for an invasion were intended as a mask to cover his real designs. He had conceived the project of an Asiatic conquest which should make Asia the base for the domination of Europe, while the base for the Asiatic conquest itself was to be Egypt. Egypt was to be the key to India, and the overthrow of the British power in India would involve the overthrow of the British power everywhere by cutting off the main source of British wealth. The scheme presented itself as practicable, on the hypothesis that Britain was not mistress of the Mediterranean; a hypothesis which at the time was actually true in fact. Great Britain, having her own shores threatened by invasion, could not afford to spare a great fleet to dominate the Mediterranean. Bonaparte's own plan was not at first submitted to the Directory. The great naval preparations which went on through the winter and spring had no other apparent object than the proposed invasion. But when at last Bonaparte brought forward his scheme for the invasion of Egypt, it was welcomed by the Directory, which was beginning to feel by no means unwilling to see its alarmingly powerful young general engaged at a distance from the shores of France. The ships which were being made ready at Toulon, Marseilles, Genoa, and Civita Vecchia, were to convey an army across the unguarded Mediterranean to the East.

But in the spring of 1798, the admiralty was seeing its way to detaching a Mediterranean squadron. St. Vincent was instructed that eight more ships were to be sent to him, so that he might send Nelson with a dozen ships into the island sea. Before those ships arrived, Jervis had already sent Nelson to watch Toulon with three ships. But Nelson's ships were disabled by a storm, whereby Bonaparte was enabled to start from Toulon, without being discovered, on 19th May. On 24th May, St. Vincent's new ships arrived, and he at once dispatched Captain Troubridge with nine ships to join Nelson, with whom he effected his junction on 7th June. Nelson had no knowledge of Bonaparte's movement, and unfortunately the storm had deprived

1798.

The masked design.**Bonaparte sails for Egypt, May.**

him of the frigates on which a battle fleet depended for scouting purposes. Bonaparte had already captured and garrisoned Malta before Nelson had any news of him ; and the English admiral only learnt that Malta had already been captured on the day after Bonaparte had sailed thence for Egypt.

There was nothing whatever to indicate the direction of Bonaparte's expedition. Nelson guessed that Egypt was his destination, and sailed straight for Alexandria. Bonaparte, however, took an indirect route ; Nelson reaching Alexandria on 28th June found neither a French fleet nor news of French ships. He at once sailed away again to hunt for his enemy. Three days later Bonaparte reached Alexandria, disembarked his troops, and set about his immediate business of mastering Egypt. Egypt, under the Mameluke government, was a dependency of Turkey, with which the Republic was not at war ; but its dependence was so nominal that the French expected to procure Turkish acquiescence in their proceedings.


**Nelson in
chase, June
and July.**

For a month Nelson was making his circuit of the Eastern Mediterranean in search of the lost French fleet, of which nothing could be seen or heard. On 1st August he was back before Alexandria, when one of his ships discovered that a French war fleet was lying in Aboukir Bay.

**Battle of the
Nile,
1st August.**

It was already late in the afternoon when Nelson bore down upon the French, who were anchored in line from north-west to south-east, with shoals on their left or western side. Nelson took his place with his flagship the *Vanguard*, sixth in the British line. The five leading British ships, on the hypothesis that where there was room for French ships to swing there was room for British ships to sail, passed down on the left of the French between them and the shoals, and engaged four of the five ships in the French van. Nelson instead of following led the rest of the line down the right of the French ships, until the five French leaders were being pounded to pieces by the fire of eight British ships. The wind was from the north, so that the French rear could not come up to take part in the engagement. It was already almost sundown when the first shot was fired. Through

half the night the battle raged ; when the French van had been crushed, the centre met with a like fate ; at ten o'clock the French flagship the *Orient* blew up. In the morning the French Mediterranean fleet had ceased to exist. Out of their thirteen sail of the line, nine were captured, two blown up or burnt, and only two made their escape. The French casualties numbered



three thousand five hundred, the British not quite nine hundred. No praise could be too high for Nelson himself or for the captains and the men who served him so magnificently. The French fought heroically, but when Nelson's plan of attack developed, a plan which had appeared to them absolutely impossible of execution, they never had a chance. The victory was decisive and overwhelming. Six months earlier the British had not even a Mediterranean squadron ; after the battle of the Nile or

Aboukir Bay, the Mediterranean was a British lake. Bonaparte in Egypt was so completely severed from his base, that scarcely even a word of news from France, much less men or supplies, could reach him.

Meanwhile, Europe had been growing uneasy. The princes in the Rhine provinces found that their territories were being in effect handed over to France with the connivance of Prussia, which proposed to compensate them by the secularisation of ecclesiastical territories elsewhere; a process not at all to the liking of orthodox Austria. Bonaparte had already set up a second North Italian republic called the Valtelline. As soon as he was out of the way, the Directory, which was anti-papal, attacked the Papacy, and transformed the papal states into the Roman Republic. In Switzerland the Helvetic Republic was established in closer dependence on France. The Bourbon king of the Two Sicilies, Ferdinand, began to tremble for his kingdom. The Russian Tsar Paul, who had hitherto stood neutral, except that he had offered naval aid to Great Britain at the moment of the mutinies, took umbrage at the seizure of Malta by Bonaparte, since that neutral island belonged to the Knights of St. John, whom he regarded as being under his own special protection. Also he looked upon the French incursion into the East as a menace to Russia. For these reasons he began actively to urge the formation of a new coalition against France; especially when the battle of the Nile gave such a coalition renewed promise of success. The strength of Great Britain, too, had just been confirmed by the suppression of a rebellion in Ireland.

Matters were precipitated by the ill-advised action of Ferdinand of Naples. Encouraged by Nelson, who visited Naples with some of his ships, he declared war on France, but with the result that his troops were routed, and he himself with his queen had to hurry on board Nelson's ship to be conveyed to Sicily in safety. The French entered Naples, and transformed Southern Italy into the Parthenopean Republic, while Ferdinand continued to reign in Sicily, in effect under British protection.

The efforts of Russia, energetically supported by Pitt and promises of British subsidies, produced at the turn of the year 1799. the second coalition. Frederick William III. of Prussia, who had succeeded his father in the Prussian kingdom in 1797, refused to join the coalition to which, however, Austria was persuaded to adhere. General hostilities were renewed at the beginning of March 1799.

The French advance against Austria from the Upper Rhine was beaten back by the Archduke Charles. In April, an army of Austrians and Russians was in North Italy under the command of Suvarov. The French were driven out of Lombardy, the king of Sardinia was restored in Piedmont, and in June and August two severe defeats were inflicted on the French at the Trebbia and at Novi. In Naples, a monarchist revolution was effected by methods which are the one serious blot on Nelson's career. Under the influence of Lady Hamilton, herself a favourite of the queen of Naples, Nelson became a violent personal partisan of the Bourbons. In very unsatisfactory circumstances the capitulation of certain fortresses held by the Republicans was voided, and large numbers of the rebels who had surrendered were put to death. Technically, Nelson's action in the matter was warranted; morally it does not appear possible to justify it, since the voiding of the capitulation was in effect his doing.

But the Austrians and Russians were quarrelling because Suvarov had declared for the reinstatement of Charles Emmanuel of Sardinia in Piedmont, whereas Austria wanted Piedmont for herself. The British also in the course of the summer met with a reverse. An expedition to the Texel captured the Dutch fleet without much difficulty, because the sailors were of the Orange party, and the ships were carried off to Yarmouth; but the further land operations, under the nominal command of the duke of York, were so badly managed that the duke and his troops were obliged to capitulate, though on terms which allowed them to withdraw from the country on condition of the liberation of some thousands of French and Dutch prisoners, in October. More serious, perhaps, was the

complete defeat at Zurich, by Masséna, of a second Russian army under Korsakoff at the end of September—a blow which entirely foiled Suvarov's plan of campaign. To stop the dissensions between Austrians and Russians, it had been arranged that the Austrians should proceed against Savoy and that Suvarov should join Korsakoff in Switzerland. But when Suvarov had forced his way into Switzerland, Korsakoff was not there to join him. Practically from that time Russia ceased to take part in the war.

Meanwhile Bonaparte had been carrying on his isolated operations in the East. In Egypt he overthrew the Mameluke government, and thence proceeded with his project for the conquest of Syria. Here, however, he found himself opposed by an insuperable obstacle. Urged by the Tsar and by Pitt, the Porte with full justification had declared war against France. Before Bonaparte could proceed to the interior, it was necessary for him to secure the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre, which would otherwise serve as a gateway through which the French could be attacked on the flank. But Acre offered a stubborn resistance, largely through the help given by the British admiral Sir Sidney Smith; who arrived with a small squadron, threw himself into the place, and defied Bonaparte's attack. The French were obliged to fall back into Egypt; when Bonaparte received intelligence from France which decided him that the time had arrived when he must himself return thither and seize the control of the government. Leaving Kléber in command of the army in Egypt and at the head of the government which he had organised, he himself with a few chosen companions stole on board ship, slipped across the Mediterranean undetected, landed on the French coast, hurried to Paris, and in November effected the *coup d'État* of Brumaire, which made him virtually the absolute ruler of France with the title of First Consul.

**Bonaparte
in the East.**

**His return
to France,
November.**

Bonaparte at once used his new position, first to pacify the districts where disturbances had again been growing active, and to permit the return of those *émigrés* who were willing to recognise the Republic, and secondly to pose as the advocate of peace. It does not, however,

**1800.
Negotiations
which failed.**

appear that he had any intention of making peace upon terms acceptable to Great Britain or Austria. Also if his peaceful intentions were genuine, he acted very unwisely in discarding the recognised diplomatic channels and addressing a personal letter to George III. The letter was answered by Pitt's cousin and foreign minister, Lord Grenville, in a tone which was certainly not calculated to further negotiations. Pitt was still of opinion that France was now in such a state of exhaustion, that she would be willing to come to satisfactory terms if a firm front were shown. Austria did not expect satisfactory terms under the present conditions, and hoped to get something better by continuing the war, subject to the receipt of an adequate supply of British gold, which was duly promised. Both the powers engaged not to sign a separate peace.

In the spring of 1800, the Austrians conducted a successful campaign in Northern Italy, where Masséna was shut up in **Genoa**; but on the other hand, Moreau from **Bonaparte in Italy.** Alsace pushed the Austrians back to Ulm; and in May Bonaparte himself appeared unexpectedly in North Italy with a force which he had brought over the great St. Bernard, and entered Milan two days before Masséna was forced by starvation to capitulate at Genoa. The Austrian commander Melas turned to face the invader, but met with a shattering defeat at Marengo, a battle which was lost and won through the unexpected arrival on the field, at the critical moment, of an unlooked-for French column. By the Convention of Alessandria, the Austrians were obliged to evacuate Northern Italy.

A few days later the hostilities in Germany were suspended. Bonaparte returned in triumph to Paris. The emperor refused **Negotiations again fail.** to be tempted into a separate negotiation for peace, but proposed a congress. Pitt was willing enough; but the First Consul demanded a general armistice. Now as matters stood, a British fleet was blockading Malta, which was on the point of surrender. An armistice would mean supplies for Malta and supplies for Egypt; neither of which it had been hitherto possible to send. Compliance with the proposal would merely have meant that negotiations would be kept

going until both Egypt and Malta were made secure, when they could be dropped. Pitt refused the armistice, and Austria still declined to negotiate separately.

To that power the consequences were disastrous. No sooner had the armistice come to an end than Moreau advanced, and on 3rd December inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Austrians at Hohenlinden. The victory was decisive. Austria could no longer resist, and the second coalition was finally dissolved by the Treaty of Lunéville (9th February 1801).

**Hohenlinden
and Luné-
ville, Feb-
ruary 1801.**

Malta had surrendered to the British in September. At the moment when the Treaty of Lunéville was being signed, Sir Ralph Abercromby was on the point of disembarking at Aboukir Bay to open the final campaign which put an end to the French occupation of Egypt. But the treaty left Great Britain once more in isolation, and in something worse, for the half-mad Tsar Paul had entirely changed his attitude. Republican France had been an abomination in his eyes; but Bonaparte seemed to him the incarnation of his own conception of absolutism. The Corsican soldier who now ruled France as an autocrat had become to him a hero. He was already disgusted with Austria, and was becoming more and more irritated with Great Britain. When the British captured Malta and did not forthwith hand it over to him, the cup of his indignation was filled. Twenty years before, the Baltic powers had united in what was called the Armed Neutrality to resist the practices of the 'Tyrant of the Seas' in dealing with neutral vessels, seizing enemy's goods carried in neutral bottoms, and interfering in the trade of neutrals at enemy's ports. Paul now set about reviving the Armed Neutrality, and a treaty of the Baltic powers was signed three weeks before the Treaty of Lunéville.

Tsar Paul.

In the British view, Paul's treaty meant in effect that the fleets of the Baltic powers were on the point of being placed at the service of France. The treaty did not in itself provide a legitimate *casus belli*; but the British government could not afford to wait and allow the Baltic powers to strike in at their own convenience. A fleet was dis-

**The battle
of the Baltic,
2nd April.**

patched to the Baltic under Sir Hyde Parker, with Nelson as his second in command. The Danes were required to surrender their fleet, which was to be held in pledge by the British. The Danes refused; whereupon Nelson forced his way into the harbour of Copenhagen, and after a furious battle, in which he took care not to see his senior officer's signal to retire, he forced the Danes to submission. The engagement is best known as the battle of the Baltic. It decisively broke up the new alliance, for the Swedes had no mind to meet the same fate as the Danes; and almost at the same moment the Tsar was assassinated and was succeeded on the throne by his son Alexander I., a young prince of no small abilities and many enthusiasms, who was entirely opposed to the strange views with which his father had become possessed. Instead of continuing Paul's policy, the young Tsar immediately set about establishing amicable relations with Great Britain.

The battle of the Baltic was fought on 2nd April. Twelve days earlier another battle of decisive importance had been fought in Egypt. According to the plan of operations three forces were to co-operate in that country for the overthrow of the French: the Turks, the expedition under Sir Ralph Abercromby, and another expedition from India, under the command of Sir David Baird. When Abercromby reached the eastern Mediterranean early in February he found the Turks not prepared to move, while the Indian expedition had not yet left Bombay. Some time elapsed before he was able on 8th March to effect the landing of his troops at Aboukir Bay, an operation performed under extreme difficulties by raw troops with an admirable courage and discipline in the face of the French veterans. The French force was obliged to fall back as the British advanced upon Alexandria, and the decisive engagement did not take place till 21st March. Abercromby himself was killed, but the French were completely defeated, Alexandria was isolated, and after two months the whole of the French forces in Egypt capitulated and were sent back to France.

The struggle was already over when Baird joined Hutchinson, on whom the command had devolved upon Abercromby's

**The French
expelled
from Egypt,
March-May.**

death. The debarkation at Aboukir Bay, and the overthrow of the French by a British force actually somewhat inferior in numbers, most of whom were new to war, was the sole striking military achievement of the British throughout the whole of the war from 1793 to 1801.

**Effects
of the
campaign.**

In fact, since the Seven Years' War British troops had never been given an opportunity of distinguishing themselves, and the Mistress of the Seas was of no account as a military power. The success in Egypt did not bring her into the ranks of the military powers; it had been accomplished by an army of only about fifteen thousand men. But it absolutely ruined all that remained of Bonaparte's dream of French power in the East; and it gave to the British that supreme confidence in the doggedness and discipline of the rawest troops in the face of veterans to which they were to owe many a victory in the struggle which was still to come.

Copenhagen and the conquest of Egypt were the last active operations in the war. Pitt himself resigned in March on account of his difference with the king on the question of Catholic emancipation. The Addington ministry, which was formed with his somewhat

**Pitt's
resignation,
March.**

lukewarm support, would have very much preferred to remain under his guidance, as the Rockinghams would have preferred to be led by the elder Pitt in 1765. As it was, it did its best to do what Pitt would have done had he remained in office. But before we turn to the formal conclusion of the war, we must revert to contemporary affairs in India, where the brilliant governor-general, best known by the title of the Marquess Wellesley, bestowed upon him during the term of his office, had been establishing the British domination.

When Cornwallis left India in 1793, he was succeeded in the governor-generalship by Sir John Shore. Shore, though endowed with many admirable qualities, including an imperturbable courage, lacked that indomitable self-confidence necessary for a ruler who must frequently be called upon to act on his own personal responsibility at moments of crisis. Moreover, he was not a soldier himself, and had no real confidence in his commander-in-chief, Sir Robert

**India :
Sir J. Shore,
1793-8.**

Abercromby, brother of Sir Ralph. Imbued with Cornwallis's belief that anything in the nature of aggression was to be avoided, but lacking his power of perceiving the necessity of vigorous action on occasion, Sir John failed to convince the native powers that the British power was not to be trifled with. When the Puna Mahrattas attacked the Nizam, Shore did not consider it necessary to intervene for his protection. The result of this was that the Nizam was on the one hand obliged to surrender territories to the Mahrattas, and on the other hand was led to regard the British government as a broken reed; consequently he organised a force of his own on European lines under the command of a French officer, Raymond. The Mahrattas at the same time came to the natural conclusion, shared by the still more dangerous Tippu Sultan, that the British ascendancy would very soon collapse. In Oudh, Shore was more successful. A disputed succession enabled him to secure the throne to the legitimate heir, Saadat Ali, upon terms establishing a more definite British suzerainty. The nawab was to be maintained on the throne partly by a British contingent, for the maintenance of which Allahabad was finally ceded to the British; while the nawab himself was to have no independent diplomatic relations with other powers. But what finally decided the home authorities on the recall of Shore was a mutiny of the European officers of the Bengal army. Neither the governor-general nor the commander-in-chief proved equal to the emergency, and the mutineers compelled the government to accede to their demands. Lord Mornington, the elder brother of Arthur Wellesley afterwards duke of Wellington, was appointed to the governor-generalship, and arrived in India in May 1798. The period of Shore's rule was otherwise signalised by the capture of the island of Ceylon from the Dutch in 1796.

Now it was precisely at this moment that Bonaparte was developing his design of an Asiatic conquest. For the past five years Great Britain had been at war with France. It was not forty years since the French in India had been decisively beaten in their duel with the British; it was barely fifteen years since Suffren

Mornington
(Wellesley),
governor-
general,
May 1798.

had been apparently on the verge of recovering the French position, in alliance with Mysore. The native powers, each desiring ascendancy for itself, continued to look upon French assistance as an available means of attaining their own ends. The Nizam had Raymond's contingent in his own dominions. Tippu had for a long time past been in communication with the French at Mauritius, and had been **The native powers.** acclaimed in republican Paris as 'Citoyen Tippu.' Sindhia also had a contingent of his own under a French commander, de Boigne. Mornington, touching at the Cape on his way to India, obtained tolerably complete information as to the state of affairs, and learnt of the further complication that Zeman Shah, the ruler at Kabul, who was believed to be an extremely powerful monarch, was contemplating a renewal of the Afghan attack upon Hindustan, in co-operation with the Mohammedan sultan of Mysore. A month after Mornington's arrival in India a proclamation issued by the French governor of Mauritius was printed, in which French citizens were invited to take service with Tippu.

Energetic and immediate action was obviously necessary. No man could have been more prompt and energetic than Mornington. Kirkpatrick and Malcolm were forthwith dispatched to the Nizam, who at once yielded to their **Mornington deals with the Nizam.** vigorous pressure. Raymond's corps was disbanded, and a British contingent was substituted on the usual terms. The Nizam undertook to admit no Europeans to his service without the British sanction. The Mahrattas were conveniently occupied with struggles among their own chiefs for the ascendancy.

The governor-general was thus enabled to concentrate upon preparations for a war with Mysore, while he was urging Tippu to adopt the alternative course of breaking off his **Tippu to be crushed.** connection with the French, dismissing his French officers, and receiving a permanent British Resident at his court. No satisfactory replies could be extracted from the sultan, even after the news of Nelson's victory of the Nile had reached India, only three months after that success had been won. Mornington

decided that Tippu must be crushed in a spring campaign. Only his own versatility and energy made the thing possible ; no help could be looked for from the Mahrattas or the Nizam.

In spite of innumerable difficulties the Madras army, under General Harris, was advancing into Mysore at the beginning of **The conquest of Mysore.** March 1799. A second force under General Stewart entered Mysore on the south-west. Tippu, a mighty warrior, though not the equal of his father Haidar Ali, attempted to annihilate Stewart, but was successfully repulsed. He turned to the north to intercept Harris, who evaded him ; and he had to fall back upon his great fortress capital, Seringapatam, itself. The siege began in April ; Tippu refused the terms offered him by the British general ; it was imperative that the town should be captured at once, a prolonged siege being out of the question ; and on 4th May Seringapatam was stormed. Tippu himself fell fighting valiantly. The capture of Seringapatam and the death of Tippu ended the war, and with it the power of Mysore.

It was some thirty years since the Mohammedan adventurer Haidar Ali had deposed the legitimate raja and made himself **Treatment of Mysore.** sultan of Mysore. The Hindu population had no love for their Moslem rulers, who had forcibly converted large numbers of them by a familiar process. The dynasty had no title to its position save that which it had won by the sword. Mornington took the perfectly legitimate course of restoring the Hindu dynasty within its own old dominions, while the territories annexed by Haidar and Tippu were annexed to the British dominions. The restored raja was taken under British protection. Theoretically the Mahrattas and the Nizam had been allies of the British in the war ; actually the Mahrattas had done nothing and the Nizam very little. Accordingly Mornington offered the north-western portion of the conquered country to the Mahrattas, subject to their acceptance of a treaty on very much the same terms as those recently accepted by the Nizam. The Mahrattas refused, and the region in question was divided between the British and the Nizam. The Nizam also received a considerable accession of territory on the north and north-west ; but all the rest, except the limited region assigned to the Mysore raja, was

taken under the direct British dominion. In the following year the Nizam ceded his share, in return for the maintenance by the British of a contingent of ten thousand men for his protection ; and he at the same time agreed to submit all disputes in which he might be involved to the British arbitration.

The governor-general was rewarded, very inadequately in his own view, with the Irish title of Marquess Wellesley. He was one of those very rare governors-general who acted upon the conviction that the acquisition of fresh territory under direct British administration was desirable whenever it could be effected in a lawful manner. It is possible, though doubtful, that Cornwallis would have abstained from appropriating so large a proportion of Tippu's territories. It is more than probable that he would have avoided the acquisition of those portions originally appropriated to the Nizam but ceded by him under Wellesley's subsidiary treaty. Almost certainly he would have refrained from the next annexations which we have to describe, not because Wellesley's action was unjust or contrary to public law—if that term may be applied to customs prevalent in India—but because as a matter of expediency he did not wish to extend British responsibilities. From Wellesley's point of view it was entirely to the advantage of the native population to be brought under British administration, and also to the advantage of the British to add to the territories under their control. Thus, wherever a question of succession arose, as in Tanjore and elsewhere, Wellesley adopted the principle, where the strength of the respective claims was in doubt, of giving British support to the candidate who accepted his terms. Those terms nearly always included the British control of foreign policy at least, and usually, of administration.

The two most striking instances which fall within the compass of the present volume are those of Arcot and Oudh. For years past the nawab of the Carnatic had governed very badly. His subsidies, payable to the British in return for their protection, were habitually in arrear, and he was only able to pay them by becoming heavily indebted to individuals among the British. In 1801 the reigning nawab

**Wellesley
and
Cornwallis.**

**1801.
The Carnatic
annexed.**

died ; there was a disputed succession ; the governor-general stepped in and recognised as nawab the claimant who was contented to retain his dignity, his title, and a permanent provision for himself and his heirs—resigning to the British the entire management of the government, the revenues, and the business of liquidating the debts, so far as they were reasonable and legitimate.

The annexation of the Carnatic practically brought all India south of the Nizam's dominions under British rule, except that **Wellesley and Oudh.** Mysore and Travancore were not under actual British administration. But in the north the position of Oudh was extremely unsatisfactory. The maintenance of a buffer between Bengal and the Mahrattas, or the Afghans if they should invade India, was of first-rate importance. But the nawab Saadat Ali was an incapable ruler. The British contingent provided under the arrangement with Shore was occupied not in the protection of the frontiers so much as in controlling the great levies of the nawab's own army. Wellesley arrived at a conclusion more agreeable to him than to the nawab. Oudh must be protected ; it could only be protected by British troops ; the nawab's own army under existing conditions was very much more dangerous than useful. Therefore the British contingent must be largely increased and the nawab's own army reduced. For the increase of the British contingent the nawab must cede the district on the south and west lying in the angle of the Ganges and the Jumna, called the Doab, and also Rohilkhand ; whereby the whole south and west frontier of Oudh would be covered by British territory. The nawab declined the suggestion, and said he would abdicate. Wellesley replied that his youthful heir could not be as well fitted to govern as he, and if it was beyond his own power the British must take possession. Apart from other considerations, without the cession there was no security that the nawab would be able to pay the subsidies in accordance with his existing obligations. Saadat Ali argued but submitted. The territories were ceded, the army was reduced, the contingent was increased, and a British Resident was established at Lucknow to emphasise the British demand

for decent administration within the borders of Oudh. Thus by 1801 Wellesley had already transformed the ascendancy of the British, as one among a group of more or less equal powers, into a great dominion of which the only possible rival was the Mahratta confederacy.

We may add the important note with regard to the French, that Wellesley fully recognised the inconvenience and danger of the French naval station established at Mauritius, **Mauritius.** threatening communications and the trade route to the Cape. He planned an expedition to seize the islands, but was foiled by the obstinacy of Admiral Rainier, who refused to undertake operations without direct orders from home. The record of the rest of Wellesley's career as governor-general belongs to our next volume.

Wellesley in India destroyed whatever prospect there had been of the overthrow of British power by native powers with or without French co-operation. The operations in Egypt and in the Baltic in the spring of 1801, after Great Britain had been left isolated by the Treaty of Lunéville, gave the finishing stroke to the Eastern ambitions of the First Consul, and confirmed British naval supremacy more decisively than ever. Both Great Britain and France were weary of war. The maritime power without active allies could not strike at France on land; France could not strike at the maritime power on sea. Both, therefore, were willing to negotiate. It is improbable that Bonaparte either expected or desired a prolonged peace, unless he should find himself able to reduce the British power without engaging in a new war; but at least he wanted peace for the time, breathing space for recuperation, the opportunity for reorganising the administration of France. He could easily afford to make peace, seeing that France, which nine years before was in danger of being shorn of the territories won for her by Louis XIV., was now established as unquestionably the first military power on the Continent. As for Great Britain, the annexation to France of the Austrian Netherlands and the practical subjection of Holland to her were an actual *fait accompli*, which it was out of the power of the British to reverse. The

**Europe:
peace in
sight.**

prevention of this had in fact been the main British interest in continental affairs. Outside the Continent Great Britain had gained much and lost nothing. She, too, therefore, could afford to make peace; which she hoped and believed would be permanent, though she could not enter upon negotiations with any real confidence that France had laid aside all designs of further aggression.

It was unfortunate that the ministry which had taken the place of Pitt's was a weak one. Pitt had been accompanied in

**The Peace
of Amiens,
March 1802.**

his retirement by the ablest of his colleagues, Grenville, Dundas, and Cornwallis among the seniors, Castlereagh and George Canning among the juniors.

Bonaparte dealt with Addington's government more dictatorially than would have been possible had Pitt himself and the stiff-necked and stiff-mannered Grenville been in office. But the main thing was to obtain peace upon honourable terms, and there was no disposition anywhere in England to be grasping. Preliminaries were signed in October, and the definitive Peace of Amiens on 27th March 1802. The settlement was one-sided enough. Egypt was to be evacuated both by the French, who had already been expelled, and by the British, who were in possession, and was to be restored to the Porte as a province of the Turkish empire, no longer under the virtually independent rule of the Mamelukes. Great Britain was to retain of her conquests only Ceylon and Trinidad. Malta was to be restored to the Knights of St. John. The affairs of the European continent were ruled out of the negotiations altogether, except in Italy, where the French were to evacuate the papal states. France had emerged triumphantly out of her ten years' struggle; Great Britain was more powerful at the end of it than she had been at the beginning. Yet the latter power had surrendered some of the fruits she had won, while France surrendered nothing at all. If French satisfaction with the treaty was complete, in the United Kingdom it was somewhat tempered.

IV. THE BRITISH ISLES AND THE UNION, 1793-1802

In his earlier years the younger Pitt like his father had been an advocate of parliamentary reform, and, speaking generally, of liberal measures. But the Great Commoner had **Pitt's change** always reposed his trust in the generous instincts **of attitude.** and the intelligence of the people at large. He had gone outside the House of Commons to ascertain the national will. His son had no such confidence in the people. Although he was cool-headed enough to hold out for some time against the alarmists when the French Revolution was in its first stage, he, too, with many of his colleagues and of the Whigs, surrendered to the later panic. After 1792, not only Tories and constitutional Conservatives like Burke, but the bulk of the people in every class, became convinced that any movement whatever in the direction of reform, any alteration or extension of the franchise, any limitation of the powers of the governing classes as then constituted, would open the floodgates of revolution, and that the scenes which had taken place in Paris would be re-enacted in London. To be an advocate of reform at all was to be condemned as a republican and a revolutionary.

The establishment of the French Republic, the death of Louis XVI., and the declaration of war, initiated an era of repression, of which, however, it cannot be denied **Public** that it was endorsed by the large majority of Pitt's **opinion.** countrymen outside as well as inside parliament. The fear of what would happen if a revolutionary party got the upper hand blinded the majority of the public to the fact that there was no prospect that it would get the upper hand. The conviction prevailed that any expression of dangerous opinions must be sternly repressed, in accordance with the common hypothesis that the more dangerous an opinion is the more likely it is to be generally adopted, if the public at large is permitted to hear arguments in its favour as well as against it. The whole machinery of social pressure, of judicial administration, of legislation, was brought to bear in order to silence all protests against existing

grievances ; and in adopting that policy the ministers had public opinion behind them. It may, however, be fairly urged in extenuation that no one knew what the amount of explosive material in the country really was. The French Revolution had taken the world by surprise ; all the received opinions with regard to the social structure in general had been subjected to a violent shock ; intelligent people whose emotions got the better of them were using excited language ; the progress of the industrial and agricultural revolutions was causing much suffering in the lower strata of society, and hungry men are easily led to desperate courses. It was not difficult to translate popular murmurs into signs that the proletariat was ripe for a revolution, to read a sinister meaning even into the language of studied moderation, or to be convinced that any spark might kindle a conflagration. It was easy to miss true perspectives in the lurid light of the September Massacres and the Reign of Terror. The ruling classes felt that their privileges were at stake and were firmly convinced that those privileges were the sole safeguards of social order. The middle classes were more afraid of those below than of those above them. The masses on the whole preferred the evils that they knew to the terrors they imagined. And therefore they acquiesced in the policy of repression.

The campaign began with the Traitorous Correspondence Act, passed in March 1793. Grey's motion for parliamentary

**Repressive
measures,
1793-5.**

reform was defeated in the House of Commons by six to one. The Act was followed up by a series of prosecutions for seditious utterances attended by monstrously disproportionate penalties—as in the judgment which condemned an unfortunate bookseller to a heavy fine and a long term of imprisonment for selling Tom Paine's *Rights of Man*. In 1794 the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended, and some leading members of the societies which sympathised with the French Revolution were arrested, though the jury were sufficiently cool-headed to acquit them of treason when they were brought to trial. The suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act was renewed every year until 1801. In 1795 the Treason-

able Practices Act made it penal to write or speak against the Crown, the government, or the constitution.

In Scotland matters were even worse than in England. In that country the monstrous anomalies of parliamentary representation had enabled Dundas to acquire a complete **Scotland.** control, to bring from Scotland to Westminster a solid phalanx of supporters who voted to order, and to keep in his own hands the entire management of the executive. It was in the interest of every one who had any voice in the government to preserve this state of things, and Dundas had no intention of opening the door to any changes. Among the proletariat on the other hand, very much better educated than their brethren south of the Tweed, and traditionally endowed with an exceedingly independent spirit, there already existed a widely spread democratic sentiment, explicit and implicit in the poems of Robert Burns, before a new impulse was given to it by the literature of the French Revolution. The sanest and soberest among the gentry—such men as Sir James Mackintosh and the historian, Robertson—found themselves in sympathy, if not with the Revolution itself, at least with the progressive ideas which lay at its root.

There was, indeed, much more reason to fear a practical application of revolutionary ideas in Scotland than in England. In 1792, a year which was marked by grave distress, **Braxfield.** there were many disturbances in the country, and the society who called themselves the 'Friends of the People' were not only disseminating their doctrines vigorously, but were inclining to adopt an attitude more aggressive and more advanced than in the southern country. Consequently when measures of repression were resolved upon, they were carried out more drastically and more conspicuously in defiance of all the principles of justice than in England. The chief instrument of the tyranny was Judge Braxfield, who held the office of Lord Justice-Clerk. Juries were deliberately packed, and Braxfield made it perfectly clear that he was on the bench not to try but to sentence accused persons. A young lawyer named Muir and a unitarian preacher named Fisher were sentenced to fourteen years' and seven years'

transportation respectively, for using language and pressing for reforms which in any other circumstances would have been regarded as perfectly legitimate. Sentences of fourteen years' transportation were passed upon three more victims early in 1794, mainly for advocating universal suffrage and annual parliaments. It required an immense audacity on the part of

The any young man who joined the Scottish Bar to profess
Scottish Bar. anything in the nature of liberal ideas, since it was at least generally believed that by so doing he would completely ruin his professional prospects. It is, however, remarkable that the result of this state of things in 1796 was not to suppress but to bring into vigorous association a number of able men who concentrated their energies upon definite principles of reform without laying themselves open to charges of using language which even Braxfield could have distorted into treason.

The virulence of the panic had by this time worked itself out both in England and in Scotland ; the Reign of Terror had been

Continued over long enough to enable men's minds to resume
repression, something like their normal equilibrium. Repres-
1795-1800. sion did not cease ; but fair trials and penalties approximately proportionate to the offence became the order of the day. Yet more than thirty years were to pass before governments ceased to tremble at the spectre of Jacobinism. In 1795, the Seditious Meetings Act was passed, which forbade the assemblage of more than fifty persons at any meeting unless previous notice had been given to the magistrate, who in effect could disperse it if he disapproved of its proceedings. Four years later, unlicensed debating clubs were forbidden, and combinations of workmen were made illegal, not so much for the protection of masters as from the fear that they would be utilised for political ends.

How little way had really been made in England by red-republican ideas is fairly demonstrated by the story of the
1797. The naval mutinies already narrated. There was no
mutinies. hint of any such ideas in the mutiny at Spit-head, where the men demanded simply the rectification of

grievances which every reasonable man knew to be intolerable. When those grievances were redressed, the men returned to their duty and never again showed any sign of disaffection. It was only at the Nore, among men who had been recruited by pressgangs from the dregs of the population, with an infusion of wastrels, better educated men who had fallen out of the social rank in which they were born, and of Irishmen who were really revolutionaries, that anything was heard of revolutionary principles.

The presence of Irishmen on the fleet at the Nore helped to give a comparatively revolutionary character to that mutiny, because Ireland in a still greater degree than **Ireland** Scotland supplied a more fruitful field than England for the revolutionary propaganda. The democratic foundation of Presbyterianism had prepared Presbyterians every- **The Presby-** where for a ready acceptance of advanced demo- **terians.** cratic doctrine: there was a solid basis of truth in the favourite aphorism of old King James I., 'No bishop no king.' In Ireland as well as in Scotland, there was a substantial Presbyterian population descended from Scottish settlers, and Cromwell's soldiery. If these latter were comparatively few, they had the stern puritan qualities of their republican forefathers. They had no love for monarchy, and they were the descendants of the very men who, against the will of the majority of their countrymen, had set the precedent of beheading a king. Moreover, they lived in a country where they were deprived of the political rights for which their ancestors had fought. The more numerous Scots were the seed of the Covenanters. It was small wonder that the Irish Presbyterians were ready recipients of the new doctrines. And it was also small wonder that the masses of the Catholic peasantry, living in perpetual destitution and squalor, **The Catholic** under an alien land system, hated everything con- **peasantry.** nected with the government, which to them was a mere tyranny, and with the law, which seemed to have been created not to protect but to oppress.

At first sight it appears somewhat of a paradox that the Ireland which had shown itself so unexpectedly loyal to the

British flag during the war of American Independence, when her parliament was directly subordinated to the British Privy Council

Failure of the independence conceded. and to the parliament at Westminster in which she was unrepresented, became in the last decade of the century a hotbed of sedition and rebellion, when she had acquired legislative independence

as well as the removal of most of those commercial restrictions which in the past had throttled her economic development. Primarily the explanation lies in the fact that although the concession of legislative independence was a great step towards political freedom it was only a step. There was no reform of parliamentary representation; the executive was not responsible to the legislature; Presbyterians as well as Roman Catholics were still rigidly excluded from all public offices, and the Roman Catholics, who were more than three-fourths of the whole population, were still unenfranchised; while the majority of the constituencies still returned their members at the dictation of a small number of individuals. In England, there was need enough for the reform of the system of rotten boroughs, but in Ireland the proportion of rotten boroughs was very much larger. The practical effect was that while the Irish parliament was theoretically independent of English control, it was actually controlled by a small oligarchy intensely interested in preserving its own ascendancy; an oligarchy which could ordinarily impose its will upon the executive head at Dublin castle.

Grattan, to whom more than to any other man Ireland owed the recognition of her independent legislature in 1782, was him-

Grattan and the oligarchy. self an advocate of parliamentary reform, and the removal of religious disabilities; but Grattan did not dominate the parliament which is called by his name. The oligarchy did not want either parliamentary reform or the removal of religious disabilities, because the completeness of its control of the legislature and of the executive would thereby have been impaired if not destroyed. Grattan's influence sank into the background.

Between 1782 and 1790 there was considerable improvement in the material prosperity of the country, owing to the

removal of the trade restrictions. But by 1790, the French Revolution was beginning to scatter its seeds broadcast. A young Protestant lawyer, Theobald Wolfe Tone, **The united Irishmen.** who was himself possessed with the new doctrines, conceived the idea of bringing together Irish Protestants and Catholics to demand reform and redress of grievances; a new departure, since traditionally the religious difference had constantly served to promote antagonism, and to prevent combination. In 1791, he founded the Society of United Irishmen, starting as an association of Northern Protestants, who welcomed the adhesion of Roman Catholics. Ostensibly it aimed at reform, not revolution; it received only a very dubious approval from Grattan, who was essentially not a revolutionary but a constitutionalist. By less cautious reformers and by the revolutionary element it was warmly welcomed.

It must be remarked, however, that no one viewed the French Revolution with more alarm than the Roman Catholic gentry, **The Revolution and the Roman Catholics.** who saw the successive French assemblies attacking the Church in France, seizing its endowments, depriving it of its privileges, and finally in effect proscribing its doctrines. But so far as the religious aspect of the question was understood at all by the Roman Catholic peasantry, the hostility of the Revolution to the Church appeared to correspond to their own hostility, not to the Roman Catholic religion, but to the Anglican establishment. They resented ecclesiastical domination, because the ecclesiastical domination which they felt was a domination which trampled upon their own religion, and which seemed to be part and parcel of the same system which imposed upon them the agrarian grievances.

During the next few years the Society of the United Irishmen grew and spread. Wolfe Tone's first half-veiled hints that any hopes of reform were really bound up with separation from Great Britain were finding acceptance, **Increasing disaffection.** and were becoming more open. When war was declared with the French Republic in 1793 it appeared necessary to Pitt that measures should be taken for checking Irish disaffection by

conciliation. While he was stoutly opposing proposals for the reform of English representation as untimely, he could not become an advocate of similar proposals for Ireland, but pressure was brought to bear upon the Irish oligarchy, **Pitt's Relief Act, 1793.** whose leading spirit was the Lord Chancellor Fitzgibbon. An Act was passed removing many of the minor disabilities under which the Catholics suffered, and admitting them to the franchise. But it still excluded them from higher public offices, and they were still excluded from parliament itself. Consequently, the Catholic gentry, who would have been the natural representatives of the Catholic population, were still precluded from active participation in politics ; and virtually the poorer sort acquired the vote, but were left to exercise it without leadership.

After the Relief Act there was something of a lull, till the waters again became troubled in 1795. The Portland Whigs had just joined the government in England, and **1795.** one of their number, Fitzwilliam, was sent to **Fitzwilliam's** Ireland as lord-lieutenant. He and every one else **lord-** supposed that a change of policy was implied in the **lieutenancy.** appointment, that there was to be a more wholehearted emancipation of the Catholics, and that Fitzgibbon and the ascendancy party were to be deprived of their predominance. Fitzwilliam's instructions were wanting in definiteness. He opened negotiations with Grattan, allowed it to be thoroughly understood that he was advocating Catholic emancipation, and dismissed one of the leaders of the Fitzgibbon party. The hopes of Grattan's friends and of the Catholics ran high ; but the lord-lieutenant had gone much further than was intended by the government at Westminster. Even now, despite the independence of the Irish parliament, it virtually rested with the ministers in Great Britain to decide the course of Irish legislation ; that is to say, they were still able to coerce the government in Ireland, at least when they had Irish public opinion on their own side. But as matters stood, Pitt's ministry instead of bringing pressure to bear upon the oligarchy in effect repudiated Fitzwilliam's actions and recalled him ; thereby thoroughly establishing the

conviction that the advocates of emancipation and of reform had nothing to hope from them.

In the meantime, the ascendancy party had become thoroughly alarmed by the two demands for Catholic emancipation and parliamentary reform, especially when they saw the Protestant dissenters joining in one camp with their old enemies of the Roman Catholic faith.

**Revival of
religious
hostility.**

In the literature of the time, the name Protestant is curiously enough restricted to the Protestants of the established Anglican Church, who were entirely hostile to Presbyterians as well as to Romanists. The old hostility between the Protestants in this narrower sense and the Catholics was again fomented; Catholics formed themselves into societies which called themselves 'Defenders,' Protestants into societies who became known as 'Peep o' day boys,' and afterwards as 'Orangemen'; and between these two there were frequent collisions. But the coalition of Presbyterians and Roman Catholics was not broken up; and in 1796, Wolfe Tone had become an open advocate of rebellion, and betook himself to France to invite the intervention of the French Republic. It was this mission of Wolfe Tone which brought about the abortive attempt at invasion under Hoche at the end of 1796.

The action or inaction of the Catholics of the south when the French fleet was off the coast implies that Wolfe Tone had very much overestimated the readiness of the population for rebellion. There were no risings, and there was apparently much more inclination to join in repelling the invader than to help him to gain a footing on land. On the other hand, the alarm of the government had already led to the passing of an Insurrection Act, in effect bestowing arbitrary powers upon the executive. Fitzwilliam's successor, Lord Camden, was practically a puppet in the hands of Fitzgibbon, on whom the earldom of Clare had been conferred. The arbitrary powers of the executive were exerted in the employment of the Protestant yeomanry, in effect to hunt down the presumably disaffected Catholic peasantry in a search for concealed arms.

**The In-
surrection,
Act, 1796.**

In England the general election in 1796 made no change in the position of parties in parliament. Although the normal revenues

England: of the country were, as always, wholly inadequate
Sinking Fund to maintain the heavy annual burden of the war, it
maintained. apparently took comfort and derived confidence in its own stability from Pitt's persistent maintenance of the Sinking Fund, although new and heavy loans were repeatedly required which it would have been less costly to restrict by stopping the contribution to the Sinking Fund. That is, if the annual million had not been paid into the fund for clearing the debt, a million less would have needed to be borrowed, whereas the accumulating interest on that million was much less than sufficient to pay the cost of borrowing it. The fund served as a sedative to the popular mind, and therefore in Pitt's view it was worth paying for, simply as a check upon panic. Taxes increased and multiplied, but were borne with stubborn endurance.

At the beginning of 1797, however, when the French fleet had just been threatening the Irish shores, when rumours of invasion were rife, and the British fleet had evacuated the

1797. were rife, and the British fleet had evacuated the
Suspension Mediterranean, a financial panic seemed imminent.
of cash In face of the prospect of a run upon the Bank of
payments. England the government in February 1797 suspended cash payments by the bank, a suspension which was endorsed by Act of Parliament in May. The confidence and patriotism of the commercial community was displayed by its ready acceptance of the bank-notes at their nominal value; though they would not, or at least might not, become convertible into cash until the end of the war. As a matter of fact the suspension of cash payments was continued until 1819. Nevertheless the exchange value of bank-notes was hardly affected until 1808. The operation itself at the time was without doubt greatly facilitated by Jervis's victory at Cape St. Vincent.

In Ireland throughout 1797 the repression of the Catholics by the Protestant magistracy and yeomanry, on the plea that Catholics were arming and drilling for insurrection, revived the old religious animosities in their bitterest

and fiercest form, but without any reconciliation of the Presbyterians to the government. Innumerable outrages of the most repulsive kind were committed on both sides. The government troops were empowered to act without civil authority ; over the troops themselves very inadequate control was maintained. Sir Ralph Abercromby as commander-in-chief was so shocked by the condition of affairs which he found that he issued **1798.**

on his own responsibility an order requiring the soldiery to act only with the civil authority ; the Irish government replied by a fresh proclamation establishing martial law, and thereupon Abercromby resigned, to be succeeded by General Lake (March 1798). In the meanwhile Lord Moira in the British parliament made a spirited protest, but the British government refused to interfere. In March 1798 the Irish government arrested several of the leaders of the United Irishmen, one of whom, Lord Edward Fitzgerald, died

**Repressive
action,
March.**

of wounds he received in resisting arrest. The blow destroyed the possibility of an organised insurrection, which was certainly in preparation. Whatever the wrongs of the Irish people, however complete any justification they might have offered for armed rebellion, it was obvious that in the face of the danger of such a rebellion, supported by troops of a European power with which the country was at war, no government could without stultifying itself have avoided the employment of strong repressive measures. But the repressive measures of the government in Ireland, if they fell short of the old methods of Alva in the Netherlands, were akin in their licentious savagery to the *dragonnades* of Louis XIV. and the harrying of the Scottish Covenanters ; methods calculated to implant the spirit of rebellion in the heart of the people, however effective they might be in breaking overt resistance.

In Ulster, Connaught, and Munster every sporadic attempt at insurrection was crushed before it could make head ; but in Leinster rebellion flamed out. In the counties of Wicklow and Wexford it took the form of what was practically a religious struggle between Catholics and Protestants. Unorganised as they were, and led largely by

**The in-
surrection
of 1798.**

Catholic priests, the rebels achieved some successes signalised by massacres ; but they were finally and decisively crushed by Lake at the fight of Vinegar Hill (21st June)—a victory signalised in its turn by still more savage excesses. Vain as the struggle was, insurrection still smouldered ; a French expedition under Humbert landed in the west of Ireland in August ; but after it had routed a force of militia in the runaway engagement known as the Race of Castlebar, no very long time elapsed before it was overwhelmed by the government forces and compelled to surrender.

On the day before the battle of Vinegar Hill Cornwallis arrived in Ireland as lord-lieutenant and commander-in-chief to take up **Cornwallis in Ireland.** a task which conspicuously required to be handled by a strong man, fearless, sympathetic, and absolutely trustworthy. No better choice could have been made ; but it took time even for Cornwallis to bring under control the savage forces which had been let loose under the recent régime. Cornwallis was swift to see that a policy of conciliation and restraint was imperative ; and in this it must be noted that he was strongly supported by the chancellor, Lord Clare. Before the end of July an Act of Amnesty was passed with certain specified exceptions. By slow degrees order was restored.

But ever since 1785 Pitt had been inclining to the belief that the solution of the Irish problem would have to be found in an **A new policy.** incorporating union. The rebellion of '98 confirmed him in that belief, which was thoroughly endorsed by Cornwallis. The government of Ireland by a Protestant oligarchy had proved to be a complete failure ; so also had the previous government, which had vested all real control in Great Britain through the subordination of both legislature and executive ; while Ireland still remained a separate province unrepresented in the British parliament. No one in England, and few Protestants, at least in Ireland, could view with equanimity the idea of an independent Irish legislature in which the Protestant ascendancy had passed away. There remained the alternative of an incorporating union, accompanied according to Pitt's view

by Catholic emancipation. The admission of Catholics to political equality would not in such circumstances carry with it the same danger of reprisal as in an independent Irish legislature. The religious grievance would disappear, and the racial grievance as well ; since Ireland would enter the union on the same footing as Scotland.

There can be no doubt that both Pitt and Cornwallis regarded Catholic emancipation as essential to making the legislative union a success. But in England, where there was no **Hostility to** hostility to the idea of a legislative union, there was **be overcome.** an element of Protestant hostility to Catholic emancipation. That sentiment reigned with concentrated force in the bosom of King George, who was moreover developing a conscientious conviction that he could not give his assent to it without breaking his coronation oath. In Ireland among the governing class there was hostility both to the whole idea of an incorporating union and to Catholic emancipation. Opposition to the Pitt-Cornwallis idea ran upon exceedingly complicated lines. Grattan and his friends, who had won for Ireland an independent legislature, believed that the true solution of the problem lay in Catholic emancipation, reform, and the continued independence of the legislature. Yet there were probably few Protestants who shared Grattan's faith in the public spirit and loyalty of the Romanists. Grattan, like Chatham, believed in appealing to the better side of men's natures. He believed in an independent parliament because he did not believe in the unfitness of Roman Catholics to take their share of the responsibilities of full citizenship. Believing in the capacity of Ireland to govern herself, he was intensely opposed to the surrender of her legislative independence. The ascendancy party, on the other hand, were ill-disposed to an incorporating union which would deprive them of the supreme power which at present lay in their own hands ; most of them were still more opposed to Catholic emancipation, which would still further diminish their influence on the representation at Westminster.

Pitt's plan, then, was certain to meet with an almost insuperable resistance in the Irish parliament. He therefore resolved

to separate the two measures. Grattan's support was out of reach, but Grattan's command of votes was small. A parliamentary majority might be gained in Dublin in favour of a legislative union, leaving the Catholic question to be dealt with by the parliament of the United Kingdom. But outside parliament it was necessary to conciliate Catholic opinion. There was no escaping the fact, so forcibly illustrated in 1706, that whatever reason might say, the national sentiment of the smaller country would be *prima facie* hostile to absorption in the larger state. The Catholics, however, would be conciliated, and would at least acquiesce in a union if they were satisfied that it would offer a better prospect of their own emancipation than continued independence. Thus it appeared to Pitt, that in order to achieve his ends it was necessary to carry the legislative union through the Irish parliament, which could not be accomplished unless it was separated from the Catholic question; to secure the acquiescence of the Catholics, who were the larger part of the population, by satisfying them that emancipation would follow; and only to deal directly with the Catholic question after the independent Irish parliament had ceased to exist.

There was the double problem then of obtaining a majority in the Protestant parliament and of satisfying the Catholics outside parliament without submitting the Catholic question to parliament. On the other hand, nothing seemed more certain than defeat if the present parliament were dissolved and a new one elected. The measure must be carried without a dissolution. Cornwallis, therefore, was instructed in the first place to inform the Catholics that there was no hope whatever for Catholic emancipation so long as the Irish parliament remained independent, and in the second place to hold out prospects of the satisfaction of their desires as the probable outcome of the Union. No positive pledge was given, but ministers, who invited active support on the basis of the expectation, though not the promise, that certain results would follow, appeared at least to have pledged themselves to do their utmost to secure those results. The govern-

**Union to pre-
cede emanci-
pation.**

**Hopes held
out to the
Catholics.**

ment by these representations obtained the support of the Catholics.

But the attitude of parliament was unpromising. The question was raised in the address on the opening of the Irish parliament in 1799; on the vote the government found themselves in a minority of five. Lord Castlereagh, the chief secretary, was the principal agent for the conversion of that minority into a majority. The methods were familiar, though they had never been practised before with quite the same profusion. The county members represented a free electorate; they were practically outside the reach of corruption. But all but a very few of the boroughs were in effect private property, constituencies whose owners could ensure the return of their own nominees. The union of parliaments would of necessity abolish the existing distribution of constituencies; the borough owners would be deprived of a valuable property; therefore they did not want to see the parliaments united. Long before, Pitt had advocated at Westminster the buying out of the owners of rotten boroughs in England; in Ireland he applied the principle with equal openness, and bought them out with £15,000 apiece. But the transaction was legitimate enough on the generally accepted hypothesis that such boroughs were actually property. The purchase did not involve that the borough-owner would support the Government Bill, but it at least removed the personal objection which would otherwise have induced him to oppose it. It does not appear that money or at least any large amount of money passed. But twenty new peers were created and a score of peers were promoted. Places and pensions were distributed, in accordance with innumerable precedents; the seats in the House of Commons which were vacated were carefully filled with supporters of the government. A government majority was duly manufactured, not by paying people to surrender their convictions, but by transferring the personal interest, which alone guided them, from the side of Opposition to the side of Government. The whole affair was highly

The persuasion of parliament.

The borough-owners.

Honours, places, and pensions.

unsavoury, to be defended only on the ground that the end was a necessity of State, which could not be attained by any other means. In the debate on the address in 1800 the government minority of five had become a majority of forty-two.

The Articles of Union were carried in the Irish parliament, The Act received the royal assent on 1st August, and the first **1800. Act** parliament of the United Kingdom met in January **of Union.** 1801. The Act of Union gave Ireland a hundred members for the new House of Commons, her population at that date being about half that of England. In the Upper House she had twenty-eight peers, appointed for life ; the rest of the Irish peers were eligible to the House of Commons for British constituencies. Great Britain and Ireland were for commercial purposes thenceforth to be treated as a unit. The established Church was united with the Church in England, and was represented by four spiritual peers. The financial relations were dealt with in clauses whereof the practical interpretation has ever since been a continual source of controversy.

The Union between England and Scotland had been carried certainly against the will of the majority of the Scottish people, **The Unions** not without corruption, but by the efforts of men **compared.** who were in the main firmly convinced that the measure was necessary to the prosperity of Scotland. Even the majority who passed that measure in the Scottish parliament approved the thing in itself, and stood out for their price only because they were sure they could get it. In Ireland it cannot be denied that most, though not all, of the men who were both disinterested and intelligent were opposed to the Union altogether. Outside parliament the support or acquiescence of the Catholic majority was obtained, not altogether with conscious dishonesty, by a misrepresentation. Pitt had abstained from taking the necessary steps to ensure that his whole design should be carried through as well as the one fragment contained in the Act of Union. Catholic emancipation was essential to its completeness ; and it was the expectation that Catholic emancipation would follow which had made it possible to get the Act of Union accepted.

Shortly after the measure had been passed, Pitt laid before the cabinet his proposals for the removal of Catholic disabilities, the commutation of tithes, and provision for the Roman Catholic clergy. Then he found himself **Catholic emancipation rejected.** faced by an insuperable obstacle. The king flatly refused to concede Catholic emancipation. His conscientious objections had been strengthened by the chancellor Loughborough, and by the archbishops of Canterbury and Armagh. Several members of the cabinet declared themselves in opposition to Pitt's view. Pitt took the only course open to him as a man of honour, and declared that he must resign if he were forbidden to act upon the moral pledges which he had given. Addington accepted the task of forming a new administration; Pitt resigned, and with him went Dundas and **Pitt's resignation.** Grenville, Spencer and Cornwallis, as well as George Canning and Castlereagh. Addington could only collect a cabinet of mediocrities. Pitt himself is fairly open to reproach for having given his virtual pledges to the Catholics without having made sure that he would be able to carry them out. He may have imagined that George would give way, himself not realising the intensity of George's conviction in the matter. Now he had to realise that nothing would make the king give way—that even if he refused his countenance to the new government, the king would hold fast though the skies should fall. Therefore, lest the skies should fall, he did give a grudging countenance to Addington, and himself returned to office before his death. On one great and crucial question, Pitt knew that he was beaten by George's *vis inertiae*. It might perhaps have been more heroic if he had refused to recognise that he was beaten, but the fact would not have been altered.

CHAPTER XI. IN THE REIGN OF GEORGE III.

I. LETTERS, 1760-1798

It is easy to recognise though not so easy to define the strong distinction between the literary eras in which the two characteristic names are those of Alexander Pope and Samuel Johnson respectively. **A change of spirit.** Something was reasserting itself in the second period which was antagonistic to the Pope convention, to the divorce between intellect and emotion. It did not yet take shape in the revival of a great emotional poetry. The supply tarried, but the demand was making itself felt; Pitt in one sphere and Wesley in another had revived the capacity for enthusiasm. It was the vitality of the nation which was reasserting itself, and seeking to find artistic expression, though with but a limited measure of success. So far at least as verse was concerned, the poets could not shake themselves free from the canons imposed by the refinements upon refinements of a century of intellectualism.

Between the death of Pope in 1744 and the publication of the *Lyrical Ballads* by Wordsworth and Coleridge in 1798, the **The poets.** output of verse in England calls for the consideration of few names. All belonged to men in whom the new spirit was stirring, but only for two can it be claimed by their warmest admirers that they accomplished any poems at all to which the epithet 'great' can be applied, William Collins and Thomas Gray; to both of whom reference was made in an earlier chapter. The poetry of Johnson, like the poetry of Gray and Collins, was written while George II. still occupied the throne; and although an occasional couplet of his survives as a familiar quotation, posterity, if it reads those poems at all, does so because it is interested in Samuel Johnson, not because it admires them as poetry.

In 1770 died by his own hand in a garret, before the completion of his eighteenth year, a poet of extraordinary promise, Thomas Chatterton, the harbinger of the coming **Chatterton** day. Instinct with poetic imagination, the boy had turned away from all the recognised models and had chosen antique patterns for imitation, since a boy must imitate. The wonder of Chatterton, however, does not lie in the ingenuity which taught him to produce sham antiques, and to palm them off as genuine upon the Jonathan Oldbucks of the time, but in the completeness of his escape from conventions and his marvellous ear for the magic of rhythms and the music of words. Yet great as was his promise, his achievement was after all only the achievement of an extraordinarily brilliant boy. At the moment he was a unique phenomenon; Coleridge was not born till two years after his death, and before Coleridge there was none who showed a like perception of magic and music save William Blake. Chatterton and Blake in their own day **Blake** seemed to be little more than literary curiosities; though later generations have not failed to do ample justice to their poetical work. Besides their names only three others claim attention. The first is Oliver Goldsmith, whose natural in- **Goldsmith** stincts were too strong for his theoretical orthodoxy, and compelled him to be charming when he intended to be didactic. The attraction of the *Deserted Village* is derived entirely from the loving hand with which he drew and certainly idealised his 'Sweet Auburn, loveliest village of the plain.' Such humble themes were accounted as fit poetic material only when they were de-vitalised in a conventional Arcadia, or turned to account for equally conventional moralisings upon the innocent joys of contented poverty—one of the sentimentalisms which Dr. Johnson cudgelled with characteristic good sense. But Goldsmith's Auburn is not a tinsel Arcadia, nor are his moralisings the things that matter; what does matter is the tender human sympathy which sees something worth recording in the humble and commonplace, even while infusing into it qualities born largely of the author's own kindly imagination.

Cowper and Crabbe also take their place among the poets as

the forerunners of a new poetic age, because they ignored conventions, and treated as subjects for poetry aspects of life and manners which had been held to be beneath the **Cowper and Crabbe.** dignity of verse. Crabbe painted 'the Village' as he saw it—and by no means as Goldsmith saw it, or as the writers of the conventional pastorals pretended to see it. Cowper wrote of nature to please himself and his friends, not the literary critics, and it was from the study of Milton, not of Pope, that he learnt the structure of his verse. Goldsmith fancied himself to be a literary conservative; Cowper and Crabbe certainly never thought of themselves as leaders of a literary revolution; but all three were in fact the outcome of the slow awakening of the general consciousness to the need of sincerity, to the artificiality of the bonds which had been forged for the poetic art.

It is, perhaps, just because he was the solid incarnation of this demand for sincerity that Samuel Johnson stands out as the representative figure of the period. Johnson **Doctor Johnson.** himself was sincere to the point of brutality. He delivered his opinions without any consideration for the feelings of his interlocutors. He had rampant prejudices which were sometimes extremely unreasonable; but the thing he said was the thing he meant, and he meant it because he believed it. He obeyed no convention because it was a convention. It was not the brilliancy of his writing nor the profundity of his learning which gave him his dominant position; the bulk of his actual contributions to literature had already been published before the accession of George III., while his supremacy belongs to the period between 1760 and his death in 1784. It was the personality of the man, not the author, which made him a power; and he remains vividly known to us, not because he wrote *Rasselas* and the *Vanity of Human Wishes*, edited Shakespeare and compiled the Dictionary, but because the man has been painted for us in the most masterly of all biographies. The favourite old paradox, perpetuated by Macaulay, that Boswell's **Boswell.** book was great just because James Boswell himself was very, very small has been sufficiently exploded. Macaulay's Boswell could neither himself have appreciated Johnson nor

have held the place in the great man's affections which the real Boswell beyond all question did hold. The work is great because Boswell appreciated Johnson, because Johnson loved Boswell, and because Boswell had an exceptionally high literary gift ; and let us add, because he, as became the friend of Johnson, painted an absolutely sincere portrait of his idol, extenuating nothing ; a thing which no man can do without being absolutely sincere himself.

The same revival of broad human sympathies, the same demand for reality in the place of conventions, were responsible for the creation of the novel in the hands of Richard- **The novelists.** son and Fielding, for the rough humours of Smollett, and in part for the freakish, fascinating irresponsibility of Laurence Sterne. Yet that group had no immediate masculine successors of importance, except Oliver Goldsmith, who was the literary offspring neither of Fielding nor of Richardson. The *Vicar of Wakefield* stands by itself redolent of freshness and sweetness, qualities by no means characteristic of the time, any more than was that delightful simplicity which belongs to Goldsmith almost alone. It may, however, be remarked that the true precursor of Dr. Primrose was the ' Man in Black ' of Goldsmith's own *Citizen of the World*, and the ' Man in Black ' was the literary offspring of Sir Roger de Coverley. There were, indeed, many other novelists, but only one of mark. Fanny Burney with her *Evelina* was not the first woman novelist ; but the novels written by other women had been remote from real life, **Women** works of exaggerated sensationalism. Fanny Burney **novelists.** was no great artist, but she set the example to women who could look upon life with a humorous enjoyment which they could impart to their readers. It was not till the last year of the century that a woman proved herself a past mistress of character delineation, in the *Castle Rackrent* of Maria Edgeworth. The nineteenth century was already some years old before the decisive achievements of Jane Austen in this field, and before Walter Scott finally established the novel in that pride of place which it has retained ever since. In the eighteenth century the young aspirant to literary honours generally came up to London with the manuscript of a tragedy in his pocket ; in the nineteenth

century he generally carried the heavier burden of a manuscript novel.

The tragedies, however, were short-lived enough. But comedy again achieved a sudden brilliancy, without any of the **The stage.** indecencies of the Restoration, in the hands of Oliver Goldsmith and Richard Brinsley Sheridan, the last of whom was also one of the two or three most brilliant parliamentary orators of the time. The stage, in fact, played no small part in preparing the way for that literary revolution which is commonly called the Romantic Revival; but this was in truth the doing not of the playwrights but of the actors. David Garrick, who was a leading figure, and for a long time very much the leading figure, on the stage, from 1741 till his last appearance in 1776, and Mrs. Siddons, who first appeared as Lady Macbeth in 1785, educated the mind of the public to that appreciation of the Shakespearian drama which it was impossible to reconcile with the eighteenth-century convention of so-called Classicism. As usual, however, in such cases, it is not easy to distinguish the interaction of cause and effect. Revolt against conventions of all sorts was in the air; Garrick was partly one of its expressions, partly one of the causes of its development. It received its most tremendous development and its most terrific expression in the French Revolution; but in England the reaction in the political field perhaps helped it to concentrate in the field of literature and so produced the revolution inaugurated in 1798.

The return to Shakespeare was one aspect of a general disposition to turn to a past more or less remote, but at any rate very **Back to the past.** different from the present, for relief from the bondage of immediate convention. Its oddest exemplification, perhaps, is to be found in Chatterton's *Rowley Poems*; oddest, not because the young poet himself was attracted by the antique, but because his productions appealed to the not very penetrating critics mainly on the score of their hypothetical antiquity. Even in the very early years of the century, Addison had reminded the public of the trumpet-note that rings in the ballad of Chevy Chase, a poem than which nothing can be imagined more remote from the classical convention. Allan

Ramsay in Edinburgh had gathered together the Scottish songs of the countryside. In 1762 James Macpherson created a *furor* for pristine Celtic literature by the publication of *Fingal*, a work which professed to be the translation of a Gaelic epic composed in the dim past by the bard Ossian, and handed down by oral tradition in the Scottish Highlands for a thousand years and more. How much of Macpherson's *Ossian* was really based upon fragments of immemorial antiquity and how much was his own invention no one will ever know. Johnson's cudgel was applied to it in the doctor's most sledge-hammer fashion ; but the popularity of the work was a significant symptom. Still more significant was the publication in 1765 of Bishop Percy's *Reliques of Ancient English Poetry*, ballads which had been collected in a manuscript volume early in the seventeenth century. A great impulse was thereby given to the study of ballad poetry, and the study of ballad poetry was one of the powerful influences of the literary revolution.

While England was still hidebound by the Augustan literary canons and seeking diversion therefrom in a recurrence to the literature of a pre-critical age rather than in the **Scotland**. development of a new creative impulse, there was growing up in Scotland the greatest of that Scottish school, if it may so be called, of poets who had never ceased to sing since the days of William Dunbar. English ballad literature had died a natural death ; in Scotland flowers of song continued to blossom by the wayside, spontaneous products of the soil, not cultivated by the hands of any literary gardeners, and only in a few cases rescued from oblivion by such appreciative collectors as Allan Ramsay. Culture was obliged to conform to the canons ; it was in the countryside that the country folks themselves went on obeying their own impulse to sing in their own vernacular tongue of familiar sights and sounds, giving utterance to the emotions and passions which stirred them in their daily lives. Robert Burns was not an innovator, though in England he has **Burns**. the appearance of the founder of a new school. He went on doing what folk of his own class had been doing for generations and were doing still, though he did it better than any of them ;

not a few of his own songs were primarily fragments of his predecessors' work. He set at naught the literary conventions of England, not because he was in conscious rebellion against them, but because they hardly touched him; when he was beguiled into attempts to write in English instead of in his native tongue he himself became their victim. He was a democrat not as a result of the French Revolution, but because the democratic spirit of the Revolution was in his bones, as it was in the bones of many of his fellow-countrymen. He used the language of the people, bringing out all its capacities, because it was the language natural to him. But because he gave free play to his own unfettered individuality, which was the thing most sternly forbidden by the dying convention, and the thing which lay at the root of the dawning movement in England, he appears in some sort as an originator of that movement, though it may be doubted whether any one of the great poets connected with it was influenced by him in any material degree.

We shall not here discuss the poetic revolution itself. It had quite definitely begun before the century closed, even though **The** it may be insisted that its beginning must not be **landmark.** identified with any particular year; the publication of the *Lyrical Ballads* in 1798 is at any rate a landmark which signifies unmistakably that a new era had opened. But it belongs to the new century, and will be treated in the story of the new century.

There is none among English poets, and among British poets none save Burns, who during this period is decisively entitled to **Prose.** be numbered among the great. Great is also a word which cannot without hesitation be applied to comedies even so brilliant as those of Sheridan, because with all their wit and charm they suggest only a very superficial criticism of life. Johnson was a great man chiefly because he was a great and occasionally a profound critic of life, not because he wrote great books. The conventions which fettered poetry did not attach to prose; and while a permanent place in literature was achieved by others than those already named—by the histories of Robertson, by the invectives of Junius, who, according to almost uni-

versally accepted belief, was Sir Philip Francis, the enemy of Hastings—there are three names which overshadow the rest, and a fourth, the bearer of which achieved, though not immediately, a very remarkable influence upon the development of political thought.

The first of our group is Edward Gibbon, whose *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* established him as the greatest of English historians, a position from which he has **Gibbon** never been deposed. It was a criticism of Sir James Mackintosh, who himself, as an apologist for the French Revolution, ventured to measure swords with Edmund Burke, that 'Gibbon might have been cut out of a corner of Burke's mind without Burke noticing it.' If Mackintosh meant to belittle Gibbon the criticism was absurd. If he meant merely to give rhetorical expression to the immensity of his own admiration for Burke the phrase was legitimate, for if Gibbon was great in his kind, it was a greatness hardly comparable with Burke's. The greater intellectual qualities of Burke were qualities shared for the most part only in a quite minor degree by the historian, while the specific qualities, lacking in Burke, which made Gibbon a great historian, did not appeal to Burke's admirer.

The fire of Burke's eloquence, the splendour of his diction, the richness of his illustration, would have sufficed to give to the great Irishman's work a very high place in the literature of any age. But his intellectual supremacy, his permanent importance as an influence, lay in the political philosophy which he enunciated in an era of revolution. The principles of Conservatism, when that term is dissociated from its connection with parliamentary politics, the principles of Liberalism, as distinguished from democratic theory, are enshrined in his pages, which provide a storehouse of arguments and illustration for political thinkers of every school except the real reactionary and the real radical reformer. For Burke was the strenuous antagonist alike of reaction and of radical reform. His statecraft would have nothing to say to ideal schemes of government, though this does not mean that he had no ideal of government. According to his view, no scheme of government could be sound which was

not a natural development of a system which had been a natural growth. Development is adaptation to new conditions ; you cannot attain it by attempting to substitute something else for the thing which has grown. The appeal is to be made to history. These liberties have their roots in the remote past ; they must not be tampered with. That authority has the sanction of ages ; it must not be repudiated. We are not to be guided to reconstruction by an abstract preference for a different kind of structure ; we are not to destroy an established custom in order to establish something in its place logically consistent with some other established custom ; abstract logic is the most dangerous of all guides in practical affairs, because it is quite certain to ignore material data which are of fundamental importance. Innovation, whether Radical or Reactionary, is to be abhorred.

Reactionary innovation, curtailing established liberties, engaged Burke's hostility during the first five-and-twenty years of **Burke's** his public career. Radical innovation, shattering **consistency**. established authority, engaged it during the last few. In the face of revolution Burke's dread of innovation made him too ready to believe that developments which were in fact both natural and logical were not developments, but innovations ; it blinded him to the fact that an apparently natural growth may be fundamentally rotten ; to some extent he misapplied his principles in particular instances ; but the principles were always the same, and there was no inconsistency between his earlier and his later attitude. Burke being dead yet speaketh. He failed to persuade the king, the Grenvilles, and the Norths to recognise his liberal principles, and we lost America ; to-day those principles have triumphed in the overseas dominions of the British empire. He, far more than any other individual, taught Britain to set her face against revolutionary France, and by the misapplication of his principles fostered reaction ; but his permanent influence has been not reactionary, but conservative, and in hardly less degree progressive.

Few books had so marked an effect in their own generation as Burke's *Reflections on the French Revolution* ; very few have

been productive of such far-reaching effects on theory and practice in one sphere, that of commercial activity, as Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*. Published at the moment **Adam Smith**, when the Americans had just declared their independence, it laid bare the weaknesses of the mercantile theory which had been in no small degree responsible for the severance of sentiment between the mother country and the colonies. It came too late to affect that contest; but it helped to establish the principle in the future, of economic non-interference. It substituted for the old theory, that our neighbour's prosperity is our own undoing, the doctrine that a prosperous neighbour provides a better market than one on the verge of bankruptcy; though the outbreak of the French war deferred its practical application, after Pitt's initial experiment. The book demolished the other old doctrine of the balance of trade by demonstrating that over the whole field the balance adjusted itself automatically. It insisted that, speaking economically, State regulation is injurious, and taxation is admissible only because, and so far as, it is directed to the provision of revenue. It declared that the maximum of wealth is attainable by the community through the unfettered action of individuals; the whole structure of nineteenth-century individualism was based upon its doctrines. It must not be forgotten, however, that Adam Smith himself was careful to recognise that a political gain may be worth an economic sacrifice, the notable instance in his own view being that of the Navigation Acts, which, by artificially encouraging the development of a powerful fighting fleet, had given to Great Britain a security which she needed, and had thus indirectly enabled her commerce to develop even while war was going on.

The last name on our list is that of Jeremy Bentham, the recognised founder of the utilitarian school in ethics and politics. In the *Fragment on Government* (1776), **Bentham**, and the *Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789), Bentham rejected all the contractual theories of the origin and development of the social order from Hobbes to Rousseau, all the theories of natural rights which were in the air—as had just been empha-

sised by the terms of the American Declaration of Independence—and proceeded to work out his formula that the end of morals and legislation is to procure the ‘greatest happiness of the greatest number’; which he analyses as the excess of the sum of pleasures over the sum of pains. But the more specific development of his doctrine, in the theory that this end can be attained only by the representative rule of the democracy, belongs rather to the nineteenth century, when it was adopted by the school of the ‘philosophic Radicals.’

II. THE INDUSTRIAL AND RURAL REVOLUTION, 1760-1800

Down to the middle of the eighteenth century, England, like every other country, was in the main a land of agriculture with more than three-fourths of its population dwelling in rural districts. Manufactures were few: raw materials and textile fabrics were the principal articles of export. We were a commercial nation as well as an agricultural nation, more commercial than our neighbours by reason of our great maritime traffic, and of the demand for such goods as we did export. We were a nation of shopkeepers as well as of agriculturists. But neither here nor anywhere else was there an industrial State, a State in which a substantial proportion of the population was engaged exclusively upon manufacture of one kind or another. Our own manufacturing, as observed in a previous chapter, was itself very largely the by-employment of people whose main employment was agricultural.

By the end of the eighteenth century a great change had already taken place. Machinery, driven first by water power and then by steam, had ousted or was ousting domestic handicrafts, had gathered or was gathering colonies of machine hands into factories, on the banks of streams or in the iron-fields and coal-fields. Many of the yeomen had surrendered their holdings; they and the cottars had for the most part become farm hands,

1760. The industrial state unknown.

1800. An industrial state in being.

and nothing else. The relative density of the population in the northern and the southern counties was being, if it had not already been, reversed; more than one-third of the population was already congregated in towns. The north of England and the south of Scotland were already the first and as yet the only home in the world's history of a large manufacturing population. No other country had followed or attempted to follow the example. Great Britain raced on so far in front of the rest, that she presently came to regard her own supremacy as an ordinance of nature; though no such supremacy before had ever been dreamed of.

Primarily there were three causes. First her inventors led the field. In the second place, the soil of England produced in vast quantities ready to hand the two materials **The three** needed to turn the inventions to the fullest account, **causes.** iron and coal. In the third place, the new methods of manufacture were hardly established in Britain when the European war broke out; and while those wars were going on the sea-girt State enjoyed opportunities from which every continental State was debarred. Her fleets secured to her alone the means of obtaining an almost uninterrupted supply of the raw materials which she required to import for the purposes of manufacture; and secured also to her alone immunity from invasion, and at least comparative immunity from the absorption of her sons upon European battlefields.

The Industrial Revolution was a portent in the world's history, not so startling, so dramatic, so terrific as the French Revolution, and the crashing of legions in the Napoleonic wars, but no whit less tremendous; for it was a **Immensely** revolution which presently extended itself over all **of the** Western Europe, creating a new type of proletariat, new conditions of life, new political problems, new questions of the distribution of wealth, and of the means to happiness, moral as well as material. It produced a new social cleavage, quite distinct from the old caste cleavage between the landowner and the peasant, the economic cleavage between capital and labour, employers and employees, the labourers and the organisers of

production. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that there was less fundamental difference between the Age of Augustus in the Roman world and the Age of Walpole in England than between the Age of Walpole and the twentieth century.

There are three notable aspects under which the changes and the conditions of life may be summarised; the changes in the conditions of manufacture, of agriculture, and of traffic.

Inventors of machinery have in view one of two objects: to increase the output in relation to the amount of human energy expended, or to give greater perfection to the product of that energy. In 1764 Kay's fly-shuttle had doubled the productive capacity of the weaver's loom, and the spinning-jenny of Hargreaves enabled one cotton spinner to do the work of eight. But the driving power of wind and water had been brought into employment for little but the working of corn-mills until, in 1760, James Smeaton evolved the effective application of water-power to the blast furnace; while Newcomen's pump was the only steam-engine in use.

In 1769, the new power era was inaugurated by Richard Arkwright, who invented a new cotton spinning-jenny, the water **Arkwright** frame driven by water-power, which produced not only a much greater quantity, but a much finer quality of thread; upon which an advance was shortly made by Samuel Crompton's 'mule.' These inventions carried the productive power of the spinner far ahead of the productive power of the weaver. Since the worker with the new machinery could turn out a much greater quantity of much better thread at a much lower price, though he could only do so by planting his machinery where water-power was available, there was no longer employment for the spinning-wheel on the cottar's hearth. The balance between the weaver and the spinner was restored when Edward **Cartwright**. Cartwright set up a steam-power loom in 1789; which was followed by a woolcomber, enabling one man to do the work of twenty.

The power-loom struck at domestic weaving, just as the water

frame struck at domestic spinning. Spinning and weaving could no longer be combined with agricultural avocations; the spinners and weavers could not set up machinery of their own; the owners of the machinery collected the workers into settlements in the immediate neighbourhood of their machines. Since cotton employed a much smaller number of workers than wool, and the first inventions were applicable to cotton but not to wool, the disastrous effects were not fully felt immediately. But wool was not long in following cotton, and when that happened, the standing by-employment of the small farmer and the cottar disappeared altogether. Labour-saving machinery injures the labourer at the outset, because until there is a corresponding increase in the demand, a smaller amount of labour is required to meet it, and unemployment results, with its concomitant of low wages. It is only when the lower prices following upon reduced cost of production have created an increased demand for goods that the dislocation of labour becomes readjusted, and usually in the long run an increased instead of a diminished demand for labour is produced. The sudden advance in labour-saving machinery from 1769 onwards was for the time extremely lucrative to the owners of machinery, but was disastrous to the rural population, which had hitherto relied upon spinning and weaving, if not for subsistence, at least for the difference between bare subsistence and some degree of comfort.

A somewhat different result attended the development of the coal and iron industries. When coal and coke superseded charcoal as fuel for blast furnaces, the charcoal and the iron-fields of the south perished, but the coal-fields and the neighbouring iron-fields of the north became enormously active. During the half century before the establishment of Smeaton's blast furnaces at the Carron iron works (1760) the imported iron went up from 15,000 tons to 50,000, about three times as much as was being produced in England. By 1788 the British output was 50,000 tons. In fact, what was needed for the developing of the iron trade was fuel; as soon as it was found practicable to use coal for the fuel there was a supply avail-

**Effect of
the new
machinery.**

**Coal versus
charcoal.**

able to meet any conceivable demand ; and, consequently, it became possible to produce enough iron to meet any possible demand. Processes of treating iron and of casting iron and steel. steel improved. The development of the use of steam-power created a demand for machinery constructed of iron and steel, and a new iron age was born. Men smiled at John Wilkinson, and called him 'iron-mad,' for declaring that iron was the proper material for building houses, bridges and even ships ; nevertheless the Severn was actually bridged with iron in 1779, and in 1790 an iron ship was actually launched. The development in the production of iron and coal meant an immediate increase in the demand for labour, and a dislocation only in so far as the demand was created in new areas at the expense of the old charcoal and iron areas such as Sussex.

The development of the steam-engine was in no small degree responsible for bringing about the increased demand for iron and steel. That development was mainly due to **Steam :** the inventive genius of James Watt, who, in 1763, while engaged in the making of mathematical instruments, applied himself to remedying the defects of Newcomen's steam pump, a machine of which the working was extremely costly. Thus he lighted upon the discoveries which made it possible to utilise steam as the principal driving power for machinery. It was some years, however, before the difficulty was surmounted of obtaining exact workmanship in material sufficiently hard and durable. Watt might design machines but he could not make them. Four years after he began upon the Newcomen pump, Roebuck of the Carron iron works became his partner ; but it was not till 1776 that Watt, in conjunction with Wilkinson and another iron master, Boulton of Birmingham, constructed the first really successful steam-engine for Wilkinson's iron works. Within ten years, Watt's machines were at work for pumping, for blast furnaces, and for driving mills ; by the end of the century, steam was established as the great driving power, and the steam factory was already displacing the water factory.

It is to be observed that though ultimately the new machinery captured wool and flax, woollens and linen, it was cotton which first profited by it and was carried from the plane **cotton.** of the minor industries into the premier position. It was not so much that cotton goods displaced other textile fabrics as that the cheapness of production created an enormously increased demand for textiles, and the bulk of the increased demand was absorbed by cotton. Between 1775 and 1789 the import of the raw material was multiplied by seven. We remark, then, that the principal raw materials of the new manufacture were three—coal, iron, and cotton; that the conjunction of coal-fields and iron-fields in Great Britain gave this country an enormous advantage over foreign competitors in all iron manufactures; and that British maritime and commercial supremacy secured a practical monopoly of cotton. To these facts primarily must be attributed the completeness with which Great Britain outstripped all competition.

The essential characteristic of the Industrial Revolution is that it took the instruments of production out of the hands of the workers and placed them under the control of **Capital** the capitalist or master. It was the master who **and labour.** owned the machinery without which the worker could not work. Formerly the weaver and the spinner, if they could get hold of their raw material, might take their worked-up goods into the market; they were not dependent upon a particular employer. But under the new conditions, the raw material was of no use to them; what they had to take into the market was not goods, but labour. The capitalist owned both the raw material and the machinery, and so long as the supply of labour exceeded the demand, the master could compel the operative to accept his own terms. The autocracy of the master could not be checked except by legislation or by combinations of the workmen. If the employees could strike in a body they might compel the master to close his works, and then the battle would become simply one of endurance. Even in that case the odds were all on the side of the master, because to the men the suspension of wages meant imminent starvation, whereas to the

master, though suspension of production meant interruption, and if prolonged perhaps ruin, to his business, it did not mean immediate starvation.

As yet, however, the operative was cut off from both remedies. Adam Smith's doctrine that the individual should be left to **No help in** go his own way without State interference was in **legislation.** possession. The old laws empowering magistrates to regulate wages had fallen into desuetude or were generally interpreted as conveying an authority to fix only a maximum wage which was not to be exceeded. The legislature was in the hands of the employing class, and legislation for the protection of the employed was no more to be looked for than legislation for the protection of employers in a legislature controlled by the employed. But beyond this, parliament in the last years of the century was possessed with the fear of Jacobinism, and **Combination** was disposed to regard the unenfranchised classes **penalised.** as presumably revolutionaries. Any combinations among working-men were alarming; even if their ostensible objects were not political, who could tell that they would not be covertly diverted by revolutionary agitators to political ends? In the last two years of the century combinations were forbidden by statute. The combination statutes had about them an air of evenhanded justice which probably deceived the legislators themselves. They forbade masters to combine no less than workmen. But the prohibition mattered nothing to the masters; a lock-out, the closing by a master of his own works, required no combination between him and other employers; but a strike of operatives without combination, without pre-arrangement, was virtually impossible. Consequently, the immediate effect of the new machinery was to place absolutely at the mercy of the capitalist the labour of which the supply was as yet greatly in excess of the demand; and so to force down wages to the lowest possible level. And it must be observed that matters were made worse because the average master was ready to **Women and** employ women and children whenever the thing **children.** could be done profitably; while the working-men themselves were too short-sighted to see that though the parti-

cular household might manage in consequence to earn a very few additional shillings or pence in a week, the employment of women and children made it more difficult for the men to earn a living wage.

A second feature of the period was the development of traffic. In the matter of facility of communication the British islands were not progressive. Till the last quarter of the **Traffic:** eighteenth century, the roads were villainously bad, **roads.** even the main roads, in spite of the institution of turnpikes. In the country districts, even near the end of the century, no superlatives of disgust were sufficient to express Arthur Young's sentiments on the subject in his peregrinations. But without facilities of transport, the means for bringing goods to market in bulk, an immense increase in the production of goods is of very little advantage. The Industrial Revolution was effective, because it was accompanied by an enormous development of canals. Packhorses and wagons could carry only small quantities of goods, and that very slowly over atrocious **Canals.** roads. But with the establishment of water-ways, an immensely greater bulk of goods could be carried upon barges. Down to the middle of the eighteenth century, England, though a well-watered country, had made the smallest possible use of her streams for traffic; in this respect she was far behind, not only Holland, where canal construction was a sheer necessity, but also France.

The beginning of canal construction in England was due to the duke of Bridgewater, who wanted to convey the coal to Manchester from his pits at Worsley by a less expensive method than one which required eight horses to carry a ton of coal. The duke discovered and employed an uneducated engineer of extraordinary genius, James Brindley. In spite of **Brindley.** the gibes of the orthodox, Brindley constructed a canal seven miles long, of which the most startling feature was an aqueduct which carried the water-road forty feet overhead across the Irwell. The cost of transport was so enormously reduced that the duke was able to sell his coal in Manchester at half the previous price. This canal was opened in 1761. Within the next

ten years, Brindley had made the plans for more than three hundred and fifty miles of canals himself, and the example was being followed all over the country. Some of the later outcries against railways were anticipated at this time. It was said that canals would ruin the coasting trade, destroy the breed of horses, and absorb land which ought to be devoted to agriculture. Neither the coasting trade nor the breed of horses suffered, and agriculture like everything else benefited by the increased ease with which goods could be supplied, and by the lower prices consequent upon the diminished cost of carriage. As concerned such heavy goods as coal and iron, the change was of immense importance; while the gain was also especially marked in the potteries, which were vigorously developing in the hands of Josiah Wedgewood and others, since fragile goods could be carried on the canals with much less risk of breakage than by road. The canals came in between haulage by road and steam haulage by rail very much as water power came in between the hand machine and the steam-engine.

Intimately associated with the industrial revolution is the rural revolution, which was proceeding apace during the same period. The meaning of the change which took place in the second half of the eighteenth century in the rural districts was analogous to the change which took place in the relations of labour and capital. At the beginning of the period a substantial part, if not the greater part, of the country under cultivation was in the hands of small holders; the average agricultural labourer was a cottar with a small plot of his own, or at any rate with a right to keep live stock and gather fuel on the village common. The yeoman, the copyholder, the small tenant-at-will, also enjoyed the common rights. Nearly all of them were supplementing what they got from the soil by weaving or spinning, which gave additional occupation to the women. Half the land which was under the plough was still cultivated under the open-field system. By the end of the century the cottars and a substantial proportion of the yeomen, copyholders, and small tenants, were absorbed in the ranks of agricultural labourers with nothing to offer in the market but

their own labour, and nothing to live upon but their wages. The new machinery had annihilated their looms and their spinning-wheels. Their commons were enclosed; their open fields were enclosed and redistributed, generally in the shape of comparatively extensive enclosed farms. Machinery and enclosures between them had given to rural England a new social structure; in effect substituting the landlord, the big tenant farmer, and the landless labourer, for the squire, the yeoman, and the cottar.

The story is pathetic enough. Under the old conditions, before machinery came, the yeoman and the cottar plodded along in the old ways, earning a sufficient subsistence, **The doom of the old order.** with neither natural inclination nor external incentive to enterprise or improvement, but in decent material comfort and with a consciousness of personal independence. The coming of machinery would in any case have robbed them of the by-employments which represented the margin between tolerable comfort and dire penury. They would probably have been crushed out in any case; but their doom was sealed by the landlords, and the economists were solid on the side of the landlords. The land was not being turned to full account. It was still producing enough to support the population, but with a margin too narrow to be satisfactory in time of war when foreign supplies might be cut off. It could be made much more productive, but not under the open-field system; the common wastes, too, absorbed much soil which could be brought under cultivation. It would be infinitely better for the community at large if cultivation were in the hands of enterprising people who could and would turn the soil to the best account. Enclosure was the way to progress, the way to awaken rural England from its inertia, the only way to provide the country at large with a really sufficient supply of home-grown food-stuffs. The time was still far off when the country would be forced to make up its mind that no human power could deliver it from the necessity of obtaining food-stuffs from other lands, for the simple reason that the British Isles were incapable of growing enough for their rapidly increasing population.

Moreover, the average landlord, being an average man, wished to make for himself the profit which he saw that he could make if only he could enclose commons and open fields. **The landlords.** He had no difficulty in believing, what was often doubtless absolutely true, that the existing system encouraged the cottar to idleness because he could get along without working very hard ; or, what was not true, that enclosure would open up additional employment which would give him ample opportunity for really earning a better livelihood. So the landlords set about enclosing with energy, as soon as they realised how profitable it might be. It is quite superfluous to attribute their conduct to merciless and unsparing greed. Self-interest had very much the same share in their actions as in the actions of other men, but so also had the honest desire to benefit the community at large, and the honest belief that they were benefiting the rural community in particular. But they had it in their power to do the thing which was very emphatically in their own interest, and they did it without allowing the other parties concerned any voice in the matter.

They had it in their power because the regular procedure was to procure an Enclosure Act of parliament for the particular area.

The procedure by bill. The promoters petitioned for an Act, the opponents presented counter-petitions, the bill was introduced, reported on by a committee, and was then very nearly as a matter of course passed. The promoter was always a big landlord ; unless there was another big landlord among the opponents it was practically assured that the committee which sat upon the bill would consist entirely of persons with a strong *a priori* disposition in its favour. For all practical purposes, if there was anything like a consensus of the big proprietors, objections on the part of the small proprietors and cottars were virtually unheard ; first, because they were as sheep having no shepherd, not knowing how to present their case ; secondly, because they could not afford to pay an expert to put the case for them ; and thirdly, because they had no means of influencing, gaining the attention of, the members of a House consisting mainly of landlords with a strong predisposition to assume that enclosure was extremely desirable.

When the Act had been passed, commissioners were sent down to carry out the allotment of the common waste to be enclosed under the bill, or the re-allotment of the open fields. The commissioners might be actuated by a pure sense of equity, but their natural bias was inevitably in favour of the landlord. There was a legal hypothesis with a very dubious historical basis, that the common lands were really the landlord's property, and that rights of common were privileges conceded by him. When commons were enclosed, and the rights of common thereon abolished, landlords and tithe owners received an extremely substantial share by way of compensation, and the separate scraps allotted to the several cottars, in lieu of their common rights in the whole, were hardly of service to them; besides which the cottar was required to fence his scrap at his own cost. The practical result was that the cottars' scraps were absorbed by the landlord, and in the end the cottar only got some very infinitesimal compensation. Arthur Young, an enthusiast for enclosure as an economic necessity, pleaded in vain for a fairer provision for the cottar. Approximately the same thing applied to the small patches allotted to yeomen and copyholders. Again, when open fields came under the bill and were re-allotted, so that each proprietor, instead of having a number of scattered strips, had a single enclosed farm, the yeoman or copyholder might or might not get his fair share; but in any case the expense of fencing was thrown upon him, and he was practically certain to find himself on the whole a good deal worse off than he had been before. Unable any longer to make both ends meet, he was easily induced to surrender his holding at little cost to the landlord, and himself swelled the ranks of the wage-earning labourers.

The procedure under the Act.

Even if the landlords and commissioners had shown a superhuman readiness to concede everything possible to the small men, the small men would have been superhuman if they had rejected the conviction that they were being badly treated. But the landlords, their agents, and the commissioners showed no such disposition; and the actual fact was obvious that the result of the whole transaction was to crush the yeoman and the

The effects.

cottar, and to make the landlord and the big farmer, who rented a group of the small farms, flourish exceedingly. A large farm with a long lease, with clauses in the agreement requiring the farmer to adopt progressive methods, offered every inducement to enterprise, and there can be no question that the methods of agriculture improved immensely. But the price paid by the country was the extinction of the yeoman class.

The war hastened the change. It raised the prices of the produce which the yeoman could send to market, but it increased **Effects of** still more the cost of living, and made it still harder **the war.** for him to make both ends meet. For whatever reason, population was at the same time increasing at an unprecedented rate. As the class of men living entirely on their wages was swelling year by year, without an equivalent increase in the demand for labour, there was no rise in wages corresponding to the rise in the cost of living. Migration to the regions where there was an increasing demand for labour would in any case have been difficult; and was artificially made the more so by the Restoration Law of Settlement, which allowed every parish to refuse admission to new-comers.


And here legislation stepped in with the best intentions and the worst results. Gilbert's Acts in 1782 sought to develop the **Gilbert's** combination of parishes into Unions, a quite desir- **Acts, 1782.** able object which had been aimed at earlier by the Workhouse Act of 1723. But at the same time that earlier Act was amended detrimentally by permitting the local authorities to give relief outside the workhouse. Moreover, a dangerous discretion was allowed to the magistrates, including authority for applying rates to supplement wages.

This proved to be the most fatal clause in Gilbert's Act; for by 1795 the enclosures, the disappearance of domestic spinning **Speenham-** and weaving due to machinery, and the war, had **land, 1795.** between them made the distress in the rural districts acute. At Speenhamland in Berkshire the justices met and adopted a plan of relief which was quickly taken up by their benevolent fellow-justices in other parts of the country. They might have exercised their powers to fix a compulsory rate of

wages regulated by the price of bread. They did not so use those powers, though they earnestly appealed to the farmers to raise wages—an appeal to which the farmers were deaf, with good reason. For they went on to take the fatal step of applying rates to supplement wages. Where the wages were not high enough to provide the labourer and his family with a livelihood, relief was to be given from the rates in proportion to the size of the labourer's family. With the gallon loaf at a shilling, the labourer was to receive three shillings a week for himself and half as much for each member of the family dependent upon him. For each extra penny on the loaf he was to have three-pence extra for himself and a penny for each member of the family. If his wages did not cover that amount the margin was to be made up out of the rates. The obvious result was, that the farmer had no inducement to grant, and the labourer no inducement to demand, a living wage, when the balance was made up by the parish. The labourer had no incentive to earn more by good work, no incentive to thrift, and every incentive to increase his family; while the spirit of independence was sapped when he was living consciously upon charity. How disastrous was the outcome we shall see in another volume.

I. THE BRITISH SUCCESSION

JAMES I. AND VI.




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
CAPITALS, Sovereigns of England, Scotland, and Ireland.

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
A single date notifies the year of death; two dates the beginning and end of reign.

II. THE HOUSE OF HANOVER





V. THE BOURBON MONARCHIES



CAPITALS, Kings of France.

Italics, Kings of Spain.

Oureadon, Kings of Sicily.

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A single date notifies the year of death: two dates the beginning and end of reign.

NOTES

I. CONCERNING THE ARMY AND NAVY

A **STANDING** army only came into existence with the Great Rebellion. The New Model army, created in 1645 by the parliament for the purposes of the Civil War, was not disbanded until the Restoration; and at the Restoration the king was still allowed to retain the troops which had accompanied General Monk from Scotland. These troops formed the nucleus of the standing army. From time to time during the reign of Charles II., additional regiments were raised for foreign service or to garrison Tangier. The king succeeded in avoiding the disbandment of these regiments, even when Tangier itself was evacuated, with the result that James II. had, in fact, a standing army of some 16,000 men in England. As yet, however, there was no statutory power of controlling and keeping the troops under special discipline in time of peace, the regulations being issued arbitrarily by the royal authority, and being of extremely doubtful legality.

In 1789 the maintenance of a standing army in time of peace as a recognised institution obtained what was in effect its first permanent legal sanction with the first Mutiny Act, of which the annual renewal became a matter of course. The annual budget made provision for the maintenance of such a supply of troops as parliament deemed necessary, and the annual Mutiny Act confirmed the power of the military authorities for the preservation of discipline, as distinct from the enforcement of the ordinary law by civil authorities upon all citizens civil and military alike. In the course of years these powers were immensely elaborated by the provision of statutory definitions and statutory penalties, limiting the arbitrary powers of officers and of courts-martial.

The troops were engaged upon a long-service system, and were liable for service in any part of the world where they might be required. There was no system of rotation, and when a regiment had once been dispatched and retained to garrison a place in some distant quarter of the globe, such as a West India island, its claims to be relieved were

apt to be forgotten, so that it might remain in exile for a long term of years. The recruiting for each regiment was the business of the officers of that regiment, who frequently found it an extremely expensive burden, though, on the other hand, the colonel's financial control often made his position highly lucrative. Commissions and promotions were mainly a matter of purchase.

The long French wars necessitated the multiplication of regiments. Marlborough in 1702 had only about 18,000 British troops. In the course of the war not only were the troops under his command raised to 25,000, but a similar number was required for service in the Spanish peninsula. It is estimated that at the highest the total of the British army may have amounted to as much as 70,000. The new regiments would be raised for short terms of service, sometimes as little as three years, and were generally disbanded when the war was over. But when regiments were multiplied, the ordinary attractions of service in the ranks were not sufficient to draw in recruits, especially for service in unpopular regions. Marlborough himself was extremely careful of the comfort of his own troops, but elsewhere generals were less careful, and even if they happened not to be, it was extremely difficult for them to induce the government to listen to their demands. Hence, besides the ordinary voluntary enlistment, the ranks were largely recruited from the gaols, convicts being offered enlistment as a way of escape from the legal penalties incurred by their crimes. In this connection, however, it must not be forgotten that the English penal code was frightfully merciless, and that the crimes for which men had been condemned to death were often little more than wild escapades, or offences which would now be reckoned as extremely trivial.

There was also another method of enlistment which was without any voluntary element. Masterless men who were without ostensible means of support could be handed up by the local authority to the recruiting officer and compelled to enter the ranks willy nilly. Such, in general, were the methods by which the army was swelled in time of war from the humble proportions to which it sank in time of peace, owing to the intense aversion of parliament and of the people at large, partly to the idea of an army which could be used by the government for domestic coercion, and partly to the expenditure on costly military establishment when there was no fighting actually going on.

Besides the standing army liable for foreign service, there existed the old institution of the militia, liable only for home defence and for the suppression of rebellion. The futility of this body was emphatically demonstrated in the Jacobite risings, when the government could place no reliance upon it, but had to supplement its own regular troops by hiring the soldiery of mercenary German princes. Theoretically, persons

who owned a certain amount of property were required either to appear in arms themselves if called upon or to provide substitutes. But there was no system of training, and such haphazard collections of untrained men with arms in their hands could not be employed in opposition to trained troops. It was the necessity of having a force for home defence, which could liberate regular troops for foreign service, that caused the elder Pitt to lay so much stress upon the Militia Bill which was passed in 1757, a bill which has been discussed in its place in this volume. Every county was to provide its quota, making up in the aggregate a force of 32,000 men, to which the 60,000 originally demanded by Pitt was reduced by the peers. The parochial authorities provided the lords-lieutenant with lists of men fit for service, from which lists the requisite numbers were drawn by ballot, the men so drawn being liable for three years' service, during which they had to attend drill on one day a week from April to October. Thus there was, at any rate after that date, a force of 30,000 men in the country with a rudimentary training, which could always be called up for home defence. Such efficiency, however, as it attained during Pitt's régime quickly fell away after the fall of the inspiring great man; and 1779 witnessed the first volunteer movement, the raising of companies of volunteers for home defence, of which the most remarkable manifestation at that time was in Ireland, though it was immensely developed in England and Scotland on the renewal of the war with France after the Peace of Amiens, in 1803.

Of the navy, it is to be observed that there was never any popular opposition to its adequate maintenance. The navy was never feared as an instrument which might be utilised by the Crown for the establishment of arbitrary power, a fear which always lay at the root of the hostility to a standing army, a military dictator being even more an object of dread than a legitimate sovereign with an army at his disposal. The discipline of the navy was regulated by a statute in the early days of Charles II., which, after periodical amendments, was displaced by a new Act in 1749, the Act under which the unfortunate Byng suffered. The ranks of the men were filled up by forcible recruiting to a much greater extent than was the case with the army, though curiously enough the terms 'impressment' and 'pressgang' originally had nothing to do with the employment of force, being derived from the 'imprest,' the cash in advance paid down to sailors on enlistment. The practice of compelling men to serve in the royal ships seems to have dated from the earliest times, though it would appear never to have been either established or abrogated by statute. It is probably to be regarded as a royal prerogative. By custom at least it was supposed to apply only to the impressment of mariners, and did not warrant the impressment of landsmen. The pressgang could only act under a warrant in the hands of a

commissioned officer. It is, however, certain that no great care was taken, in effecting captures, to distinguish between mariners and landsmen, and that it was by no means easy for a landsman to obtain a hearing to his demands for release.

II. LORD PETERBOROUGH IN SPAIN

The Spanish war has been dealt with at no great length, on account of the singular futility of the operations in general within the peninsula. Apart from what has been narrated in the volume it possesses a single interest, that associated with the extraordinary personality of the earl of Peterborough, Charles Mordaunt. Unfortunately nobody knows, or probably ever will know, with any certainty what Peterborough really did in Spain. The Peterborough probably known to the majority of readers is the hero of Macaulay's essay, of Lord Stanhope's history, and of Walter Scott; who was created by the professedly autobiographical author of the *Memoirs of Captain Carleton*. If the Carleton memoirs had never been written, Peterborough would probably never have been elevated into the character of a brilliant hero, and Colonel Parnell would not have thought it necessary to devote the iconoclasm of his *History of the War of Succession in Spain* to proving that Peterborough was the villain of the piece, a braggart, a liar, and a coward. The plain fact is that the Carleton memoirs must be put entirely on one side. There was a Captain Carleton who served in Spain, who may have written his memoirs twenty years afterwards, when he was nearer eighty than seventy. But if he did, his recollections were tempered by a lively and unscrupulous imagination, and the total result is entirely untrustworthy. The probabilities are that some ingenious friend of Peterborough's got hold of the man, and used his reminiscences as material for concocting a Peterborough myth under the plausible veil of a realistic autobiography.

But after all, to dismiss Carleton is not quite the same thing as to wipe out our Peterborough; out of the material which survives we can at any rate construct an extremely picturesque figure. Dr. John Freind, a distinguished medical man, was with him in Spain, and Freind's records are our real authority for the favourable view of his talents and character. After making all due allowance for the personal equation, the doctor's readiness to attribute to the general every possible merit which could conceivably be found in him; after assuming that he took Peterborough's own highly coloured versions of his own proceedings and of the proceedings of his neighbours *au pied de la lettre* with superfluous trustfulness; we are still left with the conviction that Peterborough

really did some of the very remarkable things attributed to him ; that he carried the art of succeeding by sheer audacity to a very high perfection ; that his strokes were distinguished by their ingenuity and unexpectedness ; that he was reckless of risks in carrying out any device which pleased him ; and that he had an elvish capacity for outwitting his enemies. These are the qualities which render him fascinating. But whenever we find Peterborough attempting to co-operate with anybody else, we see him appropriating to himself the credit of everything creditable, attributing every failure to some one else's crass stupidity or worse, and generally proving himself a quite impossible colleague. No contemporary military criticism recognises him as a great soldier, though there was an attempt on the part of the Tories to play him off against Marlborough. And it would seem that his persistent jealous belittlement of Galway has deprived that gallant and able officer of the appreciation which was his due, in his resolute struggle with a wholly impracticable task.

III. ON SOME OFFICES OF STATE

Until the accession of the House of Hanover, there was no Prime Minister in England, although until that time the minister highest in the confidence of the Crown usually held the appointment of Lord Treasurer. After 1714 that office disappears ; the Treasury is placed in commission, and commonly, though not necessarily, the leading minister is First Lord of the Treasury, and often at the same time either Chancellor of the Exchequer or a Secretary of State. Walpole and Henry Pelham throughout their administrations held the two offices of First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer. So did Stanhope for a short time before them, but though he might almost have been called Prime Minister from 1714 to 1721, he held the office of Secretary of State, not Chancellor, during the whole of that time except for one year. While Townshend and Walpole were together, Townshend was Secretary of State. Passing by the brief Newcastle administration, 1754 to 1756, when Newcastle was First Lord of the Treasury only, William Pitt the elder was a Secretary of State from 1756 till his resignation in 1761, while Newcastle remained First Lord of the Treasury. Bute was First Lord of the Treasury only ; so was Rockingham ; George Grenville combined the office with the chancellorship. From 1766 to 1770 Grafton was the nominal head of the administration, as First Lord of the Treasury ; North again combined the office with the Chancellorship of the Exchequer. So finally did the younger Pitt from the time he took office in 1783, a year and a half after North's resignation. From the time of Townshend's retirement in 1730 the practical rule emerges that

the titular head of the administration is always First Lord of the Treasury. The controlling personality, whether or no he happens to be titular head and First Lord of the Treasury, is always either Chancellor of the Exchequer or one of the two Secretaries of State.

In the nineteenth century the number of the Secretaries of State was multiplied. During the greater part of the eighteenth century there were only two actual Secretaries of State, for what were called respectively the northern and southern departments. The functions of the two secretaries overlapped considerably. Home affairs belonged to both of them. For foreign affairs the secretary of state for the southern department had to deal with France and the Mediterranean countries, the colonies also falling in his department. The secretary for the northern department had to deal with Germany, Holland, and the Baltic powers. There was no rule by which one was subordinate to the other, and consequently we find in the reign of George I. serious differences arising between Stanhope and Townshend, and afterwards between Townshend and Carteret. After Townshend's retirement, Newcastle and Harrington shared the secretaryships without friction until 1746; but in fact the secretaries remained subordinate members of the government until Pitt took office in 1756. In 1768 a third secretaryship was instituted for the colonies, which were taken out of the hands of Shelburne, who resigned in the same year. In 1782 the Colonial Secretaryship was again cancelled; but for practical purposes from this time the division into the northern and southern departments was transformed into the division between Home and Foreign affairs, the colonies falling within the Home department.

In 1794 Dundas was appointed the first Secretary of State for War; and in 1801 the colonies were transferred from the Home Office to this department. Throughout the eighteenth century there was a 'Secretary *at War*,' an important person, but not in the cabinet—not a 'Secretary of State.' This ministerial office was continued beside the Secretaryship for 'War and the Colonies' until the middle of the nineteenth century.

IV. THE ARMED NEUTRALITY

It may be convenient to summarise the main points in dispute as to the maritime rights of belligerents and neutrals. It was obviously in the interest of the dominant naval power to prevent an enemy from profiting by neutral traffic so far as that end could be attained. It was agreed upon all hands that no neutral ships might attempt to enter a port which was in a state of blockade; and that no neutral ships might carry 'contraband of war' to any port of a belligerent. The ships of a belli-

gerent were free to seize neutral ships seeking to enter a blockaded port, and to search ships sailing under a neutral flag. But the British definition of a blockaded port and the British definition of contraband of war were more inclusive than the definitions put forward by neutrals or by weaker maritime powers when at war with Great Britain, though the latter were ready enough to adopt the British practice when they were themselves at war with weaker maritime powers. Further the British claimed the right of searching neutral ships for enemy's goods as well as for contraband. The neutrals denied that claim, and asserted especially the immunity of neutral merchantmen from search when under the convoy of neutral men-of-war. The neutrals also on their side claimed additional compensation, over and above damage done and loss incurred, for the searching of neutral vessels which were found not to be carrying forbidden goods.

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