THE INDIA-PAKISTAN MILITARY STANDOFF

Crisis and Escalation in South Asia

Edited by ZACHARY S. DAVIS
THE INDIA-Pakistan MILITARY STANDOFF
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THE INDIA-Pakistan MILITARY STANDOFF

CRISIS AND ESCALATION IN SOUTH ASIA

Edited by

Zachary S. Davis
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book was written in a manner more akin to an old-fashioned community barn raising than a painting created by a lone artist. Extensive collaboration emerged from a series of Track II meetings on South Asian security conceived and convened by Peter Lavoy, then Director of the Center for Contemporary Conflict (CCC) at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Dr. Lavoy, aided by NPS colleague Feroz Khan, brought together over a period of years the best and brightest scholars and practitioners of South Asia security for a series of extraordinary meetings focused on the major issues of India-Pakistan security and foreign policy. The meeting that produced these essays followed a highly successful conference on the 1999 Kashmir crisis (which produced a volume edited by Peter Lavoy), and preceded similar meetings on India’s Cold Start doctrine, Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy, and an examination of nuclear learning in India and Pakistan during the ten years since the 1998 nuclear tests. Several sessions hosted by colleagues in India and Pakistan laid the groundwork for the Monterey meetings. Each gathering followed Peter Lavoy’s formula of bringing the very best scholarly, journalist, government, and military minds together to focus on the most policy-relevant issues in an atmosphere of trust, respect, and honesty. Those who participated in the Monterey meetings may recall intense discussions on the beach around a bonfire while the sun set over the Pacific Ocean. This pleasant atmosphere produced many valuable insights as well as lasting friendships.

The NPS/CCC Track II meetings were fueled with funding from the U.S. government, primarily the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Mike Wheeler, David Hamon, Michael Urena, and Mike Keifer of DTRA, and Toby Dalton and Kasia Mendelsohn of NNSA ensured that good ideas were transformed into successful programs. Their support and trust paid important dividends—of which the flow of scholarly publications was an important side benefit. The main goal
of these Track II meetings was to advance understanding of the conflicts between India and Pakistan for the purpose of informing policy with practical ideas to advance shared national interests in security and stability in South Asia. Close examination of the 2001–2002 military crisis enabled the authors and participants to delve into the details of crisis management, conflict escalation, counterterrorism operations, and nuclear deterrence stability in South Asia. In addition to producing this book, our Track II participants brainstormed ideas to help their governments avoid, and if necessary, manage future crises. My greatest hope is that our search for deeper understanding in some small way supported official Track I efforts to improve relations among these three great nations.

The participants in Track II sessions determine whether the barn raising succeeds or fails. At NPS, Jim Wirtz, James Russell, Chris Twomey, Tom Johnson, and Paul Kapur added intellectual muscle. In addition to his scholarly contributions, Feroz Khan remains a steady source of optimism, wisdom, common sense, and good will. Chris Clary, Rebecca Dietz, Adam Radin, Kali Shelor, Robin Walker, and the CCC research crew orchestrated the events with flair and good humor. General (Retd.) V. P. Malik at the Observer Research Foundation hosted a key interim meeting in New Delhi, and Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute anchored the Pakistan leg of the project. Much heavy lifting for this and other CCC Track II South Asia meetings was performed by Neil Joeck, Raja Menon, Drew Winner, Raja Mohan, Ashley Tellis, Hamid Khan, H. P. Flashman, Dipanker Bannerjee, Michael Krepon, Riffat Hussein, Steve Cohen, Tariq Ashraf, Tim Hoyt, P. R. Chari, and the many U.S., Pakistani, and Indian government officials who attended the sessions. Many others also joined the meetings along the way and deserve credit for their contributions. Ron Lehman and the staff at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory helped with the finishing touches, and the crew at Palgrave made the process of publishing a book look easy. Everyone’s valuable contributions are woven into the fabric of this volume. Of course, the views expressed in the book do not reflect the positions or policies of the funders or any U. S. government agency. Responsibility for any mistakes in substance or presentation is mine.

The community of South Asia security experts is relatively small and well-connected. The volume of literature on South Asian security affairs is such that it is possible to read a good proportion of what is written and discuss the issues with knowledgeable colleagues. This
Acknowledgments

community of scholars and practitioners is also notably policy focused, as opposed to primarily theoretic, and tracks the day-to-day dramas of India-Pakistan-U.S. relations with active interest. Interactions with current and former government officials in all three countries are common, and the mechanics of the policy process are generally well understood. These are important qualities for constructive Track II efforts, which must navigate between the twin dangers of being irrelevant or counterproductive—from a policy perspective. We worked very hard to make this Track II project relevant and constructive.

Our Track II collaborations, which from the outset included diverse viewpoints on some of the most contentious issues of South Asian security, rarely failed to find common ground on the major issues of war and peace. Through a process similar to what Sherlock Holmes called “scientific use of the imagination,” we attempted to bridge the gap between theoretical knowledge and practical applications. Whether we succeeded in our major task is hard to say, but for the individuals who participated in these events, rational discourse made the prospects for improved relations appear malleable. Our ability to expand areas of common understanding and use that as the basis for devising pragmatic steps to ease tensions suggests that continued investments in these types of interactions by scholars, journalists, funders, and policymakers can pay valuable dividends.

ZACHARY S. DAVIS
Image 0.1  Attack Soldiers behind Trees

Image 0.2  Parliament Attack—Soldiers Preparing
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Brig. Gen. (Retd.) Naeem Salik currently teaches postgraduate courses at the Department of Nuclear Studies at the National Defence University, Pakistan. He specializes in nuclear, missile and South Asian security issues and is the author of *Genesis of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence*. 
When India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May 1998, some scholars and policy makers hoped that it would usher in a new era of stability. Others expected the worst possible outcome. The two countries shared a bloody history. They were born out of the partition of British India in 1947. In the orgy of Hindu-Muslim violence that followed, 500,000 to 1 million people were killed and roughly 15 million were displaced. Since then, India and Pakistan had fought three wars, two of them over the disputed territory of Kashmir. The Kashmir issue had appeared to recede during the 1970s and early 1980s. By 1989, however, it was again a major source of tension, with a Pakistan-supported insurgency wracking Indian Kashmir, and India flooding the territory with hundreds of thousands of security forces in hopes of crushing the militants. Perhaps nuclear weapons would stabilize this relationship, much as they had helped to keep the peace between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war. As Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh asked in the wake of the tests: “If deterrence works in the West... by what reasoning will it not work in India?”

The 1998 nuclear tests did not mark the beginning of South Asia’s nuclear era. India and Pakistan had launched their nuclear programs decades earlier, and the two countries possessed nascent weapons capabilities long before 1998. India detonated a “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974. Indeed, from the late 1980s forward, India and Pakistan were considered opaque nuclear powers; neither country possessed a fully operational nuclear arsenal, but both could have produced a nuclear device quickly if they had decided to do so. Nonetheless, the 1998 tests were a major turning point in South Asia’s nuclear history. Previously, India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities were a matter of speculation whose significance could be downplayed by skeptics. After 1998, however, it was abundantly clear that both sides possessed a military nuclear capability and could inflict massive...
damage on one another. Thus no one could deny that any war in South Asia ran the risk of becoming catastrophically costly.

A decade later, debate continued to rage over the question of whether nuclear weapons have, on balance, stabilized or destabilized the South Asian security environment. Some scholars argue that, by threatening to make any Indo-Pakistani conflict catastrophically costly, nuclear weapons have imposed caution on New Delhi and Islamabad. As a result, the two countries have avoided major war since acquiring nuclear weapons, despite the outbreak of serious crises. Such optimistic scholars thus conclude that nuclear weapons have contributed to peace and stability on the subcontinent. Other scholars argue that nuclear weapons have undermined strategic stability in South Asia. Some pessimists cite political, technological, and particularly organizational pathologies associated with nuclear weapons as likely causes of dangerous misperceptions and miscalculations. In this view, the governmental organizations tasked with developing nuclear strategies and controlling nuclear weapons will inevitably make mistakes, resulting in accidents and deterrence failures. Other pessimistic scholars argue that nuclear weapons have emboldened Pakistani leaders to challenge the territorial status quo, drawing international attention to the Kashmir dispute while remaining insulated from all-out Indian retaliation. India has responded aggressively to Pakistani provocations, resulting in a spiral of conflict in South Asia.2

As these disagreements demonstrate, nuclear proliferation’s impact on the South Asian security environment remains open to debate. What is beyond question, however, is that India’s and Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons failed to prevent the outbreak of serious Indo-Pakistani militarized confrontations. At the time of the nuclear tests, India and Pakistan were experiencing a period of relative stability that dated back to the end of the Bangladesh war in the early 1970s. Although the intervening years had seen a number of crises and considerable tensions, India and Pakistan had not fought a war since 1971. This was the longest period without a war since the two countries attained independence in 1947. In the immediate wake of the tests, however, the first Indo-Pakistani war in 28 years erupted in a region of Kashmir called Kargil. In early 1999, Pakistani forces crossed the Line of Control (LoC) dividing Indian from Pakistani Kashmir and seized territory 8–12 kilometers inside Indian territory. Upon discovering the incursion in May, the Indians responded with an intense air, ground, and artillery campaign to oust the intruders.
Combat between Indian and Pakistani forces raged for approximately three months.

Indian forces did not cross the LoC during the fighting, though the government probably would have given them permission to do so if the campaign had gone badly. However, the Indians began to win and became confident of eventual victory. In early July, when it became clear that the Pakistanis could not succeed, then prime minister Nawaz Sharif signed a U.S.-brokered agreement to withdraw intruding forces. Thus, India and Pakistan avoided a larger war during the Kargil conflict, but such a fortunate outcome was in no way guaranteed.

Unfortunately, Kargil was not the last Indo-Pakistani confrontation in the wake of the nuclear tests. In 2001, Pakistan-based militants attacked the Indian Parliament while it was in session. No members were injured, though several security personnel died in a running gun battle with the terrorists. In response, India launched Operation Parakram, deploying approximately 500,000 troops along the LoC and the international border. The Indians also demanded that Islamabad turn over 20 criminals suspected to be residing in Pakistan; unequivocally renounce terrorism; close terrorist training camps in Pakistani territory; and cease militant infiltration into Indian Kashmir. If Pakistan did not comply, the Indians planned to strike terrorist training camps and seize territory in Pakistani Kashmir. Pakistan responded with its own large-scale deployments, and before long approximately 1 million troops faced each other across the LoC and the international border.

In January 2002, President Pervez Musharraf took two steps that helped to de-escalate the crisis. First, he outlawed Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), the terrorist organizations implicated in the parliament attack. Then, in a nationally televised speech, he promised to prevent the use of Pakistani territory for the promotion of terrorism in Kashmir. U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell subsequently assured Indian leaders that Musharraf was serious about reducing terrorism, and was even considering the extradition of non-Pakistani members of India’s list of 20 fugitives. Given the apparent success of their coercive efforts, in addition to the loss of strategic surprise, the Indians decided not to attack Pakistan in January 2002. They did, however, maintain their force deployments along the LoC and the international border.

The relative calm did not last long. In May 2002, terrorists killed 32 people at an Indian Army camp at Kaluchak in Jammu. Irate
Indian leaders devised a military response even more aggressive than the plans that they had adopted in January. The Indians now planned not simply to attack across the LoC. Rather, they prepared to drive three strike corps from Rajasthan into Pakistan proper, overwhelming Pakistan's forces and seizing territory in the Thar desert. In early June, however, president Musharraf promised U.S. deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage to end infiltration into Indian Kashmir “permanently.” Armitage relayed Musharraf’s promise to the Indian government. Musharraf’s pledge, backed by American assurances that he would honor it, as well as a significant decline in terrorist infiltration in Kashmir, led Indian leaders to conclude that their coercive diplomacy had been successful, and that an attack on Pakistan was unnecessary. Indian forces thus began withdrawing from the international border and LoC in October.

The 1999 Kargil conflict has received considerable scholarly attention. The 2001–2002 crisis, by contrast, is relatively understudied. This is unfortunate; although it did not escalate into a shooting war, its scale made 2001–2002 an extremely serious crisis—perhaps even more so than Kargil. The crisis also raises fundamental questions about the relationship between subconventional warfare and nuclear weapons, crisis escalation and de-escalation in a nuclear environment, and the utility and dangers of coercive diplomacy against a nuclear backdrop.

This book therefore focuses on the 2001–2002 crisis. The volume’s authors focus on five areas: The background to the 2001–2002 crisis; the conventional military environment during the crisis; the nuclear environment during the crisis; coercive diplomacy and de-escalation during the crisis; and arms control and confidence building measures (CBMs) that might help South Asia to avoid similar crises in the future.

The book opens with Praveen Swami’s examination of the background to the 2001–2002 crisis from an Indian perspective. Swami traces the roots of the 2001–2002 standoff back to the period immediately following the Kargil conflict. The Indians hoped to capitalize on both their military victory at Kargil and the subsequent coup that deposed Nawaz Sharif and thrust Pervez Musharraf into power in order to prevail over Pakistan in the larger Kashmir dispute. To this end, New Delhi adopted a two-pronged strategy. First, the Indians entered a dialogue with Kashmir’s largest terrorist group, Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin (HuM). Second, the Indians commenced discussions with Kashmiri secessionists. These measures met with some success.
For example, Indian overtures to HuM resulted in a five-month cease-fire between the two sides. Swami argues, however, that the Indian strategy was incomplete; it did not enable India to counter Pakistani efforts to escalate violence in Kashmir to Kargil-like levels. According to Swami, it was this failure that drove India and Pakistan to the brink of war during the Parakram crisis.

Specifically, Indian overtures to Kashmiri terror and separatist groups threatened to erode Pakistani leverage over the insurgency in Kashmir. Although the new Indian tactics did not significantly reduce terrorist violence in the region, they did lead to a splintering of separatist and terror organizations within Jammu and Kashmir (J&K); some groups favored dialogue with the Indians while others maintained a more hardline stance. The insurgency thus became less unified, and more fragmented, than it had previously been. And, as a result, Pakistan now controlled not the larger Kashmiri anti-Indian movement, but only particular factions within it. According to Swami’s analysis, Pakistan responded by seeking to derail the dialogue process by escalating the level of terrorist violence not just in Kashmir, but also in India proper. In December 2000, for example, LeT attacked the historic Red Fort in New Delhi. Far more important than the resulting physical damage was the political message that the militants and the Pakistanis hoped would emerge from the attack: despite its victory in the Kargil war, the Indian government could not crush the Kashmir insurgency, and could not even prevent attacks in the heart of the Indian state. In Swami’s view, there was more than a little truth to this claim. The Indians had engaged their opponents in Kashmir with some success, but they had no strategy for preventing the Pakistan-instigated violence that followed. Thus the Indians were unable to prevent the parliament attack in December 2001. And once it had occurred, New Delhi had no recourse but to threaten war by launching Operation Parakram. According to Swami, Parakram was in effect the third prong of India’s two-pronged engagement strategy for achieving victory in Kashmir after the Kargil war. Indeed, India’s initial strategy necessitated Operation Parakram by encouraging Pakistan to increase the level of militant violence, leaving India with no means of preventing Pakistan from doing so. Swami finds the immediate origins of the 2001–2002 crisis in the shortcomings of India’s Kashmir strategy following the Kargil war.

Zafar Jaspal follows with a broad, historical overview of the background to the 2001–2002 crisis from a Pakistani perspective. Jaspal
explains the reasons for Pakistan’s deep insecurity vis-à-vis India. Not only is Pakistan physically smaller and militarily weaker than India; many Pakistanis fear that Indians never reconciled themselves to the partition of the subcontinent in the first place. Thus, in the Pakistani view, India does not accept the notion of a strong, independent Pakistan. Rather, successive Indian leaders and opinion makers have long sought to reduce Pakistan to the status of a vassal state. Jaspal argues that, in addition to Pakistan’s basic structural disadvantages, and the historical antagonism, a number of additional developments have heightened both the Indo-Pakistani rivalry and Pakistan’s insecurity. These include India’s vivisection of Pakistan during the Bangladesh war; India’s 1984 seizure of the Siachen Glacier in Northern Kashmir; the nuclearization of the subcontinent; the rise of Hindu-nationalist ideology in domestic Indian politics; and the budding Indo-U.S. strategic relationship.

Pakistan adopted a number of tactics to counter the existential Indian threat, including the use of nonstate actors to fan the flames of the Kashmir insurgency and undermine New Delhi’s control of J&K. Jaspal argues, however, that Pakistan is not the only state in the region to have employed such tactics; India has used nonstate actors against Pakistan as well. For example, during the Bangladesh conflict India supported Mukti Bahini rebel operations against Pakistan Army forces in East Pakistan. Even if Pakistan has taken advantage of the Kashmir insurgency, Pakistan did not singlehandedly create the rebellion, and has no designs on Indian territory. Rather, as scholars and even Indian leaders have noted, the Kashmir uprising had indigenous causes, and grew out of Kashmiris’ dissatisfaction with Indian misrule.

To counter the militant threat in Kashmir, India has sought to link its counterinsurgency efforts in J&K to the struggle against international terrorism in the post–9/11 era. New Delhi has used this nebulous connection to justify large-scale military operations designed both to crush the Kashmir rebellion and to coerce Pakistan. According to Jaspal, this rationale explains the Indian government’s decision to launch Operation Parakram in the wake of the Parliament attack. Thus, although Parakram is often characterized as India’s largest-ever military mobilization, it was far more than simply a military operation. It was a coercive instrument that emerged from a unique mixture of insecurity, longstanding antagonism, ongoing low-intensity conflict, domestic politics, and the post–9/11 global war on terrorism. The outbreak of the 2001–2002 crisis thus needs to
Introduction

be understood in this broader historical and strategic context. Future crises can be expected to bear similar traits.

What was the conventional military balance during the 2001–2002 crisis? For India, the historic isolation between its political and military leadership that had shaped India’s military posture for so long began to change after the eruption of the Kashmir insurgency. By the time of the Kargil conflict, Indian political leaders were working more closely with their military chiefs than ever before. Gurmeet Kanwal credits this growing politico-military synergy with India’s rapid eviction of intruding forces during the Kargil war. He argues, however, that in the wake of the parliament attack, cooperation between India’s political and military leaders remained episodic. Indeed, Kanwal points out that considerable evidence suggests that the Indian government did not have clear military objectives in mind when it ordered the Parakram deployment in December 2001.

Nonetheless, India’s mobilization in support of Operation Parakram was total. Defensive formations reinforced their positions by laying mines, something that had not been done since the Bangladesh war. In addition, the army cancelled all leave, closed its training establishments, conducted extensive operational familiarization exercises and wargames, and established forward ammunition points. These measures were costly. Sand and dust caused extensive damage to gun barrels, vehicle engines, and auxiliary power units; large quantities of communications cable and spare parts were consumed; and significant numbers of personnel fell victim to mine-laying mishaps, mishandling of ammunition, and vehicular accidents. Analysts put Parakram’s monetary price tag at roughly $1.5 billion.

Despite these considerable costs, India had relatively little to show for Parakram by the time the operation ended. In October 2002, the Indians demobilized without having attacked Pakistan. And although the intensity of cross-border infiltration and violence had declined, Pakistan-backed terrorism in Kashmir and India proper had by no means been eradicated. Thus Pakistan emerged from the 2001–2002 confrontation unscathed, and was able to continue to pursue its strategy of low-intensity conflict against India. The result, in Kanwal’s view, was a significant erosion of India’s diplomatic and military credibility.

What lessons emerge from India’s failure to unleash its military during the 2001–2002 crisis? Kanwal argues that Parakram’s primary lesson is that India’s offensive capabilities required an inordinately long time to prepare for war. By the time Indian strike formations
were ready to hit Pakistan, the international community, led by the United States, had exerted tremendous pressure on India's civilian leadership, convincing it to stay its hand. Therefore, in Parakram's wake, Indian military leaders concluded that they needed a doctrine that would enable them to respond quickly in the event of a future crisis. The Indian Army is currently at work on such a doctrine. Known as “Cold Start,” it would enable India to launch a large-scale attack on Pakistan, across a long but relatively shallow front, within 72–96 hours of an order to prepare to move out. India could thus respond to a future Pakistani provocation before international political pressure could stop it from doing so, and before Pakistan could ready its defenses to blunt an Indian assault. And because Cold Start does not envision deep penetration of Pakistani territory, it could also enable the Indians to attack without triggering Pakistan's nuclear thresholds. Much work remains to be done before Cold Start is operational, including the integration of air and naval power, and the creation of politico-military institutions that can function in such a fast-paced military environment. But, as Kanwal shows, such doctrinal change may enable India to respond much more aggressively to future Indo-Pakistani crises than it did during the crisis of 2001–2002. However, it is by no means clear that Pakistan would accept the envisioned military defeat without resorting to its nuclear weapons.

The 2001–2002 India-Pakistan crisis joins the Berlin crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war as a major case study in escalation management between nuclear-armed states. What lessons does the cold war nuclear experience hold for South Asia? Michael Wheeler explores American nuclear doctrine and operations during the cold war to suggest ways of increasing nuclear stability on the subcontinent. Early in the cold war, U.S. nuclear targeting focused on the Soviet military-industrial complex. This policy was based on the assumption that a war with the Soviets would be a long, drawn-out conflict like World War II. The American approach changed, however, as the Soviets acquired a nuclear capability and the United States sought to defend its European allies while preventing the outbreak of a large-scale conventional war on the Continent. In the wake of the Soviets’ 1949 nuclear test and the founding of NATO, the U.S. target list expanded to include Soviet nuclear facilities and forces, as well as conventional forces arrayed against Western Europe. The United States also significantly increased the size of its arsenal, which went from no more than 300 weapons in 1951 to over 18,000 by 1960. As Wheeler explains, it is unclear why the U.S. arsenal grew so
dramatically. He speculates that the expansion probably resulted from multiple causes, including changing nuclear doctrine, interservice rivalries, poor intelligence, and the need to demonstrate American commitment to the security of Western Europe. Regardless of its cause, Wheeler points out, this buildup was ultimately destabilizing and increased the likelihood of a U.S.-Soviet nuclear confrontation.

Why and how did the United States and the Soviet Union work to stabilize the cold war nuclear environment? Wheeler argues that the Cuban Missile Crisis played a pivotal role in pushing the rivals towards the adoption of less dangerous policies. The crisis was nearly catastrophic, combining a number of extremely destabilizing attributes, including forward deployed nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons with pre-delegated launch authority, and highly misleading intelligence. The near disaster of the missile crisis, along with the risks of an accelerating U.S.-Soviet arms race, as well as the dangers of nuclear proliferation around the globe, made clear to both sides that they had a vested interest in reducing the dangers associated with nuclear weapons. Wheeler explains that the United States and the Soviet Union undertook a number of policies that helped stabilize their nuclear relationship, such as increasing the survivability of deployed nuclear weapons, reducing the likelihood of unauthorized use, and launching a painstaking process of arms control. The latter included such measures as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty, and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

What lessons do U.S. and Soviet efforts to stabilize the cold war nuclear environment hold for South Asia? Wheeler points out that the existence of nuclear weapons on the subcontinent necessarily creates a risk of their use; no policy, no matter how enlightened, can eliminate this danger. Nonetheless, Wheeler believes that the cold war experience suggests a number of strategies that India and Pakistan could adopt to stabilize their nuclear relationship. These include actively pursuing political dialogue on the Kashmir dispute, maintaining tight political control over nuclear declaratory and employment policy, reducing the vulnerability of nuclear command and control, and devising robust physical, personnel, and cyber security measures to prevent the theft or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. Wheeler concludes by suggesting that policy makers in South Asia carefully study the Cuban Missile Crisis, which in his view offers a sobering reminder of how easily a nuclear crisis can get out of control, and how close the cold war came to ending in disaster.
The India-Pakistan Military Standoff

One lesson from the crisis drawn by Pakistan is the need to fully operationalize its nuclear forces to ensure their deterrent effect. Feroz Khan, a former Pakistan Army officer who was present at the creation of Pakistan’s emerging strategic force structure, describes how Pakistan learned from previous crises with India the futility of trying to match New Delhi’s superior conventional power. Pakistan had no choice but to resort to nuclear weapons to ensure its survival. Strategic necessity dictated the acquisition of nuclear weapons, but Pakistan was satisfied with its opaque nuclear capability until the 1998 tests removed the veil and prompted Pakistan’s military to put meat on the bones of its military nuclear capabilities. The process accelerated after the 1999 Kargil war and was well under way by 9/11, which thrust Pakistan once again into an awkward partnership with the United States. With General Musharraf at the helm after having seized power in 1999, Pakistan established several new strategic organizations to shape, manage, implement, and oversee its nuclear forces. Khan describes how these organizations addressed the fundamental issues of nuclear force planning, foremost of which was the integration of nuclear forces with Pakistan’s conventional defenses. The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) took the lead to develop operational plans for nuclear war fighting. SPD also developed safety, security, and use-control mechanisms for Pakistan’s arsenal, and provided Pakistan’s leaders with expert advice on nuclear issues. The Nuclear Command Authority represented the highest level of nuclear decision making, and it included civilian members of the government. General Musharraf made it a priority to establish strong and reliable controls over Pakistan’s nuclear program.

By the time of the 2001–2002 crisis, these new organizations had established their authority and were ready to support Pakistan’s response to India’s massive mobilization. However, Khan reports that Pakistan’s military did not view the crisis as requiring preparations for nuclear options. He disputes claims that Pakistan readied nuclear weapons during the crisis, but describes how the Indian mobilization provided useful scenarios for military planners to prepare for future crises that may require nuclear forces. Khan points out that nuclear weapons will loom large over all future crises involving India and Pakistan.

Every historic crisis has behind the scenes stories of diplomatic efforts to prevent war. Often they are full of insight and intrigue. Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon recount the U.S. reaction to the crisis and subsequent efforts to prevent the 2001–2002 standoff from
escalating. Chapter 7, “The 2001–2002 Standoff: A Real-Time View from Islamabad,” offers a first-hand, on the ground report from David Smith, who watched the crisis unfold from his post in Islamabad. In late 2001, the possibility of a major Indo-Pakistani confrontation was not a serious concern for American policy makers, who were primarily focused on the military campaign in Afghanistan. Smith sheds new light on the stark choices faced by Pakistan after 9/11 and Musharraf’s efforts to come to terms with the Bush administration’s position that you are either “with us or against us.” Although the decision to join Washington as a partner in the war on terror was made quickly, the rehabilitation of Pakistan into a major U.S. ally did not happen overnight. The imposition of the 2001–2002 crisis posed many challenges for the budding U.S.-Pakistan partnership, and involved major policy changes for both governments.

U.S. officials largely ignored an October 1 car-bomb attack on the Kashmir state assembly in Srinagar, which they viewed not as a potential precursor to serious conflict but rather as another instance of continuing terrorist violence in J&K. When terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament on December 13, however, U.S. policy makers realized that they were facing a crisis of major proportions. The Americans particularly feared that India and Pakistan’s series of rapid military moves and counter-moves could lead to a general conventional war or even to inadvertent nuclear escalation, with the two sides failing to perceive each other’s strategic redlines. In hopes of heading off such a dangerous Indo-Pakistani confrontation, President Bush called both President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee, encouraging Vajpayee to exercise patience. The United States also planned a series of visits to India and Pakistan by senior American officials, as well as foreign dignitaries from the European Union, Japan, and China, in order to help ease tensions. And the United States encouraged Musharraf to blacklist leading terrorist groups operating in Pakistan to placate the Indians. As Nayak and Krepon explain, the American goal was to “play for time,” delaying any Indian decision to attack Pakistan to the point that New Delhi would view such a move as being counterproductive. These American efforts were led primarily by Secretary of State Colin Powell and his deputy secretary Richard Armitage.

As the crisis unfolded, Washington faced a delicate balancing act. The United States needed to pressure Pakistan to demonstrably curtail its support for terrorism in order to both reduce the likelihood of an Indian attack, and demonstrate to the Indians a measure of
balance in the U.S.’ South Asia policy. At the same time, however, the United States needed to avoid pushing Islamabad so hard that such efforts would reduce Pakistani cooperation in Afghanistan and in the war on terror. Despite these dangers and difficulties, by early 2002 Washington believed the situation in South Asia was improving. In a nationally televised speech on January 12, Musharraf had promised to prevent Pakistani soil from being used by terrorist organizations. This, the Americans believed, would make it politically difficult for India to attack Pakistan in the near future; before attacking, New Delhi would now have to wait to see if Musharraf made good on his pledge. Also, in response to India’s massive mobilization, Pakistan had shifted forces from its northwest region to its border with India. This move would make an Indian strike considerably more costly than it would have been in the immediate aftermath of the parliament attack. Thus as 2002 began, it appeared to American policy makers that the likelihood of an Indo-Pakistani war was diminishing.

The May 2002 terrorist assault on the Indian Army camp at Kaluchak belied the Americans’ earlier optimism. In the wake of the attack, India completed the last preparations that it would need to launch a large-scale strike on Pakistan. Despite these developments, Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage believed that a conventional military attack would be costly for the Indians, and thus was unlikely. They worried, however, about the possibility of a nuclear confrontation, particularly given India’s and Pakistan’s recent ballistic missile tests and Pakistani warnings that it might use nuclear weapons in the face of an existential threat. Powell thus counseled the Pakistanis to cease their nuclear saber-rattling. Meanwhile, the United States evacuated nonessential personnel from its embassy in New Delhi, and advised U.S. citizens to avoid traveling to the region. Nayak and Krepon believe that this move, which threatened to impose significant financial costs on the Indians, may have encouraged New Delhi to seek a means of defusing the crisis. Many Indians and Pakistanis downplay the risk of nuclear war in 2002, and view the U.S. warnings as a calculated overreaction that was part of Washington’s efforts to cool the crisis.

Probably the most important factor in defusing this “second peak” of the 2001–2002 crisis was Musharraf’s promise in early June to Armitage that Pakistan would permanently cease cross-border terrorism in Kashmir. After extracting the pledge from Musharraf in Islamabad, Armitage travelled to New Delhi, where he relayed it to
Indian leaders. According to our authors, the news of Musharraf’s promise had a significant effect on the Indians. By affording the Indians an apparent diplomatic victory, the pledge enabled Indian leaders to extract themselves from the 2001–2002 crisis without having to fight a war. The Indians did not attack Pakistan in the coming months, and in October 2002 New Delhi called Operation Parakram to a peaceful conclusion.

Few would characterize American efforts to mediate the 2001–2002 crisis as an unqualified success. The Americans were not able to prevent Pakistan from redeploying troops from the Afghan frontier, where they could support U.S. operations in Afghanistan, to the Indo-Pakistani border. Also, the Indians and Pakistanis viewed Musharraf’s June 2002 pledge differently. For example, Vajpayee subsequently claimed that the Pakistanis had promised not only to end cross-border terrorism, but also to shut down militant training camps. Musharraf, for his part, denied making any such commitment, and said that he could not guarantee an end to all militant violence. Nevertheless, India’s decision not to attack Pakistan probably resulted mainly from the fact that the Indians simply did not want war, and not primarily due to astute American diplomacy or fear of nuclear retaliation. India’s own interests and limitations made it prudent to avoid a confrontation that would have taken a significant human toll and badly harmed U.S. interests in Afghanistan.

Nayak and Krepon suggest a number of lessons that arise from the 2001–2002 crisis, including the need for ongoing high-level U.S. attention to South Asia; the need for better military-to-military contact between India and Pakistan; the need to work with other governments, including members of the UN Security Council, in pursuing stability in South Asia; and the importance of personal relationships to crisis diplomacy on the subcontinent. Smith adds additional lessons learned by the three governments, some of which may not bode well for the next crisis. For example, as Indian leaders understand the political and military advantages of rapid mobilization, the next crisis may unfold much more quickly, leaving less time for the United States or others to intervene. Conversely, the Pakistanis learned that their own mobilization capabilities enable them to blunt any Indian offensive. And while many Indians and Pakistanis still dismiss the risk that the 2002 crisis could have escalated to a nuclear exchange, they are united in their belief that their nuclear weapons deter one another from taking precipitous actions such as those that brought them to the brink in 2002.
How can we minimize the likelihood of confrontations similar to the 2001–2002 crisis in years to come? The final chapter looks to the future. Naeem Salik argues that the key to avoiding such future confrontations is a process of meaningful political dialogue between India and Pakistan. Salik maintains that such political dialogue requires a foundation of robust confidence building, nuclear risk reduction, and arms control measures. Because of India and Pakistan’s historical mistrust of one another, Salik believes that the two sides must undertake CBMs first. Only then will risk reduction and arms control agreements be a realistic possibility.

Unfortunately, as Salik explains, India and Pakistan have a “checkered” history regarding CBMs. This is due largely to widespread skepticism about their effectiveness. As numerous analysts have pointed out, CBMs cannot operate in a vacuum, and require a larger context of political cooperation to be effective. Also, CBMs have often failed in South Asia. For example, Salik claims that despite an Indo-Pakistani agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear installations, India in 1988 planned to strike Pakistani nuclear facilities, and was stopped only by stern warnings from Pakistani officials. Also, despite a commitment at the 1999 Lahore summit to peacefully resolve any Indo-Pakistani disputes, Pakistan launched large-scale incursions into Indian territory in the Kargil sector of Kashmir. Salik argues, however, that despite these problems CBMs can be useful. They have helped to avoid conflicts in the past through such practices as prior notification of major military exercises. And they can be more effective in the future if they are embraced by Indians and Pakistanis in the way that they have come to terms with concepts such as deterrence. Also, Salik points out that CBMs are considerably easier to negotiate and implement than formal arms control agreements.

Like CBMs, India and Pakistan’s accomplishments in the area of nuclear risk reduction have also been modest. As Salik explains, the concept is new to South Asia; neither India nor Pakistan was anxious to discuss nuclear risk reduction before testing and openly declaring their nuclear capabilities. Thus, prior to 1998, the only Indo-Pakistani nuclear risk reduction measure was an agreement that the two countries would not attack each other’s nuclear facilities. Salik argues, however, that the 1998 tests, by bringing India and Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities into the open, removed a significant impediment to nuclear risk reduction on the subcontinent. Since then, the two sides have taken a number of steps towards the reduction of nuclear danger. For example, the Memorandum of Understanding that emerged from
the Lahore summit promulgated several measures directly related to risk reduction, including bilateral consultations on nuclear doctrines; advance notice of ballistic missile tests; the adoption of policies to prevent accidental or unauthorized launch; a moratorium on nuclear testing; and bilateral consultations on security, disarmament, and nonproliferation issues. Thus, in Salik’s view, the future of nuclear risk reduction in South Asia is probably brighter than its past. Progress on this front, however, has been meager.

Salik turns next to the subject of nuclear arms control. He explains that arms control traditionally got little traction in South Asia because proponents focused primarily on the goal of nuclear disarmament. Since the 1998 tests, however, India and Pakistan have taken a more pragmatic approach, shifting their focus to defining the requirements of “minimum deterrence” in South Asia rather than global disarmament. Thus, in the post-test environment, Salik believes that arms control has significant potential to contribute to regional stability.

In conclusion, Salik suggests additional means for improving the South Asian nuclear environment, including upgrading the hotline between India’s and Pakistan’s military leaders, and more consistent implementation of existing CBMs. In Salik’s view, with robust political backing, these and other measures can make Indo-Pakistani nuclear relations considerably more stable than they are at present.

Several overarching insights emerge from this collection of essays. First, the 2001–2002 crisis was a symptom of a much larger historical and political problem—the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir. The potential for confrontations like 2001–2002 will remain as long as the Kashmir problem remains unresolved. Second, even if Kashmir were to be settled, regional issues such as their respective relations with Afghanistan and China, global issues such as energy and environment, and the unknown challenges ahead are likely to reignite tensions between India and Pakistan. Longstanding patterns of conflict will not help either country succeed in the coming years. Third, although nuclear weapons can create incentives for cautious crisis behavior, they do not sweep away the sources of conflict, even while threatening to make confrontations like 2001–2002 catastrophically costly. Mistakes and misperceptions about one’s own forces and those of your opponent can lead to nuclear escalation—even if neither side desires such an outcome. Deterrence in South Asia has significant shortcomings. Fourth, timely third-party mediation can help to defuse crises like 2001–2002, giving the parties an opportunity to back away from confrontations. Despite their distaste for it, American
intervention remains a key component of crisis management for New Delhi and Islamabad. Fifth, confidence building, nuclear risk reduction, and arms control are in a relatively early state in South Asia. But after the 1998 nuclear tests, such approaches hold greater promise and have become more urgent.

Careful attention to these points will not, of course, guarantee that a nuclear South Asia will enjoy a more stable future. It may, however, inform our thinking about ways to reduce the likelihood that confrontations like the 2001–2002 crisis will erupt in the first place, and inspire creative ways to prevent such conflicts from escalating into major wars if they do occur.

NOTES

Part I

The Historical and Political Background of the Crisis
Then came the Kargil Operation with all its reality and distortions. It proved a lesson to the Indians and a rude awakening to the world of the reality of Kashmir.

President Pervez Musharraf

Now that he has written his memoirs, we know what General Pervez Musharraf made of the “reality of Kashmir” in the months after he took power. What he did not see was that Pakistan was dangerously close to losing its long-running subconventional war in Kashmir, a war of which, in Musharraf’s strategic vision, Kargil was only a part.

How had this come about? In popular imagination, the months between war and near-war was a time of triumphal somnolence, a period in which India made only episodic and disjointed efforts to push forward the peace process in Kashmir. In reality, the period was one of intense and carefully wrought political activity in Kashmir, of which the near-war was in important ways a consequence. Using the leverage it obtained through its war victory, New Delhi hoped to defeat Pakistan in the larger war over Kashmir as well. Although the National Democratic Alliance had been reelected to power in the national elections held in 1999, it had seen its vote share diminish, despite its war record. One statistical analysis has shown that had the opposition Congress party not suffered a split in the single state of Maharashtra, it and not the Bharatiya Janata Party would most likely have led whatever coalition in New Delhi. To the government in New Delhi, the fact that Pakistan had apparently been tamed—and
was, moreover, in a considerable state of domestic ferment following the October 1999 coup that deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif—seemed to offer the opportunity to secure a historic outcome in Kashmir.

India’s post-Kargil response to the continuing war in Kashmir can be likened to a two-legged stool. The first pillar of this process was New Delhi’s effort to engage the largest terrorist group in Kashmir, the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin (HuM), in a dialogue. This manifested itself in a brief declaration of cease-fire by the HuM in 2000, and its five-month-long reciprocation by India. Officially described as a Non-Initiation of Combat Operations, India advertised the cease-fire as a gesture made in observance of the month of Ramzan, sacred to Muslims. The second pillar of Indian strategy sought to give the Ramzan cease-fire political meaning by engaging political secessionists within Kashmir. Together, these two elements constituted what I call the Ramzan process. What the Ramzan process lacked, I shall suggest, was the proverbial third leg of the stool—a means to deal with Pakistan; more specifically, Pakistan’s willingness to escalate violence in Kashmir to dangerous and possibly war-inducing levels, despite its recent defeat in Kargil. This failure, I argue, was eventually to drive India and Pakistan into the near-war of 2001–2002.

This chapter traces the course of the Ramzan process and the multiple crises it confronted—crises that would eventually lead to the near-war crisis of 2001–2002. The first of these is the Ramzan cease-fire itself, the decisive moment when for the first time the Union of India talked directly—in public, at least—to a terrorist group in Kashmir. I trace the multiple circumstances that led the HuM to engage in a dialogue with New Delhi, and the internal strains that eventually led it to resile from the decision. The second part addresses the political circumstances on which the Ramzan process was founded, that is the division within the Hurriyat among rejectionists, hardliners—who believed that terrorist violence would eventually push India to make concessions that currently seemed unimaginable—and pro-dialogue realists, who felt the time had come to drop maximalist demands and engage with what New Delhi was willing to bring to the table. The third and fourth parts of the chapter address Pakistan’s response to this challenge to its leverage in Kashmir, in the form of an escalation of the war within the state to unprecedented levels. Finally, I outline the circumstances that led to the dissolution of the Ramzan process—and India’s decision to mass its armies along its frontiers with Pakistan.
Some caveats to this chapter, I believe, need to be stated up-front. Little open-source substantiation exists for those parts of my narrative that deal with the internal workings of jihadist groups, as well as the Indian and Pakistani intelligence services. Much of the material used here was first gathered during my work as a journalist. I have avoided the practice of attributing information to anonymous sources, as I believe it adds nothing to the credibility of my information; this would only serve to give a spurious air of authority to the material that will be disproved if and when archival resources and the accounts of primary participants from both countries become available. Where possible, I have cited classified documents I have obtained, and written about, earlier. The violence-related data that I have used is also based on classified internal figures generated by the Indian Union Ministry of Home Affairs, where raw reports compiled by the government of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) are both audited for accuracy and adjusted to compensate for various methodological problems in reporting, often legal in nature. This data varies marginally from the data released annually by the Union Home Ministry; I have chosen to use it as it offers considerably greater detail than the published data, and thus enables more accurate conclusions to be drawn.

Finally, a note: I have referred to the Indian state of J&K in this chapter as Kashmir. While the name J&K more accurately reflects the multiethnic and multireligious character of the state, I have used the term Kashmir for ease of reading.

**TALKING TO TERROR**

By the account of the friends of the HuM commander Abdul Majid Dar, the Ramzan cease-fire of 2000 was of divine provenance. Standing before the Kaaba, the black rock that forms the centerpiece of the Haj pilgrimage, Majid Dar had a vision of the suffering that a decade of terror had inflicted on Kashmir and was as a result moved to work towards bringing peace.3

For those dissatisfied with this god-did-it narration of events, little is on offer about the precise sequence of events leading to the Ramzan cease-fire. None of the key participants have either confirmed or denied the various accounts of its genesis that have appeared in media accounts. Its broad contours, however, seem clear. In early 2000, Ghulam Mohammad Bhat, the *amir* of the Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir, made contact with Majid Dar. The two conducted their dialogue both in the United Arab Emirates, where Majid Dar’s wife worked...
as a doctor, and in Saudi Arabia, using the Haj pilgrimage as cover. Soon after, G. M. Bhat and intermediaries from the ethnic-Kashmiri diaspora initiated contact with the government of India. A. S. Dulat, the head of India’s external intelligence service, the Research and Analysis wing, played a key role in this early dialogue, along with Brajesh Mishra, the principal secretary to Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. Events moved rapidly, and, in April 2000, Majid Dar flew into Kashmir through Kathmandu and New Delhi, after guarantees of safe passage and protection were provided by the government of India.

Back in the Kashmir valley after several years, Dar set about making allies at two distinct levels. First, he sounded out key HuM field commanders on how they would respond to a political engagement with the government of India. Two powerful commanders, Masood Tantrey and Khurshid Ahmad Zargar, were particularly receptive to the idea; none voiced outright opposition to it. At the same time, key figures in the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, a platform for several major secessionist organizations, were sounded out on their position. Two centrists in the Hurriyat, Abdul Gani Bhat and Abdul Gani Lone, proved supportive of the proposal for a cease-fire. Syed Ali Shah Geelani, a hardline Islamist who served as the Jamaat-e-Islami’s representative in the Hurriyat, was less enthusiastic. After some persuasion, however, he agreed to go along with Majid Dar’s proposals, although it is unclear whether he knew of his amir’s role in shaping them.

On July 24, 2000, Majid Dar summoned a small group of journalists to a safehouse in Srinagar, and announced that the HuM would observe a three-month unilateral cease-fire. He said the organization had decided to do so to “dispel Indian propaganda that we are terrorists, rather than a people fighting for our birthright, freedom.” He laid down few preconditions: the cease-fire was subject to the cessation of Indian violence against civilians and political activists; the use of the cease-fire by India as a “tactical weapon” for propaganda, he added, would subvert its purpose. Significantly, Majid Dar let it be known that the HuM was open to the Hurriyat engaging New Delhi in a direct dialogue. “Let them talk to anybody,” he said, “the aim of the exercise should be to resolve the issue amicably, through a dialogue without preconditions.” The HuM itself, Dar continued, would encourage politicians from India and abroad to visit Kashmir, and begin a dialogue with its people. Conscious of the reaction that his statement was likely to provoke from jihadist groups with large
numbers of Pakistani nationals among their ranks, Dar described their cadres as “our brothers who have come to our help.” “Once the problem is resolved amicably and peace is restored,” Dar concluded, “they will return peacefully.”

Events, however, were not to proceed quite as smoothly as Dar’s tone may have suggested. In retrospect, it would seem Dar’s press conference was something of a political coup, an attempt to seize the political high ground by surprise. Indian signals intercepts make clear that some elements within the HuM were startled by the declaration—or were determined to sabotage it, believing it did not have the sanction of their Muzaffarabad-based *amir*, Mohammad Yusuf Shah (widely known by his *nom de guerre*, Syed Salahuddin). On the morning of July 25, the HuM deputy chief, Ghulam Nabi Khan, who would soon represent Shah at the organization’s first and only official meeting with Indian officials, called for an escalation of the jihad, using his normal code-name, Khalid Saifullah. His calls were soon joined by a Nasr-ul-Islam, a commander of the HuM–Pir Panjal Regiment, a sister organization that operates mainly in the Jammu region. It was only late on July 25, 2000, that the HuM control station in Muzaffarabad transmitted signals to its field stations D2 and D3, announcing a unilateral cease-fire. Even three days later, station 14, which serviced the HuM’s Rajouri and Poonch operations, told field units there that some 1,000 *sathies* (helpers) would soon be sent across the Line of Control (LOC).5

Majid Dar, it seems likely, aimed to force both Pakistan and the jihadist groups directed by its intelligence services into accepting a cease-fire, without India first agreeing to their presence in the negotiation room. While there is no hard evidence to support the proposition that Pakistan was taken by surprise, the proposition is borne out by several events. Majid Dar’s announcement, and Shah’s subsequent endorsement of the cease-fire, were blacked out on Pakistani television. The United Jihad Council, a coalition of 14 Pakistan-based terrorist groups operating in Kashmir, moreover, promptly removed Shah from his position as its chief, and demanded that the HuM immediately withdraw the cease-fire. Shah was deemed a traitor to the cause and was widely condemned in Pakistan.6 Jihadist reaction to the cease-fire was not restricted to polemic. The Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Jamait-ul-Mujaheddin, and the al-Umar Mujaheddin, all members of the United Jihad Council, jointly claimed credit for a series of six bomb blasts in Srinagar, which they said had been executed to protest the cease-fire.7
Still in the diplomatic doghouse after Kargil, Pakistan was in no position to oppose the cease-fire in public; just in March 2000, after all, it been subjected to the unpleasant experience of President Bill Clinton spending five days in India on an official visit, and stopping in Pakistan for just a few hours on his way home. Pakistan would, however, fight by proxy. In the days to come, jihadist attacks on the cease-fire would gain intensity. Starting from the night of August 1, jihadist groups carried out a series of mass killings intended to force India to resume offensive operations against the HuM. One hundred civilians, mostly members of religious minorities in Kashmir and also some Muslims, were killed in the first wave of attacks. Such attacks had taken place with depressing regularity in Kashmir, but in their sheer scale and brutality, the massacres of August 1 were unprecedented. Other outrages soon followed. After a series of killings in the mountain districts, particularly in Doda, the Indian government was forced to impose the Disturbed Areas Act, a legislation that gives the armed forces extensive special powers, to the provinces of Jammu and Ladakh. While the legislative measure had limited ground-level impact, since armed forces had long operated against terrorists in these areas, it did serve to illustrate just how much pressure the jihadi groups had been able to mount—and how difficult it was becoming for the National Democratic Alliance government in New Delhi to continue with a peace process in the face of this unrelenting assault.

For the moment, however, New Delhi chose to ride out the jihadist offensive, and continued to voice its commitment to the Ramzan cease-fire. The Hurriyat, however, displayed less conviction, and soon backed out of an agreement its leaders had themselves endorsed—albeit not in public. On July 28, just days after the United Jihad Council voiced its ire, the Hurriyat put out a press release describing the cease-fire as “a step taken in haste.” “The Hizb leadership,” it argued, echoing the language used by the rejectionist constituents of the United Jihad Council, “has also failed to perceive the Indian machinations and cunning behaviour that has always been there to divide Kashmiri opinion on issues like this.” At the same time, however, the Hurriyat insisted that the dispute on Kashmir “should be resolved through peaceful means, to ensure the prosperity of the region.” This last formulation points us to the twin meanings of the Hurriyat position. If the rejectionists grouped around Geelani objected to the Ramzan cease-fire on first principles, the realists had their own set of concerns, notably that a dialogue carried out in these...
circumstances would accord primacy to the HuM itself, and not to the politicians who claimed to speak for the armed struggle.

From the point of view of both the Hurriyat’s realists and the central HuM command, Majid Dar’s choice of Fazl-ul-Haq Qureshi, his old comrade in arms in Tehreek Jihad-e-Islami, posed a particular problem. A long-standing participant in anti-India terrorist activity in Kashmir, Qureshi had served as a member of the Master Cell and the al-Fatah, two groups that operated in the 1960s and 1970s. In September 1974 he, along with Farooq Rehmani and Nazir Ahmad Wani, formed the People’s League to continue the anti-India struggle. Bruised by its defeat in the India-Pakistan war of 1971, Pakistan’s covert services were less than enthused by this enterprise, whose leaders they believed to be *agents provocateurs*. As early as 1979, the People’s League’s leadership had formulated a three-year plan for an uprising against Indian rule in Kashmir. Pakistan, its attention focused on the growing anti-Soviet Islamist campaign in Afghanistan, remained skeptical. In 1988, the then-People’s League chief Abdul Aziz Sheikh finally returned to Kashmir from Pakistan, and began raising cadre for armed action. Later the same year, however, the League broke into two units, with a onetime Hurriyat executive member, Shabbir Shah, and S. Hamid forming the now-defunct Muslim Janbaaz Force. Sheikh and Mohammad Farooq Rehmani, for their part, set up the Tehreek Jihad-e-Islami. It was an ill-fated move, for Pakistan threw its weight behind the HuM, and both Shah and Rehmani found themselves militarily marginalized. Under similar pressure from Pakistan’s covert services, much of the Tehreek Jihad-e-Islami cadre joined the HuM; Qureshi and Rehmani stoically distanced themselves from the proceedings.

Given his political roots then, Qureshi was viewed with suspicion by both the rejectionists as well as the realists, to both of whom he was a direct political competitor. Given his decision to keep his distance from the HuM, it seems reasonable to speculate that Qureshi had few friends in Pakistan’s Kashmir-policy establishment. Majid Dar’s decision not to conduct his negotiations through the Hurriyat made matters all the more difficult, since Pakistan at least had some leverage over that organization—but none over Qureshi. All of this sharpened the dilemma for the strategists of its war in Kashmir. While Pakistan did not wish to be seen as a spoiler, it was precipitously close to losing all control over the war it had invested so much in. When the August 1 massacres failed to derail the cease-fire, however, direct Pakistani intervention became inevitable. Even as the HuM delegation
met India’s home secretary, Kamal Pande, for talks in Srinagar on August 3, its amir, Shah, was being pressured to announce an August 8 deadline for the inclusion of Pakistan in Majid Dar, significantly, stayed away from this meeting; he perhaps understood that a crisis was imminent, and did not wish to be a party to what would follow.

In the event, little took place at the meeting. Both sides’ representatives agreed that the HuM’s demand for the release of prisoners, as well as a cutback in search-and-cordon operations, would be considered by their principles before a second round of talks was held on August 7. Even as the negotiators were leaving the meeting, however, the HuM’s central command made public its August 8 deadline for the inclusion of Pakistan in the talks. Political dialogue, he said, executing a neat volte-face, had to precede an end to hostilities. Qureshi attempted to persuade Shah to extend the deadline, but to little effect. Meanwhile, under pressure from the right wing in his own party, which was incensed by the August 1 massacres, Prime Minister Vajpayee was forced to announce in parliament that any negotiations would be held within the framework of the Indian constitution—something that ruled out even the theoretical possibility of a territorial compromise. Unsurprisingly, the second round of talks were never held.

At 5:35 p.m. on August 8, 2000, Indian signals intelligence began jamming the half-dozen frequencies used by the HuM. Five minutes earlier, Mohammad Yusuf Shah had announced that the cease-fire his organization had announced a fortnight earlier had come to an end. India, however, would renew its commitment not to engage in offensive operations against terrorist groups three times through the coming year, hoping against hope that something could be salvaged from the ruins of the Ramzan cease-fire.

THE POLITICS OF THE CEASE-FIRE

If the Ramzan cease-fire constituted one key element of Indian policy after the 1999 war, the second thrust was an effort to initiate a dialogue with the Hurriyat. The architects of New Delhi’s Kashmir policy hoped that stripping jihadist violence of its political legitimacy—that is, the demand for the secession of the state from the Indian union—would help contain Pakistan’s continued post-Kargil ability to shape the course of events.

Two key events took place on either side of the initiation of the Ramzan cease-fire: the media noted both events, but their import was
little understood. On July 20, 2000, a little over four weeks before the cease-fire was announced, the Hurriyat elected as its leader the Muslim Conference leader Abdul Gani Bhat. Then, at an August 28 meeting of the Majlis-e-Numaidgan held shortly after the cease-fire came into force, the 90-member “house of representatives” of the Jamaat-e-Islami reelected Ghulam Mohammad Bhat their amir. He defeated Muhammad Ashraf Sehrai, who was Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s protégé and nominee. Just one member of the Majlis-e-Numaidgan voted for Geelani himself to be elevated from political chief of the organization to its overall leader. Ghulam Qadar Lone, a pro-dialogue figure, was made head of the Jamaat-e-Islami’s political bureau, giving him, in theory at least, the right to displace Geelani as its representative in the Hurriyat executive.

Both political events marked a triumph for the realists. While the Hurriyat had long been due to nominate a replacement for Geelani, whose term as chairman had expired, the fact that a series of meetings scheduled to do so were postponed suggests that rejectionists understood which way the wind was blowing. While Bhat’s political organization itself had little power, and even less influence on jihadist organizations, his nomination had considerable symbolic value. On April 18, 1999, the traditionally pro-Pakistan Islamist had called for a dialogue with mainstream political parties, a process he hoped would enable “the lasting resolution to the dispute in accordance with the aims and aspirations of the people.” All sections of Kashmir’s society, Bhat argued, had to be involved in “initiating a genuine political activity.” “If [former chief minister] Ghulam Mohammad Shah, Mohammad Sayeed and Mehbooba Sayeed [both then Congress leaders], and for that matter even [the communist leader] Mohammad Yusuf Tarigami and National Conference are interested in the resolution of the dispute, we should rise to the occasion and address the issue.” Whatever consensus was arrived at, he continued, would constitute the will of Kashmir’s people.

Abdul Ghani Bhat’s proposals marked an almost heretical break with the Hurriyat’s long-standing rejection of mainstream democratic politics, and its central dogma that no final solution of the dispute on Kashmir could be made outside the mechanism of negotiations involving itself, India, and Pakistan. In a key sense, Bhat was responding to grassroots pressures. During the first half of April 1999, the Hurriyat had been shaken by the success of a state-wide agitation against new taxes, led by the People’s Forum for Justice (PFJ). Made up of urban traders, transport-business owners, lawyers and
government employees—in other words, the Hurriyat’s core constituency—the PFJ challenged the secessionist platform’s assumption that economic issues were a diversion from its core business of fighting for Kashmir’s freedom. A democratically elected government had been in power in Kashmir since 1996, able to use the resources of the state to patronize supporters and punish opponents. Without political influence, the Hurriyat’s constituencies found themselves at the losing end of the new political game. Unless it could reinvent its position, it seemed, the Hurriyat had a real threat of becoming irrelevant. It needed to find ways of engaging with day-to-day political realities, with the problems of Kashmiris rather than the problem of Kashmir alone, or risk losing its oppositional space to new entrants. To be able to engage with these issues, quite obviously, it also needed to find space for itself on the mainstream political stage.

Ghulam Mohammad Bhat’s reelection as the Jamaat-e-Islami’s amir illustrated the workings of other ground-level political pressures for peace. As early as November 14, 1998, G. M. Bhat had proclaimed his party’s decision to sunder linkages with terrorist groups, specifically the HuM. He based his decision on the costs of confrontation with the Indian security establishment for the Jamaat-e-Islami’s rank-and-file. Over 2,000 Jamaat workers, he claimed, had been murdered as part of a “systematic campaign to finish our party.” This policy, G. M. Bhat continued, was profoundly misplaced, for the Jamaat had “nothing to do with militancy.” “If a picture showing Syed Salahuddin shaking hands with Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami chief Qazi Hussain Ahmad is published, one should not find fault with us,” he complained. Bhat sought to legitimize his position by reference to the organization’s until-then secret Constitution, which obliged it not to use means “which contribute to strife on earth.” The party, he pointed out, had contested the elections of 1987 as a constituent of the Muslim United Front. Had those elections not been rigged, he argued, Kashmir’s recent history would have been “very different.” While Bhat did not expressly assert that a fair election might therefore constitute a way out of the crisis, he made clear that the Jamaat-e-Islami would now seek to resolve the crisis in Kashmir through “amicable means.”

Unsurprisingly, the rejectionists were incensed by G. M. Bhat’s decision to break ranks with the HuM. Speaking for the rejectionists, Geelani claimed Bhat did not have the support of his own party cadre, and reiterated his “full support for the armed struggle.” Bhat’s claims to have spoken for the entire Jamaat cadre, Geelani
wrote acidly in a public statement, were “far from being true.” “I strongly refute and contradict the views expressed by Bhat at the press conference,” he proclaimed. Such open disputation of the amir’s authority was unprecedented. What is clear, however, is that this confrontation had been brewing for at least some months, during which Bhat had been calling for an end to Kashmir’s “gun culture.” The remark was made in the course of an interview to a Srinagar-based magazine, shortly after Bhat was released from jail in October and installed as the Jamaat chief. G M. Bhat had argued that although he believed the armed struggle was itself legitimate, it was a response to a specific phase in the secessionist movement, and had now “served its purpose.” The sole prospect of an end to violence in Kashmir, he asserted, was a “political dialogue.”

HuM leaders pushing for a dialogue in New Delhi, it seems probable in this context, were responding to signals from Srinagar. The organization’s relationship with Jamaat-e-Islami cadre, of whom many were unwilling to sacrifice either their lives or core proselytizing agenda for a post-dated promise of liberation from India, had become increasingly fragile. HuM commanders in the field were feeling the pressures that this loss of over-ground supporters imposed. Pakistani cadre from organizations such as the Harkat-ul-Ansar, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Jaish-e-Mohammad had, in some areas, displaced the HuM from its position of primacy. Pushed to the edge by the twin pressures of the Jamaat-e-Islami’s retreat and the Pakistanis’ ascendancy, HuM commanders such as Ghulam Nabi Khan were rumored to have opened lines of communications with both the National Conference and the People’s Democratic Party. To add to the HuM’s troubles, its leadership in Muzaffarabad was anything but united. Rifts had started showing up in the once-monolithic body, with its supreme commander pitted against second-rung leaders such as Ghulam Nabi Nowsheri and Ghulam Rasool Dar. Given the high rate of attrition of HuM commanders in the field, few second-rung leaders wished to leave the safety of Muzaffarabad for Kashmir; many responded to orders from Shah with acid suggestions that he lead the battle from the front.

In essence, then, the HuM had the choice of responding to the multiple sources of pressure upon it, or to watch its field commanders strike independent deals with diverse players in Kashmir. Indeed, the fact that G. M. Bhat was not assassinated or even threatened for his decision to distance the Jamaat-e-Islami from the HuM illustrates that the move towards dialogue had support within the terrorist
group. Days before the Ramzan cease-fire came into place, the amir-e-Jamaat again reiterated his position. This time, he was more explicit in his formulations. Talks between the Union Government and groups in Kashmir, Bhat asserted, had a “bright future.” This was because, he argued, “even when armies fight, the problem has to be solved at a political level.” There was, he concluded, “no solution through guns, and no alternative to dialogue.” Yet, one issue remained unaddressed: just who was to do the talking? As the positions of both the HuM and the Hurriyat show, neither was opposed to engagement with the government of India. Yet, it would soon become apparent that the HuM did not wish to be spoken for the Hurriyat—and that the Hurriyat, equally, was unwilling to relinquish its claims to speak for the armed struggle.

A peculiar situation had thus arisen: a dialogue intended to end armed violence had ended up convincing political secessionists that the continued use of gun was, in fact, their only guarantee of relevance. Were it to be silenced, both realists and rejectionists would, after all, lose their right to speak for it.

THE WAR AFTER THE WAR

Jihadists in Pakistan had no intention of silencing their guns. In February 2000, at a rally in Islamabad’s Aabpara square, the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s overall head, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, proclaimed that the jihad in Kashmir had reached a new stage. Kargil, Saeed proclaimed, had been the first component of this new campaign; a wave of fidayeen attacks that the organization had unleashed on major security and civilian installations was the second. “Very soon,” he promised, “we will be launching a third round.” His deputy, Abdul Rahman Makki, announced that the Lashkar would soon initiate operations in Hyderabad, a city claimed by Pakistan’s Islamist right-wing to have been seized illegally by Indian forces from its Muslim monarch in 1948. A string of similar statements had emanated from jihadists in Pakistan ever since the Kargil war. In December 1999, Saeed had told an interviewer that Kashmir was “only our base camp.” “The real war,” he asserted, “will be inside… Very soon we will enter India via Doda and unfurl the Islamic flag on the Red Fort.”

Indian security analysts took Saeed seriously, and with good reason. Pakistani defeat in the Kargil war had not meant the beginning of peace in Kashmir. Indian security force fatalities—a category that includes regular soldiers, paramilitary personnel, police, and irregulars
fighting, as it were, on the same team—had been in decline ever since 1996. The year 1999, however, had witnessed the highest levels of Indian force fatalities ever seen in the course of the Kashmir conflict, 555—a figure excluding troops lost in the war itself. Indian security force fatalities rose again in 2000, to 638, and to 706 in 2001. One particular source of concern for Indian military planners was that the ratio of terrorists killed to security force personnel lost fell to a record low in 1999, to just over 2:1. Although this ratio recovered somewhat in subsequent years, to the vicinity of 3:1, this was still lower than in the pre-Kargil period. What the figures meant was simple: India was facing better armed and trained terrorist cadre than had been seen prior to the Kargil war, and in greater numbers.

How had this come about? Part of the reason was, of course, that counterterrorist deployments had been disturbed in 1999, a dislocation from which Indian security forces took some time to recover. Yet, it seems likely that the moment of crisis could have yielded such dividends to Pakistan without careful preparation. Notably, the buildup to the Kargil war saw a significant increase in the numbers of terrorists of foreign origin—a term used by Indian officials to denote individuals from Pakistan-administered Kashmir, Pakistan itself, as well as from Afghanistan, and elsewhere in West and Central Asia, as

![Figure 1.1](image_url)  
Figure 1.1 Security Force Fatalities
opposed to Indian-administered Kashmir. Although we have no way, of course, of accurately determining the numbers of foreign terrorists operating in Kashmir, it seems reasonable to argue that the numbers killed by Indian forces would provide at least an indicative guide to their prevalence. In 1996, 194 of 1,313 terrorists killed were of foreign origin; by 1998, over a third of all terrorists killed, 394 of 1,111, had their origins to the west of the LoC.

Many of these foreign terrorists had combat experience in Afghanistan and elsewhere; unlike terrorists with families and futures on the Indian side of the LoC, they had no interest in a détente process. The large-scale increase in their numbers lends itself to the proposition that their presence was key to the escalation of conflict within Kashmir after the Kargil war. While we cannot say for certain just how many foreign jihadists may have been operating in Kashmir at any time, it is possible to demonstrate this increase using available empirical material. Killings of foreign terrorists by Indian forces registered a significant increase from 1999 onwards. A total of 348 foreign terrorists died in combat that year, followed by 403 in 2000, 488 in 2001, and 516 in 2002—a year when Pakistan had good reason to believe it could soon be at war in India. Foreign terrorists, a relatively marginal component of terrorist cadre in Kashmir in early years, had
thus come to constitute over a third of their strength, as measured by relative fatalities. Indian politicians and officials have often exaggerated the foreign component of terrorist cadre active in Kashmir; one senior Border Security Force (BSF) official asserted in 2003, for example, that it stood at 75 percent. Nonetheless, the demonstrable increase in numbers after 1996 casts some light on the increasing ferocity of conflict after the Kargil war.

It is interesting to consider the impact the rapid growth of the presence of foreigners may have had on the ability of terrorists to sustain violence levels through the Ramzan cease-fire, notwithstanding the decision of parts of the HuM to end hostilities. In purely military terms, as I have noted earlier in this chapter, India’s experience of the cease-fire was far from happy. During its five-month course, the numbers of violent incidents actually increased, in comparison with the same months of 1999–2000 and 1998–1999. Although the overall numbers of killings declined marginally, this was largely a consequence of the fact that Indian forces had been ordered to stop initiating offensive operations. Killings of civilians, a key means through which terrorist groups exercise political authority, actually increased. A measure intended to bring peace to Kashmir had, in the short term at least, succeeded in realizing precisely the opposite
outcome. Terrorist groups were more than able to compensate for
the divisions between the pro-dialogue and rejectionist command-
ers of the HuM—and to thus demonstrate that Pakistan was well-
equipped to undermine the peace process unless it was present at the
table.

How did rejectionist terrorist groups succeed in keeping military
pressure on India, despite the neutralization of a significant section of
the HuM? One problem with India’s engagement with the pro-dia-
logue faction of the HuM may have been that it overestimated the fis-
sures between foreign terrorists and those of ethnic-Kashmiri origin.
Broadly, policy makers in New Delhi assumed that a dialogue process
would create a polarization between mainly ethnic-Kashmiri organi-
zations, such as the HuM, and those made up of greater numbers
of Pakistani nationals, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad,
Harkat-ul-Mujaheddin, and Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami. In turn, some
Indian strategists believed, this fracture along ethnic and national
lines would strip these jihadi groups of the local infrastructure and
support they needed to operate, as well as their legitimacy as repre-
sentatives of popular sentiment in Kashmir. Yet, the escalation of vi-
olence during the cease-fire period made clear that these rejectionist
groups had, over the years, acquired the personnel and the resources
they needed to operate independently.

![Figure 1.4 Increasing Violence During Peace Talks](image-url)
Examples of the diffusion of lines between Islamist groups on ground are not hard to come by. Inayatullah Khan, a Pakistani national who operated using the *nom de guerre* Bilal-e-Habshi, commanded both Lashkar-e-Taiba and HuM units in the Budgam-Beerwah area over a period of seven years before his eventual elimination in December 2003. If Inayatullah Khan led mainly ethnic Kashmiris, his onetime comrade at arms, Abdul Hamid Gada, occupied the reverse position. Foreign terrorists played a key role in Gada’s operations, notably in the execution of a mass killing of 23 Pandits, 9 of them women and 4 young children, at Wandhama. Pakistan nationals working for groups other than the HuM also cooperated closely with its cadre. Mohammad Suhail Malik, a Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorist charged with having participated in the massacre of 36 Sikh villagers at Chattisinghpura, told his interrogators of one earlier joint action with the HuM. On that occasion, Malik, along with four other Lashkar terrorists, joined two Pakistan-national members of the HuM to ambush a civilian bus hired to carry army personnel. Ethnic Kashmiri cadre of the HuM followed the movements of the bus and alerted the ambush unit of its arrival.

Pakistan had an army, therefore, which it could use to undermine India’s effort to secure a deal with elements of the HuM. The Kargil war’s outcome, however, had demoralized the rank-and-file of terrorist groups, and the means needed to be found to persuade them that the war was still worth fighting. Tactics were soon devised. Starting with an attack on the BSF’s sector headquarters at Bandipora in north Kashmir, the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad unleashed a series of fidayeen attacks on high-value civilian and military targets. Generally translated as suicide-squad attacks, a partial misnomer, since few involved bombings of the kind seen in Sri Lanka or Israel, fidayeen units targeted two key symbols of state authority apart from the BSF in 1999, the headquarters of the Indian Army’s 15 Corps in Srinagar, and the offices of the crack Special Operations Group of the J&K police in the same city. There were 17 security force personnel and 5 terrorists who were killed in these attacks, a relatively trivial number, given the overall levels of combat-related fatalities. What the fidayeen attacks did do, however, was to signal to the cadre demoralized by the outcome of the Kargil war that the larger campaign against India was far from finished.

Both the scale and frequency of fidayeen targets rose steadily in the coming years, although their military utility to terrorist groups
is unclear, 38 Indian security force personnel and 18 terrorists were killed in the fidayeen attacks in 2000, numbers that increased in 2001 to 91 and 36 respectively. It is possible that the wave of fidayeen attacks led Indian forces to commit more personnel for defensive purposes, but, judging by the steady escalation in the numbers of terrorists killed from 1999 onwards, this does not seem to have significantly impeded their offensive capabilities. Although it could not have been lost on the leadership of jihadi groups that their losses in fidayeen missions represented a neat reversal of the attrition ratio recorded in combat in Kashmir, it would also have become clear that each such operation meant the loss of highly motivated personnel. Certainly, by 2003, Indian security forces seemed to have learned to deal with fidayeen attacks, sustaining just 23 fatalities while claiming 16 of their attackers. Instead, the real value of the fidayeen attacks lay in their propagandistic value, and the fact that they were able to carry the war in Kashmir to the Indian state—the very fact, of course, that led India and Pakistan to the edge of war.

We suffer, sadly, from a near-complete absence of information on the decision-making processes at the command levels of both the jihadi groups and the Pakistani military-intelligence infrastructure that guided the course of their operations in Kashmir. On the eve of the 2001 crisis, however, it seems safe to surmise that some of the key lessons of warfare since 1999 must have become clear. Pakistan could, indeed, escalate warfare within Kashmir to unprecedented levels. Indian forces were, however, able to respond to this escalation by simply stepping up their own operations. The war of attrition waged in Kashmir since 1988 had simply reached new levels, without giving Pakistan significantly greater political leverage. While it could sabotage Indian efforts at securing a unilateral dialogue with terrorist groups, as it had done with some groups in the north-east of the country, Pakistan had not yet been able to decisively tip the scales. For India, too, the escalating war held out problems. While India could contain the jihadis in Kashmir, movement towards peace had become near impossible. High levels of killings, moreover, were politically damaging—as were suicide-squad attacks on symbols of Indian control of Kashmir.

All of this might, however, have been tolerated, had it not been for one critical fact. Lashkar’s Abdur Rehman Makki had meant what he said in February 2000, and the jihad in Kashmir had begun to expand beyond its traditional geographical limitations.
CROSSING THE THRESHOLD

At the core of the Indian reaction to the terrorist attack on its parliament on December 13, 2001, was one simple fact: Pakistan’s war in Kashmir now demonstrably threatened not just Indian rule in Kashmir, but India itself. Yet, the parliament House attack was neither the first major terrorist attack outside of Kashmir nor, in terms of its scale, the largest. Why, then, did India react in the way it did? An answer to this key question requires some engagement with the history of pan-India Islamist terrorism.

Flying the flag of Islam on the Red Fort in New Delhi has been a long-standing motif in Islamist discourse, as old as the partition itself. As early as April 1948, Kasim Rizvi, an Islamist militia leader who sought to fight off Indian forces that had entered the state of Hyderabad proclaimed that this was his ultimate objective.25 Interestingly—and significantly for my argument here—Pakistan’s history of support to such groups has a pedigree of precisely the same length. One remarkably candid admission has come from Lt. Gen. Gul Hasan Khan, who served as the last commander-in-chief of the Pakistani armed forces. General Khan’s memoirs record that an unnamed “elder statesman” in Pakistan organized covert supplies of weapons to the princely state of Hyderabad in 1948, which was using armed force to resist accession to the Indian Union. According to General Khan, the “elder statesman” organized at least one shipment of .22 pistols on a DC-3 aircraft.26

India’s first major terrorist group of the Islamic Right was, however, not born in Srinagar, Hyderabad, Karachi, or Lahore. In 1985, activists of the Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadis’ Gorba faction gathered in the western Indian town of Bhiwandi to speak about the need for armed Muslim resistance to the wave of communal violence that had passed through India from early that year. Two key figures were present at that meeting: Azam Ghauri, who went on to form a Lashkar-e-Taiba–based unit in Andhra Pradesh, and Abdul Karim “Tunda,” nicknamed for his deformed arm, who was to go on to become the Lashkar’s top operative in India. At the end of the meeting, they formed the Tanzim Islahul Muslimeen (Organization for the Correction of Muslims), committed to the defense of Muslims during communal riots. The Tanzim’s early activities were mildly farcical, consisting of self-defense drills using bamboo poles and ideological classes, both borrowed from the ultra-right Hindu organization, the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh. Among their most enthusiastic recruits was Jalees Ansari, the son of a textile mill worker who went on to become a medical doctor—and to help set off a series of 43 explosions in Mumbai and Hyderabad, and 7 separate explosions on trains on December 6, 1993, the first anniversary of the Babri Masjid’s demolition by Hindu fundamentalists.

Ansari had been tasked to set off a second series of explosions on January 26, 1994, 13 days after his arrest. By the time India’s federal anticrime organization, the Central Bureau of Investigations, picked him up, however, both Karim and Ghauri had disappeared. Karim is believed to have traveled to Calcutta, and then to Dacca, where he again made contact with the Lashkar-e-Taiba network. The Lashkar-e-Taiba commander then responsible for its Indian operations outside of Kashmir, Zaki-ur-Rahman, put him to work running new recruits from the north Indian Muslim community, like Amir Hashim, who went on to execute a series of bomb explosions in New Delhi, Rohtak, and Jalandhar. Ghauri, in turn, first hid out in Andhra Pradesh, and then traveled on a fake passport to Saudi Arabia. In 1995, Saudi national Hamid Bahajib, a key financier of the Lashkar’s India activities who has relatives in Hyderabad, arrived for his travel to Pakistan. He later returned to Hyderabad, and before his elimination in a shootout with the state police, carried out a series of bombings and assassinations in and around the city.

Pakistan’s intelligence services were well poised to take advantage of the growing, if marginal, influence of jihadis among young Muslims across India. By 1991, Indian intelligence officials believe, efforts were underway to set up an alliance between Khalistan terrorists, then active in Punjab, and terrorist groups in J&K. The operation, code-named K2, has been attributed to Waqar Ahmad, the Inter-Services Intelligence officer believed by Indian intelligence to have been in charge of the Babbar Khalsa International. K2 achieved few results, for its key operatives, Manjit Singh and Mohammad Sharif, were arrested in July 1992, soon after their arrival in India. Before then, however, they had succeeded in recruiting a number of smugglers for moving weapons across the Rann of Kutch in Gujarat. There were 13 young men, from New Delhi, Mumbai, Modasa, and Ahmedabad, who had actually received training in explosives manufacture and guerrilla warfare in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Indian officials claim Manjit Singh had planned to blow up the stock exchange in Chennai a few days after his arrest.
Despite this setback, efforts to forge these kinds of alliances proceeded on several different fronts. In January 1994, Mohammad Masood Azhar Alvi, who went on to found the Jaish-e-Mohammad in the wake of his release from prison as part of the Indian Airlines hostages-for-prisoners swap of 1999, was dispatched to India. His task was to bring about a reconciliation between the fractious cadre of the Harkat-ul-Mujaheddin and the Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami, whose parent organizations had merged to form the Harkat-ul-Ansar. At this time, Azhar described the ideological content of his mission in location-specific terms. The organization’s main objective, he told his interrogators, was “to liberate Kashmir from Indian rule, and to establish Islamic rule in Kashmir.” Before leaving for Srinagar, however, he spent considerable time attempting to network with ultra-conservative theologians in the northern-Indian province of Uttar Pradesh. Sadly, Azhar’s interrogators did not seem to have asked just what his discussions consisted of, but the effort he made is evident. In the course of three days, he traveled between half a dozen cities, covering hundreds of kilometers. He sought, and in some cases secured, meetings with a who’s who of the Deoband Ullema.

Despite the failure of K2, and the arrest of Azhar, the fallout of the demolition of the Babri Masjid seems to have encouraged Pakistan’s intelligence services to renew efforts at forging pan-India alliances. At the end of 1994, the Inter-Services Intelligence had managed to form the Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front (JKIF), a body unique at the time for having no affiliation with any secessionist political organization within J&K. It was believed to have attracted considerable funding from Saudi Arabia–based religious organizations, and drew ideological inspiration from the circle of revanchist preacher Maulana Abdul Rahman Makki. The JKIF’s leadership, Sajjad Ahmad Keno, Hilal Ahmad Baig, Bilal Ahmad Baig and Javed Ahmad Krava, were drawn from the Students’ Liberation Front, that had broken from the ranks of the JKIF in the early 1990s. Its task was to work together with the mafia figures who had executed the Mumbai serial bombings of 1993, themselves a retaliation for a Hindu fundamentalist program against Muslims earlier that year. In 1995, the JKIF released a photograph of one of the key accused in the serial bombings, Abdul Razzak “Tiger” Memon, along with Keno. The photograph, it was then claimed, had been taken in Srinagar. One of the participants in the affair, Usman Majid, has since confirmed long-standing speculation that it was in fact taken at a safe house in Muzaffarabad, Pakistan. Among the JKIF’s more murderous acts was a bombing
of the busy Lajpat Nagar market in New Delhi in 1996, that claimed a dozen lives.

By 1998, though, the JKIF was in near-terminal demise. The ideas it was founded on, however, continued to flourish. That summer, the J&K police’s Special Operations Group eliminated the HuM’s top Kashmir valley commander, Ali Mohammad Dar. Better known by his nom de guerre Burhanuddin Hijazi, Dar was among the organization’s best strategic minds. Dozens of pages of handwritten notes were recovered from Dar’s temporary Srinagar hideout, perhaps ideas for communication to the HuM’s Shah. Page 66 of the Dar diaries suggests new courses of action on an all-India basis. “Ways and means should be found,” it records, “to launch the movement in India on [a] priority basis.” This can be achieved by “above all, a system of launching and logistics working to push through in a better way.”

To do this, he suggests a broad linkage with criminal organizations elsewhere in the country. “Kingpins of the underworld [should] be contacted,” Dar advocated, “to have the weapons and ammunition launched for us through other possible ways.” “A cell of three persons” would work “to develop relations with underworld beings [sic] like Dawood Ibrahim and trying to have a project of counterfeit currency.” A year earlier, in December 1998, the HuM had promised to take the “war against India outside Jammu and Kashmir,” and threatened to some “move towards Delhi.”

Then, the December 1998 issue of Majallah al-Dawa, the in-house magazine of the Lashkar’s political and financial patron, the Markaz Dawa wal’Irshad, reported the organization’s belief that its campaign in J&K was “just the beginning” and described its plans to extend its activities through India.

Pakistani nationals came to play an increasingly direct role in these activities. Ghauri’s elimination was preceded, in July 1998, by the arrest at Hyderabad of top Lashkar activist Mohammad Salim Junaid, a resident of Kala Gujran village in Pakistan’s Jhelum district. Junaid had begun his career with the Lashkar-e-Taiba in 1991, as a foot soldier for the jihad in J&K, rising rapidly through the organization’s hierarchy as a protégé of Azam Cheema, in charge of transborder movements of the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Wasim Akbar, shot dead by the Special Operations Group (SOG) in 2001, is believed to have been responsible for a bomb explosion in Jalandhar, Punjab. In May 1998, another key Lashkar-e-Taiba member active in Uttar Pradesh, known only by his alias Abu Talha, was killed in an encounter with the SOG in Srinagar. Then, on July 30, 1998, the Delhi Police arrested three other members of the “Tunda” cell, led by Abdul Sattar, a resident of
Islamnagar in Pakistan’s Faisalabad district. With his colleagues Shoaib Alam and Mohammad Faisal Hussain, Sattar had put together a base in the famous pottery town of Khurja, Uttar Pradesh. The group had built a bunker under a pottery kiln for the storage of explosives. There is considerable evidence that groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba have been able to set up a wide pan-India support network through which operatives are able to obtain cover identities. Junaid, for example, had married a Hyderabadi woman and set up a spare-parts export enterprise. Lashkar operative Zahid Hussain, similarly, tried to set up a business after being tasked to set up bases outside J&K.

All of this had been seen both in India and Pakistan as part of the business of jihad-as-usual. While Pakistan’s covert services had managed to extend the reach of the jihad in Kashmir outside of the state, they had not so far posed a serious threat to India. Now, however, the landscape was to be irrevocably transfigured. In a December 1999 interview, the Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami **amir** Maulana Fazl-ur-Rahman Khalil had threatened that if India did not immediately withdraw from territories claimed by Pakistan, “all of its states will become Kashmir.” The all-India jihad was nowhere near that point in December 2001, but New Delhi, quite obviously, had no intention of allowing matters to drift until it was.

**THE EVE OF THE NEAR-WAR**

With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that New Delhi had started to run out of options when the Kashmir jihad escalated after the Kargil war. Its détente efforts in Kashmir had secured positional gains, without doubt, but not the reduction in violence that was the stated purpose of the enterprise. Now, confronted with a new form of terror, the government of India had little choice but to make clear its willingness to go to war.

It takes little to see that the new wave of pan-India terror that broke out after the Kargil war was of a fundamentally different order to the kinds of relatively low-level terrorist activity, jihadi groups had engaged in prior to the Kargil war. The Lashkar-e-Taiba’s December 2000, attack on the Red Fort in New Delhi, a realization of the promise Abdul Rahman Makki had made in Islamabad that February, had a political impact that far transcended the damage it caused. Coming just two days after the government of India announced an extension of the Ramzan cease-fire, the outrage sent out obvious messages. Both to the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s core constituency amongst the
Hindu right, and to the voters at large, the attack signaled that the
government of India had in fundamental ways failed to protect Indian
sovereignty, notwithstanding its claims of triumph in the Kargil war.
In an interview to the Pakistani newspaper Ausaf, Saeed announced
that several similar attacks would follow. The December 13, 2001
attack on parliament made clear, in the most dramatic way possible,
that this was not an idle boast. Given the inherent fragility of the
coalition government in New Delhi, moreover, the pressures on New
Delhi to respond were all the more enormous: being seen as weak
could have cost the Bharatiya Janata Party not just long-term electoral
support, but also the backing of its sometimes fickle partners in the
National Democratic Alliance.

Why did Pakistan’s intelligence services choose to escalate the
jihad in quite such a manner? It is possible, of course, that Pakistani
strategists simply did not expect the kind of reaction that followed:
India, after all, had not threatened war after the horrific Mumbai
serial bombings of 1993. Yet, a nuanced understanding of history
ought to have led Pakistan to consider the consequences of its actions
with greater care. India had, after all, almost gone to war in 1987,
as a response to Pakistani support of Khalistan terrorists, and had
come very near to doing so again in 1990, after the outbreak of vio-
lence in Kashmir. Confronted with the prospect of losing control of
the string that flew the HuM kite, it is possible, Pakistani strategists
simply did not envisage the possible long-term consequences of esca-
lating the Kashmir jihad. In the mid-1990s, several pro-Pakistan ter-
rorist groups had splintered down their middle, and key factions had
jumped crossed over to the Indian side, with calamitous consequences
for the jihad. Pakistan’s intelligence services were determined not to
allow history to repeat itself. Majid Dar, however, proved remarkably
resistant to calls from the HuM to terminate the dialogue process.
By July 2001, Shah was sufficiently alarmed by the way events were
heading to shake up the organization’s field command. Majid Dar
and his associates were ordered back to Pakistan—a demand they
flatly refused.

Shah’s chosen replacement for Majid Dar, the portly 54-year old
Ghulam Hassan Khan, who also used the code names Saif-ul-Islam
and Engineer Zamaan, arrived in Kashmir in October 2001. By then,
the stage had been set for the bitter internecine warfare that the HuM
had tried so hard to avoid. On August 25, 2001, the Baramulla-based
pro-Shah division commander Shaqir Ghaznavi had organized the
assassination of Dar’s key aide, Farooq Sheikh Mirchal. Soon after
Khan’s arrival, the Indian intelligence succeeded in cracking *hawala* fund transfers to several of the new commanders, strangling the resources needed to establish their authority. Among the first of the seizures were funds intended for Mirchal’s successor as Kupwara division head, Javed Ahmad Rather, code named Zubair-ul-Islam. While no evidence exists on who the informer was, the pro-Shah faction of the HuM made the obvious connection. From the outset, Ghulam Hassan Khan lived in fear of betrayal—and would, indeed, be killed in a targeted operation carried out by Indian forces in 2004.

Within Kashmir, then, the HuM’s factions were well and truly at war. Lone visited Pakistan in the midst of this crisis, to attend the marriage of his elder son with the daughter of Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front leader Amanullah Khan. During a meeting with President Pervez Musharraf, the People’s Conference leader made clear his support for the cease-fire, and bilateral dialogue with India. In an interview to *The Washington Post*, he said that “the biggest danger now is from the [Islamist] extremists.” “The far right,” Lone said, “will make serious efforts to undermine the ceasefire.” To prevent that outcome, the Union Government offered the Hurriyat realists the opportunity to visit Pakistan to consult with leaders there. The sole condition was that the team not include Geelani. While the visit did not materialize, Geelani found himself isolated within the Hurriyat on the issue. Lone was among his most bitter critics. “On the one hand,” Lone said on the Hurriyat’s demand for passports to travel to Pakistan, “we ask for a legal right that stands denied to us. But in the same breath we say that allow us to go to Pakistan, and when we will reach there, we will tell the mujaheddin to sharpen their weapons against India. I see no logic in it.”

Geelani responded to his marginalization in the Hurriyat executive by mobilizing the Islamist right on the streets. With the support of terrorist groups, he gained no small success. Bhat’s enthusiasm for dialogue dulled considerably after a near-successful February 22, 2001 attempt on his life. Lone lead a stubborn rearguard action, hoping to push the Hurriyat to begin dialogue with the Union Government mediator, K. C. Pant. Terrorist threats, again, ensured he was unable to succeed. The General Council of the Hurriyat rejected the realists’ calls after a grenade went off during the meeting called to discuss the issue. At the 2001 remembrance of the assassination of Umar Farooq’s father, Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq’s death, armed men gathered around the rostrum and shouted Lone down. “Haath mein haath do, Lashkar ko saath do” (walk hand in hand with the Lashkar-
e-Taiba), went the slogans “Hurriyat mein rahna hoga to Pakistan kehna hoga” (all those in the Hurriyat must support Pakistan). Lone, however, refused to cave in. In mid-April, he and Umar Farooq, now the only two vocal realists in the Hurriyat, were quietly granted permission to travel to Sharjah to hold an extended meeting with Sardar Abdul Qayoom Khan, the head of the Kashmir Committee set up by Pakistan’s military ruler, President Pervez Musharraf. The meeting was the first in several years between major political figures from both sides of the LoC in Kashmir. Pakistan’s intelligence chief, Ehtaz-ul-Haq, is also believed to have been present at the sidelines of that meeting.

Lone offered little insight into what had been discussed with Khan during the April 17 meeting. He did, however, reiterate his commitment to dialogue. “We will go back and take the ideas we discussed here to our respective governments so that violence can end,” he said. If the [Indian] government is not ready to allow self-determination,” Lone continued, “the alternative is that they should be ready to settle the dispute through a meaningful dialogue with involving all parties concerned.” This in itself was of a piece with the stated Hurriyat policy. What was significant was that Lone did not join Khan in attacking India’s human rights record in Kashmir the previous day. Even more important, he demanded that jihadi groups “leave us alone,” as they were defaming the “freedom movement.”

Meanwhile, Geelani again came under fire from within his own party, which passed a resolution supporting “conciliatory stance adopted by Umar Farooq and Abdul Gani Lone.”

After a brief lull in early 2002—the consequence of the near-war situation—the battle resumed. One threat to the hardliners came from a series of independent political initiatives for dialogue. In early March that year, within the Indian and Pakistani armies massed along the border, a group of Srinagar lawyers called on the High Commissioner Qazi Ashraf Jehangir and called for Pakistan to back a democratic process centered around peace, governance, and the restoration of peoples’ dignity. At the same time, the doves within the Jamaat-e-Islami renewed their attacks on Geelani. The Islamist hardliner, hospitalized for the treatment of cancer, found his authority challenged by Khaliq Hanif, a onetime ally of the rejectionists. With Geelani in hospital, Hanif succeeded in pushing through an unprecedented political resolution, where the Jamaat-e-Islami stated that it would not oppose the coming elections to the Kashmir Assembly. The resolution added that should the Hurriyat choose to do so, the
Jamaat-e-Islami, as its largest constituent, would oppose its decision. From the optic of both the Islamists, a break in secessionist ranks had become inevitable. Accommodation between the two groups—and their representatives among the jihadists—was simply no longer possible.

A few column-centimeters of newsprint provoked the final showdown. On May 1, the Srinagar newspaper Greater Kashmir carried an article authored by HuM deputy commander-in-chief Abdul Ahmad Bhat, who uses the code-names Moin-ul-Islam and Umar Javed. Bhat stated that if “today India begins a genuine process of settlement and peace, we will not wait till tomorrow. We will give up our defensive [military] operation right now.”40 The HuM deputy chief added that if “India takes an initiative with good intentions, she will find us ten steps ahead of her one step. We will at once give up guns and observe real ceasefire so that [a] solution-finding path receives a headway [sic].” This was widely interpreted, correctly or otherwise, as an endorsement of efforts by the Prime Minister’s Office to bring a coalition of secessionist groupings into the electoral process. Shah, who had appointed Bhat to contain just these kinds of ideas, was infuriated. The expulsions of Dar, his second-in-command Khurshid Ahmad Zargar and their associate, central division commander Zafar Abdul Fateh followed the day after the article appeared in print. Other mid-level commanders who backed Dar were also removed after they protested the decision; Bhat himself escaped the axe by claiming the article was a hoax.

Neither side, however, emerged from the feud unscathed—and India had good reason to feel, not a little satisfaction. While its efforts to engage the HuM in dialogue had failed, it had succeeded in establishing the existence of fundamental divisions among the jihadists, and, by implication, amongst the larger anti-India movement of the Islamic right wing. As such, Pakistan was reduced to a sponsor of particular factions fighting to free Kashmir of Indian rule, not of the anti-India movement as a whole. All of this helps to explain just why Pakistan’s covert services felt compelled to escalate the war in and outside Kashmir to unprecedented levels: an enterprise that would end not just in the near-war crisis, but in retreat.

**Some Conclusions—and Some Questions**

“Don’t shoot,” the HuM commander Ghulam Rasool Dar had shouted out to journalists on August 3, 2000, just before meeting
his Indian interlocutors, “my life is in danger.” He was right: the Ramzan détente was to take a terrible toll in lives.

Lone, of course, was shot dead by a jihadi hit-squad, just before the 2002 elections. His death was to have a profound impact on the political developments in the Hurriyat, but these would unfold well after the peace process ended. Abdul Majid Dar was killed the following year, not long after the elimination of his deputy, Farooq Mirchal. Neither killing was a surprise, for Shah had expelled the moderates from the HuM in May 2002, which was the equivalent of a death sentence.41 The doves, too, were to have their vengeance. Majid Dar’s supporters were to stage a coup that would end in Shah losing much of his infrastructure and cadre in Muzaffarabad, and effectively divide the HuM into two.42 Ghulam Rasool Khan, the HuM commander sent in to replace Majid Dar, was eliminated by Indian forces in April 2003. Ghulam Rasool Dar went the same way in early January the next year, as did a number of second-rung commanders who had opposed the cease-fire, notably Shabbir Bhaduri of southern Kashmir. Few key participants in the process are now around to tell the tale. Of those who can, notably Dulat and Brajesh Mishra on the Indian side, Mohammad Yusuf Shah and Zargar in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, and the Jamaat-e-Islami’s Ghulam Mohammad Bhat in Indian-administered Kashmir, none have chosen to do so, at least in public.

None the less, it is possible to draw at least some lessons about the Ramzan détente. As I have suggested earlier in this chapter, India’s post-Kargil effort to engage secessionists in Kashmir was something of a two-legged stool. No coherent effort was made to put in place the third, essential pillar—a means to deal with Pakistan’s inevitable attempt to resist a peace process that would most likely have marginalized it in Kashmir. Operation Parakram can perhaps be understood as this third stool. It was, quite obviously, a blunt instrument; yet, the fact is that the near-war was followed by a dramatic de-escalation within Kashmir (table). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to examine the reasons why this de-escalation might have taken place. Apart from a Pakistani realization that a prolonged military standoff, or even simmering tension, might undermine the economic gains secured in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, India’s massive program of border fencing, and of course diplomatic pressure by the United States of America are likely to have played a significant role.

Another issue that needs consideration is, just why Pakistani strategists believed that an escalation in hostilities in Kashmir was needed
in the wake of the Kargil war—and, critically, what political purpose it would serve. After all, the war had won Pakistan little other than international opprobrium, and General Pervez Musharraf is certain to have known that precipitating a future crisis in Kashmir would do little to mitigate the situation. Nothing resembling a credible examination of this issue has emerged, at least so far, from Pakistan, but one obvious line of explanation is that Pakistan’s military establishment needed to reestablish its credibility both among Islamist political formations and its larger nationalist constituency after its defeat. Another interesting possibility, however, is worth exploring: the possibility that Pakistan misread political initiatives emanating from New Delhi as a sign of willingness, however fragile, to make a significant territorial concession, and thought it worth its while both to mount as much military pressure as possible and to further entrench jihadist organizations in anticipation of such an outcome.

Pakistani officials have, for some time, suggested that they believed India would be amenable to a partition of Kashmir along its religious faultlines: a replication of the logic of the Partition of India in 1947. Writing in the Pakistani newspaper The Nation, the journalist Talat Hussain had reported that Niaz Naik and R. K. Mishra, who held a series of back-channel meetings on behalf of Pakistan and India prior to the Kargil war, had discussed what has widely been called “Chenab Plan”. In essence, the plan, that has its roots in the 1950s, envisages a division of Indian-administered Kashmir into the Muslim-majority areas to its north, and the Hindu and Buddhist-majority areas to its south and east. Naik, as he is quoted in Hussain’s account, seemed to believe India would have gone along with the idea had war not broken out. A more detailed account of this rendering of events has come from Owen Bennett Jones, who asserts that Naik, at his final meeting with Mishra, purchased a map of Kashmir so his interlocutor could consider the Chenab-based partition proposal. “As he looked at the map,” Jones writes, “Mishra wondered whether the proposal could work. He neither accepted nor rejected the idea.”

Mishra has maintained a stoic silence on the question; Jones’ insight into his mind have therefore remained unchallenged. Yet, Jones makes clear that Mishra flatly rejected Naik’s proposals for a partition of Kashmir along religious lines, insisting it would “result in a blood-bath.” Given this unequivocal assertion, it is profoundly unclear how Naik could have seen the prospect of progress on the Chenab plan, which amounted to exactly the same thing—particularly, since, by his own account, Mishra had not even a basic
acquaintance with the geography involved. However, Pakistani proposals that the Chenab plan could indeed be realized may have been affirmed by secondary developments in India. On March 8, 2000, Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah and a group of his top Cabinet colleagues held a closed-door and unpublishes meeting with Farooq Kathwari, a United States-based businessman and activist who had long been denied a visa to visit India. Kathwari heads the Kashmir Study Group, a New York think tank that had among other proposals advocated the creation of a quasi independent state carved out of the Muslim-majority areas of Jammu & Kashmir.46

Pakistani strategists may also have paid close attention to the National Conference’s own proposals about Kashmir’s future, which at one stage had some similarities with those of the Kashmir Study Group. The initial report of the official Regional Autonomy Committee, eventually dropped by the Kashmir government, advocated cutting away the Muslim-majority districts Rajouri and Poonch from the Jammu region as a whole, and recasting them as a new Pir Panjal province.47 The single districts of Buddhist-majority Leh and Muslim-majority Kargil, too, were to be sundered from each other and become new provinces. In some cases, the RAC Report and the KSG proposals mirrored each other down to the smallest detail. For example, Kashmir: A Way Forward refers to the inclusion of a Gool-Gulabgarh tehsil, the smallest administrative unit in India, into the new state it advocates. There is, in fact, no such tehsil. Gool and Gulabgarh were parts of the tehsil of Mahore, the sole Muslim-majority tehsil of Udhampur district, until 1999. According to the RAC plan, as in the KSG proposals, Mahore would have formed part of a Muslim-majority zone, while Udhampur tehsil would have formed part of a Hindu-majority zone.

If this was, indeed, what Pakistan’s strategic establishment believed, events make clear that it was a fundamental misreading of both Indian intent and its threshold of tolerance. A full explanation of the Pakistani understanding of the political opportunities available to it in the course of the Kargil war is yet, as I have pointed out earlier, to become available. Yet, it seems plausible to suggest that these flirtations with the Chenab plan, peripheral as they were to the overall thrust of Indian policy and as suicidal as they would most likely have been to any political dispensation that sought to pursue them, were misunderstood as signs of Indian fatigue—raising hope that it had, at long last, tired of the costs of sustaining the status quo in Kashmir. Pakistan may also have believed that India would not respond to an
escalation of terrorist violence with a war threat, as it had done in 1987 and 1990. I shall not outline the reasons for those crisis here, nor their outcomes; scholars have done so with both considerable empirical detail and theoretical insight elsewhere.\(^{48}\) What is germane here is that India had been deterred from using conventional war to deter a subconventional offensive, among other things, by Pakistan’s nuclear capability. Why India appeared willing to take that risk, at least for a time, in 2001–2002—and the key question of why Pakistan de-escalated its offensive in Kashmir despite that threat being called off—is be addressed by other chapters in this volume.

Events in Kashmir after the end of the near-war of 2001–2002 would take a form all the key participants in the Ramzan process may have hoped for, but only a few lived to see. A new government came to power in Kashmir in October 2002, committed to the dialogue process with considerably greater intensity than the National Conference, that saw New Delhi’s engagement with the Hurriyat as something of a threat to its own position. Prime Minister Vajpayee went on to preside over direct talks with the Hurriyat leadership, sans Geelani, who broke from the organization and went on to form his own party. The HuM remained deeply divided; while Mohammad Yusuf Shah remained deeply suspicious of the détente between India and Pakistan, many of his foot-soldiers in Kashmir opened lines of communication with mainstream political parties, notably the ruling People’s Democratic Party. Even the Lashkar-e-Taiba’s Makki, among the first to proclaim the coming-into-being of an all-India war, let it be known in August 2004, that his organization “was not fighting in Kashmir to capture New Delhi” and that it did not consider suicide-squad attacks in civilian areas legitimate.\(^{49}\) At the time of writing, talks between the Hurriyat and New Delhi seem probable; Pakistan and India, too, seem to be building at least the foundations of a durable peace.

Will peace indeed come about? It is, of course, far too early too tell. As the scholar Jean-Luc Racine has perceptively noted, the war in Kashmir is fundamentally an encapsulation of Pakistan’s troubled relationship both with India and itself.\(^{50}\) It is unlikely that any diplomatic process can unravel such a complex historical process in the near-term. What at best can be hoped for is an end to violence, and the creations of conditions through which this generational conflict may be resolved. Even as India and Pakistan dialogue proceeds apace in the summer of 2005, however, there have been a spate of brutal attacks on civilians by jihadist groups, often of grassroots politicians
and local government representatives deemed insufficiently servile to the Islamist cause.\textsuperscript{51} Media reports have also spoken of a trend-breaking revival of violence, a process which, if it continues, could bring the peace process under siege again, as it did in 2000–2001.\textsuperscript{52} Participants in this round of détente, however, would do well to apply their minds to the most important lesson of the Ramzan process: that moves towards peace are fragile, and always contain within them the seeds of war.

\textbf{Notes}

1. Pervez Musharraf, “From the President’s Desk,” on the official website of the President of Pakistan, \url{http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/}
\url{FromThePresidentsDesk.aspx}

2. CSDS Team with Suhas Palshikar, “Split Factor Decides the Outcome,” \textit{Frontline} (Chennai), November 19, 1999.


15. “We are Not Militants, We’re Targets: J&K Jamaat,” \textit{Asian Age} (New Delhi), November 14, 1998.
29. [SECRET] A Note of Background Information of Interrogation, (J&K Police, Joint Interrogation Centre, Kot Bhawal, signed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Joint Interrogation Centre, Kot Bhalwal), p. 11.
30. The Dar-ul-Uloom seminary at Deoband denies any association with terrorists who draw inspiration from their teachings. For example, see Sankarshan Thakur, “What Taliban have Done is Horrifying, un-Islamic but You Need to Ask Why,” The Indian Express (New Delhi), March 14, 2001.
32. Praveen Swami, “From Terror to Politics” Frontline (Chennai), March 1, 2002.
34. See note 21.
45. Ibid.
51. For example, see “Pattan Council Chairman Killed,” *Greater Kashmir* (Srinagar), May 4, 2005.
The 2002 India-Pakistan military standoff was a natural continuation of more than five decades of India-Pakistan disputes over Kashmir. The fear of war loomed large on the subcontinent from December 2001 until October 2002.¹ The possibility of conventional war and the risk of nuclear escalation were clear for all to see. To understand the prolonged and dangerous military standoff, we must look at the political and military background that led to the crisis. This chapter examines the underlying factors that informed and motivated the actions taken by India and Pakistan leading up to the 2001–2002 crisis. Most were rooted in history, others were the result of more recent developments. Behind it all, the crisis unfolded against a backdrop of mutual distrust, acrimony, and conflict that has characterized India-Pakistan relations since 1947.² Each side expects the worst of the other, and even positive initiatives such as Musharraf’s efforts to quell the crisis and India’s restraint met with deep skepticism. Underlying it all is the imbalance of power that drives attitudes and expectations.

**Pakistan: Factors of Insecurity**

Pakistan fears Indian aggression. A majority of Pakistanis believe that India never reconciled to the division of the subcontinent and remains determined to undo Pakistan, by force if necessary. The constant
stream of threatening public statements from the Indian ruling elite since independence, intransigence on Kashmir,\(^3\) repeated disputes over the Indus Waters Treaty, and a tendency to resort to coercive diplomacy are all seen as manifestations of Indian resolve to weaken and eventually destroy Pakistan. Of course, India’s military victories over Pakistan including the partition of East Pakistan in 1972 reinforce fears that India seeks to keep Pakistan weak and subservient. India’s preponderant size, resources, technological advancement, and military superiority give credence to its threats to make Pakistan a vassal state, if not eliminate it altogether. Pakistanis perceive that their identity, territorial integrity, and independence are under constant threat from India. The following factors contribute to Pakistan’s chronic insecurity.

1. **Geography** There are no natural barriers on most of the Pakistan-India border, which make it relatively easy for troops, especially heavy armor, to cross the frontiers. Pakistan lacks territorial depth and the main communication lines run parallel to the Pakistan-India border, making them vulnerable to interdiction. Some of the main cities are situated very close to the border, within reach of invading Indian forces.

2. **Military Power** Pakistan is outmanned and outgunned. India enjoys clear military superiority over Pakistan in terms of manpower, weapons, industrial capacity, and especially defense industry. India had won the 1971 war against Pakistan.\(^4\)

3. **Regional Influence** India aspires to the role of regional hegemon in South Asia. It is able to do so through its diplomatic, economic, and military influence throughout the region, except Pakistan. Pakistan seeks no such role. It also demands equality with India.

4. **Afghanistan** Afghanistan’s irredentist claims on Pakistani territory are a source of longstanding irritation.\(^5\) Afghan Taliban’s use of Pakistani territory and support for Al Qaeda deepen Pakistan-Afghanistan antagonism. India’s involvement in Afghanistan further aggravates Pakistan’s insecurities.

5. **The Global War on Terror** The United States and international forces fighting in Afghanistan add another threatening dimension to the security puzzle for Pakistan, exacerbating the already contentious issues of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, including the refugee problem.

6. **Hindu Nationalism** The prominence of Hindutva forces in Indian politics goes to the heart of Pakistani insecurity.\(^6\) Hindutva
ideology portrays the Islamic religion as intolerant, hostile to Hindu values, proselytizing, expansionist, repressive, and violent. Hindu nationalists have not given up their dream of regaining lost territories (the sacred lands of Hinduism and Buddhism, lost to Islam during the second millennium) and restoring Hindu supremacy over the entire Akhand Bharat (undivided India). Popular support for the BJP in India raises fears of Indian aggression.

The combination of historic insecurities heightened by 9/11 and subsequent instability in Afghanistan created an environment in which renewed confrontation over Kashmir led Pakistan and India to adopt aggressive military postures in 2001 and 2002.

**Does Might Make Right?**

**Divergent Perspectives on the Regional Power Structure**

In the aftermath of decolonization, India emerged as the predominant power in South Asia. Indian leaders regard India as the legitimate heir of the British Raj—the true successor state of the British Empire. Late Indian prime minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s thinking still influences external policymaking in India. He viewed India as a powerful state dominating her neighborhood and claiming a role in world affairs. Indian elites believe, with justification, that a strong and powerful India capable of projecting its power in the region and beyond provides security and stability for all of South Asia. The bilateral problems between India and other South Asian states should, therefore, be dealt with at the bilateral level without the involvement of other states or international organizations. According to the Indira Gandhi Doctrine, India claims the right to intervene in the internal affairs of neighboring countries if disorder threatens to extend beyond national boundaries. India would not tolerate similar interventions by any outside power. If external help is needed to meet an internal crisis, states should first look to India. India regards South Asia as its geopolitical sphere of influence and expects its smaller neighbors to adhere to its regional preferences. India opposes efforts by regional states such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal to raise disputes with India (Kashmir, river-water, trade, and transit, etc.) at international forums.

India’s superiority based on its size, military, and economic potential conflicts with weaker countries’ emphasis on the concept of
sovereign equality within the community of nation states. Pakistan understands the fact of India’s power, but struggles with the Delhi-centered model of regional security. Pakistan seeks to balance India’s power through a more pluralist model of regional security that accommodates the divergent perceptions of peace and security held by the smaller states of South Asia. From this perspective, regional security rests on shared principles derived through dialogue among all South Asian states. Pakistanis, however, view India as attempting to act as a hegemonic power asserting its primacy over its smaller neighbors.

Not surprisingly, the central theme of Pakistan’s foreign policy is to defy Indian hegemony. Thus, it has adopted a number of strategies to counter the disparity of power that favors India. Pakistan’s strategy includes spending a large percentage of its budgetary allocations on defense, and joining Western defense alliances such as the South East Asian Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization. Developing nuclear weapons and forcing India to accept nuclear deterrence is a central component of this weak-state strategy to neutralize its powerful and threatening neighbor.

A TROUBLING LEGACY:
BLOWBACK FROM SUPPORT FOR SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

India and Pakistan have each adopted the practice of attempting to manipulate separatist movements to destabilize one another. With support from New Delhi and Islamabad, separatist movements have been a common tool of coercive diplomacy—and a major threat to peace and stability. India set a dangerous precedent when it backed Mukti Bahini separatists supporting the bifurcation of Pakistan in 1971. New Delhi also intervened in Sri Lanka’s internal strife and has supported separatist ambitions in Baluchistan, Kashmir, and Afghanistan for the purpose of keeping Pakistan off balance.

Pakistan has also fished in troubled waters. In the early 1980s, India accused Pakistan of providing arms and training to Sikh separatists in India’s Punjab province. The situation in Punjab eventually deteriorated in ways reminiscent of the 2001–2002 crisis when India mobilized its troops along the Pakistani border and seized territory on the Siachen Glacier in the winter of 1983–1984. As tensions escalated in 1986 and 1987, India conducted its largest ever military exercise, Operation Brasstacks. One objective of the exercise
was to show Pakistan that India could counter Islamabad’s meddling in Indian Punjab and to remind Pakistani leaders of their weakness in defending the province of Sindh. Distrust and suspicions grew in 1999 when the hijackers of an Indian Airline flight from Kathmandu to Delhi demanded, and won, the release of three terrorists (two Pakistanis and one Kashmiri) from Indian prisons. Some in India blamed Pakistan for the hijacking, which it denied. Indian suspicions grew when at least two of the freed terrorists turned up in Pakistan. One of them, Masood Azhar, enjoyed a hero’s welcome and made matters worse when he publicly announced the creation of yet another terrorist organization to fight India in Kashmir. As Indian scholar Mohammad Ayoob observed: “The free rein given by the Pakistan government to militant Islamic outfits augmented the perception of official Pakistani complicity in terrorism.” Musharraf’s 2002 promises to clamp down on cross-border terror notwithstanding, subsequent events such as the November 2008 Mumbai attack have only reaffirmed Indian concerns.

Support for insurgent forces often has a hidden price tag, as U.S. support for anti-Soviet Mujahideen fighters in Afghanistan has demonstrated. For nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, the practice has become increasingly risky. The 2001–2002 crisis illustrated for both India and Pakistan how proxy forces can get out of control and provoke unintended consequences.

**Pakistan’s Declining Power and Influence after the Cold War**

Amidst the optimism surrounding the end of the cold war, the U.S.-Pakistan strategic partnership fell victim to peace: Pakistan was no longer a frontline state. Issues that had been shelved, such as Pakistan’s nuclear program, now took precedence. Sanctions imposed for nonproliferation policy reasons severely deteriorated Pakistan’s defensive capabilities. The infamous Pressler Amendment suspended a $4.1 billion arms package to Pakistan and prohibited future assistance as well. This included the promised sale of F-16s. With its economy struggling and its access to military equipment blocked by sanctions, Pakistan found itself facing a growing military gap with India. Conversely, India after the cold war entered an era of economic growth and expanding global influence. The result was that Pakistan was forced to rely more heavily on its nuclear weapons to compensate for its political and military weakness.
The combination of chronic disputes with India over Kashmir, declining conventional capabilities, and consequent greater reliance on nuclear weapons set the stage for renewed concerns over the possibility of nuclear war in South Asia. Even Richard Nixon had observed: “Nuclear powers have never fought each other, but the clash between Muslim Pakistan and Hindu India over the disputed Kashmir territory could erupt into world’s first war between nuclear powers.”\textsuperscript{16} Instead of reducing nuclear dangers worldwide, the end of the cold war actually heightened the possibility that Kashmir could be a flash point for nuclear war.

**Nuclear Deterrence after the 1998 Tests**

Pakistan’s insecurity spiked on May 11, 1998, when the BJP government made good on its promise to demonstrate its nuclear weapon capability. Indian home minister L. K. Advani threatened to “deal firmly” with Pakistan if it did not roll back its proxy war in Kashmir in light of “the change in the geostrategic situation in the region.”\textsuperscript{17} Pakistan was compelled to match India’s demonstration of nuclear capability. The balance of terror was established as a permanent feature of South Asian security.

The presence of nuclear weapons has made India and Pakistan more cautious. Both governments have a sound understanding of each other’s capabilities, intentions, policies, and red lines, which they have been careful not to cross.\textsuperscript{18} Nuclear deterrence was a major factor checking escalation in the 1999 Kargil conflict and again during the 2001–2002 military standoff. Although India was tempted to punish Pakistan in both instances, fear of escalation undoubtedly moderated New Delhi’s response and stimulated efforts to defuse the crises. However, nuclear deterrence did not help prevent the crises from occurring in the first place, nor prevent officials on both sides from invoking nuclear threats. Nuclear weapons help Pakistan compensate for one aspect of India’s military superiority, but do not erase the fundamental sources of insecurity and conflict.

**A Sea Change in Regional Security: Emergence of the Indo-U.S. Strategic Partnership**

The followers of Nehru believe that New Delhi should obtain “Greater India,” through “moral superiority,” whereas Hindu nationalists
want to achieve it through power politics. The rise of the BJP and its coalition partners in the late 1990s brought a paradigm shift from Nehruvian idealism, to an Indian version of American neoconservatism. No longer content to just talk about changing the existing order, BJP officials advocated actions to implement their Hindu nationalist dreams. At the top of their list was strengthening the Indian armed forces, ending “nuclear apartheid,” and taking a strong stand against Pakistan. Already outgunned, outmanned, and declining in status, Pakistan sought ways to counter a more aggressive Indian posture.

Pakistan braced for the tilt towards India, which began in earnest after the 1998 nuclear tests, when the Clinton administration backed New Delhi in the Kashmir crisis of 1999. President Clinton’s tour of the subcontinent in March 2000 made clear that Washington had decided to invest heavily in India for its political, strategic, and economic benefits. It also signaled that the United States had downgraded Pakistan’s importance within its strategic framework. The military coup in Pakistan in October 1999 further undermined U.S.-Pakistan relations.

After September 2001, India was able to cast the Kashmiri freedom struggle as another front in the U.S. global war on terror (GWOT). India even reversed its longstanding position opposing external involvement in resolving Kashmir. Indian writer and strategist C. Raja Mohan opined on the new outlook:

The diplomatic support that India got from the Clinton administration in the Kargil war was entirely unexpected. It was out of character with the past American record in Indo-Pak disputes in which Washington was either neutral or seen as being tilted towards Islamabad. The Clinton administration had insisted that the Pakistani aggression across the Line of Control in the Kargil sector was unacceptable and Islamabad must unconditionally and unambiguously restore the status quo ante….The Kargil experience told India that international interventions in Indo-Pak disputes need not necessarily be against New Delhi. It is this political assessment that led New Delhi to adopt the strategy of coercive diplomacy against Pakistan following 13 December.19

The Bush administration embraced the Clinton outreach to India. Common concerns about the rise of China helped cement the expanding Indo-U.S. strategic partnership. The Bush administration welcomed India’s official support for its policy to build an antimissile shield, which represented for the first time in decades that India had
extended such support to the United States on any global armament issue.\textsuperscript{20}

The paradigm shift in New Delhi after the cold war reflected a new confidence that India could play on the world stage, and also that it could use its improved relationships with other major powers to influence events in its own backyard.\textsuperscript{21}

\textbf{THE DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD OF 9/11: INDIA’S FRUSTRATION}

The war on terrorism initiated a chain of events which elevated Pakistan’s significance for U.S. geostrategic calculations but created problems for the new U.S.-India relationship. After 9/11, India was quick to offer military cooperation in the unfolding U.S. war on terrorism. New Delhi’s decision represented a new direction for Indian foreign policy, which had been shaped for decades by the principles of nonalignment. India was betting that it could use the new international environment created by the war on terrorism to punish Pakistan for supporting and aiding the Kashmiri cause, including its support for terrorist groups. As Sumit Ganguly argued, “India’s foreign policy establishment quite skillfully emphasized its own trials and tribulations with terror and sought to link them to America’s global concerns. This endeavor, of course, gathered considerably greater force and significance in the wake of the terrorist attack on India’s parliament on 13 December 2001.”\textsuperscript{22}

However, the Bush administration was not initially persuaded that the Kashmiri’s freedom struggle was at its core part of the global jihadist movement, even if Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed were increasingly recognized as true terrorist organizations and were included on the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations. Pakistan was, once again, central to U.S. global and regional security interests.\textsuperscript{23} In return, the United States lifted a wide range of sanctions, offered a generous package of economic assistance and military aid, and expanded the scope of bilateral interactions. Instead of bringing additional pressure to bear on Pakistan, Islamabad now enjoyed a new status as a major U.S. ally.

The December 2001 cross-border attack on India, however, diminished Pakistan’s credibility and blurred the distinction between “home grown” Kashmiri freedom fighters and international terrorists who were the target of the global war on terror. The attack on the Indian Parliament forced Pakistan’s leaders to promise tough
measures against all terrorist groups operating from their territory, including those operating from Kashmir. The 2001–2002 crisis forced Pakistan’s leaders to recognize that extremist groups in their territory could ruin critical relationships with the United States and India and even drag Pakistan into unwanted conflicts. Instead of compensating for Pakistan’s military weakness, extremists were exacerbating external and internal problems.

CONCLUSION: INTERNAL WEAKNESS ADDS TO PAKISTAN’S INSECURITY

The leaders of India could not allow the December 2001 attack on its parliament to go unanswered. New Delhi’s military goal was to coerce Pakistan to end its proxy war against India. Operation Parakram also had domestic, political, and foreign policy objectives. The BJP-led government wished to demonstrate its will to use India’s superior military power against Pakistan, and to align itself with the U.S. GWOT. By these standards, Operation Parakram was largely successful, at least in the short term.

Since independence, Pakistan’s overwhelming priority has been to guard its sovereign existence. The rise of the Taliban and violent jihadist groups inside Pakistan invalidated Islamabad’s longstanding approach to Kashmir. The 2001–2002 crisis drove home this point for Pakistan’s leaders, who increasingly came to understand the dangers posed by violent Islamic organizations. Musharraf took the unprecedented step of banning some groups, but sought to maintain the distinction between global jihad and Kashmiri freedom fighters. By that time, however, groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba had gained critical mass and were dragging Pakistan into unwanted conflicts with India, Afghanistan, and the United States. Nuclear weapons may have deterred India from large-scale military retaliation for the 2001 cross-border attacks, but they could not protect Pakistan from the threats emanating from within its own body politic. Internal weakness increasingly rivals the traditional military threat from India, and the old ways of coping with Pakistan’s insecurity no longer suffice.

NOTES

1. India started mobilization in December 18, 2001. It took 20 days to mass the troops. The deployment that had troops in the states of Rajasthan, Punjab and Gujarat was the largest since the 1971 war between the
two rivals. By early January 2002 India had reportedly mobilized over 500,000 troops and its three armored divisions along the 3,000 km frontier with Pakistan. India also placed its navy and air force on “high alert” and deployed its nuclear-capable missiles.


4. In 1948, India approached the United Nations to play its role in stopping war in Kashmir. In 1965 neither India had victory, nor Pakistan was defeated.


6. The results of the Gujarat elections in which the BJP scored a substantial victory despite the massacre of thousands of Muslims a few months earlier, shows that the BJP can make use of the Hindutva slogan and exploit anti-Muslim feelings. Lt. Gen. Kamal Matinuddin (Retd.), “India-Pakistan Standoff,” Regional Studies, vol. 21, no. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 6–10; see also Ian Talbot, India and Pakistan (New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 2000), p. 2.


10. Rizvi, “South Asia as Seen by Pakistan.”

11. For Sri Lankans’ perceptions about the Indian intervention see Jayadeva Uyangoda, “Sri Lankan Conflict and SAARC,” South Asian Journal
A Pakistani Perspective of the 2002 Standoff


23. Geographic access to the main theater of war in Afghanistan as well as the Pakistani army’s intimate knowledge of the Taliban were, of course, decisive in Washington’s choice to invite Islamabad’s support for the war on terrorism.

PART II

THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY ENVIRONMENT
Chapter 3

Military Dimensions of the 2002 India-Pakistan Standoff—Planning and Preparation for Land Operations

Brig. Gen. (Retd.) Gurmeet Kanwal

The War That Never Was

For over a decade since 1989–1990, Pakistan had exploited India’s nation building challenges in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) by waging a low-cost but high-payoff “proxy war” through foreign mercenary terrorists, including suicide bombers, to annex Kashmir from India. This period of turmoil and instability resulted in the deaths of approximately 30,000 innocent Kashmiri people and over 5,000 security forces personnel, besides damage to property worth several hundred million U.S. dollars and the near total disruption of normal life in J&K. India exhibited immense restraint in the face of grave provocation by opting to fight its misguided youth within the confines of Indian territory and on its own side of the Line of Control (LoC) in J&K.

In May 1998, both India and Pakistan brought their nuclear weapons out of the closet by conducting a series of nuclear tests at Pokhran and Chagai, respectively, and earned international condemnation. In the wake of strained relations after the nuclear tests, prime ministers A. B. Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif courageously began a peace process at Lahore in February 1999. It was at this time that the Pakistan Army raised the ante once again in Kashmir by launching several military intrusions across the LoC into areas that were not physically defended in the Kargil sector of J&K and effectively sabotaged the peace process.
The Pakistan Army’s strategic blunder in Kargil resulted from the failure of its strategy to bleed India through “a thousand cuts,” and its apprehension that its strenuous efforts would be further undermined due to the peace overtures between the two countries.

India’s Operation Vijay was finely calibrated to limit military action to the Indian side of the LoC and to ensure that Pakistan’s military adventurism was not allowed to escalate into a larger conflict. The primary objective of India’s military campaign was to eliminate the intrusions and regain the territory occupied by Pakistani forces as early as possible without enlarging the scope of the ongoing conflict. Defeated once again in the field of combat, the Pakistan Army and ISI resorted to the induction of large numbers of mercenary terrorists into Kashmir, and the number of incidents of terrorism once again flared up dramatically. Consequently, the number of trans-LoC engagements, including artillery fire, also increased. Despite these provocations, Prime Minister Vajpayee once again took a huge political risk by inviting Gen. Pervez Musharraf for a summit meeting at Agra that failed.

Even as the world recoiled at the dastardly acts of terrorism enacted by the Al Qaeda in attacking the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC on September 11, 2001, Pakistani terrorists attacked the J&K legislative assembly at Srinagar in October 2001. The Chief Minister of J&K publicly called for trans-LoC retaliation. However, besides some rhetoric for mass consumption, the Indian government continued to exercise restraint. The final act of denouement that almost led to war between the two countries was a partially successful attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistani jihadi terrorists even as it was in session on December 13, 2001. Indian public opinion was outraged and this time the government felt compelled to take strong action. On December 16, 2001, the Indian armed forces were ordered to mobilize for war.

Operation Parakram, the first full-scale mobilization since the 1971 war with Pakistan, brought the two nations close to war on at least two occasions. The first “window of opportunity,” as the armed forces and several analysts call it, was in the first week of January 2002 soon after the Indian Army had completed its lumbering mobilization. In the snow-bound areas in J&K the army had relatively few options to launch a major offensive across the LoC, but in the plains of Punjab and Rajasthan the climatic conditions were ideal for offensive military action. However, the United States and other Western governments stepped in with some astute diplomatic manoeuvres.
that led to General Musharraf’s commitment in a nationally telecast speech on January 12, 2002, that Pakistan will not permit any terrorist activity “from its soil.” This led India to back off but the troops remained in place in their deployment areas on the international boundary (IB) and the three strike corps remained poised in their concentration areas.

The second window of opportunity presented itself after a terrorist attack on the family quarters in the Indian Army garrison at Kaluchak near Jammu on May 14, 2002. This time the summer weather was conducive for offensive action across the LoC in Kashmir valley as well as the Jammu Division of J&K south of the Pir Panjal mountain range. In Punjab and Rajasthan, even though the 40-degree plus temperatures were hard on both man and machine, the disadvantage was common to both the sides and major offensive action was possible. However, this time the Pakistan Army had also mobilized and was poised in its defenses. Several fighting units of Pakistan’s 10, 11, and 12 Corps had been diverted from the western front, where these were engaged in the joint fight alongside U.S. forces against the remnants of the Taliban and the Al Qaeda, to the eastern theater against India, and it was possible that even large-scale offensive action may have led only to a stalemate. Despite high-pitched rhetoric and sabre-rattling, war did not breakout.

The army remained deployed on the borders ostensibly to ensure that elections to the Kashmir legislative assembly were not disrupted by external intervention. Even though infiltration rates came down only marginally, and that too because the infantry battalions deployed on the LoC were now far better equipped in terms of surveillance devices such as hand-held thermal imagers (HHTIs) and hand-held battlefield surveillance radars (BFSRs), the armed forces were finally given the orders to stand down by the government on October 16, 2002, and the ten-month long military standoff between India and Pakistan came to an end. However, Operation Parakram continued for some time to enable the troops to lift antipersonnel and antitank mines that had been laid along the IB as a defensive measure.

**Policy Planning Processes: Politico-Military Interface**

For a brief description of India’s policy planning processes for national security, including nuclear decision making, see Appendix in this chapter.
Contrary to the earlier practice when the political leadership and the armed forces worked in splendid isolation from each other, there has been a steady increase in the interaction between India’s political leaders and the services chiefs, particularly the chief of army staff (COAS), since the present phase of militancy began in J&K in 1989–1990. The Vajpayee administration (1998–2004) was especially forthright in seeking military advice. The synergy between the political and military leadership during the Kargil conflict in 1999 led to coherent decision making and resulted in the early eviction of Pakistani intruders. During Operation Parakram also, while the services chiefs had changed, the political national security team was more or less the same, and it can be assumed that the old synergy continued to operate by way of regular consultations, frequent interaction, and zeal in resolving the difficulties of the services. However, there are conflicting reports about the quality and the type of political guidance that was provided and whether or not clear political and military aims were laid down. Praveen Swami has written:

Problems with India’s military doctrine and a lack of clarity within the Union Cabinet and on its war objectives may have undermined Operation Parakram at the very outset…Gen Padmanabhan [chief of the army staff during the 2002 military standoff] argues that significant military gains could have been achieved in January 2002, had politicians made the decision to go to war. These objectives, he says, could have included “degradation of the other force, and perhaps the capture of disputed territory in Jammu and Kashmir. They were more achievable in January, less achievable in February, and even less achievable in March. By then, the balance of forces had gradually changed…” Doctrinal baggage, he accepts, crippled India’s early options in 2002. It remains unclear, however, just why the politicians who ordered the build-up finally chose not to use the military machine they had assembled.²

Among Indian analysts opinion is divided on the issue of the utility of a long-drawn deployment on the borders as an instrument of compellation. Maj. Gen. Afsir Karim (Retd.) has written:

The American ultimatum to Pakistan to either join the war against terrorism or be prepared to suffer the fate of terrorists was a perfect example of coercive diplomacy…The purpose of deployment on Pakistan’s borders was never clearly enunciated and it did not amount to purposive use of military instrument to limit or adversely influence Pakistan’s strategic or tactical options. Pakistan’s ability to counter
our threats remained intact because of the lack of purposeful action by our troops.\(^3\)

However, K. Subrahmanyam is of the view: “Continued deployment was necessary to contain Pakistan and raise the cost of terrorism.”\(^4\)

Though several analysts claim to be in the know, it is still a matter of speculation whether any military aims and objectives were assigned to the armed forces during Operation Parakram by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) and, if such aims were assigned, what these were. “The government must have a clear and well-thought out objective before it gives such an order” (i.e. the order to mobilize), writes Lt. Gen. Pran Pahwa (Retd.).\(^5\) “In this particular case... the government did not have a firm and clear-cut plan when it decided to mobilize the country’s armed forces.” Lt. Gen. S. K. Pillai (Retd.) has written that some of the following could have been considered as plausible aims at the time the mobilization was ordered:\(^6\)

- To impose India’s will on Pakistan through military and diplomatic means, to halt support for terrorism.
- Prevent Pakistani interference in India’s efforts to bring back normalcy through the democratic process in J&K.
- Recapture portions of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (POK) from Pakistan and leave the rest for subsequent dialogue.

In the absence of a clear political directive, the COAS would have approved and the director general of military operations (DGMO) would have issued an operational directive to the three command HQ dealing with Pakistan (the army’s Northern, Western and Southern Commands). The aims and objectives would have been discussed broadly with the Indian air force (IAF) and in-house among the army’s commanders-in-chief before these were finalized. The initial operational directive, possibly issued in the week following the ordering of full-scale mobilization, that is around December 20, 2002, is likely to have proposed offensive action mainly across the LoC in J&K with a view to capturing objectives that would provide launch pads for a summer offensive and simultaneously deny major ingress routes to the Pakistan Army for the infiltration of mercenary terrorists into J&K.

Quite naturally, the selection of such objectives would preclude areas prone to heavy snowfall and, since most of these are in northern
J&K, north of the Pir Panjal Range in 14 and 15 Corps sectors, it is possible that major offensive action may have been planned in 16 Corps sector in the areas of the Poonch-Rajauri, Akhnur, and Jammu infantry divisions. It would have made military sense to do so and plan only limited trans-LoC action in 15 and 16 Corps sectors. The corps deployed along the IB with Pakistan in the plains (10, 11, and 12 Corps at that time and 9 Corps in addition now) and the three strike corps (1, 2, and 21 Corps) are likely to have been directed to be prepared for offensive action in case the hostilities in J&K spill over into the plains, and to be ready to exploit fleeting opportunities that might present themselves.

During the second window of opportunity in May-June 2002, it would have been possible to launch relatively large-scale offensive operations all across the LoC in J&K as well as in the plains of Punjab and Rajasthan. Sometime during the period March-April 2002, the military situation is likely to have been reviewed at Army HQ in consultation with the commanders-in-chief and the IAF and fresh operational directives had probably been issued to the three Command HQ for a summer offensive. By then, two to three infantry divisions forming the eastern theater would have been moved to the western theater and become available as additional effort for offensive operations in J&K. These divisions would have tilted the scales against Pakistan. Whether these new plans were presented to the CCS and approved by the prime minister and the defense minister is not known. It is likely that the plans were presented after the Kaluchak incident in May 2002 when the armed forces were again poised for war. Whether these were approved will only be known when the dramatis personae write their memoirs.

Though an emergency was not declared, the other salient provisions of the Union War Book (UWB) were invoked, contrary to the practice followed during the Kargil conflict when this had not been done. The Border Security Force (BSF) was placed under command of the Indian Army and Coast Guard, the fourth armed force of the union, which operates under the Ministry of Defense (MoD) during peace time, was placed under command of the Indian Navy. Provisions of the UWB that have an effect on incurring expenditure for mobilization and, subsequently, for war, were promulgated. The “fast-track” procedure was adopted by the MoD for the immediate purchase of critical war-like stores that were in short supply. These included tank and artillery ammunition, antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), and night vision devices, among other equipment.
India's Concept of Operations: Limited War under Nuclear Umbrella

Since India and Pakistan took their nuclear weapons out of the closet in May 1998, some details of their respective doctrines and strategy have emerged. While India is clear in its perception that nuclear weapons are political weapons and not weapons of warfighting and that their sole purpose is to deter the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by India's adversaries, Pakistan has a simple rationale for its nuclear weapons. As Pakistan's military rulers have so often emphasized, Pakistan's nuclear weapons are meant to counter India's conventional military superiority and deter India from launching a conventional attack. The Pakistan army appears to have convinced itself that if the juggernaut of India's three strike corps rolls unstoppably across the IB during the next war, the nation (and its military machine) will be safe behind a nuclear shield, as these mechanized forces will not be able to strike deep for fear of nuclear retaliation. Pakistan relies heavily on its first strike doctrine to deter conventional conflict with India. Under the shadow of its nuclear umbrella, it has waged a low-intensity proxy war against India in J&K and elsewhere for over a decade. It is for this reason that Pakistan refuses to accept India's offer of a bilateral no first use treaty as a nuclear confidence building and risk reduction measure.

Lt. Gen. Sardar F. S. Lodhi has cogently spelt out Pakistan's rationale for its first use doctrine. Writing in the Pakistan Defence Journal, General Lodhi states:10

In a deteriorating military situation when an Indian conventional attack is likely to break through our defenses or has already breached the main defense line causing a major set-back to the defenses which cannot be restored by conventional means at our disposal, the government would be left with no option except to use nuclear weapons to stabilise the situation. India's superiority in conventional arms and manpower would have to be offset by nuclear weapons.

Pakistan's nuclear doctrine would, therefore, essentially revolve around the first strike option.

General Lodhi is not alone in holding these views. This line of thinking is common to almost all Pakistani Army officers, serving or retired. Brig. Saeed Ismat of the Pakistan Army has also expressed similar views. He propounds the first strike doctrine to checkmate
an Indian offensive, which Pakistani defense analysts believe will be aimed at dismembering Pakistan:11

There could be many scenarios [of Indian offensive strikes into Pakistan]...but if an Indian military invasion came through the Rajasthan desert directed towards the Grand Trunk road near Rahimyar Khan, in a matter of days, India could cut off our north-south communication, divide and dislocate our military forces and divide the country in two...Pakistan’s options would have foreclosed—except one! We should have a well defined and declared strategy of using our ultimate choice of nuclear weapons aimed at the destruction of those military forces, which have intruded in our territory.

Pakistan’s civilian intellectuals also share the same views as the military leaders. Both have invariably acted in concert to convince India that Pakistan’s nuclear threshold is low. Abdul Sattar (former Pakistan foreign minister), Agha Shahi, and Zulfiqar Ali Khan jointly authored an article in *Dawn* on October 5, 1999, in which they wrote:12

The exigency under which Pakistan may use nuclear weapons is spelt out as: “Although the precise contingencies in which Pakistan may use nuclear weapons have not been articulated or even defined by the government, the assumption has been that if the enemy launches a war and undertakes a piercing attack to occupy large territories or communications junctions, the *weapon of last resort* would have to be invoked.”

These views raise several questions: Is this merely rhetoric designed to deter India through a doctrine of irrationality? Or, is it a carefully considered policy option that will positively be executed when the chips are down? Do the Pakistanis seriously believe that they can act out their deterrence pronouncements and get away with it? Or, is it a grotesque bluff in the high-stakes game of nuclear poker? Deterrence, as is well known, is ultimately a mind game. Indian analysts and policy planners have debated these questions at length as India’s conventional military strategy for a future war with Pakistan hinges around the answers to these, as it did during Operation Parakram.

In an interview with CBS TV in October 2000, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan’s military ruler, asserted that Pakistan could use its nuclear bomb against India if its security is jeopardized. It is a suicidal policy indeed for Pakistani defense planners and policy makers to glibly talk of initiating nuclear exchanges with India without...
having an escalation dominance capability, and knowing fully well that their country would be wiped out from the map regardless of how much damage their nuclear weapons may cause to India.

The main weakness of this argument is that if the Pakistani ruling elite, dominated as it has always been by the military establishment, believes that India would not respond with countervalue and counterforce strikes to a tactical nuclear strike on its armed forces in the field, it would be tempted to launch such a strike during the early stages of a conventional conflict. However, several Indian analysts are not convinced by this logic, as they believe that the Pakistanis are as rational as any other nuclear power and will not likely risk the destruction of their country by starting a nuclear war.

Bharat Karnad is of the following view: “In the South Asian context, any use of nuclear weapons is tactical use, which the Indian Government has wisely foresworn.”\textsuperscript{13} He quotes and agrees with a policy statement made by former defense minister George Fernandes that “Indian nuclear weapons are for strategic deterrence, not for tactical use,” and writes that not nuclearizing the Prithvi missile makes ample military sense.\textsuperscript{14} Pravin Sawhney has written: “Pakistan knows a nuclear counter-strike would be devastating to its existence….A pre-emptive nuclear strike or an early employment of nuclear weapons in a conventional war is ruled out.”\textsuperscript{15}

In Kapil Kak’s view, “India’s self-imposed compulsions of strategic restraint rule out employment of tactical nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{16} He cites the difficulties of retaining centralization of decision making in tactical nuclear warfare and gives the example of a corps commander “in a distressing operational situation, with possibly no contact with higher authorities, [who] may be tempted to employ whatever weapons he possesses,” and quotes Henry Kissinger to state that the danger comes “not so much through the action of the “mad major of the horror stories of accidental war” as through the best judgment of a hard pressed officer in the confusion of combat.”\textsuperscript{17} Lt. Gen. A. M. Vohra (Retd.) is of the view that a limited war using conventional weapons between two nuclear-armed neighbors is possible and that “this was not likely to lead to a nuclear weapons exchange due to the devastation this would cause, which could lead to the annihilation of both.”\textsuperscript{18}

According to the first army doctrine published by the Indian Army Training Command (ARTRAC) in 1999, “the Indian Army believes in fighting the war in enemy territory. If forced into a war, the aim of our offensive[s] would be to apply a sledgehammer blow to the enemy. The Indian Army’s concept of waging war is to ensure
a decisive victory and to ensure that conflict termination places us at an advantageous position. In a future Indo-Pak war in the plains, should India pursue a proactive strategy and launch an offensive with one or more strike corps across the international boundary, supported massively by the IAF, India’s mechanized spearheads are likely to achieve major operational level gains in three to five days and strategic gains soon thereafter, as the Pakistanis themselves readily concede. Pakistan may then be forced to commit its strategic reserves, that is, either one or both the Army Reserves North (ARN) and South (ARS) and risk their destruction in detail or exercise its nuclear option. A large number of Indian analysts are inclined to believe that Pakistan is likely to resort to the early use of nuclear weapons, especially when it can justify their use as a defensive measure of the last resort on its own soil against Indian mechanized forces.

However, the professed military utility of blunting a major armored offensive with nuclear weapons is debatable, as the attacker would ensure that he does not present a concentrated target at any time during an offensive. Since mechanized forces move forward, well dispersed and Indian forces advancing into Pakistan are likely to “button down,” that is close down the cupolas of their tanks and infantry combat vehicles (ICVs) one nuclear warhead—dropped over one combat command will not result in more than 30 to 40 soldiers being killed and a slightly larger number being wounded. It may result in a maximum of eight to ten AFVs being destroyed. A second nuke being dropped over the other leading combat command will achieve similar destruction. Will such employment of nuclear weapons halt the Indian offensive? It is extremely unlikely to do so, as the division commander would move his reserves forward and resume the offensive after the initial fallout has settled down.

If the Indian Army is deterred by the threat of early use of nuclear weapons, it would be left with the option to plan to seize a long though narrow strip of Pakistani territory virtually all along the front by launching a number of limited, shallow-objective offensives without ringing Pakistan’s nuclear alarm bells. However, this type of “broad-front, shallow-objective” offensive planning is unlikely to dissuade Pakistan from practicing its peculiar brand of jihad through a cocktail of terrorism and aggressive actions across the LoC a la Kargil. Most Indian military planners believe that the only sensible option for India would be to call Pakistan’s nuclear bluff and plan to launch deep offensive operations to achieve substantial gains in as early a time frame as militarily possible.
While there are advocates of shallow-objective limited-offensives across a wide front in the Indian Army, most senior officers are convinced that the strike corps must plan to launch deep offensives and that only such a policy would ensure failsafe deterrence. They take the view that while India may choose to fight a limited war in certain cases, as it did in Kargil, it is prepared to upgrade its military response to “all out” conventional war if the situation so demands. The army leadership believes that once this realization dawns on the Pakistanis, they are unlikely to act irrationally and use tactical nuclear weapons to checkmate an Indian offensive, knowing fully well that a massive Indian nuclear countervalue and counterforce response will mean the end of Pakistan as a viable nation-state. However, this strategy naturally needs strong political will to succeed and so far, Indian political leaders have failed to exhibit the type of resolve that is necessary to convince an adversary that India will mean business when push comes to shove.

Clearly, many in the political leadership and in the Indian armed forces believe that there is space for a limited conventional war below the nuclear threshold. As India’s defense minister, George Fernandes had said on many occasions that India could fight and win a limited war because it would be suicidal for Pakistan to resort to the use of nuclear weapons. It was in this context that Gen. V. P. Malik, former Indian chief of army staff had said during a seminar titled “The Challenge of Limited War: Parameters and Options” at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, on January 6, 2000, that there is space for offensive operations even under the shadow of a nuclear umbrella. The former chief of the air staff, and Adm. Sushil Kumar, former chief of the naval staff (who was the naval chief during the Kargil conflict) also hold similar views. Only offensive operations enable “the deepest, most rapid and simultaneous destruction of enemy defenses possible.” In a nuclear environment, the “deepest, most rapid and simultaneous destruction” of the enemy poses considerable difficulty. This is even more particularly so when the adversary’s perceived nuclear threshold is low—as is the case with Pakistan.

The key question of what will constitute military objectives during offensive operations in limited war remains to be debated. It is well recognized that the concept of attacking the enemy’s center of gravity is key to all operational design. In a complex organism like a divisional or corps-level field formation, some important components are more vital than others to the smooth and efficient operation of the
whole. “If these can be damaged or destroyed, their loss unbalances the entire structure, producing a cascading deterioration in cohesion and effectiveness, which may result in complete failure, and which will invariably leave the force vulnerable to further damage.”

The correct identification of the enemy’s center of gravity and the planning and successful execution of actions to expose it to attack and destroy it are the essence of operational art.

Due to the ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA), the mass of enemy forces is no longer the most vulnerable and operationally important asset of the enemy. The center of gravity of field formations is increasingly shifting towards their reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition (RSTA), intelligence, communications, and command and control systems, and long-range fire delivery means. Logistics bases and lines of communications are also important enemy assets, particularly in the mountains. The Indian armed forces are convinced that in future war, the military aim must be to destroy Pakistan’s war waging machine completely and forever by launching joint air land offensives employing conventional forces. All of these objectives can only be achieved if deep sledgehammer blows are launched jointly by the Indian Army and air force during the next war with Pakistan.

However, some Indian analysts do believe that limited war in the Indian context implies specifically targeted strikes across the LoC to destroy the sanctuaries provided by Pakistan and its army to the so-called mujahideen terrorists, including hot pursuit, so that they are unable to infiltrate and indulge in wanton acts of terrorism in J&K. They believe that such strikes would remain limited to the LoC and that escalation can be controlled so that the strikes would not result in a larger conflict. This thinking is deeply flawed, as such strikes will, first, be of little military consequence and, second, will result in a vigorous Pakistani retaliation at places where the Pakistanis hold the dominating heights on the LoC, which will then force the Indian Army to also retaliate across the LoC. The situation would eventually spin out of control. B. Raman, a senior former intelligence officer, has written: “To talk of limited military action in the form of hot pursuit of terrorists, hit-and-run raids, and air strikes on their training camps in Pakistani territory is to exhibit a surprising and worrisome ignorance of ground realities and a lack of understanding of a decades-long proxy war.”

Though the army and the air force consult each other much more frequently now than was the case even a few years earlier when both would plan their operations at the Services HQ levels independently.
and leave it to their command HQ to coordinate as well as they could, there are still some gray areas in jointly planning the conduct of an air land (or land air, as the army prefers to call it!) campaign and differences continue to persist. Praveen Swami has written: “There has been little progress in realizing one of the key premises of an Indian offensive posture, an effective joint service strategy. The air force, for example, insists that at least a week of bombing is needed before ground troops can cross the border. The army insists that no war will last long enough for such an extravagance to be useful.”

**Planning and Preparation for War**

It is in the backdrop of these beliefs that the Indian Army planned its operations during Operation Parakram. For the record, the mobilization began on December 15, 2001, after a decision of the CCS to this effect, presumably in consultation with the COAS who was also the chairman COSC, and was completed on January 3, 2002. It finally ended on October 16, 2002, when the CCS belatedly recognized that the law of diminishing returns had been operative for many months already. As a face-saving device the CCS declared that the troops were being given orders for “strategic re-location” and that a constant vigil will be maintained, particularly in J&K.

The army’s mobilization plan, which is reviewed periodically and updated as new railway lines are laid and new roads or upgraded bridges are built, was put into effect immediately. There was virtually no prior warning. Frequently practiced drills ensured that the fighting echelons were ready to move out of their peacetime cantonments within six to eight hours. While the reconnaissance parties moved out on “first line” transport (vehicles integral to each unit) and headed for their planned deployment areas, the actual movement of the main body of each unit had to await the allotment of “second and third line” transport (troops and store carrying vehicles that are held by division- and corps-level transport battalions of the Army Service Corps, respectively, and civilian hired transport (CHT). Approximately 2,500 CHTs and 500 special trains were employed to move combatants, fighting vehicles, guns, telecom equipment, ammunition, rations, fuel oil and lubricants (FOL), and other stores to the J&K, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Gujarat borders—some from as far away as eastern India.

While the formation HQ and units with a defensive operational role headed straight for their predesignated deployment areas and

10.1057/9780230118768 - The India-Pakistan Military Standoff, Edited by Zachary S. Davis
began to firm in their defenses, those on the order of battle (ORBAT) of the three strike corps moved to their concentration areas and, in some cases, interim concentration areas to marry up with their other arms counterparts, form all-arms combat teams, and await orders for being launched across the IB into Pakistan—a cherished dream of every Indian soldier. That those orders never came shall remain an everlasting regret at least for the younger officers and men who were raring to go and found it frustrating to wait endlessly for the political leaders to make up their minds.

The defensive (holding or pivot) corps deployed on the western front were ready for battle within 72 to 96 hours of receiving the order to mobilize for war with the exception of protective and defensive antipersonnel and antitank mines that take longer to lay. Cantonments of the defensive formations are so located that such a readiness state can be achieved within a short time frame. The defensive formations then set about improving their defenses and laying mines—something that had never been done since the 1971 war with Pakistan, not even during the Kargil conflict in 1999. This in itself was a major battle indicator that the army meant business and that India was not bluffing. These formations also carried out full dress rehearsals of plans for counterattacks and physically tested their plans for launching limited offensive operations across the IB while maintaining secrecy, surprise, and deception by showing their activities over much wider frontages. Each holding or pivot corps in the plains has the capability to launch at least division-size limited offensive operations either with integral resources or with additional resources placed temporarily under command. These can be launched independently or in conjunction with the major offensive operations of the strike corps.

However, the three strike corps took almost three weeks to complete their mobilization. Not only are their fighting echelons located in cantonments at large distances from the IB, but also because of their large armor and infantry combat vehicle (ICV) holdings, as well as their relatively much larger recovery and bridging vehicle fleets, they also require large quantities of railway rolling stock for moving to their concentration areas. There is also a need to build in some deception plans into the mobilization and deployment of strike corps so that the adversary is kept guessing till almost the last moment about plans to launch them. This means that some of their formations and units have to initially move to areas that are well away from the intended launch pad so as to hide the real intention and to present a much wider front as the area of responsibility (AOR). Hence, it was only in the first week
of January 2002 that major offensive action could have been undertaken with the participation of the land forces. The need to reduce the mobilization time of the strike corps was one of the major lessons of the ten-month long Indo-Pak military standoff.

This time the mobilization was total. All leave was canceled and the soldiers recalled for active duty. Almost all the training establishments of the army were closed down and the officers, junior commissioned officers (JCOs) and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who were undergoing training returned to rejoin their units. Extensive operational familiarization exercises were conducted and operational plans were war-gamed, updated, and refined. Ammunition trains had fetched up with reserve stocks and forward ammunition points had been established. In the first week of January 2002, expectation had reached fever pitch, morale was at an all time high, and the officers and troops eagerly awaited orders to be allowed to cross the IB. However, they had no way of knowing that the national aim was to practice coercive diplomacy.

The long-drawn deployment on the borders was utilized by the army to train its units and fighting formations in as realistic a war scenario as is possible, short of war—something the army had not done at such a scale for many decades primarily due to shortage of funds. The last major exercise was Exercise Brass Tacks IV that was conducted by General Sundarji as COAS in 1986–1987. This had become an issue of concern between India and Pakistan and had to be curtailed and redesigned so that it was conducted from south to west around Bikaner in northern Rajasthan, rather than east to west in the direction of Pakistan as it had been actually planned.

The frontline equipment of the army was undoubtedly subjected to high levels of wear and tear in ten months. The sand of Rajasthan and the dust of Punjab cause extensive damage to gun barrels, no matter how well capped, vehicle engines and gun APUs (auxiliary propulsion units), and to moving parts. Communication equipment that have a limited life cycle of usage, some as little as only 8,000 hours, would have been almost completely run down in ten months of daily usage. If telephone cables are left laid for that long and tanks and ICVs are constantly moving around in the area, only a small length can be retrieved for further use. Huge quantities of spare parts too would have been used up and will take several years to replace. As is well known, the equipment and ammunition consumed during the Kargil conflict were still being made up when Operational Parakram began.
The Indian Army also addressed the serious shortcomings in training that the initial mobilization revealed. There were unacceptably large casualties in mine-laying accidents, while handling ammunition in the field and in traffic accidents. It was officially stated that till March 15, 2002, “the army had lost 176 men in Operation Parakram as a result of mishaps in minefields, mishandling of ammunition and explosives and traffic accidents,” wrote Keith Flory and quoting Indian war veterans, added that this was due to “inexperience.” Later, quoting the defense minister’s statement in parliament, the Times of India reported, “During Operation Parakram up to July 2003, a total number of 798 army personnel suffered casualties.”

This does not compare favorably with the death of 527 soldiers during the Kargil conflict in 1999 that saw 50 days of intense action.

Mine-laying activities on mobilization and mine-lifting operations after Operation Parakram was called off produced the most casualties. About 10.5 lakh (1.05 million) mines were laid and subsequently cleared almost completely manually because the equipment purchased for mechanical mine clearance arrived only after de-mining had been completed. Besides the casualties sustained by army troops while laying and removing mines, local civilians also suffered immensely. Hundreds of civilians died or were maimed and thousands of cattle were killed when these animals strayed into the minefields. These are heavy costs to have incurred when war did not even break out. Clearly, the army’s mine-laying methodology, the training, and the system adopted for the marking of minefields to keep civilians and cattle out needs substantial improvement.

The cost of sustaining Operation Parakram over a ten-month period was reported to have been pegged by India’s National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) at Rupees 7 crore a day. This works out to approximately Rupees 2,100 crore (about U.S.$470 million) over ten months and, presumably, does not include the cost of mobilization and the cost of sending the troops back to the barracks. Another report estimated the total cost of mobilization as U.S.$600 million and the cost of replacement of worn-out and damaged equipment as U.S.$1.5 billion. Yet another report estimated the total cost of the massive deployment as Rupees 8,000 crore ($1.7 billion). Aditi Phadnis has calculated the total cost of the operation as Rupees 6,500 crore ($1.4 billion) and writes that as per Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan also spent U.S.$1.4 billion. Still another estimate puts the total cost of Operation Parakram at U.S.$2 billion. Former defense minister George Fernandes told parliament on October 20, 2002,
that Operation Parakram had cost the nation Rupees 8,000 crore, “excluding the Rupees 300 crore compensation paid to people in the border states where troops were deployed.”

ACHIEVEMENTS AND LESSONS: COLD START AND INTEGRATED BATTLE GROUPS

While the troops deployed along the IB with Pakistan remained in a ready-to-go mode for ten months and finally went back without firing a shot, it was business as usual along the LoC in J&K. Though all the formations of Northern Command deployed on the LoC responded to Pakistani firing with punitive retaliation specifically targeted at forward bunkers and battalion and brigade HQ, the intensity of Indian artillery concentrations was much more vigorous in the Gurez and Dras sectors, as in these sectors a large number of new defensive positions had been established during and after the Kargil conflict in 1999, and there were several skirmishes aimed at dominating the LoC and achieving moral ascendancy.

In the Gurez Sector a new post was established at Point 4444 literally on the LoC and Pakistan responded with over 3,500 rounds of artillery fire over the summer of 2002, but not only did it fail to dislodge the defenders, it was also unable to cause either casualties or material damage. However, it responded with a small intrusion in the neighboring Machal sector by surreptitiously occupying Point 3260, a small ring contour that was about 800 meters on the Indian side of the LoC in the last week of July 2002. The Indian response was swift and massive. Air strikes were called in and the artillery fired over 5,000 rounds in under a week. When an infantry battalion finally launched an assault to evict the intruders, it was a mere formality. Reeling under the artillery onslaught, they had slipped back into POK under the cover of darkness. In this episode, massive punishment was inflicted on the Pakistani brigade HQ at Kel in POK. Though the Pakistani DGMO is said to have protested, he was apparently told to tell his troops where the LoC ran, both on ground and on the map, so that they could stick to their side of it.

STRIKE CORPS PLANS

A persistent mystery that may not be solved conclusively for quite some time is the plans and locations, or, more accurately, the initial and final plans and locations of India’s three armor and mechanized
forces–based strike corps. Traditionally, the three strike corps are expected to be prepared to launch offensive action across the IB in the plains sector of Jammu-Pathankot or the plains of Punjab, in the semidesert sector of northern Rajasthan and in the desert sector of Rajasthan in the areas Jaisalmer-Barmer. They also train for and practice their secondary roles in other sectors either to reinforce success or to be launched in tandem with other strike corps. As would be expected, each one of them is ready to act as a countervailing force should the other two strike corps be nominated to launch offensive operations as well as to stabilize the situation if the defensive battle of the holding (or pivot corps as these are now called) does not go as planned and appears to become unmanageable.

There has been widespread speculation about General Padmanabhan’s plans to employ these strike corps for offensive operations during Operation Parakram. Opinion is evenly divided about plans for offensive operations in January 2002. Kanwar Sandhu wrote at that time: “The Indian Army will launch multiple attacks across a wide front to force Pakistan to thin out its defensive deployment and throw Pakistan’s strike capabilities off-balance.” However, others were of the view that in both of the so-called windows of opportunity, offensive action would have remained limited to fighting across the LoC in J&K. Drawing on the collective wisdom of a large number of analysts, mainly retired army and air force officers, Raj Chengappa and Shishir Gupta painted the scenarios of “salami slicing” (capturing small swathes of territory across the LoC) and “POK chop” (a major advance towards Skardu from the Kargil sector) as the only really feasible options for offensive operations during Operation Parakram.

Some analysts have deduced that India had concentrated all three of its strike corps in the Rajasthan sector in May 2002. Pravin Sawhney has written: “The Indian army had all its three strike corps poised in the Rajasthan desert. The military thinking was that once the balloon went up, instead of seeking multiple thrusts in POK, the army would cross the border boldly in the Thar Desert.” In a book coauthored by him with Lt. Gen. V. K. Sood (Retd.), the two have said much the same thing and deduced that the Indian Army does not believe in the concept of limited war, that the army believes that Pakistan will not use its nuclear weapons early in a war, and that India’s political leaders were deterred by Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Criticizing this line of thinking, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (Retd.), former director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA),
New Delhi, had this to say while reviewing their book: “What is dangerous is the running thread in the book which argues for bold use of military force to achieve ‘decisive results’ while Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, judged as superior to ours, would not be used. On the other hand, the concept of limited war in nuclear conditions is rubbish, perhaps because the authors have not thought through all the issues carefully. If we were to accept the thesis of the book, the choice is either nuclear exchange or status quo.”

Perhaps the most important lesson that emerged from the long standoff with Pakistan was the inordinately long time that India’s strike corps needed to mobilize for war. By the time these elite formations were ready to deliver a massive punch, the international community had prevailed on India to give General Musharraf an opportunity to prove his sincerity in curbing cross-border terrorism. These strike corps are also designed to penetrate deep into Pakistan and run the risk of crossing Pakistan’s nuclear threshold early during an offensive campaign. Praveen Swami has written:

“You could certainly question why we are so dependent on our strike formations,” he said, “and why my holding Corps don’t have the capability to do the same tasks from a cold start. This is something I have worked on while in office. Perhaps, in time, it will be our military doctrine.”

Since then the army has worked overtime to reduce the mobilization time and come up with a new offensive doctrine that would achieve the desired military objectives without risking nuclear warfare. After deliberation at length during the biannual conference of its commanders-in-chief, the army announced its “Cold Start” doctrine that is to be executed by “integrated battle groups.”

Their massive size makes the present strike corps difficult to concentrate, side step, deploy, and maneuver and virtually rules out surprise and deception. If a fleeting opportunity is to be exploited, the strike formations must be capable of launching an offensive operation from a cold start. Within 72 to 96 hours of the issue of the order for full-scale mobilization, three to five strike division “battle groups,” possibly modeled on Russia’s famed operational maneuver groups (OMGs), must cross the IB straight from the line of march. They should be launching their break-in operations and crossing the “start line” even as the holding (defensive) divisions are completing their deployment on the forward obstacles. Only such simultaneity of
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operations will unhinge the enemy, break his cohesion, and paralyze him into making mistakes from which he will not be able to recover.

While one division-size battle group each should be allotted to the holding (pivot) corps for providing an offensive punch to them, the others will need to be so structured that they are capable of independent action. These should also be designated as theater and Army HQ reserves. Each one will need to be specifically structured to achieve given objectives in the terrain in which it is expected to be launched and yet be flexible enough for two or more of them to fight dispersed under a corps HQ to bring to bear the combined weight of their combat power on a common depth objective. Also, a certain amount of relocation of offensive strike formations will be necessary to enable them to move quickly from cold start to their designated assembly areas and be ready to launch across the IB. Additional tank transporter vehicles will need to be acquired to reduce mobilization time and reduce the need to use railway rolling stock. The Indian Army is working towards achieving these goals.

Another view on the army’s Cold Start doctrine merits inclusion as it also discusses the politico-military interface in making this doctrine work during hostilities:44

Cold Start Doctrine is a conceptual move that makes the Indian response to external provocation less predictable and more flexible than the currently employed doctrine of massed offensive, and opens up the possibility of intense but limited and controllable conflicts. It, therefore, poses a credible counter to the Pakistani strategy of state-sponsored terrorism combined with nuclear blackmail.

The key lesson of Operation Parakram was that an offensive strategy structured for dismemberment of Pakistan proved to be too inflexible to be calibrated to the prevailing geopolitical situation.

The Cold Start doctrine has many merits…[but]…would be a non-starter without civilian institutions that can develop the political framework and objectives to support a rapid response doctrine, and without a politico-military command structure that can withstand the increased decision making tempo generated by the intense combat operations…. It should be noted that the publicly reported parts of Cold Start are conspicuously vague on details of how air or naval power would be employed, and they reveal the army-centric focus of the proposed doctrine. A truncated Cold Start such as this would certainly find much greater political acceptance.

Whether or not the long military deployment achieved the laid down political and military objectives will remain a debatable issue for many
years. In fact, it is not at all clear whether any military objectives were actually assigned. When asked whether the deployment of troops was aimed at attacking Pakistan, General Padmanabhan, the COAS, said: “There were many aims, which were fulfilled.” The army chief also said, “I am in favour of the army’s re-disposition. Its mission in the border has been substantially achieved. I was quite happy that I could exercise my army during the period. The strength of the Indian Army is clearly known to the enemy and the message that we are strong enough has been conveyed.” He then went on to add: “Whenever there is a situation calling for the army’s help, the latter’s role should be well defined to avoid confusion.”

Gen. V. P. Malik, General Padmanabhan’s predecessor as COAS, had this to say: “Despite speeches and international commitments … General Musharraf’s efforts to rein in jihadi groups operating against India have remained cosmetic and tactical. … Infiltration across the LoC and other ISI operations continue. … There is no let up in terrorist acts.” Brahma Chellaney was more forthright: “The harsh truth is that the government played a game of bluff not just with Pakistan but also with its own military. … When a nation enjoys credibility, it can usually achieve its objectives with a mere threat to use force. However, when there are serious credibility problems, even modest objectives are difficult to accomplish. Vajpayee ended up practicing coercive non-diplomacy.”

The aim of politico-military coercion is to induce a change in an adversary’s policies and actions through a credible threat of devastating punitive action in case of noncompliance. While trans-LoC terrorism from Pakistan continued, there was a definite reduction in its intensity. On the other hand, Pakistan steadfastly refused to terminate the activities of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), detain their leaders and block their funds, or to hand over even one of the 20 terrorists that India had demanded. Training camps and other facilities for terrorists also continued to operate in POK. Hence, the aim of Operation Parakram was only partially achieved and the credibility of India’s coercive diplomacy and military superiority was seriously undermined.

Most strategic analysts in India were concerned at this development. Air Chief Marshal A. Y. Tipnis (Retd.), former chief of air staff, said: “We have shown enormous patience, now it’s time to show we have resolve too. Inaction is damaging our credibility; people have begun to believe India incapable of taking any action.” Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar (Retd.), Director, United Service Institute of
India (a tri-Service institution modeled on the Royal United Services Institution, London), a former DGMO and United Nations force commander in former Yugoslavia wrote:

After all the posturing and jingoism, we have emerged true to type as a nation, which cannot take pain or injury where our self-respect is at stake. As a result we capitulate to the pressure applied by our adversary in threatening retaliation with war should we attack the terrorist leaders and their cadres across the Line of Control or the International Border, and by raising the nuclear bogey. . . . Pakistan’s generals have convinced themselves of this attribute of our political masters and intelligentsia. . . . I am convinced that we have lost an opportunity to hit back at the terrorists who have been playing havoc with our system over the last few years. If anyone in the system seriously believes that assurances apparently given by General Musharraf to American interlocutors and commended for acceptance by our leadership are anything more than expediency to tide over the current pressure, they should have their heads examined.

Several analysts have recommended partial mobilization and a graduated response to future crises to increase the options available and enable a more face-saving withdrawal if it becomes necessary. Lt. Gen. Pran Pahwa (Retd.) has written:

Mobilization of ground troops is slow, cumbersome and expensive. . . . [Perhaps] only the air force should be out on full alert initially to exert pressure on the enemy and the ground troops should be mobilized later on if still required. Even for offensive action, the air force should be preferred to ground troops because its disengagement involves no problems and its actions can be terminated quickly. Ground forces get physically involved and it requires all sorts of preparation and negotiations before they can be disengaged from the enemy.

Another major reason for not having gone to war even when a casus belli existed, and the international community would have supported at least limited trans-LoC offensive action and air strikes, if not a large-scale conventional conflict in the plains, was the lack of decisive conventional superiority. Over the last few decades India’s defense budget has declined in real terms even as the commitments of the armed forces, particularly the army, increased manifold and no real modernization has taken place. General V. P. Malik, former COAS, has pointed out the adverse consequences of a decline in the defense budget from 3.5 to 2.5 percent of the GDP during the 1990s.
When mobilization began in December 2002, Vijayanta tanks of 1970s vintage, artillery guns that were even older and many other obsolete or obsolescent equipment were in frontline service. Analysts pegged the overall Indo-Pak army combat force ratio at approximately 1.15:1.0 during Operation Parakram. Speaking as an MP in the Rajya Sabha less than a week after mobilization was ordered, Gen. Shankar Roychowdhury (Retd.), former COAS, blamed the “recurrent political controversies on military procurement in the last 15 years” for having “crippled the army’s weapons modernization programme.”

The slender edge that India had could have led to nothing but a stalemate, and Indian defense planners are acutely conscious of the fact that a stalemate between a large and a much smaller country amounts to victory for the smaller country. Vice Adm. Premvir Das (Retd.) has written: “The . . . constraint which has prevented us from being proactive is that we do not enjoy the type of asymmetry in military power against our adversary that we need to have. Without decisive superiority, it is just not feasible to undertake punitive measures of any real value.”

Lt. Gen. A. M. Vohra has also expressed similar views. “Operation Parakram came to a close without going to war because of the intrinsic limitations of military power of middle-order nations [like India] whose superiority is marginal.” Rear Adm. Raja Menon (Retd.) wrote: “India is reluctant to mount a cross-border operation because of our strategy, our weapon systems don’t give us the capability to ‘prevent’ the operation from turning horribly messy. We don’t have surgical capability.” Some analysts started a scare scenario by saying that Pakistan had tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) that it could use against army columns early on during a war and this was sited as another reason for the government’s indecision.

While territorial conquests have definitely lost relevance, limited war will continue to dominate events in Southern Asia. The destruction of vital components of the enemy’s military machine will remain a key factor in conventional conflict. Deterrence will hinge on the ability to cause unacceptable damage to enemy forces, resulting in their paralysis and near collapse, thereby forcing the enemy to the negotiating table. However, such destruction will be caused not so much during the contact battle but by long-range weapons systems such as those of the artillery, including SSMs and air-to-ground strikes by FGA aircraft, and attack helicopters of the air force.
Finally, it would be instructive to visualize the long-term impact of Operation Parakram. Lt. Gen. Vinay Shankar has written: 58 “Our future strategy for dealing with Pakistan would depend on the answer to a single question: have the Pakistani military and political elite begun to change their belief that Kashmir can still be secured and India kept destabilized [sic] through its combination of covert war and nuclear blackmail? While some stray voices are being heard, it would appear that hardliners within the Pakistan establishment need further convincing.”

Though the ongoing Indo-Pak rapprochement process is now being described as “irreversible” a change of guard in the Pakistan leadership can and probably will turn the clock back again. As long as the Pakistan Army continues to exercise a tight stranglehold over the country’s polity, has unbridled control over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, retains its unjustifiable size of approximately 500,000 personnel in uniform, and enjoys American patronage as a frontline state and MNNA status, brings with it new military equipment and loan waivers and rescheduling of loan payments on easier terms over longer periods, it will have no incentive to move towards genuine peace with India. The Kashmir issue is only a symptom of a much larger fundamental malaise. The Southern Asian region is likely to continue to witness periodic bouts of hostility between India and Pakistan, tempered by short interludes of tentative peace. In as much as this, Operation Parakram achieved only limited political objectives, and a great opportunity to strike at the remaining roots of terrorism in POK was once again squandered.

**APPENDIX: POLICY PLANNING PROCESSES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY**

India’s national security decision-making apparatus is built around the inviolable principle of civilian control over the military. This has been the case since the early days after independence from the British in 1947. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, strode like a colossus over the strategic landscape and, though a firm believer in grass-roots democracy and the Whitehall committee system for the functioning of government, neither sought nor encouraged the views of the armed forces chiefs for strategic decision making.

Since then, India’s national security decision-making apparatus has gradually evolved into one that is well structured in concept but often, especially during peacetime, faulty in execution. In India’s Cabinet system of government, based on the Westminster model, the prime minister (PM) is the chief executive even though the president is the supreme commander of the armed
forces. The apex body responsible for all planning and decision making on matters relating to national security is the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) headed by the PM.

Parallel to the CCS and with almost the same membership, is the National Security Council (NTSC). This too is headed by the PM. The only real difference between the composition of the CCS and the NTSC, as constituted at present, is that the National Security Advisor (NASH) and the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission are also in attendance when the NTSC meets. The NASH is assisted by the Strategic Policy Group (SPG), which is a committee of Secretaries to the government of India and the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) that comprises eminent national security experts who are mostly retired bureaucrats, diplomats, armed forces officers, strategic analysts, and former intelligence officers. Secretariat support to the NTSC is provided by the erstwhile Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) that has now been re-constituted into the NTSC Secretariat. During the May-August 1999 Kargil conflict, the CCS was reported to have met quite often. The NTSC has been convened only twice in its present avatar. Hence, it can justifiably be deduced that in practice, the CCS is now discharging the functions of political guidance and oversight in the higher direction of war and that the NTSC concept is yet to mature fully.

The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) is the highest professional advisory body on military matters. It works by consensus and is only a recommendatory body with no real executive powers. In 2002, the tri-Service Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) was constituted. However, the IDS is still without a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) at its head. In a nuclear environment, where single-point military advice to the Cabinet is de rigueur, not having a CDS even after constituting a joint planning staff is a regressive step.

**Nuclear Command Authority**

It has been unambiguously established that India’s duly elected PM, as the head of the Cabinet and the CCS, exercises ultimate control over all nuclear weapons and the planning process for their utilization, if deterrence ever fails. On January 4, 2003, the CCS adopted and made public the key elements of India’s nuclear doctrine and Command and Control structure. The PM and the CCS now comprise India’s National Command Authority (NCA). In the NCA, the “Political Council” headed by the PM, is the “sole” authority for ordering a nuclear strike. The Political Council is advised by an “Executive Council” which is headed by the NASH. The Executive Council provides inputs and advice to the Political Council and executes its decisions through the chairman, COSC and the commander-in-chief Strategic Forces Command.

Pre-1998, the PM dealt with the scientists of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) directly and the armed forces were by and large kept
out of the nuclear decision making and advisory loop. However, since the May 1998 Pokhran nuclear tests and India’s declaration that it is now a state with nuclear weapons, this acute failing is now being gradually corrected.

NOTES

4. Ibid.
7. The author was commanding the Gurez infantry brigade group deployed along the LoC in northern Kashmir when Operation Parakram commenced. This brigade group was essentially responsible for ensuring the territorial integrity of the LoC and for counterinfiltration. Plans for offensive operations are only communicated to commanders of offensive and reserve formations. Hence, the author has no personal knowledge of offensive plans.
8. “(The Union War Book) is a check list of administrative actions that governments of the center, in the states, and in the union territories must take when war is apprehended, and when it actually occurs. Ministries, departments, and the armed forces have separate war books flowing from the UWB to spell out internal measures as well as action to be taken in concert with one another when war breaks out.” Mukund B. Kunte, “The War Book,” Statesman, September 25, 2002.
14. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
20. In an interview with the *Hindustan Times*, George Fernandes said: “Pakistan can’t think of using nuclear weapons despite the fact that they are not committed to the doctrine of no first use like we are. We could take a strike, survive, and then hit back. Pakistan would be finished. I do not really fear that the nuclear issue would figure in a conflict.” Swati Chaturvedi, “We Could Take a (Nuclear) Strike, Survive and Then Hit Back,” *Hindustan Times*, December 30, 2001.
21. In an interview with *The Indian Express*, Air Chief Marshal S. K. Sareen (Retd.) said: “For Pakistan to use nuclear weapons against India would be suicidal. Pakistan is aware of our superior nuclear capabilities…any use by Pakistan of nuclear weapons would be self-defeating.” Gaurav C. Sawant, “We Must Not Climb Down,” *Indian Express*, January 6, 2002.
22. In an interview with *The Indian Express*, Adm. Sushil Kumar (Retd.) said: Nuclear wars are not meant to be fought…Pakistan has a professional armed force and they realize that in case they do resort to a strike there will be retaliation. It would be lunacy for them to start one.” Gaurav C. Sawant, “Nuclear Wars are Not Meant to be Fought, Especially Between Nuclear Powers,” *The Indian Express*, January 6, 2002.
36. Raghuvanshi, “As Pullback Begins, India Counts Costs.”
50. Pahwa, “Some Thoughts on Military Mobilisation.”
52. Saikat Datta has written: “The army’s efforts are to improve its conventional capability from a ratio of 1.14:1.00 to 1.5:1.00 vis-à-vis Pakistan.” “Big is Beautiful for Indian Forces,” *Indian Express*, September 19, 2003. Similarly, an article in the *Asian Age* pointed out: “In 1971 the combat ratio of India and Pakistan was 1.75:1.00. It fell to 1.56:1.00 in 1990 and to 1.22:1.00 in 1999,” said an official. “Army Modernisation to Stop War,” *Asian Age*, April 6, 2003. Praveen Swami’s figures are also similar: “India’s real advantage over Pakistan in actual military terms is as low as 1.25:1.00, and perhaps even worse. Pakistan’s single-point military control gives it greater flexibility of action than the Indian Army.
and some western expert accounts suggest that its modernization programme has been more effective than that of India.” “War and Games,” *Frontline*, February 15, 2002.


56. Rear Adm. Raja Menon (Retd.), “600,000 Men, 3,000 Tanks Should Not be the Sum Total of India’s Response,” *Indian Express*, May 21, 2002.


PART III

MANAGING THE
NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT
Chapter 4

What Was Done to Achieve Strategic Stability during the Cold War? Lessons for South Asia?

Michael O. Wheeler

Introduction

In this chapter, I address three major questions:

- How did strategic stability enter into American nuclear policy, doctrine, and operations during the cold war, and why?
- What cold war nuclear practices or activities were the most stabilizing and which were the most destabilizing?
- What lessons do we take away from the superpower cold war nuclear experiences for thinking about strategic stability in South Asia today?

Although the above questions are phrased in terms of “stability,” it is more appropriate to approach the analysis thinking first of “instabilities” or, more accurately, conditions or circumstances that give rise to instabilities. Consider the following analogy. In developing a missile that can accurately strike a target at long distances, one does not engineer accuracy into the missile system so much as take instabilities out by identifying and then changing or otherwise mitigating those features of the missile system and its subsystems that result in inaccuracies. This same logic applies to the concept of strategic stability, especially as it emerged in the strategic nuclear competition between the superpowers in the cold war. The two sides over time
identified and then sought to deal with nuclear instabilities that basically were of two kinds. First there were *system instabilities* where national security was threatened by unconstrained nuclear arms races, unconstrained nuclear proliferation, views that the other side thought war was inevitable and was preparing accordingly, and the like. Those are the sorts of conditions that can give rise to a pronounced sense of insecurity pervasive enough to lead to consideration of preventive or preemptive military strategies. Second, there were *crisis instabilities* where, as a result of how the sides developed, deployed, postured, controlled, and operated their nuclear forces, the risk emerged that their actions in a crisis (deliberate, accidental, or unauthorized) could be misinterpreted and trigger a nuclear response.

Nuclear instabilities of the systemic sort are the most amenable to dampening through formal arms control activities and political decisions on both sides that increase transparency of nuclear activities and operations, while nuclear instabilities of the crisis sort are most effectively dealt with by preventive measures to keep the crises from happening, by unilateral decisions on how one postures and controls one’s nuclear forces, and by more informal cooperative arrangements between adversaries to increase understanding of each other’s nuclear capabilities and procedures.

That said, let me return to the thrust of my argument. Since most of what I discuss is historical in nature and since the questions asked are complex, I must confess at the beginning that I cannot do the issues justice in this short chapter. For lessons to be meaningful to today’s nuclear stability concerns in South Asia, they should be taken from a sound interpretation of cold war nuclear history, not from myth, and that is a profoundly difficult task, given the general state of nuclear history. Let me explain.

History is lived moving forwards but remembered and written with the enormous advantage of hindsight. We cannot put ourselves in the shoes of our predecessors and adopt their mindsets. We have too much information, too much theory, too much time spent reading, discussing, and reflecting on the extensive cold war literature, too much knowledge of what transpired, to hope to see things fresh and anew (and confused) as they were seen then. And we know the outcomes of the story. Harry Truman commented in his memoirs that any intelligent young student, with the value of perfect hindsight, could have made better decisions than he, the president, had to make daily under conditions of incomplete and conflicting information, divided counsel, and constant uncertainty.
It would simplify my task enormously if I could refer the reader to a set of authoritative, comprehensive, cross-cutting histories for the following:

- American nuclear policy, doctrine, and operations in the cold war, especially in the formative phases from 1945 to 1960 that captured the texture and complexity of nuclear decision making at the time.
- Soviet, British, French, and Chinese nuclear policy, doctrine, and operations, and how they intersected the stability equation.
- Complex alliance nuclear interactions, especially for NATO.
- State nuclear programs that were begun covertly and, if begun after or not terminated by the early 1970s, fall outside the framework of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Unfortunately, no such literature exists today. Even the excellent studies we have on national nuclear programs or on specific episodes of nuclear history are tentative and incomplete, and we find nothing in the cold war nuclear history literature comparable to recent scholarship on World War II such as, for instance, Gerhard L. Weinberg’s *A World at War* (1994) or Ernest R. May’s *Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France* (2000). Works such as those are models of what we should be aiming at: descriptions that are objective, rich in structure and detail, approach the subject matter from the point of view of reconstructing how different actors and institutions interact with one another to produce the events that transpire, using original source materials from several different national archives. One result of such scholarship is to help dispel myths and that is of the first order of importance for any analytic study that tries to extract “lessons” from the past.

In the area where I have spent the most time, American nuclear history, we only have bits and pieces of the cold war nuclear story, discrete historical sketches and numerous anecdotes, a few broad histories that cut across the entire scheme, much speculation—and all too many myths. Indeed, in working with the available cold war nuclear history literature one often is left with the uneasy feeling that we find ourselves in a situation like World War II historiography prior to declassification of the spectacular successes in signal intelligence and counterintelligence that helped win the war. In short, we know the surface features of the story. We may not know its underlying dynamics very well, especially dynamics of the sort I am addressing in this chapter.
The evolution of American nuclear policy, doctrine, and operations during the cold war was a lively and convoluted process involving thousands of players over close to 50 years:

- The nine cold war presidents from Harry S. Truman to George Herbert Walker Bush, each with different governing styles and White House staff arrangements and with different approaches to nuclear weapons matters.
- An interagency system in the Executive Branch that evolved from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) that was formed late in World War II, into an elaborate National Security Council (NSC) structure after the National Security Act of 1947, with many changes in how the NSC system worked since its inception and in the role of the national security advisor and the NSC staff—a vibrant work still in progress.
- The Department of Defense (DoD) that also was created by the 1947 legislation, as later amended, to better coordinate the several different military services, to facilitate civilian control of the military, to improve military advice to the president, to divide responsibilities between the uniformed services and the combatant commands, and to give greater discipline to the process for determining defense budgets and programs—again, all activities that evolved tremendously over the course of the cold war and continue to evolve today.
- The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), a civilian agency created by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to control the design, development, and production of nuclear weapons and to oversee the government-owned, contractor-operated nuclear weapons complex where American nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians worked—again, something that has evolved over time into today’s semiautonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) within the Department of Energy (DoE).
- The State Department, and for much of the cold war its semiautonomous Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), where often (but not always) the focus of nuclear diplomacy and arms control policy resided—again, something still in evolution.
- The American Intelligence Community (IC), deriving from the wartime service intelligence branches and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and—after the 1947 National Security Act that created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—a vivacious and continually evolving community ranging across a number of
specialized agencies and covering the entire range of intelligence disciplines.

- Other federal departments and agencies responsible for such things as nuclear export control and policy concerning commercial nuclear power.
- The Congress, with its budget and oversight roles, committee structure, and expert staffs, playing a major but as yet poorly documented or analyzed role in the literature of American nuclear weapons history.
- A plethora of external organizations—e.g., the Council on Foreign Relations, the Federation of American Scientists, the Union of Concerned Scientists, the Arms Control Association—where experts and activists sought to influence nuclear policy.
- University faculties and centers and private or semipublic think tanks such as RAND or IDA, where much of the strategic stability literature of the cold war took shape, and whose members went back and forth into government and served on a number of the external advisory groups addressing nuclear matters—e.g., the General Advisory Group to the AEC, the Defense Department Scientific Advisory Board, the Scientific (later Strategic) Advisory Group first to the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), later to the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and the president’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB).

The above suggests the complexity—indeed, the sheer scope and confusion—of the milieu in which American nuclear thinking emerged, including thinking on strategic stability. What I attempt in this chapter—based on my experiences of some 40 years and ongoing research under way for more than a decade now—is to provide what I believe to be an accurate, objective, and nuanced (but admittedly tentative and incomplete) account of some of the ways in which strategic stability concerns entered into American nuclear weapons policy, doctrine, and operations during the cold war. On the basis of that account, I then will suggest “lessons” applicable to thinking about strategic stability in South Asia today.

**Strategic Stability and American Nuclear Activities during the Cold War**

In July 1945 the United States successfully and secretly tested the world’s first atomic bomb in the high desert plateau of a remote
military facility (what today is the northern corner of White Sands Missile Range) in New Mexico. With the consent of America’s wartime collaborators in the Manhattan Project, President Truman authorized American armed forces to use the bomb against Japan, and the shock of Hiroshima and Nagasaki arguably helped bring the war to a swift end. The Council of Foreign Ministers—the body that the Allies had established at Potsdam to negotiate peace treaties with the European Axis powers—convened in London on September 11, 1945, nine days after Japan’s formal surrender, and immediately deadlocked on almost all important issues. The London meeting ended in disarray one month later. Western authorities believed that a large part of the problem was the unresolved question of what role nuclear weapons would or should play in international politics and whether international control was possible.

The wartime Manhattan Project partners—the United States, Britain, and Canada—convened a summit at the level of heads of government in Washington in early November. Out of that summit came a communiqué calling for the United Nations to take up the issue of international control of atomic energy at its inaugural session the coming January. At a hastily convened foreign ministers’ meeting in Moscow in December, Stalin agreed to this scheme. When the UN General Assembly met for the first time, in London in January 1946, one of its earliest actions was to adopt a resolution establishing a United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) and setting June 14, 1946, as the date when the UNAEC would begin work. That gave a scant six months for states to prepare their initial proposals, a process already under way in the United States in the Acheson-Lilienthal study.

When the UNAEC finally met in June, the head of the American delegation, Bernard Baruch, presented a broad-ranging proposal for international control. Five days later, Andrei Gromyko, representing the Soviet Union, presented a counterproposal. The two schemes were vastly different, and the negotiations quickly deadlocked. They would remain deadlocked through the end of the Truman administration.

When President Eisenhower took office in January 1953, the prospects for serious arms control talks were dim. Earlier that month, a panel chaired by J. Robert Oppenheimer, commissioned eight months earlier by Truman’s secretary of state, Dean Acheson, delivered its report. The Oppenheimer panel had been asked to examine whether new initiatives in nuclear arms control were possible. Oppenheimer, wartime director of the Los Alamos scientific laboratory that designed
and produced the first American atomic bombs, and the key member
of the interagency committee that had put together the report that
became the core of the Baruch plan, shared the belief of his colleagues
that the Soviets were not prepared to negotiate seriously.

Eisenhower studied the Oppenheimer report carefully, directed
his senior advisors to review it, and began to reflect long and hard
on what might be done to engage the Soviet in modest steps on arms
control (Eisenhower was at odds with many of his senior advisors in
this regard). Stalin’s death in March 1953, followed by the “peace
offensive” of the collective leadership that succeeded Stalin, appeared
to provide an opening. In December 1953, at the United Nations
General Assembly, Eisenhower presented his “atoms for peace” pro-
posal. Subsequent negotiations, however, quickly bogged down and
although the talks eventually led to creation of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), they did not—as Eisenhower had
hoped—give birth to a U.S.-Soviet dialogue on beginning to control
the nuclear competition. As Eisenhower recorded in his diaries two
days after the speech: “If we were successful in getting even the tiniest
of starts [with the Soviet leaders], it was believed that gradually this
kind of talk and negotiation might expand into something broader.”

It did not. At the 1955 Geneva Summit, Eisenhower presented an
“open skies” proposal that also went nowhere (at least at the time).

By the late 1950s, a broadly conceived and increasingly dangerous
nuclear arms race was under way between the United States and the
Soviet Union. The British already had tested and acquired nuclear
weapons, and secret nuclear weapons programs had begun in several
countries including, but not limited to, China, France, and Israel.

One area where U.S.-Soviet cooperation appeared possible—and
where public pressure worldwide invited attention—was nuclear test-
ing. Following nuclear experts’ talks in Geneva in the summer of
1958, tripartite (U.S.-UK-USSR) nuclear test ban negotiations began
in October of that year and a nuclear testing moratorium was in place
for all sides.

In June 1960, as the United States approached a presidential elec-
tion where nuclear matters, including an alleged missile gap favoring
the Soviets, were major campaign issues, an academic study group
convened at MIT’s Endicott House near Boston, under the auspices
of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The Summer Study
(as it was called) was intended to examine whether a fresh approach
to nuclear arms control was possible. This study brought together a
nucleus of regular participants augmented by a number of occasional
visitors and contributors. Although the study officially ended by January 1961, its papers and issues continued to be discussed for a number of years, and their organizing theme was strategic stability. The papers and the exercises conducted during the Summer Study refined and sharpened concepts of strategic stability, and several of the most active members of the Summer Study (e.g., Jerome Wiesner and Thomas Schelling) became important advisors to the new Kennedy administration. They and others like Harry Rowen and William Kaufmann served as important links between McNamara and the academic community and external think tanks like RAND.

Essentially all of the components of strategic stability thinking in the nuclear age—arms race stability, crisis stability, first-strike stability, the instabilities attendant to forward deployment of nuclear weapons that might be seized by others or used in an unauthorized fashion—were now part of the intellectual churn, and they entered into the policy world as well. On February 20, 1961, one month into the new administration, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara sent a classified memorandum to President Kennedy. Having just completed his initial review of the Eisenhower administration FY 1961 and FY 1962 budgets for the Department of Defense—and in the process beginning to think through how to link national security objectives for military force structure—McNamara wrote inter alia, in a section entitled “Stability and Safety”:

Also of great concern, and perhaps more likely, is the chance that war could come in an irrational or unpremeditated fashion—possibly by the mistaken triggering of alert forces, by miscalculation by one side of the opponent’s intentions, by irrational or pathological actions by individuals, by spread and escalation of local wars, or by nuclear attack by a minor power. . . . We are . . . taking steps to reduce the dependence of our retaliatory power on quick decisions. We want to reassure our allies and our enemies that we do not need to act hastily or preemptively in order to be able to retaliate. We must not be forced in a crisis to take “crash” actions for the protection of our forces that might be interpreted as evidence of impending attack.6

This is a classic description of one dimension of crisis stability. As the missile age progressed, and as launch-on-warning and launch-under-attack options became more important to the strategic competition, it remained a concern.

One does not find many traces of crisis stability thinking reflected in the early national security documents that guided nuclear
planning—NSC 20/4 and NSC 30 (1948), the NSC 68 series (1950), and NSC 141 (1953) for the Truman administration, or the Basic National Security Policy documents of the Eisenhower administration from NSC 162/2 (1953) through NSC 5906/1 (1959). That is not to say there was no attention paid to the issue of miscalculation and strategic stability prior to the Kennedy years. For example, the United States treated its aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union as a risky proposition from the start, since such missions could be misinterpreted as the leading edge of a strategic attack. President Eisenhower held the final approval authority for every U-2 mission when they began over the Soviet Union in 1956. American planners also had worried prior to 1961 about how to assure command and control of nuclear forces, how to prevent forces and leadership from being destroyed by a surprise attack, and the like. But it is fair to say that it took not only the advent of the early Soviet nuclear threat but the rapid development of the Soviet ballistic missile program to bring crisis and first strike stability to the fore. Prior to that, emphasis in thinking on strategic stability was more on the problems posed by the arms race, somewhat as follows.

In the autumn of 1945, when it still was unclear whether at least some aspects of wartime cooperation with the Soviets could be sustained into the postwar period, the wartime nuclear allies gathered in Washington to confer on how to approach postwar nuclear issues. In preparation for that meeting, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were asked to give President Truman their views. In a top-secret memorandum to the president, finally declassified in 1972, they recommended:

While the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it imperative to retain technical secrets on atomic weapons for the present, they regard it as of great military importance that further steps of a political nature should be promptly and vigorously pressed during the probably limited period of American monopoly, in an effort to forestall a possible race in atomic weapons and to prevent the exposure of the United States to a form of attack against which present defenses are inadequate.

This advice was based on ongoing assessments by the joint and service staffs of the impact of nuclear weapons on nuclear planning. While military planners recognized the power that nuclear weapons could add to the American arsenal, they also assumed that absent international control, nuclear weapons would proliferate to other nations, that an advanced industrial society such as the United
States was especially vulnerable to nuclear attack, and that no perfect defense could be contemplated against nuclear aggression. The JCS advice entered into the milieu in which the Baruch proposal was formed and presented. Although some scholars have questioned the sincerity of the proposal, I believe it was properly conceived and sincerely offered. What we now know about Stalin and his motivations suggests that he would let no international control arrangements, however favorable to the Soviets, keep him from acquiring nuclear weapons.9

As it became apparent that the negotiations were going nowhere, however, and as the United States government moved step by step from 1947 and 1949 to organizing itself to fight the cold war—each step making the American nuclear deterrent a more important element of American and NATO strategy—the issue of how to pursue the nuclear arms race moved to the fore.

Part of the equation involved American nuclear doctrine. American postwar nuclear doctrine derived from the strategic bombing doctrine that American army, air forces had developed in World War II—a doctrine that emphasized precision, daytime bombing of urban-industrial targets supporting the war effort. “Precision,” of course, was relative to the technology of the times, and targets other than urban-based industries were on occasion attacked, but the main thrust of American strategic bombing doctrine focused on the urban based military-industrial target set.

It is worth noting that the doctrinal focus could have been very different in the early postwar period had Japan not surrendered after the second (Nagasaki) bomb. Gen. George Marshall revealed in an oral history interview after the war that had the Japanese continued fighting, necessitating the planned amphibious invasion of the Japanese homeland, the JCS were prepared to recommend to President Truman that the next set of atomic bombs should not be used against other Japanese cities containing military targets, but against the Japanese armed forces massed beyond the landing beaches, that is to say, used in a “tactical” mode.10 We can only speculate on what this would have done to the evolution of American nuclear doctrine after the war, since it would have placed tactical uses on a par with so-called strategic uses from the start. As it was, the United States devoted its early, limited nuclear stockpile to Strategic Air Command (SAC), and it was only when new nuclear weapons designs were available and new production reactors online in the early 1950s, that the buildup of the stockpile addressed tactical as well as strategic needs. By that time,
the strategic nuclear mission was paramount in the grand strategy of containment and deterrence.

Within the strategic nuclear mission, a central question of doctrine concerned what targets to hold at risk with American nuclear forces for purposes of deterrence and, if deterrence failed, to prosecute the war. In 1948, as the Berlin crisis focused Washington’s attention on the possibility that war might erupt quickly, American nuclear contingency war plans (specifically, the strategic air offensive supplement to the full-scope emergency war plan) called for holding at risk: (1) urban industrial concentrations and government control centers; (2) the Soviet petroleum industry; (3) inland transportation networks; and (4) electric generating facilities.\(^{11}\) Given the logistical problems involved in moving the early generation of nuclear weapons to operating bases and assembling them, the nuclear phase of the air offensive could not begin until 15 days into the war. The American nuclear stockpile at the time was small, composed of large devices that were minor modifications of the plutonium implosion device that had been dropped on Nagasaki. As a result, the plan for mounting the strategic air offensive assumed that an air campaign, potentially stretching over several years, primarily would employ nonnuclear weapons. The nuclear stockpile was reserved for striking the highest priority targets that then were considered to be military-related industrial concentrations in large cities. Additional nuclear weapons would be incorporated into the ongoing air offensive as they became available (declassified Department of Energy [DOE] information suggests that the build rate by the end of 1948 was on the order of 12 nuclear weapons a month).

In the plan discussed above, a total of 210 Soviet urban areas with military industrial targets had been identified by American intelligence, 70 of which were thought to contain the preponderance of Moscow’s war-supporting industries—armaments factories, ball and roller bearing plants, coke facilities, factories producing combat aircraft engines and airframes, electronic industries, motor vehicle production, petroleum refining facilities, submarine production plants, and plants producing tanks and self-propelled artillery vehicles. Target folders for the targets in these 70 cities were expected to be ready as early as February 1, 1949.\(^{12}\) Destruction of government control centers was seen as a “bonus” effect of striking the urban industrial facilities, and the transportation networks were not tasked to be struck in the early months of the war.

I go into so much detail on the earliest nuclear war plans to highlight how much would change in subsequent years. The early emphasis
for nuclear targeting was on Soviet military-supporting industries. The strategic concept behind the war plan, prior to Soviet acquisition of a nuclear arsenal, assumed a long struggle on the model of World War II. This assumption did not last long. The Soviets soon would acquire nuclear weapons, and the United States would enter an alliance whose members demanded a forward-defense strategy and were unwilling to entertain the prospect of again fighting a conventional war of the sort they had just emerged from—one that virtually destroyed their societies at the time, and might very well do so if general war again erupted in Europe.

With the first test of a Soviet atomic bomb in 1949 and the creation of the NATO, new target categories were added to American emergency war plans: Soviet nuclear facilities and forces, and non-nuclear Soviet forces threatening Europe. Several internal debates erupted at this point. Should the air force use all of its nuclear weapons in the first, massed strike, or reserve some for gradual escalation and bargaining? How quickly should SAC incorporate the nonindustrial targets into its near-term emergency war plans? There would be operational doctrine struggles of this sort for the remainder of the cold war. As the strategic nuclear weapons stockpile grew, the concept of retaining a strategic reserve was revisited more favorably, and every major nuclear strategy review would reopen the question of what kinds of targets should receive priority. With the possible exception of the question of graduated escalation (where military strategists and planners almost unanimously were suspicious of claims that highly refined signals could be sent in the fog of a nuclear war), it is difficult to cast most issues as ones dividing civilians from the military, scientists from diplomats, and the like. These were all diverse communities with many strong points of view, and professionals from all interested communities found themselves holding different positions in the nuclear dialogue at different times.

As new targets were discovered, as analyses were refined on how weapons systems would function and how well against enemy defenses, and the like, there was a near-constant upward pressure for numbers of nuclear weapons, a pressure intensified by interservice competition for nuclear missions, by technology push from the nuclear weapons laboratories, and by the political imperative of reassuring allies. It took the shock of the Korean war to change President Truman’s attitude towards how much could and should be spent on armed forces in general and on nuclear forces in particular.
President Truman took a number of successive decisions (in October 1949, October 1950, and January 1952) to authorize new American production reactors for military purposes. By 1950 (prior to Korea), President Truman had authorized a crash American program to develop a thermonuclear bomb, and agreed in 1951, as the Korean war was raging, that a nuclear testing facility should be build in the continental United States, in Nevada, in case the Korean war escalated into a new world war and the United States lost access to testing sites in the Pacific. By 1952, a second nuclear weapons design laboratory had been approved, to be located in California. The nuclear arms race was under way.

When the Korean war was at its peak in early 1951, the United States had a nuclear stockpile of no more than 300 weapons, less than half of which could be considered the war reserve available for immediate use by SAC bombers. By 1960, there were (according to the DOE figures declassified in 1994) 18,638 nuclear weapons in the stockpile. New nuclear weapons were being built at a rate of close to 600 a month. This (1960) was the peak year; the production rate gradually would decline after 1960; and that is only part of the story.

The number of nuclear designs available and the wide variety of yields for nuclear weapons also had increased during the 1950s. The stockpile in 1952, at the time of the first thermonuclear test, had a total destructive power on the order of 50 megatons. By 1960, the comparable figure was close to 20,450 megatons, again the high point of the cold war. During the 1950s, American nuclear weapons would be deployed on land, in the air, and at sea, on a number of platforms with different missions ranging from close-in support of infantry and armored forces, to air defense, to tactical air missions, to naval combat, to strategic warfare. What in 1950 had been a strategic monad of long-range bombers was, by the end of the decade, a strategic triad of bombers and ballistic missiles (at land and at sea) and, briefly, a quadrad including intercontinental-range cruise missiles based on the eastern seacoast of the United States.

What accounted for the massive buildup? In part it was nuclear doctrine, as discussed earlier, which took a target- and systems-performance approach to setting nuclear requirements. In part it was interservice rivalry among American military services determined not to be left out of the nuclear mission. In part it was a deliberate decision in the late Truman and early Eisenhower years to refuse to adopt a preventive war strategy, although some advised such a move, before the Soviets acquired a lethal nuclear strike capability.
In part it was the lack of good technical and military intelligence on Soviet nuclear programs, much less on the strategic intentions of the Soviet leadership, during this time. In part it was the fact that NATO Europe was still in a fragile state of recovery from World War II and that reassuring the NATO allies in the face of an overwhelming Soviet conventional threat required playing the card of American nuclear superiority. In part, it was the exposed position of American forces deployed against superior Soviet divisions, and the role of tactical nuclear weapons in leveling the playing field, psychologically if not operationally. In part it was the fact that, given the vital stakes involved in making nuclear deterrence work, a spiral development process to exploit American technology introduced wave after wave of new weapons designs and delivery systems into the armed forces. Then the “bootstrapping” phenomenon took over: new warheads and delivery systems inspired new doctrines that in turn suggested new departures in forces. In part it was the absence, major efforts notwithstanding, to construct effective defenses against Soviet nuclear offensive forces. And in part it was the determination of the Soviet Union to remain in the arms race and, at least from Western perspectives, to give priority to their nuclear forces in confronting the West.

No doubt scholars will argue for years about what accounts for the nuclear arms race in the early years of the cold war. What all appear to agree on, however, is that the nuclear arms race was intensely destabilizing. What turned it around?

Earlier I gave a brief description of how Eisenhower personally sought through arms control to engage the Soviets in modest steps to constrain the arms race, and failed. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, the only area where some degree of cooperation seemed possible was in nuclear testing, and even that possibility appeared to evaporate in the crisis atmosphere of 1961 when, after the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion, the renewed Berlin crisis, and the stormy summit meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev in Vienna, Moscow abruptly announced the resumption of nuclear testing.

It took the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 to put arms control back on track, creating the opportunities that led to the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963—the first major nuclear agreement of the cold war. It appears to have taken the Soviet offensive arms buildup after the Cuban crisis and the escalating competition to develop and deploy ballistic missile defenses to give the Soviets a vested interest in strategic arms control, something the Americans had been contemplating since the early 1960s but, prior to the advent of overhead...
satellite reconnaissance, had seen as being too risky to attempt without the safeguard of onsite inspections. The prospect of widespread nuclear proliferation also figured prominently in American thinking in seeking to cap the superpower arms race—something on the table in the international community since the Irish resolution first was introduced in the General Assembly in 1958, and which gained a new urgency after the first Chinese nuclear test in October 1964. The arms race was capped eventually, then began a slow retreat for the rest of the cold war through the formal arms control process: the interim agreement on offensive arms (SALT I) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, SALT II, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, and the parallel track of nonproliferation diplomacy, producing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Stabilizing the arms race was a deliberate, painstaking process pursued with determination, occasional setbacks notwithstanding, from the 1960s through the end of the cold war.

**WHAT COLD WAR NUCLEAR PRACTICES OR ACTIVITIES WERE THE MOST STABILIZING AND WHICH WERE THE MOST DESTABILIZING?**

A short list for stabilizing practices or activities during the cold war would include several things:

- **Actions taken to make strategic nuclear systems capable of surviving a surprise first strike by the other side.** This included alert practices, dispersal of forces, stealth and mobility (especially in the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) force), a diversity of systems, redundant command and control arrangements, continuity of government procedures, and frequent exercises. Although much of this was done by deliberate choice, it is a stretch to suggest that it was done according to any single master plan. Here the hidden hand of constant adjustments to a changing threat environment and to new technical and operational opportunities played the greatest role.

- **Actions taken to minimize the possibility of unauthorized use.** This included such things as a Human Reliability Program for personnel with access to nuclear systems, two-man rules, technical use-control devices such as the electro-mechanical Permissive Action Link (PALs), and a continual process of assessing vulnerabilities and adjusting procedures.
• Actions taken to make forward-deployed tactical nuclear systems secure from capture by hostile forces. This includes technical devices to disable the systems if captured, and military security forces that protect warhead storage areas. The most stabilizing action, however, was to remove systems from forward deployment once the situation permitted.

• Engagement in formal arms control to help first cap, then reverse the nuclear arms race.

My short list of the most destabilizing and dangerous nuclear practices and activities during the cold war, includes the following:

• Policies and doctrines that included preemptive attack options and pre-delegated authority for use of nuclear weapons. In a moment, I will discuss what we now know about the Cuban Missile Crisis. I will not discuss possible American plans for preemptive nuclear attack and pre-delegated authority during the cold war to any extent, primarily because the sources largely remain classified, other than to note that there is evidence for both practices.\(^{15}\)

• The deployment of tactical nuclear forces to offset conventional deficiencies and to protect conventional forces. Again, the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrates the dangers associated with this practice, as will be discussed in a moment. During the massive buildup of American tactical nuclear forces in Europe in the 1950s, one of the major motivations appears initially to have been the hope that such forces could offset Soviet conventional capabilities and provide possible protection for exposed, out-gunned NATO military units. This also appears to have been a large part of the Soviet motivation in Cuba.

• Stationing nuclear forces near the adversary, leading to fears by the adversary that a surprise attack could “decapitate” his (the adversary’s) command and control of his own nuclear forces. Short time-of-flight could be achieved by ground-based ballistic missiles deployed forward near the enemy’s borders or by submarines operating close to the enemy’s shores.

• Launch-on-warning options for quick-reaction ballistic missile forces. Retaining an option to launch ballistic missiles on the basis of either tactical or strategic warning carried with it the risk of false warnings.

In many ways, the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 serves as a laboratory for understanding much of what to avoid.\(^{16}\) Most scholars
agree that the Cuban Missile Crisis was the most dangerous nuclear episode of the cold war. In May 1962, Khrushchev took the decision to secretly deploy a Group of Soviet Forces equipped with nuclear weapons to Cuba. The force deployed with two types of ballistic missiles: 36 R-12 (SS-4) missiles with 24 launchers for those missiles, and 24 R-14 (SS-5) missiles with 16 launchers. The R-12, equipped with nuclear warheads whose yields were in the 200–700 kiloton range could reach targets 1,400 miles from their launch points. The R-14, equipped with nuclear warheads in the 200–800 kiloton range, could reach out to 2,800 miles. The Soviet forces also deployed to Cuba with tactical nuclear weapons: 12 Luna (FROG) unguided ballistic missiles, equipped with 2 kiloton warheads and with ranges of 20–25 miles. Six Il-28 bombers, each of which could deliver a 6 kiloton bomb to a distance of 200 miles, and 80 FKR-1 tactical cruise missiles that could deliver 5–12 kiloton warheads to a distance of 90 miles. Additionally, the Soviet diesel submarines going to Cuba deployed, for the first time, with nuclear-tipped torpedoes.

The general outlines of the Cuban Missile Crisis are well known. The Americans discovered the presence of ballistic missiles on Cuba late in the deployment—on October 15, 1962, to be precise, after a U-2 flight the previous day returned photographic evidence of Soviet ballistic missiles in Cuba. President Kennedy assembled a small group of advisors—the Executive Committee of the NSC or, as it is more popularly known, ExCom—to advise him privately on how to respond. On October 22, President Kennedy went on television to reveal the Soviet movement of offensive nuclear missiles to Cuba. Kennedy publicly demanded that the Soviets withdraw the missiles and announced a “quarantine” of the island. At the same time, American military forces were mobilized and placed on a high state of alert and planning proceeded on military actions if the Soviets did not remove the missiles, with options ranging from preemptive air strikes to a major invasion. What we now know about the actual deliberations of the ExCom is how little hard intelligence the Americans had on what was going on—either understanding of Khrushchev’s strategic intentions, or operational intelligence on the specifics of the threat. One of the largest gaps was not knowing that the tactical nuclear weapons were with the Soviet forces that deployed to Cuba.

The crisis was dangerous in a number of ways. As post–cold war discussions among former American and Russian officials involved have revealed, the Soviet commander in Cuba, Gen. Issa Pliyev, initially received from Khrushchev pre-delegated authority, delivered
in verbal form, to use the tactical nuclear weapons to defend his forces if communications were cut to the USSR Ministry of Defense. According to General Gribkov, that order was rescinded on October 22, shortly before Kennedy’s ultimatum speech. Had the Americans attacked Soviet forces in Cuba prior to October 22 (that was under consideration), the pre-delegated nuclear authorization to defend with tactical nuclear weapons if necessary would have been in play. Even after the authorization had been rescinded, there remained the possibility that if an American invasion took place, and with no technical blocking devices on the Soviet tactical nuclear weapons, a Soviet commander in Cuba may have chosen anyway to use the weapons in a desperate situation, lack of authorization notwithstanding. He might even have felt he would be supported in Moscow in this decision. As Gribkov himself concludes: “Had U.S. troops forced their way onto Cuba in the anxious days that followed, their beachhead could all too possibly have become the first atomic battlefield of World War III.”

We also now know that the Soviets deployed nuclear-armed torpedoes on the four long-range diesel submarines (Project 641 type submarines in Soviet parlance, known to NATO as Foxtrot submarines) that sortied from the Soviet Northern Fleet port of Sayda Bay to Mariel, Cuba, as an advance reconnaissance element in anticipation of the movement of seven Soviet ballistic missile submarines and support ships to Cuba. This naval component of Operation ANADYR, code-named Operation KAMA, included rules of engagement that if American forces attacked the Foxtrots while submerged or forced them to surface, the submarine commanders had pre-delegated authority to use their nuclear-tipped torpedoes. There is some evidence that Soviet authorities, sobered by the near-disasters of the Cuban crisis, moved quickly to significantly revise rules of engagement for tactical nuclear weapons sent to sea.

We can only speculate what would have happened had the Soviets resorted to nuclear weapons used tactically against an American invasion force or against an American warship involved in the quarantine. Kennedy would have been under tremendous pressure to respond in kind, perhaps not only at the tactical level but against targets in the Soviet Union. This type of scenario—general nuclear war escalating out of a local clash that then involves tactical nuclear use—was the one that many American analysts believed was the most likely route to catastrophic nuclear conflict during the cold war.
There was another disturbing dimension of the Cuban Missile Crisis that only came to light years after the event. Whether or not this is an apocryphal story remains unclear, but it has been described by sufficiently reputable sources to include it in this discussion.

Peter Hennessy, the respected British scholar who is perhaps the preeminent expert on how British prime ministers have dealt with nuclear crises in the past, has written about the Penkovsky episode. Colonel Oleg Penkovsky appears to have been the best human intelligence source that Britain and the United States had during the cold war. A Soviet officer trained in intelligence and socially prominent in Soviet elite circles, giving him excellent access to high-level information, Penkovsky in the winter of 1960 had approached Western intelligence representatives and offered to supply information on Soviet nuclear programs and related military activities. He was placed under the control of a British MI6 officer, operating under cover in the Moscow Embassy. Dino Brugioni, the longtime American senior intelligence official who supervised the preparation of all aerial reconnaissance photographs and briefing notes for the CIA during the Cuban Missile Crisis, recalls:

The importance of Oleg Penkovsky’s information made this one of the most productive intelligence operations in history. He was a trained intelligence expert who knew the value of specific information and who had access to an almost unbelievable number of secret documents. He had decided that in the interest of world peace, he must counter Soviet plans for nuclear war. During the sixteen months before he was discovered, the CIA received and processed more than 5,000 frames of microfilmed information. From these secretly photographed documents we had accurate information on the latest Soviet weapons and missile strategy.20

By the autumn of 1962, Penkovsky was a well vetted, highly trusted source for the British and Americans. Here, we pick up Hennessy’s account.

Penkovsky had been arrested by the Soviet authorities on 22 October 1962, at the moment the world became aware of the possible linkage between Cuba and Armageddon [the day of Kennedy’s public ultimatum]. The KGB did not immediately announce his capture. But various things convinced his MI6 controller that something was amiss and he ignored messages which would normally have summoned him to a crash meeting with Penkovsky.21
On November 2, as the crisis was subsiding but with American and British nuclear forces still on a high state of alert, Penkovsky’s British contact in Moscow (an agent named Gervase Cowell) received a phone call with the prearranged signal that Penkovsky was to use if a Soviet nuclear attack on the West was imminent (three deep breaths—“blows”—on the phone, repeated in a second call one minute later). Hennessy continues:

Shortly before he died, I asked Gervase Cowell, the SIS man who took the call, what he did on hearing those sounds. Certain that Penkovsky was captive and had had information extracted from him about call-signs, rendezvous and so on, Cowell decided to do nothing. He neither alerted his ambassador, Sir Frank Roberts, nor his chief in London, Sir Dick White. Mr Cowell, a small, humorous, unassuming man, delivered himself of this recollection without personal grandeur or historical drama. He is, however, the only man I have ever met who has found himself in such a precarious and classically cold war position.22

If this account is accurate, we are left with several unsettling questions. Why would the Soviets, presumably the KGB, have made this call? What would have happened if the call had been reported up channels, reaching London and Washington? Would the crisis have reignited? Would preemptive nuclear actions against Moscow have been considered?

The more we learn about the Cuban Missile Crisis, the more we understand how unstable it was at the time. It had many of the elements that could lead to nuclear catastrophe: forward-deployed tactical and strategic nuclear weapons; pre-delegated authority; no use-control other than the absence of nuclear weapons on their delivery systems (for all but the nuclear torpedoes); the inevitable fog of war clouding each side’s understanding of what was going on and why; and the potential for a massive miscalculation based upon a fraudulent report from an otherwise highly trusted, proven human intelligence source. We undoubtedly will learn even more as we continue to dissect the episode’s nuclear history and as more details come to light.

The preceding is by no means a comprehensive discussion of destabilizing nuclear practices during the cold war, nor given the limits of this chapter can I develop in detail why I have included these practices in the list and not others. I have not discussed in any detail issues raised by: the RAND bomber vulnerability studies in the early 1950s and the move to place American nuclear forces on quick-reaction
Lessons for South Asia

alert; the pursuit of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and heavy ICBMs; the ballistic missile defense debate; weapons in space; antisubmarine warfare against ballistic missile submarines; continuity of government, especially when a head of state is assassinated or a coup is attempted; or the rapid erosion of Russian early warning capability when the Soviet Union collapsed. But what I have discussed does begin to give some flavor of what might be considered for South Asian nuclear stability today, at least in light of American experiences during the cold war.

What Lessons from the Superpower Nuclear Practices in the Cold War Are Relevant to Strategic Stability in South Asia Today?

So long as nuclear weapons exist, the chances that they may be used accidentally, in an unauthorized fashion, or deliberately (but through miscalculation) cannot be dismissed. At the same time, officials responsible for nuclear policies cannot wish away their nuclear dilemmas. They will want their nuclear forces to be safe, secure, reliable, and capable in an extreme emergency of functioning as intended under the stresses of the moment and the inevitable fog of crisis and war. Neither unilateral nuclear abolition nor pursuit of decisive nuclear advantage proved to be a stabilizing policy trajectory during the cold war. What the superpowers concluded—and what I believe other nuclear powers responsible for preserving their states, not simply for destroying their enemies, also tend to conclude—is that unless and until mutual disarmament is possible, some form of nuclear deterrence is the best middle road, with the sober recognition that deterrence might fail if it is not seen as credible both in capability and will. The challenge is to make deterrence stable.

Were I a policy or military planner in South Asia today concerned about strategic stability and drawing on the experiences of the superpowers in the cold war, I would be interested in pursuing ways to

- strengthen and advance the political dialogue seeking resolution of the Kashmir situation;
- retain tight political control over nuclear use decisions, especially in a crisis;
- make nuclear forces and their command and control systems as invulnerable to surprise attack as possible;
• protect against unauthorized use of nuclear forces, employing a comprehensive approach involving human programs and technology for use control;
• provide strong physical and cyber-security for nuclear forces;
• constantly conduct vulnerability and “instability” studies and institutionalize a process for quickly incorporating the results of such studies into nuclear policy, doctrine, and operations.

And I would study carefully the Cuban Missile Crisis as perhaps the best documented cold war superpower experience of how things might get out of control in a nuclear confrontation.

NOTES

1. I am indebted to Adm. Pete Nanos (USN, Retd.) for this insight into how to think of missile accuracy which, I argue by analogy, applies to thinking of strategic stability.
2. As Kierkegaard put it in his famous aphorism, life is lived forward but written backward.
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8. Memorandum for the president from William D. Leahy for the JCS, October 23, 1945. Harry S. Truman Library, President’s Secretaries Files, NSC-Atomic, Box 1999, Atomic Bomb-Cabinet (William D. Leahy). Fleet Admiral William Leahy was the chief of staff to the commander in chief of the army and navy, a position created by Franklin Delano Roosevelt in part to balance the service roles and in part to chair the informal wartime JCS and Combined Chiefs of Staff organizations. Leahy was retained in this role by Truman and, subsequent to the National Security Act of 1947 (which formalized the JCS but did not yet create the formal position of JCS chairman) continued to preside over the JCS until Leahy left the White House for reasons of health. Dwight Eisenhower, out of uniform as the president of Columbia University, would preside briefly as the de facto chairman of the JCS prior to the amendments to the National Security Act which formally created the office of chairman, an office first occupied by Gen. Omar Bradley who was sworn in as chairman on August 12, 1949.

9. Stalin’s paranoia, standing in the way of any reasonable negotiation with the West, is described in a number of works such as Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); and David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).


11. Details on the now declassified war plans are taken from JCS 1952/1, Memorandum by the chief of staff, U.S. air force, to the JCS on Evaluation of Current Strategic Air Offensive Plans. Originally top secret, declassified May 1991. National Archives, Suitland, Maryland, Records of the JCS, Record Group 218, Box 166.

12. Target folders typically would include the information needed to navigate to and identify the target, along with aim points for the weapons.

13. The DOE figures declassified in 1994 list the nuclear inventory for 1950 as 299 nuclear weapons with 264 builds during the year and 135 retirements. In his quarterly report to authorities in Washington in April 1951, Gen. Curtis LeMay, commander of Strategic Air Command, reported that in even in case of general war, SAC was prepared within six days to strike the USSR using about 140 nuclear weapons. Since official doctrine at the time called for all nuclear forces to be used in the first wave of attack, that probably is a good estimate of America’s war reserve nuclear stockpile. Letter from Lt. Gen. Curtis LeMay to Gen. Hoyt S.
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14. I am indebted to Robert Jervis for this addition.

15. We do have circumstantial evidence suggesting that before the Soviets acquired ballistic missiles in the later 1950s, the United States had preemptive options (and I stress “options”) in its emergency war plans. These options could have permitted the president to launch a preemptive nuclear strike on Soviet bomber forces if reliable intelligence was received that the Soviets were about to go to nuclear war. We can conceive of scenarios where SAC bombers could strike Soviet arctic staging bases before the Soviet bombers could arrive and be equipped with their nuclear bombs. In August 1960, shortly before Kennedy won the presidential election, the Joint Strategic Planning Staff (JSTPS) was established, colocated with SAC at Offutt air force base in Omaha, Nebraska. This staff was given the responsibility to prepare the first Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). That initial plan, SIOP 62, was completed in a brief three months and was approved on December 1, 1960, to take effect in April 1961. Thus the incoming Kennedy administration inherited the first SIOP. At a retrospective conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis, held at Hawk’s Cay in the Florida Keys in March 1987, Robert McNamara, Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, recalled: “In March of 1961, I went out to look at the SIOP and found that there were four regular options plus a fifth called I (a) which was a first-strike plan.” James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis ((New York: Hill and Wang, 1989), 29. One finds in FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. VIII (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), a number of entries dealing with Kennedy revisiting the question of whether in an emergency, an American first strike could be launched against Soviet forces without a devastating retaliatory response. The answer consistently is no. We cannot tell from the declassified record when preemptive options disappeared from the SIOP, but it probably was during the late Kennedy or early Johnson years. For further information on the development of SIOP 62, see Scott Sagan, “SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy,” International Security vol. 12, no. 1 (Summer 1987), pp. 22–51, and Scott Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 24–26. As for predelegated authority, see Peter J. Roman, “Ike’s Hair-Trigger: U.S. Nuclear Predelegation, 1953–60,” Security Studies vol. 7, no. 4 (Summer 1998), pp. 130–76.

16. We are fortunate that for the Cuban Missile Crisis, we have a large body of contemporary literature attempting to do what I called for at the beginning of this chapter, i.e., integrate understanding across the national experiences, recollections, and declassified primary source materials of all major participants in an event. The most authoritative

17. I take the details of the Soviet deployment of all the tactical nuclear systems (excepting the nuclear-tipped torpedoes) from Gen. Anatoli I. Gribkov’s account in Operation ANADYR. At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Gribkov was a junior general officer, serving under Colonel General Ivanov on the Main Operations Directorate of the Soviet General Staff. Gribkov was given the mission of organizing the deployment to Cuba, then himself going to Cuba with the forces to report back to the general staff (a sort of inspector general role). Gribkov eventually would become chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact forces. The details of the nuclear torpedoes comes from Huchthausen’s October
Fury. (Captain Peter A. Huchthausen, USN, retired, was a junior officer aboard the USS Blandy when it took part in the Cuban operations in 1962. His research was facilitated by Captain First Rank Lev Vtorygin, Russian Navy, retired.)

22. Ibid., p. 43.
INTRODUCTION: WHY PAKISTAN LEARNED TO LOVE THE BOMB

The military crisis in 2002 reinforced the centrality of nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s national security. Pakistan’s nuclear program began with the central premise that nuclear weapons were the only recourse for national survival and the only way to deter a hostile neighbor from attacking its weaker neighbor. Demonstration of nuclear weapon capability in 1998 did not calm Pakistani anxieties. The expanding size and quality of India’s conventional forces and its advancing nuclear capability continues to make Pakistan vulnerable to Indian coercion—and to present a credible threat to its very existence. The evolution of Pakistan’s nuclear force posture is directly related to India’s conventional force postures, military doctrines, and periodic force mobilization.

India’s force mobilization in 2001–2002 was not a new threat, given the history of wars, military crises, and failed peace deals. India and Pakistan have generally maintained what T. V. Paul aptly described as an “enduring rivalry” as the core of their relationship. From Pakistan’s standpoint, the 2001–2002 crisis was another episode in the history of Indian efforts to use its superior military might to force Pakistan into submission. Many Pakistanis viewed this military standoff as India’s attempt to take advantage of the post–9/11 environment to press its case against Pakistan. Frustrated yet again at the renewed importance of Pakistan as a critical ally of the United States...
for its Afghanistan campaign, the timing of India’s military mobilization led some to believe that India welcomed the opportunity to put Pakistan on the defensive. The decision to mobilize its forces when the U.S.-led war on Pakistan’s western frontier was in a crucial phase strengthened suspicions that India was intent on exploiting Pakistan’s two-front predicament. From this perspective, the terror attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 could not have come at a worse moment for Pakistan. In December 2001 and during the spring of 2002, U.S. military forces launched operation “Tora Bora” and operation codenamed “Anaconda” respectively. The fleeing Taliban were melting into the western tribal borderlands, requiring Pakistan’s military to shift its orientation to the west. At the time of India’s military mobilization, nearly two-thirds of Pakistani airspace was deconflicted for use by the United States Air Force (USAF). These factors made the 2002 crisis different from all the previous wars and crises between Pakistan and India.

The 1998 nuclear tests ought to have taught a simple lesson for South Asia: Nuclear weapon states should focus on calming crises and preventing wars—not on fighting and winning them. In 1946 Bernard Brodie famously wrote that with the advent of “absolute weapons the chief purpose of the military establishment has shifted from fighting and winning wars to averting wars.” This became the new security paradigm of the nuclear age and the basis of major portions of deterrence theory. In South Asia, however, Brodie’s approach has been consistently challenged. Indian strategists insist on the relevancy of fighting and winning a conventional war against a nuclear-armed Pakistan. However, India’s inability to wage war in 2002 increased Pakistan’s faith in the utility of nuclear deterrence against superior conventional forces.

Beyond making a show of force, Indian war aims in 2002 were unclear. However, its military planners apparently believed they could win a limited war without escalating and without tripping Pakistan’s nuclear redlines. Pakistan would not resort to nuclear weapons for a variety of reasons, including an assumed reticence to violate moral prohibitions against nuclear use. While the use of conventional force is accepted as a legitimate instrument of policy, any nuclear use is taboo. Accepting this logic would have serious consequences for Pakistan and would leave it with only two options: match India’s conventional capabilities or surrender. With nuclear options off the table, Pakistan would be forced to accede to any Indian demands, including the ceding of territory. Pakistan’s alternative strategy is to match
India's conventional forces wherever possible, balance Indian advantages through alliances with major powers, but compensate for the obvious shortcomings of both of those approaches by maintaining credible nuclear deterrence. There is very little debate within Pakistan on the importance of its nuclear weapons for national survival.

The 2001–2002 military standoff (Operation Parakram) reinforced the view that India constitutes a perpetual existential threat and that this threat can only be countered with nuclear weapons. Terrorist attacks are a common recurrence in South Asia, and contrary to Indian belief, the government of Pakistan does not mastermind them all. If terrorist attacks such as occurred in 2001 and 2002 can justify a major mobilization of conventional forces for war, Pakistan must prepare to counter similar circumstances in the future. Lacking the resources for recurring major mobilizations whenever terrorists attack India, Pakistan was forced to rely even more explicitly on nuclear deterrence. Unfortunately, as India refines its military doctrine towards Pakistan (Cold Start) and acquires new technologies (ballistic missiles defense, for example), nuclear stability in the region is becoming less sturdy. With internal instability further challenging Pakistan's security outlook, we should expect greater reliance on nuclear weapons to deter India.

This chapter examines the impact of the 2001–2002 crises on the Pakistan's evolving nuclear force posture. The section “Historical Precedents: Conventional Forces and Nuclear Deterrence” examines the historical precedence and logic of nuclear use against conventional forces. The section “Military Crises and Pakistan’s Emerging Force Posture” examines the nature of military crises in the region, of which the 2001–2002 military standoff is one major manifestation. The section “The Evolution of Pakistan’s Nuclear Force Planning” analyzes how this crisis galvanized the evolution of Pakistani nuclear forces and tested its command system—essentially allowing Pakistan to convert its demonstrated nuclear capability into an operational deterrent. The last section analyzes how India force modernization and impact upset the offense-defense balance, trigger a regional arms race with consequences on strategic stability in the region.

**Historical Precedents: Conventional Forces and Nuclear Deterrence**

Several studies during the cold war focused on the transformation of security in the nuclear era. Bernard Brodie was the first to question...
the relevancy of Clausewitz’s treatise on war as an instrument of policy. Robert Jervis examined the meaning of nuclear revolution and concluded that nuclear weapons had “drastically altered statecraft.” During the cold war, it took the superpowers several decades to recognize that “there was no victor in a nuclear war.” At the Reykjavik summit in 1986, President Ronald Reagan and Secretary General Gorbachev agreed, “since no one wins a nuclear war, no one should start one.” Four decades of confrontation between East and West was never tested since a conventional war never broke out. Looking back at this history, the complex interplay of nuclear and conventional deterrence prevented the outbreak of a major war and contained military crises.

Facing vastly superior numbers of conventional forces in Europe, President Truman thought nuclear weapons “was all that we had” to deter the Soviets from overrunning Western Europe. He told his advisors in 1949 that the “Russians would probably have taken over Europe a long time ago if it were not for that [nuclear capability].” Eisenhower hoped a doctrine of Massive Retaliation would keep the Soviets in check without the need for huge expenditures on conventional forces, and Kennedy tried to maintain the balance through Flexible Response. To deter the threat of numerically superior Soviet mechanized forces rolling across Western Europe, American and NATO strategists backed up conventional armies with threats of nuclear escalation, including first use of tactical, forward-based, short-range, long-range, and strategic nuclear weapons.

Other regions and countries with similarly intense conflicts continue to grapple with the role of nuclear weapons in deterring conventional armies. Pakistan and Israel, for example, face similar regional challenges. Both lack strategic depth; are surrounded by hostile states with whom they have fought wars; and, in the absence of peace settlements, must live with the prospects of a sudden conventional attack that could threaten their existence. Both went nuclear to cope with these threats, and both learned that nuclear deterrence did not ease the requirements of maintaining robust conventional forces. The relationship between conventional conflict and nuclear escalation remains elusive.

Pakistan never enjoyed the luxuries of NATO or Israel. Pakistan is weak, fragile, and dependent on cautious allies such as the United States for its survival—despite its nuclear weapons. It cannot match India’s conventional forces, even if it had the resources to buy the necessary weapons. Pakistan is already spending proportionally more
than India to address multiple internal and external threats. These high defense expenditures fuel discontentment against the military throughout civil society. These shortcomings leave Pakistan with little choice but to seek security from nuclear weapons, in spite of the many difficulties this strategy poses for Pakistan, for its friends, and for the international community.

**MILITARY CRISES AND PAKISTAN’S EMERGING FORCE POSTURE**

At least four times in the two decades before the 2002 military standoff, India mobilized its conventional forces for a possible war against Pakistan. The causes and triggers for each crises varied—though most were connected with the Kashmir issue. Each time the level of military mobilization varied; each crisis left a potential for a future one; and each involved outside intervention to diffuse the tension.10

Relations between India and Pakistan were relatively calm until the mid-1980s when a new phase of India-Pakistan crises began. During the Sikh insurgency in 1984, India occupied an undemarcated area along the Siachin glacier (operation code named Meghdoot),11 while Pakistan was embroiled in the Afghanistan war against the Soviets. A new crisis with India was far from anyone’s mind. However, this small event laid the foundation for many crises to come in Kashmir, including the conflicts in 1999 and 2002.

Small-scale tactical operations in Kashmir continued throughout the mid-1980s, mostly at heights above 15,000 ft.12 Some in Pakistan viewed India’s Brasstacks exercise in 1986–1987, the brainchild of army general Krishnamurti Sunderji, as intended to punish Pakistan for its suspected support of the Sikh uprising that occurred at that time as well as provoke a war in which India might have one last chance to preemptively destroy Pakistan’s nascent nuclear capability.13 However, the combination of Pakistan’s countermobilization, bold diplomacy by Islamabad and New Delhi, and behind-the-scenes U.S. intervention helped diffuse the crisis. War was averted, but Pakistan from that point onward remained hypersensitive to Indian military mobilization on its border.

Shortly after Brasstacks, unrest in Kashmir reached boiling point. By 1990, dual insurgencies raged in Kashmir and Afghanistan. By the time of the next major crisis in 1999, however, the strategic landscape of South Asia had been transformed by the 1998 nuclear tests. Now, nuclear weapons loomed in the background of any major conflict.
Soon after the 1998 nuclear tests, the United States led an initiative to restrain India and Pakistan from making formal nuclear deployments. A small group of U.S. and Pakistan experts discussed several proposals to encourage adoption of minimum deterrent postures and strategic restraint measures. The proposals included nondeployment of nuclear weapons to keep them recessed, essentially freezing the status quo. Although Pakistan had deployed some ballistic missiles at the time, it had not deployed its nuclear forces. The main issue for Pakistan was whether constraints on its nuclear assets might undermine the credibility of its deterrence and leave it vulnerable to India’s superior conventional firepower—the whole reason for having nuclear weapons in the first place. Pakistan could not accept such constraints that would in effect neutralize its nuclear option. India, however, was equally resistant to U.S. restraint concepts that would in their view limit their nuclear aspirations, not only with respect to Pakistan but also China. India also saw nuclear restraint as limiting India’s role as an emerging great power in a world where nuclear weapons still signify status and prestige.

The next crisis in 1999 brought even more attention to nuclear weapons when news of Pakistan’s military incursions in the Kargil area brought India to the brink of war. U.S. policy makers, citing intelligence sources, claimed that Pakistan had prepared nuclear missiles for “possible deployment.” U.S. president Bill Clinton confronted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during a tense meeting at Blair House on July 4, 1999 and persuaded him to order his forces to withdraw. For many Pakistanis, this amounted to heavy U.S. pressure for the beleaguered Pakistani prime minister to submit to an unconditional withdrawal. In the absence of a cease-fire, Pakistani forces were forced to disengage from defensive positions and withdraw in broad daylight under relentless Indian fire carried out in anger and revenge. The retreat caused more Pakistani casualties than those incurred during the entire war, and the embarrassment of defeat further undermined Sharif at home and abroad. Pakistani officials forcefully denied any nuclear preparations, contending that Pakistan did not at the time possess the capability to make nuclear weapons operational in such circumstances. In fact, the Pakistani planners of the Kargil operation never contemplated the prospect of war or escalation beyond the Kargil sector and did not expect the high level of concern from the United States and elsewhere. In their view, India’s mobilization was modest compared to previous periods of tension, and
Pakistan was well aware of the likely U.S. reaction to any brandishing of nuclear weapons. Feeling falsely accused and misunderstood, Pakistan resolved to ensure that its conventional and nuclear forces were prepared for the next crisis.

Ensuring the survivability of Pakistan’s nuclear forces weighed heavily on President Musharraf when he decided to support the U.S. war in Afghanistan. This consideration was reinforced by the Indian military mobilization in 2002. By the second peak of the crisis in May 2002, the Pakistan military was using Operation Parakram to help integrate its conventional and nuclear war plans. The crisis actually provided useful threat hypotheses and scenarios from which to design conventional and nuclear responses. The crises catalyzed the emerging plans and accelerated the pace of force planning and integration. Despite speculation to the contrary, to this author’s knowledge nuclear weapons were not actually readied during the 2002 crisis. Nevertheless, by this time Pakistan possessed a functioning nuclear command structure and could have taken steps that it was incapable of in previous crises. The capability was credible, and the outcome of a major war unpredictable.

THE EVOLUTION OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR FORCE PLANNING

As Robert Jervis surmised, the meaning of the nuclear revolution takes a long time to comprehend. The transition from a conventional to a nuclear-armed state in the midst of crisis is a tumultuous experience. Military planners in Pakistan were generally well versed with conventional force mobilizations and war planning for military operations. Nuclear force planning was never a priority. The summer of 1998 changed the landscape, forcing Pakistan to reveal its capability and to begin thinking about how to derive security from its overt nuclear weapons.

Initial thinking commenced immediately after the tests in summer of 1998 under the directive of army chief Gen. Jehangir Karamat at the General Headquarters. In the mid-1990s a three-point logic had dominated Pakistan’s nuclear thinking, which was summarized by Neil Joeck in his Adelphi paper published in 1997, a year before the nuclear tests. First, notwithstanding India’s declared doctrine, nuclear threat capability warrants a nuclear response. Second, conventional force imbalance can only be offset by nuclear capability. Third, nuclear forces would not replace conventional forces.
Pakistan’s military planning focused on three strategic considerations. First, defense planners considered the geophysical disadvantage of size, lack of depth, and proximity of key communication centers against which military operational plans would be prepared. Second, Pakistan must beat Indian mobilization in time and space to deny India any benefits of surprise attack. From this standpoint, a lack of depth and proximity was an advantage for Pakistan. Third, was to deny escalation control to India making victory on the cheap impossible and the use of force a very costly adventure. Pakistan’s doctrinal ambiguity on nuclear use options shifts the onus of risk calculations on India. As Sir Michael Quinlan, surmised “Pakistan’s rejection of no-first-use seems merely a natural refusal to lighten or simplify a stronger adversary’s assessment of risk calculus.”

During the formative years of Pakistan’s nuclear command authority, Pakistan was under the leadership of President Musharraf, whose authoritarian military-led system of governance had the advantage of providing unitary command and coherent directives. With the founding of Strategic Plans Division (SPD) in 1998 and its establishment of the Joint Services Headquarters in 1999, Musharraf created a powerful military organization to oversee all of the entities involved in strategic programs. In March 1999 SPD initiated a planning process that began with a joint threat assessment with inputs from all three services and intelligence organizations. The next step was an operational appraisal of national defense capabilities to determine as carefully as possible where Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds should lie. Finally an assessment of technical and financial resources was undertaken to support realistic force goals, including long-term force structure objectives. SPD was charged with preparing plans for all contingencies, and has been the driving force behind Pakistan’s development and adaptation of survivability, physical security, communications, command, and control mechanisms. SPD also developed procedures for mating nuclear warheads and nonnuclear components with the delivery means in a safe and secure manner during an escalating crisis.

Pakistan’s Strategic Forces Commands (SFCs) took shape in 2000 and 2001. In fact, within a week after 9/11, Pakistan had dispersed its strategic assets under a preplanned execution conducted with military precision and secrecy. Pakistan had no intuition about India’s coming military mobilization but, with the U.S. attack in Afghanistan, a move by India was expected. When India mobilized for war in early 2002, Pakistan had by then established its nuclear forces (air and land) under the SFC. The Pakistan Army had ballistic missile units...
and formations, and the Pakistan air force (PAF) air squadrons under the Strategic Air Commands operated under a coherent command, control, communication, and intelligence (C3 I) system that was linked with Pakistan’s national military operation centers at the Joint Services Headquarters. Operation Parakram provided the impetus for Pakistan to take the next steps in integrating and operationalizing its nuclear forces.

Towards Operational Deterrence

Pakistani military planners do not believe that India’s conventional forces are principally aimed at China. Regardless of India’s stated intentions, Pakistan sees Indian capabilities arrayed against geographically vulnerable features and the narrow waistline in Punjab and Sind. Pakistan’s armed forces cannot afford to trade space in a war with India. Its communication lines and population centers are vulnerable to invasion with even a minor force. An added disadvantage is that several strategically sensitive areas, especially in the interior of Sind and Baluchistan, have had “fissiparous tendencies” that have at times been agitated by Indian involvement. Pakistan’s threat analysis envisions India occupying strategic space, destroying military forces and infrastructure; causing economic strangulation (through the use of naval blockade and river controls) and fomenting unrest in regions with fissiparous tendencies.

Pakistan’s military planners postulated several possible Indian invasion scenarios based on history and the disposition of Indian capabilities.

- India might conduct hot pursuits and short surgical strikes across the border using its air force and army.
- India could undertake shallow maneuvers to capture critical territory in the Pakistani heartland (Punjab) and use its air force against Pakistani forces and infrastructure.
- India might attempt deep maneuvers to slice Pakistan into two.

In all three scenarios the Indian Navy would attempt to blockade Karachi while its land forces engage Pakistan’s forces to defend multiple points of invasion. India would most likely attempt to execute its invasion plans without recourse to nuclear threat, which would be an unspoken factor intended to deter Pakistan from resorting to its nuclear forces as a last resort to avoid military defeat.
Pakistan’s newly established National Command Authority (NCA) was called for its first formal meeting in February 2000. The marathon session was held at SPD under the chairmanship of General Musharraf, who was the chief executive of the country at the time. From the outset Musharraf was determined that nuclear weapons issues would be the domain of the highest level civilian and military decision makers, who would be represented on the NCA. Nuclear force planning would be integrated with conventional war plans at the joint planning level within SPD (and report to the chairman Joint Chief of Staff’s Committee), but employment options would be decided by the president, prime minister, cabinet ministers, and four service chiefs. The heads of the relevant strategic and scientific organizations would be available to provide any needed information to the NCA members.

Within this structure, the NCA approved four major directives to guide nuclear force planning. First, minimum credible deterrence would be the guiding principle of strategic planning. Immediate strategic force goals against the threat hypotheses (discussed above) would remain the highest national security priority. Second, for mid-to long-term force goals, planning should consider national, technical, and financial resource constraints. Third, military operational plans must integrate conventional and nuclear forces into operationally effective deterrent forces at the joint services level with employment control firmly within the NCA. Fourth, conventional war-fighting plans would not be dependent on the use of nuclear force, but must be credible in their own right. Finally, nuclear weapons activities would be under centralized control to ensure safety, security, survivability, and most important, readiness.

Pakistan confronts a number of resource limitations which shape its nuclear force posture. While keeping a watchful eye on India’s nuclear development, Pakistani planners understand that the size of their nuclear forces are constrained by the country’s economic woes. Pakistan cannot afford to match every Indian advance, but is wary about entering agreements that close options. Pakistan also adopted a policy of retaining secrecy and ambiguity about its nuclear plans, thereby avoiding the need to match India tit-for-tat and obscuring any deficiencies that others might attempt to exploit. The NCA periodically review qualitative improvements, force goals, and approve strategies to make strategic assets invulnerable from outside attacks and inside sabotages.

The NCA under President Musharraf approved the current state of nondeployment as an effective means of maintaining centralized
Pakistan recognized that an imminent war would require key decisions before the outbreak of war, possibly involving the pre-war assembly of nuclear forces. The NCA understood that dispersed weapons would have to be operationally ready for the NCA to authorize the strategic forces to move to a “ready to launch” state. The NCA would then be prepared to contend with three possible launch conditions: Launch on warning; launch under attack; launch on orders. Fortunately, none of these preparations were necessary during the 2002 crisis.

**CONCLUSION**

Pakistan had not chosen to become a declared power. It was content with an opaque deterrent, much like Israel. No serious thoughts were given about nuclear force structuring. By the end of 1999, however, it became evident that achieving a regional strategic balance through negotiations and arms control would not succeed. The Kargil war revealed a decisive U.S. tilt in favor of India. The implications for Pakistan were clear. Pakistan could not lean on the United States for its national security; the U.S. role as an external balancer could not be trusted. Pakistan faced a stark choice. The “nuclear weapon was all that we had.”

Pakistan is a classic example of a state seeking to develop nuclear weapons when it faces a significant military threat to its security that cannot be met by other means. Once the veil of ambiguity was torn off by the 1998 tests, Pakistan went about the business of operationalizing its deterrent. Norms, treaties, and sanctions could not reverse the process. With a history of wars and military standoffs with India behind it, Pakistan was keen to integrate nuclear weapons into its military force posture and to link nuclear deterrence as closely as possible with conventional warfare. Pakistan was determined to deter to the best of its ability another war with India. The Kargil war in 1999 brought nuclear weapons firmly into the regional security outlook and prompted Pakistan to accelerate its efforts to operationalize its nuclear forces. The U.S. war on terror raised new concerns for the security of Pakistan’s nuclear program, which were addressed by the newly established strategic organizations. By the time of the 2001–2002 crisis and Operation Parakram, Pakistan had established the basis for a fully operationalized nuclear capability, but did not feel the need to put its nuclear forces on alert. The crisis, however, gave Pakistan confidence in its nuclear deterrent and provided important
lessons for nuclear planners who continued to develop concepts and procedures to ensure the security and readiness of the nuclear forces. From now on, every crisis involving India and Pakistan will have a nuclear backdrop and will no doubt spur efforts to prepare for the next crises to come.

NOTES

3. Author’s discussions with Pakistan military and civilian officials during a workshop sponsored by U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and Institute of Policy Research, Islamabad, Pakistan in Islamabad August 2005.
4. India’s grievance regarding attack on its parliament cannot be dismissed. An attack on Indian democratic institution is unacceptable under any circumstances. India’s assumption of Pakistani culpability and rapid mobilization, however, created more complications than it solved. India had many options to seek Pakistani cooperation in handling the crises due to the changed circumstances after 9/11. At an earlier effort at the Agra Summit in July 2001, the highest leadership in both countries had at least developed some rapport, even though the two could not come to a formal agreement. In this regard India sought a military coercion as opposed to diplomacy which was a paradigm of relations with Pakistan in the post 9/11 environment.
5. In all previous wars and crises with India, the Afghan border was peaceful and did not pose physical threat to Pakistan allowing it to focus on the eastern front. In 2001–2002 Pakistan security was tested on two fronts, underscoring the intensive nature of Pakistani security predicaments.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Force Posture


11. India had been probing in the Siachin Glacier areas since 1979 but more aggressive patrolling began in 1983. Both sides accused the other of preparing to occupy the glacier. In the summer of 1984 when the Sikh crisis was at its peak in Amritsar Punjab, India’s military forces occupied Siachin glacier prompting reciprocal Pakistani deployment to halt the offensive. Siachin continues to bleed both militaries 25 years later.

12. For details see Feroz H. Khan, Christopher Clary, and Peter Lavoy, “Pakistan Motivations and Calculations in Kargil,” in *Asymmetric War in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict*, Peter Lavoy, ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).


14. The U.S. team presented a nonpaper to Pakistan in July 1998 when deputy secretary of the state Strobe Talbot led negotiations with both India and Pakistan. The nonpaper was presented by Robert J. Einhorn to the Pakistan Foreign Office as well as the army chief where the first technical discussions were held in the Combat Development Directorate, General Headquarters. This author was present in the meeting and presented the first formal evaluation in response to the U.S. team proposal titled Minimum Deterrence Posture.


16. Several rounds of strategic dialogue led by assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation Robert J. Einhorn were held in 1998 and 1999. The U.S.-proposed minimum deterrence posture required a number of steps derived from cold war arms control concepts. For example, the U.S. proposed to keep nuclear cores, weapon components, and delivery vehicles geographically apart as an integral part of the minimum deterrence posture. Pakistan nuclear force postures were dependent on how the Indian conventional forces were poised. At the time, this author was responsible to provide military inputs to the diplomatic response and provided a formal nonpaper on strategic restraint regime in South Asia that was presented in New York in September 1998. This remains a formal arms control policy of Pakistan.

17. Pakistani and Indian proposals eventually were useful in reaching understanding at the Lahore Summit in 1999. These ideas were subsumed in “Lahore Memorandum of Understanding” of Feb 22, 1999. However, the Lahore MOU still left open the question of restraint and future force postures.
18. Former president Musharraf in his memoir called any preparation for nuclear strikes in 2002 a myth and preposterous. Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire* (New York: Free Press, Simon and Schuster, 2006), pp. 97–98. This author, based on personal knowledge and active duty position in strategic plans division at the time, does not believe nuclear weapons were either mated or played any significant role in the Kargil crises. See author interview with Aziz Haniffa, “Pakistan did not Ready Nuclear Arsenal in Kargil,” *India Abroad*, Washington DC June 14, 2002.


23. In an interview with Italian scholars Maurizio Martelleni and Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, director general Strategic Plans Division Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai stated four determinants of nuclear thresholds: space, military destruction; economic strangulation, and domestic destabilization. The scenario regarding domestic instability refers to abetting, terrorists, insurgencies, and fomenting surrogate nationalists movements on the pattern of 1971 East Pakistan (Bangladesh) separatist insurgency. India had actively helped turn a separatist movement into civil war the region before invading in November 1971.

24. A few days earlier on the eve of India’s national day January 26, 2000, Indian defense minister George Fernandes announced a doctrine of limited war under the nuclear umbrella. The doctrine explained that there was spectrum of war from low intensity to the nuclear threshold and along the spectrum there was space for a “limited” conventional war that India could wage and terminate at will.


PART IV

OUTSIDE ACTORS AND CRISIS RESOLUTION: THE UNITED STATES’ ROLE
Chapter 6

U.S. Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis

Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon

An Extended Crisis with Two Peaks

For ten months between late December 2001 and October 2002, India and Pakistan kept approximately 1 million soldiers in a high state of readiness along their international border (IB) and the Line of Control (LoC) dividing Kashmir, raising the specter of conflict. The immediate trigger for the deployment was a brazen attack by militants on the Indian Parliament building in New Delhi on December 13, 2001. The attack set in motion an extended crisis with two distinct peaks, when tensions were extremely high and when war appeared imminent to many observers. The first peak, immediately after the attack on parliament, occurred in the December 2001–January 2002 time frame. The second peak, in May–June 2002, followed another high-profile attack by militants, this time near the town of Kaluchak in Jammu. During both peaks of the crisis, high-level U.S. officials were deeply involved in crisis management, seeking to avoid war and to secure the return of Indian and Pakistani forces to their cantonments. This is the story of the Bush administration’s crisis management effort, as told by over two dozen individuals who helped shape or who led the U.S. diplomatic response during the extended crisis.

Kashmir: The Unending Quarrel

The “twin peaks” crisis grew in part out of tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Since the partition at the time of independence in 1947, Pakistan has contended that Muslim-majority
Kashmir should have been joined to Pakistan—which its leaders created to be a homeland for Muslims on the subcontinent. Pakistan maintains that the old princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is illegally occupied by Indian troops. The government of India asserts that the entire old princely state is rightfully a part of its territory because the leader of that state signed an accession agreement with India, following partition.3

Prior to the twin peaks crisis, India and Pakistan had fought in 1947, 1965, and 1999 over this territory.4 The first of these wars led to a division of the old princely state, which has remained divided to this day. Beginning in 1989, the Muslim-majority areas of the Indian state of J&K became chronically inflamed, primarily as a result of longstanding local grievances. The resultant insurgency attracted support from Pakistan’s military and intelligence services, which contributed Pakistan-based militants and Afghan Arab veterans of the “jihad” against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. The LoC dividing Kashmir became the locus of friction between India and Pakistan—marked by routine exchanges of artillery, mortar and small arms fire, and the infiltration of militants across the divide with Pakistani support.

The testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan in 1998 had the contradictory effects of exacerbating tensions over Kashmir and generating initiatives to normalize relations. As the twin peaks crisis unfolded, the Indian government, led by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and the Pakistani government, led by president and army chief Pervez Musharraf, were still pondering the lessons of a short, limited, and high-altitude war in 1999 near Kargil in Kashmir. Some observers saw the Kargil conflict as alarming evidence that both India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons status would complicate but not necessarily deter future conflicts, with the risk of escalation to nuclear use.5 In late 2000, under pressure from Washington and its allies, India and Pakistan entered into a shaky de facto cease-fire in Kashmir that was to last about ten months.

**Precipitating Events**

Even after 12 years of anti-Indian violence linked to the Kashmir cause, the two attacks that precipitated the twin peaks crisis—in December 2001 and in May 2002—evoked special outrage from the Indian public. On December 13, 2001, five terrorists—armed with assault rifles, plastic explosives, and grenades—used a fake pass to drive a nondescript, stolen white Ambassador sedan onto the grounds
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of India’s parliament, where they attempted to enter the circular building. Their apparent plan was to attack the legislators during a morning session that was to be attended by senior government leaders, including the prime minister. The plan failed by sheer luck, according to one account. The attackers’ vehicle crashed into an official car, forcing them to proceed on foot. In addition, a power outage in the capital knocked out television broadcasts of the parliamentary session; the militant who was to alert the attackers by cell phone when key ministers arrived was, therefore, unaware that the 400-plus legislators had instead adjourned and that many senior ministers would not be present. One of the militants blew himself up outside the parliament door that was to be used by the ministers. The four others died during the ensuing gun battle with the small but determined Indian security detail, which took several casualties. Indian officials immediately linked the attackers to the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad militant organizations and blamed Pakistani intelligence for sponsoring terrorism to pressure India to relinquish Kashmir.

Some Indian analysts suggested that Indian security personnel should have been better prepared for the December 13 assault on parliament in light of a suicide bombing attack on the Kashmir state assembly just over two months before. On October 1, 2001, a militant rammed an explosives-filled, hijacked, official vehicle into the assembly’s main gate while his accomplices tried to storm the complex using bullets and grenades. Forty bystanders were killed. The militants were dressed in police uniforms. Jaish-e-Muhammad, a militant group based in Pakistan, initially claimed—and then disclaimed—responsibility for the October 1 attack.

Blaming Pakistan for the October attack, Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee hinted in a letter to President George W. Bush that India would be forced to take matters into its own hands if Washington could not convince Islamabad to rein in terrorist groups based there. Indian officials demanded that Washington designate Jaish-e-Muhammad a terrorist organization, and they publicly weighed punitive attacks on militant camps on the Pakistani side of the LoC in Kashmir. India has long cited Pakistan’s failure to keep militants from crossing the LoC as evidence of Islamabad’s continuing support for their activities.

Although the casualties of the October attack were higher, the events of December 13—a dramatic and direct assault on India’s leaders in their seat of democracy—galvanized New Delhi’s response to
terrorism, much as the attacks on September 11, 2001, mobilized Washington. Home Minister L. K. Advani described the December 13 attack as “the most audacious and most alarming act of terrorism in the history of two decades of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in India.”

“Nothing will harm India more than inaction at this moment,” defense analyst Brahma Chellaney declared. Five days after the attack, India launched Operation Parakram with a general mobilization of troops.

After the October assault on the Kashmir assembly, Home Minister L. K. Advani had expressed a “measure of understanding” of U.S. equities in cooperating with Pakistan on counterterrorism. In contrast, after the December 13 attack on parliament, Indian officials criticized what they called Washington’s “double standard” on terrorism—the United States was urging restraint on New Delhi and discouraging Indian retaliation against Pakistan, whereas the United States responded to the 9/11 attacks by invading Afghanistan. Some Indian observers attributed this “double standard” to Washington’s desire to retain Pakistan’s reluctantly proffered but vital cooperation with U.S.-led operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan. The Bush administration was counting on two Pakistani army corps deployed along its border with Afghanistan to intercept Al Qaeda leaders fleeing U.S. air strikes on their mountain redoubts at Tora Bora for tribal areas within Pakistan. With India placing its army on a war footing, U.S. officials feared that Pakistan would feel compelled to redeploy these units to help block an Indian advance.

Islamabad’s initial reactions to the December 13 attack on the Indian Parliament did little to mollify New Delhi or to stem rising tensions. Indian officials brushed off President Musharraf’s condemnation of the assault and his message of sympathy. Pakistani officials, in turn, rejected New Delhi’s accusations that the attacking militants were Pakistani nationals or aided by Pakistan’s military and intelligence services. Islamabad charged New Delhi with trumping up an incident to impugn Pakistan and pressed for a joint investigation to establish the identity of the terrorists. This suggestion was dismissed out of hand by India.

As India mobilized forces, Pakistan responded in kind. Despite U.S. pleas and protests, Pakistan in late December began redeploying to its borders with India, most of the 11th and 12th Army Corps sent to the border with Afghanistan only a month earlier, at Washington’s urging. Pakistan left in place two brigades, or about 6,000 of these
regular troops, plus the 40,000 Frontier Corps troops who also had been sent to help seal the Afghan border. Most U.S. policy makers believe that the redeployment of the better equipped, more capable Pakistan Army regulars undercut whatever possibility existed of halting the passage of fleeing Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives.

Tensions between India and Pakistan were extremely high in early January 2002 as President Musharraf prepared to make a major public address. On January 11—a day before Musharraf’s scheduled speech—India’s army chief, general S. Padmanabhan, announced that the Indian armed forces were totally mobilized and awaiting a green light from the political leadership to attack. In his January 12 speech, Musharraf directly addressed the hot-button issue of militants operating from Pakistani soil. He promised to crack down on the militants and stated that he would tolerate no terrorist activity, even in support of Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir. “No organization will be allowed to perpetuate terrorism behind the garb of the Kashmiri cause,” he declared.

While Washington welcomed Musharraf’s pledge, New Delhi remained deeply skeptical. Indian officials demanded that Pakistan hand over 20 named militants as proof of good will, and they rebuffed Musharraf’s proposal to resume talks on the future of Kashmir. New Delhi insisted that Pakistan first stop abetting acts of terrorism and dismantle training camps for militants. Moreover, Indian government officials announced that they would wait and see what happened after the snows melted in April–May, when there is typically an upsurge in infiltration and acts of violence. In the meantime, troops on both sides remained deployed and ready.

As winter wore on, Indian officials seemed to grow even more pessimistic about Pakistan’s intentions. In late January and February 2002, Pakistani officials detained members of the two main militant groups implicated in attacks on Indian interests, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, only to release many of them weeks later. Campaigning for state elections held in March 2002, leaders of India’s governing coalition focused on the terrorism issue and Pakistan’s complicity. In mid-May 2002, on what turned out to be the eve of the militant attack at Kaluchak, Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh told the press that General Musharraf had broken his promise to clamp down on the groups, which India believed to be responsible for attacking parliament the previous December. “Their leadership is now freed, it lives in houses and gets paid an allowance by the government of Pakistan,” he stated. Defense Minister George Fernandes...
charged that Pakistani-backed militants were massed along the LoC, ready to cross to the Indian side.\textsuperscript{22}

With emotions already running high in India, the provocative May 14 militant attack at Kaluchak on the families of Indian soldiers who were deployed at the front instantly brought the India-Pakistan crisis to its second peak. Military leaves were again cancelled. On May 20, Deputy Prime Minister L. K. Advani announced that India “would go ahead and win the proxy war like we did in 1971.”\textsuperscript{23} Two days later, Prime Minister Vajpayee visited the front lines in Jammu, near where the attacks occurred, delivering a chilling message to the troops that “the time has come for a decisive battle, and we will have a sure victory in this battle.”\textsuperscript{24} Then, oddly, Vajpayee left on May 24, for a five-day rest in the mountain resort of Manali, from which he declared that the world community supported India’s position that “cross-border terrorism has to stop.”\textsuperscript{25} Vajpayee also reportedly mused that “we should have given a fitting reply” the day after the parliament attack.\textsuperscript{26} The Indian press reported that the Indian military would launch attacks in the Kashmir area in mid-June; the United States and Pakistan, however, had already detected the movement of one of India’s strike corps on the pivotal western front along the IB, according to one Indian account. The Indian military’s actual plans reportedly were “so audacious they had never been war-gamed before.”\textsuperscript{27}

In response to the Kaluchak attacks, the Bush administration crisis management team, led by Secretary of State Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage, once again went into high gear. The key event during the second peak was a pledge secured by Deputy Secretary Armitage from President Musharraf to do his utmost to cease infiltration “permanently” across the LoC. This pledge was relayed to senior Indian officials in New Delhi on June 8. At the behest of senior Indian officials, Armitage went public with the pledge while in India. Armitage’s message from Islamabad to New Delhi began the process of backing the two sides away from confrontation, although Indian forces would remain deployed in strength until after the J&K state election in the fall of 2002.

\textbf{Crisis Management: Where You Stand Depends on Where You Sit}

During both peaks of this extended crisis, officials in Washington believed war was possible, either by design or by inadvertence. The second peak was more worrisome to most U.S. participants. The actual beginning and end of the crisis were less clear-cut to American
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crisis managers. Some U.S. officials belatedly saw the October 1 attack in Srinagar as the start of the crisis. In New Delhi, a few discerned a worrisome pattern of events in the summer and fall of 2001, which could lead to another crisis, but most American officials in Washington and Islamabad were consumed instead with the imperatives of defeating Al Qaeda, routing the Taliban, and capturing or killing their leadership. The end date of the crisis—and whether the crisis really ended at all, or merely went into remission—is also a subject of some debate among participants.

The views of U.S. officials on the crisis varied with their vantage points. Our interviews suggest that it mattered whether participants were located in Washington, New Delhi, or Islamabad. Each venue had its own political and bureaucratic environment, day-to-day preoccupations, information networks, and perceptions of risk and opportunity. Organizational affiliations also mattered. Because the White House and Pentagon were absorbed in the military campaign in Afghanistan, crisis management on the subcontinent fell quite naturally and almost exclusively on the leadership of the State Department. Secretary of State Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage were assisted by the U.S. ambassadors to India and Pakistan and their country teams, senior State Department officials, and National Security Council (NSC) staffers.

This chapter will first examine the perspectives of U.S. officials in Washington, in New Delhi, and in Islamabad between September 11, 2001 and December 12, 2001—just prior to the attack on India’s parliament. Next, we will review these officials’ perceptions after the first and then the second peak of the crisis. The final sections of this chapter will analyze the diverse insights and lessons drawn by American policy makers from the crisis, along with implications for future U.S. policy towards South Asia.

The October 1 Bombing in Srinagar: The View from Washington

Kashmir was not even on the radar screens of most Washington policy makers on October 1, 2001, when the attack on the assembly building in Srinagar occurred. Instead, Washington’s attention was riveted on fast-moving events in the military campaign in Afghanistan. Thus, the events of October 1 rang “no bells or whistles” with Deputy Secretary of State Armitage. “Policy makers,” as Armitage recounted, “do one problem at a time.”28 Richard Falkenrath, senior director for policy and special assistant to the president in the White
House’s Office of Homeland Security from 2001 to 2003, stresses how focused senior U.S. officials were on prosecuting the global war on terrorism (GWOT):

You can’t even imagine the bandwidth problems, especially for the President, the National Security Adviser, and most cabinet and sub-cabinet-level officials. They paid little attention to anti-Indian militants mounting cross-border attacks. There was so much going on...9/11 was a gravitational black hole for the principals and deputies, who rushed into the Situation Room.

From September 11 through the run up to December 13 there were two or three Deputies or Principals Committee meetings daily on terrorism-related issues. Preparing seniors for these cabinet and sub-cabinet-level meetings blotted up endless staff time at all the national security departments and agencies. At the State Department, for example, the secretary typically received a briefing at 5:00 a.m. daily; the first in-house meeting was at 6:00 a.m.; and the first Deputies or Principals Committee meeting of the day took place at 7:00 a.m., with the State Department supplying background or decision papers for each.

“We lived Afghanistan,” recalled one former State Department official. He and his colleagues focused on military developments in Afghanistan for 18 hours a day from September 11 until late December, when the coalition military campaign finally started to wind down.

The bombing of the Kashmir assembly building thus initially drew only a pro forma condemnation and message of sympathy from the State Department. One veteran Washington South Asia hand recalls wondering if Al Qaeda had inspired the car bombing, which was an unusual event in Kashmir. Assistant Secretary Christina Rocca, who was closely monitoring events in India and Pakistan as she prepared to accompany Secretary Powell there ten days later, remembers seeing pictures of the bombing scene on CNN. Like other U.S. officials attuned to Indian and Pakistani sensitivities, she worried that this bombing, on top of the steady stream of militant violence preceding it, would jeopardize the ten-month-old cease-fire between Indian and Pakistani forces on the LoC dividing Kashmir.

Rocca’s foreboding proved well founded. While Secretary of State Powell and Rocca were in Islamabad en route to New Delhi to “lower the temperature” between India and Pakistan, Indian forces began firing artillery across the LoC in Kashmir in an apparent effort to signal to Washington as well as to Islamabad that India viewed the attack
in Srinagar as a serious provocation. Defense Minister Fernandes
told journalists that the firing was a punitive response to militant
infiltrations from the Pakistani side; Indian analyst Bharat Karnad
described it as “an Indian display of force to show Pakistan” what
could happen.\textsuperscript{36}

As one U.S. official recounted, India-Pakistan relations were “poi-
sonous” in the fall of 2001. Indian leaders were bitter that Pakistan
had become a primary beneficiary of the Bush administration’s
GWOT, despite having been the Taliban’s strongest backer before
the 9/11 attacks on U.S. soil, and despite Pakistani support for cross-
LoC infiltration resulting in terrorist attacks directed against India.
One senior Washington observer remembers that “every meeting with
Indians had one topic: Pakistan. Pakistan was getting some of the
advantages India had just won—including the lifting of sanctions.”\textsuperscript{37}

An important objective of Secretary Powell’s visit was to assuage
Indian resentment. As the \textit{Baltimore Sun} reported, “His [Powell’s]
official mission is to thank leaders of both countries for their support
for the war against terrorism. He will also urge calm in their dealings
with each other.”\textsuperscript{38}

The anger of senior Indian officials at U.S. policy was evident in
their dealings with the Powell delegation. They leapt on the secretary’s
statement at a joint press conference with Musharraf in Islamabad on
October 15, immediately before he flew to New Delhi, that Kashmir
was “a central issue” between India and Pakistan. Powell’s formul-
ation was recast in the Indian media as “the central issue,” a description
very much at odds with India’s position. He arrived in New Delhi to
a flurry of press claims that “Powell has taken the Pakistani line.”
An Indian official later reportedly admitted to a visiting American
that, anticipating U.S. criticism of India for breaching the cease-fire
in Kashmir, he had knowingly mischaracterized the secretary’s state-
ment in Islamabad, as a diversion.\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{The October 1 Bombing in Srinagar:}
\textbf{The View from New Delhi and Islamabad}

Whereas the Kashmir state assembly car bombing had little impact in
Washington, it loomed large for some U.S. embassy officials in New
Delhi. “Warning lights flashed at U.S. Embassy New Delhi . . . though
not on the 6th and 7th floors of State Department [where the assistant
secretary for South Asia and the leadership of the State Department,
respectively, reside],” one former official recalls.\textsuperscript{40} He notes that the
October 1 bombing appeared important to New Delhi as a litmus
test of U.S. attitudes towards India and the terrorist threats it faced. Other U.S. officials based in New Delhi saw little to distinguish the October 1 attack from the many, which preceded and followed it in J&K during this period.

Secretary Powell assured Indian officials during his mid-October 2001 visit to New Delhi that America’s campaign against terrorism was not confined to Afghanistan and Al Qaeda. “The United States and India are united against terrorism, and that includes the terrorism that has been directed against India as well,” he told a joint press conference with Indian external affairs minister Jaswant Singh.41 Secretary Powell’s hosts avoided public rejoinders, but anger was rising in New Delhi. To some observers, the American assurances seemed intended mainly at keeping India from retaliating against Pakistan for escalating violence in Kashmir.42

Some U.S. officials at embassy New Delhi believed that more concerted action from Washington might have headed off India’s subsequent brinksmanship.43 It would have been helpful, they subsequently speculated, if President Bush’s September 20 speech to a joint session of the U.S. Congress had underscored the importance of combating terrorism by regional “jihadi” groups favored by Pakistan, as well as by groups with “global reach.”44 The suspected perpetrators of the Kashmir assembly building attack, Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, had not yet been added to the State Department’s foreign terrorist organization list. Other U.S. officials in New Delhi believed the Indian leaders were merely maneuvering for diplomatic leverage designed to prompt Washington to lean on Pakistan.45

American officials in Islamabad were so immersed in the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan and in efforts to secure Pakistan’s help against the remnants of Al Qaeda and the Taliban that they did not focus on the October 1 attack on the Kashmir assembly building or see it as a precursor of a major crisis. From their perspective, the assembly car bombing attack was but one of many acts of terrorism in Kashmir. The October 1 attack was lost in the “noise” and in the overriding importance of effective U.S.-Pakistan cooperation in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on the border with Afghanistan.46

The First Peak:
Washington’s Initial Response

For senior White House officials and the State Department’s “7th floor,” the December 13 terrorist attack on India’s parliament
marked the start of the crisis. Under ordinary circumstances, the attack likely would have been the dominant concern of the administration. Afghanistan, however, was still the “main fight,” a Defense Department official recalls. Moreover, the United States had “unusually salient equities” in Pakistan—the need for help in blocking the retreat from Tora Bora—when the attack on parliament occurred.47 Thus, for many Washington policy makers, the December 13 attack and the subsequent Indian and Pakistani military deployments were serious and unwelcome diversions from the war on terror. One regional specialist recalled: “For the first time, I viewed [the management of] tensions between India and Pakistan as a means, not an end. The end was to keep our Afghanistan policy on track.”48

The first U.S. official to meet with Indian leaders after the attack on parliament was the senior national security director for Asia, Torkel Patterson, who was on a swing through Asia to brief governments about the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Indian national security adviser Brajesh Mishra was seething in their meeting—red-faced, grasping a pencil, charging that Washington did not take seriously the problem of Pakistani support for terrorism. Patterson felt that Mishra’s aim was to clarify that India had red lines that could not be crossed, including terrorism against India’s leadership.49

The potential for escalation was obvious to U.S. officials in Washington, New Delhi, and Islamabad. “Once the violence moved to New Delhi, India-Pakistan tensions became a whole new ball game,” Armitage recalled.50 As another former senior Bush administration official remembers:

It was extremely serious. The emotional part of it was the attack on parliament. Almost everything else you could discuss calmly…. They would point out in every conversation how close they [the militants] came to killing “my colleagues” and decapitating the Indian Government. The attack occurred at a time when almost the entire executive branch as well as the legislature was there. It shook them to their boots. They made clear that they could no longer live under this level of threat. You had to (1) listen and (2) allow them to vent their anger. U.S. message: “We know how mad you are, but this is not the time to let MAD [Mutually Assured Destruction] take over.”51

After December 13, “what really jumped out,” according to a veteran government South Asia watcher, “was the high level of U.S. attention…higher even than to [the limited war in] Kargil” in 1999.52
On December 14, 2001, President Bush called President Musharraf, then made a “very difficult call” to India’s prime minister Vajpayee, counseling “patience and calm,” a senior official recalled. The president reported back to his aides that Vajpayee was “very unhappy.” The Deputies Committee met immediately and asked that a paper with recommendations be prepared by the NSC staff and Assistant Secretary Rocca. Accordingly, Patterson spent part of Christmas Day putting together a paper for a Principals Committee the following day. The principals signed off on a strategy of engagement with India and Pakistan, to be coordinated closely with the United Kingdom. Among other elements, the strategy called for back-to-back visits to the region by senior officials, with an eye to defusing tensions and postponing decisions to launch hostilities. President Bush called Vajpayee and Musharraf again on December 29, amid rising U.S. concern about a possible Indian strike.

Reflecting this heightened concern, the South Asia Bureau’s public affairs officers prepared contingency press guidance on the India and Pakistan crisis virtually daily from December 13, 2001, through January 2002. In the preceding three months, they had done so only three times: after the October 1 state assembly bombing; on October 16, when shelling resumed across the LoC; and on November 2. While the Indian leadership blamed Musharraf for the December 13 attack, senior U.S. officials doubted that he would have had ordered an assault, which would obviously risk war with India, tarnish his reputation, and severely complicate his relations with Washington. New Delhi’s response got Washington’s attention, as intended, and caught the Pakistani army off guard, with two key army corps deployed along the Afghan border. As one senior U.S. official commented, the Indian mobilization clearly was “for real.” Secretary of State Powell watched the Indians “moving the trains up” with the understanding of a general who had seen this movie before, and indeed, had played a leading role in similar dramas. The diplomatic challenge facing Washington was to play for time and eventually to “tell the generals that their best service was to go home, to pull back.” The longer the Indian Army was deployed in the field, the more unwise the deployment would seem, harming morale and training. In fact, as one senior U.S. official recalled, “after a while, the generals were ready to go home” if they were not going to be given orders to fight.

As reports rolled in on the decision by India’s Cabinet Committee on Security to mobilize for war and on preparations by senior Indian officers to move against the bases used by militant groups implicated...
in the attack, President Musharraf put his army on high alert. U.S. policy makers worried that these moves and counter-moves could trigger unintended escalation to a general war or even nuclear use. According to one State Department official, “The question was would things get out of hand and prompt one side or another to slide toward [nuclear weapon] use. . . . Once started, Pakistani issues would lead to pressure to use [nuclear weapons]. . . . Escalation could come quickly.”59 A particular concern was that India and Pakistan could misperceive or not recognize each other’s “red lines.”60

Officials in Washington were divided on whether the Indian mobilization was intended to coerce Pakistan and spur U.S. pressure on Islamabad to rein in the militants, or to fight Pakistan. One State Department official recalls that “when India ramped up Operation Parakram on 18 December 2001, U.S. intelligence thought the chances [of war] were high in the December-January time frame, but policy makers in the State Department’s South Asia Bureau and the senior leadership on the ‘7th floor’ remained unconvinced.” These differences in threat perception mirrored the “usual divide” between intelligence agencies and regional bureaus, with the latter tending to “put the best face on prospects for diplomacy,” he observed.61 Another U.S. official—a seasoned diplomat—insisted that India had “no intention of going to war” during the December–January time frame, since Vajpayee and Musharraf were careful “not to be more belligerent than they had to be.”62 Instead, the main danger, as perceived by this official, was unintended escalation. The crisis could have turned out differently with different leaders, he added. From a crisis management perspective, it didn’t matter whether New Delhi’s intentions were to coerce or to fight Pakistan: U.S. diplomacy had to assume that the possibility of war was real and to act accordingly.

The first order of business for U.S. officials after the December 13 attack was to convince President Musharraf to blacklist certain terrorist groups operating with impunity on Pakistani soil, and to do so by Christmas, when concerns over a possible Indian strike were running high. Musharraf followed through on this agenda item, but only “cosmetically,” several officials agree. In the view of one official, Washington at this stage was “grasping at straws” to prevent a major conflict, which would interfere with the Afghan campaign and might well escalate.

Senior U.S. officials seized on Musharraf’s intention to deliver a speech in January 2002—reported back to Washington by Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin—as a major opportunity to reduce
tensions between India and Pakistan. Washington provided detailed advice to Musharraf on the content of the speech. The Bush administration also offered sensors to India to help stop the infiltration of militants across the Kashmir divide, but New Delhi—suspicious that Washington's real agenda was to obtain information about its military plans—rejected the offer.63

Even though senior U.S. officials were unsure what the Pakistani president would actually say on January 12, they concluded that, in order to buy time for peace making, "no matter what Musharraf said, it would be the right thing."64 The South Asia Bureau therefore worked on a response designed to "pat Musharraf on the back."65 In fact, U.S. officials did not need to feign satisfaction because Musharraf articulated many of the objectives they had suggested for the speech. As one former NSC staffer described it, the address was a success for the U.S. effort to "help Pakistan reposition itself to oppose terrorism."66 The implementation of Musharraf's promises would take time, during which it would be politically difficult for New Delhi to initiate a military campaign.

**Policymaking during the Crisis**

Secretary Powell, Deputy Secretary Armitage, and Assistant Secretary Rocca quickly took the lead in shaping Washington's diplomatic response to the burgeoning regional crisis. The State Department's lead role was uncontested, particularly with the Defense Department preoccupied with OEFI in Afghanistan. President Bush supported the Powell-Armitage effort throughout, with phone calls and letters to Vajpayee and Musharraf. Rocca's consistent inclusion in high-level decision making reflected Secretary Powell's management style and operating procedures in dealing with regional issues. Given the potential explosiveness of this crisis, Powell and Armitage assumed most of the heavy lifting. As one foreign service officer observed: "The level of the 'desk officer' escalates in direct proportion to the crisis. This crisis was important enough for Powell and Armitage to become 'desk officers,'" Once crisis management was at Powell's and Armitage's level, the official noted, "you don’t hand it back to an assistant secretary of State," even though both seniors relied heavily on Rocca.67

In the view of several former State Department officials, Secretary Powell excelled at "working the phones," while Deputy Secretary Armitage was the "go-to" guy and a "gifted trouble shooter."68
Both men could relate to General Musharraf naturally and forcefully, drawing on their common experience as military officers. Secretary Rumsfeld’s role in the twin peaks crisis was intermittent. His first visit to India and Pakistan came late in the crisis and was minimally coordinated with ongoing diplomatic efforts. In the view of policy makers across agencies, this reflected Rumsfeld’s independent style, strong personality, and preoccupation with OEF in Afghanistan. Rumsfeld “arranged his own travel,” one official delicately noted.

Our interviews indicated that the U.S. Congress was not significantly involved in the twin peaks crisis. The Bush administration did not encourage a congressional role in crisis management. Moreover, with a nuclear-tinged crisis looming during a critical phase in the Afghan war, members of Congress—including those belonging to the pro-India and pro-Pakistan caucuses—gave the executive branch wide latitude. This posture stood in stark contrast to congressional activism immediately after 9/11 in favor of lifting sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan for testing nuclear weapons.

The NSC staff hosted meetings of principals and deputies, but did not play a substantive role in most executive branch deliberations, several officials recall. One reason, according to Richard Falkenrath, was that National Security Advisor Rice, unlike some of her predecessors, perceived her role almost exclusively as coordinating policies for the president, not engineering outcomes. The NSC under Rice did, however, mediate some interagency disagreements relating to South Asia, such as the timing of F-16 sales to Pakistan. One senior State Department official recalls that the Pentagon was inclined to sell the aircraft in 2002, while the State Department argued that this would torpedo U.S.-India relations as Washington was trying to improve ties with New Delhi. The NSC decided to defer the sale slightly.

From December 13, 2001, through most of 2002, Deputies and Principals Committee meetings on the crisis in South Asia were held at least three times a week, sometimes daily. The ramp-down of OEF in December 2001 freed up policy makers to refocus on India-Pakistan. On South Asia issues, unlike many others, policymaking approximated the textbook sequence, with a mid-level policy coordinating committee (PCC) generating and reviewing options for consideration by the “seniors.” The combined demands of the India-Pakistan crisis and the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan smoothed many relationships in Washington and made for more congenial relations within the administration. “When you are at war, there is no question what your priorities are,” one former senior official declared, adding...
that the interagency process has worked especially well on South Asia in part because “U.S. interests have been clearer on South Asia than on, say, North Korea.”

The options considered in the PCC sessions on India-Pakistan tended to be fairly narrow, one former policy maker recalls. A proposal for joint monitoring with the United Kingdom—of militant camps linked to Pakistan—failed to catch on, since U.S. officials worried that disbanded camps would simply be reconstituted elsewhere. Similarly, a suggestion made at the working level that militant groups active in Kashmir might be disarmed and demobilized did not make the “options list” sent up the line by the PCC, presumably because it seemed too difficult to achieve and politically risky, given Washington’s delicate balancing act between India and Pakistan. “An initiative to demand that Musharraf demobilize jihadists [n]ever got up to me,” Richard Armitage affirmed, when asked if he had been presented with such a proposal.

As planned, U.S. officials worked with other concerned governments to “choreograph” a stream of senior official visits to the region from Washington, London, the European Union, Tokyo, and Beijing, in order to keep the two sides “talking and thinking” about peace. For the duration of the crisis, Assistant Secretary Rocca traveled to the region almost once a month. Senior U.S. officials assumed—or hoped—that neither India nor Pakistan would attack while foreign dignitaries were awaited or physically present in the region. China and Russia cooperated fully in this effort. A former senior Bush administration official recalls:

The “dog that did not bark” in all this was China—all we had to do was keep the Chinese informed…we had good relations with the Chinese and, for that matter, the Russians…. They did not stick their noses into it except to counsel moderation… This was a good example of the U.S. working with Russia, after its unique relationship with India for so many years, and China. They let the U.S. and EU lead [on this.]

THE FIRST PEAK: VIEWS OF U.S. OFFICIALS IN NEW DELHI AND ISLAMABAD

As the crisis unfolded, the U.S. ambassadors in New Delhi and Islamabad were sending in messages “as might be expected…to set Washington’s compass,” one policy maker remembers. “Each embassy was not shy about pointing out what the other country needed to
do to make the crisis go away. Both ambassadors sent lines in to Washington but were largely disconnected from interagency deliberations.

The two ambassadors had little in common, apart from their shared distance from the interagency process and limited prior familiarity with or experience in South Asia. In Islamabad, Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin, a career foreign service officer, tended to operate through the traditional department “chain” from the South Asia Bureau to Powell and Armitage. In New Delhi, Ambassador Robert Blackwill—a Harvard professor who had served as senior advisor on Europe on President George H. W. Bush’s NSC staff—routinely circumvented standard operating procedures, a pattern that dismayed some Washington officials. He maintained his own contacts with Vice President Cheney and then-national security advisor Rice—a former protégé—and tried to communicate directly with the State Department 7th floor, several former officials recall. Having left for New Delhi determined to cultivate India’s friendship for the United States as a counterweight to China, Blackwill quickly developed an affinity for India’s perspective that pleased some in Washington but worried many veteran diplomats in the department.

Both Chamberlin and Blackwill were contending with morale problems in their embassies in late 2001. Security problems in Islamabad had disrupted embassy staffing and the lives of embassy families. Embassy dependents and nonessential personnel had been ordered to leave after 9/11. This order was lifted in January 2002, after which most evacuees returned. Embassy New Delhi was roiled by Blackwill’s distaste for consultations with staff there and by his management style, which triggered State Department investigations into his personnel practices.

Embassy New Delhi first learned of the attack on parliament from the spouse of a political officer who was driving past the site and called in by cell phone. The embassy watched the drama unfold on television. Several days later, a diplomat posted there recalls, a journalist told him that India was going to “full mobilization.” He immediately sent a nighttime cable back to Washington. As the crisis unfolded, Ambassador Blackwill and his British counterpart, High Commissioner Robert Young, met often to discuss events, particularly their shared foreboding about possible war between India and Pakistan.

Some at embassy New Delhi worried that the Bush administration’s proactive and preemptive approach to countering terrorism
could make it easier for New Delhi to disregard U.S. cautions against attacking Pakistan. One official notes that Washington’s decision to launch a military attack on the Taliban for harboring and cooperating with Al Qaeda provided a precedent and “opened up the political space....We laid down new rules in Afghanistan....But there was no guarantee that the results [between India and Pakistan] would be clean.”

As Indian forces deployed to the borders with Pakistan, senior Indian officials warned U.S. embassy officers that Pakistani support for terrorism must end once and for all. Embassy officers recognized that these messages were a goad to Washington to lean hard on Pakistan, but also realized that “this was not play acting....It was really risky,” recalls one official posted to New Delhi in 2001–2002. Coercive diplomacy could be a prelude to punitive action. Those with access to the fullest range of information on the crisis saw the threat of attack by India as real; some believe that India and Pakistan came close to conflict between December 2001 and January 2002. “India kept us guessing masterfully,” one official recalls. The challenge for Washington was to avoid either leaning on Pakistan too hard, which could hurt OEF, or not leaning on Pakistan hard enough, which would alienate New Delhi. Other embassy officers, while worried about the risk of unintended escalation, suspected that the U.S. government was “being played” by Indian officials. Their perceptions accorded with those of Indian security expert P. R. Chari, who told the Financial Times in September 2002 that “India’s movement of troops towards the border was designed to put pressure on the U.S. to put pressure on Musharraf.”

U.S. embassy in Islamabad, preoccupied with the tasks associated with supporting OEF, was more surprised than the embassy in New Delhi by the December 13 attack on India’s parliament. Colonel David Smith, the army attaché, and Ambassador Chamberlin were in the office of the inspector general of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps on December 13 when they learned of the attack. Their host had CNN on mute during the meeting. As images of India’s parliament flashed onto the screen, he turned up the sound. Smith and Chamberlin asked for his reaction. “Oops,” the general replied.

As Colonel Smith recalls, a senior Pakistani official told him on December 22 that his government had indications that India was going to attack before dawn the following day. Smith notified the ambassador, the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Defense Intelligence...
Agency. Familiar in general terms with Pakistan’s war plans, he took at face value the warnings he had received earlier from Pakistani officials to the effect that, if the Indian military buildup continued, Islamabad would have to pull forces from the Afghan border, where they were positioned to help U.S. forces conducting counterterrorism operations against the fleeing remnants of Al Qaeda and the Taliban. General Michael “Rifle” DeLong, then deputy commander of the Central Command, conveyed to his Pakistani joint staff counterpart the importance of keeping Pakistani forces in place. In the last week of December, big roundups of Al Qaeda operatives took place along the border with Afghanistan. To the consternation of U.S. officials in Islamabad and Washington, these were to be the last such comprehensive dragnets for two years after the redeployment of Pakistani troops to counter the Indian military threat.93

Some U.S. officials in Islamabad were concerned that their messages would receive less of a hearing in Washington than those of their counterparts in New Delhi, given Ambassador Blackwill’s presumed lines of communication into the White House. They worried also that Washington would tilt towards New Delhi at the expense of OEF. Embassy New Delhi had the opposite concern—that OEF was overshadowing Washington’s commitment to open a new strategic partnership with India.94 Both embassies hoped that the senior State Department team would find the “forcing function” necessary, as one senior official characterized it, to help the two countries “climb down from the tree.”95

**Between the Peaks**

With the ball in General Musharraf’s court to fulfill the commitments made in his January 12, 2002, speech, senior policy makers in Washington relaxed a bit and turned their attention elsewhere. Although well aware that the crisis could heat up again, Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage believed developments were heading in the right direction. According to one Indian account, conflict, in fact, had been averted in early January when the Indian government withdrew offensive forces preparing to launch a limited war with Pakistan in Kashmir, after démarches by U.S. officials based on overhead imagery.96 With the redeployment of Pakistani troops from the Afghan frontier to the IBs in the same time period, the brief window of opportunity for a low-cost Indian military punitive action across the LoC had clearly passed. Moreover, Prime Minister
Vajpayee’s continuing reluctance to initiate hostilities seemed reassuring to U.S. officials.

The reality was less reassuring. Retrospective Indian accounts indicate that the Indian military began planning and training in late January to fight a wider conflict with Pakistan across the IB, should this be authorized.97 Statements emanating from New Delhi in the first four months of 2002 reflected growing outrage at Musharraf’s failure to crack down on militant groups based in Pakistan. Hearing the Indian warnings at close hand, U.S. officials in New Delhi worried that another major attack by militants would trigger an immediate Indian military response.98

THE SECOND PEAK: WASHINGTON’S INITIAL REACTIONS

The significance of the May 14 attack at Kaluchak was immediately apparent to Washington officials. Crisis management during the second peak again fell almost entirely to Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage. Once again, their guidance from the White House was simply to prevent war on the subcontinent. As the two geared up their tandem diplomacy again, officials monitoring the situation picked up evidence that Indian forces had taken the last remaining steps necessary to initiate hostilities, if they were authorized to do so.99

While belligerent statements by Indian officials were intermittently softened by messages that war was not imminent, Washington’s regional specialists were nearly unanimous in predicting that it was. They saw no obvious pathway for the two governments to walk back from the brink. The State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which had played down the prospect of conflict in January, now joined the consensus U.S. government view.

Powell and Armitage, however, doubted that war between India and Pakistan was either imminent or inevitable. Secretary Powell thought war was still preventable because India’s military options remained problematic and risky; if this were true, then Vajpayee’s calculations in May would differ little from the preceding January. Powell continued to see the military mobilizations on both sides of the border as “political” and believed both leaderships expected the U.S. government to continue to act as a “separator.” If Vajpayee could see no way to gain advantage by going to war, then a war could be avoided by adroit U.S. facilitation, he reasoned.100
Powell and Armitage nevertheless worried about the nuclear dimension of the crisis, which was prominent during the second peak. The first peak had coincided with an Indian flight test of a new version of the Agni missile, with a range well suited to reach targets in Pakistan.101 In contrast, during the second peak of the crisis, Pakistan flight-tested three ballistic missiles in quick succession.102 Moreover, between April and June 2002, several senior Pakistani officials reaffirmed earlier warnings by President Musharraf that Pakistan might use nuclear weapons if it deemed its existence to be threatened.103

On May 26 and 27, when Pakistani public statements were emphasizing the nuclear dimension of the crisis, Secretary Powell—who was accompanying President Bush on a swing through Europe—phoned Musharraf from the U.S. ambassador’s office in Paris and said: “All this chatter about nuclear weapons is very interesting, but let’s talk general-to-general. You know and I know that you can’t possibly use nuclear weapons…. It’s really an existential weapon that has not been used since 1945. So stop scaring everyone.”104 Shortly after this conversation, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United Nations made one more public reference to nuclear use, after which Pakistani statements on nuclear dangers ceased. Secretary Powell’s public message to Pakistan was to halt infiltration across the LoC. Asked in a BBC interview on May 31 as to how long Musharraf had to deliver, Powell demurred, replying: “Well, I can’t answer that question. I mean, what we are concerned about is that the Indians might find that they have to attack. I don’t know what their timeline is. There are weather considerations. There are lots of other considerations.”105

Deputy Secretary Armitage shared Powell’s view that adroit U.S. diplomacy could provide the exit strategy, which both India and Pakistan needed. As he prepared to travel to the region in early June to urge restraint in New Delhi and to elicit new assurances from General Musharraf, he consulted repeatedly with South Asia hands at the State Department.106 At one such meeting, he asked for a show of hands around the room of who thought there would be a war between India and Pakistan. Almost every hand went up. One participant asked Armitage for his definition of “war.” Armitage’s recollection was that he and Powell alone doubted that there would be war.107

The situation from late May onward appeared sufficiently bleak for the Pentagon to reexamine the effects of nuclear weapons’ use on the subcontinent. One official vividly remembers interagency discussions...
at the Pentagon on evacuating the embassies and U.S. nationals in the event of a nuclear exchange. The subcontinent’s seasonal “plumology” was studied, and evacuation planning discussed in an “oddly bloodless” and analytical way. One Pentagon official recalls how daunting evacuation planning was for India, where a large contingent of American citizens resided. With grim irony, he noted that the “safe haven” for U.S. nationals residing in Pakistan was to relocate to war-torn Afghanistan.

The View from New Delhi and Islamabad

The difficulty of evacuating U.S. nationals if warfare occurred was a pressing concern for Ambassador Blackwill. On May 30, at a meeting of embassy staff and families, he urged dependents and nonessential embassy personnel to leave as soon as possible. Blackwill’s message to a divided embassy community was clear: “I know things you don’t, and my wife is leaving.” On May 31, the State Department issued a “voluntary evacuation order” for nonessential embassy and consulate personnel and dependents in India, citing the growing risk of conflict between India and Pakistan and of terrorist attacks against Americans. Blackwill’s decision a few days later to order the departure of nonessential staff and all dependents caught the State Department by surprise, in part because much of the country team at the U.S. embassy in New Delhi had seemed to be leaning the other way. The order issued by the State Department on June 5 also urged that non-official Americans leave India and that U.S. citizens avoid travel to the region. Other Western governments immediately followed suit.

Most viewed Ambassador Blackwill’s decision as prudent, given the high state of readiness for war in the region and a recent terrorist attack in Islamabad. After September 11, 2001, the U.S. embassy in Islamabad had ordered the departure of “nonessential” staff and all dependents. In January 2002, the order was lifted, and most embassy staff and families returned. Then, on March 22, a Christian church in Islamabad was bombed, and five people died, including an embassy officer and her daughter. Dependents and nonessential personnel were again ordered to leave Pakistan. Among them were the two daughters of Ambassador Chamberlin, who later resigned her post to rejoin them in the United States. “When an embassy cannot vouch for the safety of U.S. citizens, that’s a very big deal,” observed one official who was in South Asia Bureau at the time.
Blackwill’s departure order and the State Department’s travel advisories seem to have had unanticipated benefits for U.S. crisis management. Many American officials we interviewed believe that these moves helped convince New Delhi to seek a face-saving exit from the crisis. Some Indian officials may have viewed the evacuation and advisories as a form of coercive diplomacy by Washington. These messages would surely affect business calculations, compounding the harm to India’s economy caused by the extended mobilization of Indian forces. The warnings, however, were not a gambit by U.S. embassy in New Delhi or by the State Department. Blackwill and many others sincerely thought that a war was possible, and that if war were to begin, its course would be unpredictable, including a possible breach of the nuclear threshold. Simple prudence dictated that as many Americans as possible be removed from harm’s way.

In Islamabad as in New Delhi, those who believed that war could be averted during the second peak of the crisis were in the minority. Col. David Smith was part of that minority. He did not see “drivers” that would make the benefits of warfare worth their risk. He, too, worried, however, about inadvertent escalation. The attacks at Kaluchak had caught embassy Islamabad in a difficult transition. For most, the “overwhelming preoccupations” remained the war on terrorism and operations in Afghanistan. Officials stationed there operated under severe handicaps. Most embassy families and nonessential personnel had again been evacuated from Pakistan after the deaths of two Americans in the March 17 church attack. As one U.S. official recounted, “The officers remaining were distracted and eager to leave and rejoin their families. Embassy people were basically barricaded inside for security reasons.” With the departure of Ambassador Chamberlin, the embassy was leaderless at a crucial time.

Ambassador Nancy Powell was hurriedly recruited and sent to Islamabad from her post in Ghana in an “acting” capacity, as Armitage was preparing to return to South Asia in early June. The first question she confronted was whether the embassy should be drawn down still further for security reasons. Her deputy, Bill Monroe, was also new to his post. Scrambling to assess the situation, Ambassador Powell pulsed the few Islamabad embassy staffers still on the ground, her local contacts from an earlier tour of duty in Pakistan, and the British high commissioner, with whom she had worked in the mid-1990s when both were assigned to New Delhi. Her initial concern was that a misjudgment or act of sabotage could trigger war. The two sides were talking even less than they had historically, and U.S. embassy officials
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were detecting only “old think” in conversations with Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Armitage Mission: Washington Perspectives

The most critical period of crisis management during the second peak came with Deputy Secretary Armitage’s June 6–June 8 trip to Pakistan and India. President Bush called Musharraf to support Armitage’s mission before he arrived in the region, but without “scooping” Armitage’s message. The deputy secretary’s game plan was ad hoc and was unvetted by any interagency process. His intent was to angle for a commitment by Musharraf to permanently end infiltration across the Kashmir divide. Accompanied by Ambassador Powell to the June 6 meeting with Musharraf, Armitage artfully eased into the need for new assurances sufficient to help Indian leaders step back from the brink.

Musharraf, a “literal truth teller,” at first told Armitage that “nothing is happening” across the LoC—a formulation he also used on other occasions. Armitage, however, needed more than a present-tense commitment from Musharraf. General Musharraf also claimed that training camps for militants did not exist on Pakistani soil. Armitage shared with Musharraf evidence to the contrary. The conversation kept returning to the need for assurances about infiltration, and Armitage believes that he elicited, confirmed, and reconfirmed Musharraf’s pledge to make cessation permanent. Musharraf underscored the importance of resuming a substantive dialogue with India on Kashmir. He sought and received confirmation of Washington’s interest in helping to place Pakistan-India relations on a better footing.

Another U.S. official privy to the Armitage-Musharraf discussion recalls that the commitment elicited from Musharraf was “very nuanced and came a bit at a time—starting with ‘okay, you’ve got that right’ and moving to a broader undertaking.” Armitage then discussed with Musharraf communicating the latter’s pledge to India and making it public.

Armitage did not decide how to publicize Musharraf’s pledge until he met in New Delhi with Prime Minister Vajpayee and his inner circle of advisors on June 7. Their positive reaction to the news of Musharraf’s pledge reaffirmed Armitage’s view that New Delhi’s cost-benefit assessment of a war with Pakistan remained fundamentally unchanged. Armitage recalls that Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh
particularly welcomed Musharraf’s formulation and asked Armitage to make it public.125

One U.S. official who had been present at the Armitage-Musharraf meeting was “very surprised” when Armitage went public in New Delhi with Musharraf’s commitment, but “not nearly as surprised as the Pakistanis,” who complained strenuously to U.S. embassy Islamabad. In this view, Musharraf “probably [had] a narrower definition” of going public than the deputy secretary of state. Pakistani officials were naturally more interested in the “other half” of the undertakings discussed by Musharraf and Armitage—what Islamabad saw as a U.S. promise to press India to resume talks with Pakistan. This undertaking, however, was viewed by at least one American official as “a standard one” and “not anything special.”126

The nature of the pledges made by Musharraf in his talks with Armitage quickly became a subject of dispute. The disparity between Musharraf’s perceptions and Vajpayee’s expectations was evident in separate interviews given to Lally Weymouth in June 2002:

WEYMOUTH to VAJPAYEE: U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told you that Pakistan’s President Musharraf had promised to stop the flow of militants into India-controlled Kashmir…. Did Musharraf also promise to get rid of the training camps in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and in Pakistan?

VAJPAYEE: That was the promise. There are 50 to 70 terrorist-training camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and in Pakistan. . . .

WEYMOUTH to MUSHARRAF: Did you tell Deputy Secretary of State Armitage that you would stop cross-border terrorism and shut down the training camps?

MUSHARRAF: First of all, I don’t call it cross-border terrorism. There is a freedom struggle going on in Kashmir. What I said is that there is no movement across the Line of Control…. I’ve told President Bush nothing is happening across the Line of Control. This is the assurance I’ve given. I’m not going to give you an assurance that for years nothing will happen. We have to have a response from India, a discussion about Kashmir.127

Was Musharraf’s pledge substantive or just expedient? Most U.S. policy makers believe it was mainly the latter. As one senior former official put it, “No one involved in this episode—Indian, Pakistani, or American—was a boy scout.”128 In this view, Powell and Armitage knew that the government of India knew that it could not bank on Musharraf’s promises. But the pledge was nonetheless useful in defusing the crisis. A former State Department officer describes Armitage’s
snap decision to publicize Musharraf’s pledge in New Delhi as “very creative [and] tactically brilliant” in that it gave the Indian government an exit strategy from a war it didn’t want to fight. Although skeptical of Musharraf’s statements, Prime Minister Vajpayee and his inner circle apparently welcomed Armitage’s intervention. Having a senior U.S. official as the intermediary and articulator of Musharraf’s pledge might also be helpful downstream, if infiltration and acts of terrorism resumed.

Determined to keep the pressure on both sides to disengage, the Bush administration scheduled a follow-up trip to India and Pakistan by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, who had just visited three Persian Gulf nations. Armitage met with Rumsfeld in Estonia to brief him on his meetings in Islamabad and New Delhi. In the wake of Armitage’s diplomatic breakthrough, Rumsfeld’s visit proved somewhat anticlimactic. Shortly before Rumsfeld was to reach New Delhi, India announced that it was ending patrols by its warships off Pakistani waters in the Arabian Sea and appointing a new high commissioner to Pakistan to lower tensions in response to Musharraf’s pledge—the first moves by India to ramp down the confrontation with Pakistan. Arriving in India, Rumsfeld discovered that “the savior role had already been played,” one U.S. official recalled. The secretary of defense reinforced Armitage’s message, characterized by one Pentagon official as thus: “We know you are pissed. And you have a right to be pissed. But you won’t make the situation any better by going to war.” The same official paraphrased Rumsfeld’s “Big Thought” for Pakistan as “A war will end badly for you in many ways, some very dire.”

Col. Smith and his colleagues at U.S. embassy Islamabad immediately understood that Armitage had scored a diplomatic coup with General Musharraf’s pledge to stop infiltration permanently. They also knew that Pakistani officials would be banking on what they saw as a U.S. commitment to secure India’s return to talks aimed at resolving the Kashmir conflict.

In New Delhi, meanwhile, some at the U.S. embassy found the choreography surrounding Musharraf’s pledge unsettling. They fully expected Musharraf to break the pledge, which could trigger another India-Pakistan crisis. Such a crisis might be harder for senior U.S. officials to defuse because New Delhi might scornfully dismiss any future promises extracted from Islamabad. Embassy New Delhi officers nevertheless were relieved when the Armitage mission drew a favorable reaction from senior Indian officials. While keeping forces
in place, the Indian government announced that elections in Kashmir would proceed in the fall. A successful election process would give New Delhi a natural opening to pull its troops back. Operation Parakram was officially called off on October 16, 2002, following the elections, bringing the crisis a close.

**POSTCRISIS PERSPECTIVES**

The twin peaks crisis management effort was a lonely and ad hoc enterprise for the secretary and deputy secretary of state. Powell and Armitage received presidential back-up with occasional telephone calls, but our interviews strongly suggest that they were largely on their own to succeed or fail. Their goal was clear: to avoid an India-Pakistan war that could hamper OEF in Afghanistan and that could escalate, possibly across the nuclear threshold. U.S. crisis managers helped avert another war between India and Pakistan, but they were unable to prevent the redeployment of Pakistani troops from the Afghan border—a top priority for OEF.

In this account, an indispensable factor in the success of Powell’s and Armitage’s crisis management was the desire of India’s and Pakistan’s leaders not to fight another war. This does not belittle Washington’s efforts, since wars can occur even when leaders wish to avoid them. The crux of the problem on the subcontinent was to help “rewind” the mobilizations, while avoiding a war by accident, sabotage, or inadvertence. It was up to the 7th floor of the State Department to devise creative formulas to facilitate disengagement, which Armitage did “on the fly” during his mission to Pakistan and India in June 2002. As one official concluded: “We got them down out of the tree.” Armitage believes that the outcome was “reasonable” and effective for its time and place. India and Pakistan are now in a very different and better place, in part because they were able to avoid war during this ten-month-long crisis. In the words of another former American official, Armitage’s role was to get the Indians “off the hook…. [He] defuse[d] the crisis by giving Vajpayee a face-saver. Vajpayee needed something public; Armitage gave it to him.”

**LINGERING CONCERNS**

While most American officials argue that U.S. crisis managers achieved the best possible outcome at a time of great danger and helped provide space for subsequent negotiations between India and
Pakistan,\textsuperscript{140} some believe Washington could have played its cards better in the twin peaks crisis. Several think that the State Department was too slow to take account of growing Indian unhappiness about militant attacks before the December 13 attack on parliament. One official argues that the department “fumbled” the task of keeping the pressure on Pakistan to stop terrorist activity against India. As a consequence, New Delhi joined Islamabad as a potential spoiler after the December 13 attack. One factor was the bifurcation of the U.S. dialogue with India and Pakistan prior to the crisis, with the State Department trying to ameliorate New Delhi’s concerns on terrorism, while the Pentagon was coordinating OEF with Islamabad. This bifurcation may have been unavoidable, but it complicated the Bush administration’s response to the attack on the Indian Parliament.\textsuperscript{141}

Some officials believe that earlier and more sympathetic U.S. attention to New Delhi’s concerns over terrorism would have reduced the influence of hawks within the Indian government who wanted to respond militarily during both peaks of the crisis, and might even have averted India’s troop mobilization after December 13. “The Indians saw the [president’s September 20, 2001] speech [to Congress] as signaling that we would go after ‘our terrorists,’ not theirs,” one official suggests.\textsuperscript{142} Other U.S. crisis managers believe the United States did not accord India respect commensurate with its stated importance. One American official suggests: “We did not consult with them as a serious ally. . . . We should have put real pressure on Musharraf earlier to stop terrorism. Musharraf needed us more than we needed him.”\textsuperscript{143}

Several former senior officials opine that Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage accepted “premature closure” after the first peak of the crisis. In this view they mistakenly viewed Musharraf’s January 12, 2002, speech and the closing of some camps near the LoC as satisfying Indian demands. The Bush administration, therefore, was ill-prepared for the second peak of the crisis, these officials say. Said one former policy maker: India’s troops remained “spring-loaded for attack” because New Delhi “would need more assurances than a few camps closed.”\textsuperscript{144}

A more sweeping criticism by some U.S. officials is that the Powell-Armitage diplomacy achieved tactical success at the expense of U.S. leverage in future crises. In this view, U.S. diplomacy after December 13 inadvertently helped create the conditions for the second peak. By persuading New Delhi of the importance of the commitments made by President Musharraf in his January 12, 2002, speech, Washington
raised Indian expectations; by failing to hold Pakistan to its promises, U.S. officials perpetuated India’s perception that Washington was pursuing the war on terrorism selectively, thus raising the likelihood of war after the May attacks at Kaluchak.

Especially problematic, in this view, was President Musharraf’s pledge to end infiltration “permanently,” which was then used as a lever to end the extended crisis. No one we interviewed took this pledge literally—yet it suited the purposes of all three capitals to accept it as a means to end the deployments of troops ready for battle. Critics suggest nevertheless that, because this pledge was not fully honored, future U.S. policy makers will have less to work with in the event of another crisis sparked by individuals or groups based in Pakistan.145

The authors heard several counters to these criticisms. First, the negotiating tactics chosen by U.S. crisis managers did not make war more likely on the subcontinent; rather, by bolstering cautious players in New Delhi, these tactics interrupted and slowed the rush to conflict. While the twin peaks crisis may not have persuaded Pakistan to abandon unconventional warfare as a means to leverage India on Kashmir, the “rewards” of this policy have dwindled, and the risks of imperiling Pakistan’s foreign standing have grown.

Second, worries about the costs to U.S. credibility hinge on assumptions about the nature of future crises—“counterfactuals,” as one former senior official dismissively describes them.146 Armitage believes that U.S. crisis management bought time and space for subsequent moves away from confrontation by New Delhi and Islamabad. If another severe crisis were to occur, its shape as well as its resolution would likely be different as a result of what transpired during the ten months of military confrontation and the international diplomatic response. Thus, the tools and techniques needed to defuse any future confrontation will be different from those used during the twin peaks crisis. Indeed, Armitage adds, there may never be another India-Pakistan crisis of this magnitude to defuse.

**U.S. Lessons Drawn from the Crisis**

Some of the “old hands” we interviewed pointed out that none of the appointed U.S. government officials generally have an opportunity to learn usable lessons from past crises.147 One reason is personnel turnover. Most crises have different crisis managers. Political appointees leave office, and foreign service officers move from one assignment...
and one region to the next. If key “players are new to their jobs and to the region, they are likely to start from scratch.”

Former officials point also to the absence of mechanisms within the U.S. government for systematically analyzing crises and recording foreign policy lessons. While the U.S. military critiques its performance on the battlefield regularly, the U.S. foreign policy establishment reportedly does not codify lessons. There are both cultural and institutional barriers to doing postcrisis assessments at the State Department, according to several former career officers. State Department bureaus typically do not have the time and are usually not tasked to produce such assessments. In any case, the bureaus most directly involved probably would not be the most dispassionate evaluators of their own performance. Within the State Department, a more “disinterested” unit, such as the Policy Planning Bureau or the Intelligence and Research Bureau, might be better positioned to pull out “lessons learned,” but this could cause internal friction, in the view of one former department officer. Producing candid in-house critiques of diplomatic activity would be unpopular and not career enhancing. “State has a reputation as a ‘fudge factory,’” he opines; some government officials keep their own contemporaneous notes and “memos for the file,” but these usually remain in the file cabinet. Memoirs provide important information, but can be self-serving. The bottom line, another Washington official asserts, is that “there is no [readily usable] corporate knowledge” in the State Department or elsewhere in the executive branch regarding crisis management.

The paucity of systematic “lessons learned” material on U.S. crisis management puts the onus on retrospectives such as this one, which has used interviews with numerous key official participants to capture their recollections and the lessons they have drawn from the twin peaks crisis. The authors recognize that the information so gathered reflects the biases of those interviewed. Our account is also limited by our lack of access to some senior Bush administration officials, who may subsequently add to this record with interviews and books. Nonetheless, we believe the interviews cumulatively capture important aspects of U.S. crisis diplomacy aimed at averting war between India and Pakistan in 2001 and 2002—including insights likely to be interesting as well as useful to future policy makers on this crisis-prone region.

What lessons did U.S. crisis managers learn from the twin peaks crisis? First, most American officials we interviewed believe that the
twin peaks crisis underscored the need for continuous high-level U.S. attention toward South Asia. One policy maker concludes: "After 9/11, South Asia is... part of the tiny inbox of the President... 9/11 changed the dynamic between India and Pakistan and the U.S. role in South Asia, probably forever." The attention South Asia commanded after the twin peaks crisis was evidenced by President Bush’s meetings on the sidelines of the 2004 United Nations General Assembly. Three of the four leaders the president met with were from the region—Manmohan Singh from India, Pervez Musharraf from Pakistan, and Hamid Karzai from Afghanistan.

Richard Armitage acknowledges that, as an outgrowth of the twin peaks crisis, senior U.S. officials have stayed “more engaged” with the subcontinent. Before the crisis, Washington had begun to “reenergize” relations with India and Pakistan, but the United States was “long on rhetoric, short on delivery.” Armitage believes that a critical reason for staying engaged is to ensure that both Pakistan and Afghanistan become success stories. “Neither can be successful unless both succeed,” he says. A few policy makers hold that while Washington must stay engaged in the region, steady high-level U.S. attention is not warranted because leaders in both countries are capable of improving relations when they so desire and because neither government wants a war. Richard Falkenrath suggests that the lesson we should draw from the crisis is that the most senior U.S. officials need attend to Indo-Pakistani tensions only when a crisis surges.

A second lesson learned by U.S. crisis managers was, as one official observes, that “India and Pakistan don’t know each other well despite claims to the contrary. Specifically, they have no military-military relations at the top level. Such ties were vital in U.S.-USSR relations. . . . U.S. perceptions of the military tactics of the two armies differed significantly from their intelligence on each other, which was further distorted by hyperbole on both sides.” In this view, the absence of military-to-military exchanges has fostered unhelpful stereotyping. Ambassador Nancy Powell and General John Abizaid both tried unsuccessfully to persuade Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to add to the dialogue with India a “basket” for military contacts. Indian civilian leaders are also reluctant to encourage military-to-military contacts, which they see as potentially weakening civilian control of the Indian military. In addition, India finds it difficult for reasons of protocol to engage in a senior-level bilateral military dialogue because of Musharraf’s dual roles as chief of army staff and president.
In the immediate aftermath of the twin peaks crisis, India-Pakistan relations were frozen across the board, not just in the realm of military contacts. Given Musharraf’s clear interest in resuming discussions on Kashmir and the potential for a rise in cross-LoC infiltration as a Pakistani pressure tactic, Washington players saw continued high-level U.S. intercession as essential. As a senior American policy maker observed:

What was striking was India’s refusal to deal with Pakistan at any level….This increased our need to be involved. Even during the Cold War, there was contact at all levels between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. There was no point at which we said, ‘Oh, these guys [India and Pakistan] can take care of this,’ although there was some Track II activity during this period, for example by the Kashmir Study Group. There was a real need for the U.S. role and intervention, to galvanize and lead the international community.158

A third lesson drawn by many U.S. policy makers was the value of strengthening high-level contacts and improving bilateral ties with both India and Pakistan. The upswing in relations with India that began towards the end of the Clinton administration opened that door.159 One U.S. official remarked that India “gave us the time of day” during the crisis only because U.S.-Indian ties had improved before the crisis. The twin peaks crisis also underlined the value of having experienced “South Asia-wallahs” at the U.S. embassies in New Delhi and Islamabad who could turn to longtime contacts for insights on domestic and official thinking.160

A fourth lesson learned was the value of partnering with other governments to prevent war and manage crises in South Asia. Washington’s stability goals for the region are widely shared by other capitals, including the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council. Both the long distances involved in visiting the region and the unique contributions of other governments increase the value of diplomatic burden sharing during crises in the region.

A fifth lesson drawn by U.S. policy makers was the need to stay attuned both to the activities of religious extremists as potential spoilers and to the ups and downs of India-Pakistan relations. While a process of normalization between the two governments can add shock absorbers to the equation, these can be eroded by many small-scale acts of terrorism or neutralized by a single catastrophic event blamed
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on the other side. In the words of a senior U.S. official, “the situation is still not ‘proofed’ against another crisis.”

A sixth lesson learned by some was that personal relationships clearly matter greatly in crisis diplomacy. While important matters of state will be decided based on perceived national interests, personal chemistry also plays a part. Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage brought the easy camaraderie of former military officers to conversations with President Musharraf, several U.S. crisis managers note. Similarly, Ambassador Blackwill’s extraordinary access to senior Indian officials reportedly resulted in more information sharing with U.S. officials. The closer ties to New Delhi achieved as a result of the crisis, in turn, have added impetus to the transformation of U.S.-India relations since then.

Some policy makers drew a seventh lesson: that the positive denouement of the twin peaks crisis affirmed longstanding U.S. policy not to get involved directly in brokering peace between India and Pakistan. In this view, the “backbencher” role adopted by Washington encouraged both governments to step forward and to take responsibility for initiatives to seek more normal ties. One senior U.S. crisis manager points out that the India-Pakistan dynamic changed only when then-prime minister Vajpayee decided to seek normalization and offered fresh talks with Pakistan in his April 2003 speech. Further support for this view might be found in the decisions by New Delhi and Islamabad to restart a broad “composite dialogue” in 2004, a process that has produced measured, concrete successes. Others think that any effort to broker peace between India and Pakistan would have made it hard for Washington to preserve good relations with both. One senior official suggests that, if the United States tried to mediate between the two sides, “we would screw it up...our role needs to be more subtle.” Track II involvement by U.S. think tanks may be preferable to U.S. mediation, in this official’s opinion.

The cumulative effect of successive, harrowing crises between India and Pakistan and subsequent bilateral efforts to reduce tensions merits further inquiry. Have Islamabad and New Delhi turned the corner after experiencing what some Americans see as the South Asian equivalent of the Berlin and Cuban missile crises? Are they now entering a prolonged period of lower tensions? Whatever the next few years may bring, it is worth recalling that, even while pursuing détente, the United States and the Soviet Union continued to experience crises and setbacks. India and Pakistan must reckon with
the added difficulty of religious extremists intent on punishing one or both governments for trying to normalize ties. In some respects, New Delhi and Islamabad face more complex challenges than did the two nuclear superpowers.

According to one American official, the U.S. role during the twin peaks crisis was “to stop terrorism in order to open up space for a peace initiative,” while quietly encouraging Indian, Pakistani, and Kashmiri leaders to restore normalcy in J&K. He adds: “The Indian government has its own reasons to do this” in Kashmir. The real challenge would be to “get a serious commitment to a political process” from Pakistan to normalize the situation in Kashmir. U.S. diplomacy during the twin peaks crisis helped to provide additional space for peace making, and helped to prevent a war whose course could not be confidently predicted. On both fronts—war avoidance and normalizing ties—the primary credit goes to the leaders of India and Pakistan. But they received significant assistance from the Bush administration during the twin peaks crisis. With the durability of the process still unclear and spoilers still very much on the scene, the lessons learned by U.S. crisis managers may have considerable value in the future.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has focused on the Bush administration’s crisis management effort and on the lessons drawn from it by U.S. policy makers. Far more important to the future of South Asia are the lessons learned by leaders in Pakistan and India. Some former senior officials—including those intimately involved in day-to-day discussions with leaders of the two countries—see the peace moves by New Delhi and Islamabad in 2004–2006 as proof that the two countries drew constructive lessons from the twin peaks crisis.

Others worry that Indian and Pakistani leaders may have drawn some less constructive lessons, as well. In this view, New Delhi might go on the military offensive more quickly in a future crisis to preclude U.S. diplomatic intervention and to avoid being held in check by untrustworthy Pakistani promises. Likewise, some U.S. officials expressed concern that Pakistani leaders might have learned the wrong lessons from the twin peaks crisis. Many in Pakistan still do not understand the depth of India’s anger during the twin peaks crisis, and may assume that India will forever be a “soft” state in the face of provocation. As Colonel Smith notes, it could be a mistake to
believe that each country has a good feel for the other’s moves based on “a thousand years of living together….Islamabad is relying on Indian patience to keep the peace.”

Others suggest that U.S. crisis management may have buttressed Pakistan’s reliance on Western diplomats to restrain India from retaliating in the future. If true, this would decrease Pakistan’s incentives to keep militants in check and to avoid provocative actions. For Washington, these possibilities will place an added premium on early intelligence warning of changes in India’s and Pakistan’s perceptions, intentions, and military activities, as well as on discerning militant plans and capabilities.

Ad hoc U.S. crisis management worked satisfactorily in the twin peaks crisis, but pride in U.S. diplomacy should not translate into overconfidence in Washington’s ability to manage a future India-Pakistan crisis. More systematic learning from past crises on the subcontinent would be very helpful, but every crisis is different. What worked in the twin peaks crisis might have unintended, negative effects in a future crisis, if one occurs. Ad hoc solutions are inevitable and may sometimes be desirable—but they are no substitute for an extended period of improved relations between Pakistan and India.

NOTES

1. This chapter was published as “U.S. Crisis Management in the Twin Peaks Crisis,” Report No. 57, The Henry L. Stimson Center, September 2006. The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance, insights, and recollections of many current or former U.S. officials who helped shape policy during the 2001–2002 crisis, including Walter Andersen, Richard Armitage, Robert Blackwill, Robert Boggs, Jonah Blank, Lincoln Bloomfield, Donald Camp, Lisa Curtis, Richard Falkenrath, Peter Flory, Steven Ghitelman, John Gill, Claudio Lilienfeld, Torkel Patterson, Colin Powell, Nancy Powell, Lawrence Robinson, Christina Rocca, Leonard Scensny, David Smith, Harry Thomas, Ashley Tellis, Marvin Weinbaum, and others who asked not to be named. The authors have quoted individuals by name only in those instances where permission to do so has been granted. The authors also wish to thank Nico Beck, Martine Cicconi, Ziad Haider, Nabanjan Maitra, and Michael Katz-Hyman for their research assistance.


4. India and Pakistan also fought a war in 1971, but its focus was on East Pakistan, which became the country of Bangladesh.


13. Ibid.


20. Ibid.


30. Interview with a former senior State Department official, June 27, 2005.
31. Interview with a former State Department South Asia specialist, May 19, 2005.
33. Interview with a former official, July 1, 2005.
34. Interview with Christina Rocca, June 27, 2005.
35. This was Armitage’s explanation for the Powell mission, reported by Aziz Haniffa in “Powell Hopes to Ease India-Pakistan Tension,” India Abroad (Ethnic NewsWatch), October 19, 2001, vol. XXXII, no. 3, i
37. Interview with a former senior government official, June 27, 2005.
39. Interview with a former senior government official, June 27, 2005.
40. Interview with an official formerly posted to embassy New Delhi, May 24, 2005.
43. Interview with an official formerly posted to embassy New Delhi, May 24, 2005.
44. “President Bush’s Address on Terrorism before a Joint Meeting of Congress (Transcript),” New York Times, September 21, 2001, B-4. Bush’s precise words to Congress reportedly were: “Our war on terror begins with al-Qa’eda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” See also Judy Keen, Susan Page, Barbara Slavin and Jonathan Weisman, “No Easy Decisions in War,” USA Today, October 8, 2001, A-4.
45. Interview with a diplomat who served in India, April 28, 2005.
46. Interview with Col. David Smith, (Retd.), May 26, 2005.
47. Interview with a Defense Department official, July 13, 2005.
48. Interview with a former official, July 1, 2005.
49. Interview with Torkel Patterson, May 4, 2005.
51. Interview with a former senior U.S. official, June 28, 2005.
52. Interview with a former State Department South Asia specialist, May 19, 2005.
55. Interview with a former State Department South Asia specialist, May 19, 2005; see also Uli Schmetzer and Jeff Zeleny, “Bush Appeals to Asia Foes; He Urges Calm in India, Pakistan,” Chicago Tribune, December 30, 2001, p. 1.
57. Interviews with a former senior State Department official, June 27, 2005, and with a former senior U.S. official, June 28, 2005.
59. Interview with a former State Department South Asia specialist, May 19, 2005.
60. Interview with a former senior State Department official, June 27, 2005.
61. Interview with a former State Department South Asia specialist, May 19, 2005.
63. Interview with a former National Security Council staffer, April 28, 2005.
64. Interview with a former National Security Council staffer, April 28, 2005.
65. Interviews with a former State Department South Asia specialist, May 19, 2005.
67. Interview with a State Department official, May 11, 2005.
68. Ibid.
69. Interview with a senior State Department official, June 8, 2005.
70. Interview with a State Department official, May 11, 2005.
71. Interview with a senior congressional aide, June 16, 2005.
72. Interviews with a former senior State Department official, June 27, 2005, and with a former South Asia Bureau official, May 9, 2005.
73. Interview with Richard Falkenrath, May 26, 2005.
74. Interview with a former South Asia Bureau official, May 9, 2005.
75. Interview with former senior State Department official, June 27, 2005.
76. Interview with a South Asia Bureau official, May 17, 2005.
77. Interview with former South Asia Bureau official, May 9, 2005.
79. Interview with a former senior State Department official, June 27, 2005.
80. Interview with a former senior U.S. official, June 28, 2005.
81. Interview with a State Department official, May 11, 2005.
82. Interviews with a former senior diplomat posted to New Delhi, July 12, 2005, with a former U.S. diplomat who served in India, April 28, 2005, and with a senior State Department official, June 8, 2005.
83. Interviews with a former senior diplomat posted to New Delhi, July 12, 2005, with a former U.S. diplomat who served in India, April 28, 2005, and with an official formerly posted to embassy New Delhi, May 24, 2005.
84. Interviews with a former senior U.S. official, June 28, 2005; with a former State Department South Asia specialist, May 19, 2005; with a former senior State Department official, June 27, 2005; and with a former U.S. diplomat, April 28, 2005.
86. Interview with a former U.S. diplomat who served in India, April 28, 2005.
87. Ibid.
88. Interview with an official formerly posted to embassy New Delhi, May 24, 2005.
89. Ibid.
90. Interview with a former U.S. diplomat, April 28, 2005.
92. Interview with Col. David Smith (Retd.), May 26, 2005.
94. Interviews with a senior State Department official, June 8, 2005, and with an official formerly posted to embassy New Delhi, May 24, 2005.
95. Interview with a former State Department official, June 2, 2005.
96. Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram, 80.
97. Ibid.
98. Interview with an official formerly posted to embassy New Delhi, May 24, 2005.
100. Ibid.
103. These officials included Musharraf’s Minister for Railways, a former head of Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence. Musharraf’s original statement appeared in an interview in the April 6 issue of Der Spiegel. See “Pakistan May Use Nukes, Musharraf Says,” Dawn, April 7, 2002; “Pakistan Hints at Use of Nukes if its Survival is at Stake,” The Pakistan Newswire (online), May 22, 2002; and “Pakistan May Consider Nuclear Deterrent Option: Minister,” Press Trust of India (online), May 22, 2002. Soon thereafter, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United Nations publicly reaffirmed his nation’s doctrine of first use, asking, “How can Pakistan, a weaker power, be expected to rule out all means of deterrence?” See Massood Haider, “Islamabad Refuses to Accept ‘No First Strike Doctrine,’” Dawn, May 31, 2002, and “If India Attacks, Pakistan Doesn’t Rule Out Nukes,” Dawn, May 31, 2002.

104. Interview with a former senior U.S. official, June 28, 2005.
106. Interviews with a former State Department South Asia specialist, May 19, 2005, and with a former South Asia Bureau official, May 9, 2005.
108. Interview with a South Asia Bureau official, May 17, 2005.
111. Interview with a former senior diplomat posted to New Delhi, July 12, 2005.
115. Interviews with a former State Department South Asia specialist, May 19, 2005, with a former senior State Department official, June 27, 2005, and with a former U.S. diplomat, April 28, 2005.
117. Interview with a South Asia Bureau official, May 17, 2005.
118. Interview with a former senior diplomat posted to New Delhi, July 12, 2005.
119. Interview with Col. David Smith (Retd.), May 26, 2005.
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120. Interview with a senior State Department official, June 8, 2005.
121. Ibid.
122. Interview with a senior State Department official, June 8, 2005, and with Richard Armitage, June 2, 2005.
124. Interview with a senior State Department official, June 8, 2005.
126. Interview with a senior State Department official, June 8, 2005.
129. Interview with a former State Department South Asia specialist, May 19, 2005.
134. Interview with a senior State Department official, June 8, 2005.
135. Interview with a Defense Department official, July 13, 2005.
136. Interview with an official formerly posted to embassy New Delhi, May 24, 2005.
137. The authors did not interview the president, the vice president, the national security advisor, or the secretary of defense. Their memoirs and recollections of the twin peaks crisis doubtless will add other dimensions to this account.
139. Interview with a former State Department South Asia specialist, May 19, 2005.
140. Interviews with a former senior State Department official, June 27, 2005, and with a former senior diplomat posted to New Delhi, July 12, 2005.
141. Interview with an official formerly posted to embassy New Delhi, May 24, 2005.
142. Ibid.
143. Interview with a former State Department South Asia specialist, May 19, 2005.
144. Interviews with an official formerly posted to embassy New Delhi, May 24, 2005, and with a former State Department South Asia specialist, May 19, 2005.
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146. Interview with a former senior diplomat posted to New Delhi, July 12, 2005.
147. Interview with a former Washington official, July 5, 2005
148. Ibid.
149. Interview with a former State Department South Asia specialist, May 19, 2005
150. Ibid.
152. Interview with a former senior State Department official, June 27, 2005.
156. Interview with a former senior State Department official, June 27, 2005.
157. Interview with a senior State Department official, June 8, 2005.
158. Interview with a former senior State Department official, June 27, 2005.
159. Interviews with Richard Armitage and with an official formerly posted to embassy New Delhi, May 24, 2005; a former senior U.S. official, June 28, 2005; and a former South Asia Bureau official, May 9, 2005.
160. Interviews with a senior State Department official, June 8, 2005; with Col. David Smith (Retd.), May 26, 2005; with a former South Asia Bureau official, May 9, 2005; and with an official formerly posted to embassy New Delhi, May 24, 2005.
162. Interviews with a U.S. official formerly posted to embassy New Delhi, May 24, 2005; and with Col. David Smith (Retd.), May 26, 2005.
163. Interview with a former South Asia Bureau official May 9, 2005.
164. Interview with a senior State Department official, June 8, 2005.
165. Interview with an official formerly posted to embassy New Delhi, May 24, 2005.
166. Interviews with Richard Armitage, June 2, 2005; with a former senior diplomat posted to New Delhi, July 12, 2005; with a former senior U.S. official, June 28, 2005; with a former senior State Department official, June 27, 2005; and with a former South Asia Bureau official, May 9, 2005.
168. Interviews with a former senior diplomat, embassy New Delhi, July 12, 2005; with an official formerly posted to embassy New Delhi, May
24, 2005; with Col. David Smith (Retd.), former Defense Attache
Islamabad, May 26, 2005; and with a former Washington official July
5, 2005.

169. For a detailed analysis of the dynamics of India’s and Pakistan’s secu-

rity ties to the United States, see Polly Nayak, *U.S. Security Policy on
South Asia Since 9/11—Challenges and Implications for the Future*, an
Asia-Pacific Center Occasional Paper (Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center
for Strategic Studies, February 2005).
Background

For decades, U.S. policy in South Asia had been predicated almost entirely on cold war considerations, but after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, neither Pakistan nor India figured significantly in U.S. foreign policy calculations during the 1990s. In the 1990s, nuclear and missile proliferation issues were of paramount concern, with the Clinton administration pressuring both India and Pakistan to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and join other international conventions aimed at controlling the production of fissile material and long-range missiles. The goal became a mantra: “cap, reduce, and eliminate” both nuclear programs. The 1998 nuclear tests conducted by both nations angered Clinton and triggered congressionally mandated military and economic sanctions that drastically circumscribed U.S. relations with both states.

By the end of Clinton’s term, the U.S. relationship with Pakistan arguably was at its lowest level in a long history of ups and downs. Not only was Pakistan already under three separate sanctions for its numerous nuclear transgressions, it had been sanctioned again in 1999 by another provision of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) that sharply limited economic and military relations with states overthrowing a democratically elected civilian government. Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s October 1999 coup toppling the freely elected government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, following as it did barely less than three months after the abortive Kargil crisis, was the final straw for Clinton. Pakistan was also one of only three countries in the world to recognize the odious Taliban regime in Afghanistan—the
government that had granted sanctuary to Osama bin Laden (OBL) and his Al Qaeda network, the group responsible for the bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998 and for an attack on the USS Cole in Aden harbor in 2000. More recently, Islamabad had been under strong pressure from Washington to curtail its support for the cross-border infiltration of militants into the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), where their actions seemed to be more closely identified with international terrorism than support of an indigenous war of liberation, as Islamabad invariably claimed.

In January 2001, the Bush administration came into office convinced that the United States needed to establish a long-term strategic partnership with India as a counterweight to the growing power of China in Asia. However, the administration's South Asia policy review determined that Pakistan could not be written off entirely, since its geographic location and relationship with the Taliban government made it a useful partner in dealing with the Al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan. The new policy objective would be to “de-hyphenate” India and Pakistan and deal with each one on their respective merits. There would be a much stronger policy emphasis on India, but the objective with Pakistan would be to establish a sustained, positive foreign policy not predicated on its interactions with any other country. There was also a plan to end nuclear sanctions for both countries, since the administration was convinced that the Clinton policy of “cap, reduce, and eliminate” had failed, and that nuclear weapons were now an established fact of life in South Asia. The new objectives would be to prevent an uncontrolled arms race in the region, minimize missile tests, and prevent further nuclear tests. Secretary of State Colin Powell approved the new policy in late August, and the president planned to sign the implementing memorandum on September 15 and discuss it with Indian prime minister Vajpayee at the UN General Assembly meeting in October. Ironically, the preliminary briefing to Congress was scheduled for September 11, 2001. The memo eventually was signed without fanfare on September 28, without any objections or questions from Congress.

While the policy review was under way, the new administration’s relationship with Pakistan mostly concerned terrorism and OBL. President Bush wrote to Musharraf in February 2001 stating that OBL was a direct threat to the United States and asking for Musharraf’s help to influence Taliban to expel him from Afghanistan. In March 2001, a Deputies Committee meeting decided to “initiate a comprehensive review of U.S. policy on Pakistan” and explore
policy options on Afghanistan, “including the option of supporting regime change.” On June 18, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice met with Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar and “let him have it” about Al Qaeda. Sattar stoically endured the criticism and replied only to encourage U.S. engagement with the Taliban. On August 4, Bush again wrote to Musharraf urging him to actively engage against Al Qaeda. Assistant Secretary Christina Rocca described the administration’s new approach toward Pakistan as a move from “half engagement” to “enhanced engagement.” The administration was not ready to confront Islamabad with the threat of severing relations, but its frustration with Pakistan was growing rapidly.

**Prologue: From 9/11 until December 13, 2001**

As the first airplane hit the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed, the director general of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID), was sitting down to breakfast on Capitol Hill with a U.S. congressional delegation. His visit was part of a routine, ongoing exchange of intelligence information between ISID and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) about regional terrorism. Mahmud was a proud man who hated these visits, hated being lectured by U.S. officials on Pakistan’s lackluster attitude toward the Taliban and their hospitality toward Osama bin Laden, and hated being rebuffed when he tried to explain Pakistan’s need for strategic depth and about an Afghan government that was not actively hostile to Pakistan. In return for these slights, he “tightened up on American access to every sector of the Pakistani Army and intelligence services. He also directed his subordinates in ISID to enforce strict liaison rules that blocked American contacts with Pakistani corps commanders, division commanders, and other generals. CIA access to Pakistani intelligence officers remained limited.”

Later that day, he was taken to see the still-smoldering Pentagon where rescue and firefighting operations were still under way. The next day, September 12, he was taken to the State Department to meet with Deputy Secretary Richard Armitage who put the issue to him very bluntly: “Pakistan faces a stark choice, either it is with us or it is not. This is a black and white choice with no gray…. The future begins today.” Pass the word to General Musharraf, Mahmud was told—“with us or against us.” National Security Advisor Rice chaired a Principals Committee meeting on September 13 to discuss specific actions to destroy Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. It concluded
that if Pakistan did not assist the United States against the Taliban government, then Pakistan too would be at risk. Armitage then met again with Mahmud and Pakistani ambassador Maleeha Lodhi and asked Pakistan to accept seven specific requests constituting a complete and irrevocable reversal of its past policy toward the Taliban government. Pakistan would become a de facto ally of the United States in what promised to be a war to eliminate the Al Qaeda network from Afghanistan. That afternoon, Musharraf agreed to each request. From the U.S. point of view, Pakistan now became the linchpin in the U.S. global war on terrorism and Musharraf the key actor.

On September 24, a U.S. military delegation from the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff arrived in Islamabad to conduct preliminary negotiations with senior Pakistani officers of the three military services, ISID, and Pakistan’s Joint Staff Headquarters on how to operationalize Pakistan’s decision to support the United States in the coming military strike on Afghanistan. In several meetings over two days at an ISID safe house in Islamabad, the group hammered out agreements on U.S. utilization of Pakistan air and sea space and the use of Pakistani air and naval bases for a military campaign to topple the Taliban government and destroy the Al Qaeda infrastructure in Afghanistan. The Pakistani team speedily agreed to every U.S. request and made only one request in return: it “preferred” that no coalition aircraft should enter Pakistani airspace from India. This was due to fear that India might use Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) as a cover for some undefined, but presumably hostile, purpose. With these agreements in place, U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance flights over Afghanistan began within days and the initiation of military action against Afghanistan began on October 7.

That day—October 7—was also the day Musharraf chose to conduct a massive reshuffling of the Pakistan high command, retiring or sidelining three key officers, including Mahmud, thought to be either sympathetic to the Taliban or insufficiently enthusiastic in their embrace of Pakistan’s “u-turn” on its Afghan and U.S. foreign policies, and naming several new corps commanders. George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), was happy to hear this news, since he interpreted it to be an indication that Pakistan was finally serious about helping the United States in the newly termed global war on terrorism (GWOT).

OEF unfolded rapidly and successfully, but by early December a major issue arose over a last minute request by the United States for the Pakistani army to seal the border with Afghanistan in order to
prevent fleeing Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants from escaping into Pakistan. Pakistan’s main concern revolved around the potential deployment of regular army units into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Under Pakistan’s constitution the FATA has a special status. Its seven Agencies and six Frontier regions are governed directly by the president who exercises his authority through the governor of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) who in turn appoints Political Agents to represent the interests of the government. The region is administered under a draconian set of rules called the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) that were codified in 1901, and rarely modified since. This system, a legacy of the British raj that used the approach for a hundred years to control the war-like tribes inhabiting the northwest frontier of India, relies on the principle of collective responsibility of a tribe for the actions of any single member of the tribe and authorizes the Political Agent extraordinary powers to hold hostages, blockade villages, raze residences, and call out the Frontier Corps to enforce the peace. Agencies of the FATA are further divided into “go” and “no go” areas. In the “no go” areas, government entities such as the Pakistan Army were forbidden to enter except on the invitation of the local tribal leaders, or maliks. The paramilitary Frontier Corps, whose troops are recruited locally from the tribal areas, occasionally were permitted to operate in those areas, but since independence, the army had never operated there and its leaders feared the prospect of a widespread tribal insurrection throughout the FATA if it did. Nevertheless, on December 11, having struck deals with the local tribes, the army’s 11 Corps deployed approximately 10,000 troops, mostly from the Frontier Corps into Kurram and Khyber Agencies to coincide with the initiation of the Tora Bora campaign in eastern Afghanistan. By the middle of December, virtually all of 11 Corps in NWFP and 12 Corps in Balochistan, as well as the bulk of the Frontier Corps in both provinces, a total of more than 100,000 troops, were deployed in a major operation to “seal” the Afghan border.

**India: The Complicating Factor**

Pakistan’s decision to support the United States dismayed India. Immediately after 9/11, India had offered its unstinting support to the United States, including the use of all military bases and facilities, confident that an opportunity now existed to deal once and for all with Pakistan and the proxy war it had been waging in the disputed Kashmir
region for the past decade. The burgeoning U.S.-India strategic relationship now seemed to be the first casualty of the GWOT. Prime Minister Vajpayee reacted angrily to Musharraf’s September 17 speech to the nation explaining his decision to support the United States against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, characterizing it as an “anti-Indian tirade” and asking rhetorically, “How can he be concerned about terrorism? He has promoted it.” With Pakistan now the key frontline state, many Indians thought that a decade’s worth of diplomacy to improve relations with the United States had come to nothing.

A militant attack on October 1 against the J&K Legislative Assembly in Srinagar highlighted what many in India saw as a U.S. double standard on terrorism. The Indian government believed it had no option but to confront such terrorism on its own terms rather than as part of a U.S.-led coalition. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh, then visiting Washington, explained, “You cannot address one manifestation [of terrorism] and leave all the others alone.” During a visit by Secretary Powell to Pakistan and India one week later, the Indian army initiated the largest shelling in ten months along the Line of Control (LoC) dividing the disputed territory, barely one hour before his plane touched down in New Delhi. Within days, Bush signaled his irritation with India over this distraction from the ongoing military operations in Afghanistan: “I think it is very important that India and Pakistan stand down during our activities in Afghanistan, for that matter, forever.” However, on October 21, Defense Minister George Fernandes stated on Indian television that other actions would soon be taken to stop the proxy war being waged in J&K by Pakistan, noting that he had been in consultation with senior army officers for the past two days.

That India was an irritant in the execution of OEF was certainly the view of many personnel serving in the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. The primary objective of U.S. diplomacy, at least in the short term, was to support the government of General Pervez Musharraf to ensure Pakistani cooperation in the military effort against Afghanistan, and to give other considerations, including pressuring Musharraf to curtail his support to the Kashmir militants, a lower priority for the time being. Anything that distracted from the military campaign in Afghanistan was deemed unhelpful to the vital interests of the United States. The U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, however, viewed the situation differently.

Ambassador Robert Blackwill had arrived in New Delhi in July 2001 with instructions from the president to transform the U.S.-India
relationship, although how this was to be accomplished was never defined precisely. A well-connected political appointee who was not a “South Asia hand,” Blackwill nevertheless possessed a remarkable intellect and unflagging energy in support of his mission. He made it clear when he arrived in New Delhi that he did not work for the State Department, but for the president, and he was never reluctant to communicate directly with the White House and the national security advisor when he believed his views would be better received there. On terrorism, he was a “strict constructionist” in the sense that he viewed Pakistan’s support to the Kashmir militancy as part of the international terrorism problem. After 9/11 and the promulgation by the president of a GWOT, he saw the opportunity to kill two birds with one stone, Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and terrorists in Kashmir. “Why kill just one?” he asked. He considered that the State Department and other departments in Washington were giving Pakistan far too much leeway on this issue.

Crisis Part 1: December 13, 2001, until late 2002

On December 13, Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin was making her first official visit to the province of Balochistan to meet with the governor and other senior civilian and military officials. During a call that day on the inspector general of the Frontier Corps (Balochistan), CNN broke into its regular broadcast to describe the attack on the parliament in New Delhi. Conversation in the inspector general’s office ceased as images of the attack filled the screen and the implications for the Pakistan-India relations sunk in. Asked by Chamberlin what he thought of this development, the inspector general hesitated briefly before replying, “Oops.”

Initially, there was no crisis atmosphere in Islamabad. Indian charges and Pakistani rebuttals dominated the news coverage in both capitals for several days, but the embassy’s focus remained on the unfolding military operations in Afghanistan. In addition to the large-scale border operation in the west, the rest of the Pakistan Army was in the process of returning from the traditional winter collective training period in time for the Eid holiday scheduled for December 17–19. Adhering to the traditional practice, embassy officials made no official calls on religious holidays. The embassy was completely unaware that India had directed a full-scale mobilization and deployment of its ground and air forces, Operation Parakram, on December
18. However, in Rawalpindi at Army General Headquarters (GHQ), Army’s Military Intelligence Directorate was well aware of it and was monitoring the situation carefully. Initially, GHQ believed that the Indian mobilization was identical to that seen during the 1999 Kargil operation, but soon understood it was far larger in scope and included for the first time ever units from India’s Eastern Army Command.17

On December 20, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Richard Meyers visited Pakistan and called on his counterpart, the chairman of Pakistan’s Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen. Muhammad Aziz Khan, to discuss bilateral military issues in general and specifics pertaining to Pakistan’s support for OEF operations. Aziz highlighted for Meyers the recent capture by Pakistani forces of 176 Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters fleeing into Pakistan from the Tora Bora operation. Only toward the end of this meeting did the subject of India arise. Aziz mentioned quite casually that India appeared to be mobilizing its forces but that Pakistan had not yet mobilized any of its forces in response. He hoped Pakistan would not have to do so, since this would disrupt support to the operations along the Afghan border.

The next day, December 21, the U.S. army attaché was summoned to separate meetings with the director general Military Intelligence at GHQ and the director general (analyses) of ISID at its headquarters in Islamabad. In both meetings the Indian mobilization was addressed in detail and the full picture of Indian air, naval, and ground unit movements provided. Indian Army units were reinforcing front-line formations in Kashmir along the LoC and on the international border, and “high tech” fighter aircraft were moving to forward operating bases. No missile units had yet been detected moving, but units from the Eastern Army Command were observed moving west, military leaves had been cancelled, and all troops had been recalled to their units.

The initial Pakistani assessment was that Kashmir would be the most likely location for any Indian military action. The ISID officer, a major general, believed India would expect Pakistan to retaliate along the international border in response to its mobilization, but he indicated this could not possibly occur because the army was heavily engaged in the west with two army corps and the entire Frontier Corps. India’s motivation for the deployment, he indicated, was to increase international pressure on Pakistan, tie the Kashmir insurgency directly to the GWOT, and force the Musharraf government to clamp down on extremist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and
Jaish-e-Muhammad. In conclusion, he said India was capable of a brigade-sized attack immediately and a general attack within 24 hours.

Both officers had ridiculed the notion that Pakistan was involved in any way with the militant attack in New Delhi. What, they asked rhetorically, could possibly be the motivation for Pakistan to support such an attack when its army was so heavily engaged in the west? Why were the presumed militants carrying Pakistani identification cards and other evidence linking them directly to Pakistan? Why were no automatic weapons used when they are the weapon of choice of Kashmiri militants? Why was no attempt apparently made by the militants to penetrate beyond the initial security post? The incident was typical of Indian “stage management.” They emphasized that the Pakistan Army had not yet moved any troops eastward in response to the mobilization, but that time was running out. The army attaché noticed a high state of agitation in GHQ, most likely because Pakistan had never in any previous crisis with India faced a two-front situation, one in the east and one in the west. Its two strategic reserve corps, the 11th in NWFP and the 12th in Balochistan, were fully engaged along the Afghan border and GHQ was unable to initiate its contingency war plan that called for moving these two corps immediately to the east. Both would have to withdraw from forward positions along the Afghan border and move to railheads near Peshawar and Quetta before they could even begin to move east. The scale of the Indian mobilization also took GHQ by surprise as did the realization that for the first time in history India was sending substantial forces from the Eastern Army Command to the west.

During the night of December 22/23, the army attaché received a late night call at his residence in Islamabad from ISID’s director general (analyses) who asked him to return to his embassy. An hour later, he was informed that Pakistan had received indications of an impending Indian attack that would likely occur before dawn on December 23.18 The attaché immediately notified Ambassador Chamberlin and several Washington offices and remained in his office for the rest of the night waiting for the Indian attack that never materialized. Subsequently, he learned that Pakistani intelligence had received two earlier indications of an Indian attack, but had discounted the warnings when they could not be corroborated by other sources.

A day later, on December 24, the army attaché accompanied visiting secretary of the army (acting), Les Brownlee, to meetings with the vice chief of army staff (VCOAS), Gen. Muhammad Yusaf Khan, and the secretary defense, Lt. Gen. Hamid Nawaz (Retd.). Both
officials spoke initially of other matters but soon turned to India. The VCOAS complained that India had declined to participate in a joint investigation or cooperate in an FBI investigation, and emphasized the likelihood of Indian “stage management” of the event. In case of war, he stated firmly, “Pakistan will respond with full force.” He said the next two days would be crucial, as Pakistan was under tremendous military pressure in the east. If nothing changed, the army would pull out its two corps in the west and possibly even recall troops from the UN peace keeping operations in Africa. “We can’t manage two threats at the same time,” he explained, “We must deal with the most serious one first.” The secretary defense echoed the latter point and noted that the situation was distracting Pakistan from fulfilling its coalition tasks along the border with Afghanistan.

The total focus of the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad up to this point had been on Afghanistan. Now, its attention shifted to confront what was clearly a growing and an exponentially more dangerous situation. There was a sense of frustration that the new crisis was occurring at absolutely the wrong time, that the critically important Tora Bora operation would be compromised, and that the fruits of OEF would be lost if the Pakistan Army pulled out in the west. There was also frustration due to the avalanche of cables from Ambassador Blackwill criticizing Pakistan, seemingly in an attempt to manage Washington’s response from New Delhi. Many in the embassy thought his statement to the Indian press on December 14, equating the attack on the Lok Sabha with the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, had been premature if not presumptuous. The embassy had been warning Musharraf for several months about the infiltration problem along the LoC, and there was no doubt about the connection between the ISID and the infiltrators. However, there was a clear perception in Islamabad and some quarters in Washington that Blackwill was using the crisis as a vehicle to attain his own goals for U.S.-Indian relations and deliberately minimizing the potential adverse impact of the Indian mobilization on the GWOT. Washington appeared to be of two minds: the Department of Defense was mostly concerned about the potential adverse impact on the GWOT, but while the State Department publicly urged restraint by both sides until an investigation was completed, it slowly began to embrace the Blackwill view that India had the moral high ground, and that a military response against Pakistan might be justified.

At the strategic level, Ambassador Blackwill saw the United States embarking on a global war on terrorism and believed strongly that the
situation in Kashmir fell well within its purview. The president had stated unequivocally that international terrorism must be defeated, and India was merely emulating U.S. actions. If the United States were to say in effect to India, “We will not solve your terrorism problem, and will not allow you to solve your terrorism problem,” then the entire basis for a future strategic relationship would be destroyed. The basic premise of such a relationship was a shared view of the world and a shared vision for the future. As far as OEF in Afghanistan was concerned, Blackwell believed, if India’s concerns were not taken seriously by the United States, New Delhi would go to war with Pakistan and OEF would be lost anyway. Better to stand on principle than on expediency. Eventually this logic was accepted in Washington and the State Department “grudgingly fell into line.”

If the viewpoints of the U.S. embassies in Islamabad and New Delhi differed, those of the two British High Commissions were identical at the beginning and closely coordinated throughout the crisis. Sir Hilary Synnott in Islamabad and Sir Rob Young in New Delhi immediately grasped the gravity of the crisis and worked in tandem to influence Washington, which they perceived as reluctant to recognize the seriousness of the situation. Through a series of joint cables to the Foreign and Colonial Office that they knew would be passed to the State Department, and through frequent interactions with their U.S. counterparts, the British diplomats sounded the alarm. Both were aware of the keen U.S. focus on OEF and both wanted to ensure that their American counterparts did not underestimate the seriousness of the Indian sense of outrage and frustration over the December 13 incident. Synnott believed that Musharraf was also badly misinterpreting the situation and underestimating the zeal of the Indian armed forces to go to war. Concurrently, Foreign Minister Jack Straw worked out a game plan with his U.S. counterpart, secretary of state Colin Powell, to ensure that a senior official was always available to go to India or Pakistan on short notice. They were confident that New Delhi would not initiate a military strike against Pakistan while senior U.S. or British diplomats were visiting either capital. This was a conscious strategic plan for proxy negotiations between the two hostile parties to allow enough breathing space for diplomacy to de-escalate the crisis. From 9/11 until the end of the crisis, Prime Minister Blair visited the region twice, the foreign minister three times, and other cabinet ministers ten times, as well as the chief of defense staff and the PM’s principal foreign policy advisor, Sir David Manning. Tony Blair’s January 7 visit to India and Pakistan can be seen in hindsight
as crucial to slowing the Indian road to war and allowing enough
time for General Musharraf to make the January 12 speech that
effectively defused the first stage of the crisis.

Meanwhile, at an embassy small group meeting on January 10,
Ambassador Chamberlin announced her intention to draft a major
embassy cable to Washington setting forth her concerns about the sit-
uation: “We don’t want to go down in history as not having reported
the slide to war,” she explained. The cable provided a synopsis of
the situation as seen from Islamabad, noted the high level of pres-
sure being put on Pakistan to curtail its support for militant activi-
ties, and identified diplomatic leverage available to use with India.
She reminded Washington that Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants in
the west were escaping through the now wide-open border along the
Durand Line caused by the earlier withdrawal of 11 and 12 Corps.

On January 12, Musharraf made a dramatic speech to the nation
in which he promised to curtail activities of the jihadi groups and not
to allow Pakistan to be used as a launching pad for any form of ter-
rorism. By this time, the entire Pakistan Army had fully closed into
its wartime positions along the Indian border and the atmosphere at
GHQ and ISID was far more relaxed. The Pakistan military’s attitude
from this time forward was generally that the window for Indian
military success had closed, and that if India hadn’t attacked by now
it was not serious, and was engaging in a gigantic diplomatic bluff.

On January 23, Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, the director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency, visited Pakistan and called on the
director general ISID, VCOAS, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Committee (CJCSC) among others to discuss intelligence
matters related to OEF. He was briefed that although 2,000 jehadi
activists had been jailed and 600 jihadi offices closed since January
12, Pakistani troop strength along the western border had fallen to
five regular army battalions in NWFP and three in Balochistan plus
22 wings (equivalent to a battalion) of Frontier Corps troops in each
province. Their attitude toward India was far more defiant than two
weeks earlier. They now described India’s objectives as the linkage
of Kashmir to international terrorism, assertion of its great power
status, and the manipulation of public opinion in order to win more
BJP seats in the next round of state elections. There was no sense
of crisis in the Pakistan Army now and no concern by its leaders
that India would initiate general war. The accepted notion among
senior army officers was that any Indian attack would be confined to
Kashmir and be limited in scope. Gradually, the crisis wound down to
Crisis Part 2: May 14 until Late-June 2002

Throughout the spring of 2002, concern grew within the U.S. intelligence community that Musharraf was backsliding on his commitment to the activities of militant organizations. Partly this could be ascribed to Musharraf’s misinterpretation of the message conveyed during the Armitage mission in January. He believed his commitment to curtail jihadi activities was made in exchange for U.S. diplomatic pressure on India to settle outstanding bilateral differences. With Indian military forces still deployed along the border and New Delhi refusing to talk with Pakistan, many in the embassy and the intelligence community believed Pakistan would soon return to using the jihadis as a tool to leverage India, and that this would eventually cause another spark that could yet lead to war. To reemphasize a point made earlier, the Pakistan Army believed India was bluffing and there was little danger of a wider conflict beyond a few strikes along the LoC. A senior Pakistan diplomat stated his belief that war was unlikely for three reasons: ground force ratios were insufficient to guarantee a quick Indian victory, the nuclear capability of Pakistan insulated it from general war, and a lack of international support for India’s position would eventually cause its government to back down.21

During a meeting with ISID’s newly appointed director general (Analyses) in early May, that officer emphatically denied that militants were infiltrating across the LoC into Kashmir, but cautioned that “Kashmir was a time bomb.” And so it was. On May 14, 2002, an attack by Kashmiri militants on the Indian Army garrison at Kaluchak killed 34 and injured another 55 personnel, many of them Indian Army family members. This plunged the border standoff once again into a full-bore crisis. At a meeting on May 22 to assess the deteriorating situation, Ambassador Chamberlin told her staff that the consensus view in Washington was that India was even more justified now in its position than it had been previously. Musharraf, deeply frustrated at the lack of any Indian response to his January speech and the continued deployment of its military forces on the border, dug in his heels. He perceived that U.S. pressure was only on Pakistan and this had clearly failed to defuse the crisis. The new situation required
The India-Pakistan Military Standoff

pressure on both countries, and many in the embassy feared that a continuation of Indian belligerence would drive a wedge between India and the United States if war broke out.

The situation deteriorated day by day. An embassy emergency action committee met on May 24 to discuss the possible outbreak of war. Tripwires were thought to include another major terrorist attack in India, a limited Indian air strike in Azad Kashmir, or an Indian thrust along the international border. A lengthy discussion of embassy personnel and American citizen evacuation procedures ensued. Later that day, the embassy military attachés were summoned to the ISID officers mess in Islamabad for a briefing on the military situation. The briefer, a Brigadier, began by noting that the recent terrorist attack coincided with the visit to India of assistant secretary of state for South Asian Affairs, Christina Rocca. This, he explained, seemed to be a recurring pattern of similar events coinciding with senior visits. He used a slide to illustrate his point:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Visitor</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>Mar. 2000</td>
<td>Massacre of Sikhs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blair</td>
<td>New Delhi</td>
<td>Oct. 2001</td>
<td>“Bogus” airline hijacking attempt</td>
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<td>Powell</td>
<td>Islamabad</td>
<td>Oct. 2001</td>
<td>LoC firing by India</td>
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<td>Amb Frank Taylor</td>
<td>Islamabad</td>
<td>Jan. 2002</td>
<td>LoC firing by India</td>
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He described India’s objectives in the present situation as discrediting Pakistan in the eyes of the international community, equating the “indigenous freedom struggle in Kashmir” with international terrorism, gaining political leverage from the obvious adverse impact on OEF, forcing Pakistan to change its principled stance on Kashmir, degrading Pakistan’s economy through a lengthy military deployment, sabotaging the forthcoming Pakistan general election in October, salvaging the credibility of BJP politicians who had put the Indian Army in a lengthy and fruitless deployment designed to coerce Pakistan, and affecting the outcome of the forthcoming Indian state elections, especially in Gujrat where Hindu-Muslim sectarian violence had recently broken out. He denied any Pakistani culpability in the May 14 attack or the existence of any militant camps on Pakistani soil. He further stated Pakistan would not be coerced and “would retaliate with full force if its security and integrity were threatened.” Asked the ISID assessment of potential Indian military courses of action, he replied they could include air strikes in Azad Kashmir on
View from Islamabad of the 2001–2002 Crisis

logistics facilities, brigade headquarters, supply and ammo dumps, villages, and displaced person camps, and that any of these targets struck would be characterized by India as terrorist camps.

The next day, May 25, Ambassador Chamberlin (preparing to return to the United States to rejoin her two daughters who had been evacuated twice due to terrorist attacks on the diplomatic enclave in Islamabad) met with the CJCSC, General Aziz, and a group of senior officers. An informal poll of senior Pakistani officers sitting at one table gauged the prospects for war as “50–50.” A major general at the table regretted the end of Pakistani operations in support of OEF in the west but laughed, “Sometimes you get so fed up [with India], you just want to say, ‘Go to hell!’ let’s go for it.” Although the embassy did not know it at the time, the Pakistan Army Strategic Forces Command had begun a four-day series of missile tests to demonstrate that Pakistan was no longer in a mood to be coerced by India. This series of tests of Ghauri, Ghaznavi, and Abdali missiles would later be commemorated in a framed picture hanging prominently in the office of Lt Gen. Khalid Kidwai, director general of the Strategic Plans Division, the office that coordinated Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs. In the picture was a quotation from a statement made at the conclusion of the tests by President Musharraf: “We were compelled to show them [India] in 1998 that we were not bluffing and in May 2002 that we do not bluff.”

On May 29, the commander of Central Command land forces in the theatre arrived in Islamabad to consult with GHQ about the forthcoming Operation Anaconda in the Shah-i-Kot Mountains of eastern Afghanistan. When he requested the Pakistan Army’s assistance to again seal the western border, Pakistani officers regretted their inability to provide more than one brigade each in the provinces of Balochistan and NWFP plus a number of Frontier Corps troops. Despite the necessity to have every available soldier of the Pakistan Army on the eastern front, these officers told him Pakistan was willing to take a certain amount of risk on that front in order to cooperate as much as possible on OEF. Eventually, the army would commit three brigades and 56 wings of the Frontier Corps to support coalition operations. Asked about possible Indian military options in the east, these officers predicted in order of probability: punitive Indian air strikes along the LoC, limited ground operations along the LoC, and larger ground operations at a location that would require a Pakistan Army response. However, they stated, “India doesn’t have the military capability to bring Pakistan to its knees. That is
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Our assessment.” They emphasized that with an early monsoon likely, ground operations would become even more difficult after July, so there was a steadily closing window of opportunity for the Indian Army to attack. Asked what Pakistan would do in response to any one of these contingencies, they replied it “would be unthinkable for Pakistan not to retaliate in kind.”

Ambassador Blackwill in New Delhi was becoming convinced that war, even escalating to the nuclear level, was a possibility. He met daily with Sir Rob Young, the British high commissioner, who was similarly convinced, and he continued his normal practice of holding bimonthly roundtables at his residence with senior Indian government and political figures to hear their views and use the interactions as an opportunity to shape those views in a manner advantageous to the United States. He again peppered Washington with a barrage of limited distribution (LIMDIS) and no distribution (NODIS) cables to shape key United States Government (USG) decisionmakers’ perception of the crisis, and augmented them with telephone calls to the White House, NSC, and the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State. When the crisis deepened toward the end of May, he called an embassy meeting to discuss the possibility of evacuating noncritical embassy personnel. In this forum he asked a series of questions: What is the likelihood of war? Is there a possibility of nuclear escalation? Is the chance of a nuclear escalation zero? If not zero, what percentage is it likely to be? On hearing that the figure for nuclear escalation might be 5 percent, he declared this level of risk to be unacceptable and determined to reduce the number of personnel at the embassy. He also recommended that Washington take steps to reduce the number of American citizens in India that might be at risk if war broke out. On May 31, the Department of State issued a travel advisory urging Americans to avoid travel to India.

The British High Commissioners in India and Pakistan agreed with the need for a travel advisory and wanted theirs to be published simultaneously with the United States. Both believed the advisory should have been expanded to include other countries in the region due to the potential danger of a nuclear fallout drifting across the subcontinent, and that it should have gone out much earlier than it actually did, since the situation would be much too chaotic to undertake an evacuation once war broke out. In keeping with the “game plan,” Foreign Minister Jack Straw visited Islamabad on May 28 and elicited from Musharraf another pledge to curtail militant infiltration across the LoC. The new American ambassador to Pakistan,
Nancy Powell, arrived in Islamabad on Memorial Day, just in time to be greeted with a nearly unanimous embassy assessment that war between India and Pakistan could erupt at any moment. Earlier in her career, Powell had served as a junior political officer in the embassy in Islamabad, knew many key Pakistani political figures, and was familiar with the intricacies of South Asian politics. She was serving in Accra as U.S. ambassador to Ghana when notified of her new assignment on May 1 and had only two days of briefings and preparation at the State Department before departing for Pakistan. In Washington, she was told that the Department was worried, but didn’t see that a war was certain. Her first important task, she was told, was to prepare for the arrival of Deputy Secretary Armitage on June 6, who would be following on the heels of Jack Straw and was expected to do the “heavy lifting” with Musharraf to force him to curb militant infiltration. At a June 4 emergency action committee meeting to discuss actions in the event of war, embassy and American citizen evacuation measures were reviewed as were recent cables from embassy New Delhi emphasizing the geostrategic importance of sustaining U.S.-India ties and suggesting that Pakistan must take verifiable measures to stop infiltration by the time Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Armitage visited the next week. Armitage arrived first and convinced Musharraf to make an unambiguous declaration of his government’s commitment to curb militant infiltration. This message was reinforced by Rumsfeld one week later.

While tensions were rising in the U.S. embassies in Islamabad and New Delhi in early June, the atmosphere at GHQ in Rawalpindi remained calm. Neither ISID nor the army’s Military Intelligence Directorate predicted war, only that India might conduct airstrikes or a limited ground incursion along the LoC. Most army officers were frankly puzzled by the travel advisories issued for Pakistan and India. The 70,000 troops committed in support of Operation Anaconda remained in place along the Afghan border and, in mid-June, the commander of Pakistan’s 1 Corps, its premier armored strike formation, told a group of visiting military attachés that fully 15–20 percent of his soldiers were on leave and he had no reason to recall them.

Eventually, an incident occurred that foreshadowed the end of the crisis. On June 18, a camel strayed from Pakistan into the “no man’s land” between the Pakistani and Indian border fences along the international border in southern Punjab. The Pakistan Rangers, the paramilitary equivalent of the Frontier Corps that operate along the Indian border, were summoned to retrieve the animal.
Unfortunately, while the Rangers patrol was in the process of doing so, an Indian Border Security Fence patrol arrived in the vicinity and fired at the Rangers. In the exchange that followed, one Indian and one Pakistani soldier were killed. The Indian side fired mortars and artillery, but Pakistan refrained from replying and the situation eventually was resolved in a conversation between the two directors general of Military Operations on the hotline linking their headquarters in Rawalpindi and New Delhi. After this incident, things quieted down along the border and the crisis atmosphere within the embassy ebbed as well.

A week later, on June 24, Gen. Tommy Franks, commander of U.S. Central Command, arrived in Islamabad to discuss OEF and the Anaconda operation in eastern Afghanistan. An ISID briefing on the military situation in the east indicated little or no change to India’s offensive posture and predicted that the situation would probably continue until October for India to gain maximum concessions on Kashmir, intimidate the “Indian Held Kashmir” electorate prior to the scheduled September state elections, and to project those elections as a substitute for a long-sought after plebiscite under UN auspices. The briefer predicted that Pakistan would be blamed for any violence in conjunction with the elections, called for international observers and neutral monitors to be stationed along the LoC, and emphasized that the continuous deployment of ground forces by both sides was fraught with danger, since any terrorist act that occurred in India would raise the stakes quickly. He anticipated that without Indian reciprocation to Musharraf’s renewed vow to curb the Kashmiri militants, there would be a great internal backlash in Pakistan. Pakistan needed political space for stability, he concluded, and India needed to respond to the events in Kashmir with dialogue.

With this, the crisis passed and the embassy slowly began to concentrate on other matters even as the embassy evacuations continued for another month. In August, Pakistan complained that the Indian air force had violated its airspace and dropped bombs well inside the LoC near the town of Gultari, but the Pakistani air force refrained from responding. Artillery and heavy weapons firing along the LoC continued for several months, but with diminishing intensity. In July, the Pakistan National Defense College in Islamabad conducted a series of army war games that confirmed GHQ’s optimistic view that it could match India in a conventional war. Despite inferior numbers and weaponry, commanders and staff at every level were convinced that the Pakistani army could shift its ground forces in any threatened
sector faster than India could concentrate its forces to gain local superiority. By October the crisis was over and both sides began returning forces to their barracks.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 2002 STANDOFF

In American military parlance, the term, “lessons learned” implies a process by which an event is analyzed objectively to determine what happened, if mistakes were made and by whom, when and where the mistakes occurred, and what information or lack thereof caused them. The final objective is less to apportion blame for mistakes than to institute new policies and procedures to prevent their recurrence, and to sensitize everyone involved of the need to avoid a repetition in order that a more positive outcome can be attained in the future. Although none of the three principal actors in the 2001–2002 Border Crisis conducted such a formal exercise, an evaluation of their attitudes and subsequent actions indicates they likely drew the following conclusions.

PAKISTANI CONCLUSIONS

(1) Indian Coercive Diplomacy Failed. Despite Musharraf’s repeated promises to curb support to the extremist groups targeting India, little was done other than to direct ISID to relocate the main militant camps from Azad Kashmir to other locations in NWFP and FATA and to tell their leadership to lie low for the time being. As the crisis wore on, senior military officers emphasized the “principled stand” they were taking on Kashmir and openly derided what they considered India’s failure of will to follow through with military action during the long standoff. In short, India was bluffing and Pakistan had called the bluff.

(2) Mobilization Advantage. Despite being caught off balance initially by the commitment of two full corps to support coalition military operations along the border with Afghanistan, Pakistan concluded it could still mobilize and deploy its army much faster than India and could do so without resorting to a state of emergency which would have disrupted the fragile national economy.

(3) Economic and Logistic Advantage. Because the bulk of the Pakistan Army is stationed in peacetime near the eastern border, the logistic sustainment of deployed forces was only marginally more expensive than normal garrison operations. Few army
formations moved more than 50 kilometers from garrison to their initial wartime positions. Units deploying from southern Sind, Balochistan, and NWFP were supported easily by the robust military logistical system in Punjab and northern Sind. This was a pleasant contrast to what senior Pakistani officers saw across the border and which they invariably highlighted to embassy officials. The Indian Army had to move extremely large formations and support them in austere operational areas in western Rajasthan hundreds of kilometers away from major installations. In contrast, Pakistan’s economy could easily absorb the cost of a lengthy deployment because the wartime logistics infrastructure required only minor adjustment from peacetime demands. Even so, in the months following the crisis, the army increased the stores of fuel and munitions stockpiled near the border to provide an even larger logistic cushion in the future.

(4) *Nuclear Weapons Confer Immunity.* Like the earlier Brasstacks and Kargil crises, the 2001–2002 standoff validated in the minds of Pakistani military leaders the notion that Pakistan’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program trumped India’s conventional military strength and immunized it from the threat of a massive conventional invasion. By mid-January 2002 virtually all senior military officers openly dismissed this threat, believing instead that India would limit its punitive military operations to the LoC.

(5) *Interior Lines Advantage.* Even if India should do the unexpected and seek to exploit its massive conventional military superiority by attacking across the international border, the series of war games conducted in July 2002 at the National Defense College confirmed GHQ’s confidence in the validity of its existing operational plans and wartime deployment locations. Although India had a greater than 2:1 advantage in most measures of ground combat power, the length of time required to concentrate sufficient combat power in any sector was considered to be greater than the time Pakistan required to move its reserve forces to obviate the advantage. The exercise also confirmed that Pakistan could continue to count on sufficient strategic warning time to allow the Pakistan military to move faster than India in any threatened sector. Despite being heavily outnumbered, Pakistani leaders believed this mobility advantage and superior transportation infrastructure even offered opportunities for counteroffensive operations.

(6) *Validation of the Policy of Asymmetric Warfare.* Although the crisis was initiated by the jehadi groups at the worst possible time...
for Pakistan, as the crisis unfolded the utility of such groups was seen as a valuable hedge in the unlikely event of conventional war. Ironically, Indian coercive diplomacy had exactly the opposite of its intended effect on Pakistani military leaders. As the scale of the Indian mobilization and deployment became apparent, the more it reinforced in GHQ the potential value of such groups in conducting asymmetric warfare behind the lines in Kashmir and other locations in northern India.

**INDIAN CONCLUSIONS**

1. **Coercive Diplomacy Worked.** From New Delhi’s perspective, though the military mobilization and deployment was expensive and frustratingly slow, Pakistan was compelled to foreswear its support for extremist groups focused on India.

2. **Need for Closer Civil-Military Coordination.** Indian political leaders learned at great expense that coercive diplomacy is a blunt instrument when there is disagreement between the military and civilian segments of the decision-making process and no agreed end-state or exit strategy. Having ordered the Indian army to mobilize and deploy, India’s political leaders seemed surprised to learn that the process was so lengthy that strategic surprise would be lost. Only afterward did they appreciate the gravity and potential dangers of the situation thus created and refrain from ordering a military strike.

3. **Need to Restructure the Military.** Indian military leaders learned they could no longer afford a lengthy military mobilization and deployment process. The Indian army has since developed a new ground forces doctrine, “Cold Start” that calls for immediate offensive operations by forces in place along the border to attack quickly to make shallow penetrations of Pakistani territory to seize terrain needed for follow-on offensive operations by reinforcing armor formations. They believe this neutralizes Pakistan’s mobilization and deployment advantages and will keep them sufficiently off balance to preclude counteroffensive operations. Such actions will also lessen the opportunity for external actors such the United States and the United Kingdom (or others) to “interfere” and constrain the behavior of India’s civilian leaders.

4. **No Nuclear Immunity.** India did not waver in its initial belief that Pakistan would not risk nuclear war if it initiated large-scale conventional military operations across the international border.
The Cold Start doctrine takes the Pakistani nuclear deterrent into account by specifying that ground-offensive operations will be designed not to cross Pakistan’s assessed “nuclear redlines.”

**U.S. Conclusions**

1. *Need for Unity of Decision-Making.* American policymakers had to be confused by embassy reporting from Islamabad and New Delhi. While both embassies understood U.S. policy objectives for the region, and both had a common intelligence picture of the emerging situation, each embassy interpreted for itself the best way to accomplish U.S. goals in the context of the crisis and worked assiduously to shape opinion in Washington. The coherence of U.S. crisis management improved when it was finally orchestrated from Washington rather than from the field.

2. *Need for Policy Clarity.* The Bush administration learned that it must quickly prioritize foreign policy objectives when they clashed. A former diplomat in New Delhi observed there was disagreement in Washington about how to view the Indian mobilization. The initial focus was on OEF and the GWOT, but if Indian concerns were not taken into consideration, OEF might be lost anyway. Washington walked a tightrope by asking India not to undermine OEF but tolerating India’s coercive diplomacy with Islamabad. The result was that partnerships with both countries were strained.

3. *Need for Rapid U.S. (and British) Engagement.* Coordinated diplomacy by the United States and the United Kingdom was viewed by both sides as a key to the successful de-escalation of the crisis although the latter operated as a far more coherent actor than the former in the initial stages of the crisis. Rapid and continuous engagement of Indian and Pakistani political leaders injected caution and time for reflection in a rapidly deteriorating situation. In a future crisis, both countries will almost certainly attempt similar actions.

**Final Thoughts**

Indian and Pakistani officials drew distinctly different conclusions from the 2001–2002 standoff, a basic failure that makes a future miscalculation in a similar situation almost inevitable. Whether a future crisis can be contained below the nuclear threshold is problematic,
given the inability of both sides to understand each other’s mindset. Pakistani officers frequently point out in a condescending tone to visiting Americans that of course they understand the Indian mind; after all, they laugh, “we ruled them for a thousand years.” Yet, the historical record clearly shows that in virtually every major crisis they consistently fail to accurately gauge Indian actions. This happened in the 1965 and 1971 wars, at Kargil in 1999, and in 2001. There is no reason to suspect they will become any more prescient in the future. Consider the evidence: Pakistan believes India’s coercive diplomacy failed in 2002 while India believes it worked. Pakistan believes its nuclear deterrent makes conventional war impossible while India believes it can be fought under certain conditions, and it is developing an aggressive ground doctrine, “Cold Start” to do so. Instead of curtailing support to Kashmiri militants, who brought it to the brink of an unwanted war, Pakistan sees value in maintaining linkages to them as a force multiplier in a future conflict.

Pakistan is equally sanguine in its response to India’s Cold Start doctrine and most Pakistan Army officers fail to grasp its significance as a threat to their basic defense doctrine. In 2005, a senior retired general summed up the prevailing attitude. “What can a few forward deployed battalions do?”, he asked rhetorically. Generating sufficient combat power to effect a major penetration still requires moving substantial armor forces and second-line ammunition, indicators he believes provides Pakistan ample warning time to move its strategic reserves. To date, Pakistan has made only three significant changes in recognition of Cold Start. First, when Indian Army units move away from their home stations on any form of training exercises, Pakistani units in the same area of operations are placed on a higher stage of alert until they return. Second, all the war reserve ammunition moved forward in 2002 has remained in place as prepositioned stocks so that combat formations need only move to their wartime deployment positions to have their second-line ammunitions stocks immediately available. Third, Pakistan has improved the command and control of its forces by creating a Southern Army Command to control ground forces south of Lahore while the on-call Army Field Headquarters deployed in 2002 to control ground forces north of Lahore will function in the future as a Northern Army Command. Nevertheless, India’s continued refinement of Cold Start coupled with the deployment in the past three years of significant forces in NWFP and FATA to conduct operations against extremist groups calls into question both the amount of strategic warning time available to the Pakistan
army and its ability to disengage and move those forces eastward in time to confront an Indian Cold Start incursion of its territory.

Finally, it is far from clear that U.S. and British diplomacy will be as effective in the future as it was in 2001–2002. Much has happened to change the situation since then. Cold Start seems designed precisely to prevent diplomacy from imposing caution and second thoughts on Indian decision makers. Second, the attitude toward the United States in both Pakistan and India may be different, as both sides tended to mistrust the United States in 2001–2002 albeit for different reasons. India saw the United States as duplicitous in adopting a double standard on terrorism, believing the United States was engaged in a concerted policy with Great Britain and others to dissuade India from doing to Pakistan precisely what the United States was in the process of doing to Afghanistan. At the same time, it was an article of faith among political and military officials in Pakistan that India was able to take such an aggressive stance against Pakistan only because the United States had given it tacit approval to do so. Musharraf considered that he took action to rein in the jihadis in January and June only because he thought Deputy Secretary of State, Armitage had guaranteed that the United States would pressure India to pursue a dialogue with Pakistan about the future of Kashmir. When this turned out not to be the case, he felt betrayed. Finally, during the standoff, the United States had substantial air forces in the region, including on Pakistani soil, as well as a large fleet off the Makran coast, a complicating factor for India that is unlikely to exist in the future.

Notes

1. Section 10 of the Arms Export control Act of 1976, “The Symington Amendment,” prohibited U.S. economic and military assistance to any country delivering or receiving nuclear enrichment equipment, material, or technology not under IAEA safeguards, Section 620e of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, “The Pressler Amendment,” barred most forms of military assistance to Pakistan unless the president certified that Pakistan did not have a nuclear explosive device; and Section 102(b) of the AECA, “The Glenn Amendment,” applied sanctions to both India and Pakistan for their 1998 nuclear tests.

2. This conviction was later incorporated in the National Security Strategy of the United States of America published in September 2002. Section VIII states, “The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral relationship with India based on a conviction that U.S. interests require
a strong relationship with India. We are the two largest democracies, committed to political freedom protected by representative government. India is moving toward greater economic freedom as well. We have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia.”

3. Interview with senior State Department official who wished to remain anonymous.


7. *The 9/11 Commission Report*, p. 331. The seven requests were (1) to stop Al Qaeda operatives at its border and end all logistical support for bin Laden; (2) to give the United States blanket overflight and landing rights for all necessary military and intelligence operations; (3) to provide territorial access to the United States and allied military intelligence and other personnel to conduct operations against Al Qaeda; (4) to provide the United States with intelligence information; (5) to continue to publicly condemn terrorist acts; (6) to cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from going to Afghanistan; and (7) if the evidence implicated bin Laden and Al Qaeda and the Taliban continued to harbor them, to break relations with the Taliban government.

8. The three most significant moves involved Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmad, director general of Inter-Services Intelligence, and Muzaffar Usmani, Deputy Chief of Army Staff, who were retired. Lt. Gen. Muhammad Aziz Khan, Commander 4 Corps in Lahore, was promoted to being a general and was assigned to the grand sounding but largely symbolic (and powerless) position of Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. The three were pious Muslims, but often referred to by Western analysts as the “radical triumvirate” of the army for their ostensibly fundamentalist religious views.


10. Interview with an American official serving in the U.S. Embassy New Delhi at the time, who wishes to remain anonymous.


15. Interview with a former State Department official who wishes to remain anonymous.
16. Interview with an American official serving in the U.S. Embassy New Delhi at the time who wishes to remain anonymous.
17. Interview with a retired Pakistani Brigadier who was the principal India analyst in ISID at the time.
18. Ibid. This call was based on an intelligence assessment that a division-sized Indian force had now concentrated in the southern part of the Line of Control just north of the working boundary between Azad Kashmir and the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Fortunately, “Nothing happened, but we were expecting it.”
19. Interview with an American official serving in the U.S. Embassy New Delhi at the time, who wishes to remain anonymous.
20. Interview with Sir Hilary Synnott, June 14, 2005.
21. This comment was made in the author’s presence during a trip to Washington in March 2002.
22. Interview with an American official serving in the U.S. Embassy New Delhi at the time who wishes to remain anonymous.
23. Interview with Sir Hilary Synnott, June 14, 2005.
24. Interview with a State Department official who participated in the briefings to Powell and wishes to remain anonymous.
PART V

AVOIDING FUTURE CRISSES
Chapter 8
Arms Control, Confidence Building, and Nuclear Risk Reduction—A Pakistani Perspective

Brig. Naeem Ahmad Salik

Introduction: The South Asia Context
The world is witnessing a highly complex and turbulent security environment dominated by the ongoing war against international terrorism. There are heightened concerns about the efforts by states and nonstate actors to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the security situations in Iraq and Afghanistan remain volatile, and the Israeli-Palestinian problem continues on the boil. Amidst all this turmoil, encouraging signals occasionally emanate from South Asia, where India and Pakistan have not abandoned their on-again-off-again Composite Dialogue Process despite many setbacks.

To make any meaningful progress towards achieving a peaceful resolution of disputes and creation of a peaceful and stable security environment in South Asia, the dialogue process must be sustained and built on a solid foundation that includes arms control, confidence building and nuclear risk reduction measures. The three concepts are interrelated. For instance, confidence building measures (CBMs) can lead the way for arms control, while meaningful and effective arms control measures can enhance stability and thereby reduce risks of nuclear conflict. Similarly, unilaterally adopted nuclear risk reduction measures can enhance mutual confidence and could evolve into arms control measures. In the case of India-Pakistan relations, the biggest impediment has always been mutual suspicion and lack of trust. It
may, therefore, become imperative to institute certain CBMs first, in order to create a conducive environment for subsequent agreements on arms control and nuclear risk reduction measures.

This chapter explores the prospects for arms control in South Asia, evaluating existing and possible CBMs that could lead to more substantive agreements. The chapter posits answers to the following questions:

- What confidence building, nuclear risk reduction, or arms control measures would be beneficial to Pakistani security? Which of these measures does Pakistan believe would also be beneficial to Indian security? What are the prospects for renewed bilateral talks on peace, security, and CBMs?
- What are Pakistan's considerations in weighing arms control as a contributing measure to strategic stability in South Asia? Given Pakistan's security concerns and smaller resources, are there ways for Pakistan to maintain a stable military balance despite Indian modernization? Can Pakistan respond to Indian military modernization while avoiding the Soviet experience of resource depletion?
- To what extent does Pakistan take at face value Indian claims that its modernization efforts are designed to counter a Chinese threat? How might an arms control regime be structured to satisfy both Indian and Pakistani concerns?

Arms control can help manage military competition between adversaries by imposing limitations on the numbers and types of weapons and/or restraining deployment options. Arms control can help avoid costly arms races, reduce the risk of conflicts breaking out, and could even minimize the damage if conflict does break out. However, the concept of mutual constraints is still not accepted in South Asia, where the relationship between India and Pakistan has been mostly driven by an action-reaction syndrome. As Peter Lavoy put it, “Indian and Pakistani leaders have learned to conduct military operations cautiously—they have concluded a handful of mutual confidence-building measures—but they do not accept arms control as a useful means to enhance military security and stabilise strained political relations.”

India and Pakistan have pursued the more idealistic goal of disarmament rather than the more pragmatic and practical concept of arms control. However, the two countries have followed different approaches to disarmament, with India insisting
on the more expansive goal of global disarmament, while Pakistan has pursued disarmament on a regional scale.

After the overt nuclearization of the region in May 1998, there was some hope that the two countries would explore Western-style arms control concepts to restrain their military competition, but this hope proved premature. The Lahore Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by the Indian and Pakistani foreign secretaries in February 1999 included a list of nuclear confidence building and risk reduction measures. Unfortunately, due to the deterioration in politico-diplomatic relations between the two countries in the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil conflict and again after the 2002 crisis, these agreed measures were not fully implemented and did not lead to formalized agreements. Despite the lack of progress, some analysts remain convinced that “...arms control and confidence building arrangements can help India and Pakistan avoid a war that neither wants’ and may also help in, ‘proscribing activities that impinge on security, achieving greater transparency, containing military competition and reducing forces.”

Arms control is no panacea for all the problems afflicting relations between India and Pakistan, and will only yield benefits if agreements are accompanied by progress towards resolving the political disputes that underlie India-Pakistan animosity. Foremost of these is Kashmir. Nevertheless, arms control might provide a useful tool for managing ongoing disputes, while political solutions are sought.

Ironically, the 1998 nuclear tests created opportunities for India and Pakistan to address their shared nuclear interests and actually put them in a better position to talk about nuclear restraints. Pakistan’s previous proposals for regional nuclear disarmament also fell on deaf ears. Starting with a proposal for a South Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SANWFZ) offered at the UN General Assembly in November 1974 as a response to India’s first nuclear test in May of that year, Pakistan has attempted to bring international pressure to bear on India with a view to curtailting the pace of its nuclear development. If true disarmament was unrealistic, perhaps constrains would give Pakistan time to catch up. During the period from 1978 to 1987 General Zia-ul-Haq made at least six specific proposals for regional disarmament including the following:

1. Joint renunciation of the acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons—1978.
2. Mutual inspection of each other’s nuclear facilities—1979.
5. A bilateral nuclear test ban treaty—1987. This proposal was made by Pakistani prime minister Junejo to Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and also presented on the floor of the UN General Assembly in September 1987.
6. A multilateral conference under UN auspices on nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia (1987). The idea of a multilateral conference was later modified and proposed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in June 1991 in the form of a meeting of the United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan to discuss the nuclear issue in South Asia. The proposal was designed to address Indian reservations about bilateral arrangements with Pakistan, its perception of a Chinese nuclear threat, and the presence of the nuclear-armed navies of the major powers. Later versions added other powers to assuage Indian concerns, but were also rejected.

While most of these proposals have been overtaken by events, they do hold important lessons, and some elements remain relevant to the current debates. Both countries have achieved a degree of accommodation of their nuclear status. Both are observing unilateral moratoriums on nuclear testing, although neither has committed to signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Similarly, both remain cautious about a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Neither has embraced calls for nuclear disarmament in the near term, instead adopting an “after you” approach to U.S. disarmament initiatives. Is it possible that Indian and Pakistani joint rejection of international nuclear pressures provides a basis for bilateral arms control?

**Grim Prospects for Conventional Arms Control**

Conventional arms control has never been a serious prospect in South Asia, although Pakistan has over the years offered several proposals for regional conventional arms control at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the UN General Assembly. Despite the lack of success of these proposals, overt nuclearization in 1998 raised the prospect that nuclear deterrence might reduce the risk of conventional war, and
therefore ease pressures on Pakistan’s conventional forces. Cuts in
conventional forces might now be possible. However, such ideas could
not be implemented unilaterally because in the absence of mutual and
balanced force reductions such cuts could have the undesirable effect
of bringing Pakistan’s nuclear threshold to dangerously low levels.
Despite the inclusion within the Composite Dialogue of conventional
arms control under the Peace and Security heading, prospects remain
grim. This would be the case even if India were not fixated on its
balance of forces vis-à-vis China. Conventional arms control also
faces the problem that India finds it difficult to equate itself in terms
of force ratios with a much smaller Pakistan. Furthermore, India’s
aspirations to be a major regional and even global power with corre-
sponding force projection capabilities makes it impossible for India to
contemplate the kinds of limits on its conventional forces that would
ease Pakistan’s security dilemma. India and other countries should
nonetheless take heed that India’s conventional superiority has direct
consequences for nuclear stability in South Asia.

**Problems and Prospects for CBMs
in South Asia**

CBMs can have been applied for military, political, and socio-econo-
mic purposes. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which formalized
the maintenance of the status quo in Europe is considered to be the
most comprehensive, elaborate and successful use of CBMs to date.
This agreement was supplemented by the Stockholm Accord and the
two Vienna Agreements that followed it. According to Johan Jorgen
Holst:

> Confidence building measures may be defined as arrangements
designed to enhance assurance of mind and belief in the trustworthi-
ness of states. Confidence is the product of much broader patterns of
relations than those which relate to military security. In fact the latter
have to be woven into a complex texture of economic, cultural, techni-
cal and social relationships.  

The concept of CBMs is commonly believed to have originated
in Europe in the 1970s in the backdrop of East-West confrontation.
However, such measures were already being practiced elsewhere in
the world, though not named as such. In South Asia there is a long
list of what can be termed CBMs, dating back to the 1949 Karachi
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Agreement, formalizing the cease fire in Kashmir. Other significant CBMs included the following:

- the Liaquat-Nehru pact of 1950 provided protection to minorities in each country and called for equal opportunities;
- the 1960 India-Pakistan Border Ground Rules Agreement regulating the international border between India and then-West Pakistan;
- the 1962 Indus Water Treaty regulating the distribution of river water between India and Pakistan;
- the 1966 Tashkent Agreement;
- the 1972 Simla Agreement that secured the return of Pakistani prisoners of war (POWs) from India and the return of territory occupied during the war.7

Yet the history of CBMs in South Asia has been limited due to the intractable nature of the problems and a deep-seated culture of mistrust that underlies a pervasive skepticism with regard to their utility. Dr. Lodhi described the problem with CBMs in South Asia this way:

CBMs cannot stand alone and can only work in a broader context. The presumption of priority for CBMs is that underlying problems are not resolvable and therefore by freezing the status quo, CBMs can somehow reduce tension and avert the danger of war.8

Historical experience lends credence to Dr. Lodhi’s view. For example, the 1988 agreement regarding nonattack on each other’s nuclear installations has not lead to increased confidence. In May 1998, intelligence reports indicated Indian preparations for a preemptive air strike against Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. The crisis was only averted when the Indian high commissioner to Islamabad was summoned to the foreign office around midnight and told in very clear terms of the repercussions of such an adventure. Similarly, the agreement regarding prenotification of major military exercises has not built confidence. In October 1998, India conducted its largest military exercise since Brass Tacks involving elements of all three armed services. Although India did notify before holding the exercise, the selection of an area in close proximity to Pakistan’s land and sea boundaries constituted a violation of the spirit of the agreement. Similarly, India accuses Pakistan of “stabbing it in the back” by initiating the Kargil conflict, despite the commitments made at Lahore.
for improved bilateral relations and implementation of a long list of mutually agreed CBMs in the Lahore MOU. The 2002 crisis further damaged any remaining hopes for the utility of CBMs. The cynical viewpoints expressed in 1995 seem to have prevailed. The main points are outlined below:

- CBMs are mere eyewash. They cannot solve complex and deep rooted problems in South Asia.
- How can CBMs work in present conditions of highly strained relations between India and Pakistan?
- CBMs may lead to complacency whereby a stronger determined adversary could easily take potential advantage over its weaker adversary.
- CBMs are of Western origin and hence cannot be applied in South Asian conditions that are entirely different.
- CBMs can hardly prove beneficial unless there is strong mediation by some big power or an international organization for the resolution of outstanding disputes/problems.
- Because of nuclear deterrence in South Asia, there is no possibility of a future war. Therefore, what is the great need for the CBMs?
- Both India and Pakistan now have parliamentary democracies in place and since democracies generally do not go to wars, all CBMs talk is therefore redundant.9

While some of the above-mentioned criticism may be justified, they also display a lack of understanding of the nature and purpose of the CBMs. In reality, CBMs are not designed to solve the problems by themselves but are only meant to manage and facilitate the process of problem solving. In the tension charged relations between India and Pakistan, the process has not made progress and most of the existing CBMs have been overcome by events. Yet they have facilitated caution and helped manage conflicts. If Western precept such as deterrence could be embraced by the two South Asian rivals, why not the related concepts of arms control and CBMs, which are intended to manage deterrence relations? Former foreign minister Agha Shahi, while describing the past experience with CBMs as discouraging, recognized the greater significance of CBMs in the postnuclearized environment. In Shahi’s view the non-deployed state of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in South Asia could be formalized into a bilateral agreement.10 Even critics can see the utility of building on CBMs towards arms control and nuclear risk reduction agreements.
Prior to 1998 the only agreement in the nuclear realm was the 1988 Agreement on "non-attack on each other’s nuclear facilities." This agreement required an exchange of lists of respective nuclear installations on January 1 every year. The agreement has held its ground so far and even at the peak of tensions between the two countries at the beginning of January 2002, the lists were exchanged as per the practice in vogue, which is not only a good omen but also indicative of the importance that both countries attach to this agreement and the seriousness with which they follow it.

Another area where there is a convergence of views is the need to upgrade the existing communication links between the two countries. The existing hotline between the director generals of military operations (DGMOs) has, contrary to perceptions about its disuse in times of crises, time and again proven its utility. The hotline was used for exchange of information, seeking clarifications, and finally monitoring the disengagement of forces during the Brass Tacks crisis in 1986–1987. It was again used to good effect by the DGMOs during the Kargil crisis in 1999 and throughout the 2001–2002 military standoff. Both sides agreed in the Lahore MOU to upgrade this link. However, this alone may not be enough; there is a need to reactivate political level hotlines such as the hotline between the two prime ministers, which has seldom been used. Establishment of a communication channel between the respective foreign secretaries may also be worthwhile since they are the point men for negotiations. Hotlines between the air and naval equivalents of the DGMOs as well as between sector commanders across the Line of Control and even between the heads of the nuclear establishments might reduce misperceptions and help avoid miscalculations during times of tension. The basic concept is that communication can clarify intentions. However, such hotlines can also be used for deception, and decisions not to use them may also raise, rather than quell, tensions. Unfortunately, the agreement on air space violations has been violated or ignored on many occasions. As a CBM, the associated monitoring, review, and oversight of hotline performance could build contacts and patterns of cooperation between military, political, and technical establishments.

In October 1998, during the expert level talks between India and Pakistan at Islamabad, nuclear risk reduction measures came under discussion. During the course of the discussions, Pakistan made a comprehensive proposal for a "strategic restraint regime" in South Asia. This proposal contained not only nuclear and missile restraint...
measures but suggestions about conventional restraint as well. The restraint measures covered the complete spectrum from development to testing and deployment. The Indian delegation at the time expressed a desire to evaluate the proposal, but further bilateral discussions were not pursued.16 Some of the ideas were reflected in the Lahore MOU, but the dialogue process broke down shortly after Lahore, and there has been no formal discussion of the Strategic Restraint Regime between the two countries. Discussions of strategic restraint, however, remain a potentially valuable starting point for renewed engagement.

Finally, as both countries add sea-based nuclear forces, there may be convergence of thought and interest in avoiding incidents at sea. Both countries agreed in the Lahore MOU to “conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea.”17 Such an agreement would be valuable as a CBM and a nuclear risk reduction measure.

The Lahore MOU

The Lahore MOU included eight measures for promoting a stable environment of peace and security between India and Pakistan. Of these, five measures are directly related to nuclear risk reduction, while two others (periodic review of the implementation of existing CBMs through appropriate consultative mechanisms, and the review of existing communication links between the two DGMOs) complement the nuclear risk reduction measures. The last one pertains to prevention of incidents at sea. The five specific measures related to nuclear risk reduction are the following:

- The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.
- The two sides undertake to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests and shall conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.
- The two sides are fully committed to undertaking national measures to reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their respective control. The two sides further undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of any accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident that could create the risk of a fallout with adverse consequences for both sides, or
an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries, as well as to adopt measures aimed at diminishing the possibility of such actions, or such incidents being misinterpreted by the other. The two sides shall identify/establish the appropriate communication mechanism for this purpose.

- The two sides shall continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions unless either side, in exercise of its national sovereignty decides that extraordinary events have jeopardized its supreme interests.
- The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament, and nonproliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora.\(^{18}\)

The document stated that where required, the technical details to implement the above measures would be worked out by experts of the two sides in meetings to be held on mutually agreed dates, with a view to reaching bilateral agreements. This anticipated meeting of experts did not take place due to the Kargil episode, and the risk reduction measures atrophied.

The Lahore MOU contains many good ideas for CBMs that could evolve into arms control and risk reduction agreements. One good prospect is the prenotification of ballistic missile flight-testing, which is already practiced by both sides. In April 1999, India notified Pakistan before the test of an advanced version of its medium-range ballistic missile, Agni. Similarly, when Pakistan responded to this test by testing its own medium-range, Ghauri and Shaheen-1, missiles, India was notified. Pakistan has since notified India of all of its missile tests. India discontinued pre-notification of its missile tests, probably as a reaction to the Kargil conflict, but resumed the practice in January 2002, when it notified Pakistan of its test of the shorter-range version (700 km) version of the Agni missile. This was notable in that it occurred at the peak of tensions during the 2002 military standoff. Pakistan followed suit by notifying India of its missile tests conducted in the last week of May that year. Since then both sides have notified each other of their respective tests on a regular basis. Despite the absence of any formal agreement, both sides have been very careful in ensuring that they do not point missiles in each other’s direction during the test flights to avoid any possibility of a misunderstanding or misperception.\(^{19}\)

Two other positive developments have also taken place. First, in 1999 Pakistan took a conscious decision to break the action-reaction
cycle with regard to missile testing and to conduct the tests only when dictated by the need to validate some technical parameters, and not to play to the gallery by responding to each and every Indian missile test with a test of its own. Second, as a result of the norm on notification and the care taken by both sides to test the missiles at locations away from their common borders, missile tests by either side are now regarded as routine activities of a technical, not political, nature. Thus, when Pakistan tested its Shaheen-2 missile over the ocean in March 2004, not only did Pakistan issue prior notification to India, it also issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) to international maritime and civil aviation traffic in the area since the intended impact point of the missile fell in the jurisdiction of Bombay Air Traffic Control. This is by far the clearest indication as yet that when the two countries are convinced about the utility of a particular risk reduction measure or CBM, they abide by it whether or not a formal agreement exists. In time, the norm of missile test notification will be codified in the form of a formal agreement.

Another significant aspect of the Lahore MOU is the moratorium on nuclear testing. Pakistan has on several occasions proposed that the mutual unilateral moratoria could be converted into a bilateral moratorium. However, international attention on a CTBT puts both India and Pakistan in an awkward position that complicates their nuclear testing policies. Nevertheless, the two are likely to adopt similar approaches no matter how the international debate evolves.

With regard to risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, the two countries have established requisite command and control structures. Pakistan announced the establishment of a three-tiered nuclear command and control structure in February 2000. The National Command Authority of Pakistan is the decision-making body chaired by the president with the prime minister as the vice chairman, the foreign minister as the deputy chairman, and the ministers of defense, interior, and finance joining the chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff and the three service chiefs as National Command Authority members. The second tier comprises the secretariat of National Command Authority called the Strategic Plans Division, while the third tier consists of the Strategic Force Commands of the three services. India announced the establishment of its Nuclear Command Authority in January 2003, which consists of a political committee, an executive committee, and a tri-service strategic force command. These unilateral steps were essential guarantors against unauthorized use or access to nuclear assets.
Despite many setbacks and obstacles, India and Pakistan have made significant progress in establishing the basis for CBMs that could lead to arms control and risk reduction agreements.

THE WAY FORWARD

It is not difficult to identify areas of mutual interest where CBMs have proven useful. For instance, the DGMO’s hotline has for years served as the most reliable communication link between the two countries. Yet more could be done. The existing DGMO’s hotline suffers from many technical deficiencies. There are frequent breakdowns and the quality of speech is not adequate. The links should be upgraded and monitored as recommended in the Lahore MOU.

The Lahore MOU also calls for periodic review of the implementation of existing CBMs and to establish appropriate consultative mechanisms in this regard. A review and oversight mechanism should meet at least twice annually to review the implementation of CBMs. The review committee should hold any side not meeting its obligations to account. A case in point is the Indian Basin Treaty of 1962, which is by far the most successful CBM between India and Pakistan because it is backed up by an institutionalized mechanism in the form of the two Indus Water Authorities and the respective commissioners that meet on a regular basis to review the implementation. Similar institutional mechanisms would help implement some of the more advanced security-related CBMs and usher them from informal to more formalized and enforceable arms control and risk reduction agreements.

The most brilliant ideas and the most innovative schemes in the field of arms control, confidence building, and risk reduction will not yield positive results unless they are backed up by matching political commitments and resources. Mutual interest in improving security has inspired India and Pakistan to adopt a wide range of CBMs covering an array of contentious issues. There is much common ground for agreement. It is possible and beneficial for India and Pakistan to take the next steps to evolve their CBMs beyond informal arrangements to build formal understandings about the requirements of peace and stability.

NOTES

2. The text of the Lahore MOU can be found at http://www.indiaembassy.org/South_Asia/Pakistan/mou(lahore01211999).html.
5. Kamal and Gupta, Prospects of Conventional Arms Control, section 2.2.5.
8. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. See Kanti P. Bajpai, P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Stephen P. Cohen, and Sumit Ganguly, Brass Tacks and Beyond-Crisis Prevention and Confidence Building in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 1995). The authors take the position that during the Brass Tacks crisis the DGMO’s hotline was in disuse. However, this is contrary to the facts based on the author’s personal experience.
15. Based on personal inquiries by the author with the concerned officials in Military Operations Directorate, GHQ, Pakistan Army.
16. Based on the recollections of Brig. Feroz Hassan Khan, former director arms control & disarmament affairs, Strategic Plans Division, Joint Staff Headquarters, Pakistan.
17. Text of Lahore MOU, see note 2.
19. Based on the author’s personal experience of the notification process.
22. Based on personal inquiries and observations by the author.
Conclusion:
Lessons Learned and Unlearned
Zachary S. Davis

Our search for meaning in momentous events such as the “twin peaks” crisis is motivated by more than curiosity. Understanding these events is essential for any complete analysis of South Asian security. This volume advances our knowledge by providing fresh insights into the policies, politics, diplomacy, and military considerations that led two vitally important friends of the United States, recently armed with nuclear weapons, once again to the brink of war.

The timing of the crisis was terrible for all concerned: Pakistan was scrambling to accommodate Washington’s post–9/11 war on terror. India was forging an historic new relationship with the United States. Neither side wanted war. Yet, as Barbara Tuchmann described in her history of the onset of the Great War, politicians and diplomats seemed incapable of arresting the slide towards armed conflict. Fortunately, the warning issued by the German ambassador to Russia during the onset of World War I that “mobilization means war,” did not apply to the 2001–2002 crisis. U.S. diplomacy proved critical in averting a fourth South Asian war. India’s prolonged mobilization, Operation Parakram, turned out to have been an effective, albeit risky, and expensive, tool of coercive diplomacy. Pakistan acknowledged the scope of its internal weaknesses, while stiffening its defenses against India. The United States advanced its objectives of building alliances with both parties and defeating terrorists. Each of the participants in the crisis drew important lessons from the experience.

Lessons about Nuclear Stability

India, Pakistan, and the United States witnessed how a nonstate actor such as the Pakistan-based terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba...
and Jaish-e-Mohammed can drag nuclear armed states into conflict. Islamabad, New Delhi, and Washington each took steps aimed at preventing this from happening again, although the effectiveness of those steps remains in doubt. The ability of such groups that are seeking the downfall of all three governments to provoke crisis and conflict undermines the already fragile strategic stability.

All parties to the 2001–2002 crisis learned that the threshold for nuclear use remains shrouded in the fog of war. Escalation of conflict may not follow a predictable linear path, and may jump supposed firebreaks separating low intensity conflict from major war, or cross the boundary from conventional to nuclear warfare in unexpected ways. While discounting reports that the crisis came close to the nuclear threshold, India and Pakistan took steps to buttress their capabilities to use force under the nuclear shadow. Indian strategists drew the lesson that India’s lumbering and prolonged mobilization in the form of Operation Parakram allowed Pakistan many advantages, including the ability to use nuclear threats to neutralize India’s superior conventional forces. In response, Indian strategists devised the Cold Start doctrine which they believe will enable India to conduct rapid strikes into Pakistan without crossing Islamabad’s nuclear redlines. Indian strategists believe also that India’s own nuclear capability prevents Pakistan from resorting to nuclear use. Pakistan, on the other hand, grew even more confident in the effectiveness of its nuclear forces and its first-use nuclear doctrine to deter India from attempting any large-scale military assault. Clearly, India and Pakistan drew different lessons from the 2001–2002 crisis and do not share common perceptions about the nuclear threshold. The lack of a common understanding of deterrence dynamics raises troubling questions about the sturdiness of the nuclear balance in South Asia, especially in the midst of another crisis.

Despite the growing list of questions about how nuclear weapons advance either country’s national security goals, one thing is certain: both have “doubled down” on their nuclear bets. Neither government has reduced its support for nuclear weapons. On the contrary, weapons production and delivery systems continue to expand. Cruise missiles, sea-based weapons, and missile defense add new complexity to the deterrence calculus. Proliferation optimists can still believe, as most South Asian strategists do, that such expansion is producing stable nuclear deterrence for India and Pakistan. For them, credible nuclear threats reinforce restraint and may make future crises less dangerous. Proliferation pessimists will remain unconvinced, and
conclude instead that continued expansion of nuclear weapons programs increases the risks of actual nuclear use.

In light of the incongruent perceptions and strategies held by India and Pakistan, and their continued reliance on nuclear weapons as a key component of their national security strategies, risk management and reduction measures such as outlined by Michael Wheeler and Naeem Salik would seem prudent. While the 2001–2002 South Asia crisis may not compare with the drama and consequences of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it does provide valuable insights into how misperceptions and miscalculations could lead India and Pakistan into unwanted wars and dangerous escalation. While being mindful not to impose Western cultural norms on South Asian nuclear behavior, cold war nuclear history does offer some valuable lessons for managing nuclear deterrence.

LESSONS ABOUT REGIONAL SECURITY

The most obvious lesson about regional security is that Kashmir remains explosive and provides the sparks that could easily lead India and Pakistan down the familiar path to war. That issue has been ably covered by other scholars. Beyond Kashmir, however, India and Pakistan’s other extensive border regions complicate their security calculus in ways that were not experienced during the U.S.-Soviet cold war rivalry. The porous and disputed borders that divide India and Pakistan bear many risks but offer little protection against cross-border incursions that can flare into broader conflict. The role of non-state actors in crossborder raids has been at the root of enough crises for both sides to understand their explosive potential. Nevertheless, Islamabad and Delhi may both still be tempted to use proxies to agitate inside one another’s territory.

For India, which sees the hand of Pakistan and specifically its intelligence apparatus behind a wide range of nefarious activities, more pressure on Islamabad is the primary means to halt crossborder adventurism. Thus, in addition to its emerging Cold Start doctrine to shore up the credibility of its military coercive power, New Delhi sought global support for its efforts to protect itself from terrorist groups associated with Al Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks. The debate described in the chapters by Krepon and Nayak and by David Smith highlight the efforts by Washington to balance its awkward partnership with Pakistan to prosecute the war on terror with its policy to build a new relationship with India. The crisis drove home to Pakistan the
extent to which its internal disfunctions had become a threat not only to India and the United States, but to itself. For the United States and many other countries, the crisis provided further evidence, if any was needed, that Islamic extremists in Pakistan posed a serious threat to global security. Moreover, by prompting Pakistan to relocate its army forces from the western to the eastern border, the crisis seriously undermined U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan to capture or kill Al Qaeda and Taliban forces hiding in the rugged border regions with Pakistan. Any chance of a “hammer and anvil” strategy in which the Pakistan Army blocked the retreat of Taliban forces into Pakistan was lost. The resulting influx of Taliban and Al Qaeda into Pakistan exacerbated the growing threat to Pakistan’s own stability as well as to India and other targets of violent Islamic extremism.

The November 2008 attacks in Mumbai brought this issue front and center, but the 2001 parliament attack presaged the Islamic terrorist’s strategy to provoke a devastating South Asian war that would destroy the governments in both Islamabad and New Delhi. Adding a new wrinkle to deterrence theory, one not faced to such a degree during the cold war, the terrorists actually hold as a goal to undermine stability and purposefully light the fuse on South Asia’s powder keg.

LESSONS FOR INDIA

Indian military and political thinkers reflected long and hard on the meaning of the 2001–2002 crisis. The Indian government drew many lessons and took steps to address perceived deficiencies in their preparations and doctrine. One hard lesson that requires India to let go of many historic and understandable perspectives, many described by Praveen Swami, is that India’s security is increasingly dependent on Pakistan. Pakistan’s internal weaknesses, long viewed as self-inflicted wounds plaguing its troublesome neighbor, can seriously harm India. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons underscore the uncomfortable fact that smaller, weaker, undemocratic Pakistan could conduct proxy attacks on India and then prevent retaliation by threatening to resort to nuclear weapons. However, Musharraf’s failure to reign-in the terrorists despite his pledge in 2002 and the continued erosion of civil order in Pakistan stimulated growing appreciation that Pakistan’s internal weakness posed a threat to India. The restraint shown by New Delhi after the Mumbai attacks in 2008 probably reflected Prime Minister Singh’s understanding that pressuring Pakistan’s fragile government much further could result in widespread disorder that would not serve
Conclusion

India’s interests. However, while India may have more appreciation for the dangers lurking in Pakistan’s “fissiparous tendencies,” New Delhi appears unconcerned about Pakistan’s fears about its activities in Afghanistan or its suspected fishing in the troubled waters of Baluchistan. Agitating Pakistan’s real and imagined insecurities may produce unintended consequences.

One unlearned lesson for India can be found in its preoccupation with China as its primary peer competitor. While rising India and rising China seem destined to balance one another on the world stage, crafting a nuclear deterrent relationship with Pakistan presents an urgent challenge that should not be taken for granted. There is a danger that preoccupation with China, including India’s development and deployment of strategic weapons aimed at Beijing, could distract Indian planners and leaders from tending to its nuclear relationship with Pakistan, including the effect that new forces aimed at deterring unspecified aggression from China could have on Pakistan’s security calculus. Indian reassurances that their new capabilities (missiles, submarines, cruise missiles, missile defenses, etc.) are not targeted on Pakistan, but only on China, will not dissuade Pakistani military planners from taking into account a growing imbalance of forces—and seeking to address it. Minimum nuclear deterrence could be a casualty.

Finally, India can afford to explore risk reduction measures such as outlined here and elsewhere to prevent miscalculations and misperceptions from resulting in an accidental or unintended nuclear war.2

Lessons for Pakistan

Pakistan learned several hard lessons from the 2001–2002 crisis. The first lesson confirmed the value of its nuclear deterrent. Pakistanis are united in their belief that nuclear weapons deterred India from invading in 2002. As shown by Feroz Khan, Pakistani military planners reacted to the crisis by accelerating their efforts to fully operationalize their nuclear forces to ensure their timely use and reliability. Pakistan’s first-use doctrine was vindicated. Operation Parakram proved a useful foil that provided Pakistan’s nuclear strategists with valuable inputs to their planning and preparedness against a scenario in which a conventional war escalated and nuclear forces were called into play. The crisis provided an enduring justification for the continued qualitative and quantitative expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and stiffened resistance to international nonproliferation efforts.
The crisis and the subsequent growth of violent Islamic extremism in Pakistan since 2001 also cast new shadows on the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. The A. Q. Khan scandal illustrated how Pakistan could lose control of its nuclear assets. With Pakistan’s domestic stability in jeopardy, persistent fears that terrorists might gain access to the nuclear program and seize weapons, weapon materials, or the knowledge associated with them prompted additional nuclear modernization efforts. Pakistan took a number of steps to guarantee the safety and security of its nuclear assets, as described by Feroz Khan in his chapter. The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) implemented a range of physical and procedural measures to prevent unauthorized access either from external or internal sources. Although Pakistan has tried to calm fears with repeated reassurances about the safety and security of its nuclear weapons, some remain unconvinced.

The 2001–2002 crisis alerted Pakistan’s leaders to the extent of the dangers associated with terrorists on their territory, including some who had proved useful to Pakistan (and the United States) in the past. Al Qaeda and its fellow travelers had been tolerated, but now they put Pakistan in the crosshairs of India, the United States, and the international community. Even if the Kashmiri terrorists were only loosely related to Al Qaeda, the attack on the Indian Parliament made India a victim whose right to defend itself was unquestionable. Pakistan had been dragged unwillingly into a conflict that it could ill afford. Musharraf’s promise to outlaw the culprits was sincere, but marked only the beginning of a long and difficult effort to confront the spread of violent Islamic sentiments inside Pakistan.

LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

The 2002 crisis was doubly vexing for the United States, because it interfered with two major foreign policy initiatives—the war in Afghanistan that required Pakistan’s cooperation, and the effort to build a strategic partnership with India. The standoff between two U.S. allies thrust U.S. diplomacy into the breech and illustrated that the United States would remain a vital guarantor of regional stability for the foreseeable future. The crisis alerted Washington to the extent of Pakistan’s domestic troubles, but did not weaken the Bush administration’s commitment to back General Musharraf so long as he remained faithful to the war on terror. This allegiance to Musharraf and seeming indifference to Pakistani democracy carried lessons that Washington was slow in learning.
Conclusion

Washington was forced to appreciate the limits of its influence with its new partners India and Pakistan, both of whom view the region and the world through their own national perspectives that are not always evident to American eyes. U.S. policies to shift emphasis away from longstanding Indo-Pakistani rivalry towards American priorities such as the war on terror will fail if they do not take full measure of the local politics underlying South Asian security. The United States needs specialized expertise to guide the pursuit of American interests in South Asia, and to comprehend how and why India and Pakistan sometimes construe their interests as diverging from American preferences. While welcoming closer U.S. ties, both will keep Washington at arms length, as they did during the crisis when they resisted U.S. calls for restraint. The United States is a valued partner and a vital interlocutor in times of crisis, but remains an outsider in South Asia’s regional affairs. Nevertheless, the United States has learned that South Asia is no longer a second-tier priority for U.S. security.

Final Thoughts

The concept of learning in international affairs remains elusive. It is unclear who we expect to learn the lessons of history: individuals, organizations, countries, or even the anarchic international society. It is unlikely that the 2001–2002 crisis marked a clear turning point in anyone’s thinking or caused India, Pakistan, or America to reevaluate their policies. Yet, the lessons of history are more often revealed over time, and to those who make the effort to seek knowledge from the study of past events. The 2002 crisis remains an understudied and underappreciated event that in time may join the ranks of the cold war crises involving Berlin and Taiwan that were overshadowed by the Cuban Missile Crisis. The 2002 crisis ranks even behind the 1999 Kargil crisis in the annals of South Asian nuclear brinksmanship, but like the other second-tier crises reveals much about the people and countries involved and the times they lived in. It is a coming-of-age story for nuclear deterrence in South Asia that must be understood by anyone seeking a full understanding of the evolving security dynamics of South Asia.

Notes

1. Recent scholarship on Kashmir as a catalyst for war include Peter Lavoy, Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the
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