STATE, NATIONALISM, AND ISLAMIZATION

Historical Analysis of Turkey and Pakistan

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Palgrave Studies in Religion, Politics, and Policy

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A generation ago, many social scientists regarded religion as an anachronism, whose social, economic, and political importance would inevitably wane and disappear in the face of the inexorable forces of modernity. Of course, nothing of the sort has occurred; indeed, the public role of religion is resurgent in US domestic politics, in other nations, and in the international arena. Today, religion is widely acknowledged to be a key variable in candidate nominations, platforms, and elections; it is recognized as a major influence on domestic and foreign policies. National religious movements as diverse as the Christian Right in the United States and the Taliban in Afghanistan are important factors in the internal politics of particular nations. Moreover, such transnational religious actors as Al-Qaida, Falun Gong, and the Vatican have had important effects on the politics and policies of nations around the world.

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This dissertation is dedicated to my parents and my wife Humaira. Without their constant encouragement and support, this project would have been impossible.
This book is based on my dissertation “Effect of Islam’s role in state nationalism on Islamization of government: Case studies of Turkey and Pakistan”. Therefore, I wish, first, to acknowledge my debt to Professor Jack Goldstone, the chair of my dissertation committee at the Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University. He took me under his wing in my second year and mentored me for the next four-and-a-half years. I learned a great deal as he guided me through the intricacies of comparative historical analysis while working with him as a research assistant. Dean Mark Rozell, a renowned scholar of religion and politics, brought clarity to many aspects of the complex relationship between the two. However, the scholarship is not the only topic worthy of mention about Dean Rozell. He will always be a role model for me for being very considerate and committed to his students. He was instrumental in bringing this book project to fruition. Without his support, this book would have taken many more years to see the light of the day. Professor Mandaville was the person who cultivated my interest in nationalism and Islamization. With his extensive knowledge of the politics of Muslim-majority countries, he kept me grounded and did not allow me to make any assumption that could not be supported by verifiable facts. Professor Lyons, an expert on African politics, political development and nationalism helped me make sense of the murky world of the politics of nation-building and state-building. Professor Banu Eligur, my external reader, enriched my understanding of Turkish politics and my dissertation with her perceptive advice. I also want to thank Professors Sonia Ketkar and Siona Listokin for their support and encouragement in the early part of my
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACII  Advisory Council on Islamic Ideology
AIML  All India Muslim League (Pakistan)
AKP   Justice and Development Party (Turkey)
AP    Adalet Partisi [Justice Party] (Turkey)
APS   Army Public School (Pakistan)
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
      Women (United Nations)
CHP   Republican People’s Party (Turkey)
CNE   Commission on National Education (Pakistan)
CZC   Central Zakat Committee (Pakistan)
CII   Council of Islamic Ideology
DP    Democrat Party (Turkey)
ECHR  European Court of Human Rights
EMN   Eid Milad-un-Nabi (celebration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad,
      Pakistan)
EU    European Union
GNA   Grand National Assembly (Turkey)
HDP   People’s Democratic Party
IFL   Islamic family law
IM    Istiklal Marsi (Turkish national anthem)
ITMP  Ittehad Tanzeemat Madaris Pakistan
KP    Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province
LFO   Legal Framework Order (Pakistan)
MFLO  Muslim Family Law Ordinance
MHP   Nationalist Movement Party (Turkey)
MMC   Muslim majority countries
MRA   Ministry of Religious Affairs (Pakistan)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>MSP</td>
<td>National Salvation Party (Turkey)</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan (Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCSW</td>
<td>National Commission on the Status of Women (Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North West Frontier Province (Pakistan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of Islamic Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>OYM</td>
<td>Onuncu Yi Marsi (Turkish tenth-anniversary anthem)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistan People’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBP</td>
<td>State Bank of Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Turkish Civil Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCMB</td>
<td>Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası (Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey)</td>
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Defining Islam’s role in government is one of the most pressing political issues facing the Muslim majority countries (MMCs) today. Acerbic debates relating to Islam’s relationship to laws, decrees, and policies have polarized many of these countries, making social harmony and economic growth difficult to achieve. Mass media also increasingly focus on Islamization, invariably linking it to human rights violations, religious discrimination, and terrorism. The ready explanations for the phenomenon are fundamentalism, misogyny, nativism, bigotry, or plain old hatred towards the West. This media frenzy has raised the spectre of Islamization not only in the MMCs, but also in the West. Many Westerners, despite living in countries where Muslims form a small proportion of the population, and an even a smaller proportion of the political and economic elite, are worried and ready to support anti-Shariah, anti-hijab or anti-minaret laws to thwart the imminent Islamization of their countries.

News reports often seem to imply that the level of Islamization of government is high in most MMCs and that it is increasing further. Yet, the growth and level of Islamization of government vary in the MMCs. In some MMCs, government policies and laws show a strong Islamic influence. However, in many other MMCs, secular laws—mostly adaptations of erstwhile colonial laws—prevail. At one extreme are Saudi Arabia and Iran, where the judiciary is primarily controlled by the ulema (religious scholars) and laws have to conform to the principles of Shariah. At the other extreme are secular MMCs in Central Asia, Southern Europe
or sub-Saharan Africa, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Albania, Turkmenistan, Senegal, and Burkina Faso. In these countries, religion and state are officially and constitutionally separate, and education and laws are secular. Most MMCs lie between these two extremes. In some countries, Islamization of government is limited to provisions of family law; in others, it extends to diverse areas, such as religious education, penal laws, and commercial regulations. What differentiates the latter group of countries from Iran and Saudi Arabia is that, despite substantial Islamization, the basic infrastructure of the legal system remains secular. Besides variances in the level, there are also differences in the growth of Islamization of the government. In some MMCs, Islamization of government is increasing, in others, it is declining. For example, while Malaysia recently created a Shariah index to evaluate how well its policies conform to Islamic law, Egypt and Pakistan introduced new restrictions on imams, mosques, and madrassas.

What is the primary source of this variation? A growing literature on Islamist movements and parties argues that this variation in Islamization is largely due to the differences in the popularity of these parties. Popular Islamist parties, as compared with unpopular ones, are more likely to Islamize the government themselves (after coming to power) or, as happens more often, pressurize the rulers to Islamize the government. Other scholars have countered this argument by pointing out that high-level Islamization of government is often implemented by authoritarian regimes to bolster their legitimacy in the MMCs where either Islamist parties do not exist or are not very popular. Both these arguments, individually or in combination, explain the Islamization of government in some of the MMCs, but they do not explain its variation across the Muslim world.

Due to the significance of this issue, it is critical to analyze why, in some MMCs, Islam plays a large role in government affairs while, in others, it has only a minor influence. This book contends that it is not the popularity of religious parties or the need of autocratic regimes for legitimacy but, rather, Islam’s role in an MMC’s nationalism that has the greatest influence on the Islamization of government. Two very dissimilar countries have been chosen to test this argument: Turkey, where secular nationalism is dominant, and there is a low level of Islamization of government, and Pakistan, where religious nationalism is dominant, and there is a high level of Islamization of government.

Academic literature on religious nationalism supports the view that, irrespective of specific religious tradition, the roles of religion in nationalism
and government are closely related (Rieffer 2003; Barker 2008, 68–9 and 107; Rubin 2013). Islam’s role in nationalism is frequently employed to explain Islamization of government in many countries. For example, numerous country studies of Islamization in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, or Gulf countries have linked Islamization to the nationalism of these countries. However, nationalism is often ignored when the Islamization of government is more broadly discussed, as a phenomenon happening in multiple countries. In such studies, autocratic rulers’ needs or Islamist parties’ popularity are prioritized as explanations. This inclination of down-playing religion’s role in nationalism in fostering Islamization of government is especially perplexing as, even in non-Muslim countries, religion plays a much larger role in governments of countries whose nationalism is closely linked with a particular religious tradition. For example, religious injunctions have influenced public policies in Israel, Malta, and Ireland and this influence is legitimized on the keystone of religion’s special relationship with the nation (Binder 1961; Weiss 1986; Yadgar 2010; Holoch 2011; Cohen 2012; House 2013).

THE PUZZLE: WHY THE ISLAMIZATION OF GOVERNMENT?

Sacralization of politics is a phenomenon not limited to the MMCs. Religious precepts, values, and discourse influence politics in a large number of dissimilar countries. In such countries, opinions of Popes, Ayatollahs, Swamis, or Rabbis matter and politicians can ignore them at their own peril. Emotional appeals to religion are common and policies are presented as moral imperatives. The pious are frequently warned of the vanishing of their creed, if they do not mobilize or vote in a certain way. The relegation of religion to the private sphere, as predicted by many eminent sociologists in the twentieth century, has evidently not transpired. Even in countries which either are constitutionally secular or have a large number of religiously unaffiliated ‘nones’, or both, there are regular instances of politicians passing laws or making new rules to placate and pander to the religious sentiments of the majority. Whether it is the defunding of planned parenthood and the use of administrative procedures to shut down anti-abortion clinics in the USA, or meat bans in India, religions continue to display their relevance and resilience, even in secular countries. Sacralization of politics (or Islamization) in the MMCs, however, has garnered increasing attention because of its alleged link with
terrorism. The following section delineates the gaps in understanding of the phenomenon of Islamization.

For many MMCs, independence came after more than one hundred years of bitter struggle against colonialism. People were, therefore, enthusiastic about the final cessation of external rule and gaining national sovereignty. Erwin Rosenthal (1965) argues that, after achieving independence, the national goals were “self-expression and self-fulfilment” and the place of Islam and Shariah in the laws and constitutions became a salient issue. Conservative groups considered enshrining a prominent role for religion in the government as not only beneficial, but also a sacred duty of the faithful. Many of them argued that the continuance of the Western laws meant that (Christian) colonial powers were still ruling their nation. However, these groups, despite having the sympathy of significant segments of the population, were not very successful because the leaders of most of the newly independent MMCs had no interest in Shariah. Often educated in the West, they lived lives more similar to their former colonial masters than to the majority of their countrymen; some of them were not even Muslim. Muhammad Ali Jinnah of Pakistan, Leopold Senghor of Senegal, François Tombalbaye of Chad, and Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia are some of the prominent examples of such irreligious leadership. These leaders frequently had a very low opinion of ulema (experts of Muslim tradition) and considered Shariah an obstacle to the crafting of a modern nation. Not surprisingly, under their rule the Islamization of governments was limited to few insignificant changes in laws and MMC governments remained largely secular. Ulema criticism of governmental secularism and immorality were ignored for the most part. It was only in the 1970s, in some cases decades after independence, that many MMCs took serious steps to Islamize the laws and government policies, and started to fashion a public sphere defined by religious motifs (Hibbard 2015, 297–8). The Iranian revolution, defeats in Arab–Israeli wars, disenchantment with other ideologies (Arab nationalism, Baathism, socialism, and capitalism), and the rise of rich conservative Gulf monarchies are some of the international factors cited to explain this change. However, despite these influences, the Islamization of government was often a domestic affair, and most of its motivations and repercussions were also domestic. Sinno’s (2010) statement about the use of Islam in Afghanistan may be true for many MMCs.
The strategic use of religion plays an important role in the ability of some Afghan political actors to legitimize their actions, mobilize support, undermine rivals, attract foreign aid, and control populations.

The following are some of the principal explanations given in the literature for the Islamization of the government in the MMCs:

- lack of political legitimacy
- a weak, heterogeneous state
- the presence of popular Islamist movements and parties.

There are also some essentialist explanations that hold Islam as monolithic, primitive, or state-centric, uniquely designed to impose its bigoted misogynist Shariah on Muslims and unsuspecting others. However, as these explanations are becoming rarer in academic literature and have been appropriately critiqued, they are not being discussed here.

**Lack of Political Legitimacy**

In October 2013, several Saudi women buckled up and drove their cars themselves, instead of seeking the help of their male relatives or calling a cab. Some of them were arrested and detained, as women are not issued driving licences in Saudi Arabia. On these occasions, the Saudi regime was severely criticized not only by the Western media, but also by commentators in many other MMCs. While the Saudi government cited religious reasons for the continuation of their anachronistic policy, most experts blamed Saudi royals’ long-standing strategy of seeking political legitimacy through the Islamization of government. Using Islam as a tool to gain political legitimacy is, however, not something peculiar to the Saudi monarchy. Numerous other autocratic regimes, lacking electoral legitimacy, have also been guilty of the instrumentalization of Islam. Using the examples of the Righteous Caliphate (considered by most Sunni Muslims as the golden age) or Shiite Imams (considered by most Shiite Muslims to be the only ones fit to rule), they claim that it is the prerogative of the righteous, who implement Shariah, to rule. Examples of this phenomenon are numerous. In Sudan, General Ibrahim Abbud and, later, General Jaafar Numayri used Islam to gain legitimacy (Fluehr-Lobban 1991; 71–89). Similarly, in Bangladesh, General Zia-ur-Rahman and
General Ershad introduced Islamization policies to legitimize their military takeovers and to prolong their rule (Raiz 2010). Colonel Qaddafi introduced Shariah to consolidate his power in the early 1970s and, in Iraq, Saddam Hussain, a secular Baathist, put restrictions on alcohol and made religious education mandatory after his defeat in the ‘mother of all battles’ (First Gulf War, 1990–91) to shore up his fast diminishing legitimacy (Harris 1986; Sadi 2011, 27–8).

In the same way as the autocrats, democratic leaders in the MMCs have also Islamized governments to buttress their rule. Electoral victories provided them legitimacy but the democratic experiment was new, institutions were weak, poverty widespread, bureaucracy corrupt, and difficulties immense. Consequently, many democratic leaders failed to fulfil their promises of social justice and economic development, weakening support for their rule. The religious right used this disillusionment to their advantage and criticized democratic leaders for their Westernization, immoral practices, and lack of attachment to Islam. Many democratic leaders then resorted to the Islamization of government to deflect criticism. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, who was not a practising Muslim, introduced many Islamization policies to strengthen his government and to weaken public support for the religious right opposition (Saigol 1995, 470–1). In Malaysia, too, Dr Mahathir Mohamad recruited Anwar Ibrahim (a popular Islamist activist and the leader of the Islamic Youth League) for the ruling party United Malays National Organisation and increased the Islamization of government. He was successful in scuttling challenges from his own party rivals and in thwarting the progress of the principal opposition party, the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Means 2009). More recently, in Iraq, former Prime Minister Malaki also tried to use Islamization to prolong his rule (Mamouri 2013).

**Weak, Heterogeneous State**

Seyyed Vali Nasr (2001), one of the most erudite scholars of political Islam, contended that the Islamization of government had also been used as a strategy for consolidating a weak state. Most post-colonial states had arbitrarily drawn borders that cut across linguistic, ethnic, religious and sectarian communities. Creating a unified state and a strong nation identity out of diverse communities, which were cobbled together solely to serve colonial interests, was not an easy job (Ezrow and Frantz 2013, 56–9). Therefore, post-independence leaders had to spend considerable
time, energy, and money on the twin tasks of state- and nation-building. In at least some MMCs, according to Nasr, centrifugal forces, threatening the weak post-colonial state, were countered by using Islam as a unifying element. Presenting Pakistan and Malaysia as examples, Nasr demonstrated how rulers of these heterogeneous colonial states employed Islamization to counter separatists and to keep their states united in the 1980s and beyond.

**Presence of Popular Islamist Movements and Parties**

Islamist parties and movements (hereafter referred to as “Islamist parties”) contributed to the Islamization of the government either directly or indirectly. A few Islamist parties gained power and introduced Shariah-based laws themselves. These Islamist parties had been proponents of the Islamization of government long before they came to power. Islamization was not a side-dish for them; it was the main course. It was the central principle on which the party platform was built. The leaders of these parties pledged that they would Islamize the government once they achieved power and they fulfilled their promises. Ayatollah Khomeini vowed to increase Islam’s role in government and rejected the Westoxification (Gharbzadegi), toxic influences of the Western culture that were threatening Islam and the local Persian culture. After the revolution, he delivered on his promises with the Islamization of laws and policies. More recently, former Egyptian President Morsi also increased Islamization of the government in accordance with decades of promises by the Muslim Brotherhood movement and the manifesto of his Freedom and Justice Party (FJP 2011).

More often, however, popular Islamist parties help increase the Islamization of government indirectly, not by acquiring power but by threatening to acquire power. To prevent these parties from becoming more popular and taking control of the state, rulers tried to steal their thunder and Islamized the government themselves. President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, President Chadli Benjedid of Algeria, and President Abdullah Saleh of Yemen all increased Islamization of government due to the threat of Islamist parties.

The foregoing reasons, however, fall short of giving a convincing explanation for the Islamization of government. A lack of legitimacy does not always lead to the Islamization of government. Most of the MMCs have been ruled by authoritarian regimes since independence, but the Islamization of government has been a priority in only a few. Some countries
that have been under dictatorship for decades have a low level of Islamization of government, while others that have been democratic (albeit partially) have a higher level of Islamization of government. For instance, Kazakhstan has been led by authoritarian President Nursultan Nazarbayev since independence in 1991. During the last quarter of a century, there have been elections but none of them was considered free and fair. In April 2015, Nazarbayev was elected for a fifth term in office with more than 90 per cent of the votes. However, despite his authoritarianism, Nazarbayev has never tried to Islamize the government. In fact, he has cracked down on Islamists (Radio Free Europe 2015a; Rickleton 2015). The case of Uzbekistan is similar; former President Karimov suppressed Islamists and ruled more ruthlessly than Nazarbayev for more than two decades (Dyomkin 2014; Radio Free Europe 2015b). Tunisia also did not become Islamized even after more than half a century of dictatorship under Presidents Bourguiba and Ben Ali. There is clearly less Islamization of the government in these countries than in Malaysia, a longstanding democracy, and in Pakistan, which has been an intermittent democracy since the late 1940s.

The presence of strong Islamist parties in the MMCs increases the probability of the Islamization of government, but such presence is not a necessary or sufficient condition. Examples of sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf demonstrate that the Islamization of government does not require popular Islamist parties. Conversely, popular Islamist parties in an MMC do not necessarily mean a high level of Islamization of government. Despite having no Islamist parties, governments in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman are more Islamized than the governments of Egypt and Jordan, which have popular Islamist parties. As Oliver Roy explains, regimes deal with Islamist parties in a variety of ways, depending on how the regimes perceive they can best control Islam, and the result is not always Islamization (or re-Islamization as Roy calls it):

Either moderate Islamist parties are integrated into the political scene without any particular concessions being made to them (Jordan, Kuwait, Turkey), or integration is accompanied by a state-ordered re-Islamization (Pakistan, Sudan, Egypt), or else ideological concessions are made toward re-Islamization while Islamist political participation is blocked (the Maghreb), or, finally, no concessions are made, the contradiction being too great between the founding values of the state and Islamism (secularism for Iraq and Syria, Qaddafi’s philosophy for Libya). (Volk 1994, 124–6)
Finally, elite usage of the Islamization of government as a way to consolidate a weak, heterogeneous state is also rare. Many highly heterogeneous MMCs, having a long history of conflicts, such as Chad and Sierra Leone, have a low level of Islamization of government. Conversely, some MMCs with low ethnic diversity, such as Saudi Arabia, have a high level of Islamization of government. It is particularly interesting and enlightening to compare three neighbouring MMCs in South-east Asia as they demonstrate an inverse relationship between heterogeneity and Islamization of government, rather than a positive relationship. According to Nasr (2001), the Malaysian government was Islamized to strengthen a weak, heterogeneous state. However, Indonesia, a vastly more heterogeneous and weak state at the time of its inception, was not Islamized. Meanwhile, Brunei, a tiny nation much less heterogeneous than Malaysia and Indonesia, became the most Islamized of the three, when it adopted Shariah as law in 2014 (Ozanick 2015).

Besides these reasons, geographical location also cannot explain the high Islamization of government. Although most of the MMCs with a high level of Islamization of government are in the Middle East, many others are not: Pakistan is in South Asia, Libya in North Africa, Afghanistan in Central Asia, and Mauritania in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the Islamization of government does not seem to be linked with per capita income as a high level of Islamization in government is found in countries with low per capita income (such as Afghanistan and Mauritania), medium per capita income (such as Iran), and very high per capita income (such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia).

What, then, is primarily responsible for the Islamization of governments in the MMCs? Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are considered the three most Islamized governments in the world (ARDA 2015). Studying them, one could not help but notice the prominent role of Islam in their nationalisms. All three have been called religious nationalist states and scholars have linked the Islamization of their governments to Islam’s role in their nationalisms. However, this causal link of Islam’s role in nationalism and the Islamization of government has not been pursued when the focus is on Islamization of government in multiple countries. This book intends to fill the gap. It will study two very dissimilar cases, Turkey and Pakistan, and demonstrate that Islam’s role in nationalism is one of the key causes of the Islamization of government in both these states.
STATE NATIONALISM

The story of nationalism mirrors history and modern history mirrors the story of nationalism; since about the mid-nineteenth century no place in the world remained untouched by its impact. (Harris 2009, 1)

For more than two centuries, nationalism has been one of the most powerful forces, if not the most powerful force, in the international arena. There have been debates about how or when nationalism originated, but few can deny its significance. It is argued that nationalism is powerful because people are instilled with nationalist ideology from their childhood. Not surprisingly, people internalize nationalism and consider it something natural and eternal. Education and media are two vital agents of its socialization but, as Michael Billig (1995) has explained, there are hundreds of unnoticed routine practices that reinforce nationalism. An outsider may notice these small things, but local people do not. Colour a piece of cloth one way and it becomes something to die for; colour it another way and it becomes a symbol of revulsion, deceit, and intense hatred.

In the preceding discussion, nationalism has been used in a singular form. This could give rise to the idea that each country has a unique nationalism and that this book will analyze two unique ideals, Turkish and Pakistani nationalism. Nothing can be further from the truth. There is no unique Pakistani or Turkish nationalism or, for that matter, unique French or Japanese nationalism. Every state has multiple versions of nationalism and these versions contest each other for acceptance and prominence. It is, therefore, necessary to clarify that this book employs a constructivist approach to explore state nationalisms in Turkey and Pakistan—that is, the idea of the nation as constructed and promoted by the state, and displayed in state symbols and official representations of state action and identity—and the varying role of Islam in this state-produced and presented version of nationalism.

State nationalism is the nationalism propagated by the state (or the state decision-makers) to promote a singular unified national identity. This particular version of nationalism varies over time and is always contested. It is usually presented in contrast to the popular and cultural nationalisms in which the masses believe. State nationalism is sometimes defined as elite nationalism and is explained as the nationalism of groups “politically or administratively powerful, being rich or propertied, having a title or high
of social rank, being well-educated, being a star, and so forth” and popular nationalism is the nationalism of the non-elite (Whitmeyer 2002). However, while emphasizing the distinction, it must be acknowledged that state nationalism is constantly influenced by popular nationalism(s) and it is not something “out there”, completely immune and separate.

However, as the state is not a monolithic entity, prioritizing state nationalism entails answering the secondary question: Which state nationalism? Decision-makers and elites do not always agree on the type of nationalism the state should promote. For example, the political and military elites of Turkey and Pakistan have rarely agreed on what should be promoted as Turkish and Pakistani nationalism. The contestation within the state elite, as well as pressure from popular nationalism(s), means state nationalism is not fixed or static. Figuring out state nationalism—or Islam’s role in state nationalism—is, therefore, not easy. To deal with this issue, in this book Islam’s role in state nationalism is assessed by focusing on the presence of Islamic themes in the widely accepted symbols of state nationalism, such as anthems, constitutions, flags, and images on the national currency.¹ The chapter will discuss these indicators of state nationalism later.

**Religion and State Nationalism**

The irrational emotional dimension and intrinsic divisiveness of nationalism frequently give rise to an uneasiness about it. However, misgivings about nationalism are nothing compared with the intense dislike that is evoked by the mention of religious state nationalism. A mix of religion and nationalism is considered highly dangerous and explosive (Juergensmeyer 1993).

It is difficult to define the relationship between majority religions and state nationalisms as they have been bitter rivals as well as close friends, depending on the context. Two of the early nations, France and Great Britain, exemplify these contrasting trends. Catholicism, the majority religion in France, historically has had a difficult relationship with French state nationalism, due to French revolutionary ideals, conflicts with the Pope, and wars with other major Catholic monarchies (Spain and Austria). In contrast, Anglican Christianity, the dominant religion in Great Britain, was a key constituent of British state nationalism.

Rogers Brubaker, Mark Juergensmeyer, Philip Barker, and Barbara-Ann Rieffer have made notable contributions regarding the relationship
between religion and nationalism, albeit without distinguishing between state and popular nationalism. Brubaker (2012) proposes four ways to analyze the coupling of religion and nationalism that can also be considered four types of relationships between religion and nationalism. In the first case, religion and nationalism contest each other. Each tries to become the primary identity of the nation, to the exclusion of the other. Nationalism becomes the new “religion” that is trying to replace the old one. In the second type, religion explains certain aspects of nationalism. Usually, these aspects are linked with the origin and early development of the nation. This type of relationship is quite common and religion is an implicit part of nationalism of a large number of countries. In the third type, religion contributes to nationalism. It is a visible part of the national identity and certain national myths and symbols are also based on religion. This type of relationship is also common. Finally, Brubaker defines a robust and intimate relationship between religion and nationalism. In this type, nationalism is primarily based on the majority religion and it is difficult to separate the two. As William Safran (2005, 1) implies, in such cases, “state was, more often than not, a secular manifestation of the dominant faith”.

Barker (2008) argued that religious boundaries play a pivotal role in blending religious and national identity. Giving examples from “secular” Europe, he explains that religious and confessional boundaries and a threat to national existence have helped the recognition of “other” in religious terms and made religion a key constitutive element of the nationalisms of Poland, Greece, and Ireland. In contrast, Juergensmeyer (1993, 2008) prioritizes international developments such as the fall of the communism, disenchantment with capitalism, globalization, and the resulting ideological vacuum for making religious metaphors and symbolism part of nationalism.

Citing the writings of Gellner, Anderson, and Hobsbawm, Rieffer (2003) claimed that, although religion contributed significantly to the Western European nationalisms, religion’s contribution is diluted by presenting it as part of the national culture. She contended that religious nationalism often results in religion’s precepts becoming “institutionalized in laws and procedures governing the nation.” In the context of MMCs, this institutionalization of religion’s precepts in laws and procedures governing the nation can be called the Islamization of government. Hence, her research supports the idea advanced in this book that the increased role of Islam in nationalism would lead to the increased Islamization of government.
Popular scholarship on Islam and state nationalism after 1945 can be divided into two periods; the dividing point being the 1970s. Before the 1970s, as discussed above, the leadership of most MMCs was irreligious. Islam was downplayed and effort was made to put emphasis on economic development and secular nationalism. Islam was considered a thing of past, part of the medieval, pre-industrial age, related to the defunct empires. However, being anachronistic was not always a problem as, in many MMCs, myths of an even more distant pre-Islamic past were created and promoted to present Islam (and Arabs in non-Arab countries) as a corrupting influence that deviated the “nation” from its true path.

The erstwhile MMC leadership wanted to create modern, unified, powerful, and industrial states, based on the Western model. Prioritizing Islam went against both promoting national uniqueness and unity, two essential ingredients for strong nationalism. Islam was not unique to any MMC as it was the majority religion of dozens of countries spread over three continents. Islam also could not promote unity, as most of the MMCs had significant non-Muslim populations, making emphasis on Islam divisive. Therefore, the national elite emphasized non-religious foundations of national identity to be more inclusive and to create more compact nation-states. They focused on bonds that were ethnolinguistic (for example, in Turkey), or dynastic (for instance, in Morocco, Jordan, and Oman), or ideological (such as in Syria, South Yemen, and Iraq), or territorial, or historical (such as Yemen and Lebanon), and downplayed Islam.

Not surprisingly, in this political milieu, Islam appeared weak and transient, and many scholars thought that it had lost its battle against the more powerful force of (secular) nationalism. Sylvia Haim (1955) described (secular) nationalism as the most powerful trend in modern Muslim Arab political thought; Nikki Keddie (1969, 17) suggested that popular loyalty in the Muslim world has transferred to the modern nation; and Rosenthal (1965, xii) witnessed “a vulnerable Islam gradually giving way before a secular nationalism”.

The 1970s saw a change in the environment both inside and outside the MMCs. At the global level, the power of the West, primarily the USA, declined due to the Vietnam War and the end of post-World War II economic expansion. It could not support as many repressive “modernizing” regimes in the MMCs as it did in the 1950s and 1960s. The Soviet Union, facing economic decline and internal problems, was also not aggressively vying for global leadership or communist ascendancy in the Muslim world. Furthermore, the two Arab–Israeli wars
made Muslim populations more aware of the West’s role in propping up Israel. Previoulsy, being aligned with the West was considered a source of strength at the popular level but, after the 1970s, it was a decision that had to be explained and rationalized. This was also the time of the rise of oil-rich religiously conservative monarchies that were ready to offer thousands of employment opportunities and millions of dollars in aid to other MMCs. To benefit from these changes, governments in many MMCs, some of which were still led by irreligious elites, decided to instrumentalize Islam. Islam’s role in state nationalism was highlighted and Shariah became the source of constitutions and laws (Volk 1994, 26). Media, symbols, and education were also used to propagate Islam, and to link Islam with the state and the government, as described by Gregory Starrett in *Putting Islam to Work* (1998). These governmental activities increased Islam’s role in nationalism. Unlike previously, nationalism was no longer substituting or downplaying Islam but, rather, accommodating it.

After 9/11, as Islam came under the global spotlight, Islam’s role in the state nationalisms of the MMCs was exaggerated in a sector of media and academia. In contrast to the 1960s, it was argued that secular elements of state nationalism were weak and becoming weaker by the day as compared to Islamism or religious nationalism. The “clash of civilizations” narrative was employed to de-emphasize and to deny not only the potency of secular elements of state nationalisms, but also the nation-state itself. The spectre of Islam, fundamentalism, or Islamism was seen descending on the MMCs (Tibi 2002).

For a brief period, the Arab Spring (2010–11) undermined this narrative as, at best, Islam and Islamists played a limited role in these uprisings. However, when Islamist parties won elections in Egypt and Tunisia, references to the “Islamist threat” came back and some analysts claimed that the post-Arab Spring is a period of Islamists’ ascendancy and that prerogatives of (secular state) nationalism were shrinking (Krauthammer 2012; Rubin 2012). Some of these writings have obviously been influenced by the Islamists’ regular denunciation of nationalism. Two of the leading ideologues of modern Islamist movements, Maududi and Sayyid Qutb, pleaded with Muslims to shun nationalism as it had destroyed the unity of the Muslim Ummah by promoting loyalty to land, language, or ethnicity (Nasr 1995; Toth 2013). Many Muslim terrorist movements—most famously Al-Qaida and Daesh (Islamic State) —also reject secular nationalism. But is Islam’s role in
state nationalism increasing in the MMCs after 9/11? Researchers have not been able to answer this question conclusively, one way or the other, for the whole Muslim world, as there are fifty MMCs, each with a unique history and a distinct culture. As discussed earlier, in some MMCs Islam’s role in state nationalism is surging, but in others it is declining. A definitive answer, as in the case of religion’s role in the nationalisms of Christian, Hindu, or Buddhist-majority countries, is only possible at the individual country level.

A definitive answer about Islam’s role in state nationalism in a particular MMC, however, would only be true for the present period. Islam’s role in state nationalism, as with state nationalism itself, is constantly evolving. The contrasting relationships between religion and (state) nationalism, as defined by Brubaker (2012), can be found in the same country at various points in its history. In Iran, for example, secular ethnolinguistic nationalism reigned supreme in the 1930s and 1940s, and state nationalism had an antagonistic relationship with Islam. During the 1960s and 1970s, the last Shah of Iran accepted an implicit role of Islam in state nationalism. Although anti-clericalism was still dominant, the antagonistic relationship with Islam was toned down. Since the 1980s, however, Iran has been a country where national and religious identities are inseparable. Similarly, early Bangladeshi state nationalism emphasized ethnolinguistic ties but later, in the 1980s and 1990s, Islam became a significant part of Bangladeshi state nationalism. Recently, the tables have turned again, and Islam’s role in Bangladeshi state nationalism is decreasing, as the government is promoting Bengali (ethnolinguistic) nationalism.

**Islamization of Government**

Islamization, like nationalism, is not an easy concept to define. Scholars have used Islamization, Arabization, Muslimization, Shariatization, and, more recently, Talibanization interchangeably (Korotayev 2000; Singh 2007; Lindley-Highfield 2008; Shaikh 2008). Add to this the secondary concepts of re-Islamization, de-Islamization, and creeping Islamization, and the difficulty in untangling the conceptual muddle increases.

Following are some of the definitions of Islamization in the academic literature, amply demonstrating the difficulty in defining the concept.
Julian Lee acknowledges the elusiveness of the concept and links Islamization with “conservative, orthodox Islam”:

The perceived essence of any religious or otherwise ideological movement is seldom if ever without significant variation and contest among those who identify with it. By our referring to them as Islamists . . . seem to be ascribed with the default or most essential figuration of what Islam is. But there is no entirely satisfactory way out of this quandary . . . “Islamization” refers in this book then to the process of instilling and creating that which is in ostensible accord with orthodox conservative Islam (Lee 2010, 19).

Michael Buehler (2016, 1) links Islamization to the adoption of Shariah. Salim, in the following definition, also links Islamization with Shariah and Islamic doctrines. However, to use the definitions of Lee, Buehler, and Salim, one still has to define conservative, orthodox Islam, Islamic doctrines and Shariah, which is not an easy task:

A process of certain measures and campaigns, regardless of the identity of the advocates and the motives behind the actions, that call for the establishment of what are regarded as Islamic doctrines in Muslim legal, political, and social systems . . . It is clear that the proponents of the formal implementation of shari’a consider shari’a the foundation of Islamization . . . In sum, the assumption of the proponents of shari’a-based reform is that the more shari’a rules are incorporated into the state legal system, the deeper the Islamization of a country. Under this scheme, moves toward Islamization ultimately lead to attempts at founding an Islamic state. (Salim 2008, 45)

Farzana Shaikh (2008) distinguishes between Islamization and Shariatization. She opines that both “share an uncompromising emphasis on the enforcement of Islamic law at the expense of the broader and vaguer commitment to the ethical principles of Islam”. However, for her, leaders and supporters of Islamization and Shariatization are dissimilar; Islamization’s major promoters are statist modernizing groups, while Shariatization’s key sponsors are non-Westernized groups, such as clerics. Shaikh’s distinctions are, however, difficult to accept, as Islamization of government is always undertaken with the help of clerics and Shariatization cannot be achieved without the help of the state.

It is clear from the above discussion that there is no agreement on what comprises the Islamization of government, except that there is a linkage
between Islam, Shariah, and the government. Due to the wide variety of ways in which Islam and Shariah are interpreted, there can be, and are, many contending views of the Islamization of government.

**OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES**

As with many other social science concepts, it is difficult to operationalize state nationalism and the Islamization of government. Finding indicators that can simultaneously give valid, reliable, and precise measurements of these concepts is almost impossible. Researchers, however, have not been daunted by the challenging situation and have used a wide variety of indicators to measure these concepts. As elites decide and promote state nationalism, it has been measured either directly, by asking the state elite (using interviews or surveys), or indirectly, by analyzing their speeches, books, and actions. State nationalism has also been estimated using national symbols, such as flags or anthems. Similarly, the Islamization of government has been measured using a multiplicity of indicators. Some scholars have examined laws, others have studied constitutions, and yet others have conducted public opinion surveys, ignoring the distinction between the Islamization of government and societal Islamization.

**Measuring Islam’s Role in State Nationalism**

Measuring religion’s role in state nationalism is particularly difficult. Nationalist struggles bring together a broad spectrum of ideas and groups. However, there is usually a specific culture, religion, language, ethnicity, or a blend that is prioritized, highlighted, and mentioned so frequently that it becomes inscribed on the nation’s memory. Even primordialists, who claim nations are ancient, agree that nationalists choose a few out of tens—if not hundreds—of battles, martyrs, events, folktales, and myths to “awaken” the nation.

Notwithstanding the difficulty, this book will make an effort to devise criteria on the basis of which a reasonably fair assessment can be made and the state nationalisms of Turkey and Pakistan can be analyzed. Three criteria have been selected to assess Islam’s role in state nationalism: the featuring of Islam in general clauses of the constitution that describe the nation; the presence of Islam-inspired national mottos, emblems, anthems, and flags that the state uses to identify Islam with the nation; and Islamic themes on banknotes, which are the most common everyday
symbols of the state that reach the hands of the people. As the focus here is on Islam’s role in state nationalism, only those constitutional clauses, national symbols, and banknote images that demonstrate an increase or decrease in Islam’s role will be identified and studied.

Constitutions are windows to the national identity and state nationalism. More than mere lists of legal principles, they inform us about national narratives and beliefs. The constitution embodies the hopes and aspirations of the nation. Therefore, the Turkish and Pakistani constitutions are good proxies for estimating Islam’s role in state nationalism. Clauses relating to religion or secularism will be identified, and changes in their number and content will be explored.

The iconography of banknotes has recently been recognized as an instrument used by states to promote state nationalism. A national currency is intimately linked with the nation as it is ubiquitous in the nation and difficult to use outside national territory. The images chosen for banknotes are useful indicators of the character of state nationalism, as they have been issued regularly by the state throughout the history of both countries (more than 60 unique images on Turkish banknotes and around 40 unique images on Pakistani banknotes), allowing one to follow the changes in the representation of the nation on state instruments in minute detail.

National symbols—flags, emblems, national holidays, and so on—are critical markers of national identity. They evoke deep emotions, incite passions, identify nations, and make them visible to their nationals as well as to foreigners. Perhaps the most obvious example of national symbols revealing the link between state nationalism and religion are national flags. Scores of national flags have either a cross or a crescent and star on them, signifying a country’s link to Christianity or Islam, respectively. Therefore, national symbols are a good way to estimate Islam’s changing role in the state nationalism of Turkey and Pakistan. As in the case of other indicators, only national symbols that introduce or reduce religious content will be examined.

*Measuring the Islamization of Government*

Measuring the Islamization of government is also difficult as scholars cannot, as discussed, agree on how to define it. Measuring the Islamization of government is part of the broader debate on how to approximate the role of religion in the government in all countries. Previously, scholars used to measure religion’s role in state affairs solely by analyzing constitutional provisions and laws, embodying elements of the religious precepts and
practice. However, in the last two decades research has expanded to include many diverse criteria. While most of the work on this subject has comprised qualitative case studies, there have been efforts to quantify and standardize this estimation. The Religion and State Project, undertaken by the Bar Ilan University, Israel, and led by Jonathan Fox, is the most extensive and most successful of these attempts (ARDA 2015). Unfortunately, this data on distinct aspects of the state–religion relationship is not available prior to the late 1990s. As this book intends to investigate the Islamization of government (or the lack thereof) in Turkish and Pakistani republics since their formation (1923 and 1947 respectively), this data cannot be used.

Islamization of government in this study is, therefore, estimated using the following three indicators: the clauses in the laws relating to family and personal status that are based on Islamic law (Shariah), the presence and functions of the ministry of religious affairs, and the government’s support for private and public religious education. These indicators have been used by various scholars to measure religion’s role in the government or the Islamization of government.4

Family law consists of the rules related to marriage, divorce, inheritance, custody, and so on. Family law is key to gauging the extent of Islamization of the government as family is at the centre of Muslim culture. Moreover, family law was the only part of the existing laws that was left untouched by most European colonial powers, after they conquered the MMCs. It thus became a symbol of Muslim identity and is still considered as such by many. The extent to which the government patterns family law on secular or Western principles, or on traditional Muslim practices, can, therefore, be considered a crucial indicator of Islamization of the government.

Governmental institutions (ministries, departments, or bureaus) dealing specifically with religious practice are usually established to regulate religion(s) or to give preference to one or more religions. The presence of a Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA) demonstrates the significance government attaches to religion. This significance may be due to the government considering religion as an ally or as a competitor. An analysis of the MRA’s presence and its functions can thus be employed to determine government’s relationship with the majority religion (Islam), as well as the level of Islamization of government.

It is not uncommon to find religious education in public schools or government support for religious schools, but there are large variations across countries. Some governments establish and operate religious schools, while others only send an annual cheque. A high level of
Islamization is usually associated with large and regular support to the private religious schools and long hours of religious education in public schools; for instance, in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Government support for religious education in both public and private schools is, therefore, a good proxy for the Islamization of government.

**Islam’s Role in Turkish and Pakistani State Nationalism**

Before moving on to research design and methodology, it is worthwhile taking a look at the dominant narratives that explain Islam’s role in Turkish and Pakistani state nationalism. These narratives are not grounded on a rigorous analysis of the past, but paint and promote a picture of the past that strengthens a particular view, usually the view endorsed by the state. In developing these narratives, as Fatma Gocek (2006, 85–103) has observed, events are selectively highlighted or ignored depending on their perceived usefulness for strengthening the narrative.

There are two dominant historical narratives in the literature about Turkish state nationalism. In the first type, Turkish state nationalism is considered largely secular and always in contention with Muslim nationalism or Islamism (Lewis 1961; Berkes 1964). The origins of this narrative can be traced back to the nineteenth century. It gradually gained ascendancy and, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, it became the official state narrative. Some scholars have explained this dichotomous narrative in terms of centre–periphery or state–society conflict in Turkey, with the centre (state) representing secular state nationalism and the periphery (society) representing Muslim nationalism or Islamism (Mardin 1973; Akcam 2004, 2). This narrative is based on an earlier trend in scholarship that “juxtaposed Muslim societies against secular states as mutually exclusive or inherently antagonistic categories, albeit from different perspectives” (Turam 2012, 3). The gradual rise of the Refah Party and the current dominance of the Justice and Development Party (the AKP) are thus presented as the defeat of Turkish state nationalism.

In the other narrative, which has become more popular since the 1970s, it is argued that Islam has always been a vital constituent of Turkish state nationalism. The Greek–Turkish population exchange, varlik vergisi tax, immigration policies giving preference to Muslims, mistrust of the (Christian) West, and the discrimination against non-Muslims in Turkey are presented as evidence of what Ilker Ayturk calls the “harmony thesis” (Gurbey 2012, 42–3, Ayturk 2014). It is contended
that even at the time of high Kemalism and aggressive secularism in the late 1920s and 1930s, when the Turkish state promoted ethnolinguistic nationalism and ostensibly rejected religion, Islam was a key component of Turkish state nationalism (Cagaptay 2006, 156–7). According to this narrative, Islam has been, and always will be, an important part of Turkish state nationalism.

Both these narratives are based on the assumption that Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism coalesced into permanence around the time of formation of modern Turkey. In the first narrative, Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism is negligible and will always remain so. There is an antagonistic relationship between the two for almost a century and this relationship will continue in future. In the second narrative, Islam’s contribution to Turkish state nationalism has always been significant and will continue to be so in the future.

In this book, however, it is contended that Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism has been mutable, not static or fixed. It had a high profile during the war of independence followed by much lower prominence in the 1930s; since the 1950s, it has been slowly increasing. This dynamic view of Islam’s role better explains the variations in Turkish state nationalism since independence than assuming that Turkish state nationalism was always secular or always had a strong religious component.

Another argument that is gaining traction acknowledges Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism but claims that there are many Islams, not just one, and that the Turkish state, in each era, chose an Islam that it perceived as most suitable for achieving its objectives. The early Turkish state chose a modernist and rational Islam that also had an ethnic component. In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the ethnic component was de-emphasized and rationalism was toned down; since the 1980s, it has chosen a conservative, neo-liberal Islam. Islam was thus not discarded or disestablished in any era, but established in a unique form in each era of Turkish history, as Davison (2003) explains the events of the 1920s:

The separation of religion from its previous position of influence constituted a shift in Islam’s institutional and legitimation position, not its formal, full elimination. How to explain, for example, the new state religious establishment, the state religious educational interest, the marking of religious identity on state identity cards, and the like? Islam was not disestablished; it was differently established.
Laiklik (laicism and secularism, as practiced in early Republican Turkey), according to this argument, was thus not anti-Islam, but a different version of Islam than what had been in the ascendant during the Ottoman Empire (Davison 1998, 154). Westernized young Turks were not against Islam; they were against obstructionist and medieval (Arabic) versions of Islam. They wanted to rediscover “true” or Turkish Islam that was rational and compatible with modernity (Azak 2010, 5–6).

This argument has an element of truth, as Ataturk and other Turkish leaders in many of their statements praised Islam and claimed that they were only against those using a false version of Islam, based on Arab and Ottoman culture, to halt progress. For example, Ataturk said in 1923:

Our religion is a most reasonable and most natural religion, and it is precisely for this reason that it has been the last religion. In order for a religion to be natural, it should conform to reason, technology, science, and logic. Our religion is totally compatible with these. (Azak 2010, 14)

The difficulty a researcher confronts after accepting this narrative is that it becomes extremely difficult to ascertain whether the adoption of some symbol (or a constitutional clause) increases or decreases Islam’s role in state nationalism. For example, did removing all Islamic references from the Turkish Constitution in 1928 lead to an increase (or decrease) in Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism? On the basis of traditional interpretations of Islam, Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism was decreased. However, a believer in a modernist interpretation of Islam can argue, as many did, that “true Islam” was revived and its role increased in Turkish nationalism, as previously a “false Islam”, which was mixed with politics, had been in the ascendant.

In the case of Pakistan, too, there are two dominant narratives. However, unlike the Turkish narratives, the difference between the Pakistani narratives is not about the presence or absence of Islam’s role in state nationalism. The major difference between the two narratives is whether Islam’s role in state nationalism has always been dominant, or whether it has only become dominant since the late 1970s. In the first narrative, Islam is represented as the key component of Pakistani state nationalism and it is stressed that Jinnah wanted to establish an Islamic state, although opinions differ on whether the objective was a modern democratic or a traditional Islamic state (Ali 1967; Zaman 1985; Mujahid 1999). According to this narrative, since Pakistan was created on the
premise of Muslim nationalism, denying or lessening Islam’s role in Pakistani state nationalism means denying Pakistani nationalism. General Zia presented this view in 1981:

Take out the Judaism from Israel and it will fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse. (Tharoor 2014)

Nasim Jawed (2010, 15) calls proponents of this narrative “Islamic nationalists”:

To many Islamic nationalists it was not a matter of choice for the Pakistanis whether to build their nationhood on the foundation of Islam or on a common and truly secular cultural heritage: the latter in their view, simply did not exist.

When these Islamic nationalists are confronted with evidence that Jinnah did not want to make Pakistan an Islamic state, they respond that it is immaterial whether Jinnah or other leaders of Pakistan’s independence struggle were secularists—using religion as a tool of mobilization or as a ploy—as most of the people voted for an Islamic state when they voted for Pakistan in the 1946 elections. Some even go further and contend that it is the responsibility of Muslims, who are sovereign over a piece of land, to establish Shariah (Nadeem 2001, 13). Ian Talbot (2005, 152–3) has aptly described this narrative as being “the two nation theory of Pakistani nationalism dealt in primordial certitudes” that are fixed and monolithic. According to this narrative, most of the difficulties Pakistan is facing today, and has faced since independence, are due to the fact that the Pakistani elite has not embraced the paramount role of Islam in Pakistan and has often worked to reduce it. Although proponents of this narrative accept that the elite is now more accepting of Islam’s role than they were in the 1950s and 1960s, they do not think that this is enough.

Many experts also accept this narrative and acknowledge Islam’s principal role in Pakistani state nationalism. However, for them, this defining role constitutes a serious handicap. Sectarianism, terrorism, the separation of East Pakistan, and the rise of the Taliban are all linked to Islam’s dominant role in Pakistan’s state nationalism. Not surprisingly, they advocate a reduction in Islam’s role and argue that even Jinnah was only using Islam and that an Islamic Pakistan was not his aim. 


In the other narrative, the critical significance of Islam for the creation of Pakistan is acknowledged but its dominance and current (usually deemed pernicious) manifestation is considered to be the result of the genesis of the mullah–military alliance in the 1970s. Many Pakistani scholars, and others, who subscribe to this narrative, reminisce about the halcyon period when General Ayub Khan and, later, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto ruled Pakistan and Islam’s role in state nationalism was less dominant. The contrast is made between Jinnah’s Pakistan, which was tolerant, open, and liberal, and Zia’s Pakistan, which is dogmatic, illiberal and xenophobic.

An example of this narrative is the following passage:

So, how do we contend with the legacy of Gen Zia ul Haq? Why was it possible for a villainous military dictator to subvert the very spirit of the nation and sow the seeds of religious militancy in a country founded by Mohammad Ali Jinnah? We can pose that question once again: is this Jinnah’s Pakistan or is it Zia’s? (Salahuddin 2010)

Similarly, Rasul B. Rais, one of the leading political scientists in Pakistan, writes in his article titled “Is this Jinnah’s Pakistan?”:

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the father of our nation, must be turning in his grave if angels were to carry the news and pictures of today’s Pakistan to him—targeted killings of Shias, persecution of Christians and public conversion of Hindus on live media. This is not the Pakistan he or other founders powered by a dream of an independent country envisioned. Were they around today, they would have launched another independent movement—this time, to liberate the country from three powerful influences that have taken the form of institutions and have, in many ways, established their control over the soul of the country. They are the mullahs, the military and the feudal elites. (Rais 2012)

In this narrative, Islam’s role in Pakistani state nationalism was stagnant or largely inconsequential for the first thirty years and then started increasing in the late 1970s due to General Zia’s coup and the (first) Afghan war. Since then, due to the continuing alliance between religious forces and a powerful military, Islam’s role in state nationalism has been increasing.

The commonality between these two narratives is that Islam’s role in Pakistani state nationalism is seen as having increased since the 1980s. However, as Chapters 2–4 will show, a careful examination demonstrates
that Islam’s role in Pakistani state nationalism has been decreasing since 1999. Amid the rise of religious terrorism inside Pakistan, this dramatic change in Islam’s role in Pakistani state nationalism has been happening under the radar and has not been noticed by many.

**RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY**

This study employs the comparative case study method for analysis. The key benefit of the case study method is its focus and attention to detail. The researcher using this method concentrates on a single case, or a few cases, and tries to understand all of their aspects and dimensions, leading to an explanation of the past and the present, as well as to predictions regarding the future. The major disadvantage of this method is that since the research is limited to, at the most, a few cases, the results are often not generalizable. The case study method has, therefore, been considered less appropriate for discovering general laws and more suitable for answering the “how” and “why” questions, and for investigating a “contemporary phenomenon in depth and within some real-life context” (Yin 2009).

The choice of the case study method for this study was made based on the research puzzle of why and how the Islamization of government varies over time, which requires a comparative historical analysis of the two countries’ politics. Many other scholars have also used multiple case studies and comparative historical analysis for answering challenging political questions (Goldstone 1991; Rueschemeyer et. al. 1992; Moore 1993; Mahoney 2001; Collier and Collier 2002).

Content analysis techniques will be used to understand the changes in the Turkish and Pakistani constitutions, laws, symbols, and so on. While analyzing constitutions and laws, the focus will be on articles that are associated with Islam or secularism. For example, whether Islam is designated as the state religion in the constitution, or whether polygamy is allowed or restricted or prohibited in the family law. In the case of symbols and banknote imagery, pictures of mosques, Islamic personalities, Islamic buildings, Islamic themes (such as the star and crescent) will be highlighted. The chapters on the MRA and religious education will analyze the expansion of these institutions in both Turkey and Pakistan since their inception as independent states. The emphasis during this analysis will be on highlighting the changes both in Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government in Turkish and Pakistani history.
John Stuart Mill’s methods, though timeworn, still provide one of the best ways of systematically identifying causal relationships. In this book, Mill’s method of difference has been used to demonstrate the link between the role of Islam in state nationalism and the Islamization of government. In the method of difference, similar cases with dissimilar outcomes are analyzed and the cause of the dissimilar outcome for the variable of interest is investigated. In this book, the method of difference will be used for both Pakistan and Turkey for within-case comparisons. Different eras in the histories of Pakistan and Turkey will be studied and examined. In some eras, the Islamization of government increased; in others, it declined. If indicators related to rival explanations of Islamization of government do not change, Islam’s role in state nationalism can be deemed as the likely reason for the change in the Islamization of government in different eras in both countries.

Turkey and Pakistan have been selected on the basis of being the most different cases. There are many dissimilarities between these two countries that make them contrasting cases. First, Turkey, being the successor state of the Ottoman Empire, was a colonizer, while Pakistan was a British colony for at least one hundred years. Second, in terms of the state–Islam linkage, Turkey was the first and one of the few MMCs in the world that espoused secularism. Secularism was one of the most cherished principles of the Kemalist state and is still considered part of Turkish state nationalism. Pakistan’s creation, on the other hand, is directly linked to Islam and its state nationalism is viewed as an exemplar of religious nationalism. Finally, Turkey is the only MMC that has seen the continued success of Islamic parties at the ballot box. The AKP has won six national elections (five parliamentary and one presidential) in a row. In contrast, despite the Islamization of government and support from the military, Islamic parties in Pakistan have been unpopular and unsuccessful. If, despite these differences, Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government increases or decreases in parallel in both countries, then one can argue that there is the possibility of a causal connection. Choosing the widely different cases of Turkey and Pakistan also provides the strongest justification for generalization.

Mill’s method of difference, however, demonstrates only correlation and does not consider all variables of significance related to the research problem. To explore the possibility of a causal link between Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government, the subsequent chapters intend to fulfil the requirements of causality as listed by various scholars:
• correlation between the explanatory and response variable
• the appearance of explanatory variable before the response variable (Granger causality)
• whether the association between the explanatory variable and response variable is spurious
• identification of the mechanisms that link the explanatory variable and response variable.

The concluding chapter will examine each of these criteria in the context of Turkey and Pakistan.

**Outline of the Book**

The book comprises eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter—which presents the topic and the research problem, sets out the conceptual framework, and describes the research design and methodology—the subsequent six chapters present research on the indicators of Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government. Each of these six chapters traces the history of an indicator from the inception of the Turkish and Pakistani republics to the present era. The historical analysis challenges the dominant conventional narratives of Turkish and Pakistani nationalisms, and sets out the permutations each indicator has gone through. After giving a brief introduction, each chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the indicator’s journey through Turkey’s history and the second part through Pakistan’s history. The chapters end with a brief comparative analysis of the two journeys. Chapters 2–4 investigate the indicators of the explanatory variable “Islam’s role in state nationalism”. Chapter 2 examines four constitutions of Turkey and three constitutions of Pakistan, focusing on articles related to Islam or secularism. Chapters 3 and 4 highlight Islamic themes that inform national symbols and banknote images, respectively. Chapters 5–7 cover the three indicators of the response variable “Islamization of government”. Chapter 5 analyzes the family laws of Turkey and Pakistan and reveals their changing relationship with Islam. Chapter 6 focuses on the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) of Turkey and the Ministry of Religious Affairs of Pakistan and explains how, paradoxically, the Diyanet has grown into a huge institution in a secular republic while the Ministry of Religious Affairs remains a small part of the government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The policies regarding government support for private and for
public religious education are explored in Chapter 7. Chapter 8, which concludes the book, will demonstrate the causal link between the rise and fall of Islam in state nationalism and the increase or decrease of the Islamization of government. This chapter will also highlight the implications of this research beyond Turkey and Pakistan, and identify further areas for research.

**Implications**

This study will contribute to two different areas of research. First, it will help in understanding the politics of Turkey and Pakistan. Both these countries have played a much larger role in international affairs than their respective sizes or economies would suggest. As middle powers on the rise, it appears that these two countries will play an even more influential role in the twenty-first century than they played in the twentieth. Furthermore, both countries are already among the twenty-five biggest economies in the world, based on gross domestic product (purchasing power parity) data (World Bank 2015). Therefore, understanding their politics is important.

This study puts into perspective the recent interactions between Islam and politics in both countries. According to many experts, Turkey, a secular republic, is moving towards the Islamization of government, while Pakistan is being further Islamized even as it suffers from the terrorism of Islamic militants who want to impose Shariah in the country. Is this analysis an accurate picture of reality? What are the reasons for the change of course in Turkey and policy continuity in Pakistan? This study will attempt to shed some light on these issues.

Second, while the focus of the study is Turkey and Pakistan, its results may help explain events in other MMCs. These two countries also represent the opposite ends of the Islam–politics continuum. Turkish governments have tried to suppress Islam’s public role and, until recently, Islam had a negligible role in the making of laws, rules, and policies in Turkey. In contrast, Pakistani governments have amplified Islam’s role in politics and the public sphere. Comparing and understanding these two countries helps us understand a whole range of interactions that can happen between Islam and politics in an MMC.

For example, after the success of Islamist parties in Egypt and Tunisia in 2011, the Islamization of government was considered unstoppable in both countries. However, in both these countries, Islamists are now not in the
driving seat. The argument presented in this book (at least) gives a partial explanation of what happened. It can be argued that, in Tunisia and Egypt, the Islamization of government was scuttled because Islam’s role in the state nationalism of Tunisia and Egypt—although present—was not sufficient for the kind of Islamization attempted by the Al-Nahda and Muslim Brotherhood-controlled governments. It would have been better for these parties to slow the pace of Islamization of the government.

In sum, this book will demonstrate a causal link such that establishing a strong role for Islam in state nationalism is shown to be necessary for a strong Islamization of government. Conversely, if Islam is weak, absent, or diminishing in state nationalism, the Islamization of government will also falter.

Notes

1. As there are many excellent studies on the state nationalisms of Turkey and Pakistan and as it is the explanatory variable in this book, the contestation with popular nationalism and the intra-elite struggles that ultimately define the state nationalisms of Turkey and Pakistan will not be discussed in this book.

2. Arab regimes also highlighted Western support, as they could not explain to their compatriots how a small country could defeat them.

3. Based on the work of Grim and Finke (2006) on the U.S. State Department’s International Religious Freedom reports, the state–religion relationship in nearly two hundred countries has been quantified based on three indices and one variable (Government Regulation of Religion Index, Government Favoritism of Religion Index, Social Regulation of Religion Index, and Religious Persecution).

4. Each of these indicators has a whole chapter devoted to it. References to some of these scholars will be given in these chapters.

5. The increase of Islamic references in curricula is another way to measure government support for religious education and, thereby, a sign of Islamization of government. The measure used in this book is based on Ahmet Kuru’s book Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey (2009).

6. As a result of a combination of factors, a section of the Ottoman elite gradually embraced Turkish nationalism in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Initially, Turkish nationalism was not anti-Islamic or anti-clerical, but it did emphasize belief in the Turkish nation over and above the belief in the Muslim or Ottoman nation (Hanioglu 2002, 85–98).

7. Most notably, Ayesha Jalal (1994) has persuasively suggested that Pakistan was a bargaining trick and Jinnah only wanted a better deal for the Indian
Muslims. The idea of Jinnah trying to build a more secular state had been supported by scholars such as Mohammad Munir in *From Jinnah to Zia* (1980), Ajeet Jawed in *Secular and Nationalist Jinnah* (2009) and Moonis Ahmar in *Conflict Management & Vision for a Secular Pakistan* (2014). Others have refuted these arguments, such as Waheed-uz-Zaman in *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah: Myth and Reality* (1985) and Saleema Karim in *Secular Jinnah and Pakistan* (2010).


9. In the June 2015 parliamentary elections, the AKP, for the first time since 2002, was unable to win the majority of seats in the Turkish Parliament. However, it was still by far the largest party in the Parliament. In November 2015, it again won the majority of seats and formed the government independently.
Islam, Secularism and Constitutions

Islam has been called a “political religion”, “political ideology”, “political ideology that is not religion”, “both religion and political ideology”, and “political ideology in the garb of religion” (Spengler 2004; Shakir 2006; and Cesari 2010). As the above phrases show, Islam, in contrast to other major religions, is considered inherently political, leading some people even to deny Islam is a religion (Martin 2014). Since the attacks of September 11 2001, the Islam–state relationship has been the subject of hundreds of articles and books, and there is an appetite for more as events, such as the meteoric rise of Daesh (Islamic State), are easier to explain by emphasizing and essentializing Islam.

Islam’s role in state nationalism has evolved in both Turkey and Pakistan since independence and the change is visible in their constitutions. Turkey started with Islam as the state religion but gradually became a secular republic. Pakistan moved in the opposite direction. Islam was the basis of the creation of Pakistan but the colonial constitution and laws inherited from the British were generally retained during its first decade. However, later, the Islam–state relationship transformed. At present, Islam is Pakistan’s state religion and any law can be declared unconstitutional, if it is deemed to be against Islamic precepts or principles. In both countries, the Islam–state relationship has not been settled yet and the proponents of secular state and confessional state are fighting in the legislatures, on the streets, in the media, and in cyberspace.
The importance of a constitution in a nation’s life can hardly be exaggerated. Constitutions are foundational documents that provide frameworks for the nation’s existence and power-sharing arrangements not for one or two decades but for (possibly) all times to come. Therefore, constitutions make sense of national history, shed light on current political debates, and express national aspirations for the future.

**What Is a Constitution?**

Before discussing Turkish and Pakistani constitutions, it is important to clarify what is meant by a constitution. Constitution is called the “higher law” or the “supreme law of the land” but how is it different from other laws? Political scientists usually detail three necessary characteristics of constitutions:

- They are written (except the British Constitution);
- They are entrenched and hence difficult to change; and
- They inform how political power is regulated.

However, some scholars have defined constitution much more broadly than the written constitution. Perry (2001) includes in the definition of the constitution not only the written constitution, but also the norms/principles that the written constitution establishes. Chris Thornhill goes even further. With norms and the written constitution, he also includes broad unwritten societal rules relating to political power in the definition of a constitution. His definition of constitution is as follows:

It is a legal order impacting on the exercise of political power that (a) contains an effectively established presumption of public rule in accordance with principles or conventions, expressed as law, that cannot easily (i.e. without societally unsettling controversy) be suspended; (b) is designed to constrain or restrict egregiously mandatory use of power in both public and private functions; (c) allocates powers within the state itself, and comprises some form of popular/political representation in respect of questions perceived as possessing importance for all politically relevant sectors of society; and (d) expresses a legal distinction between the forms of the state and those persons assuming authority to borrow and enforce the power stored within the state. (Thornhill 2011, 10–11)
It is beyond the scope of this book to discuss constitutions as defined by Thornhill, or even Perry; therefore, the focus will be on the written constitutions, with some explanation of the context to assist in a deeper understanding of the constitutional text.

**Constitution and Nation**

Constitutions and nations are supposed to be intimately linked. Constitutions, we are told, constitute a nation and are the soul of the nation, uniting and representing all the people who are, have been, or will be part of the nation. Such glowing tributes to constitutions are usually based on the experience and role of existing constitutions—such as the US Constitution—that have a long history, but most constitutions are only a few decades old. Surely, it would be difficult to call the current Haitian Constitution the soul of the Haitian nation as, then, we have to recognize the demise of more than twenty previous souls (constitutions). So, if constitutions are not the soul of the nation, what do they represent and how they are associated with the nation? Perhaps the process of constitution-making may provide a clue. Studying 160 different constitution-making events, Mendez and Wheatley (2013, 26–8) divide the constitution-making bodies into three types: elites appointed, indirectly selected, and directly elected. He concludes that, of the 160 cases he studied, 55 were appointed by an elite, 28 were indirectly selected, and 62 were directly elected. He also had a residual category, comprising 15 cases, corresponded to the situations where there was no formal constitution-making body and the elites and party leaders negotiated the constitution between themselves. As is clear from above, constitution-making is usually an intra-elite affair. More than 60 per cent of the constitution-making bodies have been either appointed by an elite or twice-removed from the people. Even in cases where the body is directly elected, the influence of elites is greater than any group of constituents. So, if constitutions are windows to the national identity and nationalism, then perhaps these windows are constructed by the national elite. Constitutions thus reveal the elite’s vision for the nation and who they consider part of the nation. They are not only a set of procedures and methods related to politics, but also inform about national myths, narratives, and beliefs, selected and prioritized by the elite. These myths and narratives become particularly evident when one looks at the preambles of different constitutions. The following preambles demonstrate the differential focus.
The preamble of the US Constitution is succinct:

We the people of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America (US Constitution)

Contrast it with the preamble of the Egyptian Constitution that was approved in 2014. It is a three-page document and starts with the following sentences:

In the Name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful. This is Our Constitution. Egypt is the gift of the Nile for Egyptians and the gift of Egyptians to humanity. With its unique location and history, Egypt is the Arab heart of the world. It is the meeting point of world civilizations and cultures and the crossroads of its maritime transportation and communications. It is the head of Africa on the Mediterranean and the estuary of its greatest river: the Nile. This is Egypt, an immortal homeland for Egyptians, and a message of peace and love to all peoples . . .  (Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt 2014)

And the preamble of the Constitution of Germany starts with the following paragraph:

Conscious of their responsibility before God and man, Inspired by the determination to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe, the German people, in the exercise of their constituent power, have adopted this Basic Law. Germans in the Länder of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringia have achieved the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination. This Basic Law thus applies to the entire German people. (Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany)

Each of these preambles talks about national dreams and hopes, but the dreams and hopes are different. They do have some similar aspects, but each one is distinct and thus reveals something about these nations, their histories, and their aspirations. For example, the phrase “to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe” in the preamble of
Germany’s Basic Law is linked to the German framers’ desire to show their nation’s commitment to peace and their hopes of overcoming the pariah status Germany had acquired due to what happened in the first half of the twentieth century (Kommers and Miller 2012, 200 and 325).

Similarly, the preamble of the American Constitution mentions “common defense” which might point to the difficulties the Second Continental Congress faced in getting the states to pay for the War of Independence under the Articles of Confederation, and the desire of the framers to allow the new federal government to collect taxes to pay existing war debts, and to raise and maintain military forces in future (Conserva 2011, 9-10).

Further, constitutions also provide information about the values and goals of the nation. Both Egypt and Germany promote world peace in their constitutions, while the US Constitution focuses on domestic tranquillity. Reading the histories of these countries can help one understand why these countries prioritize different concepts of peace.

Constitutions also enlighten an observer on how a nation perceives itself. State nationalism is an exercise in boundary creation, both territorial and psychological. There is always an in-group and an out-group. The preamble to the Basic Law demonstrates that German ethnicity is crucial to how Germans define themselves. The Egyptian Constitution preamble highlights the importance of Arab ethnicity (with its reference to the Arab heart) for the Egyptian national identity. However, ethnicity is ignored in the American Constitution and the concept of the nation is based on territory and ideals.

Constitutions are thus like flags and anthems, symbols of the national identity and ideals. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, one should be clear that the nationalism represented in and by a constitution is often the nationalism that the elite, who wrote the constitution, want to project and promote. As discussed in Chapter 1, this nationalism might be different from what the masses believe. The next section analyzes Islam’s role in state nationalism, first, by focusing on the various Turkish constitutions and, then, on the Pakistani constitutions.

**Turkish Constitutions**

The Republic of Turkey is the successor state to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire existed for more than six hundred years and spanned three continents. As is often the case, the early centuries were a period of expansion of the Empire and the latter ones were chronicles of defeats, decline, and
ultimately disintegration. After its downfall in World War I, the future of Ottoman/Turkish state looked ominous. Constantinople was under the control of the victorious Allies and the Ottoman Sultan was little more than a prisoner. The Treaty of Sevres (1920) not only marked the end of the Ottoman Empire by forcing Turkey to renounce all rights over the Middle East and North Africa, it also split the Turkish Anatolian heartland amongst the victorious Allies. This humiliation resulted in a strong resurgence of national pride and, led by General Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the people of Turkey fought the War of Independence (1919–1922). The Turkish forces managed to defeat and drive the Allies out of the Anatolian peninsula and the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) created the present borders of Turkey.

The Early 1920s to the Mid-1940s

The ulema, Islamic symbols, and religious rhetoric played a crucial role in the mobilization of the Turkish Anatolian population against the Allies. Most of the references in founding charters of the new Turkish state were to the Muslim nation and the new Turkish nation was hardly mentioned. Not surprisingly, Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism was significant and apparent. Both the 1921 and 1924 Constitutions declared Islam as the state religion. However, things soon began to unravel as the state started promoting a secular identity and Islam’s role in the public sphere was rejected (Yavuz 2003, 45–7).

1921 Constitution

As the Ottoman Caliph/Sultan was considered a prisoner in 1921, and so unable to rule, a provisional government was declared in Ankara which issued the first Turkish constitutional document. Promulgated during the War, the 1921 Constitution was limited in many respects. It had only 23 articles and did not deal with many issues that are considered a necessary part of a constitution (MFA 2015). Compared with the 1876 Ottoman Constitution, this constitution detailed a new and different state–Islam relationship. The most significant change was the substitution of the Sultan’s divine sovereignty with popular sovereignty. The 1876 Ottoman Constitution declared:

The Ottoman sovereignty which is united in the person of the sovereign of the supreme Caliph of Islam belongs to the eldest of the princes of the dynasty of Osman. (Davison 1998, 162)
The Article 1 of 1921 Constitution, however, stated:

Sovereignty is vested in the nation without condition. Governmental system is based on the principle of self-determination and government by people. (Government of Turkey 1921)

All the legislative and executive powers were vested in the Grand National Assembly (GNA) which was popularly elected (Ozbudun and Genckaya 2009, 10). Moreover, there was no mention of Islam as the state religion, a significant change from the 1876 Ottoman Constitution which had designated Islam the state religion (Ardic 2012, 57). The role of religion in state affairs was mentioned at two places in the 1921 Constitution. Article 11 stated that religion was a federal subject and Article 7 (as reproduced below) explained that sacred law (Shariat/Shariah) remained the basis of legislation:

The basic rights of the application of the ordinances of the sacred law; the promulgation, amendment and abrogation of all laws; the concluding of peace treaties; the promulgation of defense of the motherland belong to the Grand National Assembly. The preparation of laws and regulations will be guided by juridical and religious provisions, which best conform to the modus operandi of the people and the needs of the times, as well as established customs... (Government of Turkey 1921)

However, the language of the article made clear that the application of sacred law would be restricted. Along with sacred law, the people’s customs and needs of time would also be given consideration, and the decision-maker would be the GNA, not the Ottoman Sultan or Sheikh-ul-Islam. The Sultanate itself was abolished in November 1922, ending the threat of a rival power centre that might be sympathetic to Islam. Islam only became the state religion of the new state by a constitutional amendment passed on 29 October 1923, which was the day the Turkish Republic was established. As the government, led by Ataturk, aimed at reducing Islam’s role in state affairs, the declaration of Islam as the state religion was somewhat surprising. The fact that both decisions were announced on the same day leads one to think that the announcement of state religion was done to placate the Turkish population, as the establishment of a Republic was bitterly opposed and criticized both inside and outside the GNA.
The 1921 Constitution, thus, gave Islam a prominent role, revealing the key role of Islam in Turkish state nationalism in the early 1920s.

1924 Constitution
A new Constitution comprising 105 articles was promulgated on 20 April 1924. A unicameral parliament, with a mixed system, partly presidential and partly parliamentary, was established. An independent judiciary and the fundamental rights of the citizenry were also enshrined in the Constitution.

During its lifetime, the 1924 Constitution saw sweeping changes regarding state–Islam relations, thereby, demonstrating the drastic change in Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism. Initially, when the Constitution was promulgated, Islam was the state religion and Islam was accepted as an important part of Turkish national identity. However, during the next 14 years, Turkish society was subjected to an authoritarian top-down modernization process. The state evolved and tried to transform society. Islam was rejected as a component of national identity and Turkey was declared a secular republic under Atatürk’s leadership.

The process of decreasing Islam’s role in public affairs began a little before the promulgation of the 1924 Constitution. On 3 March 1924, the Caliphate and the Ministry of Religious Affairs were abolished. The Caliphate was not mentioned in the 1921 Constitution but the Caliph was still revered and considered the Turkish head of the state until this critical change. Concurrently, the GNA also put all kinds of schools (public, as well as religious) under the control of the Ministry of Education. On 8 April 1924, religious courts were also abolished, ending centuries of ulama’s role in the judiciary, paving the way for a wholly secular judiciary in the new Constitution that was promulgated on 20 April 1924. Edward Earle (1925, 86) described these steps, which banished religion from Turkish government affairs, as revolutionary and unimaginable just a decade before:

By a series of drastic decrees issued within less than a week, therefore, the Grand National Assembly had destroyed all differentiation between civil and religious jurisdiction, had secularized religious property, had driven religious influences out of the schools and the law and the courts, had divorced religion and politics in the Cabinet...
However, despite these changes, Islam retained its formal privileged position of state religion in the 1924 Constitution. Article 2 in the new 1924 Constitution stated:

The religion of the Turkish State is Islam; the official language is Turkish; the seat of government is Ankara. (Government of Turkey 1924)

This anomaly, as Ataturk hinted later, was a way to reassure the masses that, despite government’s concerted efforts to decrease the role of Islam, the state was not rejecting Islam. Besides Article 2, there were other references to Islam in the Constitution. Article 26 declared that the GNA would execute the Shariah itself, not allowing religious scholars to interfere in the legislation. The oath of the GNA members also started with “I swear to God” (Article 16).

The new Constitution, therefore, demonstrated that, although not paramount as it had been before, Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism was still significant: Islam was the state religion, the GNA was to execute Shariah, and the parliamentarian’s oath still had reference to God. This Constitution was, however, destined to go through a sweeping process of secularization not long after its promulgation. In his famous six-day speech (Nutuk) in the GNA in 1927, Ataturk advised the GNA to remove Islam as the state religion as it was a “meaningless phrase.” He told them that he had only allowed it as a political maneuver:

After the founding of the Republic, while the new constitution was being made, with the purpose of not providing an opportunity for those who are inclined to interpret the phrase, “laic government,” as anti-religious and take advantage of such an interpretation, it has been allowed that a meaningless phrase be added to article two of the constitution. (Ataturk 1929)

Inevitably, in 1928, the amendment to remove Islam as the state religion from the Constitution was passed. The amendment also discarded other references to Islam in the Constitution, such as in Article 26 (execution of Shariah/Holy law) and Article 16 (mention of God in the mandatory oath of the GNA members), demonstrating that the Turkish elite no longer considered Islam foundational to the Turkish nation. However, secularism was neither a principle of the Constitution nor part of Turkish state nationalism, yet.

During this initial phase of the Republic, territorial state nationalism was emphasized as an antidote to religious state nationalism. However, in
the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Turkish elite began promoting Turkish ethnic nationalism, underscoring the ancient nature and magnificence of the Turkish language and ethnicity. It was proclaimed that the Turkish civilization was the mother of all civilizations, and efforts were made to restore the Turkish language by rejecting words coming from other languages. There was also a state sponsored campaign, “Citizen speak Turkish.” The Quran’s language, Arabic, and Persian had great influence on the Turkish language and literature. To counter this influence of Islam, in 1928, Arabic numerals and script were discarded and Turkey adopted European numerals and a modified Latin alphabet. This change severed the last connection between secular and religious literacy. A campaign began to purge Arabic and Persian words from the Turkish language and imams (prayer leaders) were ordered to deliver Friday sermons in Turkish. This focus on distancing the Turkish state from Islam eventually led to the declaration of a secular republic in 1937. Article 2 which, after 1928, made no reference to religion and simply affirmed Turkish as the national language and Ankara as the national capital, was amended to read as follows:

Turkish State is republican, nationalist, populist, statist, secular and revolutionary. Its official language is Turkish. Its capital is the city of Ankara.

After the death of Ataturk, his loyal lieutenant, Ismet Inonu, became President and continued the secularization policies. Islam’s connection to the emergence of the Turkish nation was suppressed, and the Turkish constitution and laws espoused a secular state nationalism. The biggest change in the Constitution under President Inonu was the adoption of a new version of the 1924 Constitution in 1945 that eliminated Arabic and Persian words present in the original Constitution and replaced them with Turkish words. Hence, not only Islam but even words that showed an Islamic influence were discarded from the Constitution. Islam’s banishment from Turkish state nationalism was nearly complete.

The Late 1940s to Late 1970s

Things began to change when the single-party rule of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) ended in the late 1940s and the first multi-party elections were held. Since most of the Turkish population lived in villages, generally out of the reach of the state, the influence of the two decades of
secularist reforms was limited. Islam still played a large part in the lives of this rural majority and the 1946 elections made the CHP elite appreciate this fact. Critics of secularism in the ruling CHP started voicing their objections as the popularity of the main opposition party, the Democrat Party (DP), increased. Although the CHP had won the first election in 1946, it realized that it had to change its anti-Islam image in order to win the next election. Hence, the CHP initiated a host of changes before the next elections in 1950. These initiatives included relaxation of restrictions on religious education in schools, provision of foreign exchange for pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia, the opening of tombs of some Muslim saints, new educational courses for prayer leaders, establishment of a Faculty of Theology at the University of Ankara, and the expansion of the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs). However, there were no constitutional changes.

The CHP reforms did not save it from defeat and the DP comfortably won the next election in 1950, winning 415 of the total 487 GNA seats. The religious groups celebrated the victory as “a day of deliverance from the ‘Godless People’s Party’” (Feroze 1976, 121). The DP was not an Islamic party and was committed to secularism, though in a less aggressive way. It lifted numerous restrictions on religious actions and symbolism, such as permitting Adhan (prayer calling) in Arabic, allowing religious programming on state-run radio, making religious education compulsory in elementary schools (parents had the option of opting out), setting up of schools for prayer leaders, and increasing the funding for the Diyanet. It also gave leeway to the banned religious orders which had assisted in its electoral success (Eligur 2010, 57–9).

However, there was no attempt to reverse the most significant of Atatürk’s secularization reforms, such as discarding civil and penal codes (based on European codes), or amending the Constitution to reject secularism. The biggest change regarding Islam was bringing back the pre-1945 version of the 1924 Constitution. So, in 1952, the Turkified version of the Constitution was replaced by a version that had Arabic and Persian words. Secularism, as one of the main principles of the Republic, was still part of the Constitution.

The DP won elections in 1954 and 1957, but its popularity gradually waned as economic growth slowed in the late 1950s. The DP’s share of the total vote declined from 58.4 per cent in 1954 to 48.6 per cent in 1957. Prime Minister Menderes became more autocratic and tried to scuttle all activities of the opposition. On 27 May 1960, the DP government was overthrown in a military coup. The coup leaders claimed that the DP had violated the constitution by establishing a single-party state and by exploiting
religion. They promised to establish a new constitution (Jenkins 2008, 115–23; Eligur 2010, 72–75)

1961 Constitution
The 1961 Constitution was promulgated in July 1961 and had 157 articles. A parliamentary system was envisaged, with a bicameral parliament. The independence of the judiciary was ensured and an expanded list of fundamental rights was enshrined in the constitution. The 1961 Constitution is regarded as the most liberal constitution of all Turkish constitutions and can also be seen as a continuation of the movement, which started in the late 1940s, towards a less authoritarian and more progressive state. Though Menderes behaved like an autocrat in his later years, he was liberal in his economic and religious policies. He did not change the secular character of the Constitution and only gave religious Turks rights that the secular Constitution guaranteed.

The 1961 Constitution was a product of deliberation amongst the Turkish elite, with almost no popular input. It expanded the right of religious freedom significantly compared with the 1924 Constitution. For instance, besides giving the right to every individual to choose and practice any religion, as in the 1924 Constitution, it also directed that a person could neither be compelled to worship or participate in religious ceremony, nor be forced to reveal (or be reproached) because of their beliefs. The Constitution also forbade the exploitation or abuse of religion for personal benefit, or to gain power.

During the DP rule, the Diyanet and religious education had expanded, creating the anomalous situation of a secular state providing religious education and managing religious practice. The 1961 Constitution, instead of removing these anomalies, gave them constitutional approval. First, it gave an individual control over his own and his legal wards’ religious education (Article 19). Thus, it indirectly endorsed state’s right to provide religious education in the public schools. Second, in the 1961 Constitution, the secular elite decided to raise the stature of the Diyanet and make it a constitutional body (Article 154). The Diyanet was not part of the 1924 Constitution.

In the 1961 Constitution, secularism remained one of the defining characteristics of the state:

The Turkish Republic is a nationalistic, democratic, secular and social state, governed by the rule of law, based on human rights and fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble. (Article 2)
The political parties (Article 57) were also required to adhere to secularism and it was also included in the oaths of GNA members:

I swear upon my honour that I will protect the independence of the State, the integrity of the homeland and the nation, that I will remain committed to unqualified and unconditional sovereignty of the nation and to the principles of a democratic and secular republic, and that I will make every effort to promote the happiness of the people. (Article 77)

To secure secularism further, eight laws related to secularism, passed during Atatürk’s time, were made part of the Constitution, thus making it very difficult to change them (Article 153).

Based on the 1961 Constitution, secularism thus remained part of the Turkish state nationalism. Islam had no official role in the creation or sustaining of the Turkish nation. A distinguishing feature of the 1961 Constitution was liberalism, but this liberalism was not extended to religious sections of the society, who were not considered proper and full members of the Turkish nation. Islam and religion returned to the Constitution through articles related to religious education and the Diyanet but, as the overall language of the Constitution demonstrates, Islam was a threat that had to be contained, and religious education and the Diyanet were instruments of the state to control the threat by propagating an official sanitized Islam. The purpose of religious education and the Diyanet was also clarified in 1965, when a comprehensive law relating to the Diyanet’s objectives and responsibilities was passed. It made it mandatory that the Diyanet would only employ imams trained by the state, as imams trained by non-state institutions were considered a threat to the secular order.

The DP was dissolved by the military junta after the coup. Most of the members of the DP formed a new party, called the Justice Party (AP: Adalet Partisi). Despite the authoritarianism shown by Menderes in the last couple of years before the coup and the military junta’s action against the party and its leaders, the popularity of the DP platform, which was adopted by the AP, was still visible in the 1961 elections. The CHP, with all its state support, could not win a simple majority of the National Assembly seats and the newly formed AP came a close second to the CHP. A coalition government of the CHP and the AP, with former President İnönü as Prime Minister, was formed and the military junta transferred power to it. The
political instability continued until 1965, when the AP won the elections comprehensively, winning 240 of the total 450 National Assembly seats.  

The AP, led by Suleyman Demirel, retained power in the 1969 elections, winning 256 seats. There was, however, no constitutional amendment relating to religion, as the secular elite still controlled the primarily unelected Senate (Jenkins 2008, 126–29; Eligur 2010, 72–75).

In 1971, Turkey suffered its second military coup. The AP-led civilian government was forced to resign and a government of technocrats was established. Although the 1961 Constitution survived the coup, it was the end of the liberalism guaranteed by that Constitution. Gradually, over the course of the next few years, rights given to universities, labour, media, and so on, were taken back by amendments to the Constitution under the tutelage of the military. The commitment to secularism, however, remained high until the end of the 1970s. The Turkish military had started cooperating with, or ignoring, the violence of right-wing militias, but it was all in the shadows (Feroz 2002, 150–70).

Opinions are divided on the 1961 Constitution. Some scholars call it the most liberal Turkish constitution, as it privileged human rights and declared that all citizens have numerous inviolable rights. The Constitution also recognized social justice as an important constitutional principle and strengthened the judiciary (Szyliowicz 1963). The critics of the 1961 Constitution recognize these achievements but point to the start of some troubling traditions, such as the formation of the National Security Council (giving the military a permanent political role), respecting coup leaders by making them senators, and the use of the Constitutional Court to ban political parties (Hurriyet Daily News 2010).

Thus, under the 1961 Constitution, Turkish state nationalism retained its predominantly secular character. However, constitutional acceptance of religious education and the Diyanet had some unintended consequences, as educated Islamists came of age in large numbers and the Turkish elite decided to use them and Islam to deter left-wing radicalism and Kurdish nationalism.

The Early 1980s to Late 2000s

Increasing street violence, deteriorating economic conditions and political instability led to the third military coup in September 1980. The third coup resulted in the longest (1980–83) and the most authoritarian and brutal military dictatorship in the history of Turkey (Barkey and Kadioglu 2011).
Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism went through a critical transformation in the 1980s. This change came about under a movement called Turkish–Islamic synthesis (Turk–Islam sentezi), which tried to blend Turkishness, Islam, and modernism. The movement started in the late 1960s and early 1970s but its origins can be traced back to Ziya Gokalp, the father of Turkish nationalism. Turkish–Islamic synthesis subordinated Islam to Turkish state nationalism by making it a necessary part of Turkish culture. By emphasizing the inseparability of Turkish state nationalism and Islam, and by accepting Ataturk reforms, Turkish–Islamic synthesis allowed the (mostly secular) national elite to use Islam as a tool for strengthening Turkish state nationalism against communism and Kurdish nationalism, two ideologies they perceived as threats to the Turkish state. The doctrine also provided popular support to the 1980 military coup and its authoritarian actions (Kurt 2010).

This transformation changed the Turkish military elite’s views about Islam.13 Previously, for Turkish generals, defending secularism and Ataturk’s reforms and legacy meant strictly rejecting Islam’s public or constitutional role. One of the common reasons given for all three coups was that the elected governments were straying from Ataturk’s legacy and exploiting religion for political purposes. After the 1980 coup, the Turkish military recognized the utility of Islam and started instrumenting it.

The military junta banned all political activity and political parties, and nominated a select group to draft a new constitution in 1960. The new constitution, written under the directions of the junta, was approved in a referendum in November 1982. It had 177 articles, established a unicameral Parliament and a parliamentary system of government (though, initially, the former coup leader and President Kenan Evren had extensive powers). This 1982 Constitution is the most authoritarian of all Turkish constitutions. While constitutions are usually made to limit state power and to protect and extend people’s rights, the 1982 Constitution was trying to protect the state from the people:

Its primary aim was to restore the authority of the State and to maintain public order rather than to protect the rights and liberties of its citizens. As is commonly observed, the underlying philosophy of the 1982 Constitution was to protect the State from the actions of its citizens rather than to protect the fundamental rights and liberties of the citizens from the State’s encroachment. (Ozbudun 2007)
The 1982 Constitution added the promotion of a cult of Ataturk to the emphasis on secularism. This change was one of the distinguishing features of the new Constitution. Starting from the preamble of the Constitution, the importance of secularism and Ataturk’s reforms was highlighted. For the first time, the principle of secularism was introduced in the President’s oath and made one of the Diyanet’s objectives. Similarly, loyalty to Ataturk’s reforms and to (secular) nationalism was made a part of the binding oath taken by the GNA members. This recourse to Ataturk was not limited to the Constitution. In the 1980s and 1990s, the image of Ataturk was increasingly depicted—encouraged by the state—on badges, posters, and stickers, bordering to what a scholar called “Ataturk fetishism” (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 189).

However, despite continued loyalty to secularism, Islam made gains in the 1982 Constitution. For the first time since the early years of the Republic, religious education became compulsory in both primary and secondary schools:

> Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction shall be subject to the individual’s own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives. (Article 24)

Moreover, the Diyanet’s significance was increased by making national solidarity and integrity one of its duties:

> The Directorate of Religious Affairs, which is within the general administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance with the principles of secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity. (Article 136)

The military junta’s approach appeared contradictory. On the one hand, its leaders publically read the Quranic verses, increased religious education, expanded the Diyanet, and tried to reinvent Ataturk as a pious Muslim. On the other hand, they legalized abortion and banned headscarves in universities and public places. Whatever the reasons for this approach, religion’s public role increased appreciably during the 1980s. Later, civilian governments also continued these policies (Jenkins 2008, 146–64). Linking Islam with state nationalism helped the National View (Milli Gorus) movement of Erbakan. Although he and his party, the National Salvation Party (MSP)
were banned from politics in the wake of the 1980 military coup, they re-emerged as the Welfare Party and attracted more supporters.

Since its promulgation, the 1982 Constitution has been amended many times. Of particular importance were the amendments passed in 1995, 2001, 2004, and 2010. All these amendments tried to decrease the authoritarian character of the Constitution, but secularism still retained pride of place. One of the most significant changes was amending Article 14, and it had implications for religion–state relations. The original Article 14 made all the fundamental rights, given in the Constitution, suspect and doubtful. The original text was as follows:

None of the rights and liberties embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, of endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Republic, destroying fundamental rights and liberties, of placing the government of the State under the control of an individual or a group of people, or establishing the hegemony of one social class over others, or creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or sect, or of establishing by any other means a system of government based on these concepts and ideas.

After the 2001 Amendment, the new Article 14 not only protected fundamental rights, but also restricted the secular character of the Republic by linking it to democracy and human rights:

None of the rights and liberties embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, and endangering the existence of the democratic and secular Republic based on human rights. No provision of the Constitution shall be interpreted in a manner that would enable the State or individuals to destroy the fundamental rights and liberties embodied in the Constitution or to engage in an activity with the aim of restricting them more extensively than is stated in the Constitution.

Other changes were made in the laws to limit the state from punishing perceived anti-secularist activities. In 1991, Articles 141, 142, and 163 of the penal code that prescribed punishments for engaging in anti-secular propaganda and organization were repealed. In 2002, a higher bar was set to convict people under penal code Article 312, the article that now dealt with the incitement of hostility and hatred based on differences in social class, religion, sect, race, and region.
With the coming of power of the Islamic-oriented government of the AKP, the religious-right hoped and the secularists dreaded the dilution of strict secularism that had been part of all Turkish constitutions since 1937. However, the AKP initially did not take any initiative to attack secularism enshrined in the Constitution.

After winning three electoral contests in 2007 (the constitutional referendum, the presidential election, and the parliamentary election), the AKP grew more confident. In 2008, the AKP-dominated GNA passed a constitutional amendment that was considered by some as giving Islam an ingress to Turkish state nationalism and disturbing the religion–state relationship in Turkey. The amendment, referred in the press as the “Turban Amendment”, tried to remove discrimination against women wearing headscarves. As mentioned, in the early 1980s the military government debarred these women from universities, civil service jobs, and government offices. The Turban amendment was, however, declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Moreover, this amendment nearly resulted in the dissolution of the AKP by the Constitutional Court as proponents of secularism (the CHP and many in the military, media, and judiciary) claimed that the AKP had violated the Turkish constitutional principle of laiklik (secularism) and was trying to establish an Islamist state (Gungor 2008; Smith 2013; Axiarlis 2014, 57–64).

The discussion thus far has highlighted the increased role of Islam in Turkish state nationalism during this period. For the first time since the early 1920s, the constitutional framers accepted the political utility of religion and Islam. Religion was not to be feared as before but, rather, used for national unity and to deter external/internal threats.

2010 Onwards

The 2010 referendum marks the advent of a new era in Turkish politics. Held on 12 September 2010, this constitutional referendum did not change the relationship between the state and Islam in the constitution; rather, it opened up the possibilities for such changes in the future. This referendum marked the end of the hold of two institutions, the Constitutional Court and the military, that were controlled by the secularists and had undermined democracy since 1961. The 2010 referendum reduced the powers of the military and broke the 50-year control of secularists over the Constitutional Court. The composition of the Constitutional Court was changed, giving democratic governments more powers. The power of the Turkish military over civilian matters
was decreased by allowing civilian courts to try military personnel, removing the protection of the 1980 coup leaders, and by reducing powers of the Supreme Military Council (Today’s Zaman 2010a). Thus, these amendments made it possible for a future political party to introduce Islam into the constitution, if it has sufficient public support behind it.

Even before the constitutional referendum, all leading Turkish political parties agreed that a new constitution was required as the present 1982 Constitution was not democratic. However, despite extensive discussions between parties, there has been no agreement. Nevertheless, no party has, until now, argued for taking secularism out of the new constitution.

The most probable outcome of constitutional discussions appears to be a US-style secularism that is less aggressive and more liberal, with some reference to Islam’s role in Turkish history—thus, increasing Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism but not inviting the opposition’s wrath. This probability was strengthened when the Constitutional Court itself interpreted secularism in a liberal way, while declaring discriminations against lawyers wearing headscarves illegal (Daily Sabah 2014). The AKP appears to be more interested in establishing a presidential system than bringing back Islam in the new constitution, but it used Islamic symbols and rhetoric to win both the 2015 elections and some analysts argued that this could force it to increase Islam’s presence in the constitution (Mert 2015; Sezgin 2015). In April 2016, the Speaker of the GNA, Ismail Kahraman, a member of the AKP, sparked controversy when he talked about a religious constitution for Turkey. He said:

As a Muslim country, why should we be in a situation where we are in retreat from religion? ... We are a Muslim country. As a consequence, we must have a religious constitution. (AFP 2016a)

Kahraman’s statement was widely condemned and the CHP leader asked him to resign. Critics of the AKP claimed that the statement showed the true face and intentions of the AKP. President Erdogan and Prime Minister Davutoglu, however, quickly denied any plans for a religious constitution and reaffirmed their fidelity to secularism (Seibert 2016). Erdogan even defended a liberal version of secularism:

If the faith of all religious groups in this country is guaranteed in the constitution, and the state’s equal distance to all religious groups is a foundation, why do you need to emphasize Islam? If I can live my faith as a Muslim
the way I want to, the issue is over. If a Christian can live his/her Christianity, if a Jew can live his/her Jewishness or an atheist can live his/her atheism, the issue is also over for them. (Akyol 2016)

The denials and defence of secularism helped calm things down and focus shifted back to the presidential system. The AKP teamed up with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to hold a referendum on a new presidential system in April 2017. The new super-presidential system was approved by the voters and President Erdogan will remain the most powerful man in Turkey for the foreseeable future. The focus may now move back to the new constitution. One may ask whether the AKP will propose an Islamic constitution. Probably not, but it will be more Islamic than the 1982 Constitution, showcasing the increasing role of Islam in Turkish state nationalism (Akyol 2016; Daily Sabah 2016). President Erdogan’s statement after winning was important. He claimed that by voting “yes”, Turkey has resolved the 200-year-old conflict in its administrative system. The reference is towards the start of Westernization or Tanzimat reforms. Will Turkey turn its back on Europe? The type of language used by President Erdogan against European leaders during the referendum campaign leaves one with little hope. If the European accession talks failed, there is no denying the fact that the new constitution will have atleast some Islamic references.

Pakistan Constitution

Looking at the entire 70 years of Pakistan’s history, one can see competing portraits of the Pakistani nation promoted by the elite in the country’s three Constitutions and the amendments made to them. The Turkish constitutions were promulgated decades apart, thus capturing the changing contribution of Islam to state nationalism in various periods of Turkish history. In contrast, the constitutions of Pakistan were promulgated in close proximity in 1956, 1962 and 1973. The first two Pakistani constitutions are just six years apart, and all three were promulgated within a span of 17 years. To present the evolving state nationalism and contribution of Islam to Pakistan’s constitutional history effectively, this analysis has been divided into three distinct periods:

- the late 1940s to late 1960s
- the early 1970s to late 1990s
- 1999 onwards.
The Late 1940s to Late 1960s

Two distinctive features of this period’s constitutional activity were Islamic symbolism and the primacy of the British colonial legacy. The colonial legacy was a key characteristic of the period because most of the ruling elite had either served in the British Indian legislatures, or were part of the British Indian civil-military bureaucracy. Almost all of the prominent leaders of the Pakistani independence movement (such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan, and Khawaja Nazimuddin), who led Pakistan during the first few years, had been members of the British Indian legislatures. Later on, bureaucrats, who were trained by the British, became influential. Governor General Ghulam Mohammad and Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Chaudhry were members of the British Indian accounts services and Governor General/President Iskandar Mirza was a member of the British Indian political service. Moving forward, General Ayub Khan, who ruled Pakistan from 1958–69, had served in the British Indian Army for almost 20 years before opting for the Pakistan Army at the time of independence.

It was, therefore, not surprising that the ruling elite of Pakistan chose to continue with British institutions, laws, and rules. For the first nine years of Pakistan’s existence, a modified version of the British India Act of 1935 served as Pakistan’s Constitution. Similarly, the (British) Indian Penal Code of 1860 was adopted as Pakistan’s penal code following independence. During the period 1947–71, there were few variations in the adopted penal code, except those that were necessitated by the changes in the territory, titles, and inflation.

However, the predicament for the Pakistani ruling elite was that the country had been created on the basis of Muslim nationhood. Leaders of the Pakistan independence movement, including Jinnah, had, at various times, emphasized the importance of Islam and the Quran as the basis of laws. Infighting within the ruling elite (for instance, the political versus the civil/military-bureaucratic elite, or the Bengali versus the Punjabi elite) and the resulting failure in governance helped further increase support for the religious elite’s demand for implementation of Islamic law (Shariah) in Pakistan. The ruling elite had no intention of implementing any real change in the governing system so, under pressure from the religious right, they made some symbolic changes to increase their legitimacy and authenticity. They thought these symbolic changes did not matter, but the changes did increase Islam’s role in
state nationalism. In terms of the constitution, the first such symbolic change was the passing of the Objectives Resolution (1949). As Pakistan did not have its first constitution till 1956, the Objective Resolution, passed by the Constituent Assembly, stated the principles on which the first constitution of Pakistan would be established. The passage of the Objective Resolution was significant, as it was the first constitutional document in Pakistan that gave Islam a prominent place and hence revealed the important role that Islam played in Pakistani state nationalism. It accepted Allah’s sovereignty, made several references to Islamic precepts, and asked the state to enable Muslims to live in accordance with the Quran and Sunnah:

WHEREAS sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust;

WHEREAS the Founder of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Mahomed Ali Jinnah, declared that Pakistan would be a democratic State based on Islamic principles of social justice;

WHEREIN the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam, should be fully observed;

WHEREIN the Muslims of Pakistan should be enabled individually and collectively to order their lives in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam, as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah;

WHEREIN adequate provisions should be made for the minorities to freely profess and practise their religion and develop their culture.

Some scholars have argued that the Objectives Resolution started the slippery slope that led to the extensive Islamization that Pakistan witnessed later (Hasan 2010). While Objectives Resolution did showcased the significant role of Islam in Pakistani state nationalism, it is difficult to accept this argument. Notwithstanding Objectives Resolution references to Islam and Islamic precepts, the ruling elite made sure that what they gave with one hand, they took away with the other. For example, according to the Objectives Resolution, sovereignty belonged to Allah alone, but it also stated that power had to be exercised by the people of Pakistan through their chosen representatives. Furthermore, there was no role for ulema in the Objectives Resolution.
1956 Constitution
The 1956 Constitution was promulgated on 23 March 1956 and had 234 articles. It established a federal polity and a unicameral parliament. It also envisaged a parliamentary system, and included sections related to both fundamental rights and Islamic provisions.

The 1956 Constitution demonstrated the importance of Islam’s role in Pakistan’s state nationalism. The Objectives Resolution (Preamble) and the Directive Principles of State Policy (Articles 23–31) both contained Islamic references. For instance, Article 25 called for making the teaching of the Holy Quran compulsory, promoting unity among Muslims, and proper organization of Zakat, wakfs and mosques.

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan was chosen as the name of the country (Article 1(1)) and only a Muslim was eligible to become President of the country (Article 32(2)). There was also a separate section in the Constitution entitled Islamic provisions that had two significant articles. One of the potentially most powerful articles related to Islam stated:

No law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, hereinafter referred to as Injunctions of Islam, and existing law shall be brought into conformity with such Injunctions. (Article 198)

Though the above article showed the significance of Islam’s role in state nationalism, it also revealed the true intent of the ruling elite. Instead of writing that all future laws enacted would be based on Islam, the wording of the provision was “No law shall be enacted which is repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah”, which gave the government considerable leeway to make all kinds of laws. The second part of the provision relating to changing existing laws had no timeframe and the recommendations had to come from a commission to be established by the President within one year after the promulgation of the 1956 Constitution. The Constitution was promulgated on 23 March 1956, but the Commission was never established during the two-and-a-half years before the Constitution was abrogated in October 1958 following a military coup. The coup leader, General Ayub Khan, promised a new constitution.

1962 Constitution
The 1962 Constitution was promulgated on 8 June 1962 and had 250 articles. It established a unicameral parliament and a presidential system,
with few checks and balances. The independence of the judiciary, Islamic provisions, and fundamental rights were enshrined in the Constitution.

The original 1962 Constitution, formulated under General Ayub Khan, tried to reduce Islam’s role in Pakistan’s state nationalism. Some of the articles related to Islam in the 1962 Constitution were similar to the 1956 Constitution. The Objectives Resolution and Directive Principles of Policy were included in the 1962 Constitution and the President had to be Muslim. However, there were also major differences that intended to reduce Islam’s role. The name of Pakistan was changed from the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the Republic of Pakistan in the new Constitution. Second, in the 1962 Constitution, there was no article similar to Article 198 of the 1956 Constitution. Ayub Khan, a modernist Muslim, did not find it necessary to bring laws into conformity with the Quran and Sunnah. Third, in articles where the 1956 Constitution referred to the Quran and the Sunnah, the 1962 Constitution referred only to Islam to avoid specific commitments. These changes were criticized by the religious right, but Ayub remained committed to limiting Islam in the new Pakistani Constitution, thereby decreasing Islam’s role in state nationalism. However, after democracy was restored in 1962 and elections were held, the legislators passed the First Amendment to the Constitution in 1963, bringing back most of the Islamic articles of the 1956 Constitution. Pakistan, again, became the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the word “Islam” was replaced by the “Quran and Sunnah” in many provisions.

One area where the original 1962 Constitution appeared more Islamic than the 1956 Constitution was the creation of Islamic advisory institutions. While the 1956 Constitution established only the Organization for Islamic Research and Instruction, two bodies related to Islam were established under the 1962 Constitution, the Advisory Council on Islamic Ideology (Article 199) and the Islamic Research Institute (Article 207). These bodies were to assist governments in enabling and encouraging the Muslims of Pakistan to live their lives according to Islam, and to examine all laws in force with a view to bringing them into conformity with Islam. However, Ayub Khan considered the purpose of these institutions advisory at best and did not think government should stop and wait for their advice:

It is the legislature and the President who will be elected by the people, and it is therefore they who must finally accept the responsibility for making laws and giving decisions. The function of the Council, backed by the Islamic
Research Institute, is to produce considered, well-thought out, scientific advice... If they choose not to tender their advice within a given period, life cannot stop. Work must go on. (Government of Pakistan 1962)

He appointed Fazal-ur-Rehman, a modernist professor, as head of the Islamic Research Institute, indicating a desire for an interpretation of Islam that accommodated modernity, instead of moving modern laws closer to the traditional religious laws, as was demanded by the religious right.

The Islamic provisions of both the 1956 and the 1962 Constitutions substantiated that Islam, despite Ayub Khan’s efforts, remained an important part of Pakistan’s state nationalism. Pakistan was an “Islamic Republic” and the head of state had to be Muslim. Moreover, the Objectives Resolution and the Directive Principle of State Policy, with their many references to Islam, were part of both Constitutions. Finally, Islamic provisions were also part of both constitutions.

The Early 1970s to Late 1990s

In March 1969, General Yahya Khan imposed martial law, abrogated the 1962 Constitution, and announced the holding of elections soon. Following the 1970 elections, power was not handed over to the Awami League, the party from East Pakistan that had won the elections. Instead, a military operation was launched in East Pakistan, which gave the reason India was waiting for to intervene militarily and led to the eventual loss of East Pakistan in December 1971. The upheaval in the late 1960s and the later separation of East Pakistan forced a review of Pakistan’s state nationalism. As the following discussion on constitutional changes shows, the Pakistani elite—both civilian and military—decided that increasing the contribution of Islam to state nationalism was the remedy for avoiding another “Bangladesh”.

Legal Framework Order, 1970

The Legal Framework Order (LFO), issued by the military government after lengthy discussions with all stakeholders, was a legal and constitutional roadmap to return the country to civilian rule. It had many positive aspects, such as the adoption of the universal adult franchise for coming elections and a more decentralized government structure. However, it also contained provisions that put restrictions on the
future constituent assembly, revealing the desire of General Yahya’s regime to be the final arbiter of elections and to retain power (Government of Pakistan 1970).

The most important aspect of the LFO, as far as this book is concerned, was the specific link that was established between Pakistan and Islamic ideology in this constitutional document. Under the heading of fundamental principles of the constitution, Clause 20(b) stated:

i. *Islamic ideology which is the basis for the creation of Pakistan shall be preserved: and*

ii. *The Head of the State shall be a Muslim.*

The requirement of the head of the Pakistani state to be a Muslim was present in the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions, but the categorical statement that Islamic ideology was the basis of Pakistan was new. No such claim was made in the previous two Constitutions. While Islam’s role was generally acknowledged, there were no provisions in the previous Constitutions about an “Islamic ideology” that was under threat and gave the state responsibility to preserve the ideology.

1972 Interim Constitution

The 1972 Interim Constitution was promulgated after the separation of East Pakistan to serve as a constitution until a new constitution was agreed upon and promulgated. It served as Pakistan’s constitution for 16 months, from April 1972 to August 1973. It contained most of the Islamic provisions of the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions: the preamble; the name of the republic; the requirement for the head of state to be Muslim; and the establishing of an Advisory Council of Islamic Ideology. The change was a new addition related to Islam that became part of the oath that important state officials had to take:

That I will strive to preserve the Islamic Ideology which is the basis for the creation of Pakistan… (Interim Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1972)

This requirement for preserving the Islamic ideology thus continued from the LFO to this interim constitution and soon became part of the 1973 Constitution.
1973 Constitution

The 1973 Constitution was promulgated on 14 August 1973 and had 280 articles. Through it, Pakistan reverted to being a parliamentary system of government. For the first time, the parliament was bicameral, with the Senate representing federating units. It expanded the Islamic provisions and the fundamental rights as compared to the previous two Constitutions.

The subtle change that had started with the LFO, 1970, matured in the new Constitution. Pakistan became a confessional state, with nationality defined in terms of Islam. Though the new Constitution promulgated in 1973 was based on the British model and the laws were still mostly based on the colonial heritage, Islam’s influence became more than symbolic, as it was acknowledged to be a major part of Pakistan’s national identity. One can also argue that it was a movement from the low, rural, folk Islam to Gellnerian high, scriptural, urban Islam, a step towards the development of an Islamic nationalism (Hassan 2013). The constitutional documents after 1973 projected Pakistan as a Muslim state that was part of the Ummah, the global Islamic community. This image became acceptable both to the ruling classes and to the masses for the following reasons:

- It moved the focus away from the excruciating loss of half of the country after a humiliating defeat at the hands of the arch-rival India. The blow to the national pride could not be harder. Envisioning Pakistan as part of the global Islamic Ummah softened the blow. If all Muslims were one nation, then India had not been successful in separating West Pakistanis and East Pakistanis (Bangladeshis), as they were still one nation. Moreover, if all Muslims were one nation, then the new Pakistan was bigger than India, despite being more than six times smaller.

- Bhutto, the new leader of Pakistan, promoted this image as a way to benefit from the newly rich conservative Arab Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. Pakistan was in dire economic straits because of the war, loss of half the country, and the oil embargo that resulted in tripling the oil prices in the mid-1970s. Aligning with the Arab Muslim countries not only brought millions of dollars in economic aid, but also resulted in jobs for thousands of Pakistanis in these countries.

- It also projected the loss of East Pakistan as the result of perennial Hindu–Muslim rivalry, instead of as the direct consequence of the actions of the West Pakistan ruling elite during the 1950s and 1960s, when they refused to share power with their East Pakistani counterparts.
The 1973 Constitution had more Islamic provisions than the previous two Constitutions. For example, Islam was declared the state religion for the first time in Pakistan’s history. In Article 2, the Pakistani state proudly declared itself Islamic. Moreover, the 1973 Constitution also called for Islamic unity; support for the teaching of Arabic and *Islamiyat* (Islamic Studies); correct and exact printing of the Quran; and prevention of the printing and circulation of obscene literature. All these directives became part of a Pakistani constitution for the first time. An article, similar to Article 198 of the 1956 Constitution, calling for making new and existing laws closer to the Quran and Sunnah was also revived. Furthermore, for the first time, almost all oaths given in the Constitution contained the statement, “That I will strive to preserve the Islamic Ideology, which is the basis for the creation of Pakistan” and ended with, “May Allah Almighty help and guide me (A’meen)”. Finally, along with the President, the Prime Minister was required to be a Muslim in the 1973 Constitution.

However, these changes were not considered enough and the amendments to the 1973 Constitution during this period further linked the national identity with Islam. The Second Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, passed in 1974, defined a Muslim and made Ahmadis, or Qadianis or Ahmadiyyah, a deviant sect, non-Muslim. Bhutto’s actions to promote Islam and ties with Islamic countries, however, did not save him and he was ousted in a military coup in 1977 after a protest movement mainly led by the religious parties. General Zia, who led the coup, was an observant Muslim and decided to legitimize his rule using Islam. Hence, the blending of Pakistan state nationalism and Islam continued with an increased vigour. General Zia made extensive changes to the 1973 Constitution and forced the parliamentarians to accept these changes before ending martial law in 1985. Most of these changes were included in the Constitution as the Eighth Amendment. Some of the most significant changes brought about by the Eighth Amendment are:

- The Objective Resolution was added to the Constitution and was made a substantive part of the Constitution (Article 2A);
- “Freely” was omitted from the following Objectives Resolution sentence related to minorities, “Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to *freely* profess and practise their religions and develop their cultures” (Article 2A);
Wherever the word “Parliament” occurs in the Constitution, it was substituted by “Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)”, linking Parliament with the Quranic concept of shura\(^{24}\);

- The image of an ideal Islamic parliamentarian was made part of the Constitution (Articles 62 and 63);
- The state was to take steps to collect ushr (an Islamic tax on agricultural produce), in addition to zakat, auqaf, and mosques (Article 31);
- The Federal Shariat Court and Shariat Bench of the Supreme Court were established (Article 203, Clauses 203A to 203 J).

The Eighth Amendment also legalized all Islam-inspired laws and ordinances that General Zia introduced between 1977 and 1985:

- Hudood Ordinances (1979)
- Zakat and Ushr Ordinance (1980)
- Ehteram-e-Ramadan (Reverence of Ramadan) Ordinance (1981)
- Amendments to various laws to enable an interest-free banking system (early 1980s)
- Blasphemy laws made more stringent, with severe punishments (1980s)
- Ordinance XX that is the basis of discrimination against the Ahmadi community (1984).

After these changes, the 1973 Constitution unmistakably showed that Islam was the basis for Pakistan’s state nationalism. Two characteristics distinguished the constitutional and legal changes under Zia. First, these were all Islam-inspired. Second, almost all of the changes were based on traditional Shariah and ignored the Indian Islamic culture that had been a reality for close to one thousand years in Pakistan. Numerous administrative changes were also made to strengthen the new “Islamic” national image. For instance, thousands of prayer wardens were appointed to persuade people to pray (the Nizam-e-Salat campaign in the early 1980s). This trend was also helped by the return of thousands of Pakistanis from the Gulf States, who were influenced by the puritanical Islam practised in those states.

Despite Zia’s religious proclivities, the increased presence of Islam in the 1973 Constitution would not have been possible without the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent Afghan “jihad”. The millions
of dollars provided by the USA and Saudi Arabia allowed the Pakistan Army to support hundreds of madrassas where religious and military training was provided to Muslims coming from all parts of the world. Islamic rhetoric, ideology, and culture were emphasized, while local Muslim cultures, including Pakistani culture, were de-emphasized and considered un-Islamic.

After Zia’s death in 1988, democracy returned and it became difficult to Islamize the constitution further. The blowback of the Zia’s Islamization drive and the decade-old Afghan war, which transformed into a civil war after the Soviet withdrawal (1989), was fierce. The Pakistani state was unable to control thousands of trained (mostly Pakistani) men, armed with advanced weapons and an exclusionist ideology, from hampering economic development and disturbing social peace. Rival sectarian groups fought each other, killing thousands of people in the 1990s.

Without dictatorial powers, it was difficult to silence and counter opposition to “Islamize” the Constitution. Two constitutional amendments bringing the Constitution closer to Shariah failed. In the late 1980s, the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution, attempting to make Shariah the supreme law of Pakistan, was rejected. In 1998, the Fifteenth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution attempted to make the Holy Quran and Sunnah the supreme law of Pakistan but it also failed. However, the piecemeal inclusion of Shariah at a lower level continued to be sponsored by Pakistani governments. In 1991, the Enforcement of Shariah Act was passed and the Qisas and Diyat Ordinances were passed by Parliament in 1997.

The 1973 Constitution and the subsequent amendments demonstrate that Islam had become a major contributor to Pakistan’s state nationalism. The new Pakistani identity prioritized scriptural Islam over living Islam and global Islam over local, cultural Pakistani Islam. This trend was not limited to Pakistan and, more or less, all Muslim-majority countries were affected by the trend. In Pakistan, however, this global Islamic identity took a deeper hold than in other MMCs because of the prominent role played by Islam in the creation of Pakistan, the humiliating defeat of 1971, and participation in the Afghan War in the late 1970s and 1980s.

1999 Onwards

As compared with the short-lived 1956 and 1962 Constitutions, the 1973 Constitution is still the supreme law of Pakistan after 44 years. It was partly
suspended or held in abeyance from 1977 to 1985 and from 1999 to 2002 during the periods of martial laws but, once the martial laws ended, it again became operational. It is still very popular and, although some fringe groups have called for a new social contract (that is, constitution), all the major political players publically avow their loyalty to it.

At the turn of the millennium, an important change happened in Pakistan. Since the early 1970s, as discussed, the trend had been to Islamize the Constitution, with more and more Islam-inspired amendments and laws. This trend changed after the introduction of martial law in October 1999. There were no more serious attempts to introduce more Shariah to the Constitution. If there were a trend after 1999, it was the gradual chipping away of Islam-inspired legislation introduced in the 1970s and 1980s.

A brief look at the context is necessary to understand why the national elite stopped thinking of Islamization of the Constitution (and laws) as a viable national strategy. By the late 1990s, the blowback of Islamization was evident but the purported benefits were nowhere in sight. Sectarianism, political instability, an increase in narcotics usage and the crime rate, low economic growth, escalation of ethnic melees, and so on, made the 1990s Pakistan’s lost decade. Change came with the military coup of 1999 that brought General Musharraf to power. If General Zia, a practising Muslim, personified the increasingly Islamic Pakistani identity, General Musharraf, a Westernized Muslim who loved drinking, dancing, and music, personified change in the opposite direction. If Zia’s ideal was the puritanical Saudi Arabia, Musharraf, in contrast, wanted Pakistan to be more like secular Turkey and claimed Ataturk as his childhood hero and General Evren as his ideal (BBC 1999; Singh 2004). If Zia promoted an Islamic identity and entangled Pakistan in foreign adventures, Musharraf developed the policy of “Pakistan First”. Addressing the Pakistani nation after September 11, he prioritized a Pakistani identity over a global Islamic identity and tried to dissuade Pakistanis from being concerned about other Muslim countries and non-Pakistani Muslims:

Pakistan comes first, everything else is secondary… Dear countrymen, at this moment, I am only concerned about Pakistan. As the commander-in-chief of Pakistan, I will defend Pakistan first of all… (BBC 2001)

Another policy initiative was that of “Enlightened Moderation” which, as General Musharraf himself explained, was a two-pronged strategy:
The first part is for the Muslim world to shun militancy and extremism and adopt the path of socioeconomic uplift. The second is for the West, and the United States in particular, to seek to resolve all political disputes with justice and to aid in the socioeconomic betterment of the deprived Muslim world... (Musharraf 2004)

Musharraf started as an avowed modernist and took the following administrative measures to limit the Islamization of Pakistan and the global Islamic identity. Under his rule, thousands of Taliban members were killed or captured, and military action was taken against militant groups that were fighting against the USA and the International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan. Some religious militant groups were banned and infiltration into Indian-controlled Kashmir was reduced. More madrassahs were registered and efforts were made to increase the state’s control over their curriculum.

However, in terms of the Constitution, his legacy is mixed due to his alliance with the religious right. Musharraf’s personal desire to continue ruling as both President and Army Chief for as long as he could and the military’s institutional needs made an alliance with the country’s democratic forces improbable. Therefore, to counter the opposition from mainstream democratic parties, he allied with the religious parties and both his signature policies, Pakistan first and enlightened moderation, took a backseat to his desire to retain power. He indirectly supported religious parties in the 2002 elections by not allowing the two mainstream parties to participate in the elections freely. In return, by supporting the passage of the Seventeenth Constitutional Amendment, religious parties not only indemnified all his illegal and unconstitutional actions during martial law (1999–2002), but also allowed him to become president while still remaining Army Chief, an arrangement specifically forbidden in the Constitution.

However, despite this mullah–military alliance, Islam’s contribution to Pakistan’s state nationalism decreased from around 2000, as is evident from the constitutional amendments. During the period from 2001 to April 2017, seven amendments were passed. The Nineteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-second Amendments are specifically focused on appointments of the superior judiciary and the conduct of free elections, and were not related to the state–religion relationship. The following section will analyze the Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Twenty-first, and Twenty-eighth Amendments to the 1973 Constitution.

In the Seventeenth Amendment, hundreds of laws promulgated under Musharraf’s martial law were legalized. Some of these laws that tried to de-
link the Pakistan state and traditional Shariah were the introduction of joint electorates, an increase in the number of seats reserved for women in the Parliament and provincial assemblies, and the institution of a new local government system that gave one-third representation to women and increased representation to minorities. Re-introduction of joint electorates was a particularly important change as it integrated the electoral lists and allowed non-Muslims to vote for the same candidates for whom Muslims were voting. Since 1985, under a separate electoral mechanism, which prioritized Muslim identity over Pakistani identity, non-Muslims could not vote for their local candidates and only voted for their own non-Muslim candidates. The change under the Seventeenth Amendment promoted and strengthened territorial state nationalism, instead of a nationalism based on religious identity.

After the Seventeenth Amendment, because of the strong presence of religious parties in the Parliament, no new constitutional amendment could be passed that decreased the role of Islam, but Musharraf’s regime did pass some laws to undo the excesses of the 1980s. Women and minorities that had suffered during the previous three decades were given more rights and discriminatory laws were discarded, making them feel a part of the Pakistani nation. For example, in 2006, the Women Protection Law was passed and the quota of women in the elite bureaucracy was increased from 5 per cent to 10 per cent. Minorities were given reserved seats in the local bodies. However, major changes could not be made. For example, the Hudood or blasphemy laws remained on the books, despite Musharraf’s admission that they had been misused (Musharraf 2006, 319, 336).

The chipping away of the Islamization of the 1980s and 1990s of the constitution continued after the restoration of democracy in 2008, as liberal parties won the election and formed the government. Governments moved to undo legal discrimination, to protect human rights, and to accommodate women and minorities:

- Numerous pro-minorities measures and laws (Celebration of National Minorities Day 2009, reservation of a 5 per cent quota
However, major constitutional changes could not be made (again) as the religious parties were still influential due to the support of the military. These parties dubbed any deletion of Zia’s amendments as proof of subservience to the West. One of the biggest opportunities to change the constitutional character, which still bore the hallmarks of puritanical Zia, came in 2010. The whole constitution was scrutinized in the run-up to the Eighteenth Amendment. Nothing was off the table. But, while revolutionary steps were taken in other areas (for example, centre—province relations, parliamentary form of government, judicial appointments), few changes were made relating to state–Islam relations:

- “Freely” was re-introduced in the following Objectives Resolution sentence related to the minorities, “Wherein adequate provision shall be made for the minorities freely to profess and practise their religions and develop their cultures”;
- In Article 62, the mainly religious qualifications for a person to become a member of parliament or provincial assemblies were decreased or circumscribed;
- The right to information, education, and free trial were made fundamental constitutional rights (2010);
- The conditions in Article 63(h), which states the disqualifications for a member parliament or provincial assembly, were also narrowed down (Mir 2010).

Perhaps the biggest change in terms of the constitutional persona came after the attack on the Army Public School (APS), Peshawar, in which the Taliban killed 132 school children on 16 December 2014. National outrage led to the revival of the death penalty and the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution. This amendment has rightly been criticized as a return to quasi-military rule, or a soft coup or militarization of the Constitution (Boone 2015; Khan 2015b; Yousaf 2015). Pakistan, which has been ruled by generals for almost half its history, can ill afford transferring more powers to the military, no matter how exceptional the circumstances (Dawn 2015; Perera 2015; Walsh 2015; Wolf 2015). However, the Twenty-first Amendment was also the first time Muslim extremism, terrorism, and militancy was acknowledged in the Constitution. Previously, it was anathema to link Muslims with
extremism or terrorism. The Taliban’s savagery and declarations that they would do even more inhuman and barbaric acts made this unthinkable amendment acceptable. The religious right’s hold on Pakistani identity was significantly breached in a major way and religious parties were up in arms against it, but they failed (Abbtakk.tv. 2015; Express Tribune 2015; Hughes 2015). The notable references to Muslim militancy and terrorism in the amendment acknowledged the separation of the Pakistani Muslim identity and other Muslim identities, thus showing the strength of the movement towards territorial nationalism that started under Musharraf.

Under the Twenty-first Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, it was clearly stated that the changes in Article 175 were specifically meant for groups and individuals, “who claims, or is known, to belong to any terrorist group or organization using the name of religion or a sect”. Moreover, the changes in the Pakistan Army Act also targeted religious militancy specifically (Government of Pakistan 2015a; 2015b). In March 2017, the Twenty-eighth Amendment renewed military courts and their powers against religious militants for two more years (Radio Pakistan 2017).

The current period, as the above discussion shows, has resulted in a decline in Islam’s contribution to Pakistan’s state nationalism. The trend of the last three decades of the twentieth century, when different governments were trying to increase Islamization of the Constitution, ended at the dawn of the millennium. Losing more than 50,000 Pakistanis to Muslim militant groups during the last decade has a lasting effect on Pakistani state nationalism and the 1973 Constitution shows this change, particularly after the passage of the Twenty-first and Twenty-eighth Amendments.

**CONCLUSION**

Constitutions are a way to decipher state nationalisms and to evince Islam’s contribution to state nationalism in the MMCs. In the preceding discussion, in addition to some smaller constitutional documents, three constitutions each of Turkey and Pakistan were analyzed in terms of their Islamic and secular provisions. The variations in the number and type of constitutional provisions related to religion and secularism demonstrated the ebb and flow of Islam’s role in the state nationalisms of these countries.
Two conclusions may be drawn from the analysis of Turkish constitutions. First, all Turkish constitutions were drafted by the secular elite without much popular input (Barkey and Kadioglu 2011). The first constitution was adopted under a single party regime, with military figures still dominant. The second constitution was crafted in 1960–1, again under the guidance of the Turkish military. Finally, the constitution-making process of the 1982 Constitution was also dominated by the military junta. The Turkish elite (mainly the military, but also the higher levels of the judiciary, bureaucracy, and intelligentsia) tried to use these Constitutions to take Turkish society closer to the West and away from its traditional ways and norms. Nothing explains the situation more clearly than the Kemalist slogan, “for the people, despite the people” (Taspinar 2001).

Second, while the emphasis on secularism increased with time, the role of the Diyanet and religious education also expanded. Islam had a large role in Turkish state nationalism at the start of the Republic and this was visible in the 1924 Constitution, where Islam was the state religion and there were also other references to Islam. Gradually, Ataturk and his close associates were able to decrease Islam’s role in state nationalism and, by 1927, all references relating to Islam, including the clause making Islam the state religion, were omitted from the Constitution. Islam’s role in state nationalism diminished further in 1937, when a constitutional amendment made Turkey a secular republic. The 1961 Constitution further entrenched secularism by making the amendment process difficult so that popular governments, even after winning elections, cannot bring Islam back into the Constitution. Moreover, eight laws passed in the 1920s and 1930s, which were part of Ataturk’s secularizing reforms, were also made part of the Constitution, thus making it hard to change them. However, paradoxically, Islam’s role also increased. First, the Diyanet became a constitutional body in 1961, increasing its legitimacy and influence. Second, the Constitution allowed religious (Islamic) education in public schools. Under the 1982 Constitution, Turkey remained a secular republic and secularism was added to the oaths of President and the GNA members. But Islam’s contribution to state nationalism was also increasingly evident, as the Constitution further increased the Diyanet’s role and also made religious education mandatory in schools.

Since the 1980s, Islam’s role in state nationalism has increased but there have not been many amendments to the Constitution that are related to Islam. Former President Ahmet Sezer (2000–07) and the Constitutional Court both rejected amendments proposed by the AKP. As from 2010, the AKP could have amended the Constitution to introduce minor changes
related to Islam but its interest shifted to bringing about a presidential system. President Erdogan has said that secularism will remain part of the new constitution, but it is difficult to know what will happen after the April 2017 referendum win. This win will certainly increase his power and confidence and, with neither military nor the EU to worry about, he can introduce some religious provisions in the new constitution. Maybe he is following the strategy of Ataturk. As discussed, Ataturk, against his wishes, made Islam the state religion in the 1924 Constitution but later, after he had decimated the opposition using Sheikh Said’s rebellion, excluded all references to Islam in the constitution.

In contrast to Turkey, Islam’s role in state nationalism has increased exponentially for the majority of Pakistan’s history. Each constitution was more Islamic than the previous one. The main reasons were Islam’s role in the creation of Pakistan, the constant tussle with (Hindu) India and its role in the loss of East Pakistan, the Afghan Liberation War (1979–89), and the alliance of the Pakistan military with the religious right. However, at the turn of the millennium, there was a change of course. Efforts to increase Islamic provisions in the Constitution decreased significantly. Slowly, territorial state nationalism is gaining ground over religious state nationalism. Implementing Shariah lost its prominence as one of the viable policy options and many Islam-inspired constitutional clauses and laws were either restricted or removed. The legal discrimination against women and minorities, which had previously been increasing, is now decreasing. However, these changes may not be construed as an evidence of Islam not being an important part of Pakistani state nationalism. Islam’s role in state nationalism is still important, but it has shown some decline since 1999, particularly after 2014.

The main difference between the Pakistani and Turkish constitutional debates regarding state–religion relations is that, in Turkey, such debates discuss what kind of secularism the country should have. In the case of Pakistan, such debates revolve around the question of the kind of Islamic polity Pakistan should be. The objective of the debates in both countries is balancing Islam and secularism, and they are moving closer as Turkey rejects assertive secularism and Pakistan damps down its desire for an Islamic polity.

This concludes the analysis of one of the indicators of Islam’s role in state nationalism; that is, constitutional provisions relating to religion. Chapters 3 and 4 will continue our examination of the indicators of Islam’s role in state nationalism. Chapter 3 will analyze national symbols, while Chapter 4 will focus on images on banknotes.
Notes

1. The ulema were mobilizing Muslims for both Ataturk and the Ottoman Sultan. The Sultan’s ulema, including Sheikh-ul-Islam Durrizade Efendi, issued fatwas against Ataturk and his followers, sanctioning their killing.

2. For example, there were no provisions related to the judicial branch of the government and no separate section on fundamental rights. There was also no mention of the Ottoman Sultan/Caliph, who was still regarded as the head of state of the new entity. However, despite its deficiencies, it was prepared in a democratic way. According to some experts, the framers of this constitution were more representative of the Turkish population than the framers of earlier Ottoman or later (three) Turkish constitutions (Eyes 2005).

3. The ministry was replaced by a department in the Prime Minister’s office (Diyanet) and a foundation. These changes will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

4. Two theories championed by Ataturk himself were the Sun language theory and the Turkish historical thesis. The Sun language theory broadly claimed that a proto-Turkish language was the basis of all languages and the Turkish historical thesis argued that Central Asia (the ancient homeland of the Turks) was the cradle of all major civilizations. The scientific evidence supporting these theories was weak.

5. However, it should be clear that the official Ottoman language was Turkish. It had many Arabic and Persian words, and was written in Arabic script but it was Turkish. Not surprisingly, most Turks did not understand the Quran even in the Ottoman times.

6. These six principles are known as six arrows of Kemalism and are depicted on of the CHP flag.

7. Islam’s role was not completely eliminated in the Turkish state nationalism, as non-Muslims were still considered second-class Turkish citizens.

8. The DP was formed by a group of former CHP leaders. It was a center-right party, not an Islamist party. While the DP favoured removing some restrictions on religious practice, its leaders Celal Bayar (a confidant of Ataturk who served under him in numerous positions, including as Prime Minister) and Adnan Menderes (a former member of the CHP) did not change the secular nature of Turkey’s institutions. The difference between Menderes and the CHP leadership was that he was not anti-religion. Menderes “did not detest or fear religious practice, as many Kemalists did” (Kinzer 2008, 61).

9. The Diyanet and religious education expansion will be discussed in detail in Chapters 6 and 7, respectively.

10. Including hanging Menderes and two of his ministers.
11. The party promoted itself as a “champion of Islam” and, as with the DP, had the support of religious orders (Eligur 2010, 59).
12. From 1961 to 1965, four different governments ruled Turkey.
13. Since the Turkish military was the most powerful supporter of secularism, the change in its views removed the major obstacle to Islam’s contribution to Turkish state nationalism.
14. Though it failed to maintain its majority in the parliament in the June 2015 elections, it was still the largest party. It reclaimed its majority in November 2015 by increasing its vote share.
15. Founding father. He was Governor General from 1947 to 1948.
16. Liaqat Ali Khan was Prime Minister from 1947 to 1951.
17. Khawaja Nazimuddin was Governor General from 1948 to 1951 before serving as Prime Minister from 1951 to 1954.
18. There was no mention of Islam in other sections of the Constitution, except in the clauses mentioned above (Name, Objectives Resolution and Directive Principles of State Policy).
19. It ended the “One Unit” experiment. One Unit was created in 1954 by merging all the provinces and territories of West Pakistan to balance the numerical superiority of Bengalis/East Pakistanis. After uniting West Pakistan under One Unit, parity between East and West Pakistan became a constitutional principle. Under the parity principle, in the constitutions of both 1956 and 1962, East and West Pakistan (One Unit) had equal members in the central legislature. The political leadership of all provinces in West Pakistan—except the largest province Punjab, which benefited from this arrangement—protested against One Unit throughout the late 1950s and 1960s.
20. For example, the constituent assembly would stand dissolved, if it could not agree on a constitution in 120 days.
21. In the 1962 Constitution, this clause was present but was part of the principles of state policy and thus not binding.
22. Though no other amendments related to Islam were made under Bhutto (1972–77), he did make Islam a more influential part of Pakistan’s governing system by extensively using Islamic rhetoric and symbolism, and by having very close relations with Muslim countries. He also made some legal changes, which will be discussed later.
23. Zia’s penchant for using Islam was evident even before he became Pakistan’s leader. After becoming Army chief, he changed the Army’s motto to “Iman, Taqwa, Jihad-e-fi-Sabilillah” (Faith, fear of Allah, struggle/jihad for Allah), based on the Quranic precepts. He also discouraged alcohol, encouraged prayers, and openly used Islamic rhetoric.
24. Shoora means “mutual consultation”, it is considered an Islamic principle and is often cited as an evidence of support of democracy in the Quran. The Quran (42:38) describes the qualities of good Muslims in a verse as follows:
And those who have responded to their Lord and established prayer and whose affair is [determined by] consultation among themselves, and from what We have provided them, they spend.

The Quran (3:159) also advised Prophet Muhammad to consult with other Muslims:

So by mercy from Allah, [O Muhammad], you were lenient with them. And if you had been rude [in speech] and harsh in heart, they would have disbanded from about you. So pardon them and ask forgiveness for them and consult them in the matter. And when you have decided, then rely upon Allah. Indeed, Allah loves those who rely [upon Him].

By naming Parliament as the Majlis-e-Shoora (meaning mutual consultation council), Zia tried to link Parliament with Islam.

25. In 2002, the religious right won their largest share in votes cast in national elections in the history of Pakistan.
National symbols are important markers of a nation. National anthems and national flags, two of the most important national symbols, evoke deep emotions and incite passions in people who usually would not consider themselves very emotional or patriotic. Everyone has seen athletes and other sportsmen, usually the epitome of masculinity, cry on hearing their national anthem and seeing their national flag raised during the Olympic ceremonies. The recursive, subliminal indoctrination that these symbols provide makes them not only depictions of state nationalism, but also architects of state nationalism (Geisler 2005).

National symbols define nations and make them visible. They are required because nations have to be personified and seen before they are loved (Walzer 1967). National symbols are primary cues to national history, one’s national duties and obligations, and the superiority of national identity over other identities, and, therefore, stimulate state nationalism. National symbols are thus not inferior to the real markers of national identity but are equally important, if not more so, to the nation-building process (Elgenius 2011). Geisler explains why these symbols are a significant part of state nationalism and the nation-building effort.

Yet national symbols perform an important function not only as catalysts for the formation and maintenance of national identity. They take on a particularly crucial importance in fusing a nation to a state. For especially in those cases where the territorial boundaries of the state do not correspond to the
geographic outlines of the ancestral “homeland” claimed by a nation, or
where a state is created without the ideological support structure of a nation,
national symbols are charged with the difficult task of creating a nation.
(Geisler 2005)

Flags, anthems, and mottos are recognized as icons of a nation’s identity,
both within the nation and internationally. Flags and anthems stir emotions
across nations, as they are considered the embodiment of a nation’s history
and pride. National mottos call to mind long-standing national myths and
also create new ones, keeping in view the requirements of the nation.
Similarly, national holidays and celebrations are important national symbols.
If flags and anthems are visual and auditory symbols of a nation, national
holidays are temporal symbols of state nationalism. The selection of these
holidays, particularly new holidays, informs how a state wants to be seen. As
all these symbols are chosen and controlled by the state, the nationalism
they project is state nationalism. These symbols evince which groups,
according to the state elite, are part of the nation and what, in accordance
with the elite, are the markers of the national identity. For instance, a new
national holiday in honour of Martin Luther King, Jr was one way to
reassure the African-Americans that they were a valued part of the nation
and whiteness was no longer a marker of the US national identity.

Since this book is analyzing Islam’s role in state nationalism of Turkey
and Pakistan, there are perhaps few better ways forward than to examine
and unpack the national symbols of these countries. In this chapter,
following symbols of Turkey and Pakistan will be evaluated for their
religious content:

- national emblems and anthems
- national languages and mottos of the military
- national and presidential flags
- national mosques
- national capitals, and so on.

To trace the variations in Islam’s role in state nationalism, those
national symbols have been chosen that have been modified, so that
the changes in state nationalism, in relation to Islam, becomes appar-
ent. The absence of change in national symbols, however, does not
mean that state nationalism did not change. It is quite possible that the
same symbol has been used to signify different state nationalisms in
different eras. The American Star-Spangled Banner, French Tricolor, and the British Union Jack now symbolize nations and ideologies that are very different from what they symbolized in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As will be discussed, the Turkish flag also signified different state nationalisms in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The following section will first analyze Turkish national symbols and then Pakistani national symbols to ascertain changes in Islam’s role in Turkish and Pakistani state nationalism, respectively. But symbols can be interpreted in different ways by different people, even during the same period. The same symbol can evoke wholly opposite emotions; a flag can simultaneously be a symbol of ethnic pride and of multiculturalism. As the focus is on state nationalism—nationalism that the state elite want to promote—the changes in state symbols will be examined keeping in view the outlooks and opinions of the ruling elite in Turkey and Pakistan.

**Turkish National Symbols**

This section analyzes different Turkish national symbols over the last one hundred years. As mentioned earlier, the focus will be on those symbols that demonstrate a change in Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism.

**The Early 1920s to Mid-1940s**

The national symbols of this period exhibited the rejection of Ottoman and Muslim nationalism and the adoption of territorial and ethnic (Turk or Turkic) state nationalism. Islam or religious nationalism that was part of Ottoman emblems, logos, and flags was discarded within the first few years of the Republic. Ethnolinguistic state nationalism became especially dominant in the 1930s when glorifying Turkish ethnicity and the Turkish language became a passion for Ataturk, forming the basis of state support for the “fantastic tales” of Turkish magnificence since time immemorial (Mango 2002, 492–7).

**The Red National Flag**

Starting from the mid-1920s, the Turkish elite tried to break Turkey free from the Ottoman-Islamic culture of the past. Male dress code, Hat law, adoption of the Latin script and Gregorian calendar, and other changes demonstrate their commitment to reducing Islam/Ottoman influence and
the introduction of a new Western European culture. Concurrently, Islam’s role in state nationalism was also reduced, as discussed in Chapter 2, by removing Islamic references from the 1924 Constitution. In these circumstances, it may seem strange that the early Republican regime adopted the flag of the Ottoman Empire as the flag of the new state, with its conspicuous religious symbolism of the crescent and star. However, the Republican regime interpreted the flag and its crescent and star as an Anatolian and Turkish symbol, and not as an Islamic symbol. It emphasized that the crescent and star was not an Islamic symbol but a symbol of the Turks (Smith 2001). The choice of the crescent and star and the red Ottoman flag was, therefore, a selection of a territorial and ethnic symbol over a religious symbol that was represented by the Ottoman Caliphate’s green flag. In the late Ottoman era, the Caliphate was represented by the green flag and the Sultanate by the red flag. The new Republic rejected the green flag and the affiliated religious symbolism.

**State Emblem**
The religious state nationalism of the Ottoman Caliphate was evident in its emblem. There was a green flag with a crescent at the bottom and a green crescent and circle at the top in the centre. The new Turkish government rejected this emblem.

In 1925, the Education Ministry organized a contest for a new state emblem. The contest was won by Namik Ismail. His proposed emblem had a strong ethnic nationalist flavour. It depicted a white asena and a combination of the crescent and the star on a red background. The asena is a mythological she-wolf, associated with the ancient Turks and Turkish empire built by the Ashina tribe in the sixth century (Findley 2004, 37–40). Though this emblem was not officially adopted as the state emblem, the Ottoman emblem with religious motifs never came back. Since then, the white crescent and star against the red background has been used in place of the official emblem.

**The Two Turkish Anthems**
The following discussion on two Turkish anthems shows the ebb and flow of Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism during this initial period of the Turkish Republic. The national anthem and the tenth anniversary anthem—because of their content, authors, and the year and era in which
they were written—probably represent the two extremes of Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism.

A country’s national anthem is one of the most important symbols of a nation. In 1921, Turkey adopted the Istiklal Marsi (IM) as its national anthem, even before it was formally established as a nation. It is still Turkey’s national anthem. However, in 1933, another anthem was composed known as the tenth anniversary anthem, as it celebrated the first ten years of Turkey as a nation. ⁴

The IM⁵ was written by Mehmet Ali Ersoy and approved by the Grand National Assembly as the Turkish national anthem on 12 March 1921. ⁶ Ersoy (1873–1936) was a religious man and a stronger believer in Ummah (Islamic/Muslim nationalism) than in Turkish nationalism based on ethnolinguistic affinities. Nationalism for him was the Devil’s way of destroying Muslims. The following is a translated excerpt from one of the sermons he gave in a mosque towards the end of World War I:

I do not understand how, instead of being firmly united by Islam, the idea of the separatism entered into your mind? Is it the devil that put the idea of nationalism in your mind? Nationalism is nothing but an earthquake that would undermine and destroy the Islamic unity which has kept together so many ethnicities and nations so different from each other. To forget this reality is an eternal mistake…The most recent policy, Turkism is also condemned to failure. The Creator made all of you members of a single family. If you continue with this mentality and nurture ethnic nationalism you will your country to foreigners. (Seyhun 2014, 25)

Ersoy wholeheartedly supported the Turkish War of Independence and the Turkish Republic. However, as Atatürk’s secularist and authoritarian proclivities became evident, Ersoy found it difficult to live in Turkey. He went into exile in Egypt in the early 1920s, permanently settling there in 1926. Before leaving Turkey, he even destroyed the manuscript of his Turkish translation of the Quran because he became afraid that Atatürk’s regime would use his Turkish translation to promote secularism (Seyhun 2014, 20; Arslanbenzer 2015). In Turkey, he was considered an enemy and traitor, code-named irtica-906 in intelligence reports (Dunya Bulteni 2015). Ersoy came back to Turkey when he was very ill and died a few months after his return, in December 1936. There was no official funeral and not one of the Turkish leaders that had extolled him in 1921 attended his funeral. The single-party Republican regime was so focused on
promoting secular nationalism that it completely ignored the death of the creator of the national anthem. Some of the regime supporters even defamed him after his death and made clear that they despised him due to his Islamic opinions and his Muslim nationalism (Aym Ali 2014; Emre 2016; Kakirgil 2016).

The IM clearly showed the Islamic inclinations of Ersoy. The IM is an Islamic battle cry, not a Turkish or Turkic paean. It has been linked to the Prophet Muhammad (Bahadiroglu 2016). There are also many words in the IM that use Islamic terminology. For instance, Ersoy utilizes the following religious terms in the IM: God-worshipping nation, thousands that lie beneath without shrouds, shaheed (Muslim martyr), cennet (the name of paradise in the Quran), na-mehrim (stranger, outsider), and so on. The eighth and ninth stanzas of the ten stanza anthem are filled with Islamic imagery:

O Lord, the sole wish of my heart is that,
No infidel’s hand should touch the bosom of my temple.
These adhans, the shahadah of which is the base of the religion,
Shall sound loud over my eternal homeland.
Then my tombstone—if there is one—will a thousand times touch its forehead on earth in ecstasy,
O Lord, tears of blood flowing out of my every wound,
My corpse will gush out from the earth like a spirit,
And then, my head will perhaps rise and reach the heavens.

It has been suggested that the IM would not have become the Turkish national anthem, if the decision about the national anthem has been made a few years after 1921. The “other”—rival or enemy—in this battle-cry was the West, as the fourth stanza demonstrates without any doubt:

The lands of the West may be armoured with walls of steel,
But I have borders guarded by the mighty chest of a believer.
Recognize your innate strength! And think: how can this fiery faith ever be killed,
By that battered, single-toothed monster you call “civilization”?

A comparison of the IM with the tenth anniversary anthem, Onuncu Yi Marsi (OYM) highlights the religious and Islamic nationalism of the IM and the Turkish (secular) nationalism of the OYM. The OYM, which is often used in official and unofficial gatherings in place of, or with, the
national anthem, was written by Faruk Camlibel and Behcet Caglar. The first six lines of the OYM are:

We ended every war proud in the last ten years
We created 15 million youth of all ages in ten years
The whole world respects our leader and commander-in-chief
We knitted all four corners of the motherland with railroad tracks
We are Turks of the Republic; our chest is a bronze shield
The Turk does not stop; the Turk is at the front. Forward Turk! (Ozyurek 2006, 168)

In contrast to the IM, the emphasis in the OYM is on Turks, on Ataturk, and on this (materialistic and mundane) world. The OYM refers to worldly achievements such as the railroad network, a large population and the creation of an egalitarian, united, and classless society after Turkey became independent. It rejoices in the fact that Ataturk and Turkishness are admired by the world. While the main theme of the IM national anthem is fighting and sacrificing, the OYM is mainly about growth, development, and moving forward. The refrain in the OYM (We are Turks of... ) refers to “Turk” four times and is itself repeated four times, thus emphasizing the ethnolinguistic nature of the state imagined (the word “Turk” is repeated 17 times in one recitation of the OYM). One may argue that the word “Turk” includes all Turkish citizens irrespective of their ethnicities but, as discussed in Chapter 2, the early and mid-1930s were the years when Turkish ethnicity and language were particularly accentuated by Ataturk and the Turkish state.

Zurcher (2008) underscores the differences between the IM and Ataturk’s tenth anniversary speech, which, like the OYM, was devoid of any religious content and also praised the Western civilization. It is clear from reading the following excerpt that, although the IM was the national anthem, it did not represent the Turkish state of the 1930s:

Earlier we saw how Ataturk’s 1933 speech symbolized the ambition of the Turkish elite to become part of European civilization. It is not difficult, however, to come up with an equally important historical text that represents the image of the West as a threat... This text, perhaps surprisingly, is that of the national anthem of the Republic of Turkey... Ataturk’s exalted civilization, the West, is in Akif’s view simultaneously an aggressive force that had invaded the fatherland and a sham that is no match to the religious fervor of the Turks. The enormous
difference can be attributed to the different circumstances in which the two texts came into being. (Zurcher 2008, 98–100)

In this context, it is not difficult to understand why the OYM soon became greatly loved and was sometimes sung along with the national anthem on national days and recognized as a Republican symbol during this period. It was also taught to many generations of Turkish children in schools (Ozyurek 2006, 168; Yilmaz 2013, 189).

Presidential Emblem and Flag
The state symbols most unambiguously demonstrating the preference of ethnic state nationalism in the new Republic were the presidential flag and emblem. The Ottoman imperial standard was discarded. It showed the Sultan’s tughra (the sultan’s name, often with his father’s name and a prayer in beautiful Arabic script calligraphy) on a red background. With its focus on Arabic (script) calligraphy and the absence of any pictures, figures, or images, the imperial standard followed the strict Islamic guidelines.

The new presidential emblem was adopted even before the formal inauguration of the Republic. It was seen in 1922 as part of the presidential flag on Atatürk’s car and has been in continuous use. It has 17 stars on a red background. In the middle of the emblem, there is a large 16-pointed star representing the Turkish Republic. Around the sun are 16 smaller stars, representing the 16 great Turkic states of the past. The focus is on Turks as an ethnic group and the Turkish Republic is represented as the continuation of all the great empires built by the Turks from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. This emblem is also part of the presidential flag. The presidential flag is the Turkish flag, with the addition of a small presidential emblem embossed, in gold, in the upper left-hand corner (Government of Turkey 2006, 2015).

Ankara: A Modern and Secular City
Capital cities are symbols of the nation. New nations give particular importance to their capitals to create an image and to foster a new identity.

It is obvious that there is a direct relationship between the building of a new state and its capital. According to [Professor Gonul] Tankut, the making of a capital should be perceived as a state-sponsored political operation. What is intended while planning a new capital is to create a
symbol for a new political system and to realize different political and social operations. (Onge 2007, 73)

Due to its history, Ankara, the capital of Turkey, has always been linked to Ataturk, republicanism, modernization, and secularism. Ankara, a small town, was chosen as the capital at the expense of Istanbul, an imperial city for more than one thousand years, because it was very difficult to construct a new identity, especially a secular identity, with Istanbul as its centre. Ottoman-Islamic images were too prominent in Istanbul, as Cinar (2005, 111) explains:

Ankara itself bore no significant marks of Islam and Ottoman times, but Istanbul was so full of such marks that it was impossible for them to be hidden or underemphasized in any way. Grand mosques standing tall as reigning monuments of Islam and glorious palaces and mansions testifying to the imperial authority of the Ottoman state were visible from all over the city. Laced with water fountains, tombs, small mosques, lodges, and monuments, every street, corner, and square of the old city was heavily laden with Ottoman and Islamic marks. The pronounced presence of symbols and marks of the Ottoman-Islamic reign made the articulation of the new national identity in the city difficult.

After consolidating its power in the early 1920s, the Republican regime started the building of a new model city. The main city planner chosen was a German Professor Hermann Jansen. Later, other European architects were invited to plan the main buildings, statues, monuments, and so on. Following the European modernist architectural trends, these architects often ignored the historical and cultural aspects of Ankara. Perhaps they knew they were part of an ideological project, a spatial modernity project running parallel to the social, cultural, administrative, and economic modernization (Onge 2007, 77–88). Besides architecture, the naming of the areas and streets in Ankara also revealed the political disposition of the Republican regime. Names reminiscent of Islamic or Ottoman history were largely avoided. Most of the streets were named after events or leaders of the War of Independence. Moreover, many monuments and statues were erected to commemorate the events of the War of Independence and its leader, Ataturk. Ataturk, who chose Ankara as Turkey’s capital, is everywhere in Ankara in the form of street names, statues, monuments, and commemorative buildings. The construction of
Ataturk’s mausoleum further linked Ankara with Ataturk and his modernization project, an important component of which was secularization (Erdentug and Burcak 1998).

The two major monuments were erected in the capital during this era. The Victory Monument, completed in 1927 and commemorating the victory in the Turkish War of Independence, depicts Ataturk, in military uniform, sitting on a horse. There are also three minor figures: two soldiers and a woman. The Guvenpark Monument (the Monument to a Secure, Confident Future) was completed in 1935. It depicts a nation marching ahead. On one side of a wall there are two large sculptures of musicians; on the other side, Ataturk and four muscular men are depicted in relief. Smaller figures carved at the base exhibit sculptures of ordinary Turks during the War of Independence, or working in different sectors of the economy. Religious imagery is completely absent from both monuments. Furthermore, the statues of persons evince a break from the Ottoman-Islamic past, when the making of statues was considered close to idolatry and, hence, sacrilegious.

**The Late 1940s to Late 1970s**

The single-party era represented the triumph of ethnic/territorial facets of Turkish state nationalism. Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism was negligible. This new era demonstrated a revival of the religious flavour, albeit minor, in Turkish state nationalism. Umut Uzer terms it as the rise of conservative state nationalism:

I define conservative nationalism as a form of nationalism in which the nation cannot be conceived except in terms of the religion to which the majority of the members of that nation belong... This form of nationalism became increasingly important in Turkish nationalism after the 1950s, with the triple processes of modernization, democratization, and Islamization of the society and their ramifications for the body politic. (Uzer 2011, 105)

The advent of multi-party politics meant that the political parties had to be cognizant of the sentiments of the mostly conservative electorate for whom Islam was important. However, the secular elite still had power, as it largely controlled the military, judiciary, and the media. The ruling political parties
thus had to keep both the electorate and the non-elected secular elite satisfied. This was particularly difficult for the centre-right parties which were always suspected of being disloyal to the Republic, secularism, and the Ataturk legacy. Three military coups in 20 years show that keeping the balance was not easy (Yavuz 2009, 27–8). So, the state, during this era, promoted a blend of ethnic and civil state nationalism. Islam had a minor contribution to the state nationalism. For the most part, during this period, Islam’s role in state nationalism did not appear independently (except for the Kocatepe mosque) but, rather, as part of a veneration to Ottoman or Seljuk achievements, which could be considered Turkic as well as Islamic. Reappropriation of the victories of the Turkish Islamic past, which were mostly ignored during single-party rule to focus on the more distant non-Islamic past of Turks, was the change witnessed during this period.

Ethnic state nationalism had lost its earlier strength but it was still not completely out of favour. For example, thousands of non-Turkic names of villages, towns, and geographical landmarks were replaced by Turkic names (that is, Turkification of the map). Another sign of the strength of ethnic aspect in Turkish state nationalism was the choice of the emblem of the capital city, Ankara.

Kocatepe (National) Mosque
The Kocatepe Mosque was the first major project of the enduring movement of Islamizing Ankara’s urban space. There were no plans to build a national place of worship in Ankara before the 1940s. If there were any suggestion of building a mosque, it was limited to building a modest mosque in central Ankara. Starting from the mid-1940s, these plans gradually became more and more elaborate. The gradually expanding plans and the eventual construction of the Kocatepe mosque in Ankara represented the rising contribution of Islam to Turkish state nationalism.

From the time of the first competition for its design in 1947 to its completion in 1987, the mosque project faced many hurdles and construction did not start until 1967. However, the delays helped the project since, as time passed, not only did the project expand, but the proposed project site was changed to a more prominent place, a hill overlooking the whole city. The gigantic structure and the prominent location made it a rival to another place of worship, the Anitkabir
(Mausoleum of Ataturk), something unthinkable at the start of the mosque project in the 1940s:

The Ataturk Memorial Tomb and the Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara are arguably the two most important monuments of the Turkish republic. The two sites, one Kemalist and the other Islamist, represent the claims of two different “orders” of meanings and values to a dominant position in the public life of the Turkish republic. Moreover, standing at similar elevations and in open view of one another, the tomb and the mosque can appear to be in a relationship of challenge and response. (Meeker 1997)

The Hittite Sun Monument
While those fighting to make Turkey a country proud of its Islamic identity and heritage won a big victory by constructing the Kocatepe mosque, the secularists were still powerful and managed to secure their own victories in the form of the Hittite Sun Monument and in making the Hittite Sun the emblem of the capital city.

The Hittites were late Bronze Age Anatolian people who established an empire that was centred near present-day Ankara. Since the major archeological discoveries in the 1930s related to the Hittite civilization, Ankara has been linked to the Hittites. In 1946, Ankara University adopted the Hittite Sun Disc (representing probably the Sun god or goddess) as its logo. Later, in 1961, it became associated with secularism as the coup leaders that had toppled Menderes made it the city emblem to reaffirm their commitment to secularism and Ataturk. In 1973, Vedat Dalokay, an internationally renowned architect and a member of the CHP, became the mayor of Ankara. He revived the Hittite Sun emblem and also decided to build a Hittite Sun monument in the city centre. His plan for the monument was vigorously opposed by the members of Erbakan’s conservative National Salvation Party, who contended that a pre-Islamic civilization could not be used to represent the capital. Despite their opposition, Dalokay remained persistent and managed to get the monument constructed (Shaw 2008; Hayden and Sevin 2012).

Two Anniversaries: Reappropriation of Islamic Past
Another evidence of the increase of Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism came in the form of celebration by the Turkish state of the events that were linked to its Muslim past. Two important anniversaries were celebrated at state level, one linked to the Ottoman dynasty and the other linked to the Seljuk dynasty. Both were important Turkish Islamic military
victories, the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul (1453) and the Seljuk victory at the Battle of Manzikert (1071), in which their opponents were not only non-Turks, but also non-Muslims. Although these events were presented as achievements of Turks and not Muslims, it was still an important development as, previously, Turkey’s Muslim past, particularly that of the Ottoman era, was termed a period of decline and Atatürk presented the Turkish Republic as a clear break from the humiliating Ottoman past. These anniversaries did not change the secular nature of the Turkish state but Islam, by virtue of association with the Ottomans and the Seljuks, started becoming accepted as a part of the state’s myth. As these two anniversaries were planned and celebrated by different governments 20 years apart, it cannot be argued that these celebrations were actions of a particular leader or government. Moreover, most of the important parties and other state institutions, such as the Turkish military, at the time of these anniversaries agreed with the government that these anniversaries should be celebrated, making it a state-level affair. The effect of these anniversaries continued beyond their celebration, as stamps and coins were issued and public monuments were built to commemorate them.

Five Hundredth Anniversary Celebrations of Istanbul Conquest

An evidence of the acceptance of Islam as part of Turkish state nationalism by the state elite was the rehabilitation of the Ottomans. In the first three decades of the Republic, Ottomans were castigated and their achievements were disparaged by the state elite, including Atatürk himself. But there was a change in the 1940s, when at least some of the Ottoman sultans were no longer the enemies of the Turks, and their conquests and achievements were to be celebrated at state level. This was visible in the grand celebrations of the five hundredth anniversary of the Istanbul (Constantinople) conquest in 1453 by the Turkish government.

In June 1950, the Turkish Cabinet formed the Istanbul Conquest Society to organize the five hundredth anniversary. This committee organized ten-day celebrations (May 29–June 6, 1953) that emphasized the Islamic character of the conquest. There was a sacrificial slaughter of animals, special prayers in the Sultan Fatih mosque, prayers on state radio, and a specially prepared sermon by the Diyanet that was read in all mosques in Turkey, highlighting the importance of the Ottoman conquest for both Islam and the Turks (Brockett 2011, 197–8). Soon thereafter, celebrations on 29 May became an annual event. The Turkish government also issued a series of stamps to commemorate the Istanbul conquest.
Nine Hundredth Anniversary of the Battle of Manzikert

The Battle of Manzikert was fought between Seljuk Sultan Alp Arslan and Byzantine Emperor Romanus Diogenes in August 1071 in Eastern Turkey. The decisive victory of the Seljuks and the capture of the Byzantine Emperor opened the Anatolian peninsula to more Seljuk/Ottoman victories, the spread of Islam, and Turkification.

While Ottomans were disparaged by the early Turkish elite, and even their achievements were rejected, the Seljuks received a fairer treatment. Seljuks also became part of the national myth earlier than Ottomans as they were considered truer Turks, uncontaminated by outside influences (Islamic, Arabian, and Persian) that later corrupted the Ottomans. The Battle of Manzikert (Malazgirt, in Turkish) was celebrated by many Turkish historians as a triumph of the Turks over the Greeks, and a few historians also made connections between Sultan Alp Arslan and Ataturk (Hillenbrand 2007, 202–9).

The celebrations of the nine hundredth anniversary of the battle in 1971 were preceded by the establishment of the Institute of Seljuk History and Civilisation in Ankara in 1966, the construction of an Alp Arslan statue in 1967, and the start of the publication of a journal on Seljuk studies in 1969. The foundation stone of the statue was laid by President Cevdet Sunay, demonstrating the fact that celebrating the anniversary was not the decision of one government. The actual anniversary was celebrated in August 1971 after the 1971 military coup, with fanfare and fervour. Coins and stamps were also issued to commemorate the occasion and, later, two public monuments were also built (Hillenbrand 2007, 210–2; Gurpinar 2013, 125).

The Early 1980s to Late 2000s

This period saw a further increase in Islam’s contribution to Turkish state nationalism. As discussed in the previous chapter, Turkish-Islamic synthesis became the unofficial state ideology, linking Islam and Turkish nationalism:

In an attempt to reduce social tension and focus on the main political danger, the military tried to placate Islamists with a policy of “controlled Islam.” Its goal was a “Turkish-Islamic synthesis,” a new nationalism that embraced the predominant interpretation of Sunnism in Turkey and thereby aimed to shield pious Turks from international Islamist movements. (Baran 2010, 35–6)
Perhaps nothing shows the resurgence of Islam during this period better than the acceptance of an exhibition of Islamic piety and religiousness at the highest level. During this era, for the first time since the early 1920s, it became acceptable for Turkish presidents and prime ministers to show Islamic piety. It started with General Kenan Evren, the leader of the military junta that carried out the military coup in 1980, who cited Islamic and Quranic references in his public pronouncements. Turgut Ozal (the Prime Minister in the 1980s and President in the 1990s) carried it to a whole new level. He was the first Turkish prime minister to perform pilgrimage while in office; pictures of that pilgrimage were shown on state television and he was called the hajji Prime Minister (Bianchi 2004, 143). He was ready to be photographed praying in mosques, a sight uncommon in the Republican Turkey. After Ozal, the trend of giving importance to religious symbolism continued. In terms of national symbols, though main national symbols (such as the flag, anthem, and presidential flag) remained the same, the conservative elite tried to create new symbols that highlighted Islam’s contribution to Turkish state nationalism. For example, the second Bosphorus bridge was named the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge, Mehmet Ersoy was rediscovered as a national hero, and the capital city Ankara’s emblem was changed to depict a mosque.

The Restoration of Mehmet Ersoy and Glorification of IM
From the 1950s to 1970s, although the OYM was still being sung in schools and at sports events, it gradually lost its place as a competitor to the IM. The centre-right democratic governments generally preferred the IM, as compared with the CHP or military-led governments. The rehabilitation of Ersoy also started, but at a slow pace. In October 1949, the Ankara City Council named the house where Ersoy had lived in the early 1920s and written the national anthem, and the street close to it, after him. In 1973, the house was restored by Hacettepe University and it was turned into a museum. In 1978, the Turkish Writers Association started holding memorial meetings in the Mehmet Akif Ersoy Museum (Islam and Ihsan 2016; Ministry of Culture and Tourism 2016).

A major change came in the 1980s, when the Turkish-Islamic synthesis became the state’s ideology and the Turkish military accepted Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism. After the 1980 coup, the military junta ordered that every classroom should have Ataturk’s picture, his speech to the youth, and the IM, and every student in the primary schools had to
memorize the IM (Dede 2008, 96–120). This change was the symbolic representation of Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Significantly, all ten stanzas of the national anthem, with all Islamic references and anti-West rhetoric, were displayed in the classrooms and had to be memorized. From 1982 to 1984, a major restoration of the Mehmet Akif Ersoy Museum was completed that was financed not only by the Hacettepe University and certain private individuals, but also by many government ministries and departments (Ministry of Culture and Tourism (Turkey) 2016). Still another sign of the rehabilitation was the choice of Ersoy’s portrait and the anthem to grace the 100 Lira banknote issued by Turkey’s Central Bank in 1983. In 1986, for the first time and fifty years after his death, official ceremonies were held to commemorate him and celebrate his contributions to the national cause (Islam and Ihsan 2016).

In the 1990s, when the Refah Party became increasingly popular, it embraced the IM to show it accepted the state’s symbols and ideology. As the state prioritized the IM and other Islamic symbols and Islamic- oriented parties accepted them, the secularists revived the OYM. Singing and playing the OYM became fashionable in urban areas and young people danced to its disco versions.

When the AKP won the election in November 2002, singing the OYM in demonstrations again became popular among secularists. The OYM had become such a symbol of secularism and opposition to the mixing of religion and politics that Prime Minister Erdogan did not take the singing of the OYM as a neutral act. He criticized those who were singing the OYM and claimed that he was doing more to make Turkey modern, developed, and connected through rail networks (as referred in the OYM) than his adversaries. Today’s Zaman reported this criticism in the following way. It is important to note that the newspaper refers to the OYM as the national anthem:

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan commented yesterday that modernism and becoming contemporary could not be achieved merely by singing the “10th Year Anthem.” Referring to a line from Turkey’s national anthem, Erdogan said: “It cannot be achieved by the words ‘to weave iron nets all over the country.’ It was a goal. We are realizing that goal. We proved that with the subway [construction] in Istanbul. With God’s help, we will do that in Turkey.” (Today’s Zaman 2003)

The AKP did not stop the OYM from being used in state events, but its preference for the IM and its author was obvious. In March 2006, the
Turkish government established the Mehmet Akif Ersoy University in Burdur province, which Ersoy represented in the first Turkish Parliament. In May 2007, 12 March was declared “Mehmet Akif Ersoy commemoration and the acceptance of national anthem day” in memory of 12 March 1921, when the IM was accepted as the national anthem (Turfan and Micallef 2015). Since then, there has been a significant increase in the activities relating to the IM and Ersoy. There was a potent upsurge in the importance and popularity of the IM due to another event. In 2007, a German private organization tried to acquire the copyright for the IM in Germany, claiming that the Turkish state had not acquired the international copyright for the Turkish national anthem. As the threat came from a European and a Western organization, this tapped into the deep-seated fear of the West in the Turkish elite and the IM’s importance to the Turkish state nationalism increased (Today’s Zaman 2010b).

**Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge**

The choice of Ottoman Sultan Fatih Mehmet as the name of the second Bosphorus bridge was significant. Not only was Fatih Sultan Mehmet an Ottoman Sultan, he was also the recipient of Prophet Muhammad’s direct praise and blessings, a distinction not shared by any other Turkish sultan or any other Muslim ruler. It could be argued that a bridge over the Bosphorus is not a national icon. However, because of their size, cost, and location, all three bridges over the Bosphorus have been considered Turkish national icons or symbols and have not been thought of as a concern only of those living in Istanbul. The first bridge built over the Bosphorus, called the Bosphorus (Bogazici) Bridge, was inaugurated on the fiftieth anniversary of the Turkish Republic in 1973 as a symbol of progress and advancement of the country in the preceding fifty years. It was later depicted on banknotes (as discussed in Chapter 4) and on the 50 kurus coin, which is currently in circulation.

The fact that the bridge was named after Fatih Sultan Mehmet in the mid-1980s is important. The coup leader, General Kenan Evren, was still the President of Turkey and the Turkish military was still the most important political player in Turkey, so it appears the President did not object to naming the bridge after Sultan Fatih, signifying the agreement of all state institutions on Ottoman/Muslim Sultan Fatih being a national hero. The Turkish government further showed that the Fatih Bridge was a national icon by issuing a stamp to honour its completion.
Islamizing Ankara’s Emblem

During the 1990s, the Kemalist-Republican image of Ankara started changing. In 1994, Melih Gokcek of the Islamic-oriented Refah party won the election and became mayor of Ankara. If Ankara was the symbol of Turkey, the Islamists had reached the stage where they could Islamize this symbol.

In June 1995, Gokcek arranged a competition for a new emblem to replace the Hittite Sun emblem. The winning design, a mix of a Kocatepe mosque and Atakule, was approved and adopted as Ankara’s emblem. This started a long drawn-out battle in which the mayor wanted to retain the new emblem while his opponents, mainly Kemalists and secularists, wanted the Hittite Sun symbol. Neither of the two sides considered it a fight over the symbol of an urban municipality. As Ankara was Turkey’s capital, both sides considered it a fight over two different visions of Turkey. The mosque as an emblem of Turkey’s capital city and Ataturk’s city was particularly offensive to many Kemalist Turks.

Mayor Gokcek was ordered many times by courts and commissions to restore the Hittite Sun as Ankara’s emblem but he did not. The fight only ended in 2012. The image combining the Kocatepe mosque and Atakule, with some changes, remained Ankara’s emblem.

Creating a Devout Urban Space

Nation-building and fostering state nationalism also involves creating a national space that is unique and that can be used to imagine a nation in concrete:

An essential component of nationalist projects that seek to institute a new sense of nationhood and define a new national subject is the construction of national space... Hence, cities, spaces, and places take the center stage in the construction of a new sense of nationhood or in the emergence and advancement of alternative nationalist projects. (Cinar 2005, 99)

The change of emblem was only one of the changes that Mayor Gokcek made to Islamize Turkey’s capital city. Following his election as Ankara’s mayor, Mayor Gokcek started a campaign against “nudity”, removing numerous sculptures, which did not conform to his moral outlook, from the city’s streets and parks. About a sculpture exhibiting two women dancing, he famously said, ‘I spit on this kind of art’ (Kucuksahin 2016). Under Mayor Gokcek, for the first time, numerous
streets were named after events and leaders relating to the Muslim history and world. He also constructed fountains and mosques reminiscent of Ottoman Sultans. Many housing schemes constructed by the city were given a façade reminiscent of the Ottomans (Links 2014; Gurcan and Peker 2015, 66–70).

2010 Onwards

One of the main reasons for Islam’s minor role in Turkish state nationalism was the secularists’ control of the judiciary, military, and the majority of mainstream media. Despite winning most elections since the 1950s, the centre-right parties worked under the watchful eye of, and within the limits prescribed by, the secularists in these institutions. The threat of a ban or dissolution was always hanging over these parties. For the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, during this period, the secularists no longer control the judiciary and media, and the military has no role in politics. Although it is too early to pronounce a verdict, there is evidence of Islam’s increasing role in Turkish state nationalism in this period.

The End of OYM as the Official Anthem and the Construction of an Ersoy’s Cult?

Prime Minister Erdogan further increased the status of the national anthem and its author by declaring 2011 as the Year of Mehmet Akif Ersoy, as it was the ninetieth anniversary of the official adoption of the IM as the national anthem and the seventy-fifty anniversary of Ersoy’s death in 1936 (Today’s Zaman 2011a). The Gezi Park protest against Erdogan and the AKP again made the OYM popular. Protestors brought Ataturk’s pictures and sang the OYM.

No surprise, then, that the image on the wall at which the Gezi Park protesters silently stare is Ataturk’s. Moderates across Turkey have brought out images of Ataturk. In the prior, noisier demonstrations, the protesters sang the Republic’s unofficial anthem, the “Tenth Year March,” honoring the first decade of Ataturk’s rule. (Fradkin and Libby 2013)

Responding to his Gezi Park critics and those that criticized prayers at the opening of the Marmaray railway, Erdogan pointed out that (Islamic) prayers were part of the Turkish tradition. He reminded Turks that Turkey’s first Parliament was opened with prayers and that the national
anthem also references prayer. Then, drawing a contrast between himself and the secularists, he said:

> While [the opposition] sings the Republic’s 10th anniversary anthem, we are offering Marmaray as part of the republic’s 90th anniversary and talking about the centenary goals. Those who have always sang the 10th anniversary anthem—how much railway have you built? None. (*Hurriyet Daily News* 2013b)

It is clear that the AKP’s rivals consider the use of the OYM as a way to criticize the AKP policies, and any policies linking religion and politics. They pledge their support to secularism or, at least, to the early Republican ideals and opposition to the AKP’s policies. It is also obvious that the AKP sees the OYM as the anthem of its rivals. A telling exchange happened in July 2013 in the Turkish Parliament. When a member of an opposition party pointed out that some state officials did not stand for the national flag and the OYM at a sporting event, the AKP’s Minister of Justice replied that while state officials were obliged to stand for the national flag and national anthem, they were not obliged to stand up for the OYM. Mehmet Metiner, an AKP member, later called the OYM a fascist anthem and, despite the protests of opposition members, the AKP ministers present in the Parliament did not criticize Mr Metiner (*Gazete Vatan* 2013). Moreover, in June 2016, Yusuf Cengiz, the director of national education in Bolu province, banned the playing of Turkey’s tenth year anthem in schools. Mr Cengiz deflected criticism by arguing that the time of the OYM has passed and the focus should be on the one hundredth year anthem, which would be due in 2023. Interestingly, Mr Cengiz and Bolu Governor Aydın Barus had no problem with anachronism when an Ottoman-style janissary band made up of school children greeted them (*Hurriyet Daily News* 2016b). These events make it probable that, as the AKP further consolidates its hold on power, the OYM might gradually disappear from state events and lose the status of an anthem. One can compare this with Ersoy’s ever-increasing prominence visible in December 2016 when President Erdogan, Parliamentary Speaker Kahraman, and the leaders of three major parties (the AKP, the CHP, and the MHP) thought it essential to issue statements on the anniversary of the death of Ersoy, honouring his contributions to the national cause (*Sabah* 2016; *Samsun Haberim* 2016; *Takvim* 2016).
It is not difficult to understand how the construction of Ersoy’s cult helps President Erdogan. Ersoy’s story not only reveals Islam’s original association with Turkish nationalism, but also reveals the oppression of the early Republican regime to secure its secular ideals.

**A New Ottoman/Islamic Ankara**

Mayor Gokcek has continued to promote Islamic and Ottoman themes in Ankara. On his orders, many beautiful clock towers have been built in Ankara recently. This fascination with clock towers is associated with a similar Ottoman interest in such towers. Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II, a believer in pan-Islamism and a favourite of the AKP leadership, was particularly enamoured with clock towers and, on the twenty-fifth anniversary of his enthronement, more than one hundred clock towers were built in the Ottoman Empire (Boyacioglu 2014; Kayahan 2014).

Another sign of Mayor Gokcek’s infatuation or fascination with Ottomans and Islam is his support for the football club Osmanlispor. This club was formed in place of Ankaraspor, a club mired in crisis, in 2014. The Osmanlispor team is called the Ottomans and their stadium is named the Ottoman stadium. The club is supported by the Mayor, who is the honorary chairman of the club; his son, Ahmet, is the founding president/chairman, and there are many other AKP supporters. The club is currently having its best year in decades and is playing in the Europa League in 2016. Osmanlispor’s change of name and sudden change in fortunes is linked with the financial and institutional support that Ankara’s Mayor provides to it. Perhaps he wants to see the Ottomans again conquering Europe (through football) (Wyer 2016).

In 2013–14, Mayor Gokcek “Islamized” all the major entry points of Ankara. On the orders of Mayor Gokcek, five new entrance gates were built on roads connecting Ankara to the four adjacent cities of Konya, Samsun, Eskisehir, and Istanbul, and on the road to the international airport. All these city gates exhibited a distinct architectural style reminiscent of the Islamic architecture during the Seljuk and Ottoman eras. One gate resembles the gate of Ottoman’s Topkapi Palace in Istanbul. Another displays a pattern made with the octagonal star, a symbol of the Seljuk dynasty. It was clearly another effort by the Mayor to create an Islamic urban space.
Mayor Gokcek himself explained that he was changing what Ankara was previously known for and giving it a new identity:

Insallah [God willing] our gates, with their distinctive attributes and architecture, will become the symbols of Ankara. Our gates embody reminiscences of Seljuk and Ottoman architecture, and, as a result, reflect our history. (Tasdizen and Ulgen 2015)

After the July 2015 coup, Mayor Gokcek took yet another step towards making Ankara more "Islamic." He, with the help of municipal council members, started naming road, bridges and other landmarks after the people who were killed fighting against the coup. Landmarks named after secular heroes might soon become a minority.

Ataturk tried to envision and guide the construction of a new Ankara that could rightfully be called the symbol of the new Turkish state; a European capital that was bereft of Islamic and Ottoman symbols. Mayor Gokcek and the AKP also want a new Ankara, but their vision is different. They want Ankara to symbolize the new powerful Muslim, Turkish state that they are building. Hence, since the early 1990s, this symbol of Turkish state has changed in many ways, reflecting the growing role of Islam in Turkish nationalism.

Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge
The third bridge over the Bosphorus was named the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge in May 2013 to honour Ottoman Sultan Selim I. Sultan Selim’s name is mired in controversy as he is reputed to have ordered the massacre of thousands of Alevi during his reign, but he is also eulogized for appropriating the Caliphate for Ottomans by conquering Egypt and Hijaz, and becoming the protector of the two holy cities of Makkah and Madina. It is this achievement that perhaps made him the sultan whose name was chosen to grace the third Bosphorus bridge. Protests started immediately after the name was announced by President Abdullah Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan. The Alevi and many other Turks did not consider it the naming of an ordinary bridge that could be ignored, neither did the political parties. The CHP Vice President, Muharram Thin, strongly criticized the decision and asked why the bridge could not be named after Ataturk. Masum Turker, the leader of the Democratic Left Party, argued that the choice of Sultan Selim demonstrated that the AKP leadership wanted to change the character of the Turkish state from a secular republic to a Sunni state.

The head of the
Alevi Cem Foundation, Izzettin Dogan, also protested and argued that Sultan Selim’s name should not be put on the Bosphorus as it would make him an unforgettable and permanent part of Turkish history (Haber 7 2013; Today’s Zaman 2015b). However, the name was not changed. More recently, the opposition leader and the CHP head, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, proposed the name of Ataturk again. Yet, despite all these pleas and the availability of other suitable names, the name of the bridge has remained the same even after its official opening in August 2016 (Osterlund 2016).

It is interesting to note that the first bridge on the strait was named the Bosphorus Bridge; the second, the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge; and the third, the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge. The increasing propensity of choosing names linked with Islam is obvious. In July 2016, the name of the Bosphorus Bridge was changed to 15 July Martyrs’ Bridge. The etymology of the word ‘sehit’ (martyr) used in the new name is Islamic/Arabic. Therefore, the names of all the bridges on the Bosphorus are now, one way or another, linked with Islam (Hurriyet Daily News 2016c).

Islamization of the Presidency: The Symbol of the Nation

Before April 2017 referendum, Turkish president had few powers constitutionally, but he was the head of state and thus represented the state and the nation.28 He was the symbol of the nation. Since the formation of the Turkish Republic, the presidential palace had been a bastion of secularism. The first six presidents (five were retired generals) were strict secularists; they not only avoided any action that linked the presidency with Islam, but also objected to and nullified attempts by the centre-right governments to align Islam with the Turkish state. Ahmet Sezer, the tenth Turkish president (2000–2007), can also be included in this list. Although Turgut Ozal, Suleyman Demirel, and Abdullah Gul could not be termed as secularists, they were also mindful of Ataturk’s legacy, constitutional provisions, and the military’s stance on mixing religion with politics; they generally avoided directly linking Islam with the Turkish state or presidency.

With the elevation of Erdogan to the presidency in 2014, however, this bastion of state secularism stands breached. The symbol of the Republic is not only a devout man, but a devout man who is confident enough to preach. Erdogan is not only preaching (as will be seen in later chapters), but leaving a permanent mark on the presidency. He has built a new Presidential palace, based on Seljuk architecture, and named the Presidential Palace as Cumhurbaskanlığı Kulliyesi, meaning Presidential
(Mosque) Complex. The kulliye is not a neutral word and has Islamic/Ottoman origins:

The word “kulliye” is derived from the Arabic word “kull,” which means all. Kulliye was mostly used in the Ottoman times to refer to a complex of buildings around a mosque that are generally run by a foundation for charitable purposes. (Today’s Zaman 2015a)

He has also constructed one of the largest mosques in Ankara, inside the new Presidential palace, thus linking the presidency, the symbol of the state, with Islam in an enduring way. This mosque, with a capacity for 3000 worshippers, is visible from many parts of Ankara. The old presidential (Cankaya) palace, used by Ataturk and other presidents, did not have a conspicuous mosque.

Furthermore, President Erdogan made no efforts to de-emphasize the construction of such a sizeable mosque in the presidential complex of a secular state. He inaugurated this mosque in July 2015, along with the Prime Minister, several ministers and the head of the Diyanet, and said that mosques are a source of pride, promising more mosques in Ankara after Kocatepe and Bestepe (Daily Sabah 2015; Hurriyet Daily News 2015).

**PAKISTANI NATIONAL SYMBOLS**

As in Chapter 2, Pakistan’s history has been divided into three parts and the analysis of Pakistani national symbols shows an initial period where Islam’s role was increasing at a slow pace. This period then gave way to a more puritanical Islam with a predominant role in the state nationalism. Finally, after 1999, there was a reversal of what had been done under Z.A. Bhutto and General Zia and Islam’s role in state nationalism decreased.

**The Late 1940s to Late 1960s**

Four national symbols are discussed in this section: the state emblem, the head of the state’s flag, the new national capital, and Pakistan’s first national monument. The creation of new symbols and the changes in old symbols during this period reveal the increasing role of Islam in state nationalism. However, the state elites wanted to make Pakistan a modern Muslim country, not an Islamic state.
National Flag and National Anthem
The selection of a national flag and national anthem both show a gradual increase in Islam’s role in state nationalism. The national flag was a modification of the flag of the All India Muslim League (AIML), the party which led the fight for independence under the leadership of Jinnah. The green colour and the star and crescent are usually associated with Islam. Most of the flags of Muslim countries are either green, or have a crescent and star, or both. Unsurprisingly, the party that wanted to represent Muslims in British India adopted a flag that had a crescent and star on a green background. After independence, a white strip was added to the AIML flag to recognize the role of minorities, but the flag remained predominantly green with a crescent and star.

The choice of the national anthem also evinces an Islamic influence, but not a predominant one. The anthem was written by Abdul Hafiz Jallundari and was adopted as the national anthem in 1954 after a competition. The lyrics of the anthem display a heavy Persian influence, which links Pakistan to Islam and the Middle East, instead of reminding Pakistanis that they are part of South Asia. There are three religious references in the anthem. In the opening stanza, there are two such references: the blessed sacred land and the country being the centre of belief and faith. In the final stanza, the poet talks about Pakistan being “under the shade of Mighty and Glorious God”. However, none of the three religious references are specific to Islam. References to the sacredness and blessedness of the national territory, or its being the centre of belief, are a common theme in anthems, and the word used for God is not Allah (the Arabic word for God used in the Quran) but Khuda (a Persian word used initially for Ahura Mazda, the god of Zoroastrianism).

State Emblem
The first Pakistan emblem was adopted in 1947. It had a star and crescent at the top, with “Pakistan” written inside the crescent in Urdu. The writing style showed the influence of Arabic as a diacritic (madda) appears in the middle of the word “Pakistan”. While madda is common in the Persian language, it is generally used at the start of a word, not in the middle. Urdu follows the Persian style and a madda is not used in the middle of a word. Below the star and crescent were six gonfalons (hung banners) with a crescent and star on each. The banner beneath them showed “PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT” written in English.
A new emblem, adopted in 1954, showed several changes associated with growing Pakistani nationalism:\(^\text{30}\)

- Foreign languages were eliminated: “PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT” was replaced by the Pakistan state’s motto “Eman, Ittehad, Nazm” (meaning “unity, faith, discipline”) in Urdu. The Arabic diacritic was also omitted.
- The shapes of the star and crescent were changed and, in the new emblem, the crescent opens towards the right (from the bearer’s perspective).
- The colour was changed to green, which is the colour of Islam and main colour of the Pakistani flag.
- The gonfalons were replaced by a quartered shield, with four crops shown in each of the quarters, demonstrating the contribution of agriculture to Pakistan economy. The crops shown were the main crops of Pakistan: cotton, jute, wheat and tea.
- A floral wreath was also part of the new emblem. It surrounds the quartered shield. The wreath is made of the flowers and leaves of jasmine, the national flower of Pakistan.

The state emblem has not changed since 1954. Islam’s influence is visible in the star and crescent and the green colour, although the number of stars and crescents decreased compared with the previous emblem.

**Head of State’s Flag**

The flag of the Governor General of Pakistan, adopted in 1947, was similar to the flags of Governors General of other British dominions. It showed a lion crowned with the British imperial state crown\(^\text{31}\) standing on another imperial state crown on a royal blue ground. Beneath the larger crown, “Pakistan” was written in English. Each of the two crowns shown has two full-crosses pattée\(^\text{32}\) and two half-crosses pattée. So, there were four full-crosses and four half-crosses on the flag of the Governor General of Pakistan. Ironically, the crosses pattée depicted on the presidential flag were linked with the Crusaders. However, despite these crosses, there was no public outcry for its removal in Pakistan (MacDonald 2013a).

With the promulgation of its first constitution in 1956 establishing the new Pakistani republic, a new presidential flag was introduced. It was a blue flag with a crescent and star in the middle with two wheat branches. Beneath the crescent, “Pakistan” was written in Urdu. Hence, the increasing
influence of Islam is visible as the Crusader crosses have been replaced by a crescent and star (MacDonald 2013b).

National Capital, Islamabad
In 1959, soon after taking power, General Ayub Khan announced that a national capital, Islamabad, would be built and the federal government would shift from Karachi to Islamabad. While there were many other practical and personal reasons (for Ayub Khan) to build a new capital city, a particular wish was to create a “purely Pakistani space”, truly representative of the whole nation:

Other than these ostensibly practical arguments, shifting the capital also fit with Ayub Khan’s wider professed aim of building a stronger and more unified nation (an aim linked of course with his desire to strengthen and consolidate his own power). As Karachi disintegrated into a chaotic patchwork of competing groups, it hardly represented the ideal, unified nation of Pakistan that many had dreamed of. By moving the capital to a new location, Ayub Khan hoped to “start afresh”, to build a city in which the residents would all simply be Pakistanis, which would “become a symbol for the whole nation” (Dox-PA-127, 6) and which could prove Pakistan’s potential to become a strong, modern nation. (Harper 2010, 92–3)

The choice of Islamabad as the name of the new capital by Ayub Khan demonstrates that he was aware of the importance of Islam for Pakistani nationalism, but his Islam was linked with modernity. Therefore, he chose a Greek architect, Constantine Doxiadis, to create the image of the Pakistani nation in concrete. Doxiadis was a Ford Foundation advisor. He was an exponent of modernist urbanism that emphasized universalism, scientific modernization, growth, and progress, though he also had experience of working in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Karachi. Hence, he had the blend of experience and knowledge that Ayub wanted in an architect to design Pakistan’s new capital.

Doxiadis made the master plan based on a grid pattern; a group of British architects and others later designed the important buildings (Harper 2010, 95–125). The master plan and the important buildings in Islamabad designed in the 1960s did not borrow much from the Muslim (Mughal) past or from the local culture, and the major influence was the modernist movement in architecture. The major concession that Doxiadis did make
was to keep a place for a mosque in every residential sector of Islamabad. However, he did not plan for a large national mosque (Hull 2010).

**Pakistan Resolution Monument**

The Pakistan resolution monument was built in the 1960s and was the first national monument. It is called Minar-e-Pakistan, as it is a minaret. It commemorates the passing of the Pakistan Resolution in March 1940 that formed the basis of the Pakistani independence movement. The choice of a minaret (a slender tower) to memorialize the Pakistan resolution was associated with minarets being an important part of Islamic architecture. At the base of Minar-e-Pakistan, besides writings related to the Pakistan independence movement, Quranic verses and ninety-nine names of Allah were also inscribed. The Minar not only reminds one of the Pakistan Resolution, but also that Pakistan is an Islamic Republic.

This discussion evinces that the role of Islam in Pakistani nationalism was increasing during this period, but this increase was measured.

**The Early 1970s to Late 1990s**

This period demonstrated a rapid increase in the role of Islam in Pakistani nationalism. Four national symbols are discussed in this section. The modification of the presidential flag is discussed, followed by an analysis of the change in the motto of the Pakistani Army. Being the most powerful political player in the country, a change in the motto of the Pakistani Army is extremely important for gauging the role of Islam in Pakistani nationalism. The section goes on to discuss the construction of a national mosque in Islamabad, which, despite not being a part of the master plan for Islamabad, was considered necessary. Finally, the emergence of two new national holidays is examined.

**Presidential Flag**

After the separation of East Pakistan and the promulgation of the 1973 Constitution, a new presidential flag was unveiled. It was different than the previous flag in two significant ways; it was more Islamic and nationalist. First, the colour of the flag was changed from royal blue, the colour associated with British colonial times, to green, the colour of Islam and the dominant colour of Pakistan’s national flag. Second, the direction of the crescent horns was changed and now they pointed to the right side, as in Pakistan’s national flag. The star, wheat branches, and “Pakistan” written in Urdu remained unchanged (Ian 2013b).
Pakistan Army Motto

After the Indian Mutiny in 1857, the British were sensitive to the religious proclivities of the Indian soldiers. Priests of different religions were attached to the army regiments and troops took oaths of loyalty to their regiment based on their religious tradition. After Pakistan came into existence, a number of factors increased Islam’s role in the military. As almost all of the military men were Muslim, Islam started being used more frequently to motivate the troops. Second, as the primary perceived enemy was India and most of the troops were from West Pakistan (the current Pakistan), it was easy to associate the Pakistan Army with scores of Muslim armies that came from the North-west and successfully invaded the Indian sub-continent. Finally, the use of quotes relating to warfare from Islamic religious sources and traditions made motivating soldiers much easier. However, the military remained largely non-religious during the first two decades of Pakistan’s existence. Officers drank alcohol and related more to their British regimental traditions than to the tales of historic Muslim armies.

Things began to change in the late 1960s and, with the start of the insurgency in East Pakistan, the first serious attempts were made to change a Pakistani soldier into a Muslim soldier, or (at least) to a Pakistani-Muslim soldier. One of the major changes came in the 1970s when General Zia-ul-Haq changed the army motto to ‘Iman, Taqwa, Jihad-e-fisabilillah’ (meaning “faith, self-restraint, struggle for the sake of Allah”). Previously, the army’s motto was the same as the national/state motto ‘Eman, Ittehad, Nazm’ (meaning “unity, faith, discipline”) (Cohen 1998, 34–40; 86–104; Ijaz 2011).

Islam was also made part of the training curriculum at the prestigious Command and Staff College, Quetta. From British colonial times, its emblem was an owl, perched on crossed swords. As an owl is considered a symbol of wisdom in the West, it was chosen as the College emblem. In the 1970s, the owl was replaced with the word “iqra” in a circle. Iqra is an Arabic word meaning “read” and it has religious significance, as it was the very first word revealed to Prophet Muhammad (Army Staff College 2015).

National Mosque

In Doxiadis’s master plan of Islamabad, there was no large mosque that could be called a national mosque. Mosques were planned in all areas of the national capital, as were schools, markets, and playing fields. The
design dealt with the functional needs of the people. This was a change from what is seen as an ideal Islamic city.

In one of many departures from the prevailing ideal-typical “Islamic City,” with its central mosque-market complex, no mosque was planned for the major commercial artery, the Blue Area. Planners saw Islamabad not as an Islamic city but as a city populated by Muslims, that is, a city not to be designed and administered according to Islamic principles but a modern city that would serve the needs of Muslims. (Hull 2012, 215)

By 1969, however, a large national mosque was considered necessary for the national capital. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia agreed to provide monetary assistance and, after an international competition, Vedat Dalokay, a Turkish architect, was awarded the contract. By the time the construction of the mosque began in 1976, King Faisal had been assassinated. Due to the Saudi assistance of more than one hundred million dollars for this project, the mosque was named the Faisal mosque. Set in the Margalla foothills, the Faisal mosque symbolizes an increased role of Islam in Pakistani nationalism. It is one of the largest mosques in the world, accommodating 10,000 worshippers inside the main hall and around 200,000 in the outside courtyards.

Two New National Holidays
National holidays are important national symbols. Their selection and the way they are observed provide keen insights into what is considered important by a nation. During this period, two new Islamic holidays became part of the national calendar.

Eid Milad-un-Nabi (EMN), also called Mawlid and Mevlid, is the celebration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad. The EMN was celebrated in British India and then in early Pakistan, but it was not a national holiday. It was Z.A. Bhutto that declared EMN a national holiday in the late 1970s. General Zia raised the profile of the EMN holiday by making it one of three holidays on which the day began with a gun salute. The day started with a 31-gun salute in the federal capital and a 21-gun salute in each of the four provincial capitals. Under Zia, not only school and colleges, but also many military units started officially organizing events for EMN (Haqqani 2005, 151; Crescent 2007). Zia also used the EMN holiday in February 1979 to link and legitimize his promulgation of puritanical Hudood Ordinances, discussed Chapter 5 on family law (Wasti 2009, 106).
Youm-e-Takbir (Day of Allah’s greatness) was declared a public holiday by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1998. It was celebrated on 29 May to commemorate the nuclear tests. The day ostensibly had nothing to do with Islam. But, following a national competition, the day was given an Islamic veneer by naming it Youm-e-Takbir. Many celebrated this day as the inauguration of a Muslim nuclear power, along with the existing Christian, Jewish, and Hindu nuclear powers. As Pakistan’s nuclear tests were undertaken in reaction to the Indian nuclear tests, the connection between Islam and nationalism was readily made. The Pakistan Army also named their missiles Ghauri, Ghaznavi, and Shaheen during this period, linking Islam, nationalism, and militancy (Hoodbhoy 2008).

**1999 Onwards**

This period saw a movement away from linking Pakistan exclusively with Islam. There was also a symbolic rejection of militarism and extremism that the state promoted in the name of Islam during the 1980s and early 1990s. The presidential flag was changed at the start of this period to make it also representative of non-Muslim Pakistanis. The Youm-e-Takbir holiday was revoked and state celebrations of it were discontinued. The new Pakistan Monument only tangentially associates Pakistan with Islam. Finally, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, bordering Afghanistan, also changed its motto and emblem to promote peace.

**Presidential Flag**

A new presidential flag was adopted in 1998. It was more representative of Pakistan, as it acknowledged the presence of non-Muslim Pakistanis. The change from the previous flag was the introduction of a white vertical bar near the hoist, similar to the national flag. As the white bar in the national flag symbolized the religious minorities in Pakistan, the new presidential flag now also symbolically represents not only the majority Muslim population, but also the non-Muslim minorities (Ian 2013b).

**Youm-e-Takbir Holiday Discontinued**

General Musharraf discontinued the public holiday on Youm-e-Takbir. One does not know whether this was done because of his personal enmity with Nawaz Sharif, whom he removed from power, or to show his love for...
peace. The national celebrations also ended and now the only recognition are certain pronouncements and events organized by Nawaz Sharif’s party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), and certain other organizations (Geo TV 2009). Significantly, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif did not revive the holiday when he returned to power in 2013.

Pakistan National Monument
The Pakistan national monument was completed in 2007. It is in the shape of a blooming flower, with seven petals, each representing a region of Pakistan. The murals inside the petals display numerous luminaries of the independence movement (Jinnah, his sister Fatima Jinnah, and the poet-philosopher Iqbal), iconic buildings and structures (Lahore fort, the Badshahi and Faisal mosques, Minar-e-Pakistan, and Jinnah’s mausoleum), and people dancing and playing games and music. The last aspect is important, as the austere aspect of Islam promoted in the 1970s and 1980s rejected all kinds of dancing, games, and music. Furthermore, white doves have also been painted to evince Pakistan’s commitment to peace.

The museum accompanying the monument, completed in 2010, presents paintings and wax figures to illustrate Pakistan’s history from ancient times to the modern era. This is a significant change as, in Pakistan, history is usually taught and written onwards from the invasion of the Arab Muslim general Muhammad bin Qasim in the eighth century.

Finally, there is no explicit reference to Islam in the new Pakistan monument that is devoid of linkage with Pakistani territory or culture. An Arab or an Indonesian Muslim would not find anything that they could relate to. In this way, this monument is different from Minar-e-Pakistan, where Quranic verses and the ninety-nine names of Allah were inscribed and there were no pictures.

16 December: A National Day of Mourning and Resolve
On 16th December 2014, the Taliban killed 132 children in an attack on a school in Peshawar. This attack resulted in the revocation of the moratorium on the death penalty, the passage of the Twenty-first constitutional amendment, and a National Action Plan to combat terrorism. Another significant change is that 16 December has become a symbol of resistance to religious extremism and terrorism. Although officially it is just another day (except for the local holiday in Peshawar), in 2015 and in 2016, the state leadership issued statements and renewed its resolve and commitment to fight religious terrorism. On 16th December 2015, Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif visited the APS and declared, “We will take revenge for every drop of blood of our innocent children.” On 16th December 2016, Sharif promised that no mercy would be shown to the terrorists and assured the nation that the war against terrorism would be taken to its logical conclusion. In both 2015 and 2016, the Chief of Army Staff (General Raheel Sharif, in 2015, and General Qamar Bajwa, in 2016), considered by many the most powerful decision-maker in Pakistan, visited the site of the massacre on 16th December, participated in the memorial programme and resolved to fight against terrorism (AFP/Web Desk 2015; Awaz TV 2016; Prime Minister’s Office 2016). Television channels, by broadcasting special programs, and newspapers, by publishing columns and editorials, also kept the national leadership on their toes and mindful of their promises (Abbasi 2016; Azhar 2016; Editorial 2017; Mir 2016; Zaidi 2016). It is too early to tell but 16th December is definitely turning into a red-letter day in the national calendar and remind Pakistanis that religion can also lead to despicable cruelty and terrorism.

**Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Motto and Emblem**
The KP province borders Afghanistan and has a majority population of the ethnic group Pashtuns. It has borne the brunt of the decades-long Afghanistan civil war. In the 1980s, it was the province where most of the Afghan refugees settled. Since 2002, it has faced terrorism at the hands of Taliban. In 2010, KP decided to change its emblem and motto. The new emblem and motto highlighted its estrangement from terrorism and militancy, Islamic or otherwise. This was especially important when one considers that, in the ethnic Pashtun culture, as in many other tribal cultures, the warrior has been celebrated for centuries. When Pashtuns accepted Islam, the local hero was a Muslim warrior fighting against non-Muslims. The Pakistani state, with the help of Saudi Arabia and the USA, promoted this Muslim Pashtun warrior hero during the 1980s to motivate the Pashtuns of both Afghanistan and Pakistan to fight against the Soviets. In the 1990s, the Taliban were encouraged by, again, depicting Pashtuns as Islamic warriors. So, an emblem and logo promoting peace by the Pashtun-majority province, bordering Afghanistan, was clearly a radical change by the state elite (Fry 1989, 2012; and Khan 2015b).

The major changes in the emblem were as follows:

- The universal symbol of peace, the dove, was added to the emblem.
• The laurel wreath, also associated with peace, became part of the emblem.

The same message was given in the motto of the province which is ‘One message, one voice—PEACE’. On the official website of the KP government, one can see not only this motto, but also a silhouette of a dove with an olive branch (KP government 2015).

CONCLUSION

Geisler (2005, xv) argues that national symbols perform two important functions:

• They serve as a catalyst for the creation and preservation of national identity.
• They align the nation to the state.

The second function is particularly important in new nations, where the imaginary boundaries of the ancestral homeland do not correspond to the actual boundaries of the new state. Both Turkey and Pakistan were new states. Their geographical boundaries were difficult to predict just six months before their birth. For both Indian and Turkish Muslims, the ancestral homeland spanned much larger areas than the new states. National symbols, therefore, had to not only create new national identities in Turkey and Pakistan, but also to delimit the boundaries of the nation to the boundaries of the state.

The early Republican elite in Turkey saw the population’s affinity with Islam as a problem; it was a hindrance in delineating the national boundaries within the new state boundaries. Therefore, new national symbols were selected that had no religious or Ottoman content in order to break all linkages with the Ottoman Empire and its boundaries. In some cases, when national symbols, with religious content, were selected or retained, their religious content was de-emphasized and efforts were made to erase the religious connotation completely. The examples of the first type of symbols were the presidential emblem and presidential flag, which emphasized ethnic nationalism and had no link with Islam or the Ottomans. The tenth anniversary anthem can also be added to these two symbols. The examples of the second type of symbol were the Turkish flag and the Turkish national anthem. Both these symbols had religious content but,
during the early period, this content was de-emphasized and they were re-imagined as secular symbols.

During the second period (the late 1940s to late 1970s), religious symbols were still not acceptable to the new state. However, some allowance was made for the Ottoman symbols which the aggressively secular promoted as Turkish symbols but, for many ordinary Turks, they had religious inferences. This change demonstrates a modest increase in Islam’s role in Turkish nationalism during this period. The best example of this change was the seven-day official celebrations of the five-hundredth anniversary of the Istanbul conquest in 1952.

In the subsequent period (the early 1980s to late 2000s), the state remained secular but, for the first time since the early 1920s, Islam’s role in Turkish nationalism was acknowledged by the Turkish state. Under the new ideology of Turkish-Islamic synthesis, religious symbolism gradually made a comeback. The entire Turkish national anthem, with its Islamic references, was promoted and the Turkish elite started showing religious piety by offering prayers, embarking on pilgrimage, and attending Ramadan iftars. However, due to continued resistance from secular components of society, Islamic-oriented parties and governments had more success in creating new symbols, rather than changing the old symbols. Since 2010, Islam’s re-emergence as a significant part of Turkish nationalism has continued at an increasing speed. Resistance to Islamic symbols has been further eroded, leading to certain important changes.

One can see that the ebb and flow of Islam’s role in Turkish nationalism follows the same pattern, as seen in Chapter 2. There was initially a complete elimination of Islam’s role in nationalism and then, slowly and gradually, Islam made a comeback in the second and third periods. In the fourth and current period, Islam’s role in Turkish nationalism appears to be increasing and, after the AKP’s win in the April 2017 referendum, the trend might continue. However, it is too early to predict what will be the dominant trend in this period.

In Pakistan, the early national elite had a more difficult task than their Turkish counterparts. They were largely non-religious, like the Turkish elite, and wanted to restrict Islam’s role in Pakistani nationalism but could not do so without damaging the raison d’etre of the Pakistani state. Hence, out of necessity, Islam’s role in nationalism increased after independence. National symbols were almost all linked to Islam, whether it was the national anthem, flag, or state emblem. In the second period (the early 1970s to late 1990s), Islam’s role in nationalism further increased as the ruling elite, in contrast to
the first period, started actively promoting it. The increased role of Islam can be seen in the new motto of Pakistan’s military, a new national mosque, and two new holidays. The current period, starting in 1999, shows a slow decrease in Islam’s role in Pakistani nationalism. This reversal in policy can be seen in changes in the presidential flag, the cancellation of the Youm-e-Takbir holiday, and the construction of a new Pakistani monument that promotes territorial nationalism. As indicators of Islam’s role in nationalism, national symbols follow the pattern seen in Chapter 2. Pakistani national symbols demonstrated an increase in Islam’s role after independence. In the second period (the early 1970s to late 1990s), religious symbolism became predominant in state affairs, showcasing a massive increase in Islam’s role in nationalism. Finally, in the current period, post-1999, national symbols have become less religious, highlighting a slow decrease in Islam’s role in nationalism.

In Chapter 4, imagery on banknotes will be analyzed to examine the increase or decrease of Islam’s role in nationalism in both Turkey and Pakistan. Chapters 5–7 will focus on three indicators of the Islamization of government (family law, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and education).

Notes

1. Historical evidence shows that the crescent and star is an old Anatolian symbol. The crescent was the symbol of the ancient city of Byzantium. The Emperor Constantine added the star to the crescent as the symbol of the renamed city of Constantinople. Hence, the crescent and star was both an Anatolian and Turkish symbol that later became an Islamic symbol.
2. Although the red Ottoman flag was initially an Ottoman symbol, due to state’s influence, it swiftly became a symbol of the Turkish Republic, and its opponents adopted the green Ottoman flag as their symbol. During Sheikh Said’s rebellion (1925), which was against the ending of the sultanate, caliphate and Hat Law (1925), green flags were adopted by the rebels. Leaders of the Progressive Republican Party (the first opposition party, created in 1924) were also welcomed in many cities with green flags.
3. The Ottomans also used Sancak-i-Serif (literally “holy banner”, a banner believed to be Prophet Muhammad’s) as an imperial standard to rally troops or the populace (Finkel 2007, 237–43; 435). After the establishment of the Republic, this banner was never used.
4. The tenth anniversary anthem was written in 1933, at the height of assertive secularism in Turkey. Compared with the national anthem, this anthem is
devoid of any religious content, so many secular Turks take it as a symbol of secularism as subsequent discussion will demonstrate.

5. Istiklal Marsi means “independence march”.

6. There was a contest held to write the national anthem and a prize of £500 was announced. Ersoy refused to enter the contest because he felt that it was a patriotic duty and so monetary inducement was not right. However, on the insistence of the Education Minister, Suphi, he wrote the IM and it was adopted amid applause and a standing ovation by the GNA members. Later, Ersoy refused the prize and asked that it be used for Independence war veterans’ welfare.

7. According to Muslim traditions, all dead Muslims are to be washed and covered in a shroud before funeral prayers and then buried. Only martyrs are exempt from these rules due to their exalted status. They are buried in the clothes they are wearing and no funeral prayers are offered.

8. As in Islamic daily prayers.

9. Onuncu Yi Marsi means “tenth year march”.

10. Camlibel was a teacher and later became a deputy of the Democrat Party. After serving for 14 years in the GNA, he was imprisoned for around 15 months in the wake of the 1960 coup. He left politics after that and died in 1973 (Turner 2006). Trained as an engineer, Caglar was sent to London by Ataturk to study after he became famous because of the tenth anniversary anthem. He also served in the GNA in the 1940s. He was a staunch Kemalist and resigned in 1949 when the Republican Party moved away from strict secularism. He later served as President of the Constituent Assembly in 1961 after the 1960 coup. He died in 1969 (ESA 2011). So, the authors of Onuncu Yi Marsi showed opposite political leanings, one became a member of a centre-right party and the other became a strict secularist.

11. It is not totally devoid of militaristic content; for example, the reference to Ataturk as the Commander-in-Chief and the militaristic command “Forward Turk”.

12. Each Ottoman sultan had his own tughra. A particular tughra for Ataturk, or a general tughra for presidents of Turkey, could have been produced easily.

13. In the initial years of the Republic, the 16 stars, according to some analysts, represented 16 Anatolian beyliks (small Turkish states in the Middle Ages).

14. Even after the construction started, it was interrupted many times.

15. While Mayor Dalokay was fighting for Turkish secular identity in Ankara, he was indirectly involved in cementing Pakistan’s Islamic identity, as he was the architect of the Faisal Mosque, the national mosque, in Pakistan’s capital Islamabad.

16. Constantinople was conquered by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II (who reigned in 1444–46 and 1451–81) in 1453. After the conquest, “Fatih”
(meaning “conqueror”) was added to his name. In Turkey, he is commonly remembered as Sultan Fatih.
17. Built on the orders of Sultan Fatih himself in Istanbul.
18. There were many non-religious celebrations, too, such as a military parade, a ball, and so on.
19. Honorary title given to those who have performed pilgrimage (hajj, in Arabic)
20. Though the IM was full of Islamic references, a significant portion of right-wing voters considered it was not Islamic enough. In September 1980, at a rally of an Islamic-oriented party, the National Salvation Party (MSP), participants jeered when the IM was played.
21. An Islamic-oriented party of the 1990s, the successor of the MSP, also led by Necmettin Erbakan. In its 1996 party congress, the IM was sung by all participants (Hurriyet Daily News 1996).
22. During the protests against the Refah government (1997–98), the OYM was played regularly as a way to show aversion to political Islam and the love of secularism. After the Refah Party government was forced to resign and the party was banned, OYM lost its popularity (Ozyurek 2006, 168–75).
23. Prophet Muhammad was quoted praising the Muslim ruler that would conquer Constantinople in future.
24. The first bridge was criticized by the main opposition party, the CHP, the Turkish Workers’ Party, and many other organizations as useless and wasteful. The Leader of the CHP, Bulent Ecevit, said, “Before you try to build a suspension bridge over Istanbul, we should be trying to provide employment and job opportunities for 38 percent of villagers.” Criticism from the Turkish Workers’ Party was also in terms of the whole of Turkey, and not focused on Istanbul. It distributed flyers in the streets with the phrase, “30 million of us are starving, and the bridge won’t feed us” (Durukan 2008).
The recent controversy generated over the name of the third bridge on the Bosphorus, as will be discussed in the next section, also demonstrates the significance of the names of the Bosphorus bridges.
25. Even in other countries, it was considered a national icon of Turkey. For example, an Iranian stamp on the fiftieth anniversary of Turkey depicted this bridge.
26. A high tower in Ankara. Ata refers to Ataturk and “kule” is “tower” in Turkish.
27. In this tussle that lasted more than a decade, the mayor also proposed the image of an Angora cat’s eyes as a compromise.
28. With the approval of constitutional amendments in April 2017, Turkish presidents have become one of the most powerful constitutional leaders in the world.
29. From 1947 to 1956, Pakistan was a British dominion and so the head of state was the British Monarch and their representative in Pakistan was the Governor General. After the promulgation of the 1956 Constitution, Pakistan became a republic and the head of state was the President of Pakistan.

30. In heraldry, the right-hand side of the shield from the user's perspective. It is considered a side of greater honor compared with the left (sinister) side.

31. The crown shown is not identical to the real British imperial state crown.

32. A type of cross whose arms narrow close to the centre.

33. These armies were led by Ghaznavids, Ghoris, Tughlaqs, Khiljis, Afsharids, and Mughals.

34. Ghauri and Ghaznavi were named after Muslim invaders of India, Sultan Muhammad Ghauri (reign 1173–1202) and Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni (reign 998–1030). One of the Indian missiles is called Prithavi, named after Prithviraj Chohan (reign 1165–92), the last independent Hindu king to rule from Delhi. Prithviraj defeated Sultan Ghauri and was, in turn, defeated by him.

35. More than one political party exists that have taken the name of the Pakistan Muslim League.
CHAPTER 4

Nationalism, Banknotes and Islamic Iconography

Whether one considers nationalism primordial or modern, the importance of narratives and symbolism in the construction of nationalism cannot be denied. Narratives select and, where necessary, invent events to authenticate the distinctiveness of the nation, and symbols provide artifacts for worshipping at the national altar. National currencies primarily function as the monetary medium of exchange. The imagery depicted on them, however, also assists states in inventing and reinforcing the national narratives. They thus serve as unique symbols of the nation and have been used to develop “portraits of the nation” (Schwarzenbach 1999). Since all nationalisms are social constructs and most nations are heterogeneous, the “official” portrait is always contested by diverse groups within the nation. Images on banknotes provide an easy way for the state elite to promote their (own) views widely, imperceptibly, and without much cost. Banknote iconography is, therefore, frequently used, consciously or unconsciously, to authenticate and popularize the state elite’s narratives over other competing narratives, and deconstructing banknote imagery can help identify which ideas about the nation and the national identity are preferred by the state elite.

Eric Helleiner (1998), one of the pioneers of currency iconography research, has argued that national currencies contribute to the national identity in five ways. National currency operates as a medium of social communication. National unity is also strengthened because citizens go through a collective monetary experience when they use the national currency. National currencies are also symbols of national sovereignty, as
other currencies cannot be used easily in the country. Moreover, national currencies require, and frequently instil, trust and faith in the nation. Without faith, a national currency would fail as a monetary medium of exchange. Finally, nationalist iconography on banknotes instils a sense of common, historic, and homogeneous identity in the populace.

Subsequently, many scholars have linked national currency iconography with national identities. Emily Gilbert (1999) examined the images on the Canadian dollar and their association with Canadian nationalism. Marcia Pointon (1998) has shown the relationship between the banknote imagery and national identities of France, Germany, and United Kingdom. Adrian Tschoegl (2004) has analyzed Bulgarian currency images and Harcourt Fuller (2008) has focused on the Ghanaian cedi. Furthermore, Unwin and Hewitt (2001; see also Hewitt and Unwin 2004) have studied the currencies of Central and Eastern European countries.

Before starting the analysis of Turkish and Pakistani banknotes, it is important to emphasize that a wide variety of choices, limited by neither time nor space, are available to national leaders for selection of imagery on banknotes. Events that happened centuries ago and persons who have lived thousands of miles away from the state, both real and imaginary, can be utilized to promote state nationalism.

**Turkish Banknotes**

This chapter analyzes all 66 banknotes (with 67 unique images) issued by the Turkish Republic since its formation in 1923. There are nine series of banknotes, of which eight were released by the Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası (TCMB), the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, established in 1930. The first series was issued by the Ministry of Finance in May 1927. Series are referred as “emissions” by the TCMB. The number of banknotes issued in each emission and the time span of emissions are dissimilar. For example, only two banknotes were issued under emission 4 (E4) and it spanned little more than a year; however, E7 comprised of 15 banknotes and continued for a quarter of a century. Both sides of the banknotes have been analyzed, except for the ubiquitous portrait of Ataturk. As Ataturk has long been owned by almost all sections (secularists, Islamists, democrats, pacifists, militarists, and so on) of Turkish society, and it is common practice to have the picture of the founding father on the banknotes, his image has not been included in the following analysis. 1
This chapter assumes that the pictures on Turkish and Pakistani banknotes are conscious efforts by the state elite to promote their preferred version of state nationalism. Banknotes are excellent instruments for this purpose, as everyone uses them and very few people think of them as having any purpose other than that of a medium of exchange. Thus, in contrast to monuments, flags, and museums, the message conveyed by the images printed on Turkish banknotes can subtly affect the entire population, even those who are consciously trying to oppose the state’s preferred national vision (TCMB 2017) (Table 4.1).

For more than a century, the Ottoman elite tried to devise and agree on a combination of din (religion) and devlet (state) that could stem the decline of their empire. The empire disintegrated in the aftermath of World War I and the new Republican elite opted for a secular state. Ataturk equated religion with backwardness and advised Turks to leave such superstitions behind to join “contemporary civilization” and become a modern nation. Not surprisingly, religious images were not regularly depicted on Turkish banknotes. Of the 67 unique banknote images depicted in the history of the Turkish Republic, there were only eight that could be linked to religion. One of these images was related to Christianity (or to ancient Roman religion) and the other seven were related to Islam. However, while looking for Islamic symbolism on banknotes, one also has to take into account the fact that many Ottoman symbols were also perceived as Islamic symbols. As discussed in Chapter 3, Ottoman and Islamic symbolisms were so intertwined

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Banknote series</th>
<th>Banknotes</th>
<th>Unique images&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E1 (Dec. 1927)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2 (Sep. 1937–Jun. 1944)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3 (Jan. 1942–Mar. 1947)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4 (Feb. 1947–Sep. 1948)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5 (Dec. 1951–Apr. 1953)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E6 (Jun. 1966–May 1978)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E7 (Dec. 1979–Nov. 2001)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8 (Jan. 2005)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E9 (Jan. 2009)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Excluding portraits of Ataturk and President Inonu, and identical images
under the six centuries of the Ottoman Empire/Caliphate that it was
difficult to distinguish one from the other. The early Republican
regime, perhaps understanding the association, rejected them both.
Textbooks in the early Republican era presented the Ottoman era as
being the dark ages and Ottoman sultans as major enemies of the
Turkish nation but, later on, the Ottomans were rehabilitated (Ince
2012, 84). Therefore, together with purely religious images, the fol-
lowing analysis will also study the Ottoman images on Turkish
banknotes.

Images of mosques, portraits and mausoleums of Islamic personal-
ities, and Islamic inscriptions on banknotes have been used as indica-
tors of the role of Islam in state nationalism. Mosques are symbols of
Islam, as their incidence is linked with Islam and their presence
manifests the presence of Islam and Muslims. Besides Turkey and
Pakistan, some of the other MMCs that have depicted mosques on
their banknotes are Tunisia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Bangladesh, and
Morocco.

Portraits and mausoleums of Islamic personalities are chosen as symbols
of Islam as they signify Islam and Islamic qualities. Countries where religion
is an important part of nationalism regularly choose portraits and tombs of
religious personalities to grace their banknotes, even when the person
belonged to a different nation and era. For example, Iran has frequently
depicted mausoleums of religious personalities—such as that of the biblical
prophet Daniel and of the eighth Shiite Imam Ali Reza—on its banknotes.
Israel issued a banknote in the 1950s that depicted ancient tombs of the
Sanhedrin in Jerusalem. In the 1980s, a banknote was issued with the
portrait of twelfth-century Rabbi Maimonides, one of the most in
fluential Torah scholars. Rabbi Maimonides was born in Spain, and lived in Morocco
and Egypt.

Islamic inscriptions are another symbol of Islam on banknotes.
Although rare, religious inscriptions are depicted on banknotes. The
most famous inscription of this type is “In God, we trust” on the US
banknotes and coins.

Besides these symbols, Islam is also portrayed on the Pakistani bank-
notes as a crescent moon and star. The crescent moon and star is a
common symbol of Islam, and appears on many of the flags of the
MMCs. However, in the case of Turkey, as explained in Chapter 3, the
crescent moon and star is interpreted by the state elite as a Turkish symbol
and not as an Islamic symbol.
Based on religious images and changes in state nationalism, emissions have been divided into three eras. Each of the three eras has three emissions:

- The early 1920s to mid-1940s (E1, E2, and E3)
- The late 1940s to late 1970s (E4, E5, and E6)
- The early 1980s to late 2000s (E7, E8, and E9).

**The Early 1920s to Mid-1940s**

After using Islamic rhetoric and symbols to mobilize the people during the War of Independence, the Republican regime reduced the role of religion in state affairs. Religion was confined to the private sphere and any public display of religion was frowned upon, if not persecuted. Predictably, only one banknote with an Islamic image and two banknotes with Ottoman images were issued during this period. This was in complete contrast to the preceding Ottoman period, when Islam had a significant influence on the choices regarding banknote imagery. The most striking feature of the Ottoman banknotes was the absence of any image of a person, or even a living thing. This was in agreement with the traditional Islamic precepts that forbid the drawing of living things (Daily Sabah 2016). The Arabic script and the Sultan’s tughras also distinguish the Ottoman banknotes from the Turkish banknotes that were subsequently issued.

Three emissions/series were issued from the early 1920s and mid-1940s. The first series, issued in December 1927, had eleven unique images. There was only one Islamic image and no Ottoman image. This was the only series issued by the Turkish Ministry of Finance (Table 4.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Banknote Emissions</th>
<th>Unique Images</th>
<th>Islamic</th>
<th>Ottoman</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E1 (Dec. 1927)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2 (Mar. 1938–Jun. 1944)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3 (Jan. 1942–Mar. 1947)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a The Ottoman mosques are counted as Islamic symbols
The solitary Islamic image depicted in this era was that of the Gök Medrese (blue Islamic educational institution). It was portrayed on the 500 lira banknote, first issued in 1927. This medrese was built in the thirteenth century, during the reign of the Seljuk dynasty, in Sivas, Turkey. Although this medrese is one of the finest Islamic monuments in Anatolia, it seems strange that an image of an Islamic institution was chosen at a time when Ataturk was trying to banish Islam from the public sphere (Lifchez 1992, 3). Although the actual reason might be different, there are two possible explanations. First, at that time, the Turkish state was not only trying to suppress Islam, but also to degrade Ottomans. So, it might have been chosen not as a religious institution but, rather, as evidence of the magnificence of Turkish architecture before the Ottomans. Second, the image of the Gök Medrese could be seen to be presenting the Sivas Congress (September 1919), not Islam. With the picture of the medrese was a picture of Ataturk and, on the opposite side, there was a picture of the town of Sivas. Therefore, if one takes all of the imagery on the banknote into consideration, it was Sivas, not the medrese, that was the focus of the banknote. Looking at this banknote, Turks were more likely to be reminded of the Sivas Congress during the War of Independence, and Ataturk’s leading role in it, than of Islam.

In the second and third series, issued during the 1930s and 1940s, there was no Islamic-themed image on any Turkish banknote. However, Ottoman architecture appeared on the banknotes. Ottoman images in this period are particularly significant and exhibit a gradual change of heart, as the Ottoman period was regularly portrayed as being the dark ages and Ottoman Sultans presented by the state as major enemies of the Turks in the textbooks of this era (Ince 2012, 84). The depiction of the Ottoman Rumelihisar in 1939 may, therefore, be considered as the first sign, on the banknotes, of the restoration of the Ottomans in the national pantheon. However, Ankara remained the focus of this era banknotes, with Ankara fort appearing five times.

There were two different images in the second series that depicted the Ottoman fortress Rumelihisarı in Istanbul. The Rumelihisarı was built by Sultan Mehmet Fatih on the Bosphorus as part of his preparation to conquer Constantinople/Istanbul in 1451–52 (Freely 2011, 11). After building this fortress, Sultan Mehmet Fatih was able to conquer Istanbul in 1492. Besides being one of the greatest moments in Turkish history, this event also had religious significance. As mentioned earlier, Prophet Muhammad extolled the future Muslim conqueror of Constantinople and his soldiers. Sultan Fatih was, therefore, considered a Muslim hero and Rumelihisarı is a reminder of his greatest military achievement, as well as a religious achievement.
The increase in the Ottoman images in the E2 series did not lead to a further increase in Ottoman images in the E3 series (1942–47). In fact, there were no Islamic or Ottoman images in the E3 series. With only three out of 26 unique images related to Islam and Ottomans, it is clear that Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism in this era was negligible.

**The Late 1940s to Late 1970s**

There was only one Islamic-themed image chosen to appear on Turkish banknotes during this period, images of the Ottoman buildings being the dominant theme.

The first Islamic-themed image was issued by the Democrat Party regime in 1953. As discussed in the Chapters 2 and 3, the Democrat Party came to power after the end of a single-party era. The Democrat Party supported a passive secularism and campaigned for inclusive modernization that did not completely reject Turkish culture and traditions. After coming to power in 1950, the Democratic Party relaxed many restrictions on Islam’s role in the public sphere, as Islam was a significant component of Turkish culture and traditions. So, it was not surprising that the Democratic Party chose the Sultan Ahmet mosque to appear on the 500 lira banknote. It was the first mosque to appear on Turkish banknotes since the Gök Medrese in 1927.

One of the most magnificent and famous mosques in the world, the Sultan Ahmet Mosque (the blue mosque) was built by Sultan Ahmet I between 1609 and 1616. The image on the banknote comprised not only the Sultan Ahmet Mosque, but also the Obelix and the Hippodrome, the latter two images being in the forefront, while the mosque was in the background. Therefore, although the depiction of the blue mosque was significant, the banknote image was of an Istanbul square replete with Turkish history, spanning more than one thousand years.

As Table 4.3 shows, in contrast to Islamic images, the number of Ottoman images increased during this period. Both images in the E4 series showed Ottoman architecture, while almost half the images in series E5 and E6 were also related to the Ottomans.

In the E4 series (1947–48), there were two images and both were of Ottoman buildings. The first image was of the Sultan Ahmet fountain on the 10 lira banknote. Situated near the imperial gate of the Topkapi Palace, this fountain was built by Sultan Ahmet III in 1728. It is one of the most beautiful fountains in Istanbul (Freely 2011, 386–7). The second
image was of Rumeli Hisar, a reminder of the conquest of Istanbul by the Muslim Turks.

In the E5 series (1951–53), out of the total of seven images other than portraits, three were images of Ottoman buildings. One of the images, discussed in detail above, was that of the famous Istanbul square, with the Sultan Ahmet mosque. The second image was that of the Bridge of Meric, Edirne. One of the eight bridges in Edirne, it was also called the new bridge. It was started during the reign of Mehmet II and completed during the reign of Abdul Macet I in the nineteenth century (Freely 2011, 87). The last image was of the Bosphorus Strait, but a part of Rumeli Hisar could also be seen in the foreground.

In the E6 series (1966–78), the last of this era, the popularity of the Ottoman architecture and buildings continued. Of the total of seven images in this series, three were related to the Ottomans. The beautiful ornate gate of the Istanbul University graced the 500 lira banknote. The gate was built by Sultan Abdul Aziz, who had been impressed by the French monument the Arc de Triomphe on a trip to Paris.

The second Ottoman image showed the Bosphorus Strait. Although the focus was on the new bridge, which had been constructed in 1988 and connected the European and Asian parts of Istanbul, one could see part of Rumeli Hisar in the foreground. The bridge was named after Fatih Sultan Mehmet, the conqueror of Istanbul and the builder of Rumeli Hisar, thus strengthening the Ottoman connection. Rumeli Hisar thus appeared four times on banknotes during the period 1939 to 1978. Perhaps the popularity of the fortress was associated with the five hundredth anniversary of the conquest in 1952, but it certainly indicates the acceptance of the Ottomans. Choosing Rumeli Hisar repeatedly also revealed a change in preference of the decision-makers. In contrast with the 1920s and 1930s, (Islamic/Ottoman) Istanbul was depicted more frequently on the banknotes than the (secular) Ankara.

Table 4.3  Religion in Turkish banknote imagery (the late 1940s to late 1970s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Banknote series</th>
<th>Unique images</th>
<th>Islamic</th>
<th>Ottoman</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E4 (Feb. 1947–Sep. 1948)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E5 (Dec. 1951–Apr. 1953)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E6 (Jun. 1966–May 1978)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The third Ottoman image was of a marble fountain in Topkapi Palace. Topkapi Palace was the seat of power and the residence of Ottoman sultans for four centuries. It was, and still is, a symbol of Ottoman grandeur, and perhaps no other site represents “the values, tastes and aspirations of the Ottoman Empire” as much as Topkapi Palace. Topkapi Palace acquired religious significance in the twentieth century, as it was converted to a museum in the 1920s and holds many religious relics, including the Prophet Muhammad’s hair (Simons 1993). Choosing the image of Topkapi Palace was another sign of the Turkish state taking pride in its Ottoman past.

As seen in Chapter 3 on symbols, this era did not show an increased depiction of Islamic symbols. Islam was visible indirectly as part of Ottoman symbols, which were increasingly chosen to represent the Turkish state. With half of the unique images depicting Islam or Ottomans themes, the increase in Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism is evident.

The Early 1980s to Late 2000s

This is the era of the ascendancy of Turkish-Islamic synthesis, a Turkish state ideology that accepted Islam as an important component of Turkish nationalism. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, in this era the Turkish state, for the first time, enthusiastically used Islam to pacify and unify a society that had been marred by continuous ideological violence in the late 1970s. During this period, the number of Islamic images increased, demonstrating an increase in Islam’s role in state nationalism. In this period, there were five images related to Islam, four of which were portraits of Mehmet Ersoy, Mevlana Rumi, Yunus Emre, and Buhurizade Mustafa Efendi (Itri), the fifth depicted Mimar Sinan, with the Selimiye mosque (Table 4.4).

The first two Islamic images appeared in quick succession in 1981–82. In November 1981, the Mevlana Rumi Mausoleum and a figure of Mevlana appeared on the 5000 lira banknote. Less than one year later, in October

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Banknote series</th>
<th>Unique images</th>
<th>Islamic</th>
<th>Ottoman</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E7 (Dec. 1979–Nov. 2001)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New E8 (Jan. 2005–Dec. 2008)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E9 (Jan. 2009)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1982, the image of the sixteenth-century architect (Mimar) Sinan and his supreme architectural accomplishment, the Selimiye Mosque, appeared on the 10,000 lira banknote.

These two portraits were followed by a portrait of Mehmet Ersoy in 1983. As discussed in Chapter 3, Ersoy, the author of the national anthem, was an Islamic intellectual and rejected Ataturk’s drift toward secular ethnolinguistic nationalism. The choice of his portrait indicated an acceptance of Islam’s contribution to Turkish state nationalism.

The last two Islamic images appeared in the current E9 series in 2009. Yunus Emre’s portrait was chosen together with his tomb and his famous verse “Let’s love and be loved”, which appeared on the 200 lira banknote in 2009. Like Mevlana, Emre was also a Muslim mystic and is more famous for his poetry than for his piety. However, he is often falsely portrayed as a heterodox Bektashi, a believer in some early form of Turkish nationalism, or an anti-Islam humanist. His verse and tone show that he never rejected his Islamic roots, although, like Rumi and many other great Muslim poets, he did reject orthodoxy (Baskal 2004).

The second Islamic image was the portrait of Itri, with musical instruments and the figure of a mevlevi. Itri’s real name was Buhurizade Mustafa Efendi. He was an Ottoman court musician, calligrapher, and poet who lived in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He is considered the founder of Turkish classical music and his fame is linked to his works as a musician. But he was also a mevlevi, belonging to a religious order, and wrote and composed many religious songs. He is sometimes called the “Muslim Bach” for his religiosity (Somel 2003, 142; Reinhard et al. 2008, 868).

The number of Ottoman images decreased in this period. In the E7 series, besides the two Islamic-themed images already mentioned, there were two Ottoman images. One was the image of the Izmir clock tower. It was built by a French architect in 1901 to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s reign (Caskey and Caskey 2013, 97). The choice of depicting something related to Sultan Abdul Hamid II was significant as secularists detest him, calling him the “red sultan”, a despot who promoted pan-Islamism or Muslim nationalism and destroyed the Ottoman Empire (Duran 2016).

The second image was that of Sultan Mehmet Fatih. He was not only the first Ottoman sultan, but also the first historic personality to be depicted on Turkish Republic banknotes. Choosing Sultan Fatih, instead of other Ottoman sultans, is probably linked with Istanbul’s conquest (the old Istanbul skyline is depicted in the background), which was Sultan
Fatih’s greatest achievement. It can also be argued that he was chosen because he was less religious than many later sultans (for example, Suleiman, the Magnificent) but Sultan Fatih was also the only Ottoman sultan who was praised in a saying of the Prophet Muhammad. So, he could be considered both an Ottoman and an Islamic icon.

The E8 series had six banknotes but four of them were copies of banknotes from the E7 series. Only the 50 and 100 lira banknotes were new. On the 100 lira banknote, the Ishak Pasha Palace was depicted. This magnificent palace in Eastern Turkey was built by the Ottoman governor Hasan Ishak Pasha in the eighteenth century (Sinclair 1989, 387).

In the current E9 series, there is only one image related to the Ottomans. Fatma Aliye has the distinction of being the first women depicted on Turkish currency. She was also the first female novelist, a humanitarian and, as also, the daughter of the prominent Ottoman intellectual, writer, reformer, official historian, and the Minister of Justice Ahmed Cevdet Pasha. In this era, the number of images related to Ottomans decreased but images related to Islam increased from one each in previous eras to five. Although the images related to Islam and Ottomans was less than half of the unique images, their total number also increased, demonstrating the increasing role of Islam in Turkish state nationalism.

Since no new banknotes series have been issued after 2009, it is not possible to estimates the change in Islam’s role in Turkish Nationalism after 2010 using banknote images. However, after winning the referendum and becoming more powerful, odds are that the next banknote series under President Erdogan will have much greater religious symbolism than the past two series issued under his watch.

**PAKISTANI BANKNOTES**

Similar to the Turkish section, this section analyzes Islam’s role in Pakistan’s state nationalism using images on all banknotes issued in Pakistan since 1947. Five series of banknotes have been issued in Pakistan since independence in 1947. For ease of analysis, the following decisions have been made:

- In Pakistan, the Ministry of Finance used to issue Rs1 banknotes. As only three unique images of the Rs1 banknote have been issued since 1947, these images have been considered part of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) banknote series that was circulating at the time of their first issuance.
Table 4.5  Pakistani banknote series (1947–2017)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Banknote series</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Banknotes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948 Provisional series</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948 Regular series</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First SBP series</td>
<td>1949–53</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second SBP series</td>
<td>1957–70</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third SBP series (emergency issue)</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth SBP series</td>
<td>1976–87</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth SBP series</td>
<td>2005–08</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- On the fiftieth anniversary of Pakistan’s independence in August 1997, the SBP issued a commemorative Rs5 banknote that was not part of a regular SBP series. This banknote has been included in the fifth (current) SBP series for the analysis.⁷

Table 4.5 gives an overview of all the banknote series that have circulated in Pakistan since independence, and lists the total number of banknotes analyzed, including the addition of the Rs1 banknote and commemorative banknotes. It divides Pakistan’s history into three distinct eras, based on Islam’s role in Pakistan’s state nationalism (Table 4.6).

The following section deliberates the importance of Islam to Pakistan’s state nationalism as demonstrated on Pakistan’s banknotes. But, before analyzing Pakistan’s banknotes, a brief overview of the Islamic symbols on Pakistan’s banknotes is provided.

Table 4.6  Number of banknotes analyzed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time period</th>
<th>Banknotes issued by SBP as part of a series</th>
<th>Other banknotes⁷</th>
<th>Total banknotes</th>
<th>Unique images⁸</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The late 1940s to late 1960s</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The early 1970s to late 1990s</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 onwards</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁷ Banknotes issued by the Ministry of Finance and commemorative banknotes

⁸ Excluding Jinnah’s portrait and geometric patterns
Besides images of mosques, Islamic inscriptions, and portraits and mausoleums of Islamic personalities, Mughal buildings have also been used as indicators of the role of Islam in Pakistani state nationalism. Similar to the Ottoman Empire in Turkey, the Mughals were the last Muslim dynasty, and the pinnacle of Muslim power and culture in the Indian sub-continent. The Mughals ruled for almost four centuries and during this time Islamic and Mughal symbols intertwined.

Two reasons can be given for the choice of the Mughal era as the golden age by the Pakistani state elite. First, Mughals were the last and the greatest of the Muslim Empires in the Indian subcontinent. Moreover, it was a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and highly cultured empire. As the Pakistani identity was also not based on a common ethnicity or language, it helped the elites to evoke memories of the Mughals who were not only Muslims, but had successfully ruled a diverse set of people. Mughals were also perceived as religiously and culturally tolerant, something Pakistan’s national elite wanted to highlight.

Like the British, the Mughals were colonizers in South Asia and brought with them a vibrant trade, economy, art, and theology. They are also remembered as the perpetuators of the great synthetic Mughal architectural style, the Indo-Islamic style. The collective remembrance of Mughal rule in Pakistan is a nostalgic review of the successful amalgamation of a large geographic region, subsequent economic prosperity, and Islamic rule of an empire, often (although not always) with tolerance for other religions. This is reflected in almost every history of architecture, art, and administration of the Mughal period (Campbell 2011, 317).

Second, as India had been Pakistan’s rival since independence and was much larger than Pakistan, evoking memories of the Mughal Empire was a convenient way of reminding Pakistanis of a time when a comparatively smaller number of Muslims had ruled the entire Indian subcontinent for centuries (Waseem 1996).

The Late 1940s to Late 1960s

The first collection of banknotes was issued by the SBP in 1948. In this series, there were only three banknotes and none of them had any pictures on them. This might be due to the lack of time, as Pakistan issued these banknotes only one year after independence and a few months after the
Reserve Bank of India had issued a banknote series specifically for Pakistan. Various issues, including Kashmir and the division of assets, had already soured India–Pakistan relations. All three banknotes of this series were similar, with geometric designs and a crescent and star on one side, and only geometric designs on the other. The depiction of the crescent and star showed Islam’s prominent role in Pakistani state nationalism.

In the next series, issued from 1949 to 1953, there were two images that were inspired by Islam—the Badshahi mosque on the Rs2 banknote, and a crescent and star on the Rs1 banknote. In addition, there were three images that were related to the Mughals:

- A minaret of Emperor Jahangir’s (reign: 1605–27) tomb was shown on the Rs2 banknote.
- The Shalimar Gardens, built by the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan (reign 1627–58), was illustrated on the Rs10 banknote. Emperor Shah Jahan is famous for building the Taj Mahal in Agra, India, in memory of his wife.
- The Naulakha Pavilion, also built by Emperor Shah Jahan, was depicted on the Rs1 banknote.

So, Islam and Mughal themed images increased from three in the 1948 series to five in this series (Table 4.7).

The next banknote series spanned 13 years, from 1957 to 1970. However, there were only five images. The only Islamic image was that of Badshahi mosque, which was chosen once more to be depicted on the banknotes. The only image on the banknotes related to the Mughals, besides the Badshahi mosque, was the Shalimar Gardens. Thus, the total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Unique images</th>
<th>Islamic</th>
<th>Mughal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949–1953</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957–1970</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Including one banknote from 1970, as the last SBP series continued until 1970

*b The Mughal mosques are counted as Islamic symbols
number of images related to Islam decreased from five in the previous series to two in this series. One of the reasons for this decline was the rise of General Ayub Khan in 1958 who, as discussed in previous chapters, was one of the few Pakistani rulers who took on the religious right, and tried to decrease Islam’s role in Pakistani state nationalism and to steer Pakistan toward a less religious future.

Based on the images appearing on banknotes, one can argue that Islam’s role in state nationalism was significant in this era, as more than half of the unique images had some Islamic symbolism.

**The Early 1970s to Late 1990s**

During this period, two banknote series were issued by the SBP. However, the first series, called the “emergency series” by the SBP, did not have any unique images. It was issued in 1972 after the separation of East Pakistan and reprinted four banknotes of the previous series in colours that were different from the originals. As the focus of this chapter is on images, this series, a replica of the previous series, is also not included in the analysis.

A new series was issued by the SBP, with banknotes of seven different denominations, from the mid-1970s to the 1990s. However, the total number of banknotes analyzed in this section is 10, as the Ministry of Finance issued two Rs1 banknotes, and one commemorative banknote was issued by the SBP in 1997 for the fiftieth anniversary of Pakistan’s independence.

This period saw a significant increase in Islamic images. From 10 in the previous period, the number of Islamic images increased to 17, as a religious inscription became part of every banknote issued by the SBP and the Ministry of Finance during this period.

The Badshahi mosque, a permanent fixture on Pakistani banknotes, was again depicted on the Rs2 banknote in this series. The crescent and star was chosen to appear on the other side of the Badshahi mosque banknote, as well as on the Rs1 banknotes issued by the Ministry of Finance. Two new categories of Islamic symbols were used for the first time during this era, mausoleums of religious personalities and Islamic inscriptions. As discussed, the mausoleum of Emperor Jahangir had appeared on Pakistani banknotes, but the mausoleum of a personality famous for his association with Islam first appeared on Pakistani banknotes in this era.

In this series, mausoleums of two persons linked with Islam appeared on Pakistani banknotes. First, Dr Muhammad Iqbal’s mausoleum was
chosen to appear on the Rs1 banknote in 1981. Dr Iqbal is the national poet of Pakistan and is credited not only with presenting the idea of Pakistan, but also with popularizing the concept of Muslim nationalism through his poetry. Second, in 1997, the image of the mausoleum of Shah Rukn-e-Alam, a thirteenth-century Muslim Sufi saint, was selected to appear on Pakistan’s fiftieth anniversary commemorative banknote.

However, the biggest change in this period was the addition of a religious inscription to all banknotes in 1980. The religious inscription on Pakistani banknotes was introduced in the 1980s by General Zia-ul-Haq, who, as previously discussed, was trying to legitimize his coup and prolong his rule using Islam. The inscription that appeared on every banknote, after a minor change, was “Rizq-e-Halal ain Ibadat Hai”, meaning “Legal livelihood is equivalent to prayer”.

Two Mughal buildings also appeared on the Pakistani banknotes. One was the image of the Lahore Fort on the Rs50 banknote. The origins of the fort are ancient but, in its present location, it was constructed by the Mughal Emperor Akbar (reign 1556–1605) in the sixteenth century. The other image was of Emperor Jahangir’s tomb. In the 1949–53 series, only one minaret of the tomb appeared on the Rs2 banknote but, this time, a picture of the complete tomb appeared on the Rs1000 banknote.

The above discussion and Table 4.8 show that Islamic images proliferated during this era, demonstrating a substantial increase in Islam’s role in Pakistani state nationalism.

Table 4.8 Religion in Pakistani banknote imagery (the early 1970s to late 1990s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Unique images</th>
<th>Islamic</th>
<th>Mughal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The late 1940s to late 1960s</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The early 1970s to late 1990s</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1999 Onwards

Only one series has been issued (2006–08) in this period and the banknotes of this series are currently in use in Pakistan. Images on the eight banknotes of this series show a decline in Islam’s role in Pakistan’s state nationalism, as Islamic and Mughal images have decreased from 18 in the preceding period to only four in the current period. This era also marks the
end of the role of the Ministry of Finance as an issuer of banknotes, as the Rs1 banknote was discontinued due to inflation and Rs1 coin was introduced (Table 4.9).

In this series, two mosques were depicted on the banknotes, the Badshahi mosque and the Faisal mosque. The Faisal mosque, as discussed, was built in the new capital, Islamabad, and is considered the national mosque of Pakistan. In this series, the crescent and star was depicted on the Rs500 and Rs1000 banknotes. The major change related to Islamic images was the disappearance of the religious inscription that was prominently displayed on each banknote of the last series. In the current series, it has been depicted in such a way that it is almost invisible. It is hidden in a circle and appears more like an intricate design than something written in Urdu. The value of symbols is in their ability to evoke emotions. A symbol is of no value if it is not recognized or understood. Since the circle visible on the Pakistani banknotes is now not recognizable as an Islamic inscription, it is not an Islamic symbol. This change does not appear to be random or arbitrary, as General Musharraf was trying to reduce Islam’s role in state affairs.8

In the current series, no Mughal building was depicted on the banknotes (except the Badshahi mosque). Overall, this series demonstrates a decrease in Islam’s role in Pakistani state nationalism, as Islamic-priented images have decreased from 18 in the previous era to only four in this era.

### Table 4.9 Religion in Pakistani Banknote imagery (1999 onwards)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Unique images</th>
<th>Islamic</th>
<th>Mughal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The late 1940s to late 1960s</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The early 1970s to late 1990s</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 onwards</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CONCLUSION**

Using images on banknotes to identify Islam’s role in state nationalism may seem to be a novel idea but the iconography of banknotes has increasingly been accepted as a means by which to analyze state nationalism and national identity (Hymans 2005, 316). The banknote analysis illustrates the pattern of increase and decrease in Islam’s role in state nationalism in Turkey and Pakistan that is similar to that seen in Chapters 2 and 3. In the early Republican period in Turkey, Islam’s role was reduced to a minimum. Of
all banknotes issued in this period, only the image of the Gök Medrese can be considered Islamic but, looking at the entire banknote, it is apparent that the focus is on the Sivas Congress and Ataturk.

In the second period, there were dramatic changes. Similar to the first period, there is only one image that can be related to Islam, but Ottoman images increased manifold. In the first period, of 26 unique images, there were two images related to the Ottomans. In the second period, of 16 unique images, seven were related to the Ottomans. As argued previously, Ottoman images and symbols were not Islamic, but they were a close proxy. Hence, one can see a slight increase in Islam’s role in state nationalism during the second period.

In the third period (the early 1980s to late 2000s), as in Chapters 2 and 3, there is evidence of an increased role of Islam in Turkish state nationalism. In the first two periods, there was only one image that can be related to Islam. In the third period, there were five such images, highlighting a significant increase.

The chapters on constitutions and national symbols have demonstrated a further increase in Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism since 2010. However, since no banknote series has been released since January 2009, one cannot analyze the change in Islam’s role in nationalism for the current period.

As in the case of Turkey, Islam’s role in Pakistani state nationalism has fluctuated. Since Pakistan’s creation was based on Muslim nationalism, Islam’s role in state nationalism increased after independence. In the first period of 16 unique banknote images, there were six images related to Islam and four were related to the Mughals. In the next period (the early 1970s to late 1990s), there was a surge in Islamic images. The number of Islamic images increased to 16 and there were only two images related to the Mughals. This clearly demonstrates a huge increase in Islam’s role in Pakistani state nationalism. This big leap was also seen in Chapters 2 and 3. In the current period, starting in 1999, Islamic images have not been chosen as frequently. The decrease in Islamic images is significant, from 16 in the previous period to four in the current period. Moreover, for the first time, there are no Mughal images in this period.9

Based on the analysis of Chapters 2 and 3, and this chapter, it can be contended that Islam’s role in Turkish nationalism decreased during the first period but has been increasing since then. In the second period, the increase is slow but still perceptible. Islam’s role in Pakistani state nationalism increased during the first period after independence. In the next
period, the increase in Islam’s role represented a quantitative leap over the first period. The current period shows a policy reversal and Islam’s role in state nationalism appears to be decreasing.

This concludes the analysis of the indicators for the independent variable “Islam’s role in state nationalism”. Chapters 5–7 will examine indicators of the dependent variable “Islamization of government”. Chapter 5 will focus on family laws in both countries, while Chapters 6 and 7 will analyze the role of the Ministries of Religious Affairs and religious education.

Notes

1. In the case of series E3 and E4 (and, in part, E2), President Inonu’s picture replaced Ataturk’s picture on Turkish banknotes, but this practice was discontinued for E5 and, since then, Ataturk’s picture has graced one side of Turkish banknotes.
2. As seen in Chapter 2 on constitutions, despite pronouncements from the elite, Turkey was not a completely secular state.
3. This medrese, along with others, was closed by the Turkish government in 1925–26; later, it was turned into a museum (Sahin 2006).
4. It was difficult to decide whether to consider him an Ottoman character or an Islamic personality.
5. It was the first Ottoman building to grace the banknotes that was not in Istanbul.
6. A provisional series was issued by the Reserve Bank of India for Pakistan in 1948. This series was similar to the banknotes circulating in India. The only difference was the inscription of “Government of Pakistan” on the Pakistani banknotes. The images on these banknotes were chosen by the British Indian authorities and the portrait of King George VI was displayed on all of them. As the Pakistani elite were not involved in the choice of images, this series has been excluded from the following analysis.
7. The SBP also issued some hajj banknotes for the use of pilgrims going to Saudi Arabia to perform hajj. These banknotes were similar to the regular series, except for the colour and the inscriptions, “For Hajj Pilgrims from Pakistan—For use in Saudi Arabia only” in English and “hajj note” in Urdu. As the images were similar to the regular banknotes, these hajj notes were considered to be the part of the same banknote series.
8. One might ask why General Musharraf did not delete the inscription. The reason could be the fear of a backlash by the religious right. So, a “golden mean” was chosen by not deleting the inscription but making it invisible, so its value as a symbol is lost.
9. Besides the Badshahi mosque, which is counted as an Islamic image.
In the twentieth century, more than one hundred new nation states came into existence. Most of these nations were previously colonies and not economically developed. One of the strategies the national elite in these countries tried, in order to promote social, economic, and political development, was to copy constitutions and laws from their former colonial masters or from other developed countries. Constitutions and laws thus became nation-building instruments for the national elite. The elite hoped that these legal instruments would force the nations to become united and accept modernity, and thus become more like the advanced nations. Unfortunately, the power of laws and constitutions to unite or develop societies was greatly exaggerated. Tradition, culture, religious edicts, and ethnolinguistic ties did not cease to exist just because a new law was passed by the Parliament. Just as drawing borders did not create homogeneous nation-states, the adoption of Western laws did not create societies that resembled the Western world.

For the new MMCs, family law was one of the main areas of political contention. The national elite wanted to change and modernize, or at least reform, family law. Religious leaders and a large section of the population, who believed in the divine origins of family law, were generally not in favour of any significant changes. This chapter focuses on changes in the family laws that Pakistani and Turkish governments have promulgated since these states became independent, and the extent to which the Islamization of government is reflected in those changes. Before we turn to an analysis of Turkish and Pakistani family law in the next section,
consider the following two caveats. First, the MMCs are not the only countries where religious edicts affect family law. The state of Israel, for instance, has accepted the primacy of Jewish Orthodox traditions and rules over the family law (Weiss and Gross-Horowitz 2013). Similarly, laws against sodomy in many countries have a religious origin (Eskridge 2009, 161). Second, focusing on official family law does not mean that this law was, or is, followed by all, or even by most, of the people living in Turkey and Pakistan. It is only a partial story of how family relations were, and are, regulated in Turkey and Pakistan, or in other countries (Welchman 2007, 9). This incomplete or partial story is, however, important to analyze here as family law is particularly significant in the context of Islamization of government, as the following discussion will demonstrate.

**WHY FOCUS ON FAMILY LAW?**

Family law is a group of laws that regulate marriage, divorce, inheritance, custody, and related issues. Sometimes, family law is also called “personal status” law, as these regulations are primarily concerned with the personal life of an individual. Family law is important in gauging the extent of Islamization of government for the reasons that now follow.

First, while the Quran is not a book of laws, clear rules about marriage, divorce, and inheritance are given in the Quran. Other important issues related to the family are based on the sayings and actions (Sunnah) of the Prophet Muhammad. This is in contrast to other areas of human life, such as the economic realm, where there are very few clear Quranic injunctions, making it easier to frame new laws or adopt laws from the Western world. Changing family law is, therefore, more difficult than changing other laws.

Second, the family is the center of Muslim culture. As with other religious and traditional cultures, family and family life are considered sacrosanct and crucial to a pious existence. As Mansoori (2006, vii) notes:

> Marriage institution occupies vital importance in Islamic legal system. Its importance can be judged from the fact that the Muslim jurists consider preservation of family unit among the five basic objectives of Shariah. Marriage in Islam is not an ordinary civil covenant, it is rather a firm covenant. In the words of Quran, it is mithaq ghaliz—a phrase that refers to the sacred nature of marriage contract. It is not only a worldly affair (mu’anlah) but also an act of worship (ibadah).
The third reason for choosing family law as a focus of analysis is that these laws were often left untouched by the colonial powers ruling the MMCs or, if changed, the change was limited. Hence, when the MMCs became independent, unlike other pre-colonial laws, Islamic family law was still operational in many MMCs. Decisions about reforming, ignoring or replacing family law to keep pace with modern times, therefore, had to be made in the post-independence period. Hence, one way to gauge the extent of Islamization of government in the MMCs is to look at family law reforms that happened in the MMCs during the course of the last century. As Esposito explains:

Muslim family law provides primary example of Islamic reform in the twentieth century. Islamic law (the Shariah) constitutes the ideal blueprint for Muslim society . . . Reflecting the centrality of the family in Islam, family law has been the heart of the Shariah and the major area of Islamic law that has remained in force . . . While most areas of Islamic law have been replaced by modern Western legal codes, Muslim family law has provided the major area of Islamic reform. . . Changes in family law, then, is significant both as an index of social change and as an illustration of Islamic reform, its methodology, and problems. (Esposito 2001, xiv)

Today, despite reforms, family law in the MMCs is still most likely to be based on religious traditions contra other laws (such as penal law) that have long since been changed (Rahman 2012, 56).

Fourth, family law is the symbol of Muslim identity in the modern world. Due to its basis in the Quran, its primacy in Islam and its continuity for more than 14 centuries, it is no surprise that family law has become a symbol of Muslim identity and authenticity. In his comparative study of family laws, An-Na‘im (2002, xi–xii) has written that, for Muslims, Islamic family law (IFL) is akin to religious identity, a pre-colonial authenticity, that survived the rule of alien colonialists as well as local modernists:

In particular, one must appreciate that IFL has become for most Muslims the symbol of their Islamic identity, the hard irreducible core of what it means to be a Muslim today. This is precisely because IFL is the main aspect of Shariah that is believed to have successfully resisted displacement by European codes during the colonial period, and survived various degrees or forms of secularization of the state and its institutions in many Islamic countries.

Finally, many Muslims argue that a strong family structure (based on Muslim family law) protected Muslim culture from the Western onslaught
of three centuries. Moreover, family law is the one area where Muslims consider themselves superior to Westerners. The breakdown of the Western family structure is often cited as the justification for retaining Muslim family law and rejecting Westernization. Based on a survey of opinions in scores of the MMCs, Esposito and Mogahed (2007, 22–3) concluded that the family is not only the centre of the Muslim community, but also a source of pride:

Family bonds are among the aspects of Islamic societies that Muslims say they most admire, signaling that family is not only something Muslims value, but an attribute of their society they take pride in... Family law is viewed as the “heart of the Shariah” and the basis for a strong, Islamically-oriented family structure and society. In the 19th century, the family provided religious, cultural, and social protection from colonial and Western domination, as well as site for political resistance.

Generally, three approaches have been adopted in the last century for reforming Muslim family law in the MMCs:

- Rejection in toto: These laws were considered obsolete and incompatible with the modern world, so they were discarded.
- Literal application: Medieval tradition and interpretations were thought to be the reasons for making these laws ineffective, so regulations from the original sources of the Quran and Sunnah were applied, literally replacing medieval traditions.
- Modern interpretation: It was argued that every age had the right to interpret the original sources according to its own times, so new laws were promulgated based on new interpretations of the Quran and Sunnah (Esposito p. x).

Neither total rejection nor literal application has been the preferred approach in most MMCs. More often, family law has been reformed based on modern interpretation of the original sources. Welchman identifies three broad phases of family law reform in the twentieth century in the Arab/Muslim world (2007, 42–3).

- Ottoman and Egyptian legislative interventions in the early twentieth century: Ottomans and Egyptians were pioneers in reforming Muslim family law as they were not under direct Western colonial
rule but still in close contact with the Western culture and legal traditions. Changes made by the Ottomans and Egyptians later inspired reform in other MMCs.

- National codifications in the 1950s: Most of the newly independent MMCs tried to reform family law after becoming independent. The impetus of the reform was partly driven by a concern about women’s rights and partly by a desire for codification. However, the basis of change was still primarily religious edicts and precepts.

- The rise of Islamists and human rights activism: After the 1960s, not only did the international environment change, but the tight control of the modernizing elite, which had led the national struggles against colonial rule, also ended. Islamists gained ground, but they were not the only group gaining traction and power in this period. New national actors (such as women and human rights groups) also made their presence felt. International focus and pressure (from the UN, the EU, international human rights and women’s rights movements, and so on) and more opportunities for networking and mobilization made family reform a key area of contestation between Islamists and human/women’s rights activists. In some countries, such as Iran, many changes made earlier in the twentieth century were rejected. In others, such as Egypt, there was more Westernization, but only after a bitter fight that is by no means finished (Mahmood 2012).

Due to its criticality and prominence in Islam and its continuity, family law has been chosen as one of the indicators of the Islamization of government. In the following section, Turkish and Pakistani family law are analyzed.

**Turkish Family Law**

As in Chapters 2–4, the Turkish Republic’s history has been divided into four periods to study whether the Islamization of government in Turkey followed the pattern of the rise and fall of Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism. The first period covers the years after the formation of Republic until the end of the single-party era. During this period, initially, Islam was the basis of Turkish family law. However, after the adoption of the Swiss Civil Code, Islam’s connection with Turkish family law was severed for good. During the second phase,
from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, there were few changes in Turkish family law. Hence, Islam’s contribution to Turkish family law remained low. In the third phase, from the early 1980s to the late 2000s, there were initially changes in Turkish family law that increased gender equality and the protection of children’s rights. Later, in 2002, a new family law was promulgated. The new law continued the trend started in the early 1980s that increased gender equality and afforded greater protection for children’s rights. The contribution of Islam to the new code (or to amendments) was negligible. Since 2010, a new phase has started. Due to the continued political ascendancy of the AKP and President Erdogan, many analysts expect changes in family law that will again bring it closer to traditional Muslim family law. There have been some signs that these expectations will soon become a reality.

The origins of the Ottoman dynasty can be traced back to the end of the thirteenth century, but it was only after the fifteenth century that the Sultans began perceiving themselves to be defenders of the faith and the torch-bearers of Islam. Concurrent with this change was the administrative development of the Ottoman Empire, which gradually became complex and bureaucratic. Both these changes increased the importance of Islamic family law, as it became the state family law applicable in all areas of the Ottoman realm. The law was administered by the qadis (judges) who had wide authority in applying the law, as it was not yet codified. However, outside the urban centres, the reach of the Ottoman state was limited and the official laws had a tenuous hold on society and family law (Oguz 2005).

As the power of the Ottoman Empire declined in the eighteenth century and it started suffering defeats at the hands of Europeans, a long period of introspection commenced. At first, introspection was limited to the military sphere but it gradually widened and other areas of society also came under intense scrutiny. With respect to family law, however, most of the elites agreed that there was no need to replace existing family law with European laws.

The major change in Ottoman family law came in 1917, when a new law was adopted. The Law of Family Rights (Hukuk-ı Aile Kararnamesi), passed in 1917, resulted in the following significant changes:

- For the first time, the religious courts, which dealt with family law cases, were put under the administrative control of the Ministry of
Justice. Previously, these courts were under the control of the Sheikh-ul-Islam;

- For the first time, women were given the right to add supplementary provisions to their marriage contracts, including provisions restricting polygamy;
- Women were given more liberal rights of divorce;
- For the first time, a minimum age for marriage was prescribed. The marriageable age was set at nine years for women and ten years for men.

Besides these changes, the law established two new principles relating to family law. It accepted the doctrine of supra-madhhab. According to this doctrine, the state laws did not have to be based on a single school of thought (for example Hanafi), as in the past, and the government was free to choose rulings or fatwas of any of the four established Sunni schools of thought (madhhabs). Second, it was established that, as with other laws in effect, the family law had to be codified.

The Early 1920s to Mid-1940s

As discussed in previous chapters, the role of Islam in the Turkish state steadily decreased after 1924. Even before the promulgation of the 1924 Constitution, the Turkish government, in 1923, formed several committees under the Ministry of Justice to devise new legal codes for various areas of human activity. However, these reports were rejected because they were thought to be too influenced by the Shariah. The Turkish government then decided to adopt European legal codes, with minor adjustments. Soon, the Italian Criminal Code, the Swiss Civil Code, and the German Commercial Code were adopted. Changes in family law were particularly difficult to make as it was one of the “last strongholds of the Shariah” and “one of the most resistant area of the legal system to secularization” (Toprak 1981, 52–3).

The year 1926 was a particularly opportune moment to replace the millennium-old Islamic family law tradition with a European code because Ataturk was in total control and had managed to remove all opposition to his rule. The 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion provided a convenient excuse for enacting tough laws and silencing all opposition. The press was intimidated and the opposition Progressive Republican Party, which Ataturk himself helped establish only six months earlier, was outlawed. Its leader,
General Kazim Karabekir, who was one of the earliest supporters of the nationalist struggle and had fought alongside Ataturk throughout the War of Independence, was imprisoned (Zurcher 2004, 169–74).

Despite these harsh measures, the adoption of a European civil code in place of Ottoman family law, inspired by Islam, was not easy. But Ataturk and his followers were convinced of the righteousness of their cause. Mahmut Esat, the Minister of Justice, did not mince words in stating that the religious laws had impeded progress in the past and, if Turkey wanted to become “civilized”, it had to change:

Not to change is a necessity for religions. For this reason, that religions should remain matters of conscience is one of the principles of the civilization of the present century and of the most important elements that distinguish the new civilization from the old. Laws that derive their principles from religions...constitute one of the major factors and reasons impeding progress...As a matter of fact, the stipulations of the religious Ottoman code are doubtlessly irreconcilable with contemporary civilization. But it is also obvious that the Ottoman code and similar other religious regulations are not reconcilable with Turkish national life. (Arat 2010)

The adoption of the Swiss Civil Code, with some minor changes, as the Turkish Civil Code (TCC) or family law brought about some radical changes:

- Polygamy was outlawed.
- Civil marriage became the primary legal requirement, while religious marriage became optional.
- Freedom to choose one’s religion was granted.
- Women and men were given equal shares in inheritance.
- The acceptance of three times unilateral repudiation by a husband as a divorce was replaced by a court granted divorce.
- Both men and women could marry people from other religions.
- The minimum age of marriage was increased to 17 years for girls and 18 years for boys. (Ozsu 2010; Yilmaz 2015, 59)

The adoption of the TCC can be acclaimed as a revolutionary step for two reasons. First, the European laws were introduced during the Ottoman rule but it was done in areas where there were no clear commandments from the Quran and Sunnah. The introduction of the TCC was different
because clear Quranic commandments were being replaced by European civil laws. Second, earlier changes in family law, such as the 1917 family law, brought Turkish/Ottoman family law closer to the Western family laws, but justifications for those changes were found in the Islamic tradition. The introduction of the TCC was the first major change in family law that was not justified on the basis of Islam but was, rather, justified on the basis of Islamic laws being primitive.

The contribution of Islam to Turkish family law thus suffered in two ways following the introduction of the TCC in 1926. First, family law based on traditional Islamic edicts and principles was rejected. Second, and more importantly, Islam was no longer the criterion used to accept or reject changes in family law. Thus, after 1926, there was no need to find a Quranic verse, or a Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad, or a fatwa of a traditional Islamic scholar to justify a change in Turkish family law (Yilmaz 2003).

It is argued that some of the patriarchal provisions of the TCC evinced a lingering trace of Shariah. However, there were other reasons that could explain the presence of these provisions. First, many patriarchal provisions were part of the Swiss Civil Code and, when it was adopted, those provisions became part of the TCC. For example, the Swiss Code accepted the husband as the head of the family and this provision became part of the TCC. Second, many of the governing elite, including Ataturk himself, despite their rhetoric, subscribed to the Turkish patriarchal culture and had reservations about gender equality. They wanted to give women rights and freedom, but within limits. They were rejecting religion, but not the patriarchal tradition that was much older than the religion (Mango 2002, 410; Gunduz 2004).

The historic link between the religious law and Turkish family law was broken in 1926, but the new family law was not accepted by the populace, particularly in the rural areas. During this era, most of the rural Turks continued to marry according to the Islamic religious tradition and did not feel the need for a civil marriage. Until the early 1970s, 50 years after the adoption of the TCC, more than one-fifth of all the marriages in villages were solely religious marriages. This made thousands of children illegitimate in the eyes of the law. The Turkish elite knew of, and accepted, this widespread non-observance of the new family law and regularly passed amnesty laws to legitimize children of these “illegal” marriages. According to one estimate, by the 1990s, around three million children were made legitimate by the amnesty laws promulgated by the Turkish state (Toprak 1981, 54–5; Yilmaz 2003).
The Late 1940s to Late 1970s

Few amendments were made to the TCC during this period (Atamer 2008). This was not due to an absence of pressure to reform the TCC. In fact, demands for revisions in the TCC had regularly been asserted since the late 1940s due to the introduction of multi-party democracy, the changed socio-economic environment, and the disconnect between what most Turks practised and what the TCC prescribed. A commission to review the TCC was formed in 1951 after the Democratic Party took power. However, reform was not possible due to the mistrust between the democratic leadership and the old Kemalist elites. The Kemalist elites considered the TCC their premier accomplishment, a necessary and significant step taken by them to “civilize” Turkey. They were not ready to change the TCC for those who, many Kemalists thought, wanted to reverse all of Atatürk’s major reforms and take Turkey back to the primitive Ottoman times.

Three review commissions were formed for revision of the TCC during this era, but they were all unsuccessful:

- The 1951 review commission: Its report was presented in 1971 after two decades of work. However, its final recommendations were lambasted by critics and were rejected.
- The 1971 review commission: It was established only to review the divorce laws. This limitation was not acceptable to the members of the commission. Therefore, the Ministry of Justice stopped convening the commission.
- The 1976 review commission: It worked for approximately two years. Before it could finish its work, it was disbanded. (Ozsunay 2014)

Not surprisingly, only a few amendments were made to the TCC during this era:

- In June 1938, the minimum marriage age requirements were reduced for both genders. For men, the new minimum marriageable age was 17 years and, for women, it was 15 years. (Yilmaz 2015, 59)
- In 1971, the right to petition for divorce was extended to both parties (instead of only the less guilty party).
- In 1971, the rights of illegitimate children were recognized.
• Modernization of the civil registration system that covered personal information and status took place. (Ablak 2012)

These changes were compatible with the changes happening in other laws. For example, in 1976 the Child Law increased the legal protection of children. Moreover, a juvenile court law was passed in 1979 and came into force in 1982.

Islam’s role in the TCC remained negligible during this period. There was no significant attempt to bring Islamic injunctions back into the TCC. Furthermore, the civil marriage provision of the TCC was given constitutional protection under Article 153 of the 1961 Constitution, making it very difficult to change.7

The Early 1980s to Late 2000s

More amendments to the TCC were passed in this period than in the previous 50 years. There were several reasons for this increase in amendments. First, more than 50 years had passed since the promulgation of the TCC. Socially, demographically, and economically, the Turkey of the 1980s had few similarities to the Turkey of the 1920s. Second, the ideological differences that plagued Turkey for more than two decades, and the ensuing violence, declined in the 1980s. Third, after the end of military rule, there was not only economic liberalization, but also social liberalization as a result of increased literacy,8 the advent of information and communication technologies, the ease of travel to and from Turkey, and a general desire to join the European Union. One example of this change was the blossoming of civil society associations. From 1926 to 1980, around 25,000 associations were created, but in the next 15 years more than 40,000 associations were established (Yavuz 2003, 92–3). Finally, the Turkish women’s movement matured and thrived during the 1980s. It became much more powerful and organized as more women became educated and joined the labour force. Women protested against the policies of the elites that supported women’s liberalization within a framework based on the traditional patriarchal system. The women’s movement benefited from the Kemalist reforms, including the TCC, but the concept of gender equality had changed over the 60-year period, so there was a demand for a revision of the TCC (Gunduz 2004).
The efforts of the women’s movement and others led to many amendments in the TCC that increased gender equality. Many of the following changes were the result of court cases that were brought by women challenging laws that were perceived as discriminatory:

- In 1983, abortion was made legal within the first ten weeks of conception. Under certain conditions, it was legal until twenty weeks after conception.
- In 1988, under certain circumstances, a divorced spouse was allowed to request alimony without a time limit.
- Also in 1988, an amendment was passed to make an “incompatibility” divorce easier to obtain.
- In 1990, wives were allowed to choose their profession freely, or to work outside the home. They did not have to seek permission from their husbands, as had been necessary in the past.
- In 1992, the law which tied the ability of a woman to work to her husband’s permission was abolished.
- In 1997, an amendment was passed to allow women to keep their maiden surname as their middle name. However, they still had to use the surname of the husband after marriage.
- In 1996 and 1998, the Constitutional Court decisions annulled adultery laws because they discriminated against women.
- In 1998, the Law for the Protection of the Family was passed, providing protection against domestic violence. (Gunduz 2004; Ansay 2005, 117; Matthews 2012)

In the 1980s and 1990s, child protection also became accepted as an important responsibility of the government. The Social Services and Child Protection Agency was established in May 1983 and the first juvenile court was established in 1988. In September 1990, Turkey signed the Convention on the Rights of the Child and ratified it in December 1994. In 1997, a special unit of police to deal with cases involving children was created (Hancioglu et al. 2000). Concurrent with these changes, amendments were made to the TCC, making it more child-friendly. Examples of these changes are the lowering of the age of individuals who could apply to adopt children from 40 to 35 years in 1983, and the granting of equal status to legitimate and illegitimate children in 1990.

Some procedural changes were also enacted during this phase. In 1984, Law 3080 amended several articles related to the personal status officers
who are responsible for the registration of changes in personal status such as marriage, death, birth, and so on. And, in 2000, an eleven-digit Turkish personal identification number was introduced.

Islam’s role in the TCC remained minimal. The constitutional protection of the civil marriage part of the TCC continued in the new constitution. In the 1982 Constitution, under Article 174, the civil marriage part of the TCC was one of the eight laws that were safeguarded from any legal challenge. Despite the rise of Islamists in the 1990s, there was no movement to bring Islam into the TCC.

These piecemeal revisions, often forced by the courts, further increased the pressure to reform the whole law. The fourth review commission to reform the TCC was established by the military government in 1981. It finished its work in October 1984 but its recommendations were never presented to Parliament for discussion and enactment. Ten years later, in 1994, another review commission was formed. After lengthy deliberations, it presented its report in September 1998. The Turkish GNA accepted most of the report’s recommendations and passed the new TCC in November 2001. It came into force on 1 January 2002 (Ozsunay 2014).

The key differences between the old and the new law were related to gender equality and children rights. The new code increased gender equality in several ways. Previously, the minimum age for marriage for men was 17 years and, for women, it was 15 years. In the 2002 code, the minimum marriageable age was set at 17 years for both sexes. In the past, judges could lower the minimum age to 15 years for men and 14 years for women but, under the new code, they could not lower the age below 16 years for either sex. The most important change in the code was the recognition that husbands were no longer the head of the family. Other changes followed from this recognition. For example, an application for marriage could now be filed at the place of residence of either the bride or groom; previously, such an application could only be filed near groom’s residence. Either spouse could now, under the new TCC, legally represent the marriage and choose the (family) home. Another major change was that income and property acquired during marriage was assumed to be the property of both spouses and, if the marriage ended in divorce, the property was to be divided equally. The winding up of the husband’s role as the decision-maker, protector, and provider of the family was not all loss for them, as they gained some new rights. After 2002, husbands could request alimony and women had to help pay the marriage expenses and contribute to the family income.
Several changes in the new code were designed to benefit children. Some of them were related to the recognition of paternity. For example, after 2002, the law allowed the mother to prove that her husband was not the child’s father. A natural father could also request the courts to establish his paternity. In the case of a divorce or a separation, the new code asked the judge to consider the interests of the child when deciding custody or alimony cases. Both mother and father were responsible for child care and education. For the first time, a child could also file a case requesting support against a parent. Moreover, single parents could adopt children under the new TCC.

The main reasons for the promulgation of the new code were the pressure from the women’s movement and Turkey’s desire to join the European Union (EU). The women’s rights activists would have forced the government to reform the civil code even without the EU, but the EU accession process probably made the Turkish ruling elite act sooner. The EU annual reports on the accession process, emphasizing the requirement of gender equality, were crucial in forcing different political parties to come together and pass the new TCC. This unity against patriarchy would have been difficult to contemplate in 2001–02, without the EU deterrent (Gunduz 2004).

Islam’s role in the new TCC was negligible. Interestingly, Islam became an issue in the debate on the proposed new code not because of provisions related to Islamic law, but because of the wording in the rationale for the code. Islam-inspired parties argued strongly not for an Islamic family law but, rather, to exclude the (shortened) original 1926 rationale of the code as it dismissed and derided Islam. They pointed out that 1926 rationale contained the following excerpt:

To be absolutely observant of custom and tradition is so dangerous a mission that it cannot move humanity one step ahead of its most primitive condition. In harmony with the demands of life, no civilized nation has remained within such a restrictive belief system and has not hesitated to undermine customs and traditions that restrain her. . . . Confronted with realities, it is not a dictate of intelligence to be loyal to beliefs inherited from fathers and forefathers. . . . The day the Turkish Civil Code is ratified our nation will have been saved from the sick beliefs and commotion of thirteenth century that is circumscribing her and it will close the doors of the old civilization and enter contemporary civilization that brings life and efficiency. (As quoted in Arat 2010)
Islam-inspired parties, thus, only wanted to protect Islam as a symbol, not as a living idea. Others, including the Minister of Law, however, argued that nobody wanted to disrespect Islam. He noted that neither the current supporters of the inclusion of the rationale nor the founding fathers that introduced the rationale in the 1926 Code were against Islam. He claimed that only the archaic customs and traditions were rejected in the rationale and, therefore, the rationale had to be included in the new TCC. (Arat 2010).

Soon after the passage of the new TCC, the AKP came to power. Many people were afraid that the AKP would increase the Islamization of government, as it had a commanding majority in the Parliament. These fears seemed to be coming true in 2004, when the AKP government decided to criminalize adultery. However, this change was shelved after a strong reaction from both inside Turkey and from the EU (Smith 2004). After this defeat, the AKP did not make much of an effort to Islamize family law during this era.

2010 Onwards

Since defeating its domestic rivals and establishing its control over the judiciary and the military, the AKP is in a better position to put in place laws of its own choice. The dithering of the EU support for Turkish accession removed the external restriction on the AKP. Though there has not been Islamization of the TCC yet, the changes in other laws and regulations, statements by Prime Minister/President Erdogan, and the constitutional changes proposed in late 2016 point towards a more conservative future.

The first largely symbolic change was the modification of the name of the “Ministry of Women and Family Affairs” to the “Ministry of Family and Social Policies”, in 2011. Announcing this change, despite protests, Prime Minster Erdogan did not hide that this was not a normal administrative change:

We are a conservative democratic party. The family is important to us. (Belge 2011)

The change was considered a backward step by women’s groups but the new minister, Fatma Sahin, decided to work with the civil society and soon achieved a major victory for women. In March 2012, on International Women’s Day, the AKP-dominated assembly passed a comprehensive law relating to domestic violence in Turkey. Called a “historic step” by
women’s rights activist and lawyer Nazan Moroglu, despite her misgivings, this law not only protected all women (regardless of their marital status), but also introduced a number of new ways and regulations to protect women. Police were authorized to intervene earlier, less evidence was required to place restrictions on those that could use violence against women, past offenders could be asked to wear ankle bracelets and wristbands to track their movements, those who felt threatened could be moved to secure places, and sentences were increased for individuals who transgressed against the law (Hurriyet Daily News 2012; Zeldin 2012).

Since 2010, Erdogan’s statements have suggested a bias against working women. He has asked Turkish women to have at least three children, praised motherhood, and called birth control a treason (Binyon 2012; Today's Zaman 2013; Hurriyet Daily News 2013a; AFP 2014). When criticized, he responded that he neither legally obligated anyone, nor put a gun to anyone’s head, to have three children. He was only recommending it and, as the Prime Minister, he had the right to recommend what is good for the people (Daloglu 2013). He has also suggested that women and men could not do the same jobs as they are equivalent, not equal (Sarhan 2014). Abortion, however, is one area where he has not only spoken, but has also acted. Abortion has been legal in Turkey since the early 1980s, as discussed. In 2012, Prime Minister Erdogan stated his views about abortion:

There is no difference between killing a baby in its mother’s stomach and killing a baby after birth... I consider abortion to be murder. No-one should have the right to allow this to happen. (Ahmadi 2012)

After this statement by the Prime Minister, the AKP government passed a law in 2012 that restricted permissible abortions, under normal circumstances, to the first ten weeks of pregnancy. The law proposed punishments for women who underwent abortions that were not medically necessary after that period. In March 2014, it was reported that though abortion remains legal, the government has effectively stopped public hospitals from providing them. So, doctors either have to perform an abortion under emergency services, or ask the patient to go to a private hospital. This means that although abortions remained legal, abortion services became difficult to find and more costly (Hurriyet Daily News 2014a; Tremblay 2014).
The most noticeable evidence that Turkey’s family law is going to change is the rejection of the requirement for a civil marriage before religious marriage by the Constitutional Court in May 2015. Since the late 1920s, as discussed, it was illegal to perform a religious marriage ceremony before the civil ceremony. The bride, groom, and imam—who officiated the marriage—could be sent to jail for two to six months. However, the law was annulled in 2015. The majority of the judges argued that, since two persons living together without civil marriage is not illegal, it would be discriminatory to punish two persons living together after religious marriage without a civil marriage. This decriminalization of religious marriage was considered a serious setback to Atatürk’s legacy of secularism. The civil marriage requirement was, for many liberal and secular Turks, a bulwark against polygamy and underage marriages, augmenting women’s and children rights (Akyol 2015; Arman 2015).

However, one could argue that this decision was evidence of a liberal interpretation of family law. It reduced the state’s interference in people’s lives and enhanced individual rights, particularly if one combines it with two other recent decisions. In October 2015, the Supreme Court of Appeals decided that women could continue using their maiden names after marriage (Daily Sabah 2015). In May 2016, the same court accepted the right of women to have an independent residence after marriage and decided that the inability of a husband to provide such a residence was a legitimate reason to seek divorce (Cetingulec 2016). In April, there were also positive development in terms of children’s rights when Turkey acceded to the Hague Convention (1996 Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children) and the Child Support Convention (2007 Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance) (Cetinkaya and Baydar 2016).

The authoritarian features of family law are certainly being discarded, but are they being replaced by a liberal regime or by religious law? Looking at the broader ethos, the evidence of a liberal regime prospering under President Erdogan is weak. In January 2016, the AKP government established a parliamentary commission called “Protecting the Integrity of Family” to investigate the causes of the high divorce rates in Turkey. Its report has been highly controversial, as it recommended lowering the age of marriage, put restrictions on alimony, suggested changes that made
getting a divorce and filing complaints against domestic violence difficult, and proposed the involvement of the Diyanet in divorce mediation (Alphan 2016; Tremblay 2016a). Although the recommendations of the commission have not resulted in changes to family law, groups supporting gender equality are wary. In March 2016, President Erdogan delivered a speech in relation to International Women’s Day in which he rejected the “Western-style” women’s rights and used nationalism to promote “Turkish-style women’s rights”:

On the contrary, this issue is an issue for our country’s and our nation’s future. We had that saying, “Turkish-style presidential system, Turkish-style constitution.” On this issue [women’s rights] too, we are obliged to develop a Turkish-style model and implement it. We don’t necessarily have to express, defend and implement women’s rights in the format and style that exists in the West. (Hurriyet Daily News 2016a)

In June 2016, President Erdogan further angered many women’s rights activists by declaring that, while he was a strong supporter of working women, those who reject motherhood because of their careers are “incomplete”, deficient, giving up on humanity, and denying their femininity. He also said that family planning and contraception were inappropriate for Muslim families and that strong families led to strong nations; hence, establishing a link between Islam, patriarchy, and nationalism. Furthermore, only one woman minister was appointed in the new Prime Minister Binali Yildirim’s cabinet and, while the health minister provided assurances that his ministry was not planning on restricting family planning or abortion services, he called family planning "primitive" (AFP 2016b; Hurriyet Daily News 2016e). On 15 December 2016, a CHP parliamentarian presented a book in the GNA titled “Marriage and Family Life” that was handed out as a gift to all newlyweds in Kutahya province. It was written by an employee of the Diyanet and suggested: men should prefer to marry virgins; men could beat their wives or practice polygamy if the wives were not obedient; women should stay at home; children should marry early; and, after a beating by the husband, the wife might serve him coffee in a sexy outfit so that the conflict would end with make-up sex. Next day, another booklet titled “Marriage and Its Sanctity” was presented at a conference. The booklet, which was published by Pamukkale municipality, was even more humiliating for women. It argued that the more a man beats his wife, the more she would desire him sexually and that women are mentally deficient, so they should
not be consulted on any matter (Tremblay 2016b). It seems that changes are happening at the local level that do not draw much attention. Supporters of President Erdogan would, however, argue that he is not a misogynist and does not want to turn Turkey into another Iran or Saudi Arabia. He sent his daughters to the USA to study and, in November 2016, he said to the representatives of Muslim countries that locking women in their homes was wrong. Speaking at the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) conference titled, “Status of Women in the OIC Member States in Light of Current Challenges”, he said that the Western countries are ahead of the Muslim countries because they have recognized that strong, developed nations could not be built if women were denied participation in national life (Hurriyet Daily News 2016d).

So, will Islamic injunctions influence the TCC in the future? There are signs that it will. If the latest constitutional amendments are passed, President Erdogan will be even more powerful than he is now. With absolute command over the country, he will not turn it into another Iran, but he could introduce changes that will be based on Islam. For instance, he could bring back the adultery laws that he wanted to implement in 2004, or promulgate laws to discriminate legally against homosexuals. He could also use his new power or emergency laws to shut down at least some of the women’s rights organizations. Then, feminism would be allowed but within the boundaries prescribed by the state, which was the way it was under Ataturk and throughout most of Turkish history. With the EU accession process stalled, there will be no external pressure and a majority of Turks would probably stay silent or support him. Hence, an increase of Islam’s role in state nationalism, as established in Chapters 2–4, would likely lead to Islamization of the TCC and government in Turkey in the 2020s.

**FAMILY LAW IN PAKISTAN**

The reform of family law in Pakistan can be divided into three distinct periods. During the first period, from the late 1940s to late 1960s, family law was Islamized but the pace of Islamization was slow and Islam was used to make the law less gender discriminatory. The period from the early 1970s to late 1990s was an era of intense Islamization of Pakistani laws. The traditional discriminatory interpretations of Islam dominated the state, and the amendments in family and other laws were influenced by these misogynist interpretations. The current period, starting in 1999,
is focused on reducing some of the most egregious discriminations present in family law. Each period can be defined by a quintessential law. The first period is defined by the 1961 Muslim Family Law Ordinance (MFLO). The hallmark of the second period is the 1979 Zina Ordinance. The third period is characterized by the 2006 Women’s Protection Act. Each period is described more fully below and its significance explained.

Before independence, the British colonial administration had generally left family law to the various religious communities. Muslims were governed by Muslim family law and Hindus, Sikhs, and Parsis were governed by their own family laws. The one caveat was that these laws were adjudicated by judges trained in the British common law tradition and, since family law was not completely codified, the judges had some leeway in deciding family law cases. The resulting case law was thus a mixture of religious law and common law, and was sometimes called Anglo-Mohammadan law (Mehdi 1994, 4–5).

During the early twentieth century, there were a few areas where the British decided it was necessary to intervene and legislate, often under pressure from the religious communities themselves, to decrease the injustices brought about by traditional interpretations of religious family law. One prominent example of such British legislation was the Child Marriage Restraint Act of 1929, which established the minimum age of marriage for women at 14 years and for men at 18 years. This Act was applicable to all Indians. It was supported by Jinnah and other political leaders, and opposed by both the Hindu and Muslim religious leaders (Ahmed 1999; Jalal 2000, 457).

For Muslims, a major piece of British Indian legislation relating to family law was passed in 1937. The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, increased the role of Islam in family law by establishing that, for Muslims, inheritance would be based on Shariat (another name for Shariah). Hence, the customary law that had been applicable before was replaced by Shariah (Agarwal 2005). In the new law, based on Shariah, women were to inherit half the share of men. This law would appear discriminatory, but it was much better than the customary law, where women received nothing. However, the new law was not without at least two loopholes that allowed men to continue to deny women their inheritance.

Another law that addressed family matters was the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. This law broadened the grounds on
which a wife could request the dissolution of a marriage. The law also accepted the *takhayyar* principle of Islamic law, which is close to the supra-madhhab doctrine explained earlier. According to this principle, Muslims do not have to follow one school of thought exclusively. While following predominantly one school of thought, Muslims have the right to follow some rulings from another school of thought. Thus, although most of the Muslims in British India followed the Hanafi School of thought and family law was based on that school, the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, used some interpretations from the Malaki School of thought. With some modifications, this law, promulgated in 1939, is still applicable today in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.

**The Late 1940s to Late 1960s**

Following Pakistan’s independence, there were not many changes in family law but the trend of replacing the customary inheritance law with Shariah, which started with the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, continued.

In 1948, the exceptions to the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937 were targeted by the women legislators in the Punjab province. These legislators, though few in number, were able to extend the application of Shariah to the inheritance of agricultural lands. They were able to make these changes despite strong resistance from the powerful Punjabi landlords that dominated the legislature. Under the West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1948, it became mandatory to give women their share of property as decided by the Shariah. In 1951, the other exception was also removed in the Punjab and all matters related to inheritance, both testate and intestate, came under the Shariah (Government of the Punjab 1948, 1951).

However, since Pakistan was a federation, application of these (provincial) laws was limited to the Punjab province only. Other provinces, therefore, promulgated their own laws to bring agricultural land inheritance under Shariah: the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application (Sind Amendment) Act, 1950; the Bahawalpur State (Muslim Personal Law) Application Act, 1951, and the Khairpur State Muslim Female Inheritance (Removal of Customs) Act, 1952. The NWFP had already applied Shariah laws to agricultural land inheritance prior to independence. The only major exception
was the province of Balochistan, which was still under the control of federal bureaucracy and tribal chiefs, and did not have its own provincial legislature.13

Another major development in the history of Pakistani family law was the formation of a government commission in 1955, chaired by the former Chief Justice of the Federal (Supreme) Court of Pakistan Mian Abdul Rashid, to study and recommend changes in the family law of Pakistan (Mehdi 1994, 155). This commission was the first in Pakistan established specifically to deal with women’s issues. The Rashid Commission had seven members, three women and four men, including the traditionally trained religious scholar Maulana Ehtesham-ul-Haq Thanvi. In 1956, after working for one year, the commission submitted its report, written by Justice Rasheed. Maulana Thanvi did not accept the report and later added a dissenting note. The commission recommended a modern interpretation of Islam with respect to family law; that is, the gender discrimination rife in traditional interpretations was to be ignored or rejected. The report recommended, among other things, the registration of marriage and divorce, and the making of divorce less discriminatory towards women. Despite following broad Islamic injunctions and justifying its recommendations on a religious basis, the commission’s report was rejected by most ulema14 (Ghosh 2012, 161–2) and their strong opposition and the existing political instability doomed any efforts to reform family law based on the Commission’s report (Cheema 2013).15

In October 1958, martial law was imposed in Pakistan by General Ayub Khan. He is considered the architect of family law reform in Pakistan. The MFLO of 1961, for which he was responsible, is still the key family law in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

As discussed previously, Ayub Khan assigned himself the task of transforming Pakistan into a modern Muslim state. He had great confidence in his abilities, patriotism, and missionary zeal. He attempted to implement land reforms, agricultural reforms, educational reforms, economic reforms, and political reforms, amongst others. In this social engineering mission, he was supported and praised not only by many parts of Pakistani society, but also by many Western scholars. Samuel Huntington, for instance, admiringly compared him to the great lawgivers Solon and Lycurgus; others termed him Muslim de Gaulle or a latter-day Ataturk (Haq 2005, 204; Haqqani 2005, 43).

General Ayub Khan had a very negative opinion of religious leaders and considered them obstacles to Pakistan’s socio-economic development. He
considered most of the ulema not God-fearing scholars serving the people, but power hungry political players:

I knew that the ulema will not be satisfied with this arrangement. They claimed the exclusive right to interpret and decide matters pertaining to Islam…The history of the ulema in the sub-continent has been one of the perpetual conflict with the educated classes… I wish to make clear that here I am referring to that class of ulema who are openly engaged in politics and not those God-fearing people who have served the community by teaching Quran and propagating the message of Islam in a selfless, humble, and devoted manner. (Haq 2005, 204)

Ayub promulgated the MFLO in 1961, which was influenced by the Justice Rasheed Commission Report and resulted in the following changes to the family law of Pakistan:

- Marriage: Registration of marriage was made compulsory. A standard nikahnama (marriage contract) was introduced.
- Divorce: Registration of divorce was made a legal requirement. Divorce was made effective only after three months during which reconciliation was deemed possible.
- Inheritance: Children of a dead son or daughter were entitled to the deceased’s share of inheritance from their grandparents.
- Polygamy: Restrictions were placed on polygamy. Prior approval by the first wife was deemed a requirement.
- Dower and Maintenance: Dower and maintenance allowance payments to wives were made mandatory.
- Child marriage: The minimum age for marriage was increased from 14 to 16 years for women and from 18 to 21 years for men (Mehdi 1994, 194–5).
- Divorce by wife: The procedure to initiate a divorce was made easier for women.

In 1962, General Ayub Khan promulgated the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act which extended the application of Shariah to inheritance cases for all of current Pakistan, except for the tribal areas close to the NWFP. This brought uniformity to the law regarding inheritance. However, as before, the Act did not prescribe any specific shares (for each type of heir) and only made the application of Shariah mandatory.
There was strong opposition to the MFLO and it became the religious right’s bête noire, unifying them despite their internal differences. To safeguard the law from challenges in the courts, Ayub made it part of the 1962 Constitution. To facilitate the implementation of the MFLO and to increase its effectiveness, General Ayub Khan also promulgated the West Pakistan Family Courts Act of 1964. Previously, in the civil courts, cases related to family law were delayed for years. The new law was promulgated, “to make provision for the establishment of Family Courts for the expeditious settlement and disposal of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith”. The law dealt with matters related to the dissolution of marriage, dower, maintenance, restitution of conjugal rights, guardianship, and the custody of children. The law specified time limits for different judicial procedures, making it mandatory for judges to decide the cases expeditiously. Expeditious proceedings often helped women more often than men, as women could not afford to hire and interact with lawyers frequently, or be present at all case hearings that could potentially continue for years (Government of West Pakistan 1964).

The Early 1970s to Late 1990s

After the separation of Bangladesh in December 1971, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto took over the control of Pakistan. As discussed in previous chapters, he was a Western-educated, non-religious man. From his rhetoric and behaviour, it would not have been incorrect to assume that he would reject traditional interpretations of Islam and make the MFLO more gender neutral. Bhutto did manage to introduce some clauses in the Constitution related to gender equality, but during his five-and-a-half year rule, no major legislation on family law was enacted.

The declaration of 1975 as the International Women’s Year by the United Nations did act as a catalyst to remind Bhutto of his commitment to women. Unfortunately, his actions had little impact. After the first lady, Nusrat Bhutto, led a group of women to the first World Conference on Women in Mexico City, two laws (the Dowry and Bridal Gifts Restriction Act, 1976, and the Dowry and Bridal Gifts Restriction Rules, 1976) were passed, giving permanent ownership of all gifts given to the wife by the husband before or after the marriage to the wife. These gifts were not required, as before, to be returned to the husband if the wife sought a divorce (khula). Another action that could have led to reform/change in
family law occurred in January 1976. A 13-member Women’s Rights Committee, with nine female members, was formed under the chairmanship of Yahya Bakhtiar, the Attorney General of Pakistan. This committee was, “to consider and formulate proposals for law reforms, with a view to improve the social, legal and economic conditions of the women of Pakistan and to provide for speedier legal remedies for obtaining relief in matters like maintenance, custody of children, etc.”. The committee presented its recommendations in July 1976, proposing changes in the MFLO, the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, and other laws to improve the position of women in matters relating to marriage, divorce, custody, maintenance, and inheritance. However, no action was taken on these recommendations (NCSW 2015). Bhutto’s tenure (1972–77) was no doubt a disappointment for those women that supported him for his promises to decrease legal gender discrimination.

General Zia’s coup in 1977, as discussed in previous chapters, ensued a long period of the Islamization of government. Six Hadood ordinances related to Islamization were enacted on 10 February 1979:

- Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1979: This law introduced taxes based on Islamic laws and legal traditions.\(^\text{18}\)
- Offence against Property (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979: This law prescribed conviction requirements and punishments for theft and robbery.
- Offences of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979: This law described the conviction process and punishments for zina (which included fornication, adultery, and rape).
- Offences of Qazaf (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979: This law prescribed the conviction process and punishments for false accusation of zina.
- Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979: This law prescribed the conviction process and punishments for production, possession, transport, sale and consumption of alcohol.
- Execution of Punishment of Whipping Ordinance, 1979: This law prescribed how the punishment of whipping, which was one of the punishments awarded in the previous three ordinances, should be carried out.

Some scholars have argued that Zia did not want to implement a traditional medieval Islamic system and Hadood ordinances (and other acts of
Islamization of government) were just the political instrumentalization of Islam to enhance legitimacy (Fuller 1991). This might be true, as Zia also convened a commission on the status of women (which, albeit, was a failure) and established a separate administrative unit for women’s affairs, probably to keep his Western allies happy.

However, regardless of his intentions, Zia’s Islamization of the government was real and had disastrous consequences for several sections of society, including women. In terms of family law legislation, the Offences of Zina (Enforcement of Hadood) Ordinance, 1979 (hereafter referred to as the Zina Ordinance) is important. It did not directly affect family law, but it significantly affected the position of women in the family. In a patriarchal environment, where corruption was prevalent, this Ordinance was often used against women. There were examples of men accusing former wives of adultery under this law if they remarried, and of fathers accusing their daughters of fornication if they married against their will (Patel 2006). Even more unfortunate, there were examples of women being charged with fornication or adultery if they reported being raped but could not prove the offence. It was taken as evidence that they had had sex outside of marriage. As crimes under this Ordinance were non-bailable, influential persons (usually men) could get the weak (most often women) jailed just by accusing them of a crime. Moreover, these zina crimes were also non-compoundable, meaning the state could continue to investigate the complaint even when the complainant had withdrawn their complaint. This gave power to police (again, usually men) to harass and imprison the weaker party (again, most often women) in order to obtain a bribe. Legal gender discrimination increased, while state protection for women decreased in Pakistan, after the promulgation of this law. General Zia’s tenure (1977–88) was a long nightmare for the Pakistani women but, fortunately, he did not try to change the MFLO.

The Islamization of Pakistani laws slowed but did not end with Zia’s death in 1988. In 1989, the Supreme Court Shariat Appellate Bench’s decision declared that the sections of the penal code dealing with bodily injury crimes (including murder) were un-Islamic. Subsequently, the government introduced the Qisas and the Diyat Ordinance in 1991 that made bodily injury crimes a matter between the victim and the perpetrator, and not crimes against society (to be prosecuted by the state). Hence, the victim or their heirs could decide to forgive the perpetrator. This ordinance became a law in 1997. Both Pakistani and
foreign scholars have criticized this law because it allows perpetrators, instigators, and accomplices of the murderers of women in the name of family honour to stand up in court and forgive each other. This law also has problematic repercussions in a society which has wide income and power disparities, making it easier for the rich and powerful to entice or threaten a victim’s family to “forgive” the murderers (NCSW 2006; Palo 2009).

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1988–90 and 1993–96), despite some efforts on her part, was not able to make any change in family law, primarily because she did not have a majority in both houses of the Parliament and the other political parties were not ready to help her amend these laws. However, under Bhutto, Pakistan signed the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Thus, Pakistan agreed to be monitored by outsiders on all kinds of discrimination against women, including the legal discriminations designed and perpetuated by the government. She also established a Commission of Inquiry for Women in 1994 charged with reviewing “all the existing laws which were discriminatory to women or affect their right of being equal citizens of Pakistan”. The Commission’s report recommended several changes in family law, but unfortunately none of the proposed changes were enacted (Burki-Liebl 2007, 121–2).

1999 Onwards

This period is characterized by an unprecedented effort by the state elite of diverse affiliations to decrease the traditional Islamization of government. Family law has seen numerous changes in the twenty-first century that make it less gender discriminatory. Several legislative initiatives have been taken to undo the Islamization implemented during the 1980s and 1990s, as well as to end many centuries-old cultural practices and customs that had also assumed a religious hue and came under the protection of the religious right.

General Musharraf came to power in 1999 through a military coup. In his initial statements, he presented himself as a modernist and a liberal, willing to do away with the rampant gender discrimination in Pakistan. Though most of the initial hopes were dashed, there were few changes during his nine-year rule (1999–2008) that did decrease gender discrimination. In terms of family law, the first change was the establishment of a permanent National Commission on the Status of Women (NCSW) in
July 2000. This Commission was mandated to review any laws affecting women in Pakistan. Family law in Pakistan has since been the main focus of the NCSW, with reports published on divorce, marriage, inheritance, domestic violence, and so on. The NCSW cannot change laws that discriminate against women, but it can build pressure for change by collecting data, petitioning courts and the government, arranging conferences and seminars, contacting the media, and publishing reports on family laws and their implementation (NCSW 2015).

The Family Courts (Amendments) Ordinance of 2002 was the first change in family law brought about by the Musharraf government. It added more areas to be tried in the family courts and established strict time frames for judges to decide the cases. For instance, the case of dissolution of marriage on a wife’s request now has to be decided within four months, and an appeal against this order has also to be decided in four months.

One of the major achievements of the Musharraf regime was the enactment of the Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Law in 2006. For the first time since 1979, the law distinguished between rape and consensual sex in terms of required evidence. Previously, women, who could not prove rape allegations were prosecuted for adultery or fornication under the Zina Ordinance. After the passage of the 2006 law, rape was taken out of the purview of the Zina Ordinance. Women can now pursue rapists without being afraid of imprisonment in the event that they are not able prove the rape charge. They also do not need four male witnesses to prove the rape crime, as was required under the Zina Ordinance.

In 2008, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) returned to power and formed coalition governments at the federal level and in three provinces. Two laws related to marriage were passed by these coalition governments. The Prevention of Anti-Women Practices Act of 2011 strengthened women’s rights in diverse areas. It criminalized forced marriages and attempts to stop women from inheriting property. It also plugged loopholes that could be used to reduce the punishment of persons accused of rape and outlawed traditional gender discriminatory customs such as vani or swara. This legislation also outlawed marriage to the Quran that had no religious basis (Government of Pakistan 2011).

Another discriminatory custom related to marriage, which was prevalent in some areas of KP, was Ghag. Under Ghag, a person declared his intention to marry a girl, usually from his own family, and after this
declaration, the girl, her parents, and other suitors were under threat of bodily harm if there were any attempt to marry the girl to anybody else. In 2013, the KP provincial assembly passed the Elimination of Custom of Ghag Act unanimously (Ashfaq 2013).

The work of the NCSW was constrained by two limitations. It did not have financial autonomy, and it could not legally force public officials and private organizations to cooperate. The NCSW Act 2012 dealt with both these problems. The new law made NCSW financially autonomous and gave it judicial powers, similar to those of parliamentary committees, to call witnesses and public records.

Women in Pakistan did not have protection from domestic violence until 2013. Cases of domestic violence could be registered under the penal code provisions related to assault and bodily harm. However, societal norms did not consider it appropriate to file cases against family members, even when there was bodily harm involved. Further, the police ignored such complaints. Women’s organizations decried this situation and campaigned for a domestic violence law. However, opposition from the religious right was very strong. The PPP government (2008–13) first tried to criminalize domestic violence at the federal level, but it failed. The Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Bill, 2009 was passed by the National Assembly but did not become law, as it was not passed by the Senate due to the opposition of the religious right. Some time later, it was the Senate that passed a bill on domestic violence (prevention and protection) but it was not passed by the National Assembly. After the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 2010, the penal code became a provincial subject, so the federal government could not legislate on issues related to domestic violence. Since 2013, the provinces and federal territories have gradually been passing legislation against domestic violence. The Islamabad Capital Territory was the first entity to have domestic violence legislation. Sindh passed a law against domestic violence in 2013 and Balochistan in 2014. In 2016, Punjab passed a landmark bill criminalizing domestic violence and abuse, and provided unprecedented legal protection to women from domestic, psychological, and sexual violence, despite objections from the Council of Islamic Ideology (Express Tribune 2016). It has been called “the most comprehensive legislation on the subject”, despite ardent opposition (Editorial 2016). The only province without a law against domestic violence is the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province (formerly known as the NWFP), which is reviewing its bill after objections from the Council of Islamic Ideology.
The religious right vociferously opposed these laws and calls them attempts by the rulers to Westernize society to please their foreign masters (Wasim 2012; Ali 2014; Shah 2014). Another positive development was the new legislation to prevent child marriages. Sindh was the first province to act on this issue. It promulgated the Sindh Child Marriage Restraint Act in April 2014, increasing punishment and fines for those who force children to marry and for nikah khwans (officials and or local imams who register marriages). In March 2015, the Punjab Child Marriage Restraint Act was passed, again increasing fines and punishments to deter people from supporting and administering child marriages. The KP province had sent its proposed bill for restraining child marriages to the CII for review. Only in Balochistan has there been no action on this important issue (Tunio 2014; Mustafa 2015; Rehman 2015).

In 2016, Prime Minister Sharif took a public stand against honour killings and said, “There is no honor in honor-killings”. In October 2016, Parliament passed anti-honour crime legislation that would make honour killers serve mandatory imprisonment for twelve-and-a-half years, even if they were “forgiven” by the victim’s family. Parliament also passed anti-rape legislation that allowed DNA testing to enable the easy detection and unerringly conviction of the perpetrators of this heinous crime (Bilal 2016).

**Conclusion**

Prior to 1926, Islam was the basis of Turkish family law and, if any amendments were proposed to family law, they had to be justified on the basis of Islamic precepts and legal tradition. This justification was extant, irrespective of whether the change was desired to follow the West, to decrease gender discrimination, or to discard medieval interpretations to rediscover the real, authentic Islam. Thus, prior to 1926, Turkey was like Pakistan (and many other MMCs), where Islam is the underpinning of the family law. 25

With the passage of the TCC in 1926, the role of Islam in Turkish family law came to an end. Islam features neither as the source nor the justification for any changes since 1926. Based on family law indicator, the Islamization of government was reduced to a minimum. Later, in the second period, due to the perceived importance of the TCC/women’s “emancipation” to secularism and Ataturk’s legacy, Turkish secularists,
supported by the powerful military, made sure that there were not many changes made to family law by the right-of-centre parties, although they were regularly winning elections.

It was only in the third period (from the early 1980s to late 2000s) that the TCC was amended. However, the number of amendments remained small. There was a significant increase in Islam’s role in state nationalism during this period, as has been seen in Chapters 2–4, but this change is not reflected in the Islamization of government based on the analysis of Turkish family law. Perhaps the reason was the possibility of EU membership that was added to the perceived significance of the TCC/women’s emancipation to secularism and Atatürk’s legacy. Most of the amendments in family law during this period were related to the reduction of discrimination against women in the TCC. The ascending women’s movement in Turkey, with EU support, fought for these changes. The Turkish elite, most of them men, might have resisted these changes, but EU reports and statements from Brussels kept up the pressure for change. The major change in family laws came in 2001–02 when, instead of piecemeal changes, the whole code was revised based on the recommendations of the fifth review commission. Islam, as a source of change, was again absent.

Since 2002, there have not been many changes to the new TCC. But the fear of Islam playing a role in family law heightened after 2002 as an Islam-inspired party, the AKP, formed the government. However, despite making many statements and some attempts (such as criminalizing adultery), Islamic precepts and injunctions did not form the basis of any changes to the TCC.

In the current phase, since 2010, one can see some changes that can be related to Islam. For example, women are being incentivized to have more children and abortion is being made difficult. But it is still early days in this period. However, with Erdogan becoming more powerful and authoritarian after constitutional amendments in 2017, the odds are strong that family law will see some changes in the near future that could be related to Islam.

Family law reform in Pakistan, as in the case of Islam’s role in state nationalism, has been divided into three distinct periods. During the first period (the late 1940s to late 1960s), family law was Islamized, but the pace was slow and there were also some changes to bring it closer to modern and Western practices. The religious right opposed these later reforms but could not stop or reverse the changes. Hence, family law was more Islamized than it had been in 1947. During the second period (the early 1970s to late 1990s), Islamization of the government reigned supreme. During this period, there
were not many direct changes in the MFLO but other legal changes, such as the Hadood Ordinances and Qisas and Diyat Ordinance, decreased legal protections for women given in the Constitution, the MFLO, and other laws. The current period (1999 onwards) has resulted in decreasing the discriminatory laws passed during the previous period. The passage of laws against rape, forced and early marriages, honour killings, and domestic violence indicates that the Islamization of government is declining, as was expected after the reduction in Islam’s role in Pakistani state nationalism.

Comparatively, as the above discussion shows, there is a stark difference between how the Turkish and Pakistani states dealt with the traditional family laws based on Islamic provisions. The Pakistani decision-makers tried to reform and update the traditional law. In contrast, the Turkish decision-makers rejected the old law and imported a completely new law. While the Pakistani decision-makers adopted the strategy of splitting the difference between the demands of women and ulema, and adopted a gradualist approach, the Turkish decision-makers discarded the traditional law and rejected any role of ulema in family law reform.26

In Chapter 6, the second indicator of Islamization of government, “the presence and functions of the Ministry of Religious Affairs”, will be discussed.

Notes

1. The term “Islamic family law” has not been used in this book, as it conveys the idea that there is one Islamic family law. While the family law in most MMCs is based on Islamic sources, such as the Quran and Sunnah, each of the 50 MMCs has a different family law. Even in the past, Muslim schools of thought differed on specific points related to family law; for example, how much time was required, after the disappearance of her husband, before the wife could apply for divorce.

2. The chief religious communities of the Ottoman Empire were divided into millets, each governed by its own religious family law. Muslim family law was based on the Hanafi school of thought and was administered by qadi courts. Besides qadi courts, which dealt with cases relating to family law and certain other areas, there were also other courts that administered kanun (secular laws made by the Ottoman Sultan for governing areas where traditional religious law was silent). Sultan Suleiman, the Magnificent (1494–1566) was called Suleiman Kanuni (lawgiver). His marble relief portrait in the US Capitol building is an acknowledgment of his accomplishments in the codification of the secular Ottoman laws.
3. Another reason was the TCC’s incomprehensibility. It was in a (Turkish) language that contained many words from the Arabic and Persian languages. Some of these words were discarded in the 1930s and the 1940s in a state-sponsored drive, discussed in previous chapters, to purify the Turkish language.

4. The Kemalist elites controlled the military, judiciary, media, and universities, even after they were rejected by the people in elections in 1950.

5. The change might be an attempt to bring the law closer to reality. In the rural areas, the earlier increase in minimum age did not have much effect.

6. With the permission of a judge, the minimum marriageable age could be reduced to 15 years for men and 14 years for women.

7. As discussed in Chapter 2, a total of eight (reform) laws promulgated under Ataturk were made part of the 1961 Constitution. The civil marriage law was one of them.

8. The adult literacy rate was still less than 20 per cent in 1935. By 1980, it was more than 70 per cent (Turkish Statistical Institute 2012).

9. The pressure was from communities, not religious leaders, who were happy with the traditional interpretations.

10. Customary law was considered a source of law in British India and meant law based on customs, which were considered reasonable and had been in use continuously since time immemorial (Ahmad 2013).

11. First, under the new law, Shariat was not applicable to the inheritance of agricultural property and, second, the testate succession (succession is based on a valid will of the deceased) was also outside the purview of this law. Customary law was still applicable in these two areas. The law highlights that although family law was generally based on religious law, there were some areas where religious law was not applied and customary law was followed instead. Moreover, this law was not applied in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) that had, in 1935, passed its own law, the NWFP Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act.

12. They could follow the ruling of one school on one issue and of another school on a different issue. Many ulema (religious scholars) refuse to accept this eclecticism and consider it dangerous for a layman to pick and choose between different schools (Yilmaz 2005; Sajaad 2014).

13. One important point to be noted is that these laws did not explicitly define the Shariat’s principles of inheritance. It was left to the judge to decide what the laws of inheritance in Shariat are, probably because different schools of thought interpret the law of inheritance a little differently.

14. Alim means Islamic religious scholar and ulema is the plural of alim. The term "ulema" is now most often used to denote traditional religious leaders. They may or may not be scholars of Islamic law.
15. From September 1956 to December 1957, Pakistan had four different prime ministers. This political instability, mainly due to the unconstitutional political ambitions of General Ayub Khan and President Iskander Mirza, eventually resulted in martial law in October 1958.

16. Not to East Pakistan, the present Bangladesh.

17. The military regime of General Yahya handed power to Bhutto after defeat in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, as he had won most seats in what was the remaining Pakistan.

18. Zakat is a tax on valuables, while ushr is a tax on agricultural produce.

19. Federation of Pakistan v. Gul Hassan

20. Qisas is translated as “retribution” and Diyat as “compensation”.

21. Family courts are considered female-friendly, as compared with ordinary courts, due to their rules favouring women.

22. Under these tribal customs, if one family is aggrieved by the action of another family, it receives reparations in the form of a young girl’s hand in marriage. The young girl from the guilty family is married to someone from the aggrieved family.

23. According to this custom, girls are married to the Quran to keep the property from being distributed or going outside the immediate family.

24. Criminalizing domestic violence would require amendments in the penal code.

25. Family law is not static in these MMCs, but changes have to be justified on the basis of Islam.

CHAPTER 6

Islamization and the Ministry of Religious Affairs

The governmental institutions (ministries, departments, and so on) dealing specifically with religious practice are usually established to control or regulate religions, or to give preference to one or more religions. It is extremely rare that the establishment of a Ministry of Religious Affairs (MRA) is linked with greater freedom from religious persecution.\(^1\)

The presence of an MRA demonstrates the importance of religion to the government. This importance may be due to the government considering religion to be an ally or a competitor. If the government considers religion as useful, an MRA is established to give preference to and promote the practice of religion. This preference is usually for one religion, but can be for more than one religion. These preferences, however, would result in discrimination against all those who do not follow the preferred religions.

When government sees religion as a competitor, the presence of an MRA generally signifies a greater presence of religious persecution. This situation was quite common in the Communist countries. As Communist philosophy deemed religion a false consciousness and a tool to keep the capitalist class’s hold on workers and farmers, the ruling communist parties tried to “expose” religion and wake the lower classes up to these dangers. Religious activity was thus strictly controlled and regulated in most Communist countries. The instruments to regulate religion were departments that made policy either for all religions or for a single religion. The departments dealing with all religions did not usually have representatives
of all those religions advising the government. However, departments dealing with a particular religion usually had representatives of that religion within the department, but these representatives had little power and were more representative of state policy than the religion they supposedly represented.

This demonstrates that the presence of an MRA and its functions can be an excellent indicator of a government’s religious policy. In the case of the MMCs, it can assist in untangling the complex issues of Islamization of government and provide for a comparative assessment of Islamization. For instance, it is difficult to estimate which government is more Islamized: Egyptian, Jordanian, or Moroccan. One plausible way to answer this question is to see whether there is an MRA present in each of these countries and then undertake a comparative analysis of their functions to illuminate the kind of preferences accorded to Islam through them. Looking at the presence and function of an MRA across different eras can also help one ascertain whether a particular country has become more or less Islamized over time.

There are usually three kinds of state policy towards religion, and these are demonstrated by the presence and functions of an MRA:

- secular states that neither have a preference for any religion nor regulate religion usually do not have an MRA;
- states that have a preference for one or more religions usually have an MRA that implements the preferential policies given in laws and administrative decisions; the MRA in such states indirectly promotes discrimination against those who do not believe in a preferred religion;
- states that consider religion a competitor tend to have an MRA. Its functions are, however, different. It exists to discriminate against all religions, and to downplay and discourage religious sensibilities and practice.

It can be argued that, in many MMCs, an MRA is an instrument of control and regulates Islam, so it may not be used as an indicator of Islamization of government. This is a valid argument but, in this volume, the focus is on the rise and fall of the Islamization of government, not on the motives of the decision-makers. Hence, notwithstanding whether a decision has been taken to control or to promote religion, what is important is whether an action increases Islamization or not. The following analysis will
demonstrate that it is possible, even when governments are controlling Islam, that they might be increasing Islamization.

As in Chapter 5, this chapter endeavours to gauge whether the governments of Turkey and Pakistan have been Islamized to a greater or lesser degree during the course of their histories. In the following section, the presence and functions of MRAs in both countries will be analyzed to highlight their proclivities towards Islamization.

DIYANET, TURKEY

The Diyanet Isleri Baskanlari (Presidency of Religious Affairs) is the equivalent of an MRA in the Turkish political system. The Diyanet was one of the first institutions established in the new Republic of Turkey and it is still one of its main institutions. It is also one of the most controversial Turkish state institutions (Adanali 2008). Despite the passage of almost a century, the reasons for the existence of the Diyanet and its benefits are still hotly contested. Support and opposition to the Diyanet cut across party and religious lines, and the usual division of Turkish society between the Islamists and the secularists. Ironically, the Diyanet was established by secularists and prospered under their rule:

The Diyanet was founded in the heyday of secularizing reforms by the same law that abolished the Caliphate and led to the closure of the religious schools. The institution was granted constitutional rank in the aftermath of the first coup d’état in 1960; in 1971, the year of the second putsch, the Directorate’s prayer leaders and preachers were made civil servants. Moreover, the law governing political parties that forbids expressing the demand for a change in the Directorate’s status, freezing the current situation, was passed in the aftermath of the last military takeover in 1980. (Seufert 2006, 136)

The Ottoman Empire was a Muslim state but not a theocracy. The Sheikh-ul-Islam (or Seyhülislam), the highest religious authority, was appointed by the Ottoman Sultan and served at the pleasure of Sultan. The Sheikh-ul-Islam initially did not have control over either the Justice system or the Islamic education system. Gradually, however, the Sheikh-ul-Islam became a very powerful position, almost equivalent to the Grand Vizier (who was second only to the Ottoman Sultan). As discussed previously, Ottoman laws were based on the Shariah, as well as on other sources.
Religious judges (kadis) were state employees who interpreted and administered justice primarily on the basis of Islamic tradition. There were also other state functionaries that adjudicated secular public law (kanun). Both were controlled by the Sultan. Personal laws of major non-Muslim religious communities (“millets”) were adjudicated by their own community (religious) leaders (Davison 1998, 138–41; Denli 2011, 89).

For Ottoman reformists and modernists, the office of Sheikh-ul-Islam was a symbol of anachronism and, therefore, during the entire nineteenth century, they tried to limit the Sheikh-ul-Islam’s authority to religious affairs (Ersahin 2008). Their efforts bore fruit and, starting from the Tanzimat reforms in 1839, the authority of the Sheikh-ul-Islam steadily declined. This erosion of power accelerated under the rule of the Committee of Union and Progress (1913–18). In one of their last major acts in 1917, they withdrew the control of Muslim endowments from the Sheikh-ul-Islam and transferred the administration of all religious courts to the Ministry of Justice, thus removing two of the primary powers of the Sheikh-ul-Islam (Bein 2011, 40–7).

During the Turkish War of Independence, the Ottoman Sheikh-ul-Islam issued a fatwa against the nationalist forces, led by Ataturk. Hence, even if one ignores Ataturk’s secularist inclinations, there was no love lost between Ataturk and the Sheikh-ul-Islam. In April 1920, a new cabinet was formed, and one of the ministries was the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Foundations, in place of the office of Sheikh-ul-Islam. This ministry was headed by the mufti of Karacabey, Mustafa Fehmi Effendi. It performed some—but not all—of the functions of the Sheikh-ul-Islam (Karaman 2008). However, Islam and ulema still had a privileged status, and the Ministry was considered one of the most critically important ministries during the national liberation struggle (Bozan 2007, 50).

As in previous chapters, the almost one hundred years of the Turkish Republic’s history has been divided into four periods to study whether the Islamization of government in Turkey followed the pattern of the rise and fall of Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism.

**The Early 1920s to Mid-1940s**

After abolishing the Ottoman Sultanate in November 1922 and securing Turkey from external attacks through the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, Ataturk moved to end the Caliphate in March 1924. However, to demonstrate that this was not an action against Islam, he took several
steps. For instance, Friday was declared the weekly holiday in January 1924 and it was agreed that, in the new Constitution, Islam would be the state religion.

With the Caliphate, the Religious Affairs and Charitable Foundations Ministry was also abolished on 3 March 1924 and two religious institutions were created to replace the Ministry. These new institutions were the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Reisligi, hereafter referred to as “the Diyanet”) and the Directorate of Pious Foundations. The Diyanet took over the responsibility for managing mosques and religious personnel, while the Directorate of Pious Foundations administered religious endowments. Another law also passed on 3 March 1924 was the Law of Unification of Education that took away control of religious education from religious clerics. Thus, the administration of madrassas, one of the functions of the abolished Ministry, was not transferred to the Diyanet or to the Directorate of Pious Foundations but, rather, to the Ministry of Education, which promptly closed almost all of them (Jenkins 2008, 91–4). These three actions certainly gave a hint of what kind of relationship the new republic would have with Islam.

The first Article of Act 429, which created the Diyanet, clarified the limited functions of the Diyanet in the new Republic:

> In the Republic of Turkey, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the cabinet that is formed by it are responsible for the legislation and execution of provisions concerning the affairs of the people; and the Presidency of Religious Affairs will be formed as a part of the Republic for the implementation of all provisions concerning faith and worship of the religion of Islam, and the administration of religious organizations.

The Diyanet was to be limited to the implementation of matters related to “faith and worship” while decisions in these matters, and all other matters, would be made by the GNA. Other Articles in the Act put the Diyanet under the control of the Prime Minister’s office. The head of the Diyanet was to be appointed by the President of the Republic, on the advice of the Prime Minister.

This legislation was very significant as it demonstrated the transformation of the state–religion relationship. First, the very fact that there was to be no ministry but only a presidency/directorate under the Prime Minister’s office indicated that there was a deliberate attempt to decrease the importance of religion in state affairs. Henceforth, there would be no
minister stating the religious viewpoint in the cabinet. Second, putting religion under the Prime Minister’s office meant that it would be under direct and tight control, away from politics. Finally, the Act made clear, in the very first Article, that henceforth the cabinet would be the main decision-making body. The Diyanet would be limited to the implementation of specific functions relating to faith, worship, and religious organizations (Gozaydin and Ozturk 2014).

Establishment of the Diyanet was partially modelled on the French Central Bureau of Religious Affairs, under the French Ministry of Interior. However, the centralization and organization of religious activity within the purview of the Diyanet was designated to be much more extensive than its French counterpart. Under the new law, any public religious activity that was not under the Diyanet was illegal (Sunier and Landman 2014).

To understand the Diyanet, one has to understand the views about religion held by Mustafa Kemal and his fellow Republicans. They not only wanted to privatize religion, but also to control and purify it. The peculiar form of Turkish secularism and the institution of the Diyanet were the result of a desire to achieve all these goals:

Laicism, as understood by the Republican elite, meant not only state dominance and control of religious institutions, but also implied regulating the lived Islamic tradition and expression of popular religiosity. (Denli 2011, 91)

Baskan (2014, 64) argues that the early Republican elite’s view of Islam was based on three assertions. First, while politics was seen as dirty and profane, Islam was considered pure and sacred. Combining this thesis and anti-thesis, one comes to the synthesis that Islam should not be tainted with politics. Second, as Islam had no clergy, no person or group should try to represent Islam. Therefore, anybody posing as a member of Muslim clergy should be punished. Finally, there was a pure Islam based on original sources that had been lost. As there were many distorted version of Islam circulating in the Republic, the state would help Turks find the true Islam through the Diyanet and its representatives. The fact that the second and third assertions were somewhat contradictory did not matter.

In the 1920s, the Diyanet was considered a key institution and was provided sufficient funds to finance multi-year research projects, such as the Turkish translation of the Quran and publication of a multi-volume
interpretation of the Quran (Bozan 2007, 52). In the late 1920s, the administrative structure and the organizational law of the Diyanet were also defined. However, as the Turkish government moved towards secularism, the prominence of the Diyanet progressively declined (Gozaydin 2008).

The period from the early 1930s to the mid-1940s was the nadir of the Islamization of government in all of Turkish history. The authority and functions of the Diyanet were curtailed, and its personnel and budget were slashed. A major change in the Diyanet’s fortune occurred in June 1931, when the Budget Act transferred the management of mosques and all the personnel who administered the mosques to the Directorate of Pious Foundations. The Diyanet’s budget started declining as a percentage of the total budget; from around 1 per cent of the total budget in 1924, it declined to 0.24 per cent of the total budget in 1939 (Cakir and Bozan 2005, 28). Hence, the Diyanet became largely non-functional in the 1930s.

As discussed earlier, in the 1930s, Ataturk became enamoured with ethnolinguistic nationalism and Turkey’s link with Islam became an issue. The pre-Islamic Turkish history was glorified and efforts were made to “purify” the Turkish language, eliminating the Arabic and Persian words from it. Even the Arabic language used in religious services became an object of scorn and a target of attacks. Though there were earlier suggestions to change the language of prayer and the azan (the call for prayer) to Turkish, these suggestions were not successful, as they did not have support from the top elite. The Diyanet was also able to oppose and reject such calls. However, in the early 1930s, Ataturk himself led efforts to replace Arabic with the Turkish language in religious services, such as in the azan. The Diyanet could not withstand this pressure and approved the prayer calls in Turkish (Azak 2008). From the mid-1930s to the mid-1940s, there was not much activity regarding the Diyanet, except for the promulgation of a law regarding the organization of the Diyanet in June 1935 (Diyanet 2015). There was not much interest in the Diyanet’s work and there were no major initiatives related to the Diyanet. The Diyanet’s budget had dwindled to 0.15 per cent of the total budget in 1946 (Cakir and Bozan 2005, 28).

**The Late 1940s to Late 1970s**

In the late 1940s, Turkey became a multi-party democracy. As discussed in previous chapters, the CHP, afraid of losing the 1950 elections to the DP, relaxed its strict policies relating to Islam.
The change in the political climate regarding religion was bound to affect the Diyanet, the primary state institution dealing with religion. In March 1950, Act No. 5634 was passed; this transformed the Diyanet. First, the budget and administration of mosques and prayer leaders were returned to the Diyanet. Second, the name of the Diyanet was changed from “Diyanet Isleri Reisligi” to “Diyanet Isleri Baskanlari”. “Reisligi” meant “presidency” in Ottoman Turkish and so was replaced by “Baskanlari”, which was the equivalent word for the presidency in modern Turkish. Third, the Diyanet was expanded and 941 new personnel were appointed. Finally, the law added new departments to the Diyanet, such as publications and pilgrimage (Bozan 2007, 54).

With the DP’s election triumph in May 1950, Islam returned to the public sphere. The azan in Arabic was allowed, religious education expanded, religious programming on state radio began, and Imam-hatip schools were revived. The Diyanet also benefited from increased interest during the DP regime. In the first year after the DP came to power, the Diyanet’s budget more than doubled, from 2.9 million Turkish Lira to 7.8 million Turkish Lira, tripling its share in total expenditure from 0.2 per cent to 0.61 per cent. The DP’s massive programme to build mosques also increased the Diyanet’s influence, as all mosques in Turkey were administered by the Diyanet. During the DP’s tenure, more than 15,000 mosques (more than four per day) were built. The Diyanet built many of these mosques and also restored more than 600 historical mosques (Jenkins 2008, 117–18).

When the DP was ousted from power in a coup in 1960, there was a possibility that the restrictive religious atmosphere of the 1930s and early 1940s might return under the secular military. However, the new military regime reaffirmed the importance of religion. President Gursel visited the Diyanet in October 1962 and, for the first time in decades, allowed relics of different Prophets to be displayed in the Topkapi Palace. He said to the critics of his religious policy:

Those who blame religion for our backwardness are wrong. The cause of our backwardness is not religion but those who have misinterpreted our religion to us by exploiting it for their own benefits. Islam is the most sacred, most constructive, most dynamic and powerful religion in the world. (Taspinar 2001, 196)
This attitude was similar to that in the early Republican era, when the elites considered religion both good and useful, if kept under control. In the 1961 Constitution, this attitude was exhibited by raising the stature of the Diyanet; it was made a constitutional body for the first time in Turkish history. Article 154 of the 1961 Constitution stated:

The Presidency of Religious Affairs, which is incorporated in the general administration, discharges the function prescribed by a special law.

The budget of the Diyanet grew from 0.76 per cent in 1961 to 0.90 per cent of total government expenditure in 1964, as the CHP-dominated coalition government supported the building of mosques at the same pace as the DP government (1500 per year) and opened new Imam-hatip schools (Jenkins 2008, 126–7; Bulut 2011).

In 1963, an amendment was proposed to change the Diyanet to the “Presidency of Religious Sects”, so as to move it away from only propagating the Sunni Hanafi tradition and to make it an institution representative of all Muslims, including those belonging to Alevite, Shia, and Sufi traditions. However, this proposal was rejected (Gozaydın 2008). Perhaps as Turkish nationalism was accepting and prioritizing Sunni Hanafi Islam, “true” Islamization of government was also to be limited to the same tradition.

As required by the 1961 Constitution, in June 1965 Act No. 633, a comprehensive law dealing with the Diyanet, was passed by the coalition government of the CHP and the AP. It established the organization and duties of the Diyanet and replaced the 1950 Act. The objectives of the law were quite comprehensive and evinced that expansion of the Diyanet was now acceptable to the secularist Kemalist Republican Party and the military. The Diyanet was an institution that was to be made attractive, not something gradually decimated and forgotten. These objectives of the law were:

- To determine the duties and responsibilities of the Diyanet in accordance with the principle of secularism and the freedom of religion and conscience indicated in the constitution;
- To bring under a unified law various regulative changes and amendments concerning the Diyanet;
- To provide financial support for the Diyanet and make the institution attractive for young people who are equipped in the moral and positive sciences;
To increase the number of those who have competence in scholarly studies on various religious topics and use the results of their studies to serve and enlighten society, and thus solidify the unity and integrity of the nation in matters of faith and moral principles by removing bigotry and superstition, which were not permitted by the religion of Islam. (Adanali 2008)

The Act expanded the Diyanet and broadened its sphere of authority and influence. One of the most important additions to its responsibilities was the supervision and management of moral principles. Article 1 of the Act stated:

The Directorate of Religious Affairs has been established subordinate to the Prime Ministry to manage all affairs related to beliefs, worship and moral principles of the religion of Islam, to enlighten society on the subject of religion and to administer places of worship. (Jenkins 2008, 127)

This extension was criticized by many, as was the reference to the “moral principles of Islam”. It was considered incompatible with the principles of secularism and democracy. Some analysts argued that a secular state should not be concerned with the religious morals of the people. Others criticized it because it was a deviation from Atatürk’s principles. Finally, there was a criticism of this extension because managing or improving morals was not a part of the functions of a modern democratic state (Bozan 2007, 57–9; Adanali 2008; Gozaydin 2008).

Another important development for the Diyanet was the recognition of its usefulness for the “unity and integrity of the nation”. Thus, it evolved from a (negative) instrument of control to a (positive) instrument of national unity and nationalism. This role grew as Turkey moved into the 1980s. Finally, Act No. 633 required all imams (clergy) employed by the Diyanet to be graduates of official educational institutions. The main reason for this change was to stop the employment of graduates of the private Quran schools, which Turkish secularists suspected of holding radical views. Due to the acceptance of the Diyanet’s role and the expansion of the Diyanet’s mandate to pursue “enlightening society on the subject of religion”, there was a significant growth in the number of courses administered by the Diyanet, starting with the 1970s. There was also an increase in conferences, seminars, and religious publications produced by the Diyanet (Jenkins 2008, 127; Citak et al. 2015).
The question frequently asked was why secularists/Kemalists sought to increase the Diyanet’s role and protect it from attacks. This contradictory behaviour of the secularists was due to a dilemma they faced. They wanted to close the Diyanet but, until society was secularized, they could not, as they thought Islam had to be controlled. Kuru explains:

Nonetheless, assertive secularists have regarded Diyanet and related institutions as temporary instruments, which were supposed to be marginalized when society became secularized. That is why they closed the only department of theology, all Imam-Hatip schools, and a majority of the Qur’an courses, in addition to trivializing the Diyanet from 1933 to 1949. However, since societal secularization—in terms of the decreasing ratio of religious participation and the declining public role of Islam—did not happen in Turkey, the state had to reopen and even multiply these institutions. This has been the assertive secularists’ dilemma in Turkey: they needed certain institutions to keep Islam under state control, but they also sought to minimize these institutions’ social impacts. (Kuru 2014, 156)

As discussed in Chapter 2, in 1965, the AP, the right-of-centre successor of the DP, won elections and assumed power without forming a coalition with other parties. The AP continued to build mosques and increased the pace of opening the Imam-hatip schools. The Diyanet’s budget as a percentage of the total Turkish budget jumped from 1.15 per cent in 1965 to 1.89 per cent in 1966. The increase in mosques naturally necessitated a growth in Diyanet personnel. However, by the early 1970s Imam-hatip schools were producing even more graduates than were required by the Diyanet, indicating the popularity of religious education.

In the 1970s, the growth in the Diyanet’s personnel and budget continued. The growth, however, has to be kept in perspective. Despite the expansion, the Diyanet’s share in total governmental expenditure fell from 0.94 per cent in 1972 to 0.77 per cent in 1979 (Jenkins 2008, 126–7). This decrease in share can be partly explained as the lingering effect of the second coup and the increase in the total budget. The most important development relating to the Diyanet during the 1970s was the constitutional lawsuit challenging its very existence. In 1971, an Alevi party, the Birlik Partisi, filed a petition against the Diyanet in the Constitutional Court. The petitioner claimed that the Diyanet was unconstitutional because Turkey was a secular republic and the creation of a
group of people who provide religious services was against the Turkish Constitution, principles of Ataturk, and the Islamic faith.

The Constitutional Court, despite being staunchly secular, rejected the petition. The majority of the judges argued that the Diyanet was necessary and constitutional because secularism had to be understood in the context of the two over-arching aims of the Republic: the exaltation of the Turkish nation, and the acquisition of the status of modern civilization. Freedom of religion was allowed in Turkey but, due to the trends in national history, the judges contended this freedom had to be circumscribed. Similarly, separation of religion and state was important but, due to the comprehensiveness of Islam, the judges feared that, if Islam were left unmanaged, it could be abused. Therefore, the Court decided that Diyanet was a constitutional body and its personnel did not constitute a religious class but, rather, were civil servants whose work was indispensable (Adanali 2008).

In 1975, Act No. 1893, related to the Diyanet, was passed. It made certain administrative changes and also introduced the concept of democratic principles to the selection of Diyanet personnel. But President Koruturk objected to these changes; first, he sent the Act back to the GNA and, then, to the Constitutional Court for review. The Court annulled the Act and asked the GNA to devise a new law within one year. However, the next Diyanet law was not passed until 2010. For 30 years, the Diyanet remained in legal limbo as Act No. 633 was rendered obsolete following the passage of Act No. 1893 (Gozaydin 2008). Those 30 years, however, might be considered the most productive years of the Diyanet.

The Early 1980s to Late 2000s

After the 1980 coup, as discussed earlier, there was a change in the secular Turkish elite’s perception of Islam. Islam moved from a predominantly negative influence to a useful source of national unity and strength. The Diyanet was one of the foremost beneficiaries of this change. The first major sign of this change was the increased importance of the Diyanet in the 1982 Constitution. From a body administering duties related primarily to religion, it became an instrument to promote “national solidarity and integrity”. Comparing the articles related to the Diyanet in the 1961 Constitution and 1982 Constitution illustrates the change:
The Presidency of Religious Affairs, which is incorporated in the general administration, discharges the function prescribed by a special law. (Article 154 of 1961 Constitution)

The Presidency of Religious Affairs, which is within the general administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance with the principles of secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity. (Article 136 of 1982 Constitution)

The Diyanet’s budget share fluctuated during this period, gradually increasing to 1.23 per cent in 1990, then decreasing to 0.60 per cent in 2000, before increasing again to 0.90 per cent in 2008 (Cakir and Bozan 2005, 28; Valley 2011; Sacmali 2013, 54).

The number of the Diyanet employees followed the same pattern. From the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, the Diyanet’s employees almost doubled: in 1981, staff numbered 43,197; 22,380 in 1985; 74,789 in 1991; 75,043 in 1995; and 81,492 in 1997). Later, due to the post-modern coup, the number of employees decreased for a few years (74,108 in 2003) but increased again to hover around the 80,000 mark again at the end of this period in 2009–10 (Cakir and Bozan 2005, 26).

Another key characteristic of this era was the expansion of the Diyanet’s outreach beyond Turkey’s borders. During the 1950s and 1960s, a large number of Turks had moved to Europe as temporary workers. Temporary employment, however, gradually changed into permanent employment and permanent residence. In the early 1970s, to satisfy the need of religious services for these emigrants, the Diyanet started sending its personnel to Europe on a temporary basis, such as for the month of Ramadan. However, as private religious and Kurdish organizations started to grow in the Turkish diaspora, the Turkish state elite decided to expand and institutionalize the international role of the Diyanet to counter Islamism and Kurdish nationalism. The European governments endorsed this decision for their own reasons. While the Turkish elite wanted to control the Turkish diaspora, host countries preferred Turkish imams as they were perceived to be less likely to be instruments of radicalization, being trained and controlled by an aggressively secular government. The first Turkish consulate of religious affairs was established in West Germany in 1978. After 1980, due to the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, there was a large growth in the Diyanet’s work outside Turkey. In August 1984, a foreign relations department was established in the Diyanet by presidential
decree (Cakir and Bozan 2005, 69). The break-up of the Soviet Union and the independence of six Turkic republics further increased the demand for the services of the Diyanet, as the new Republics had been cut off from the Islamic tradition for over one hundred years. The secular leaders of these republics, as their West European counterparts, preferred Turkish Islam to other Islamic influences (from Iran, Pakistan, or Saudi Arabia) as it was less likely to be extremist or radical. The Turkish government, therefore, expanded the external relations department (now named the Foreign Relations Department) in November 1994 to deal with these new opportunities.


Later in the era, the Diyanet established a separate Directorate General, with five subordinate departments to administer its affairs outside Turkey:

- the Department of Turks Living Abroad
- the Department of Eurasian Countries
- the Department of Education and Counselling Abroad
- the Department of Muslim Countries and Communities
- the Department of Interreligious and Intercultural relations.

Another major development during this era that expanded the reach and influence of the Diyanet was the Diyanet’s increased employment of female preachers. Traditionally, women are not allowed to be leaders or preachers in Islamic religious circles, despite many examples of learned Muslim women instructing men, starting with the wives of the Prophet Muhammad. The Diyanet first employed a female preacher, Beyza Bilgin, in the 1960s but very few women were employed during the subsequent two decades. In the 1990s, the Diyanet focused on employing more women and also standardized the religious engagement of women. Though the Diyanet’s female employees did not lead men in prayers, they gave religious sermons, managed pilgrimages, monitored local imams, and taught the Quranic courses (Schleifer 2005; Maritato 2016). The number of female preachers increased from 29 in 1990 to 233 in 2008, and to 488 in 2014 (Hassan 2011; Aysel 2014). These female preachers were a far cry from the “new” Turkish woman that Ataturk
envisioned: modern, Westernized, and free from all kinds of superstition and religion. It also demonstrated a set of policy contradictions. The Turkish state was against women in hijabs as university students, parliamentarians, or public sector employees, but it was also increasingly employing female preachers wearing hijabs.

The number of mosques continued to increase during this period, from 47,645 mosques in 1981 to 80,636 mosques in 2009. The period from the early 1980s to the early 1990s saw the most rapid expansion in the history of Turkish Republic. Around 20,000 mosques were built during this time, reaching a total of 66,674 mosques in 1991. After this period, expansion slowed due to the coup, but never came to an end (Cakir and Bozan 2005, 24; Diyanet 2016).

2010 Onwards

In the current era, the trend of the Diyanet’s increasing influence in Turkey appears to have continued. Though the Diyanet saw rapid expansion and a rise in influence from the early 1980s to the late 2000s, the trend currently seems to be even more pronounced. The AKP, following the defeat of its secular rivals, can now implement its own agenda. In 2015, Erdogan compared the President of the Diyanet with the Catholic Pope and promised him a private jet. It might be electoral rhetoric or a case of baiting his supporters, but it may also be a sign of things to come.

Almost 50 years after the passing of Act No. 633, a new Diyanet law was passed and became operational in July 2010. One of the main reasons that it took so long to pass a new law was the controversial nature of the Diyanet. As is clear from the above discussion, beyond budget, personnel, and purpose, even the existence of the Diyanet is controversial.

Act No. 6002 resulted in numerous significant changes. The status of the Diyanet was raised to the level of the undersecretary. The Act also allowed the Diyanet to establish radio and television channels. The service conditions of Diyanet employees were also improved. The Diyanet’s mandate was expanded to provide religious services outside mosques, including, for example, in institutions such as hospitals, prisons, retirement homes, and women’s shelters (Yildirim 2011; Diyanet 2015). It also started issuing halal certificates, a new function that has been unimaginable before 2010.

The Diyanet’s personnel and budget had been increasing since the 1950s, but the increase since 2010 is unprecedented. If we look at the
percentage share of the Diyanet’s budget of the total Turkish budget, it has exceeded 1.2 per cent only a few times in the Turkish history and, in 2014, it was 1.24 per cent. So, in terms of budget share, the Diyanet has attained one of the highest levels ever achieved. However, it is the increase in the number of personnel that is astounding. From 2010 to 2014, the number has increased markedly from 84,000 to around 120,000 (Cakir and Bozan 2005, 74; Bozdag 2012; Diyanet 2016). While the Diyanet’s official statistics show a decline in the number of employees since 2013, other sources point to increases in Diyanet employment. The *Al-Waqt* claims the Diyanet had around 141,000 employees in 2015–16, while *Foreign Affairs* and others estimate it to be around 150,000 (Lepeska 2015; Al-Waqt 2016; Babur 2016). This discrepancy might be due to the usage of contract workers by the Diyanet. Wary of increasing attention, the Diyanet might have decided to use contract workers to keep the number of its regular employees low.

There also has been an increase in the rate at which mosques are being built. During the last five years of the previous period, between 2004 and 2009, the number of mosques increased by less than 3000. In 2004, the number of mosques was 77,161, while, in 2009, it was 80,636. During the first five years of this period, between 2010 and 2015, around 5000 more mosques were built. In 2010, the number of mosques was 81,984, which increased to 86,792 mosques in 2015 (Diyanet 2016).

The Diyanet’s activities outside Turkey have also mushroomed. Gursel (2015) provided the following summary from the Diyanet’s 2013 annual report: more than two hundred thousand symposiums, conferences, panels, and meetings were organized internationally to improve Islam’s image; eighty official delegations sent to Muslim-majority countries or countries with significant Muslim minorities; joint initiatives with more than seventy countries; and more than three thousand seven hundred students brought to Turkey to study in the Quranic courses, Imam-Hatip schools, and post-graduate programs relating to Islam. The Diyanet has also gone on a mega-mosque building spree. It has built over hundred mosques and school in twenty-five countries, including an 110 million dollars mosque in Maryland, United States. Costing hundreds of millions of dollars, these magnificent mosques flaunt Turkey’s (and Erdogan’s) power and Islamic credentials (Abdul 2016; *The Economist* 2016). By 2011, the Diyanet’s external footprint had increased to around 1350 employees outside Turkey in 81 countries (Hurd 2015, 94).
The Diyanet’s rise in the current period is difficult to doubt or deny. In 2012, then President Gul was the first president in more than 30 years to visit the Diyanet (Sunday’s Zaman 2013). In 2014, Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, after assuming his post, raised the stature of the Diyanet by deciding that the head of the Diyanet would report directly to him and not to a minister in his office. Previously, the Diyanet was part of the Prime Minister’s office but was supervised by a minister of state. The Prime Minister also remarked that he aimed for an international mission for the Diyanet, wanted to raise the status of the institution, and was not happy with the perception that the Diyanet was only a bureaucratic institution. Shortly after this statement by Prime Minister Davutoglu, President Erdogan raised the status of the head of the Diyanet in the state protocol list above that of many of the cabinet ministers (Hurriyet Daily News 2014b, 2014c).

The Diyanet has also become more involved in politics and, according to many analysts, has become an instrument of the AKP. President Erdogan appointed Mehmet Gormez as the new head of the Diyanet in 2010 and it appears that he was ready to adhere to the AKP positions. For instance, in 2014, when the AKP government shut down Twitter, many interpreted the Diyanet’s Friday sermon reminding Turks that “freedom requires responsibility” as thinly veiled support for the ban and, in May 2015, just before the June parliamentary elections, the Diyanet published a Kurdish translation of the Quran, which President Erdogan used to garner support (Cetingulec 2015; Lepeska 2015).

Erdogan had tried to involve the Diyanet in politics previously but Ali Bardakoglu, who was appointed the Diyanet’s head by secularist president Ahmet Necdet Sezer, refused. When Erdogan sought an opinion from the Diyanet on ending the headscarf ban, Bardakoglu said that consulting the Diyanet on legislation was counter to the principle of secularism (Cornell 2015).

Not surprisingly, in the June 2015 parliamentary elections the Diyanet became a significant issue. It was criticized by the main opposition political parties. The CHP promised, if they won elections, they would keep the Diyanet above politics and equidistant from all religions, while the People’s Democratic Party (HDP) promised to abolish it. The AKP declared that it would promote the Diyanet further, and highlighted the stance of the CHP and the HDP to consolidate its religious voters (Korkmaz 2015; Tremblay 2015). In early 2017, the Diyanet was mired in another controversy when some European governments/agencies accused its imams of spying for Turkey (Daily Sabah 2017).
The increase in personnel, budget, high-profile visits, and status does seem to be the dawn of a new era in the role of the Diyanet. However, it is too early to tell. If this trend continues, then it can be safely argued that the Diyanet has entered another expansionist phase of its history and that the Islamization of government in Turkey is in full swing.

**Ministry of Religious Affairs, Pakistan**

For the first quarter of a century of Pakistan’s existence, the MRA did not exist. This was surprising for a country that was created in the name of religion and was the first to call itself an “Islamic republic”. The MRA was established in 1974 and, since then, it has marched on, sometimes as an independent ministry, at other times as a part of a larger ministry. Most often, it has been a part of the Ministry of Religious and Minority Affairs. The following section analyzes the MRA’s journey through three eras of Pakistan’s history, after a brief look at the circumstances before independence.

Sultan Iltutmish (reign 1211–36) was the first Indian Sultan to appoint an alim as Sheikh-ul-Islam to look after religious affairs. His successors changed the name to Sadr-us-Sudur, but the duties remained similar. Generally, this office was combined with the Qazi-ul-Quzat, the highest judicial officer in the realm. Religious authority was, however, always subservient to the Sultan (Reddy 2006, B-87). The Mughal dynasty, coming to power in the sixteenth century, broadly maintained the same administration. British rule resulted in the gradual replacement of the customary law and the Muslim Hanafi law with British laws. As discussed in Chapter 5, on family law, British rulers were generally tolerant of religious practices of the “natives” and did not interfere in family law. This was especially true after the Queen Victoria’s 1858 proclamation in which she promised religious freedom for all her subjects and admonished her colonial officers for interfering with local religious practices.

**The Late 1940s to Late 1960s**

Pakistan was created in 1947 as a state ostensibly for Indian Muslims so that they could live according to Islamic principles. However, there was no MRA in either the first Pakistani administration established following independence, or in subsequent administrations that governed Pakistan for the next quarter of a century. Why it was not considered necessary to have an MRA in the new Islamic state for decades? There are four reasons that might explain this anomaly.
The first reason could be the absence of a government ministry regulating religion or facilitating religion in British India. Most of the founding fathers of Pakistan had worked in or with the British Indian government and were influenced by its policies. The Pakistani leadership post-independence was perhaps trying to continue with the colonial distinction between religious and non-religious issues. Family law and personal status issues were to be considered, as before independence, the domain of religion, and the religious leadership, and the state would (usually) not interfere in that domain. Similarly, as before, all other affairs were to be in the state’s domain and neither religion nor the religious leadership would be allowed or expected to interfere in these areas. Creating an MRA went against this policy of two discrete spheres of action and influence. An MRA might have emboldened and galvanized the ulema to expand their influence, making things difficult for the mostly non-religious state elite.

The second reason for not creating an MRA may be related to the views of the landed gentry. The landed gentry’s support for Pakistan was crucial in winning the 1946 elections that led to the creation of Pakistan. It is difficult to imagine how the All India Muslim League could have won the 1946 elections without their help, and Pakistan would not have come into existence without winning the 1946 elections. After the formation of Pakistan, the central legislature had a hefty representation of the landed gentry and the provincial legislatures of West Pakistan were dominated by them (Nasir 1996).

The establishment of the MRA did not suit the landed gentry, as their control of the land and populace could have been jeopardized by the MRA. They were happy with the way things were and wanted to maintain the folk religion of the masses (led by local religious leadership) that had existed for centuries and often supported their control. They did not want high religion. The MRA could lead to consequences such as centralization, institutionalization, and codification of religion and the enhancement of religious education, leading to the rise of a new religious elite that the landed gentry would not be able to control.

Third, the MRA did not come into existence perhaps because even the religious right did not consistently demand it. Initially, the ulama did make a public demand for a powerful MRA. In January 1948, a religious party, the Jamiat-al-ulema-i-Islam, passed a resolution that demanded that the government should appoint a religious scholar as Sheikh-ul-Islam, with executive powers nationwide over the Islamic judges (kadis) (Binder 1961, 98). A few months later, there was a meeting of the
ulema that planned for a very potent MRA. According to reports, the proposed MRA was supposed to report directly to the head of state and would not only control qadi courts, mosques, and endowments, but would also supervise the behaviour of government servants (Binder 1961, 33).

But two years later, in 1950, in the 22 points covering the future constitution of Pakistan that were agreed and signed by more than 30 prominent ulema, the demand for a separate MRA was not included (Naseer 2011). One might ask what happened between 1948 and 1950 such that the demand for a powerful MRA was dropped. It could be due to the recognition of the weakness of any potential MRA, or change of strategy to focus on long-term objectives such as changes in the constitution. The result, however, was that the ulema started requesting constitutional powers to vet legislation and ignored the demands for a separate MRA.

Finally, there was no love lost between the founding fathers, most of whom were non-religious, and the Muslim ulema, who had mostly opposed the creation of Pakistan and ridiculed the founding fathers, sometimes even calling them infidels (non-Muslim). Therefore, the founding fathers did not have a high opinion of the ulema and did not want to give them a seat at the table by setting up an MRA.

With almost no powerful group interested in creating an MRA, unsurprisingly, none existed in the first 25 years of Pakistan’s history. Despite governments by different parties and two periods of martial law, no MRA was created in the Islamic republic.

However, this does not mean that Islamization was at the same level as it had been under colonial rule. Some of the functions that are now performed by the MRA were assigned to other ministries or institutions within a few years of independence; for instance, hajj (pilgrimage) management. The Hajj Directorate was established by the government in the early 1950s to manage hajj arrangements relating to travel and stay in Saudi Arabia. It kept operating under the administrative control of different ministries in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s before being attached to the MRA. Similarly, the Auqaf Department (managing religious endowments) was attached to different ministries before finally becoming part of the MRA after it was established in 1974.

Efforts were also made to establish a Zakat system but all of them failed. In 1950, a Zakat Committee was formed under the Ministry of Finance to propose a Zakat system. Its 1952 report called for Ijtihad and
the development of a system that increased social welfare. Nothing resulted from this report. This issue was taken up by the Advisory Council on Islamic Ideology (ACII) in the 1960s. In 1969, the ACII proposed that a separate ministry should be established for the collection and distribution of Zakat (Malik 1996, 85–7). This proposal was also not implemented.

The 1956 Constitution called for the appointment of a commission within one year to advise legislatures how to “Islamize” the existing laws and to recommend new laws based on Islamic injunctions. However, this Commission was never established.

The relationship between Islam and the state during this period was “an uneasy compromise”:

Pakistan remained a nation state indebted to its British colonial legacy for its institutions and the orientation of its elites. Its Islamic character rested tenuously upon ad hoc Islamic trappings—its title as an “Islamic republic”, and constitutional provisions declaring that Islam was the state religion and that there could be no law contrary to Islam. (Weiss 1986, page x)

**The Early 1970s to Late 1990s**

If one tried to guess which Pakistani ruler established the MRA based on their reputations, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto would be one of the most improbable answers. As discussed in previous chapters, Bhutto was not only non-religious, but also a modernist, something that distinguished him from most other Pakistani rulers. However, it was Bhutto who first established the MRA in Pakistan. Another anomaly was that the MRA was established when he was at the peak of his powers in 1974. The question that has perplexed many scholars is why Bhutto established the MRA. It might have been established to better organize the hajj (the annual pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia). Due to Bhutto’s close relations with Saudi Arabia, there was a massive increase in the number of Pakistani pilgrims after he came to power. In the eight years between 1971 and 1979, Pakistan sent almost 400,000 pilgrims to Saudi Arabia, nearly equal to the total number of pilgrims sent in the previous 23 years (1947–70), even when the country was half the size because of the separation of Bangladesh in 1971 (Bianchi 2004, 77). Or perhaps Bhutto wanted to control the religious right and thought an MRA would be the best way to do it following the anti-Qadiani (or anti-Ahmadi) unrest. The
anti-Qadiani unrest in Punjab in the summer of 1974 was no doubt the event that triggered the formation of the MRA. These riots forced Bhutto to pass the second constitutional amendment on 7 September 1974 and then, on 22 October 1974, the MRA was created. Bhutto’s minister of information, Maulana Kausar Niazi, himself a cleric, no doubt contributed to this decision (Wolpert 1993, 248–58). Haqqani (2005, 107–8), however, links the Qadianis’ constitutional excommunication, Islamic Conference, and the creation of the MRA and explains them as pragmatic decisions based on the economy and national security:

Bhutto’s tilt toward religious conservatism was connected to his economic and national security agendas. The Arab oil embargo in 1973 has caused higher prices of oil all around the world and boom in the economies of Persian Gulf Arab countries. Bhutto wanted Pakistan to benefit from the flow of petrodollars, which required emphasizing Pakistan’s Islamic identity. Pakistan hosted the Islamic summit conference in Lahore and, under the patronage of Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal bin Abdel Aziz, took the lead in creating permanent structures for the OIC. The presence of heads of state and government from all Muslim-majority countries enabled Bhutto to invite President Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh and formally recognize Bangladesh. The Islamic Summit’s most tangible result was the recognition of Pakistan as a leading power in the Muslim world.

Jones (2003, 15), however, thinks that it was exploitation of religion:

Although he was one of the most modernist leaders Pakistan has ever had, Bhutto consistently gave in to radical demands. He was cynical in his exploitation of religion. A man of broad intellectual horizons, he repeatedly pandered to the Islamic radicals in the hope of securing short-term political advantage.

The main functions given to the MRA in 1974 were the administration of pilgrimages, error-free printing of the Quran, ruet-e-hilal, tabligh, the training of ulema, organization of the Zakat, Islamic studies and research, and liaison with international institutions on religious matters (Government of Pakistan 1974).

The Ministry was, however, small and, when a major re-organization of the federal government took place in February 1976, the MRA was merged with the Ministry of Minority Affairs and Overseas Pakistanis.
The new ministry was called the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Minority Affairs and Overseas Pakistanis.

General Zia-ul-Haq’s era (1977–88) was beyond doubt the most important era in the history of the MRA. Islamization was now a priority, rather than rhetoric, and the MRA was the conduit.

No doubt, a commitment to make Pakistan into an ideal polity infused with Islamic ideas of justice and progress, or more fundamentalist versions of it, had been part of the official rhetoric of all governments. However, no previous government undertook the necessary and sufficient measures to construct a national identity that comprehensively reflected the ideology of an Islamist garrison state. (Ahmed 2013, 236)

Zia’s regime made three changes related to the MRA. First, in October 1977, responsibility for (the welfare of) overseas Pakistanis was transferred to the Manpower Division and the Ministry was re-designated as the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Minority Affairs, thus making it focused on religious issues. Second, the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), an autonomous part of the MRA, became the main policy think-tank for the Islamization of government. Finally, a Zakat system was established under the MRA. These three changes augmented the significance of the MRA manifold.

The CII had been established under the 1973 Constitution. According to Article 230 of the Constitution, the functions of the Council were:

- To make recommendations to Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) and the Provincial Assemblies as to the ways and means of enabling and encouraging the Muslims of Pakistan to order their lives individually and collectively in all respects in accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Quran and Sunnah;
- To advise a House, a Provincial Assembly, the President or a Governor on any question referred to the Council as to whether a proposed law is or is not repugnant to the injunctions of Islam;
- To make recommendations as to the measures for bringing existing laws into conformity with the Injunctions of Islam and the stages by which such measures should be brought into effect; and
- To compile in a suitable form, for the guidance of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) and the Provincial Assemblies, such Injunctions of Islam as can be given legislative effect.17
Between 1973 and 1977, not much importance was given to the CII reports. It was only towards the end of his rule that the Bhutto government asked the CII to finalize its recommendations regarding the Islamization of laws, probably to fend off protests from the religious right (Malik 1996 37–8). Just before the coup, the civilian government also transferred the administrative control of the CII from the Law Ministry to the MRA.

After the coup in 1977, the CII, now under the MRA, found itself in the thick of things. Its office was shifted from Lahore to Islamabad and a new chairman was appointed in September 1977. From then onwards, the CII was assigned significant new tasks; for example, the Islamization of penal laws, proposing a Zakat system, deciding whether the electoral system was Islamic (Wasti 2009, 103–4; CII 2015).

The CII played a major role in the Islamization drive of General Zia from 1977–88. Zia did not change the functions of the CII, but he changed its composition to achieve recommendations closer to what he desired and started implementing those recommendations. He started appointing more ulema, who had graduated from traditional madrassas, to the CII, instead of modernist scholars who had studied Islam and comparative religion in universities. As the number of ulema increased, the output of the CII became more conservative. Gradually, the atmosphere within the CII became so puritanical that even traditional ulema, belonging to the Barelvi and Shia schools, began to resign (Malik 1996, 39–48; Wasti 2009, 117–18).

The prominence of the MRA also increased with the establishment of the Zakat system. In November 1977, Zia asked the CII to form a committee of economists to implement a proper Zakat system in Pakistan. The committee reported in April 1978 but there were many disagreements between the Ministry of Finance, the CII, and the Planning Commission. Eventually, the government decided to deduct Zakat from saving accounts. The Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980, formally established the system. The MRA had an important role in both the collection and distribution of Zakat under the Ordinance. It decides the nisab (the amount above which Zakat becomes obligatory) each year which is then conveyed to the commercial banks and financial institutions to make the deductions. The MRA also acts as a secretariat for the Central Zakat Committee (CZC), the highest policy-making body of the Zakat system. The CZC makes the policies relating to the collection, management, and distribution of Zakat. Provinces also have Zakat committees but they
follow the lead of the CZC. The MRA convenes the meetings of the CZC and monitors the implementation of its policies. It also recommends new members for the CZC when a vacancy occurs (Ahmad 2004, 92–3). The MRA Secretary is also the Administrator General of Zakat and makes administrative decisions under the overall supervision of the CZC.

The MRA also has a role in the distribution of Zakat. Initially, the MRA used to make two distributions of Zakat funds to the provinces per year. After receiving the funds, provinces were free to distribute the money, keeping in view the policy directions of the CZC and the MRA. In 1994, the Zakat system was federalized. The power of the provinces was reduced, and the CZC and the MRA controlled the actual distribution of Zakat in provinces, besides making the policy. This change was not successful and, in 1997, control of Zakat distribution was returned to the provinces (KP government 2014). The Zakat deduction increased manifold from the early 1980s to the late 1990s: Rs. 884 million (1981), Rs. 1335 million (1985), Rs. 2574 million (1990), Rs. 3073 million (1995), and Rs. 4061 million (1999) (SBP 2006, 2010, 2014). The MRA, in this era, was a significant contributor to the national exchequer.

The 1990s saw some loss of interest in the Islamization campaign. Few laws to Islamize Pakistan were enacted in the 1990s and none of these laws resulted in any increase in the powers or functions of the MRA. For example, in June 1991, the Enforcement of Shariah Act was passed. It called for the Islamization of education and the economy, promotion of Islam through media, the setting up of bait-ul-mal (an Islamic welfare fund), promotion of Islamic virtues, and the elimination of bribery and corruption. Under the Act, the MRA would have seen an increase in its influence, but the Act did not result in any policy changes due to political instability (Government of Pakistan 1991). The MRA also experienced mergers and re-organizations in the 1990s, but its basic functions did not change.

The most important function for the MRA in the 1990s was the hajj operation. The hajj operation was controlled and conducted by the MRA, and was the most important annual activity for the MRA. The hajj operation started as a small affair in the 1950s and 1960s but, concurrently with the creation of the MRA, the hajj expanded. This was due to Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s close relationship with the Saudis, and his need to counter the religious right and brush up his religious credentials. As discussed, the expansion of the hajj under Bhutto was unprecedented and, in terms of hajjis (pilgrims) as a percentage of the total population, it is still unmatched (Bianchi 2004, 77–112; Gabriel 2008, 90).
1999 Onwards

The decision of the Supreme Court in March 1999 regarding Zakat was the harbinger of things to come for the MRA. The Supreme Court decided that the government could not forcibly deduct Zakat. So, any Muslim could submit an affidavit and exempt herself from the compulsory deduction of Zakat from bank accounts and other saving instruments. Previously, this facility was only available to Shia Muslims. As trust in Pakistani government is usually low, people availed themselves of this opportunity and exempted themselves from mandatory deduction, leading to a decrease in the growth of Zakat funds. Another reason for this decrease was the rise in gold prices. The contrast between the increase in Zakat deduction in the 1980s and 1990s and after 2000 is striking. From 1981 to 1999, Zakat deduction increased from Rs. 844 million to Rs. 4061 million, an increase of more than 380 per cent in 19 years. Since 2000, the deduction has fluctuated and could only increase by 16 per cent to reach Rs. 4720 million in 2014, (SBP 2012, 2014). This increase does not even equal the expected increase due to inflation (annual average inflation in Pakistan since 2000 has been more than 8 per cent) so, in real terms, growth was negative. The MRA’s operations and its importance, no doubt, suffered due to the lack of growth in Zakat deduction.

The CII’s importance also declined during this period as General Musharraf’s government was not interested in obtaining the CII’s opinion on matters of importance. Musharraf was a non-religious person and, following the events of 9/11, was interested in decreasing the Islamization of government, not increasing it. The CII’s website itself implicitly acknowledges that its best days are long gone. In a table on the website, of thr total of 11 major achievements shown, nine are from the period between the 1970s and the 1990s. After 1999, the CII assisted in the promulgation of only two laws (CII 2011).

Due to the decline in Zakat deduction and the importance of the CII, the main job of the MRA, from 1999 onwards, has been the administration of the hajj operation. However, here, too, one can see stunted growth. During the first period (the late 1940s to late 1960s), the number of pilgrims annually remained below 24,000. The period between the early 1970s to the late 1980s saw phenomenal growth and the number of annual pilgrims increased from under 24,000 to over 91,000 (Bianchi 2004, 275–6). Since early 1990, the growth has been gradual, as a limit (0.1 per cent of the total Muslim population) on the number of pilgrims
from every country was placed by the Organization of Islamic Countries and the Saudi Arabian government (Bianchi 2004, 51–2).22

A long-ignored function of the MRA, that of madrassa reform, was taken up again in 2005. However, due to the opposition of madrassa administrators, progress was limited. Starting with Ayub Khan, Pakistani rulers have unsuccessfully tried to bring the madrassas into the mainstream. The latest endeavour to reform the madrassas23 was started by General Musharraf. While many link his enthusiasm for this project with the external pressure after the 9/11 attacks, he started the reform a few months earlier when he promulgated the Modal Deeni Madrassa Ordinance on 10 August 2001 to establish model madrassas to demonstrate what a modern madrassa should look like. After 9/11, as focus turned to the Taliban, madrassas were declared by many in the West as jihadi factories and universities of militants. Responding to the pressure, General Musharraf promulgated a new ordinance to require that the madaris register. The government issued the Pakistan Madrassa Education Ordinance of 2002. Under this ordinance, a Pakistan Madaris Education Board was established to standardize the curricula and examination system of the madrassas. A Rs. 5 billion project was also started to mainstream them. In October 2004, the government made another attempt to reform the madrassas and introduced the Government Madrassa Reforms Programme in 2004. However, all these efforts failed because of resistance of the Ittehad Tanzeemat Madaris Pakistan (ITMP—an umbrella organization of madrassa groups) which objected to:

- the linking of madrassas to militancy;
- the heavy footprint of the West in the madrassa reform project; the ITMP accepted the need for reform but argued that it should be based on Pakistan’s internal requirements;
- government’s desire to control madrassas; and
- the capacity of the government of Pakistan to reform madrassas when public schools, which were under its own control, were highly ineffective and inefficient.24 (Zaidi 2013)

All these reform efforts were managed by either the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Education. The ITMP objected to the involvement of the Ministry of the Interior25 in their reform as it strengthened the notion that they are somehow linked with the military. They also objected to the reform being implemented by the Ministry of
Education, as the Minister of Education was a retired army general who had spoken publicly against madrassas. The ITMP preferred that the reform be led by the MRA, as the Minister of Religious Affairs was Ejaz-ul-Haq, the son of General Zia-ul-Haq. Hence, the Madrassa Board was attached to the MRA in 2006 (Fair 2008, 82–3, Zaidi 2013, 24, Haq 2014). As Musharraf’s position deteriorated in 2007, madrassa reform languished for the next two years. Madrassa reform took off once more in 2010, when an agreement was signed between the ITMP and the government; however, it was not implemented as religious affairs and education both became provincial matters after the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment and power to reform madrassas shifted to the provincial governments (U.S. Department of State 2011).

In July 2014, the Supreme Court of Pakistan also gave a seminal judgment in favour of minority rights. It made several recommendations in its judgment to stop discrimination against minorities and decided to convene regularly to see whether its recommendations have been implemented. The main recommendations related to the MRA were the establishment of a National Commission for Minorities Rights and setting up quotas for the minorities in public sector jobs. This Commission was formed under the MRA, and the MRA instructed the provincial governments to implement the minority quota requirements (Iqbal 2014). The Commission held a meeting under the auspices of the Minister of Religious Affairs in January 2015 and decided to form a three-member committee to review a preliminary draft of a national policy on interfaith harmony and give its recommendations (INP 2015). In May 2015, the Minister of the State for Religious Affairs and Interfaith Harmony said that the committee had the draft policy but, 18 months later, the policy is still to be approved by the government (Pakistan Today 2015).

There had been an effort to revive the MRA, particularly after the 2014 Peshawar massacre. The hallmark of this initiative appears to be increased state (MRA) involvement in controlling the religious narrative and societal Islamization in Pakistan. The National Action Plan (NAP) announced by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif contains several points where the MRA can take the lead. For example, the NAP requires the government to control literature related to religious hate, regulate the madrassas, protect religious minorities, take steps to end religious extremism and sectarianism, and so on. Many of these actions fall under the purview of the MRA.

The MRA did try to restart madrassa reform, as decided under the NAP. The Minister of Religious Affairs said, “We want the Madaris to
teach religious as well as secular subjects. No Madrassa will be allowed to teach or publish literature which promotes extremism or sectarianism”.

There were some hopes of progress and reform. However, in February 2015, the ITMP refused to attend a meeting convened by the government, as they argued that new regulations/agreements could not be made unless the MRA and the Ministry of the Interior implement previous agreements (Haq 2014; Gishkori 2015a, 2015c). The Minister of Religious Affairs tried to placate the ITMP, but agreement seems difficult (NNI 2015).

The MRA has also begun to study and learn from the Diyanet. The current Minister of Religious Affairs visited Turkey, learned how the Diyanet works, and requested help. It was decided that the Diyanet would establish model Imam-hatip schools in Pakistan. A team of the Diyanet staff visited Pakistan in February 2015 to take stock of the situation (Daily Times 2015). Unfortunately, after almost two years, no progress has been made on this project. Dr Mehmet Gormez, President of Diyanet, visited Pakistan in December 2016 and had many meetings with the Minister of Religious Affairs. The President of Pakistan, Mr Mamnoon Hussain, also appreciated the idea of establishing Imam-hatip schools in Pakistan. However, as with many other MRA initiatives, this one also seems to be going nowhere (The News 2016).

There was also an attempt by the MRA to set-up a Nizam-e-Salah programme in the mosques in Islamabad. Under this system, all mosques would have uniform times for azan and perform prayer simultaneously (Staff Report 2015). However, this attempt was also unsuccessful.

In sum, in this period, Zakat, the main source of MRA revenue, experienced negative growth in real terms and its main policy instrument, the CII, became redundant. The recent initiative to revive the MRA has also been largely unsuccessful. Hence, according to this indicator, the Islamization of government has declined in the current era.

**CONCLUSION**

The Diyanet is a unique Turkish institution. It is hard to find a similar institution in any other MMC—perhaps even in the world. It controls and discriminates, but also supports and promotes religion in a secular republic. The Diyanet’s history is also exceptional as it has been supported by Islamists, secularists, democrats, military dictators, socialists, and nationalists at different points in Turkish history.
The Diyanet faces three types of criticism. First, it is criticized by the secularists who find its presence an anomaly in an avowed secular republic. Second, it is criticized by the non-Sunni Muslim communities, particularly the Alevi. These communities, who make up 15–20 per cent of the Turkish population, are forced by the Diyanet, or by the Turkish state, to learn about Sunni Islam and pay for its propagation. Alevi children learn about Sunni Islam in schools and their parents pay for the building of Sunni mosques, while their Alevi places of worship (cemevis) receive no support from the state. Finally, even Islamist and religious Sunnis criticize the Diyanet for being a tool of the state. They resent many of the Diyanet’s measures, such as its support for Turkish azan in the 1930s and 1940s. Therefore, these groups want a Diyanet that is independent of the state, helping people to lead pious lives, without being influenced by politics. Despite these varied criticisms, the Diyanet has flourished since the 1950s and has grown to be an immense and powerful organization in Turkey.

As an indicator of the Islamization of government in Turkey, the Diyanet follows a pattern. In the period after independence, there was a sharp decrease in the Islamization of government, followed by a slow increase from the 1950s to 1970s, and then an accelerated increase after the 1980s. Finally, after 2010, the pace of the Islamization of government increased further. This pattern can be related to what was seen in the case of indicators of Islam’s role in state nationalism discussed in Chapters 2–4.

During the early decades of the Republic, the changes in the state administration of religious affairs indicate a sharp decrease in the Islamization of government. First, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was abolished and the Diyanet was established. Then, the Diyanet’s influence decreased in the 1920s and, in 1931, most of its personnel were transferred to another department and its budget decreased from more than 1 per cent of the total government expenditure to one third of 1 per cent. The decline continued until the mid-1940s, when its share in total government expenditure fell to 0.15 per cent. In the second period, starting in the late 1940s, there was a revival of the influence of the Diyanet, demonstrating an increase in the Islamization of government. The Diyanet’s budget increased and most of the personnel taken away in 1931 were transferred back to the Diyanet. In 1961, the Diyanet became a constitutional body and secularists also accepted its role. In the 1970s, the Diyanet continued to increase its personnel, budget, and functions.
In the third era, the Diyanet rapidly expanded, indicating an escalation in the Islamization of government. In the current (1982) Constitution, the Diyanet was given, for the first time, the constitutional role of assisting “national solidarity and integrity”. In the decade between 1981 and 1991, almost 20,000 mosques were built—the largest increase in one decade in the history of Turkey. In the 1990s, the Diyanet also expanded outside Turkey to Europe and later, to the newly independent Central Asian Republics. The Quran courses increased and female preachers were also inducted in the Diyanet.

In the current era, the pace of the Diyanet expansion has increased further, signifying an increase in the Islamization of government. The Diyanet’s budget is greater than that of many ministries and has reached 1.24 per cent of the total budget. The number of its personnel has increased to more than 140,000. Both the President and Prime Minister have strived to increase the Diyanet’s role and have promised to make it an even more important institution in future. President Erdogan even drew a comparison between the Catholic Pope and President of the Diyanet, and argued that President of Diyanet should be venerated (Geopolitical Diary 2015).

For a country which was created in the name of Islam, an MRA might seem to be a necessity to broker the close links between religion and state. Pakistan, however, only established its MRA in 1974, more than a quarter of a century after independence. Though some of the current MRA functions were taken over by the government, the MRA was not established. This demonstrates the comparatively slow pace of the Islamization of government during the first period, from the late 1940s to late 1960s. The main reasons for the absence of an MRA were the opposition of the ulema, the national elite, and the landed elite. The ulema opposed the MRA because they feared the state would thereby control religion. The elite did not establish the MRA as they wanted less interference from religion and the ulema in governmental matters. The landed elite was concerned about the centralization of religion that they thought would result from the creation of the MRA. In the second period (the early 1970s to late 1990s), the MRA not only came into existence, it also prospered beyond imagination. It gained new functions, powers, and a source of revenue in Zakat. One of the autonomous organizations attached to it, the CII, became the main source of policies for Zia’s drive for the Islamization of government, expanding the MRA’s influence to other ministries and provinces. The MRA and CII wrote, advised on, and vetted legislation on financial, social, and political matters.
In the current period, starting in 1999, the MRA’s influence has receded. First, the Supreme Court disallowed the mandatory deduction of Zakat by the government from the accounts of the majority of the Sunni population. The Supreme Court decided that, as with the Shiites, the Sunnis could also exempt themselves from the mandatory deduction. This decision sounded the death knell for the rapid growth in Zakat collection that was seen in the 1990s. Under General Musharraf, the CII was out of favour, and its meetings and pronouncements were largely ignored. Since 2014, there has been an effort to revive the MRA but this has been largely unsuccessful.

The rise and fall of Islamization of government in Pakistan as seen in this chapter follows that same pattern as observed in previous chapters. There was a small increase in Islamization of government in the initial period (the late 1940s to late 1960s). During the second period (the early 1970s to late 1990s), Islamization of the government experienced a rapid increase, mainly due to the policies of General Zia’s government (1977–88). In the current period (1999 onwards), the Islamization of government is decreasing for the first time since the establishment of Pakistan.

Having analyzed three indicators related to Islam’s role in state nationalism in Chapters 2–4 and two indicators regarding the Islamization of government in Chapter 5 and the current chapter, Chapter 7 will discuss the last indicator related to the Islamization of government, “religious education”. It will be interesting to see whether religious education follows the same pattern as the previous five indicators.

Notes

1. The Chinese Bureau of Religious Affairs is a rare example. Its disbandment in 1975, when the Cultural Revolution was still in full swing, meant an increase in religious persecution. The revival of the Bureau in 1979, after the end of the Cultural Revolution, resulted in a decrease in religious persecution and increased religious freedoms (Cohen 1992; Potter 2003; Government of China 2015).

2. For example, the Ottoman state started establishing public primary schools in the 1870s, thus establishing an alternative to the medrese (madrasa) system, controlled by the Sheikh-ul-Islam (Baskan 2014, 38–9).

3. Ziya Gokalp, the father of Turkish nationalism, and many others supported religious services in the Turkish language (Azak 2008). Gokalp died in 1924.
4. The All India Muslim League campaigned on the slogan of Pakistan and so, if it had lost the 1946 elections, the British would have been less inclined to accept the demand of a separate state, Pakistan.

5. High religion is defined in contrast to folk religion. High religion is scripturalist, based on theology, and is generally similar across cultures. Folk religion is about how religion is actually practiced and varies across cultures. Every culture has its own folk religions, which are adaptations of high religion to make it more in tune with local history and local culture (Dever 2005, ix).

6. It would have been difficult for one MRA, no matter how powerful, to fight against the entire bureaucracy and the political class, which were both largely non-religious, in official meetings behind closed doors. It was far easier to fight politicians and bureaucracy on the streets in a poor, conservative country.

7. Both Jinnah and Iqbal (a national poet and considered the first person to have clearly articulated the idea of Pakistan) were called kafir (infidel) by the religious right.

8. Hajj is the pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia. It happens annually on specific dates of the Islamic calendar. Every Muslim, with means, has to perform the pilgrimage once in his or her life.

9. It remained part of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as Ministry of Commerce.

10. It is the 2.5 per cent tax on annual savings to be spent on specific religious purposes.

11. Ijtihad is an Islamic legal concept that refers to coming up with an original interpretation, using independent reasoning and the utmost effort, to deal with an issue that is discussed in the Quran and Sunnah.

12. He established state control on the economy and education by nationalizing banks, industries, and schools. The MRA could be thought of as a way to establish state control over religion.

13. This amendment proclaimed Qadianis/Ahmadis non-Muslim. The Qadianis are considered a heretic sect by most Pakistanis (and by many in the Middle East) because of their belief that an Indian Muslim, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835–1908), was a prophet, or a messiah, or a reincarnation of Prophet Essa (Jesus). The acceptance of Prophet Muhammad as the last prophet is one of the cardinal tenets of Islam.

14. Not only to Saudi Arabia, but also to other places such as Iran and Iraq.

15. Moon-sighting. It is considered an important function as the Islamic calendar is a lunar calendar and dates of fasting, eids, and hajj are based on moon-sighting.

16. Proselytization.

17. These functions were not very different from the ACII in the 1962 Constitution. The most significant change was that at least some of the members of the CII were required to have experience in Islamic research or
instruction, rather than just “understanding and appreciation of Islam and of the economic, political, legal and administrative problems of Pakistan”, as required under the 1962 Constitution.

18. Interestingly, new chairman Justice Afzal Cheema was a sitting judge of the Supreme Court hearing a case against General Zia’s coup. Not surprisingly, Justice Cheema declared that the coup was legitimate and even tried to justify the coup on the basis of Islam.

19. Barelvi and Shias are considered closer to the folk Islam prevalent in Pakistan, as opposed to the Deobandi and Salafi (Wahhabi) tradition that is considered more strict and scripturalist but was preferred by General Zia (Bahadur 2009, 105).

20. The Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1979, initially established the system but it had to be changed, mainly due to the opposition of Shias who give their Zakat to their ulema directly and are against the collection of Zakat by the state.

21. As nisab is based on the price of gold (and silver); a rise in the price of gold means an increase in nisab and, consequently, a decrease in deductions. However, gold prices crashed in 2011, without a corresponding increase in the Zakat deductions.

22. It was decided that pilgrims allowed from a country will not exceed 0.1 per cent of the total Muslim population.

23. The plural of “madrassa” is “madaris”; however, “madrassas” is now in common use.

24. These arguments by the ITMP were more or less seconded by the Brooking Institution’s report on Pakistan’s Education system, Beyond Madrasas (Graff and Winthrop 2010).

25. Counterpart of the Department of Homeland Security. Primary functions of the Ministry of the Interior are internal security, terrorism, penal law reform, citizenship, immigration, and so on. Policing is, however, a provincial subject.

26. Islamabad, the federal capital, is the only major urban area where the MRA has direct control over mosques. Other urban areas are administered by the provinces.
CHAPTER 7

Islamization and Religious Education

The importance of education in the socialization of the next generation cannot be over-emphasized. Education from kindergarten to 12th grade (K-12) is usually managed and financed through public funds. It is considered one of the most important responsibilities of the modern state, and is also a great opportunity for the state to influence future generations, and to socialize them into good and obedient citizens. Hence, governments in the MMCs (and other countries) prioritize and focus on what is taught in schools and proponents of ideologies of all hues—Islamists, liberals, secularists, and so on—try to control education.

There are scores of different education indicators available, each capturing an important aspect of education. Since the objective here is to measure the Islamization of the government, the education indicators chosen are related to religious education. Governments that want to Islamize, or to show that they are undertaking Islamization, would enhance the share of religious education in relation to education in secular subjects. Religious education can be increased in three ways. Governments can start teaching religious education in public schools. If it is optional, they can make it mandatory for all students, or increase the hours of religious education per week. Governments can also open and operate religious schools where the focus is on religious education, rather than on general education. This arrangement can cater in a situation where a minority wants to have religious education and the government offers religious schools for such a minority, without forcing all students to study religion. Finally, the government can support religious education without
administering that education itself. It can provide institutional, legal, and financial support to private religious schools or schools run by religious organizations. In this chapter, these three indicators will be used to examine government support for religious education, thereby estimating the overall Islamization of the government in Turkey and Pakistan. Since the early 1980s, there have been many studies focusing on the religious content in the K-12 education syllabi of MMCs, but there is less focus on the duration of religious instruction in public schools and a collective and comparative look at religious instruction in public schools, public religious schools, and private religious schools.

Based on the above discussion, this chapter analyzes how the following three indicators have changed since the independence of Turkey and Pakistan:

- religious instruction in public schools
- public religious schools
- private religious education.

Ahmet Kuru has used similar measures in his award-winning book, *Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey* (2009).1 His comparative analysis of the education systems in Turkey, France and the USA concentrated on six areas in the education system to analyze the role of religion and secularism: religious dress and religious symbols in public schools, pledges recited in public schools, private religious education, religious instruction in public schools, public funding for private religious schools, and prayer in public schools.

Since Kuru’s focus is secularization and is based on a different set of countries, his approach cannot be followed exclusively. In this chapter, the three indicators mentioned earlier will be used to see whether the Islamization of government has increased or decreased in Turkey and Pakistan.

**Turkey: State Support for Religious Education**

Ataturk wanted to create a modern Turkey, a contemporary civilization, far removed from the erstwhile Ottoman Empire. To realize his dream, he knew that he had to focus on youth education. He once argued that around 300 million Muslims worldwide were under the control of other nations and were disrespected because they had the wrong kind of
education. Hence, he vowed that, if Turkey were to modernize, it had to have a different education system (Mango 2002, 484). Public, free, and scientific education were prominent components of Atatürk’s modernizing project; religious and madrassa education, the mainstays of the Ottoman education system, were to be discarded. At present, President Erdoğan also wants a new Turkey and yearns for a break from the immediate past. He claims that Turkey is experiencing its greatest struggle since independence and, perhaps unsurprisingly, he also emphasizes youth and their education. However, he wants to increase religious education, as his desire is to raise a “devout generation” (Gursel 2014). The following section explores how religious education has fared in Turkey between these two projects, which are almost one hundred years apart.

Under the Ottomans, all education was controlled by the ulema and there was no separate secular education system until the nineteenth century. The movement toward a more secular public education system began after the Ottoman defeat in the Greek War of Independence (1831–32). During the Tanzimat period (1839–76), educational reforms accelerated. A Ministry of Education was created in 1847 and teacher training colleges were established soon thereafter. Higher secondary (idadiye), high (sultaniye), and elementary (ibtidaiye) schools were also added to the public education system, which was completely separate from the madrassas that were managed by the ulema (Jenkins 2008, 47–8 and 61). Though the new system was not managed by the ulema, religious instruction was part of the curricula. Even students in the (secular) military academies had to attend religious courses, as Atatürk himself did when he was a cadet.

The Early 1920s to Mid-1940s

This period represents the gradual secularization of the Turkish education system. Initially, religious instruction, as in the past, was an important component of public education. In 1920, while discussing the education programme, the Minister of Education, Riza Nur, declared, “in our program, we put religious education above all else”. In 1921, the new Minister of Education, Hamdullah Suphi, advised, “[We] should order the Ministry of Religious Affairs to [protect] the conscience of our children against the currents coming from the West” (Bayar 2012, 22).

However, decisions were soon taken to make education secular and the role of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (or its successor the Diyanet) in public education was eliminated. After the passage of the Tevhid-Tedrisat
Kanunu (Law of Unification of Educational Instruction) on 3 March 1924, all educational institutions came under the purview of the Ministry of Education. As madrassas were either closed or replaced by Imam-hatip schools (state-run religious schools), even religious education came under the control of the Ministry of Education, run by a non-religious leadership. Later, in the 1930s, religious courses in public education were also prohibited and state-run religious schools (Imam-hatip schools) were closed, signifying a sharp decline in the Islamization of government.3

The following section analyzes the Islamization of government in the following three areas related to education from the early 1920s to mid-1940s:

- religious instruction in public schools
- public religious education
- private religious education.

Religious Instruction in Public Schools
After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, religious instruction continued to be provided in public schools as it had been under the Ottomans. However, gradually the number of hours of mandatory religious instruction in schools was reduced. By the mid-1930s, even optional religious courses were difficult to find in public schools. Between 1938 and 1949, there was no religious instruction in public schools (Adanali 2002).

The objective of the ban on religious education was partly to civilize or modernize, and partly to engender nationalism in the new generation. Ataturk considered religious education useless and wanted Turks to acquire modern knowledge and scientific education in order to join the modern world. Speaking to a gathering of teachers in 1924, he said:

> For everything in the world—for civilization, for life, for success—the truest guide is knowledge and science. To seek a guide other than knowledge and science is [a mark of] heedlessness, ignorance and aberration.4 (Mango 2002, 484)

Prime Minister Inonu explained in more detail why a “national” education, and not a religious or international education, was necessary:

> We want national education. What do we mean by this? This idea is easier to understand if we define its opposite. The opposite is religious upbringing or
international education. You teachers should not offer religious and inter-
national, but national education...Religious education is in one sense
international education. Our education, however, should be by ourselves,
for ourselves. (Ozdalga 1999)

Public Religious Schools
When all private religious schools (madrassas) were banned, they were
replaced by state-run religious schools, called Imam-hatip schools. These schools were established to placate conservatives who were still
part of the ruling elite in the early 1920s. Imam-hatip schools taught a
mixed curriculum approved by the state, including both religious and
secular subjects. Initially, 29 Imam-hatip schools were opened, catering
to around 2250 students in 1924. These were mostly erstwhile madrassa
students. A faculty of theology was also opened at Darulfunun (the
former name of the Istanbul University) (Cakir and Bozan 2005, 40).
However, the number of schools was gradually reduced and, by 1928/9,
there were only two schools with only 100 students. By 1930, these
remaining schools were also discontinued. Three years later, the faculty
of theology at the Istanbul University also suffered the same fate. The
government claimed that the Imam-hatip schools had been closed since
there was no demand for religious education. However, as later events
demonstrated, the demand for religious education has remained strong
throughout modern Turkish history. Imam-hatip schools were essen-
tially shut down to discourage religious education (Cakir et al. 2004,
58; Bozan 2007, 12).

Private Religious Education
As already mentioned, after the passage of the Tevhid-Tedrisat Kanunu, it
became illegal to provide private religious education. On 16 March 1924,
the Education Minister reported that 479 madrassas were no longer in
operation. Around 16,000 students had been studying in these madrassas
(Jenkins 2008, 93). Reforms had been introduced in Ottoman madrassas
during the preceding 50 years, such as the introduction of secular subjects.
However, Ataturk considered them beyond redemption. He declared:

The medreses, established by the old Turks, are degenerated ruins, unable to
be reformed in the light of a modern academic mentality. (Agai 2007)
Though the Turkish state tried to close all madrassas, many small madrassas in rural areas continued to provide religious education, primarily focusing on teaching children how to read the Quran. These private religious schools were illegal, but they still operated secretly. Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan, a celebrated preacher and scholar of the Sufi Naqshbandi order, was one of the many scholars providing religious education illegally at the local level. He taught everywhere: in homes, shops, and barns (Atasoy 2005, 83).⁶

The Late 1940s to Late 1970s

As mentioned before, in the mid-1940s, the CHP had to end its single-party rule and introduce the multi-party system. Though the DP did not campaign on the basis of religion, it quickly became popular by portraying the CHP as a party that was elitist and anti-tradition. In 1947, the CHP held its Seventh Party Congress. As the threat of electoral loss at the hands of the DP loomed large, many participants pleaded for a change of policy toward religious education.

Public pressure was mainly from the rural areas. Due to the ban on religious education, both public and private, there was a serious dearth of religious personnel in the 1940s. Most of the religious scholars of the late Ottoman period and early republican years were either executed, sequestered or exiled during the establishment of new Turkey or they passed away from natural causes. There were no religious authority left to guide the society at practical matters concern- ing rituals such as funerals, religious holidays etc. (Kavakci 2007, 211)

In the end, even President Inonu relented and said:

We have to take national realities into account. We have to be responsive to the moral needs of the nation and relieve the people from a feeling of being neglected by the government. (Atasoy 2005, 72)

The CHP gave a few concessions, such as allowing elective religious courses in public schools. These concessions were difficult to make for the CHP but, compared with what happened over the next three decades, they were just the tip of the iceberg. Religious education expanded in all kind of ways and all parties, including the CHP, played their part.
The next section analyzes the Islamization of government in the following areas:

- religious instruction in public schools
- public religious education
- private religious education.

Religious Instruction in Public Schools
Feeling the popular pressure, the CHP agreed to optional religious education in public schools and, in February 1949, religious education was allowed as an elective subject. In November 1950, the DP included religious instruction in elementary school curricula and religious instruction became mandatory, unless parents requested an exemption. Very few parents actually exercised this option and almost all elementary school children started having religious education for the first time since the mid-1920s (Jenkins 2008, 115–17).

In 1956, religious education was introduced in secondary schools and, in 1967, formed part of the curricula of high schools (Adanali 2002). There was a fear that, following the 1960 military coup, religious education would again be banned in public schools but this did not happen. In fact, Article 19 of the 1961 Constitution legitimized religious education:

Religious education and teaching shall be subject to the individual’s own will and volition, and in the case of minors, to their legally appointed guardians… (Islamic Studies 1963)

Public Religious Schools
State-sponsored religious schools were also revived in this era. In the Seventh Congress of the CHP, there were calls for the re-opening of the Imam-hatip schools, but the CHP leadership did not oblige. It only allowed the commencement of a 10-month religious course in major cities and opened a faculty of theology at the University of Ankara in 1949 (Cakir and Bozan 2005, 40).

In 1951, the DP, which had promised to open Imam-hatip schools, ushered in the first seven schools in the major cities of Ankara, Istanbul, Adana, Istanbul, Izmir, Kayseri, and Marash, now called Kahramanmaras (Bozan 2007, 14). These schools replaced the Imam-hatip courses started
by the CHP. Imam-hatip schools worked on a seven-year course, four years focused on culture and three years focused on vocational skills. However, even after seven years of study, including secular subjects, graduates of Imam-hatip schools were only equivalent to graduates of regular secondary schools, not high school graduates.

There were 19 Imam-hatip schools, with around 3500 students, when the first batch of Imam-hatip schools graduated in 1958 (Jenkins 2008, 117–8). Next year, the government opened the first Higher Institute of Islam or Higher Islamic Institute (Yüksek İslam Enstitüleri) in Istanbul for these graduates to continue their education beyond secondary level. There were 19 Imam-Hatip schools by the end of the decade (Cakir et al. 2004, 60; Ozgur 2012, 40–1)

The coup in 1960 did not stop the growth of Imam-hatip schools. The coalition of the CHP and the AP (Justice Party) opened seven more Imam-hatip schools in 1961 and continued to open more such schools during its tenure (Jenkins 2008, 126). The AP won the election in 1965 and far outpaced the DP in the expansion of state-run religious education. Three Higher Institutes of Islam were opened by the AP in its first three years in power and, by 1972/3, there were more than 2000 students studying in five Higher Institutes of Islam (Landau 1984, 188). However, it was the increase in Imam-hatip schools that was phenomenal. Only 26 Imam-hatip schools were opened in the 15 years from 1950 to 1965, the AP opened 43 new Imam-hatip schools in its first three years in power. The enrolment in these schools almost tripled, from 13,500 in 1965/6 to 41,300 in 1968/9. This massive expansion cleared the backlog of religious personal and it was obvious that all the new graduates would not be employed by the Diyanet. Parents were clearly choosing these schools to provide their children with religious education, not to make them prayer leaders to work for the Diyanet. The popularity of the Imam-hatip schools was probably also influenced by another change by the AP government. It removed the earlier restrictions on graduates of Imam-hatip schools from joining universities (Cakir and Bozan 2005, 40–1; Jenkins 2008, 128–9).

The 1971 coup caused a slight hiccup in the growth of the number of Imam-hatip schools. The middle school sections of the Imam-hatip schools were closed but were soon re-opened and the expansion continued. The growth in Imam-hatip schools was particularly remarkable from 1974 to 1978. This increase was mainly due to the work of the National Salvation Party (MSP). The MSP, despite winning only around 10 per
cent of the popular vote, remained part of the ruling coalitions, first with the CHP and then with the AP, during the 1970s. The MSP was formed in 1972 by Necmettin Erbakan, who was the first prominent political leader since 1923 to publicly call for an increased role of Islam in the Turkish state. Imam-hatip schools benefited from three developments in the mid-1970s. First, the ban on middle sections of Imam-hatip schools was lifted. Second, the new education policy declared that Imam-hatip schools were not providers of vocational religious education only. They were accepted as schools providing general education, equivalent to regular high schools. So, discrimination against Imam-hatip schools students from entering social sciences and humanities faculties in universities were removed. Finally, in 1976, girls were also allowed in the Imam-hatip schools (Cakir et al. 2004, 40–1; Jenkins 2008, 130–7).

The changes in the 1960s and 1970s gradually established Imam-hatip schools as a viable alternative path to university. Students (and parents) did not have to choose between religious education and a successful career. They could have it both ways; they could be religiously educated in the Imam-hatip schools and also become lawyers, bureaucrats, police officers, and so on. Not surprisingly, the number of schools increased from 16 in 1955 to 101 in 1975, and 339 in 1980. Similarly, the number of students in Imam-hatip schools increased from fewer than 900 in 1955 to 200,000 by 1981 (Landau 1984, 188; Cakir et al. 2004, 41; Cakir and Bozan 2005, 41 and 64; Jenkins 2008, 136).

Although founded as vocational-religious institutions, imam-hatip schools were integrated into the secondary educational system in 1973 by the coalition government of the centre-left RPP and pro-Islamic NSP [MSP]. This has transformed them into an alternative educational system that trains students to perform religious services and also prepares them for higher education. Most graduates continue their education in various university departments for careers in engineering, law, and medicine. They enter the job market as professionals and civil servants. In 1987, nearly 40 per cent of students in the Public Administration Department of Ankara University’s prestigious Faculty of Political Science were graduates of imam-hatip lycées [high schools]. (Atasoy 2005, 156)

In the 1970s, the Turkish state also started to provide a more basic level of religious education which focused on teaching children the basic
fundamentals of Islam and the recitation of the Quran. The demand for such an education was rising and was being fulfilled by illegal private religious schools. To counter private religious schools, the Diyanet started its own Quranic courses. This was also the first time since 1924 that religious education was managed by the Diyanet and the principle set by the Law of Unification of Educational Instruction was ignored.

Private Religious Education

The ban on private religious education was also relaxed after the DP took power in 1950. With 15,000 mosques constructed during the 10-year rule of the DP, it was not possible for Imam-hatip schools to keep up with the demand of religious personal. The DP government, therefore, allowed them to register as private organizations and the Diyanet started hiring the graduates of these schools to administer new mosques. The increase in activity of these schools in this period could be gauged by the number of private organizations established by the religious orders administering them. These organizations increased from less than 100 in 1949 to 251 in 1951, and more than 5000 by the time the DP government was toppled by the military coup in 1960 (Atasoy 2005, 74).

However, the state was still afraid of traditional Islam. Teachers and students of the Quran courses were still suspected of anti-state activities and were frequently interrogated by law enforcement officers. This concern about private religious education was one of the reasons why a new Diyanet law was passed in 1965. This law stopped the Diyanet from hiring religious personnel trained in private religious schools. It decreed that anybody hired as a state employee by the Diyanet had to be a graduate of state-run religious educational institutions, such as Imam-hatip schools, higher institutes of Islam, or theology faculties attached to the universities (Jenkins 2008, 118–27). As in the case of other types of religious education, after the 1970 military coup more restrictions were placed on private religious schools and there was an attempt to reduce their growth; however, when democracy was restored, the growth resumed.

The Early 1980s to Late 2000s

As has been discussed, the military coup in September 1980 transformed the Turkish state’s relationship with Islam. Islam became an accepted part of Turkish state nationalism and attempts were made to re-imagine Ataturk as an Islamic leader and hero. Trying to fight radical left and
Kurdish nationalists, and to counter decreasing social cohesion and increasing political instability, the Turkish military let its fear of Islam take a back seat and decided to give Islam a much more public and expanded role. The military still claimed to be the guardian of secularism and adopted some policies that were against traditional Islam (such as the ban on headscarves) but the break from the past and the state’s acceptance of Islam was too conspicuous.

National historiography was revised and Islam was presented as an outstanding national trait of the Turks, as well as being a source of social and moral stability. The curriculum of state schools was adapted to religious demands, obligatory religious courses were introduced, and the theory of evolution was banned from schoolbooks. This appears to be one of the reasons why important Islamic groups such as Fethullah Gulen gave their support to the coup d’état. The new state-promoted form of Islam became more visible than ever. (Agai 2007, 153)

All types of religious education grew exponentially during this period and the military regime fully integrated (Sunni Hanafi) Islam into the Turkish education system (Ozgur 2012, 48). There was a brief interlude in the late 1990s. The success of the Islamic-oriented Refah Party, led by Erbakan, in the mid-1990s, made the military take several measures to strengthen secularism in education. Imam-hatip schools and the Quran courses were discouraged, and the ban on headscarves was strictly enforced. However, after the AKP won the election in 2002, religious education resumed its gallop. Soon, it had recouped most of the losses that it suffered in the aftermath of the 1997/8 post-modern coup and marched ahead. Islamization of the government not only increased in this period, it also increased at a much faster pace.

The following section discusses the Islamization of government in three areas:

- religious instruction in public schools
- public religious education
- private religious education.

Religious Instruction in Public Schools
Religious education was already part of primary, secondary, and high schools curricula before 1980. As discussed in Chapter 2, the 1982
Constitution, crafted by a military junta, made it a constitutional requirement. Intellectuals’ Hearth, a right-wing association of scholars that also came up with the new unofficial state ideology—Turkish-Islamic synthesis—played a prominent role in bringing about this change. Other individuals also contributed. In 1980, Professor Huseyin Atay, the dean of the Ankara University Divinity Faculty, submitted a report to the military junta arguing that there is no contradiction between compulsory religious education and secularism:

Education without religion, he argued, would not produce loyal citizens; even though the ideas of Ataturk and the Turkish Republic were being taught in public schools, he argued, the youth were still not loyal to the state, because of their lack of religious knowledge. (Eligur 2010, 103)

The military leadership accepted the argument of right-wing scholars and Article 24 was included in the 1982 Constitution:

Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. (Constitution of 1982)

Though the Constitution and Basic Law of National Education (1983) reaffirmed the Turkish state’s commitment to secularism, it was difficult to understand how, as Professor Atay argued, an increase in compulsory religious education would help state secularism. Article 12 of the Basic Law declared:

Secularism is the fundamental feature of the Turkish National Education. Religious Culture and Ethics Teaching is among the compulsory courses taught in the primary, secondary and high schools… (Selcuk 2009, 133)

In 2002, before the AKP began its long period in power, religious education started in grade 4 and continued until the end of high school in grade 12. The course content included information on Islam, other religions, and ethics (Adanali 2002). Since coming to power, the AKP has tried to increase the religious content of public education by offering more elective courses related to Islam and increasing the hours of religious education. For example, in 2005, students were offered three new elective courses related to the Quran and Seerat (Daloglu 2014). In 2008, the government increased funding to the theology faculties of the universities. There were also instances of the celebration of religious functions in public
schools, with headmasters asked by the government to attend the celebrations (Arat 2009).

Expansion in compulsory religious courses in public schools was a major issue for the Alevi population of Turkey. Although these courses provided information about ethics and other religions, most of the content was based on the teachings of Sunni Hanafi Islam. This was unacceptable to Alevis. On the plea of an Alevi father, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) gave a judgment against Turkey in 2007, and advised the Turkish government to reform its religious education and make it more neutral, or allow an exemption to those who did not want their children to attend these classes (ECHR 2007). In 2008, the Turkish Court of Appeals also decided that these courses had to be reformed, as they were based on the teachings of Sunni Islam. However, most of these courses were not reformed or removed from the curriculum even after these decisions (Ince 2012, 156–7).

Public Religious Schools
In 1980, the leaders of the military coup also removed the last remaining restrictions on Imam-hatip school students. Imam-hatip school students could now enter all university faculties in the same way as any other high school graduate. They also attached all Higher Institutes of Islam to universities and declared them faculties of theology, thus increasing their prominence, authority, and acceptability.

Cakir et. al. (2004, 42) claims that the 1980 coup was “a critical turning point in the history of Turkey and also for the history of Imam-hatip high schools”. The number of Imam-hatip schools increased from around 350 to 605 from the early 1980s to 1998, but the number of students exploded from 200,000 to more than 500,000, meaning that Imam-hatip school students comprised around 13% of all Turkish high school students (Jenkins 2008, 159). The reasons given for the increased popularity of and attendance at Imam-hatip schools were: the increase in demand for religious education; more opportunities for Imam-hatip school students for career advancement; the increase in dormitories, school buildings and scholarships made available by private individuals and associations; and an increase in female students (Cakir et al. 2004, 40–50).

After the 1997 post-modern coup, Imam-hatip schools were targeted, as they were considered recruiting grounds for the Refah and other Islamic-oriented parties. The reforms that were introduced disadvantaged
Imam-hatip schools in two ways. First, changes were made to the universities’ admission process, making it almost impossible for graduates of Imam-hatip schools to enter faculties, other than theology faculties. Second, compulsory education was extended from five to eight years, thus shutting down the middle section of all Imam-hatip schools.

The main argument for these changes was that, since these schools were religious vocational schools, their graduates should be working in their own field. The military questioned the need for 53,500 graduates from Imam-hatip schools annually when the Diyanet, the main employer, could only absorb 2300 graduates. These changes decreased the number of schools and students drastically. By 2003, the number of schools had declined to 450 from 605 in 1998, and the number of students plummeted to 64,534 from 511,500 in 1998 (Jenkins 2008, 162–3; Ozgur 2012, 50).

The AKP’s election programme included a commitment to eliminate the discrimination against Imam-hatip school graduates in university exams. It won the election comprehensively but was unable to remove the restriction due to opposition from President Sezer, the military, and the judiciary. In the second half of 2003, an attempt by the AKP to remove restrictions on Imam-hatip schools graduates was vehemently opposed by the military and the AKP backed down. After winning local elections in March 2004 by 41 per cent of the vote, the AKP passed a law to end discrimination, despite opposition from the military. However, it was vetoed by President Sezer. Due to this tussle, few new Imam-hatip schools were opened between 2002 and 2009. However, the number of students more than doubled from around 71,000 to more than 198,000.

After winning another election and presidency in 2007, the AKP gradually increased the number of Imam-hatip schools, from 450 schools in 2003 to 465 schools in 2010. In 2009, the discrimination against Imam-hatip school graduates, instituted in 1998, was removed. Imam-hatip graduates could now be admitted to all university faculties. Enrolment, which had been stagnant, increased immediately after this decision. During the year 2009/10, it was around 200,000 students (Jenkins 2008, 163; Ozgur 2012, 137).

The Quran courses by the Diyanet also continued to increase during this period. From 60,000 students in 1980, the number increased to 146,000 in 1990. Enrolment further increased to 158,000 by 1996, but then declined to fewer than 80,000 in 2002 in the aftermath of the post-modern coup. After the AKP came to power, there was a gradual return to
Quran courses and enrolment increased to 200,000 by 2010 (Bozan 2007, 87; Turkish Statistical Institute 2015).

Private Religious Education
The ban on private religious education continued during this period. There were private religious institutions providing religious instruction to people but they were illegal and so did not operate openly. The military junta expanded the Diyanet’s Quran courses and urged parents to use state-run programs, instead of giving religious education themselves or using private religious institutions. Coup leader General Kenan Evren said:

Families should not give religious education to children. This would be improper since it may be taught incorrectly, incompletely, or through the family’s own point of view… I ask you… not to send your children to illegal Koran schools… religion will be taught to our children by the state in state schools. (Atasoy 2005, 155)

However, the private Quran courses continued to educate and increase, once military was back in barracks in 1983. The new Prime Minister Turgut Ozal was himself a follower of Sufi Naqshbandi Order. After 1997 coup, there was a crackdown on the private Quran courses but after a gap, they re-emerged. The AKP’s coming to power resulted in a relaxation of the atmosphere. In 2005, the AKP tried to reduce the punishment for setting-up the private Quran schools but it was vetoed by President Sezer (Today’s Zaman 2005). So, these schools remained illegal, even when they continue to operate and mushroom. State funding or support for these schools was, however, out of the question.

2010 Onwards
This period starts with the success of AKP in the constitutional referendum in September 2010. In this referendum, many of the authoritarian aspects of the 1982 Constitution were rejected and changes enhancing democratization approved. As discussed in the chapter on constitutions, these changes decreased powers of military and judiciary, the two institutions defending secularism. The changes approved included removal of constitutional immunity of the 1980 coup leaders; increased social and political rights; and reform of the judiciary. With the approval of these reforms, most checks on Prime Minister Erdogan’s power were also removed, allowing him to use his
parliamentary majority to pass almost any law he liked (CNN wire staff 2010). This has led to the expansion of religious education, indicating an increase in the Islamization of government. As quoted at the start of this chapter, Erdogan declared that he wanted to raise a “devout generation” of Turks. He has also argued that religious education has helped in the fight against violence, racism, terrorism, drug addiction, Islamophobia and anti-Semitism (Hurriyet Daily News 2014e).

The following section analyzes the Islamization of government in these areas:

- Religious instruction in public schools;
- Public religious education;
- Private religious education.

**Religious Instruction in Public Schools**

Religious instruction continues to be a part of school curricula at all three levels. In 2014, there were unsuccessful attempts to start teaching of values at the kindergarten level that critics called teaching religion to kids before they could think for themselves. President Erdogan did not help matters by questioning Turkish reforms of the last two centuries, an oblique reference to Westernization process started by Tanzimat in 1839:

> We are going beyond the banalities taught to us for 200 years. We are finally asking the right questions. (Korkmaz 2014b)

As discussed in the last section, in 2007, ECHR decided that the Turkish government had to reform its religious education or allow exemption as it was not neutral and promoted Sunni Islam. As scarcely few changes were made, in September 2014, ECHR gave another judgment reiterating that religious education in public schools should be reformed. The case was again filed by Alevi who, unlike non-Muslim Turkish citizens, could not take exemption from religious classes. The ECHR (2014) ruled:

> Turkey has to remedy the situation without delay, in particular by introducing a system whereby pupils could be exempted from religion and ethics classes without their parents having to disclose their own religious or philosophical convictions.
PM Davutoglu, while accepting the ruling, defended the necessity of religious education:

This [having mandatory religious courses] is a must for Turkey, if you look at developments surrounding the country . . . If a solid religious education is not given [to children] through institutions, there will be no way to control the unorganized and unhealthy religious information that is a source of the radicalization trend around us. (Daloglu 2014; Korkmaz 2014a)

Turkey appealed the ECHR ruling in December 2014 but this appeal was rejected by the ECHR in February 2015 (Ozalp 2015).

Public Religious Schools
The AKP’s government has supported Imam-hatip schools since 2002. But, after 2010, when the AKP was successful in subjugating its opponents, the future of Imam-hatip schools seemed secure, so there has been a surge in Imam-hatip school enrolments not seen since the 1970s. Erdogan showed his commitment to these schools by declaring at a public rally in June 2011 (in response to the CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu’s speech against these schools):

Whether [Kilicdaroglu] wants or not, we opened, we are opening and will open Imam-hatip schools as long as you support us . . . My four children are graduates of Imam-hatip schools, and I am proud of them. (Ozgur 2012, 1)

Not only his children, he himself is an Imam-hatip school graduate and takes pride in them. In 2014, after he had become President, he said:

These schools were unfairly branded as enemies of the state (in 1997) . . . We proved how unfair this treatment was, and now one of them is the president of this country. (Yeginsu 2014)

The number of Imam-hatip secondary schools increased from 1099 in 2012/13 to 1361 in 2013/14, and 1961 in 2015/16. Similarly, the number of Imam-hatip high schools rose from 493 in 2010/11 to 704 in 2012/13, and to 1149 in 2015/16. Many of the normal high schools have also been converted to Imam-hatip schools. Under Erdogan, enrolment in Imam-hatip schools has increased from around 70,000 to 1 million students in 12 years (Gursel 2014; Yinanc 2014; Egitim Sen 2016).
In 2012, the AKP government introduced a new educational system. Critics argued that this change was politically motivated and was introduced to benefit Imam-hatip schools. By limiting the places at secular schools and expanding Imam-hatip schools, Erdogan was accused of trying to create a “devout generation”. However, supporters of Imam-hatip schools have argued that the increase was in response to parents’ demand that their children study in an environment which was safe from drugs, and where good morals and values were taught (Cengiz 2014).

During this period, many Imam-hatip schools have also opened outside Turkey. Furthermore, three international Imam-hatip schools inside Turkey—in Istanbul, Kayseri, and Konya—are educating students from 72 countries (Canturk 2014).

The AKP also abolished the minimum age limit for the Quran courses under the Diyanet in 2011. This limit was imposed under pressure from the military. In 1997, after the coup, parents could not send their children to mosques during summer holidays until the children were 12 years old (Today’s Zaman 2011b). This minimum age limit was removed. As a result, the Diyanet reported that more than 3 million students attended its Quran courses and more than 5 million Qurans were distributed in 2013. These courses were offered at more than 70,000 locations and more than 100,000 tutors were used to provide students with basic knowledge of Islam. Ali Erbas, the head of the Religious Affairs Directorate’s Training Services branch said:

That the age and school grade restriction was lifted and that books were distributed free of charge to the students was received well both by the students and the parents. (OnIslam and News Agencies 2013)

In June 2016, the AKP government created a new Education Foundation (MAVAK) that would be controlled and funded by the state, but would be outside the institutional control of the Education Ministry. Critics have argued that this foundation is a way to bypass the Education Ministry and parliamentary oversight to promote the AKP’s Islamist/nationalist agenda (Dogan 2016).

**Private Religious Education**

The ban on private religious education continues during this period. However, as in the past, private religious institutions continue the illegal provision of religious instruction. As the enforcement of laws remains
relaxed under the AKP, these institutions are operating easily. However, as the state itself is increasingly providing religious instruction, there may be fewer people using these private institutions in future. As previously, there is no funding by the state to such schools. Most of their funds come from private donations.

PAKISTAN: STATE SUPPORT FOR RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

The north-western region of the Indian subcontinent now known as Pakistan was one of the last areas conquered by the British. A few decades later, this region became the foremost recruiting ground for the British Indian Army. This recruitment policy meant that the social and political power of the Punjabi feudals, who were in charge of local recruitment drives, was to be maintained, making local education a low priority for the British. Late conquest and recruitment preference both contributed to a very low literacy rate in Pakistan at the time of independence. It was less than 15 per cent in 1947 (Mahmood 1978).

Since independence, educational opportunities have improved in Pakistan but the growth of literacy has been difficult and slow. The history of the state’s role in education in Pakistan can be gauged by the following quote from a Pakistani scholar:

The history of educational policy-making in Pakistan is one of laments, broken promises and tall claims. Each successive government has blamed the previous government of not being serious and committed to the educational cause of the nation. Each successive government has promised to raise literacy levels to new (often unattainable) heights. Each regime has promised to put in more money and allocate more resources for the education sector. And each successive policy has made loud claims of harmonizing education with the principles of Islam. Yet in real terms education in Pakistan has remained largely underdeveloped both in quantitative as well as in qualitative terms. (Naseem 2004, 20)

Religion was not part of the public school curricula before independence, as the colonial government did not interfere in matters of religion following Queen Victoria’s 1858 proclamation, as discussed in Chapter 6.13 There were missionary schools which were supported by the colonial officials, but these schools were few in number. Despite the absence of religion in the curricula, British education policies in India were socially
conservative. For example, education for girls was not encouraged and, if girls were educated, they were supposed not to work. In 1936, a British president of a university in India criticized the “lucky girls who get a higher education” but then “utilize their education to escape...and do not even bring up their own children”, and argued:

Would it not be possible to make the women’s education of a far more practical kind than it is now, so that no women can obtain any kind of degree or diploma without being really trained for what is bound to be the main occupation of 99% of her sex? (As quoted in Rouse 2006, 15)\(^{14}\)

Religious education was left to the individual communities to finance and administer by the colonial administration. Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and other religious communities managed their own religious education. Madrassas were the main source of Muslim religious education before the arrival of the British but, with no official assistance and no prospects of paid employment, madrassas lost most of their earlier clientele and were largely marginalized (Malik 1996, 122).

**The Late 1940s to Late 1960s**

During this initial era, the Pakistani founding fathers had simultaneously to build a state and a nation (Jalil 1996, 88–9). As Pakistan was not the seat of British Indian administration, the whole state structure had to be built from scratch. Pakistan was also ethnolinguistically and religiously diverse, so all its individual communities had to be moulded into a nation.

Father of the nation and first Governor General Jinnah knew the importance of education for the progress of the new nation and, inaugurating the first education conference just three months after independence, said:

The importance of education and the type of education cannot be over-emphasized...There is no doubt that the future of our State will and must greatly depend upon the type of education we give to our children and the way in which we bring them up as future citizens of Pakistan. (Government of Pakistan 1957, 542)
Jinnah’s concern about education did not begin in 1947. He has been an advocate for education, especially primary education, since at least 1912 and was critical of the paucity of British efforts in this regard (Jalil 1996, 105–6).

As Pakistan had come into existence on the basis of Muslim nationalism, the importance of religion in public education was a topic discussed at Pakistan’s first educational conference. The Education Minister stressed the following three points in this conference:

- Education system should be inspired by Islamic ideology, accentuating Islam’s focus on universal brotherhood, tolerance, and justice;
- Primary education to be free and compulsory for five years and can be coeducational; and
- Technical education to be linked with the national economic needs and the genius of the people. (Government of Pakistan 1957, 542)

During this period, religious education became mandatory in all public schools. Private religious schools (madrassas) also increased in number as affluence allowed more Pakistanis to support them through donations. Islamization of the government, therefore, increased during this period.

The following section debates the Islamization of government in these three areas:

- religious instruction in public schools
- public religious education
- private religious education.

Religious Instruction in Public Schools

Religious instruction in public schools started soon after independence, but the emphasis was on developing good citizens, rather than good Muslims. Islamic education was an instrument to achieve a new generation which could take part in the development of the nation as the following excerpt on the objectives of the first Five Year Plan (1955–60) made clear:

The overall objectives of the first Five Year Plan for education sector included the enrichment of all education to make it pupil-centre and rooted in the spirit of Islam. However, with this emphasis, there was focus on preparing children for a democratic society and vibrant economy. The paragraphs on primary school curricula do not talk about Islam or religious education. In case of
secondary school curricula the emphasis was on social and natural sciences and principles/history of Pakistani culture to develop individual character, righteous living and patriotic citizens who can assist in the economic development of the country. (Government of Pakistan 1957, 544–9)

General Ayub Khan came to power in 1958 with a reformist and modernist agenda. As in other areas, he and his lieutenants were determined to impose their educational vision on society.

General Ayub’s rule was a classic case of the state-rules-the-society model, whereby the regime was consciously committed to providing good government to the people, in view of their perceived ignorance of what is good for them (Waseem 1989, 152 as quoted in; Jalil 1996, 129).

Along with many other government commissions, Ayub Khan also established the Commission on National Education (CNE) after coming to power. While announcing its formation, Ayub Khan said:

A sound system of education is a prerequisite to cementing the shattered fabric of the nation. In fact, proper education is a fundamental need of our own generation as well as of posterity. (As quoted in Jalil 1996, 159)

The CNE presented its report in August 1959. It recommended, among other things, compulsory religious education. This was the first time a government commission recommended compulsory religious education in the primary and middle schools (usually from grade 1 to 8). This was quite similar to what happened in Turkey; a modernizing non-religious authoritarian regime was emphasizing religious education. For secondary school students (usually from grade 9 to grade 12), religious education was to be an optional subject and the CNE recommended that the state should encourage research related to religious studies at university level. To bring religious madrassas into the mainstream, the introduction of non-religious subjects and modern Arabic in their curricula was suggested. The Cabinet approved these recommendations and they became government policy (Malik 1996, 125–6).

The second Five Year Plan (1960–65) also emphasized religious education in the public schools but primary school education, where most religious education was being taught, was given the lowest priority. Primary education’s share of the total expenditure on education, despite
being the base of the education pyramid and low literacy rate, was only 3.6 per cent during the period of the Five Year Plan (Jalil 1996, 166–7). Fixated on economic growth, General Ayub Khan’s government ignored primary education, and prioritized secondary and higher education. This meant fewer funds for the tier where religious education was mandatory.

General Ayub Khan’s regime was toppled by another military coup in 1969 led by General Yahya Khan. The new educational minister, Nur Khan, a retired air marshall, also tried to come up with education reforms. A report on education was presented by the government in 1969. Among other things, the report recommended making religious education mandatory up to grade 10 and affiliating madrassas with normal schools. These proposals were not implemented due to general elections and civil war (Faizi et al. 2012).

Public Religious Schools
There were no public religious schools during this period. During the Ayub Khan era, it was thought that madrassas would gradually become public religious schools, after they implemented the reforms recommended by the 1961 committee. The madrassas were also given some financial incentives to encourage them to implement the reforms. However, madrassas did not accept the government reforms and the financial assistance, and preferred to remain outside the state’s control.

Private Religious Education
In 1947, there were only around 250 madrassas in West Pakistan, educating a negligible proportion of school-aged children. The early Pakistani governments largely ignored madrassas as they were even neglecting the public school system, which should have been their first priority. By 1960, the number of madrassas had gradually increased to 464. Punjab, being the most populous province in West Pakistan, had the largest number of madrassas at 195 (Fair 2008).

Despite the small number of madrassas, General Ayub Khan was conscious of the need for Pakistan to have a uniform national education system and wanted to bring madrassas into the mainstream. He considered the ulema an obstruction to Pakistan’s economic, political, and social progress, and wanted to curtail their influence. So, madrassa reform was to serve two purposes; it was a way to reduce the power of the ulema, and it would also assist in bringing madrassa students into the mainstream and make them part of the effort to nationalize and modernize the country.
General Ayub Khan’s pronouncements and the CNE recommendations made the ulema realize that their autonomy over madrassas was in danger and they united, in the late 1950s, under wafaqs (umbrella organizations or federations) to counter government reforms. Four madrassa wafaqs were formed: Wafaq-ul-Madaris-al Salafia, by Salafi/Wahhabi madrassas in 1955; Wafaq-ul-Madaris-al-Arabia Pakistan, by Hanafi Deobandi madrassas in 1959; Wafaq-ul-Madaris-Shia, by Shiite madrassas in 1959; and Tanzeem-ul-Madaris, by Hanafi Barelvi madrassas in 1960. Later on, Jamaat-e-Islami affiliated madrassas also formed a wafaq, Rabita-ul Madaris Al Islamia, in 1980 (Fair 2008, 58).

As suggested by the CNE, Ayub Khan’s government formed a committee in 1961 to reform the curriculum taught in the madrassas. This committee had the representation of madrassa administrators but they were in the minority. The committee, therefore, supported the mainstreaming and nationalizing objectives of the state. It recommended that, at primary school level, the public school syllabus should be used in madrassas and religious subjects should be taught at the middle and secondary levels. It also recommended that more non-religious subjects be taught at the secondary level and rejected certain subjects taught at madrassas as anachronistic and not required. A Directorate of Religious Education was also proposed to monitor and evaluate standards. Most of these recommendations were never implemented due to a lack of interest from both the government and the madrassas (Malik 1996, 122–8).

The Early 1970s to Late 1990s

This period starts with the loss of half of the country due to the civil war, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. As the Pakistani state tried to rise from the ashes of defeat, the aim of state education changed. In the previous era, the aim of the education system was to develop children’s capabilities not only to make them productive members of the society, but also to nurture a unified Pakistani nation. However, after the 1970s the focus changed and the priority of the education system became a unified Muslim Pakistani nation. For instance, during the previous era the policy-makers were concerned about how to make the madrassa students part of the Pakistani nation, as these students were not studying the standard public school curricula. In this era, the main issue was how to make the public school students good Muslims, as they were not receiving sufficient religious education. Ayub Khan’s government recommended teaching
secular subjects and modern Arabic to madrassa students to bring their education in line with the rest of the populace. Zia-ul-Haq’s government recommended teaching Quranic Arabic to public school students to make them better Muslims and more like madrassa students.

Thus Ayub expected religious educators to have secular and modern knowledge, Zia expected teachers of secular subjects to infuse religion into their teaching at all levels. (Saigol 1995, 432)

Religious education thrived during this era and, as Chapters 5 and 6 have demonstrated, the Islamization of government was its height. The next section discusses the Islamization of government in the following areas:

- religious instruction in public schools
- public religious education
- private religious education.

Religious Instruction in Public Schools

The era of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1972–7) started with a major transformation in public education. He nationalized all private educational institutions in March 1972. Thousands of private educational institutions, including missionary schools and colleges, came under state control; only the madrassas were not nationalized. The stated aim was to end the exploitation of the students and teachers, and to provide affordable education to all. Nationalization greatly enhanced the reach of government policies, as thousands of former private schools were now directly controlled by the federal and provincial governments. The effect of nationalization was particularly significant at the post-secondary level, where private institutions were educating a greater share of children in schools (Jimenez and Tan 1987).

Common curriculum was adopted nationwide that created the national harmony and integrity and lessened the disruption and provincialism at least in the field of education. With the rise in the investment on education by the government the improvement in the literacy rate appeared. The parents and students who had to bear heavy dues could easily bear the expenditures of
education. The uniform system of education was implemented where all students were acquiring same education. (Hussain and Haroon 2014)

Bhutto made Islamiat (or Islamiyat)\textsuperscript{19} compulsory from grades 1 to 10. Thus, two additional years of mandatory religious instruction were added to the public school curricula. However, this was not the most important change. The transformation that the New Education Policy, 1972, under Bhutto brought was adding Islam to the teaching of secular subjects.

It will also be ensured that the study of Islamiyat does not remain an isolated item in the school curriculum but that the values and the spirit of Islam are woven into the entire warp and woof of our educational fabric. (Saigol 1995, 471)

Under this policy, curricula were re-organized and history, civics, and other subjects were also Islamized or altered in view of the (Islamic) ideology of Pakistan (Malik 1996, 129). Another change was the teaching of Arabic. The 1973 Constitution asked the state to facilitate learning of Arabic. Therefore, Arabic was introduced as an optional subject in the middle school (grade 6 to grade 8) in 1975. The government also signed agreements with Arab governments and organizations for assistance, in the form of both human and financial resources, for teaching Arabic. (Rahman 2000)

General Zia-ul-Haq (1977–88), who used Islam to legitimize his coup, went one step further and made Islamiat mandatory until graduate level. While for Bhutto, Islamization was a side dish, for Zia-ul-Haq, it was the entree.

Soon after his coup in 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq called a national education conference, the goals and objectives of which were “to redefine the aims of education, choose basic strategies, ascertain the main problems in education confronting the nation, and to bring education in line with Pakistani faith and ideology”. The direction [given], again, was clear. General Zia said in his inaugural speech: “Our curriculum must ensure that our children are brought up educated as good Pakistanis and good Muslims. They must imbibe the lofty ideals and principles of Islam. (Nayyar and Salim 2005, 3)

In 1978, Zia-ul-Haq also made Arabic mandatory for middle school students and, in 1982, for high school students (grade 6 to grade 8).
The aim of the policy was to help Muslims better understand the basic texts of Islam. Another change was to award extra credit to a student who had memorized the whole Quran, thus giving them an advantage over other students in admission to universities and professional (medical and engineering) colleges (Rahman 2000; Shah 2012). Under General Zia-ul-Haq, schools also started having competitions in Quran/Qirat (Quran reciting) and Na’at (songs in praise of the Prophet Muhammad). The month of Ramazan and Milad (the celebration of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday) also became events in the schools’ annual calendar.

Zia-ul-Haq also reversed the nationalization policy and gave back hundreds of educational institutions to the previous owners. His government’s lack of investment in the public schools led to a mushrooming of private schools, first in the urban areas and, later, in the rural areas. Especially in the 1990s, the growth of private schools was unprecedented. This transformed the educational landscape of Pakistan. In the developed world and many developing countries (such as Turkey), almost all children go to public schools; private schools cater to a very small segment of the school-age population. This was not the case in Pakistan. By the end of the century, around 20 per cent of primary school-aged children were attending private schools. Private schools had grown from approximately 3300 in 1983 to 32,000 in 2000 (Andrabi et al. 2002).

This transformation meant that the government did not have full control over what was being taught to a significant portion of the school-aged population. Though private school generally followed the government curricula, they were business ventures. So, changes that cost money but were not very important to their clientele (parents) were not implemented. One example of such a change was the mandatory introduction of Arabic required by the government during this era. Most of the private schools ignored the government’s instructions (Rahman 2000). However, changes that were valued by the parents and for which parents were willing to pay were introduced, such as course books published by international publishers; for example, the Oxford University Press.

After Zia-ul-Haq, from 1988 to 1999 there was not much increase in religious instruction in public schools and colleges. Although the Enforcement of Shariah Act, 1991 called for further Islamization of education, it was largely ignored and did not have any tangible results.

By 1998, it was clear that, while most private schools and many public schools were teaching Islamiat, they simply disregarded the requirement
to teach Arabic imposed under Zia-ul-Haq. Therefore, to force schools to start teaching Arabic, Nawaz Sharif’s second government (1997–99) directed all schools to certify that children were being taught Arabic. However, before the implementation of this order, Sharif’s government was toppled by General Musharraf (Rahman 2000; Faizi et al. 2012).

Public Religious Schools
There were no public religious schools from the 1970s to 1990s. However, an Islamic university was established in Islamabad with the assistance of Saudi Arabia in 1980. This university still receives funding from Saudi sources and always has a pro-chancellor nominated by Saudi Arabia. The education in this university is not limited to Islamic subjects and the university has nine different faculties, including engineering, management, and social science faculties (International Islamic University 2015).

In the early years of Zia-ul-Haq, the Council of Islamic Ideology, the premier constitutional body relating to Islamic laws, suggested that model madrassas be established. The Council requested that the federal government ask each of the four provincial governments to establish model madrassas in view of the intransigence of the ulema and their aversion to madrassa reform (as will be shown in the next section). The Council passed a unanimous resolution and sent it to the government:

The Council pays homage to the government for her efforts for bringing close the modern and classic religious educational institutions. The first example of such efforts is the setting up of international Islamic University at Islamabad . . . The Council realizes the phenomena of shortage of qualified, trained and right for job persons as required for and the key reason for this shortage is the insistence of Madaris authorities on clinging to the centuries old version of curriculum and they do not seem to be cooperative in this regard. Therefore, the Council recommends that provincial governments should establish one Model Madrasah in their jurisdiction, where the system of education as well as syllabus, both should be exemplified through integration of Modern and Classic religious versions. These Madaris should serve as model to other Madaris in order to incite them to modify their system and syllabus as per requirements of present day.

However, no action on this request was taken by the government (Muhammad et al. 2012).
Private Religious Education

This era saw massive growth in the number of madrassas. Accurate data from the 1970s is not available; however, the growth from 1980 to 2000 was around 230 per cent, from 2056 madrassas in 1980 to 6741 madrassas in 2000. The provinces of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (bordering Afghanistan) had the largest share of madrassas. Punjab had 3153 madrassas (47 per cent), while Khyber Pakhtunkhwa had 1281 madrassas (20 per cent) (Fair 2008).

When Bhutto’s government nationalized all education institutions, madrassas were the only institutions that escaped this policy as a group. Initially, the government’s policy towards madrassas was benign neglect. But, after 1975, madrassas saw a policy change which was either an attempt to mainstream madrassas (as Ayub had tried previously), or a way to placate and co-opt Islamists. First, the government asked the Council of Islamic Ideology to prepare a comprehensive report on Islamic education in Pakistan in 1975. Also in 1975, the National Assembly partially approved a long-standing demand by madrassas that their academic certificates/degrees be accepted as equivalent to standard educational qualifications. Subsequently, in 1976, the Ministry of Education recognized registered madrassas’ Isnads (madrassa certificates/degrees) of 14 years of education and made them equivalent to a graduate degree. However, lesser certificates (for example, a certificate of equivalence of high school for 12 years of madrassa education) were not recognized by the Ministry of Education (Malik 1996, 128–9).

Under General Zia-ul-Haq, the National Committee for Dini Madaris (“Deeni” means “religious” and “madaris” is the plural of “madrassa” in Urdu) was established in 1979 to improve madrassa education and to make madrassas part of the national education system. It had a large representation of ulema. The report of this committee (called the Halepota Committee, after its chairman) praised the role of madrassas in society and promised no state control. However, to mainstream madrassas it also recommended more non-religious courses and a National Institute of Dini Madaris to conduct examinations of madrassa students to allow the government to equate their madrassa education with the regular education taught in public schools. It also advised the government to ameliorate the financial problems of madrassas, which provide free education and lodging to poor. The committee suggested the endowment of property to madrassas, as well as financial aid to buy books, furniture, and teaching aids. However, the report was rejected by the madrassas, as they did not want any interference from government in their affairs.
Despite this, during Zia-ul-Haq’s rule, madrassas obtained two legal benefits that they still enjoy. First, their isnad for 16 years of education was accepted as equivalent to a Master’s degree in Arabic or Islamic Studies. Second, with the Zakat system in place, madrassas became the recipient of government-collected Zakat funds. The Quran is specific about who should receive Zakat funds and madrassas are not included in the list. This issue was resolved by giving Zakat funds to madrassas in the name of students who were the most needy and poor; thus, they could be beneficiaries of Zakat funds (Malik 1996, 132–45).

However, what really changed the life of madrassa owners and leaders, especially those in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Tribal Areas, was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Soon Pakistani, Saudi, and the American governments decided to use madrassas to socialize and train Afghans, Pakistanis, and other Muslims to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. This decision gave madrassas access to millions of dollars coming from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and the USA, besides military training and weapons.

After Zia-ul-Haq, political instability, one of whose causes was the mullah–military alliance that did not want the democratic governments to succeed, meant there were no new initiatives to mainstream madrassas. The state assistance to madrassas through Zakat funds continued. The increase in the number of madrassas and students also continued. However, there are wide disagreements about the increase in the number of madrassas during this era. Estimates range from a few thousand to 30,000. Of the more reliable estimates, Fair (2008) considers 6700 madrassas in 2000 as close to reality, but Rahman (2004) estimates around 10,000 madrassas in 2002.

1999 Onwards

This era started with a military takeover by the more secular General Musharraf. In the first few months in office, as mentioned, he showed his inclination to the West by praising Ataturk, posing with his dogs, and criticizing General Zia-ul-Haq’s and former Prime Minister Sharif’s efforts at Islamization. Two years later, in 2001, the 9/11 attacks occurred and Pakistan became a frontline state in the war on terror. Everything happening in Pakistan, especially related to Islam, came into sharper focus and became worthy of an international audience. Pakistan’s madrassas were particularly scrutinized, as many of the Taliban leaders were known to have studied in these madrassas, a fact that was not denied by Pakistan. Many Pakistani experts also publicized the notion of madrassas as
“universities of jihad” (Haqqani 2002). Not surprisingly, the 9/11 Commission Report linked the Pakistan education system to terrorism and declared it a “particular concern” for the USA:

Poor education is a particular concern. Millions of families, especially those with little money, send their children to religious schools, or madrassahs. Many of these schools are the only opportunity available for an education, but some have been used as incubators for violent extremism. (9/11 Commission 2004, 367)

However, this link between madrassa education and extremism and violence was not limited to Pakistan. Though madrassa education in Pakistan was of specific interest, madrassa education worldwide was linked with violence, as the 9/11 report quotes the Defense Secretary asking his advisors:

Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us? (9/11 Commission 2004, 374)

The next section analyzes the Islamization of government in the following three areas during this period (1999 onwards):

- religious instruction in public schools
- public religious education
- private religious education.

Religious Instruction in Public Schools
After 9/11, implementing reforms relating to religious instruction in schools has become very difficult. Reforms are now seen as ways to promote the West’s agenda. Islamists are happy to link all changes to the West, thus delegitimizing these changes in the eyes of most Pakistanis. Successive Pakistani governments have tried to walk a fine line. They have not tried to decrease the number of hours of religious instruction, as that has been more difficult to defend. They have, however, tried to change the curricula to make it more diversity-friendly and tolerant. The National Education Policy, 2009, informed:

Pakistan is currently engaged in the process of reviewing, updating and reforming school curriculum from Early Childhood Education up to Higher Secondary School levels keeping in view the Islamic teachings and
ideology of Pakistan, cultural and religious sensitivities in the country and modern emerging trends to make the whole education purposeful and to create a just civil society that respects diversity of views, beliefs and faiths. (Ministry of Education 2009)

These efforts have, however, encountered strong resistance and have been only marginally successful.

Public Religious Schools
There was an attempt by General Musharraf to establish public religious schools (model madrassas) in 2001. Significantly, this attempt was conceived before 9/11, thus refuting the ulema’s claim that all the efforts of Musharraf’s government to implement madrassa reform were due to Western pressure after 9/11. The Pakistan Madrassahs Education (Establishment and Affiliation of Model Deeni Madaris) Board Ordinance was promulgated on 18 August 2001. Under this Ordinance, three model madrassas were to be established. Madrassas for boys were to be established in Karachi and Sukkur, while one madrassa for girls was to be established in Islamabad. There were also plans to establish model madrassas in each district of Pakistan, together with a madrassa board to oversee their curricula and examination. However, this plan was not implemented (Muhammad et al. 2012). Later, in 2011, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial government tried to establish a model madrassa in Peshawar but, again, the plan was not realized (Express Tribune 2011).

In April 2014, the Minister of Religious Affairs, Sardar Yousaf, visited Turkey to study the Turkish Imam-hatip schools. The head of the Diyanet, Dr Mehmet Gormez, offered to open an Imam-hatip school in Pakistan. Minister Sardar Yousaf thanked him for the offer but did not immediately accept it. After the Peshawar school massacre, the National Action Plan emphasized madrassa reform, so there has been a renewed interest. In February 2015, a team from the Diyanet came to Pakistan; it was agreed that Turkey would help Pakistan establish Imam-hatip schools, and that the first school would be built in Islamabad. Twenty-two Pakistani were already studying in Imam-hatip schools in Turkey in 2015 (Flare 2014; Daily Times 2015). Unfortunately, two years later, Imam-Hatip schools in Pakistan had still not progressed beyond a concept. In December 2016, Dr Mehmet Gormez, President Religious Affairs of Turkey, visited Pakistan and there was again much appreciation for
establishing Imam-hatip schools but, as mentioned, the odds are against it (The News 2016).

Private Religious Education
In Pakistan, the number of madrassas has continued to increase in the twenty-first century, even though madrassas and their financial donors have come under increasing scrutiny. According to Zaidi (2013), more than 27,000 madrassas have been registered with various wafaqs. This seems to be a massive increase from around 7000 madrassas in 2000 (Fair 2008, 50) or 10,000 madrassas in 2002 (Rahman 2004). Compared with the data from Rahman (2004), the growth in individual wafaqs is as follows: in 2013, the Tanzeem-ul-Madaris had around 8000 madrassas, a 400 per cent increase. The Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Arabia had around 16,800 madrassas, an increase of 140 per cent. The Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Salafia had 1400 madrassas affiliated to it, an increase of more than 270 per cent. The Rabita ul-Madaris al-Islamia had 1000 madrassas affiliated to it, an increase of 100 per cent. Only the Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Shia did not experience growth.

It seems strange that the madrassas multiplied at a faster pace in one decade when the government was actively discouraging them compared with the preceding three decades when the government was encouraging them. These massive increases have become even more questionable, if one considers that, based on the latest educational census in 2005/6, madrassa growth has tapered off (Khwaja 2009).

To understand this anomaly, one has to understand the diverse incentives to different wafaqs related to reporting the number of madrassas registered with their wafaq. A common incentive to all wafaqs is to exaggerate the number of madrassas registered with them. A higher number increases their power in relation to the state as well as with regard to other wafaqs. With more madrassas, a wafaq can demand more concessions and concede less to the state or to other wafaqs. Moreover, with increasing restrictions on madrassa activity, it is advantageous to register small maktabs as madrassas so as to have the opportunity to expand them later. However, notwithstanding the above discussion, the total number of madrassas is increasing in Pakistan.

The efforts at madrassa reform by various governments have largely failed, as explained in Chapter 6, on the Ministry of Religious Affairs. General Musharraf tried a number of different ordinances and incentives but he was mistrusted by the madrassa wafaqs. After him, democratic governments largely ignored madrassa reform, except for an accord in
The lack of interest in madrassa reform may be explained by:

- Lack of external pressure: In 2011, USA–Pakistan relations deteriorated and did not recover until 2013. By then, the US withdrawal from Afghanistan was close, so pressure from the USA for madrassa reform had reduced. Another reason for the decrease in Western pressure may be linked to a series of influential studies that exposed the madrassa myth—the notion that madrassas are the main source of militancy and terrorism (Bergen and Pandey 2006; Fair 2008, 4–6; Khwaja 2009); and

- The fear of the mullah–military alliance: The mullah–military alliance had conspired against democratic governments since the 1970s. It is, therefore, difficult for democratic governments to act against madrasas without thinking about the backlash from madrassas, supported, overtly or covertly, by the Pakistani military.

After the Peshawar school massacre, madrassa reform has again become important. It was a significant component of the National Action Plan, issued by the government after the massacre, to defeat terrorism. A committee was established under the Minister of the Interior in January 2015 to renew efforts to register and regulate madrassas, and to stop foreign funding to the madrassas. An interesting change was the recent criticism of Saudi Arabia by a federal minister for funding radical madrasas, probably the first such criticism. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, initial prospects of reform are not promising, as madrassas have again rejected any control or interference by government in their affairs (Kohli 2015; Gishkori 2015b).

**Conclusion**

As is clear from this discussion, the public education system in Turkey and Pakistan has not received equivalent focus and attention. In Turkey, starting with Ataturk, public education was considered crucial for the survival of the Republican regime. As with many other national (revolutionary) regimes that considered gradual evolutionary societal progress unacceptable and wanted to transform their societies, public K-12 education was a priority area for Ataturk. The immense focus on public education in Turkey was similar to what was seen in many communist countries; regimes in these countries also wanted not
simply to educate an individual, but to create a new individual (King 2012, 1–20). This emphasis resulted in the development of a comprehensive public education system in Turkey. In contrast, the Pakistani elite did not have such grandiose aims, and the Kashmir war and subsequent perceived threat from India meant that defence expenditures took the lion’s share of the budget, leaving little money for other areas. Education, particularly primary education, never became a priority and so the public education system in Pakistan is still ineffective. This has led to the opening of thousands of private schools which cater to the demands of different sections of society.

As in Chapters 5 and 6, one can see evidence of a sharp decrease in the Islamization of government in the early Republican period in Turkey. Education was almost completely secularized, as religious education was scrapped from the schools. By the early 1930s, all kinds of religious education were discontinued and all religious schools (both public and private) were abolished. Moreover, co-education was introduced at all levels. From the early 1950s, due to a number of reasons, there was a policy change and religious education, and thereby the Islamization of government, made a comeback. Religious education was made “virtually compulsory” and, gradually, the number of hours of religious education was increased (Eligur 2010, 57). Private religious education also flourished despite a ban and, by the 1970s, public religious (Imam-hatip) schools were educating thousands of students.

In the third phase, starting in the 1980s, the Islamization of education continued unabated, except for a brief period after the 1997 coup when the military unsuccessfully tried to undo the gains made in the preceding four decades. Religious instruction in schools became a constitutional requirement in 1982 and there was a gradual increase in the number of hours of religious education, both at primary and secondary school level. Imam-hatip schools and the Quran schools expanded; this period also saw the establishment of Imam-hatip schools for girls. Private religious schools also increased their clientele.

In the current period (2010 onwards), the Islamization of education is growing as the number of mandatory hours of religious education in schools and the optional religious courses continues to rise. Imam-hatip schools have also seen unprecedented growth in this period. Although in time it may prove to be a false dawn, the current era seems to be exceptional for the Islamization of government in Turkey.

In Pakistan, the education system also followed the pattern of the Islamization of government, as seen in Chapters 5 and 6. In the first
period, religious education was made mandatory. This formed the basis of a further massive increase in the second period. In the current period, there has been a policy reversal and religious education, and thereby the Islamization of government, is gradually decreasing.

One can observe an increase in the Islamization of government in the early period after independence as governments made religious education mandatory and, later, increased the number of hours of mandatory religious education in public schools. There was also an increase in the number of madrassas.

In the second period, starting with the 1970s, the pace of the Islamization of government increased significantly. In terms of an increase in the number of madrassas, as well as in the hours of compulsory religious education and the state funding for religious education (public and private), this period saw an extraordinary increase in the Islamization of government. An international Islamic university was also established in this period.

The current period has seen some decrease in the Islamization of government. The growth in the number of madrassas and their funding has diminished due to a decrease in available Zakat funds and the government’s restrictions on foreign funding of these institutions. In public schools, there is also less emphasis on the study of Islamiat and Arabic, although Islamiat is still compulsory until graduation. A massive increase in the number of private schools, even for poor, has helped the trend in decreasing the Islamization of government. Private schools are usually co-educational and often use books prepared by foreign publishers (for instance, from Singapore and the United Kingdom), and follow state curricula only when required. These books present concepts in a secular way and, thus, millions of students have received limited religious education as compared with their counterparts in the preceding Pakistani generations.

In Chapters 5 and 6 and in this chapter, three indicators of the Islamization of government (family law, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, and education) have been analyzed. Generally, the increase and decrease in the Islamization of government have followed the same pattern of ebb and flow of Islam’s role in state nationalism, as seen in Chapters 2–4. In the case of Turkey, history was divided into four phases, with both Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government decreasing in the first phase and then increasing in the next three phases, with the pace intensifying in each subsequent phase. In the case of Pakistan, history was divided into three phases. Both Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government increased in the first phase. This increase was followed by an even greater increase in both variables...
in the second phase. In the current phase, for the first time in Pakistan’s history, there has been a gradual decrease in both these variables.

In Chapter 8, the argument and evidence presented in Chapters 2–7 will be summarized, and the causal inference between Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government will be highlighted.

NOTES

2. The education structure in the early twentieth century was three years of elementary education (ibtidaiye), three years of lower secondary education (rusdiye), three years of higher secondary education (idadiye) schools and three years of tertiary education (sultaniye) (Landau 1984, 189).
3. The Quran courses, administered by the state, were not banned, but their number was also strictly limited.
4. This is a very famous statement made by Ataturk and its first part is now engraved on the main building of Ankara University.
5. The imam is the one who leads prayers. In Arabic, Khatib, from which hatip emerged, is the one who delivers the sermon, usually the Friday sermon. So, these schools were for leaders of prayers and preachers.
6. Later on, his students/followers also started teaching the Quran and a large network of schools was born. These schools are referred as Suleymançilar schools and they operate both inside and outside Turkey.
7. The MSP and Erbakan were banned from politics after the 1980 coup. In 1983, when restrictions on political activity were removed, Erbakan organized the Refah (Welfare) Party. He assumed the leadership formally in 1987, when he was allowed to be politically active. The Refah Party won the 1996 election and Erbakan became Prime Minister, but was forced to resign in 1997 by the Turkish military.
8. Seerat is the study of the life of the Prophet Muhammad.
9. Other sects or schools of thought of Islam are covered briefly or ignored. Alevi, who comprise between 15 and 25 per cent of the Turkish Muslim population, are also forced to study Sunni Islam, which many of them deeply resent.
10. Alevi are a sect considered heterodox by many Sunni Turks.
11. Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey
12. After a Supreme Council for Education decision in July 1990, it was possible for the children of Turkish Jews and Christians to be exempted from religious and ethics lessons. Children of Turks belonging to other religions (such as Buddhism), or those with no religion, are not exempt from religious classes (ECHR 2007).
13. However, it did not mean religion, particularly the religion of the rulers, was completely absent from schools. British educators used literature and other subjects to teach the message of Christianity (Langohr 2005).

14. The evidence of conservative views of British colonial officials about the education of women is also available from the Middle East. In 1920, Miss Gertrude Bell—the Oriental Secretary to the Civil Commissioner in Iraq—said in a speech at the opening of a girls’ school in Baghdad that the aim of the school was not to produce politically or economically active women but, instead, to create proper mothers (Efrati 2012, 100).

15. It is important to note the qualities of Islam emphasized by the education minister.

16. He established 33 different commissions and committees to recommend changes in different sectors (Jalil 1996, 119).

17. Nur Khan was a former Pakistan Air Force Chief and was also a member of new President’s Council of Administration in 1969.

18. These two groups predominantly supported and voted for Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the 1970 elections.

19. The subject was also called deeniyat. Non-Muslim students could choose to study ethics, but teachers of ethics were usually not available and non-Muslims invariably had to study Islamiat.

20. The current president of the International Islamic University, Prof. Dr Ahmed Yousif Ahmed Al Draiweesh, is a Saudi scholar.

21. In Pakistan, until recently, graduating with a degree (except for engineering, law and medicine) required only 14 years of schooling.

22. The only condition was that the madrassa issuing the isnad must be registered with a wafāq. For the degree to apply in any other profession, madrassa graduates had to pass two other graduate-level subject examinations.

23. Zakat can only be spent for the following purposes: to help the poor, to help the needy, to pay Zakat administrators, to help those whose hearts are to be reconciled (such as new Muslims), to free slaves and captives, to help those in debt, to assist the cause of Allah, and to help the needy traveller.

24. Districts are administrative and geographical sub-divisions of provinces. Pakistan has around 140 districts.

25. Small irregular religious tuition centres, mostly attached with the local mosques, with few students.

26. According to the National Education Policy, 2009, a Madrassah Education Authority was planned by the Ministry of the Interior but it was established (Ministry of Education 2009).

27. Although Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism and the Islamization of government has increased in the present period, these are still early days. Hence, the jury is still out and future developments may change the observations made here about this period.
Chapters 2–7 gave a detailed examination of Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of the governments of Pakistan and Turkey. The two very different cases of Pakistan and Turkey were chosen to test the following hypothesis: Islam’s role in state nationalism is one of the most important causes of the Islamization of government.

The Islamization of a government is a multi-faceted phenomenon. Its multiple forms and aspects have made it difficult for scholars to agree on one definition. Unsurprisingly, explaining or predicting the Islamization of government has also been challenging. As discussed in Chapter 1, in the academic literature, the Islamization of government is mostly considered either the result of dictators’ need for legitimacy, or the consequence of pressure by the Islamist movements. While these two causes are helpful to understand the phenomenon in certain individual countries, once one moves to a higher level of abstraction, the explanations fall short. Some dictators in the MMCs do use the Islamization of government as a way to increase their legitimacy, but others do not. Similarly, the presence of strong Islamist movements and parties sometimes leads to more Islamization of government but, on many occasions, it does not. This book intends to show that Islam’s role in state nationalism is one of the main causes of the Islamization of government in Pakistan and Turkey.

As explained in Chapter 1, to demonstrate the causal inference, the following four requirements had to be fulfilled:
To ascertain the causal inference between Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government in Turkey and Pakistan, the following section examines all these requirements. The first two requirements will be discussed together.

**Co-variation and Granger Causality Condition**

The first two requirements to establish a causal inference between two variables are demonstrating a correlation and an appropriate time order—that is, changes in the independent variable must come prior to the correlating changes in the dependent variable. The following discussion shows that, during different eras in both Turkish and Pakistani history, Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government increased and decreased together. Moreover, change in Islam’s role in state nationalism often occurred before the change in the Islamization of government. Turkey’s case will be discussed first and Pakistan’s case will be examined later.

**Turkey**

Turkish history was divided into four periods in terms of major changes in Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government:

- the early 1920s to mid-1940s
- the late 1940s to late 1970s
- the early 1980s to late 2000s
- 2010 onwards.

In all four periods, Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government co-vary, and changes in Islam’s role in state nationalism often happen before changes in the Islamization of government. This fulfils the first two requirements of causal inference between the two variables. In the first period, Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government decreased and, in the
subsequent period, there was a modest increase in both of them. In the last two periods, there is a clear and distinct increase in both of them.

**The Early 1920s to Mid-1940s**

During this period, Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism and the Islamization of government declined sharply. The Ottoman state had claimed to be a caliphate, highlighting its Islamic foundations. The new Turkish Republic rejected the religious basis of the state and promoted mostly an ethnolinguistic state nationalism. The criticality of Turkish language and ethnicity to the Turkish nationhood was emphasized in a number of ways.

In Chapter 2, the decreasing role of Islam in state nationalism was seen in the minimal role that Islam played in the 1921 Constitution. After initially declaring Islam the state religion, the 1924 Constitution also went the same way. All religious references, including to Islam as the state religion, were eliminated from the Constitution in 1928 and Turkey was declared a secular state in 1937.

Turkish national symbols also reflected the diminishing role of Islam in state nationalism. The Ottoman emblem was rejected and a small city (Ankara) was preferred over the imperial, but Islamic, Istanbul. The new presidential flag, adopted in 1922, clearly prioritized ethnolinguistic nationalism. Images on banknotes during this era also depicted few religious buildings and symbols. The War of Independence, Turkish ethnicity, and Ankara were the most popular motifs on banknotes in this era. The grey wolf, a symbol of Turkish ethnicity, appeared twice and the Citadel of Ankara, a magnificent remnant of the pre-Islamic era, was chosen to appear on Turkish banknotes five times.

With the decrease in Islam’s role in state nationalism, a decrease in the Islamization of government was also witnessed, with a time lag. Family law based on Shariah was discarded and the TCC, based on the Swiss Civil Code, was adopted in 1926. The Unification of Education law (1924) banned private religious education and the later government ended all forms of religious education in schools. The Ministry of Religious Affairs lost influence. Initially, it was demoted and, instead of being a separate ministry, it became a directorate, the Diyanet. Then, the Diyanet also gradually lost its limited influence. Its budget was decreased and most of its personnel were transferred to another department in 1931.
The Late 1940s to Late 1970s

In this period, hostility toward Islam in official circles declined. There was a realization that the policy to suppress Islam had failed and focus shifted from ignoring or belittling it to controlling it. The Turks had not rejected Islam, despite the state’s efforts and the increase in education. The ruling elite decided to control Islam by teaching a republican, “enlightened” Islam, rather than eliminating Islam (Agai 2007, 152).

During this era, therefore, the Turkish elite saw Islam as both an object of fear and an object of utility. Islam’s role in state nationalism saw a minimal increase. Between the late 1940s and 1970s, the adoption of Ottoman personalities and history by the state allowed the state elite to accept some religious symbolism, without damaging their hallowed principle of secularism (Deringil 1993). The appearance of Ottoman themes, however, and not purely Islamic themes, demonstrates that although Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism was slowly growing, it was still not considered a completely legitimate feature.

In Turkish constitutional history, the first major change in this era was the rejection of the 1945 version of the Constitution and the revival of the original version of the 1924 Constitution (which was in Ottoman Turkish, with many Persian and Arabic words). By rejecting the Turkified version, Turkish parliamentarians enacted a policy reversal and demonstrated a small revival of Ottoman/Islamic symbolism (Gurcaglar 2008, 87–8). In the 1961 Constitution, Turkey remained a secular republic and there was no mention of Islam, but there was, again, a slight upturn in Islam’s role. The Diyanet was considered important enough to become a constitutional body and the state accepted the necessity for religious education.

Changes in the national symbols also indicated a minor increase in Islam’s role in state nationalism in the form of the return of Ottoman and Seljuk symbols. The state accepted the need of a national mosque in Ankara in the mid-1940s. The official celebrations of the five hundredth anniversary of the Istanbul conquest and the nine hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Manzikert demonstrated the increasing linkage between Islam and the Turks. Finally, in this period, for the first time since the establishment of the Republic, one could also see the appearance of images of Ottoman buildings on Turkish banknotes. During this period, seven images related to the Ottomans were depicted on the banknotes.

As in the case of the previous period, the variations in Islam’s role in state nationalism in Turkey frequently occurred prior to the changes in the Islamization of government. In education, there were many changes that
showed an increase in the Islamization of government. Not only religious education was revived in public schools, but also private religious education, although still legally banned, was allowed to flourish informally. Later, in the 1950s, public religious schools were also revived and religious education was made effectively mandatory in public schools. The influence of the Diyanet also increased during this era. In March 1950, a new Diyanet law was passed which returned the administration of mosques and prayer leaders to the Diyanet and expanded it to include new personnel and departments. In 1965, a new law further expanded the Diyanet’s sphere of influence. However, Turkish family law remained free of Islamization during this era.

The Early 1980s to Late 2000s
During this period, the role of Islam in Turkish state nationalism surged appreciably and, for the first time since the early years of the Republic, Islam became an accepted part of Turkish nationalism at state level. Commonly referred to as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, this combination of Turkish state nationalism and Islam can be seen in the 1982 Constitution, which made religious education compulsory and declared “national solidarity and integrity” as one of the responsibilities of the Diyanet, thereby sanctioning Islam’s role in state nationalism.

Changes in Turkish national symbols also illustrate this move towards a greater role for Islam. After the 1980 coup, the entire national anthem, with all its Islamic symbolism, was put in every Turkish classroom, along with Ataturk’s picture and his address to the youth. In 1986, for the first time and 50 years after his death, official ceremonies were held to commemorate the national anthem’s poet Mehmet Ersoy, a critic of Ataturk’s secularization. In 1988, a national icon, the second bridge on the Bosphorus was named after an Ottoman sultan, Fatih Sultan Mehmet. Later, the emblem of Ankara, the capital city and once a symbol of the secularist state, was changed to include the Kocatepe mosque (although secularists kept fighting for its reversion to Hittite Sun). Banknotes also reflected Islam’s growing acceptability, with depictions of personalities linked with Islam and also a mosque. Ersoy, Mevlana Rumi, and Fatih Sultan appeared on the banknotes in the 1980s and 1990s.

At the start of this period, Islamization expanded rapidly, but then it suffered a setback due to the 1997 coup before gradually regaining its momentum in the late 2000s. In education, private religious education
flourished. Public religious schools continued to expand. There were also more mandatory hours of religious education in the public schools. The Diyanet continued to expand its role, the number of employees, and its budget. The Diyanet’s Quran courses became very popular and, for the first time, it expanded its role to other countries. Turkish family law, however, showed no traces of Islamization. It was reformed comprehensively during this period and a new law was promulgated in 2002, but religious influence was absent, as was the case in the previous law promulgated in 1926. The reason might be pressure from the EU and the women non-governmental organizations.

2010 Onwards
It appears that the trend towards a growing role for Islam in Turkish state nationalism will continue in the present era, but it is too early to draw any definite conclusions. Most of the evidence points towards less emphasis on secularism in the next Constitution, whenever it is promulgated, as the AKP and President Erdogan are becoming more and more powerful. The constitutional referendum of 2010 ended the stronghold of the secular judiciary on the Constitutional Court and reduced the power of the secular Turkish military (Hill 2010). Although the amendments proposed in the Constitutional referendum 2017 do not disturb the ascendancy of secularism in the Constitution, once the presidential system is introduced, President Erdogan will have control over all state institutions and the opposition will have few powers to stop the President from getting his way while negotiating the new Constitution.

Changes in national symbols also show the emergent role of Islam in Turkish state nationalism. Mayor Gokcek is busy creating Islamic and Ottoman urban spaces in Ankara, the modernistic capital built under Ataturk, reclaiming the symbol of Turkey for the AKP’s devout constituency. Another symbolic change was the building of a large and prominent mosque in the new presidential palace, previously a bastion of secularism. Since no new emission of banknotes has been released since 2010, this indicator cannot be used for estimating Islam’s role in state nationalism.

The pace of the Islamization of government has also increased as restrictions on the AKP’s power have been whittled away. The ban on private religious education has been relaxed. Imam-hatip schools have continued to expand and religious education in public schools has been increased. The Diyanet influence has expanded rapidly. It has now around 150,000 employees and a budget that is larger than many ministries. Its administrative stature has also been raised by
Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu. The 2002 family law continues to be resistant to the dominant trend of the Islamization of government, despite pronouncements by President Erdogan that could be seen as threats to this legislation and some administrative measures by the AKP government to deny abortion services in public hospitals. Will the Islamization of government continue and will the next target be family law? It is too early to tell, as it is the start of a new period. If Islam’s role in state nationalism continued to increase, family law may also be changed to be closer to traditional Islamic precepts.

**Pakistan**

Pakistan’s history can be divided into three periods in terms of major variations in Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government:

- the late 1940s to late 1960s
- the early 1970s to late 1990s
- 1999 onwards.

In all three periods, Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government co-vary and changes in the Islamization of government usually materialized after the changes in Islam’s role in state nationalism. In the first two periods, Islam’s role in Pakistani state nationalism and the Islamization of government increased and, in the last period, they decreased. This fulfills the first two conditions of determining a causal inference between Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government.

**The Late 1940s to Late 1960s**

Pakistan came into existence on the basis of Muslim nationalism. The main identity marker was religion, not ethnicity or language as was the case for many other post-colonial nations. Therefore, the initial period of Pakistan’s history showed an increase in Islam’s role in Pakistan’s state nationalism. However, due to the mostly irreligious elite’s opposition to a larger role for Islam, the upsurge of Islam’s role in state nationalism was slow in the initial period.

In comparison with the British India Act, 1935, that served as Pakistan’s Constitution for the first nine years, both the 1956 and 1962
Constitutions were Islamic-oriented. The Objectives Resolution, with its many Islamic references, was passed in 1949 and has been the preamble to all three Pakistani constitutions. Constitution framers also decided that the name of the country was to be the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and that the head of the state was to be a Muslim.

National symbols also demonstrated the religious aspect of Pakistani state nationalism. The national flag had religious symbolism in the form of a crescent and star on a green background and the national anthem had religious undertones. Banknotes also showed the influence of Islam. The crescent and star appeared four times and mosques twice on a total of 13 banknotes issued during this period. As in the case of Turkey, changes in Islam’s role in state nationalism preceded changes in the Islamization of government.

The Islamization of the Pakistani state started slowly. Religious education in public schools was made compulsory but there were no public religious educational institutions and private madrassas were few and not supported by the state. With respect to family law, in the late 1940s and 1950s there was a movement towards adopting the Shariah law of inheritance. One after another, most of the provinces adopted the Shariah law of inheritance. In 1961, the Muslim Family Law Ordinance was passed; this legislation tried to balance traditional Muslim family law with modern practices. It allowed restricted polygamy and tried to limit a husband’s authority in the event of divorce. There was no MRA during this period. However, the state gradually became involved in the administration of pilgrimage, the main function performed by the current MRA.

The Early 1970s to Late 1990s

This period saw a large escalation in the role of Islam in Pakistani state nationalism. The Legal Framework Order (LFO), issued for the first time in 1970, made preservation of Islamic ideology a state responsibility. When the 1973 Constitution was promulgated, it had more Islamic provisions than the previous two Pakistani Constitutions, promulgated in 1956 and 1962. Amendments passed under Prime Minister Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto and General Zia added further religious provisions to the 1973 Constitution.

National symbols also reflected the increasingly dominant role of Islam in Pakistani state nationalism during this era. A national mosque was built in Islamabad and the flag of the President of Pakistan became more Islamic. A new Islamic motto for the Pakistan Army was adopted and
two new annual public holidays were announced, one directly related to Islam and the other with an Islam-inspired name. Images on Pakistani banknotes also reflected an upsurge in Islam’s role. In 1981, all banknotes started carrying an Islamic inscription.

The 1980s are remembered in Pakistan as the decade of Islamization. With respect to family law, the MFLO remained in force but the Hadood Ordinances, promulgated in 1979, restricted its application. These ordinances had a detrimental effect on women’s rights in the family and in larger society.

The MRA was established in 1974 and became highly influential during the 1980s. The Council of Islamic Ideology, part of the MRA, was the force behind the formulation of the Islamization policy under General Zia. The MRA was also given the new task of Zakat collection.

Prior to 1972, religious education was only taught in religious classes. The 1972 education policy allowed religious teachings to influence other subjects, such as history and social studies. Thus, secular subjects became imbued with Islamic teachings. Religious studies (Islamiat) were made compulsory in all grades up to graduation level. In the 1980s, as a result of the Afghan War against the Soviets, hundreds of new madrassas were also established. In most cases, changes in the role of Islam in state nationalism appeared before the changes in the Islamization of government in the 1980s.

1999 Onwards
In this period, the role of Islam in state nationalism is gradually declining. After the 1990s, the growth in Islam’s role in state nationalism slowed as Pakistan started facing the repercussions of General Zia’s policies. After 9/11, international pressure made policy reversal more acceptable to the Pakistani military, the main decision-maker and supporter of the religious right. The Seventeenth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution revived the joint electorates for minorities and increased the number of reserved seats for women and religious minorities. Further changes came in the Eighteenth Amendment. However, the most important shift came in 2015 with the passage of the Twenty-first Constitutional Amendment. This amendment explicitly linked religious extremism with terrorism and promised action against it through expedited trials in military courts. In March 2017, the Twenty-eighth Amendment extended the action against religious extremism for two more years.

The changes in the national symbols also indicated a decrease in Islam’s role in Pakistan’s state nationalism. A white band was added to the presidential flag to make it representative of the Pakistani religious minorities;
the flag has previously been wholly green. The Pakistan monument emphasized nationalistic themes instead of Islamic themes, and the Youm-e-Takbir holiday was cancelled. Banknotes also pointed towards a decreasing role of Islam in state nationalism. The Islamic inscription that had had pride of place on all Pakistani banknotes was made virtually invisible. As before, changes in Islam’s role in state nationalism most often came before changes in the Islamization of government.

Corresponding to the decrease in Islam’s role in state nationalism, there was also a decline in the Islamization of government. The Protection of Women law in 2006 restricted the role of the Hadood Ordinances. The role of family courts was also expanded. In education, the state support for madrassas decreased in this period while efforts were made to regulate them. Religious education in public schools did not change but, due to the popularity of private education, its role became more limited. The MRA’s influence also diminished. A Supreme Court decision decreased the collection of Zakat and its role is now largely limited to making pilgrimage arrangements.

**Mill’s Method of Difference**

Tables 8.1 and 8.2, based on the analysis in Chapters 2–7, demonstrate that alternative explanations usually purported to explain the rise and fall of the Islamization of government in Turkey and Pakistan are not helpful. Authoritarian governments, high ethnic diversity, or strong Islamist parties are not essential to the Islamization of governments. Authoritarian government in Turkey and Pakistan have not always resulted in the increasing Islamization of government. While ethnic fractionalization has not changed much in Turkey since the 1930s, there have been, first, the drastic reduction and, then, the gradual increase in the Islamization of government. In the case of Pakistan, ethnic fractionalization decreased in the early 1970s due to the separation of East Pakistan but, contrary to theoretical predictions, the Islamization of government increased. Finally, Islamist parties have been relatively weak in both countries but, while Pakistan has Islamized rapidly (from the early 1970s and late 1990s), Turkey has not. Counterintuitively, Pakistan’s Islamist parties have never been popular but Pakistan has seen a high level of Islamization. Islam’s role in state nationalism in both countries, however, positively correlates with the Islamization of government. As the rival explanations have been unable to explain the variations of Islamization of government in both
Table 8.1  Turkey: Mill’s Method of Difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eras</th>
<th>Alternative explanatory variables</th>
<th>Is Islam’s role in state nationalism increasing?</th>
<th>Is the Islamization of government increasing?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authoritarian governments</td>
<td>Weak Islamist parties</td>
<td>High ethnic diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The early 1920s to mid-1940s</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The late-1940s to late 1970s</td>
<td>Yes (partially)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The early 1980s to late 2000s</td>
<td>Yes (partially)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 onwards</td>
<td>Yes (partially)</td>
<td>Yes (partially)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The AKP is still not an Islamist party but may become one in this period
Turkey and Pakistan, Islam’s role in state nationalism may be the likely reason for the change in the Islamization of government in different eras in both countries.

**Table 8.2** Pakistan: Mill’s Method of Difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eras</th>
<th>Alternative explanatory variables</th>
<th>Is Islam’s role in state nationalism increasing?</th>
<th>Is the Islamization of government increasing?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Authoritarian governments</td>
<td>Weak Islamist parties</td>
<td>High ethnic diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The late 1940s to late 1960s</td>
<td>Yes (partially)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The early 1970s to late 1990s 1999 onwards</td>
<td>Yes (partially)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turkey and Pakistan, Islam’s role in state nationalism may be the likely reason for the change in the Islamization of government in different eras in both countries.

**Non-spuriousness**

The discussion above tried to establish that the two variables, Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government, co-vary and that the changes in Islam’s role in state nationalism often comes before the changes in the Islamization of government in both Turkey and Pakistan.

However, this co-variation may be because of a confounding variable, signifying a spurious relationship. If the research design were based on a single case, there would have been a long list of possible confounding variables; however, a comparative case study design makes the presence of a confounding variable less likely. The possibility of confounding variables was further reduced by selecting cases that are very different. This is the logic on which Mill’s method of agreement is based. If very different cases, in which only one independent variable is common, result in the same outcome, then that independent variable is probably the cause of the outcome.

As explained in Chapter 1, Pakistan and Turkey were chosen because they are very different. Not only are Turkey and Pakistan
polar opposites in terms of Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government, they are also very different in terms of history, socio-economic indicators, and geography. Therefore, a confounding variable that affects both of them in a similar way is very difficult to find. Table 8.3 underscores the differences between the two cases.

The improbability of a confounding variable is apparent from Table 8.3. It can, thus, be argued that the relationship between Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government is non-spurious, based on the case studies of Turkey and Pakistan.

### Table 8.3 Dissimilarities between Turkey and Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>Colonizer</td>
<td>Colonized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Europe/Middle East</td>
<td>South Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic fractionalization</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linguistic fractionalization</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious majority/Sectarian minority</td>
<td>Alevi</td>
<td>Twelver Shias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major ethnic minority</td>
<td>Kurds</td>
<td>Sindhis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (current US$ billion)</td>
<td>822.1</td>
<td>232.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$)</td>
<td>8722.9</td>
<td>789.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (annual %)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (in million)</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>182.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth (annual %)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population ages 0–14 (% of total)</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (% of total)</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population growth (annual %)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy (years)</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected years of schooling (2012)</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI rank (of 187 countries)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, value-added (% of GDP)</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports (% of GDP)</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty ratio at $2/day (% population) (2010)</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births)</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>170.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female labour force (% of total labour force)</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The data is from the year 2013 unless otherwise specified.*

*Source: Alesina et al. (2003), UNDP (2015) and World Bank (2015)*
Causal Mechanisms Connecting Islam’s Role in State Nationalism and the Islamization of Government

The fourth requirement for proving a causal inference between Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government is the identification of causal mechanisms that link the independent variable to the dependent variable. Identifying causal mechanisms has increasingly been accepted as a significant condition for causal inference. Even scholars that primarily use quantitative methods and statistical causal inference recognize that their argument for causal inference would be stronger if a small-N study pinpoints the intervening mechanisms and variables that link their independent and dependent variables (Steinberg 2007). Sometimes identifying causal mechanisms is important even when causal inference is well-established (Weller and Barnes 2014, 1–3).

However, despite this acceptance, utility, and wide usage, there is disagreement on what are, in fact, causal mechanisms. One of the disagreements is whether causal mechanisms are similar to or different from intervening variables. For this study, causal mechanisms are assumed to be similar to intervening variables as defined by Imai et al. (2011, 765):

We define a causal mechanism as a process in which a causal variable of interest, i.e., a treatment variable, influences an outcome. The identification of a causal mechanism requires the specification of an intermediate variable or a mediator that lies on the causal pathway between the treatment and outcome variables.

There are three intervening variables that serve as the causal mechanisms between Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government. As these intervening variables are not confined to Pakistan and Turkey alone, the following discussion will provide examples from other MMCs as well. These variables are:

- the need for legitimacy
- the need for mobilization
- the need for authenticity.

Religions, because they are a separate system of laws and beliefs, can provide legitimacy for actions that may be contrary to domestic or
international law. Religions are also a potent source of mobilization and, because many religions are centuries old and passed on from generation to generation, they are also frequently used as a criterion for establishing authenticity.

Colonialization, which brought modernity in its wake, resulted in a major transformation in many MMCs as the state and Islam became adversaries for the first time since the advent of Islam. The power of Islam as a source of legitimacy, mobilization, and authenticity declined as it was increasingly questioned and challenged, not only by the colonial state, but also by many Muslim leaders. After independence, statehood increased the power of Islam in the MMCs as Muslims became decision-makers. But it was primarily the secular Muslim elites that led the independence movements and, later, governed the new states. Therefore, Islam’s role in the state remained minimal as elites tried to make territorial or ethnolinguistic nationalism, not religion, the primary source of loyalty. Non-religious state nationalism, supported by all the resources of the state, became a strong competitor to Islam in many MMCs. It competed with Islam as the source of mobilization, legitimacy, and authenticity.

Despite this competition, Islam remained a part of state nationalism, as it was used as an easy mobilization mechanism by the founding fathers of the MMCs in order to unite and rally people against their colonial masters and invaders, who were invariably Christian. Even secular leaders, such as Ataturk or Bourguiba, used Islam to unite and mobilize the population. By the 1970s, as the appeal of other ideologies (Arabism, socialism, capitalism, and so on) declined due to the lack of economic development and defeat in wars, Islam’s role in state nationalism increased in the MMCs, often with the assistance of national leaders, who were still largely a-religious, if not secular, themselves.

This increased role of Islam in state nationalism made Islam a more powerful basis of legitimacy, as people accepted that it was incumbent on them to follow Islam—not only because it was their religion, but also because it was (at least, partly) the basis of their nation. So, autocratic leaders who did not have electoral legitimacy and democratic leaders who had lost their electoral legitimacy found it convenient to justify their rule on the basis of Islam. However, to claim this legitimacy leaders had to show that the state was Islamic, or more Islamic than before, and this led to the Islamization of government. Therefore, the need for legitimacy of authoritarian leaders is an intervening variable and not the main reason for the Islamization of government in the MMCs. Islamization can only be
used for legitimization in countries where Islam has a large role in state nationalism. Perhaps that is why Central Asian dictators, not having much legitimacy, did not use the Islamization of government to legitimize themselves, while democratically elected Mahathir found it necessary to use Islamization.

The power of Islam to mobilize people was never in doubt, but it became stronger as the role of Islam in state nationalism increased. People were ready to fight national enemies but it became much easier to mobilize them if the national enemies were also designated as religious enemies. So, countries hostile to the MMCs were re-designated by the leaders and the elite as enemies of Islam, rather than the enemy of the country. So, India, Israel, and the Soviet Union became Hindu India, Jewish Israel, and Godless Communists. Even internal opposition was declared insufficiently Muslim to mobilize Muslims against the internal opposition. For instance, Bengalis were considered lesser Muslims by many West Pakistanis before 1971. But to justifyably wear the mantle of Islam in the eyes of the people, leaders had to show that they were true to Islam and that the state was an Islamic state.\(^2\) And that required and led to the Islamization of government.

Finally, during the 1960s and 1970s, the leadership in the MMCs lost the trust of the Muslim citizenry due to corruption and the inability to solve basic problems, such as reducing poverty and unemployment. Due to the support of such leadership by the USA or the Soviet Union, it was perceived as a lackey of the West and acting against the interests of ordinary Muslims. This lack of trust in the leadership was not limited to the MMCs. People in other developing countries felt the same way due to the corruption and ineffectiveness of the Westernized elite (Lee 2008, 1).

Being authentic, true to oneself or to one’s core and past, became important as the unfairness of the international economic system—and, thereby, the futility of following the Western prescriptions to achieving economic development—became widely accepted. In the case of the MMCs, the West’s (perceived) unqualified support for Israel provided another evidence of the West’s bias against Islam and Muslims. In this atmosphere, Islamist parties gained ground and accused the rulers of being Western stooges, who are following the West even when it gave nothing and took everything. Islamists argued that Islam and Islamization is the solution. These accusations and the solution resonated because the majority of ordinary Muslims had remained poor (Mandaville 2002, 68). When rulers argued that application of centuries-old Islamic laws was impossible,
the Islamist leaders pointed to Iran and the oil-rich Gulf kingdoms as models of the successful Islamization of government in the modern world. As both the USA and the Soviet Union (Russia) were against the Islamization of government in the MMCs, Islamization became the touchstone of authenticity; authentic Muslims were supposed to reject both the USA and the Soviet Union and do what Allah commanded. Islamists proudly claimed that they were authentic, while the ruling national elite were not. Facing this challenge, rulers had three choices. They could increase repression and continue to rule; or they become selfless, hardworking and efficient, demonstrating to the people that they were authentic; or they could Islamize the government, thus taking the sting out of Islamists’ accusations. Most leaders of the MMCs opted for first or third choice.

**Conclusion**

The above discussion shows that although Islam was already a source of legitimacy, mobilization, and authenticity before the independence of the MMCs, its influence increased manifold when it became part of the state nationalism of these countries. Initially, the state elite did not use this resource in many MMCs but, after the 1970s, they increasingly used Islam to gain legitimacy and authenticity, and to mobilize people, irrespective of their own religiousness. However, to use Islam it was necessary to prove to the people that the state and leadership were themselves Islamic, and this required the Islamization of government. Initially, rhetoric and some clauses in the Constitution were sufficient. Later, as elites were commonly perceived as insincere to Islam and Muslims, and as the Islamist parties accused them of being Western or secular, the elites had to counter this perception by increasing the Islamization of government. In some countries, Islamists became part of the elite and increased the Islamization of government to prove their authenticity and to differentiate themselves from their secular predecessors.

The discussion above completes the requirements of establishing the causal inference between Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government. Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government co-varied throughout the histories of Pakistan and Turkey, and variations in Islam’s role in state nationalism preceded the changes in the Islamization of government. There were also no confounding variables influencing both Islam’s role in state nationalism
and the Islamization of government, and so the relationship between these variables is non-spurious. Three intervening variables were identified as causal mechanisms that connect Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government: the need for legitimacy, the need for mobilization, and the need for authenticity.

**The Importance of Initial Conditions**

While the detailed analysis of the two case studies has fulfilled the requirements of causal inference between Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government, it might be difficult to understand the comparative level of the Islamization of government in Pakistan and Turkey now. While the state of Pakistan, with only 50 years of Islamization (the late 1940s to late 1990s), is highly Islamized, the Turkish Republic, even after more than 70 years (the late 1940s to 2017) of increasing Islamization of government, is comparatively less Islamized. This difference can be explained on the basis of the early period after independence. Pakistan started with a very significant role for Islam in its state nationalism; in fact, Islam was the sole basis of its pre-independence nationalism. Turkey, on the other hand, started with a partly religious and partly ethnolinguistic nationalism. However, soon after independence, Islam’s role in state nationalism was forcibly expunged by the Turkish elite. Islam’s role in Turkish state nationalism was only partially accepted in the 1980s. Islam is still not the main marker of Turkish identity. In comparison, Islam continues to be the main marker of Pakistani identity, despite attempts in the twenty-first century to move to a more territorial-based state nationalism.

**Strengthening Granger’s Causality**

One of the main problems in finding evidence for causal inference is the Granger causality criterion. This difficulty is also experienced here. As both Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government affect each other, it is not the direction of the causal arrow but the direction of the larger causal arrow that is contested. The tests and techniques available to economists cannot be used on the two variables in focus in this book. Therefore, although the analysis has tried to show that changes in Islam’s role in state nationalism have often happened before the corresponding changes in the Islamization of government, the evidence can be
challenged, and it can be argued that the direction of the larger causal arrow is from the Islamization of government to Islam’s role in state nationalism, rather than what is being argued in this book.

One way to resolve this issue is to review the broader political science literature on nationalism and its relationship with public policies, as the independent variable in this book (Islam’s role in state nationalism) is a subset of overall state nationalism, while the dependent variable (the Islamization of government) is the subset of the universal set of public policies.

The relationship between nationalism and public policies has been extensively studied, and it is generally accepted that both nationalism and public policies affect each other. However, on the question of the greater and stronger effect, most of the literature points the causal arrow from state nationalism to public policies, rather than the other way around.

For example, Abdelal (2001) shows how state nationalisms of the Eastern European countries affected their economic policies following the collapse of Soviet Union. Similarly, Pickel (2003) talks about national economic cultures and how they affect decision-making. Beland and Lecours (2008) highlight how nationalism influences social policy and Mayar (2000) focuses on nationalism’s effects on states’ gender policies. Furthermore, there is a plethora of literature that studies and provides evidence of how state nationalism affects nations’ foreign and defence policies. For example, Prizel (1998, 14) argues in his book that national identity “is an extremely important, if not the driving force, behind the formation of its [nation’s] foreign policy”. Zhimin (2005) studies Chinese foreign policy during the last hundred years and concludes that state nationalism has been one of the key driving forces shaping it. Anderson and Seitz (2006) explain that the European Union’s Security and Defence Policy is based on their comparatively new European national identity.

The very brief literature review above demonstrates that state nationalism affects public policies and that the opposite effect is present, but comparatively small. Therefore, the argument made in this book is supported by the broader political science literature.

**AVENUES OF FUTURE RESEARCH**

Besides extending the research on Turkey and Pakistan, one of the most interesting countries to explore the causal link between Islam’s role in state nationalism and the Islamization of government is Malaysia.
Malaysian nationalism is associated with Malay ethnicity and Islam. Article 3 of the Malaysian Constitution declares Islam as the religion of the federation. Initially, Malay ethnicity was the dominant factor and the role of Islam was subservient. The very name of the country clarified to whom the new nation belonged. However, Islamic influence and Islam’s role in Malaysian state nationalism has gradually increased. It has been argued that it was the 22-year period under Dr Mahathir Mohamad (1981–2003) that saw the expansion of Islam’s role in state nationalism. However, the expansion would not have been possible without Islam’s prominent role in the Malay federation, the precursor of Malaysia, and the Muslim Malay states that have historically dominated the Malay Archipelago. It would be fascinating to trace the rise of Islam’s role in Malaysian state nationalism and study its effect on the Islamization of government in Malaysia. The recent controversies about Hadood laws and the prohibition regarding the usage of word “Allah” by non-Muslims point towards the increasing Islamization of government, but is there a link (Saleem 2014, 2016)?

One question that may be asked is whether the causal link between Islam’s role in state nationalism and Islamization of the government is only true for the MMCs, or whether it has some broader application. For instance, could an increased role of Christianity in nationalism lead to increasing influence of Christianity on laws, education, and government regulations? Research on two non-Muslim majority countries, Israel and Sri Lanka, can answer this question. Judaism had a key role in the early development of Israeli nationalism or Zionism. However, as in the case of Pakistan, the national elite in the early decades were not very religious and Jewish customs, laws, and precepts had limited influence. The one area where Orthodox Jewish custom dominated the law was family law, which has been under the control of the Chief Rabbinate since independence. Lately, the right-wing parties have attained a stronghold on the Knesset. Will this lead to the “Judaization” of Israeli law, or is it the role of Judaism in Israeli state nationalism that really matters and the success and failure of the right-wing parties is more of a confounding variable?

Sri Lanka is a Buddhist-majority country and Buddhism had an influential role in early Sri Lankan nationalism. However, in the first Constitution promulgated in 1948, Buddhism was not privileged over other religions. As in many other countries, the 1960s was a period of intense debates and, in the 1970s, religious forces triumphed in Sri Lanka. In the 1972 Constitution, Buddhism was declared the “foremost
religion”, and it was the duty of the state to protect and foster it (Section 6). The 1978 Constitution reiterated the stance in Article 9. In 1983, relations between the Sinhala Buddhist majority and the Tamil Hindu minority broke down; a civil war began that continued until 2009. One would like to know whether the 25 years of civil war with the Tamils further strengthened the association of Buddhism with Sri Lankan nationalism and whether it increased the influence of Buddhism on Sri Lankan laws (Schonthal 2012; Nayagam 2014).

NOTES

1. Habib Bourguiba was the independence leader and first President of Tunisia.
2. Or, at least, on the way to becoming an Islamic state.
3. In the broader literature, nationalism and state nationalism are not clearly distinguished. However, often, when nationalism is analyzed, the focus is on the dominant form of nationalism propagated by the state.
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