

ROLE OF
SIR ABDULLAH HAROON IN THE POLITICS OF SINDH
(1872-1942)

By
NASREEN AFZAL



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Sani H. Panhwar

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DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate my thesis to my beloved father who instilled the love of knowledge in me, to my brothers Javed and Saleem who supported me on every occasion and to my beloved mother whom I lost during the research.

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NASREEN AFZAL
Ph.D. Scholar

ABSTRACT

A great deal has been written on the freedom struggle of Muslims in India. But for the most part the bulk of literature has been concerned with the familiar leaders of the freedom struggle. Anything hardly has been written on the leaders of provinces, who made an extremely valuable contribution to the freedom struggle. Speaking specially about Sindh, there is no major work of this nature that deals with the leaders. Particularly, there is no specific study on the work and contributions made by Sir Haji Abdullah Haroon in the freedom struggle. This study focuses on the life and achievements of Sir Haroon who was not only a successful business man but gave selfless political services to his province.

The study illustrates that as soon as he achieved stability in his business; he turned his attention towards improving the life of his city fellows and entered into politics by winning a seat in Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC). The study includes that during his councillorship he provided huge amount of money from his own pocket for the different welfare projects of Municipality.

In the early years of his political career, he got involved in Khilafat Movement. It also discloses that he not only actively participated in the movement but whenever the movement was in monetary crisis he had always been ready to help. This movement trained him for the upcoming political crisis which was the movement to separate Sindh from the Bombay Presidency. It was he who for the first time raised this local issue from the All India Muslim League platform and converted it into a national issue. During the separation movement Muslim leadership got united but as soon as separation was achieved, their solidarity ended and got divided into different factions which after the elections of 1937 began to compete with each other for getting the political control of the province. This situation continued throughout the life of Haroon and till his last breath he tried to unify the Muslims of Sindh on the platform of League.

To accomplish this he in 1938 organized a conference of Sindh Provincial Muslim League at Karachi where he pronounce that Hindus and Muslims are two different nations and to solve Hindu-Muslim crisis he gave the proposal of dividing India into Hindu India and Muslim India.

Following the conference Haroon became occupied in two main assignments. Firstly, the consolidation of League in Sindh and establishing League ministry but due to the division among the Muslim members of the Sindh Assembly, these initial efforts were not successful.

Secondly, he concentrated on developing public opinion in favor of his idea. As a consequence the suggestion got accepted and different schemes for the division of India were proposed by several Muslims. The study proves that it was the continuous pursuance of Sir Haroon that Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Muslim League accepted the proposition and finally passed it in the form of a resolution in 1940 at Lahore which later became the central objective of League.

The study discloses that during the last days of his life his only mission was to propagate and explain the Muslim demand of Pakistan not only to the Muslims but also to Hindus and British alike. The premature death of Haroon did not allow him to see his idea coming into reality.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFM	Archives of Freedom Movement
AHC	Abdullah Haroon Collection
AIMC	All India Muslim Conference
AIML	All India Muslim League
AIMLCC	All India Muslim League Central Committee
BLCP	Bombay Legislative Council Proceedings
CLAD	Central Legislative Assembly Debates
CWMG	Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi
F	Files (Archives)
FOP	Foundations of Pakistan
GHHP	Ghulam Hussain Hydayatullah Papers
GMSC	G. M. Sayed Collection
IAR	Indian Annual Register
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PSLA	Proceedings of the Sindh Legislative Assembly
PWD	Public Works Department
QAP	Quaid-i-Azam Papers
RTC	Round Table Conference
SAC	Sindh Azad Conference
SAP	Sindh Azad Party
SHC	Shamsul Hassan Collection
SMA	Sindh Muhammadan Association
SMPP	Sindh Muslim Political Party
SPML	Sindh Provincial Muslim League
SUP	Sindh United Party

GLOSSARY

Akhbar	Newspaper
Amil	A Hindu sub-caste prominent in high levels of Sindh government service.
Anjuman	An association or organization
Baluch	Name given to the group of tribes west of Sindh, some of which settled in Sindh
Bania	Hindu money lenders of the Vaisya caste
Batai	Division of agricultural produce between government and the cultivators
Bhaibund	A Hindu merchant sub-caste
Bhora	A largely urban Muslim business casts
Budmash	A bad character: A rascal
Dak	Letters
Dak Banglows	Rest places for people carrying letters from one place to another.
Durbar	A ceremonial court or reception held in British times to honor prominent Indians
Fatwa	A religion decree issued by Muslim religious scholars
Hari	Generally landless cultivators, tenants-at-will
Hijrat	A mass migration of Muslims for religious scholars
Hilal-e-Ahmar Society	A society like red Crescent, which helps needy people
Jagir	A land grant awarded for military service
Jehad	Holy War
Jutha	A group of people
Kaa'ba	Place where Muslim perform Haj.
Kardars	District in charge of Sindh, during Talpur regime, who acted as revenue and judicial officer of the district.
Khalifa	A temporal and spiritual head of the entire Muslim of the word
Khalifa	Caliph
Khilafat-e-Usmania	Turkish Ottoman Empire
Khoja	A Muslim trading caste most of whom are Shia followers.
Khuddam-e-Kaaba	Servants of Kaaba
Khutbah	The official sermon in the congregational prayers and Fridays
LAPO	Form of revenue in which both hand full of grains were taken as tax on grains, collected by Zamindar for himself
Malikano	Owner's fee, another form of Tax collected by Zamindars
Maulana/Maulvi	A title used for Muslim religious scholars
Memon	A Muslim merchant caste
Mufti	One who issues fatwa
Nawabzada	Son of Nawab

Pir	A Muslim saint
Pukka Sindhis	Those having a genuine claim to be old true Sindhis
Quaid-i-Azam	A title given to Mohammed Ali Jinnah meaning 'the Great Leader'.
Raj Kharch	Expenses of the village, yet another form of tax collected by Zamindar for himself.
Raja	Ruler of a Princely state
Salam	To pay homage
Sanad	Confirmation letter/certificate
Sardar	A term used by the Baluch to denote tribal chieftainship
Satyagraha	A non-violent campaign of civil disobedience
Sawaraj	Independence
Shariat	Islamic Law
Sheikh	A title adopted by Hindu converts to Islam
Swadesh	Indigenous
Swaraj	Self-rule
Taluka	A unit used for administrative and revenue purposes
Ulema	Muslim religious scholars
Ulema	Muslim theologians
Zaminar	A landholder who was responsible for paying land revenue to the government.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The birth of Pakistan in 1947, under the leadership of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah was the result of the collective efforts of the Muslim leadership all over India. Traditionally in the historical accounts of freedom struggle, the role of only central leadership of the Muslim League is highlighted where as the leadership of the Muslim majority provinces of pre-partition India such as Sindh, Punjab, Bengal and North West Frontier province, which along with the central leadership struggled for the partition of India has mostly escaped the eyes of historical research and little is known about their contribution to the Freedom Movement.

In recent years, however, scholars have shifted their attention to the study of the provinces that later became Pakistan. At a time when regional studies have become an important aspect in historical research, it is pertinent for researchers to reconstruct historical development in some detail, to find out relatively unknown facts about the contributions of different provinces of Pakistan in freedom struggle so that the gaps in the historical information can be filled out. Among the Muslim majority Provinces Sindh and its leadership played significant and distinct role in Pakistan Movement.

Sindh was the province where the first regular session of All India Muslim League was held in the city of Karachi on 29-30 December 1907, It took lead in propagating the idea of separate Muslim state from the platform of the Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference which in October 1938 recommended to All India Muslim

League to devise a constitutional scheme under which Muslims shall attain full independence. Sindh was the only province which supported the principles of 23 March 1940 Lahore Resolution which demanded the division of India by grouping together the Muslim and Hindu majority areas to form sovereign states, officially in the Sindh Legislative Assembly on 3 March 1943 and above all it joined the Pakistan territories on 26 June 1947 before any other Muslim majority province could do it. Thus because of the above mention efforts of the Muslim leaders of Sindh that Pakistan Movement got a firm footing in Sindh than any other Province of India. In view of these significant contributions of the Muslim politicians of Sindh researcher felt compelled to select Sindh and its leadership to elucidate the role of the political leaders of this imperative province.

One such leader of Sindh who had played a role of immense importance in the provincial and national level politics is Sir Haji Abdullah Haroon whose political career

and efforts need examination. He was not only a successful businessman but gave selfless political service to his province in general and to the Muslims of India in particular.

The researchers of the contemporary history have not sufficiently and appropriately examined the contributions made by Haroon in the Muslim politics of India. Some of the scholars such as Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, K.K. Aziz, G. Allana, Stanley Wolpert, and Khalid Bin Sayeed etc have discussed his contributions in their studies but only generally as a part of their research. Therefore the lack of weight given by these scholars in their work necessitated to analyze his efforts in detail in context of Sindh and All India level politics.

It was this desire to write about the political life of Haroon so that an appropriate place can be given to him among the other Muslim Leaders, prompted the selection of Sindh and his leader Haroon as topic for Ph.D. dissertation.

Specific Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study are;

- 1) To look into the nature of the development of politics in Sindh and the part played by Haroon in those political events.
- 2) To examine his efforts in the promotion of political consciousness among local Sindhi Muslims.
- 3) To explore his services in the important political events such as Khilafat Movement, Sindh Separation Movement and Manzilgah Mosque crisis.
- 4) To study his input in the formation of the public opinion in favor of Pakistan Scheme among Muslims of Sindh.
- 5) To scrutinize his relationship with the leadership of other provinces and with local Sindhi leaders.
- 6) To probe into the hard work put in by him in the organization of Muslim League at the Provincial level.

And finally provide him an appropriate place in the history of Freedom struggle.

Significance of the study

As no systematic study has yet been done on the personal, social and political life of Sir Haji Abdullah Haroon, the significance of this research is that this study is a pioneer work in this field and will help other scholars in their research.

This dissertation not only deals with the political life of Haroon but also with the role of other political leaders of Sindh as the study elaborates the differences and alliances among the political leaders of Sindh. Similarly detailed information regarding the relationship between the leaders of Sindh and other Muslim majority provinces during the most decisive period of freedom struggle has also been included. In this perspective, this study will help to understand the interregional cooperation of Muslim leaders during freedom movement, which will lead to the national integration among the provinces of Pakistan.

An additional significance of the study is that being a biography it supplies an interesting dimension of history. A reader can grasp the events through the activities of Haroon and can understand a period through the achievements of Haroon.

Thus this study is not only a political biography of Haroon but is a complete political history of Sindh as well.

Research Methodology

There are basically two methods of historical research - quantitative and qualitative. To recreate history in quantitative research quantitative data such as election returns, census reports etc are used, thus it includes statistical analysis. In qualitative research written literature such as manuscripts, letters, official documents etc are the main source of information on which past events are reinterpreted and analyzed.

For writing this dissertation, basically the qualitative style of research has been applied (A qualitative researcher look at the sequence of events and pays attention to what happens first, second, third and so on and can detect process of an event). Besides this all different techniques which are in practice for historical research has been used. For example, being a biography a chronological approach has been adopted. The study starts with the economic situation of Sindh during late nineteenth century when the father of Sir Haji Abdullah Haroon came to Karachi and settled here for better business opportunities. The study starts with the birth, the childhood and his early difficulties in life and his growth as a successful businessman. Then it deals with his entrance into public life and beginning of his political career as member of Karachi Municipal Corporation. The study deals with his participation in events like Khilafat Movement, Sindh Separation Movement and his life when he became President of Sindh Provincial Muslim League and worked for the cause of Pakistan. Thus through chronological approach the systematic occurrence of the events of Haroon's life has been recreated.

This dissertation is an example of narrative history. The material is chronologically arranged and each chapter is connected to the other in the order of events. Another approach used in this dissertation is a Historical Comparative method, which is usually interpretive (to make data meaningful and understandable), descriptive (focuses on

who, how) and exploratory (explore all sources of information). Thus by using all the above mentioned techniques the researcher has tried to make this research readable and as accurate as possible.

Before venturing upon research, to locate the literary sources both primary and secondary relevant to the topic the researcher visited public and private libraries in and outside Sindh. In Sindh the libraries of Sindhology, Sindh Archives, University of Karachi, Quaid-i-Azam Academy, Shams-ul-Hassan Library, G.M. Sayed library, Khuhro library, Commissioner house library and KMC library was consulted. Whereas outside Sindh the libraries of National Documentation Centre, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, National Library, National Archives and Quaid-i-Azam University library were searched and a large number of original documents related to the important political events of the topic was found.

The study is not confined to secondary sources but the primary sources such as government records and documents, personal diaries, private papers, contemporary biographies, memoirs, pamphlets, speeches, gazettes, newspapers and other contemporary accounts have extensively been consulted to make this study more authentic. In addition to the source material in English language, the source material available in Urdu and Sindhi languages has also been consulted.

Organization of the Study

The dissertation is structured into eleven chapters.

The *second* chapter deals with the political history of Sindh, the land of his birth from the ancient times till the period of Talpurs and finally up to the occupation of Sindh in 1843 by the British forces. It throws light on the efforts of British government to consolidate their power in Sindh. Finally it discusses the introduction of reforms in the social and economic fields, which started a new era of development in Sindh.

In the *third* chapter the birth, his early childhood, the beginning of his career as a businessman and his rise as a business magnate and as a philanthropist his social activities have been studied.

His role in the important political event of that time the Khilafat Movement is the topic of discussion in the *fourth* chapter. It starts with the background of the Khilafat issues and discuss the reasons for the initiation of the Movement by the Indian Muslims. In this chapter not only the contributions of Haroon are highlighted but also the participation of all the important Leaders of that time has been discussed thus recreating a complete picture of the movement.

In the *fifth* chapter the role of Haroon in the Sindh Separation Movement has been examined in detail, Though Sindh was occupied by the British in 1843 it remained an

autonomous province under General Napier till 1847 when it lost its independent status and was joined with Bombay Presidency, Over a period of time this merger proved disastrous for the administrative and economic development of Sindh. Besides this, in 1919 the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms scheme was introduced in India for the growth of the parliamentary system of Government. As a result, the political leaders of Sindh and organizations began to consider what Sindh's position should be under India's new political order. Thus to protect the interests of Sindh the Sindh leaders both Hindus and Muslims started demanding Sindh separation from the Bombay Presidency. Haroon joined this movement after the death of G.M. Bhurgri and converted this local issue into an all India issue. In this chapter not only the individual role of Maroon has been highlighted but the part played by organizations like Sindh Congress, Sindh Hindu Mahasabha and All India Muslim League has also been described.

In the *sixth* chapter the political career of Haroon, which starts from 1913 when he was elected as a member of Karachi Municipality and later became the members of Bombay Legislative Assembly and Central Assembly, has been scanned.

Soon after the announcement of the elections to be held under the Act of 1935 hectic political activities started in Sindh. To contest elections Haroon formed his own provincial political party namely Sindh United Party. Along with him Hidayatullah formed Sindh Muslim Political Party and Shaikh Abdul Majeed Sindhi established Sindh Azad Party. In the *seventh* chapter the formation of these parties, the election results and the establishment of first Ministry of Sindh as a self-governing Province has been debated. In this chapter one year struggle between Hidayatullah Ministry and Sindh United Party has been discussed.

In chapter *eight* the working of the Allah Baksh Ministry is investigated. Though Allah Baksh belonged to Haroon's Sindh United Party after becoming the premier he started implementing Congress agenda in Sindh. Therefore Haroon and other leaders got disheartened at the conduct of Allah Baksh and joined Muslim League as a result of which League in Sindh grew in strength. The symbol of growth and expansion of League in Sindh was the Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference held in 1938. At this conference Haroon made a historical suggestion to the All India Muslim League. He declares that Hindus and Muslims are two different nations therefore to settle the Hindu-Muslim problem India should be divided into Hindu India and Muslim India placed under separate federations. In this chapter the effect of Karachi Resolution on the political life of the Muslims and on the policies of All India Muslim League has been investigated.

Chapter *nine* deals with the efforts put by Haroon to popularize his idea of division of India among the leaders of League, which resulted in the pronouncement of different schemes by Muslims of different background. On the basis of these recommendations

finally in 1940 Muslim League passed Lahore Resolution in which League demanded division of India, which became the ultimate objective of League. In this chapter the contributions of Haroon in drafting the Lahore Resolution have been highlighted.

In chapter *ten* Mir Bandeh Ali Ministry has been scrutinized. This Ministry had support of the Muslim League. However, the League Ministers like G.M. Sayed and Khuhro because of their personal dislike of Bandeh Ali decided to remove him from the office. To achieve this they signed a secret Pact with the President of Congress, Maulana Azad without consulting the league or the League President Mr. Jinnah. The Pact stated the reshuffling of the Ministry and brining back Allah Baksh and Hidayatullah in the Ministry who were bitter enemies of the League. Jinnah and Haroon intervned in the Ministerial tangle and stated that the Pact was not legal as it had no approval by the League. The role of Haroon in this controversy is explained along with other leaders.

Chapter *eleven* highlights the last days of Haroon, which he spent in consolidating League in Sindh and working for the achievement of Pakistan.

In *conclusion* the analysis of the life of Haroon is presented and due recognition has given to his contributions in the Pakistan Movement. In the end important documents are given in the appendices.

To sum up this is a modest attempt to bring out to the public the facts about the life of Haroon. This study is an attempt to document his role in politics and is not the last word on this topic.

CHAPTER II

THE SINDH IN RETROSPECT

The province of Sindh, derives its name from the ancient Sanskrit word *Sindhu*. References of this word can be found in "*Rig Veda* and in *Puranas* where it is mentioned as a country, lying on the west of Indus river and also in the travelogue of Chinese traveler Hiuen-Tsang, who mentioned Sindh as *Sin-tu*".¹ During the Harappan period, Sindh was known as "*Meluhha*, *Hindush* under the Achaemenians and Sarsanians, *Indos*, *Prasania* and *Patalene* under Greeks and Bactrians, and *Shakadvipa* under the Scythians. It was also called *Sangama* in Ramayana, *Sauvira*, *Sudra*, Barbara in Mahabharata, Prajjuna and *Sauvira* in Kautilya's Arthasastra, *Skythia* by Periplus, *Indoskythia* by Ptolemy, *Brahmanaka* and *Sauvira* in Panini's Astradhyayi".² Arab historians such as Ibn-Haukal (*Ashltalu-I Bilad*) and Al Bairuni (*Kitabul Hind*) described Sindh and Hind as two different countries. According to Al Bairuni, "Hind is surrounded on the east by Chin and Machin, on the west by Sindh and Kabul and on the South by the Sea. On the north lie Kashmir".³ Ibn-Ishaq in his work *Kitabul-l-Akalim* states that Sindh and Hind are two different countries. The cities of Sindh, according to him, were "Mansura, Dibal, Nirur (Nirun), Kalvi (Kallari) Annari, Balwi (ballart), Miswahi, Nehruj, Banyia, Manhanari (Manjabari), Sadusan and Alruz (Afore). Whereas cities of Hind were Amhul, Kambya, Subara, Sindan, Saimur, Multan, Jandrud, and Basmand".⁴ According to *Buglar Nama*, "Sindh derives its name from Sindh, the Son of Ham, the Son of Noh".⁵

The geo-political history of Sindh shows that the 'territory of this region has been changing from time to time. It has never remained within the same boundaries'.⁶ There was a time when the boundaries of Sindh were stretched up to Kashmir and at the time of the British occupation of Sindh, it was reduced almost up to the present boundaries of Sindh. "The province of Baluchistan and the Punjab bound the Province of Sindh on the west and north; by the Rajasthan on the east; and by Rann of Katch and the Arabian Sea to the south. The area of Sindh is 140,914 square kilometers".⁷ "Despite its rich soil

¹ Hamida Khuhro (ed.), *Sindh Through Centuries* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 35-36 Also see J. Abbot, *Sindh: A Re-interpretation of the Unhappy Valley* (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1977).

² Suhail Zaheer Lari, *An Illustrated History of Sindh* (Karachi: Heritage foundation, 2002), p. 10.

³ Elliot and Dowson, *The History of India as Told by its Own Historian: The Mohammadan period*, Vol. 1 (Lahore: Islamic book service, 1979) p. 45.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 292.

⁶ M. Pithawalla, *Physical and Economic Geography of Sindh*, (Hyderabad: Sindhi Adabi Board, 1976), p. 17.

⁷ *Pakistan 1988: An official handbook*, (Islamabad: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1988), p. 23.

and riverine tract Sindh had in the past only sparse population, scattered throughout the province".⁸

Ethnological study of Sindh reveals that the original inhabitants of Sindh were the "Jats and the Meds, the former accustomed to the use of Boats and the later a Pastoral people".⁹ Arab writers such as Ibn Khurdadba and Al Baladhuri have also mentioned them as 'important tribes of Sindh'.¹⁰ As different races such as Dravidians Aryans, Iranians, Greeks etc have ruled Sindh; therefore the people living in Sindh) belong to all these races. "On the basis of this the population of Sindh can be divided into four main ethnographic groups, such as pre-Dravidians, pro-Mediterranean, the Dravidian and Alpine strain".¹¹ But generally speaking the population of Sindh is divided into two main classes; Muslims and non-Muslims. According to the 1931 census, the population of Sindh was "38, 87,007 of which the overwhelming majority, that is, 82 percent was rural based while the remaining 18 percent dwelled in towns and cities. Of the total population, 28 percent were Hindus and 72 percent Muslims",¹² The Muslims of Sindh are further divided into different ethnic groups such as Brahuis, Jogis, Jats, Khojas, Memons, Samats, Soomras, Merasis, Manganhars, and Muhanas are known as *pukka Sindhi* (original inhabitants). There are many Muslim immigrant tribes also, which are Afghans, Arghuns, Balochis, Iranians, Pathans, Punjabis, Sahtas, Sayyids, Shidis, Tarkhans and Turks".¹³ Hindus are also divided into different ethnic groups such as "Bhatias,

Brahmans, Baghris, Bhils, Karia, Khatri, Luhanas, Oda and Rajputs. Similarly the low caste Hindus were also divided into ethnic groups such as Kolhis, Menghwars, Bhangis, Rabaries and Shikaris".¹⁴

Sindh is a land of ancient Indus valley civilization which dates back to several hundred years B.C., which is clearly evident from the presence of the ancient sites of "Moen-jodaro: Kot-Diji; Amri; Chanhudaro; Allah Dino; Lakhiaudaro; and Bhandu Qubao".¹⁵

After the fall of Mohenjodaro, we know virtually nothing about the history of Sindh except the glimpses of political state of the country prior to the advent of Alexander the Great, which can be found in the historical records of 'Sanskrit, Persian and Pali

⁸ Maneck B. Pithwalla, *An introduction of Sind: Its wealth and welfare*, (Karachi: Sindh Observer Press, 1951), p. 43.

⁹ H.T. Lambrick, *Sind: A General Introduction* (Hyderabad: Sindhi Adabi Board, 1975), p. 209.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 210 For further study on different races of Sindh see S.S. Sarkar; *Ancient races of Balochistan, Punjab and Sindh* (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1981).

¹¹ H.T. Sorley, *The Gazetteer of West Pakistan, the former province of Sindh* (Lahore: Government of West Pakistan, 1968), p. 233.

¹² H.T. Lambrick, *Census of India 1941, Volume XII: Sindh* (Delhi: Government of India Press, 1942), p. 2.

¹³ Sorley's *Gazetteer*, *op.cit.*, p. 235.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 258-259.

¹⁵ Dr. G.A. Allana, *Pakistan ki Tarikh main Sindh ka hissa* (urdu) (Karachi: Makiab-e-Ishaqia, 1983), p. 3.

literature'.¹⁶ Historically after the destruction of Indus valley, Sindh was ruled by Dravidian, Arians, Iranians, Greeks, Indians. Arabs, Afghans, Arghuns, Turkhans and Mughals. Then in the eighteenth century it was ruled by local Kalhora and Talpur dynasties and in the mid of nineteenth century it came under British control. Due to the scarcity of historical material of Dravidians. Aryans and Iranians, their history is obscure.

The Greek historian Arian's account reveals that after the destruction of Indus Valley, Sindh was invaded and conquered by the army of the Greek ruler, Alexander the Great. After occupying Punjab, he in "326 BC entered Sindh and occupied Sehwan, Alore (modern Aror) and Patala".¹⁷ Alexander left Sindh in 325 BC. The historical material of the period between the departure of Alexander and Arab conquest of Sindh are inadequate to establish a credible historical account.

Arabs historical accounts are the first account, which gives comprehensive details about the history of Sindh just before its occupation by Arabs in eighth century A.D. Arab historians reveal that Ummayeds had made several attempts before the invasion of Muhammad Bin Qasim. According to al Biladuri in his book *Futuhu-l-Buldan* narrates that "Hajjaj had sent two armies under Ubaidullah and Budail against Debal. Both these armies were defeated by the army of Sindh and expedition ended in a failure".¹⁸ Arab historical accounts¹⁹ also states that at the time of their attacks on 'Sindh it was ruled by a local Hindu Rai dynasty, which had ruled Sindh for the last one hundred and thirty seven years. The accounts also informs us that shortly before the attack of Muhammad Bin Qasim, Rai Sahasi, the last ruler of Rai dynasty died and his minister named Chach married his widow in 631 AD and became the new ruler of Sindh. He was succeeded by his brother Chandar who then was succeeded by his son Dahir'.²⁰ Muhammad Bin Qasim invaded Sindh during his reign that eventually led to the final occupation of 'Sindh by the hands of Arabs in 712 AD'.²¹

¹⁶ H.T. Lambrick, *Sindh Before the Muslim Conquest* (Hyderabad: Sindhi Adabi Board, 1973), p. 67.

¹⁷ H. T Sorley, *The Gazetteer of West Pakistan: The former province of Sindh*, op.cit., p. 143. According to the Hughes Gazetteer of 1907, Patala was situated near the head of the river delta and Alexander constructed a dockyard at Patala. As Richard F. Burton says in his book, *Sindh and the races that inhabit the valley of Indus* (Karachi: Indus publications, 1988), p. 5, that Thatta has been supposed to be the ancient Pattala.

¹⁸ Elliot and Dowson, op.cit., p. 119.

¹⁹ For further information see, Al Biladuri's *Futuhu-l-Buldan*, Mir Masoom Bhakkari's *Tarikh-e-Masoomi, Chachnama* and *Beglarnama*.

²⁰ Elliot and Dowson, op.cit., p. 292.

²¹ The Caliph Abdul Malik of Ummayad dynasty received the news that some of his ships had been plundered in the waters of Sindh. He prepared an army for the invasion of Sindh but before he could send it he died. After some delay the new Caliph Walid ordered Hajjaj bin Yousuf to dispatch an army against the ruler of Sindh. He then sent an army under Muhammad bin Qasim to punish the ruler of Sindh.

'Sindh remained under Arab control for almost next three hundred years (Umayyad, Abbasid, Habbarid dynasty and Qaramathians)²² when finally in '1019 A.D., Mahmood of Ghazni an Afghan ruler invaded India and conquered Multan and Uch. He then sent his Wazir Abdur Razai to occupy Sindh. He expelled Arab officials out of Sindh and made it a part of Afghan kingdom in 1026 AD'.²³

While, the rulers of Delhi Sultanat were engaged in consolidation process in India and confronted with the local uprisings, Ibn-Somer, the ruler of Multan challenged the sovereignty of Ghaznivids over Sindh. Ghaznivids sent an expedition against him and inflicted defeat. However, Ghaznivids allowed him to rule Sindh under their sway. Sindh's remoteness from the centre Delhi and the preoccupation of Sultans of Delhi in the north of India led the circumstances of Sindh to gradual disassociation from the control of Ghaznivids. 'This encouraged Sumras to announce the complete independence in 1051 A.D. As a result, once again, Sindh achieved its independent status under local dynasty, which was succeeded by another local Sindhi family of Samma in Sindh',²⁴ which ruled Sindh from '1351 to 1511 AD'.²⁵

During Summa rule, rulers of Delhi invaded Sindh to bring it under their control but Sumas' defended and maintained their control till the advent of Arghun. During the reign of Jam Nizamuddin (1461-1509), Shah Baig Arghun²⁶ attacked Sindh but was defeated and went back to Kandahar. When Babur set on conquering the Arghun areas, Shah Beg, left Kandahar and occupied 'Sindh in 1521 AD, thus laid down the foundation of Arghun dynasty'²⁷ and Sindh came under the control of foreign dynasty. In 1524, after the death of Shah Beg his son, Mirza Shah Hussain succeeded to throne and ruled Sindh for thirty-four years. As he was childless, Arghun dynasty comes to an end with his death in 1554 AD and Sindh came under another Afghan tribe 'Turkhans who held the reign from 1554 to 1591'.²⁸

Zaheeruddin Muhammad Babur, though, laid the foundation of Mughal dynasty in Delhi (1526-1530), the expansion and consolidation of the empire was largely credited to his grandson Akbar the Great (1556-1605). Under his policy of expansion he directed his attention towards the remote province of 'Sindh and brought the region under the

²² For detail study on Arab rule in Sindh see Dr. Mumtaz Hussain Pathan, *Sindh—Arab period* (Hyderabad: Sindhi Adabi Board, 1978).

²³ A.W. Hughes, *Gazetteer of the province of Sind*. (Karachi, Indus publications, 1996), p. 27.

²⁴ Summa tribe had come from kachh and settled at Sammanagar, modern Sehwan. For more detail see Khudadad Khan, *Lab-e-Tarikh Sindh* (Hyderabad: Sindhi Adabi Board, 1959).

²⁵ Hughe's *Gazetteer op cit.*, p. 28.

²⁶ Shah Baig belonged to a tribe of Huns origin from Central Asia. It derived its name from Arghun Khan Turkhan, the grandson of Halaku, who was the grandson of Chengis Khan.

²⁷ Muhammad Hussain Siddiqui, *The history of Arghuns and Tarkhans of Sindh* (1507-1593) (Jamshoro: Institute of Sindhology, 1972), p. 234.

²⁸ For further detail see *Tuhfat-ul-Kiram* of Ali Sher Kani and *Lab-e-Tarikh-e-Sindh* of Khudadad Khan and *Tarkhan Nama* of Saiyid Jamal.

control of Delhi in 1592 AD²⁹ that continued during the period of Emperor Jahangir (1605-1627), Shah Jahan (1627-1658), and Aurangzeb Alamgir (1658-1707). Soon after the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, war of succession started among his successors that severely weakened the strength of Mughal Empire that caused internal strife.

This chaotic situation encouraged local Sindhis to reassemble their strength. The Kalhora tribe³⁰ took the advantage of the situation and gradually expanded its control on Sindh. Finally in 1736 the Mughal ruler Muhammad Shah (1719-1748) recognized Kalhoras as the legitimate ruler of Sindh.

During the Kalhora period (1701-1782), Talpur tribe (actually Baluchi tribe settled in Sindh) emerged as an important component of administration of Sindh who's notable chief Mir Bijar Talpur, son of Mir Bahram took the full advantage of the lawlessness under Kalhora's rule. He eventually rose against the Kalhora ruler Mir Ghulam Nabi Kalhora and slain him in a battle. On the hearing the news of the death of his brother Abdul Nabi Khan Kalhora who wanted the throne for him made a deal with Mir Bijar according to which Mir Bijar became the minister of Abdul Nabi whose sovereignty was accepted by him. Abdul Nabi Khan was not happy with this arrangement and was suspicious of Mir Bijar Khan. Therefore he assassinated Mir Bijar Khan and a civil war between Kalhoras and Talpur started which lasted till 1782 when Mir Fateh Ali finally defeated Abdul Nabi and assumed the throne of Sindh. But soon he faced resistance from other Talpur chiefs who were not ready to accept him as a sole ruler of Sindh and wanted the share in the administration. To avoid any conflict among Talpur chiefs Sindh was divided into three administrative regions, being ruled by three families. 'Thus the government of Sindh became a confederacy of chiefs. Under this settlement Hyderabad was ruled by Mir Fateh Ali Talpur (along with his three brothers), Mir Sohrab ruled at Khairpur and Mir Tharo ruled at Mirpure'.³¹ The government of Mirs had no administrative and political unity among themselves. It was this disunity, which was exploited by Napier and used it in its own benefit and occupied Sindh.

The relationship of British East India Company (hereafter Company) with Sindh starts from 1635, during the period of Shah Johan, with the opening a factory at Thatta. The company entered into Sindh with three trade objectives: 1) "to keep up the supply of cotton cloth for the London Market; 2) to obtain indigo; and 3) to get as much as it could of the profit of the carrying trade to the Persian gulf and down the western coast of India".³² But as the trade was not profitable the factory was closed down in 1662.

²⁹ For further detail, see M. Saleem Akhtar, *Sindh under Mughals* (Karachi: Government of Sindh, 1990).

³⁰ The Kalhoras are set to be descended from Abbas, the uncle of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H). For further information see, Ghulam Rascal Mehar, *Tarikh-e-Sindh, Kalhora Daur*, (Urdu) (Karachi: Government of Sindh, 1996).

³¹ E. H. Aitken, *Gazetteer of the Province of Sindh* (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1986), p. 118, see also H.T. Lambrick, *History of Sindh* (Hyderabad: Sindhi Adabi Board, 1975).

³² Hameeda Khurho, *The Making of Modern Sind: British Policy and Social Change in the Nineteenth Century* (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1978), p. 196.

Then in 1758 the factory was reopened but Sarfaraz Khan Kalhora, the ruler of Sindh became suspicious of the activities of the British Merchants, he ordered the closure of the factory in 1775.

Towards the end of eighteenth century, the rise of Napoleon in Europe and his intension to occupy the eastern colonies of England, created fear in the minds of British administrators of India. They also came to know about the letter of Tipu Sultan, ruler of Maysore, which he wrote to Napoleon asking for his help against the Company. The company's officials feared that through western side of India (Sindh and Baluchistan) Napoleon might try to enter India and occupy their Indian territories.

Until now company had only commercial interest in Sindh. But with these new developments to counter Napoleon's attack, the company therefore decided to revive their commercial relations with the Talpur Amir. So in 1799, company opened factories at Karachi and Thatta. For the first time a British Resident was appointed at Karachi.³³ But the small volume of their trade was used by local traders to convince Amirs that the real objective of the company is not commercial but to occupy Sindh. As a result, Amirs ordered British Resident to close the factory and leave Sindh. Finally the factory was closed in 1800.

But the event which not only further increased the British interest in Sindh, but led to its occupation was the 'first Anglo Afghan war'³⁴ (1839-1842).

Since the commencement of the nineteenth century Russia acquired political control of certain important areas of Central Asia, such as 'Georgia in 1801. In 1813, by the Treaty of Gulistan, she gained the districts round the Caspian coast. In 1826, by the treaty of Turco Manchi, the cities of Erivan and Tiflis were ceded to her'.³⁵ Russians' relationship with Persia (Iran) convinced the administrators of the Company that Russia will attack on British Indian Empire through Persia or Afghanistan. To counter Russian attack, Company decided to develop friendly relations with Persia and Afghanistan. Therefore, Company sends friendly missions to Persia (12 March 1809), and Afghanistan (June 1809). 'The treaties signed with the Shah of Iran and the King of Afghanistan, promised not to allow any European force to pass through their areas towards India'.³⁶

Russians its commercial advancement in Central Asia was also creating alarm for British. According to Arthur Connolly,³⁷ "Some 3000 camels were employed by Russia

³³ The resident was a representative of company at the court of Amirs. Mr. Nathan Crow was the first British Resident.

³⁴ For further detail on first Anglo Afghan War see Sir George Mac Munn, *The Lure of the Indus* (Karachi: Allied Book Company, 1986).

³⁵ Dr. Adrian Duane, *The History of British relations with Sindh* (Karachi: National Book Foundation, 1976), p. 236.

³⁶ Suhail Zaheer Lari, *An Illustrated History of Sindh* (Karachi: Heritage Foundation, 2002), p. 194.

³⁷ An Irish Officer, who in 1830 visited upper Sindh.

in its commerce in Asia and had an annual income of 8 million rubbles. The four commercial routes of Russia, as described by Connolly starts from Orenburg, Astrakhan, Resht and Tiflis, covering all the principle cities of Central Asia – to Khiv, Bokhara, Khokand and Samarkand in the Khanates; to Teheran, Ispahan, Meshed and Herat in Persia; to Kabul and Kandahar in Afghanistan; and, finally, to Kashgar, in Central Turkistan".³⁸

In view of this British authorities assumed that Russians might cross-river Indus to enter India. So for the protection of their Indian Empire, it becomes necessary for Company to develop good understanding with the Amirs of Sindh. It was thus only on this regard (importance of river Indus), that Company after the expulsion of Nathan Crow, again tried to renew their relationship with the Talpur Amir. So, '1809, 1820 and in 1831, they sent different political missions to Sindh which enabled them to re-enter into Sindh and consolidate their position'.³⁹ Thus because of the fear of Russian attack on India, the possession of Sindh and the control of the river Indus became an important tool for countering the Russian designs.

To achieve this, it was necessary to get permission from the Amirs of Sindh. For this William Bentinck sends Col. Henry Pottinger to do negotiations with the Amirs, resulted in the signing of a new treaty in 1832, in which under certain restrictions 'Amirs of Sindh allowed British Merchants and travelers to ingress to the country and to use Indus only for commercial purpose and disallowed the passage of armed boats for the transportation of troops and military stores'.⁴⁰ In 1834, a tariff on river trade was fixed. In beginning of 1838, Company obtained further concessions from the Amirs of Sindh who allowed 'British Resident to stay at Hyderabad and accepted the friendly mediation of the British between them and Ranjeet Singh, ruler of Punjab'.⁴¹

At the time of the appointment of Lord Auckland as Governor General of India (1838), the situation in Afghanistan and Persia was very complex and critical. On Russian encouragement Persia was planning an attack on Herat, and Persian Agents were busy intriguing with the Sardars of Kandahar. Meanwhile Dost Muhammad, ruler of Afghanistan was known to have dispatched an Afghan agent to St. Petersburg'.⁴²

Therefore, at the time of his appointment, Auckland was asked to keep strict eye on the events in Afghanistan and Persia and was also permitted to do whatever necessary to counter Russian designs. Thus Afghanistan and Sindh became the first line of defence of

³⁸ Dr. Adrian Duarte; *The History of British relations with Sind*, op. cit. p. 236.

³⁹ For further details see, Kala Thairani, *British Political Missions to Sindh* (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1981) and C.L. Mariwalla, *British Policy Towards Sindh* (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1982).

⁴⁰ Lt. Col. Outram; *The Conquest of Scinde: A commentary* (Quetta: Gosha-e-Adab, 1978), p. 29.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 29 and Dr. Adrian Duane, op. cit., p. 312.

⁴² Dr. Adrian Duarte, *Ibid*, p. 313.

British Empire in India and it became necessary to establish their influence on these regions.

As a first step, Auckland decided to send a mission to Afghanistan. He in 1837 appointed Alexander Burns as the head of the mission. Dost Mohammad in his meeting with Alexander Burns accepted the offer of friendship from Company but under one condition that if Company can force Ranjeet Singh to handover Peshawar back to him. He further said that if "Peshawar were giving back to him there was nothing he would not do to please the English. He and his brethren at Kandahar would give up all relations with Persia and Russia".⁴³

Lord Auckland turned down the demand of Dost Mohammad and said that "it was not the practice of the British Government, to interfere in the concerns of independent states. The return of Peshawar was entirely the Maharaja's affair; the British had nothing to do with it".⁴⁴ After losing all hopes of British assistance in getting back Peshawar, Dost Mohammad decided to develop friendly relation with Russia. Thus Burns mission ended in a failure.

This twist of Dost Mohammad towards Russia alarmed Company. To counter this threat from Dost Mohammad, Lord Auckland finally decided to dethrone Dost Mohammad and place Shah Shujah⁴⁵ on the throne of the Afghanistan. To finalize this plan, Macnaghten, Secretary to the Indian Government, was sent to Lahore (Punjab) and on 26 June 1838, the Tripartite Treaty was signed between Ranjeet Singh, Shah Shujah and the Company. It was originally decided that Shah Shujah along with the Sikh and Company's Army would move into Afghanistan through Punjab to place him on the throne. But Ranjeet Singh refused to allow the passage of British troops through his area. It was therefore; decided that British Army will take Shah Shujah to Afghanistan. To do that, it became necessary to pass British troops through Sindh. The River Indus became more necessary as a means of transporting British troops to Afghanistan. To get permission from Amirs of Sindh Lord Auckland demanded the 'Mirs to give passage to the British troops through their country, should allow to use river Indus for the transportation of British troops, the cession, for the time being, the areas of Karachi (with permission to use it as a military depot) Sukkur and Bukkur to them, and to abrogate all the river tolls'.⁴⁶

Mirs rejected the demands of Auckland and refused to sign a new treaty. In the mean time British Navy captured Karachi (1839). Through this act of Company, Amirs of Sindh became terrified and accepted the new terms of the treaty.

⁴³ *Ibid*, p. 315.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 316.

⁴⁵ In 1809, Shah Shuja was over thrown by Dost Mohammad, left Afghanistan and took refuge in Punjab.

⁴⁶ Dr. Adrian Duarte, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

Soon Auckland ordered the movement of the British troops through Sindh and in March 1839 reached Quetta. After occupying Kandahar in April, British Army moved towards Kabul, which was occupied and Shah Shujah was placed on the throne of Afghanistan in August 1839. Throughout 1840 and 41 Shah Shujah's position in Afghanistan was consolidated and the Company's Army kept occupying different areas of Afghanistan to bring them under its sway. These activities of British Army generated hatred against them. Finally on 2 November 1841, Akbar Khan, son of Dost Mohammad along with his supporters, attacked and plundered the homes of British officers. The mob attacked on the escort of Sir Alexander Burns and his brother Captain Burns in Kabul, in which they were killed, resulted in a full fledged fight between Akbar Khan and British troops. This fight proved to be a disaster for the British. 'To protect them from the further humiliation Macnaghten concluded a treaty with Akbar Khan on 11 December 1841, agreed to leave Afghanistan and to release Dost Mohammad'.⁴⁷ Under this agreement British military left Kabul for Jalalabad on 6 January 1842. During retreat British troops were massacred. On receiving the news of massacre, Lord Ellenbrough, Governor General of India at once recalled the British troops from Afghanistan. On 12 October 1842 British troops started their march back to India. Dost Mohammad was realized and once again became the ruler of Afghanistan.

During the retreat of British army through Sindh, Lord Ellenbrough suspected Amirs for harboring resentment and ungrateful feelings against British. 'From past many years Sindhi tribe Khosa of parker dessert had been invading and looting villages in Cutch district which was under the control of Bombay government'.⁴⁸ The government had lodged several times their complains with the Amir, but Amirs failed to take stem actions against Khosas. Lord Ellenbrough used these incidents as an excuse for invasion. To keep an eye on the activities of Amirs of Sindh, Lord Ellenbrough sends Sir Charles Napier as the British Resident in Sindh, with the absolute powers of war and peace. Napier reached Sindh on September 1842 and soon received news about Amir's hostile designs against British.

To punish Amirs for their secret designs, Governor General instructed Napier to force Amirs to accept a new treaty. Napier demanded that coins of Sindh should bear the name of the King of England, that the Talpurs should cede Karachi, Shikarpur, Sabzalkot and Umarkot to the British and that hundred yards of land on either side of the Indus should be given to the British Government',⁴⁹ Napier received the news that Amirs had refused to accept new demands of British and were busy in preparations of war. Napier as a result attacked and captured the fortress of Imamghar. The Amirs became terrified and agreed to sign a new treaty. But before it could actually be signed, a group of Baluch soldiers attacked the British Residency (15 February 1843) and set it

⁴⁷ Edward Thompson and G.T. Garrett, *Rise and Fulfillment of British Rule in India* (Allahabad: Central Book Depot, 1962), p. 347.

⁴⁸ E.B. Eastwick, *A Glance at Sindh before Napier* (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1989), p. 2.

⁴⁹ Suhail Zaheer Lari; *op. cit.*, p. 202.

on fire. Outram escaped from Hyderabad and went to Napier, who along with his Army marched towards Hyderabad to confront Hyderabad Mirs. 'On 17 February 1843, Napier fought Talpur Amirs at Miani and routed their army and occupied Hyderabad. On 24 March, he fought, Sher Muhammad, at Dabbo and defeated him also'.⁵⁰ Thus his campaign ended with the defeat of Talpur Mirs and the complete occupation of Sindh.

The main reason for the success of British were the disunity among the three houses of Talpurs, the different agreements signed between Talpur Mirs and British which gave them an easy access into Sindh and the Baluch soldiers who were brave but could not compete with the well trained and disciplined army which was equipped with the latest war equipment.

Soon after the victory of Miani, Napier announced his victory to the people of Sindh in these words:

"The Talpoors have been overthrown by the British and are dethroned—Sciend belongs to them no-longer. All revenues paid to the Ameers are now to be paid to the English Slavery is abolished throughout the land and all people are invited to return and live peacefully at their homes".⁵¹

After the final victory against Talpur Amirs at Dubbo, Governor General Lord Ellenbrough on 31 March 1843 appointed Napier as the Governor of Sindh who after his appointment on 20 May 1843 issued a proclamation asking all the 'Jagirdars to accept him as a new ruler of Sindh'. He further announced that all those 'jagirdars who will not come and pay their homage (*salam*) to him, their Jagirs will be confiscated by the government'. He fixed 24 May as a day of offering *salam*s by the Jagirdars. 'Some two hundred'⁵² Jagirdars tendered their allegiance to him. 'Every Jagirdar who came and made *salam* received a letter known as *salam sanad* or *salam parwana* signed by Napier confirming their entire Jagirs to them'.⁵³ The main object of this policy was to reduced the enmity, suspicions and mistrust of Sindhi Jagirdars and lastly to secure loyalty for his government.

Lord Ellenbrough in his letter of 12 April 1843 to Napier discussed about the future object of the administration of Sindh which according to him should be to 'redeem the character' which they had lost during the Afghan war. To achieve that; he suggested

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

⁵¹ William Napier, *History of General Sir Charles Napier's Administration of Scinde and campaign in the Cutchee Hills* (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1993), pp. 10-11.

⁵² W. Napier in his book *History of Sir Charles Napier's Administration of Scinde* says that there were 400 chiefs who submitted before Napier, p. 14.

⁵³ E. H. Aitken, *Gazetteer of the province of Sind*, *op.cit.* p. 141.

that they "have to create an Egypt" and this can be done by the "exercise of European mind in the administration of Asiatic province".⁵⁴

Regarding the administration of Sindh, Lord Ellenbrough suggested Napier that in the beginning no drastic changes should be made in the administrative set up of the province, rather he should follow the "old pattern of framing revenues, but should make the collection of revenues more efficient". He further suggested that "Sindh should be divided into districts under an English officer". According to him, "these officers should not only protect the farmers but should give justice to them".⁵⁵

Napier divided the government of Sindh into four branches, 'three military and one civil branch. The three military branches included, regular troops for protecting and conquering the territory, irregular horse. to help regular troops and the police for maintaining law and order, where as civil branch to run the civil administration of Sindh'.⁵⁶

As a governor in his first step Napier shifted his capital from Hyderabad to Karachi. For civil administration of the province he created the office of commissioner and appointed E. J. Brown as the first Commissioner of Sindh. He then, 'divided Sindh into three collectorates (districts) namely Karachi, Hyderabad and Shikarpur'.⁵⁷ British military officers were appointed as chief collectors of these collectorates. The collectorates were sub-divided into sub-collectorates (sub-districts), which were given under the control of sub-collectors/deputy collectors (total 16 in numbers). In a collectorates, deputy collectors assisted chief collector. Military officers, Captain Pope. Captain Preedy and Lieutenant Rathborne were the first chief collectors of Shikarpur, Karachi and Hyderabad districts respectively. Under them he placed all the local government officers of previous Talpur regime including Kardars'.⁵⁸ Thus the system of administration device by the Napier was military-cum-civilian.

Explaining his system of administration that is the reemployment of local government officers of previous regime Napier in his letter to Lord Ellenbrough wrote that "as they had all the knowledge of official details", therefore he had decided "to keep them employ, so that their knowledge can be used by this government". He further wrote that "if they were turned out they would intrigue against us", Napier hoped that his

⁵⁴ R. D. Choksey, *The Story of Sind: An Economic and Social Survey (1843-1933)* (Karachi: Indus publications, 2003), p. 14.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 14.

⁵⁶ Hamida Khuhro, *Making of Modern Sind: British Policy and Social Change in the Nineteenth Century*, op.cit., p. 29.

⁵⁷ The area of Karachi Collectorate was 16000 square miles; Hyderabad 30,000 square miles and Shikarpur 11,532 square miles. The Hyderabad collectorate included the area of Thar and Parkar, the Shikarpur collectorates consisted of Sukkur, Upper Sindh Frontier and Larkana Districts.

⁵⁸ During Talpur regime Kardars were the district in charge of Sindh who acted as revenue and judicial officer of the district.

arrangement would "steer the ship for the present" and would "prevent an extravagant government".⁵⁹ For creating harmony, understanding and acceptance of British rule by the locals Napier asked his officers 'not to make any avoidable change in the ancient custom and laws of the country'.⁶⁰

The collectors and deputy collectors were given the powers of both revenue and judicial officers. Deputy collectors in the capacity of revenue officers were required to send every month the statements of income and expenditure of their respective sub-districts to the collectors. The collectors in the capacity of revenue officers were required to prepare a complete report of income and expenditure of their collectorates and send it to commissioner who then along with his comments would send the statement of accounts to the governor who then would give his final approval on the expenses of the province and also send a complete report of accounts to the governor general.

As a magistrate the powers of deputy collectors were very limited and were only allowed to hear minor criminal cases. 'Under this system every judgment given by the deputy collector, was to be confirmed by the collector. Then collector had to send proceedings of all the cases to the Judge Advocate General (usually and army officers). His court was basically a revision court'.⁶¹

'Whereas in the case of serious crime, collector was required to prepare the preliminary enquiry report and collect the required documents. Then the enquiry report and other concerned documents were sent to the Judge Advocate General who then along with his comments submitted them to the governor. Then it was the governor who decided that in which court, civil or military, the case should be sent. Even the decision of military court was not supposed to be final. It required the final confirmation of the governor'.⁶²

As a governor the first aim of Napier was to bring the law and order situation of the province in control. To achieve this he reorganized the 'old police system and divided the police department into three sections, the City police, the rural police and mounted police'.⁶³ 'The city police was stationed in big towns and cities and was required to keep the crimes under control and maintain law and order. But the mounted police was not only required to act against crime but to protect the plains from the plundering by hill tribes and in case of military operations on the northern border of Sindh they were supposed to aid the troops also. He appointed military personnel as the head of the police stations'.⁶⁴ Along with the police force⁶⁵ troops were also under his control, which

⁵⁹ R. D. Choksey, *op. cit.* p. 15.

⁶⁰ Hamida Khuhro, *Making of Modern Sindh*, *op. cit.* p. 30.

⁶¹ W. Napier, *History of General Charles Napier's Administration of Sind*, *op.cit.* pp. 31 -32.

⁶² *Ibid*, pp. 32-33.

⁶³ W. Napier, *op.cit.* p. 23.

⁶⁴ R.D. Choksey, *op.cit.* p. 30 and W. Napier, *op.cit.* p, 23.

was to be called when police could not control the situation. Napier developed a police department on the model of the Royal Irish Constabulary. Under this model, which was now applied to Sindh, 'the whole territory was to be under the supervision of an Inspector General, while the districts would have their own Superintendents of Police, answerable to both the Inspector General and the District Collector, representing the civilian authority. While the rank and file were to be Indians, the officers were to be invariably Europeans'.⁶⁶

Napier soon realized that land revenue was the main source of government income. To improve the land revenue system, he appointed a committee under Mr. Preedy to collect the information regarding the ways of assessing and collecting land revenue during Talpur period. The committee was also required to *propose* changes in the current revenue system. Mr. Preedy submitted his report in July 1843. He reported that during 'Talpur rule land revenue was taken by dividing the agriculture produce (*Batai*) between government and the cultivators. He further reported the share of the government in the agricultural produce depended on the mode of irrigation used by the farmer on his land. From the land irrigated by the government (canals), the share of the government was one-fourth to one third of the produce, while from the land irrigated by rain was from two-fifth or one-half. Meanwhile on certain crops such as sugar cane, cotton, tobacco and vegetables government had imposed tax, which was collected in form of cash'.⁶⁷

In this regard, Napier brought some changes in the share of the government. "From the land irrigated without the aid of the government (farmer irrigating lands on their owns) the share of the government was fixed at one third or two fifths of the produce and from the land irrigated by the government the share was fixed at half of the produced".⁶⁸

Regarding the collection of land revenue Mr. Preedy reported that 'principal Zamindar was assigned with the duty to collect government's share of the produce from the village and acted as a middleman between the government and farmers. Zamindars apart from collecting revenue for the government used to collect other taxes also such as '*Lapo* (both had full) a small share of grains, *Malikano* or owner's fee and *Raj Kharch*, or the expenses of the village' for himself'.⁶⁹ To regulate land revenue Napier made seven-year settlement with the Jagirdars. To maintain strict supervision of the government on the collection of revenue, he replaced principal Zamindars with revenue officers (all British) who were to deal with the cultivators directly.

⁶⁵ R.D. Choksey, *op.cit.* p. 30. The total number of police force appointed by him was 2,400 and according to W. Napier, number of Police Force appointed by Napier was 2500, p. 23.

⁶⁶ Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, *From Plassey to Partition* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2004) p. 103.

⁶⁷ R.D. Choksey, *op.cit.* p. 3.

⁶⁸ *Ibid* p. 21.

⁶⁹ Hamida Khuhro, *Making of Modern Sind. op. cit.* p. 110 and R.D. Choksey, *op. cit.* p. 4.

At the time of British occupation, there was no proper irrigation system in Sindh. Realizing the importance of river Indus in the agricultural sector of Sindh he in one of his earliest acts 'created an irrigation and canal department, Colonel Walter Scott was appointed as the head of this department'.⁷⁰

He asked the engineer of the canal department to make a survey regarding the existing canals and to recommend the suggestion for the proper use of the surplus water of Indus and for the improvement of canal system. They recommended a barrage on the river Indus at Sukkur. As it was impossible to construct the barrage immediately, so to solve the problem of the usage of surplus Indus water, on the direction of Napier, the canal department started 'Sluice System'.⁷¹ Under this system water reservoirs with gates were constructed, Whenever river Indus overflowed, the surplus water was stored in these reservoirs. These water tanks were connected with the agricultural lands through canals. At the time of the harvest, the gates were opened and water through canals reaches the agricultural lands. In 1846, Napier gave the management of irrigation to the canal department. As employees of this department were not engineers as a result canal department could not accomplished much. Therefore it was abolished in '1849 and canal duties were transferred to collectors'.⁷²

Realizing the importance of Karachi harbor for the economic growth of the province Napier planned to improve the facilities at harbor. To allow ships to enter in harbor in any condition of weather he deepened and extended the anchorage. He also made a plan not only to link harbor with the interior of province but with the other areas of India. In this connection he started a project for joining the 'Keamari Island with mainland Karachi by a causeway or mole, which later on known as Napier's mole which was completed in 1854, and opened the Channel between the Port and the Indus by Ghisree Bunder'.⁷³ 'To protect Karachi from any outside attack, he intended to build fortification wall around it. He also made a project of construction of bridge over the Indus River at Sukkur'.⁷⁴

As governor of Sindh, Napier also tried to put down many abuses, which existed in the province. Most common was female suicide or murder of wives by their husbands, In this connection he in August 1844, issued a proclamation forbidding the people to "kill their wives without pity". He further warned that hereafter whosoever "kills his wife, the matter will be investigated by Court of Justice, and offender shall be punished

⁷⁰ Aitkin's Gazetteer, *op.cit*, p. 259.

⁷¹ Sluice System, An artificial passage for water with gates for controlling the flow.

⁷² Aitkin's Gazetteer, *op.cit*. p. 259.

⁷³ W.P. Andrew, *The Indus and Its Provinces: Their Political and Commercial Importance* (Karachi Indus Publications, 1986), P. 7.

⁷⁴ Ahmed Hussain Siddiqui, *Karachi - The Pearl of Arabian Sea* (Karachi: Muhammad Hussain Academy, 1996), p. 42.

according to his crime".⁷⁵ In 1847, Napier issued strict orders to all the magistrates to use their powers to stop this crime. In this connection he issued a proclamation forbidding the people to murder their wives. 'He warned that if in any village a woman is murdered, heavy fine will be imposed on all the residents of village and the murderers will be sent to far away over the water'.⁷⁶

To stop oppression of the villagers by native soldiers, he issued orders of death to soldiers. He issued another very interesting decree against furious driving. He said: "gentlemen as well as beggars may if they like ride to the devil when they get on horseback, but neither gentleman nor beggars have a right to send other people there, which will be the case if furious driving be allowed in the camp or bazaar".⁷⁷

During his regime he had been continuously fighting with the Baluchi tribes in the north of Sindh. These expeditions cost a lot and had adverse affect on the British's exchequer in India. Under the vehement criticism by the Bombay Presidency establishment, which had personal grudges against Napier, he, on 27 October 1847, was removed from the post of Governor.

With the departure of Sir Charles Napier in 1847, the status of Sindh was reduced from an independent province to the 'Commissionerate' and placed under the control of Bombay Presidency. Furthermore the post of governor was also abolished and a new designation of Chief Commissioner of Sindh was created. Mr. Robert Keith Pringle as senior Bombay civil servant was appointed as the first commissioner of Sindh. Commissioner was empowered with both executive and judicial powers. 'Two Assistant Commissioners namely E. J. Brown who was the Secretary to the Government of Sindh under Napier and Lieutenant Lester of the Deccan Revenue survey department were also appointed to help him in the administration'.⁷⁸

The division of the government of Sindh into one civil and three military branches as done by Napier, continued during Pringle's administration, but with the little change that is instead of Governor, now Commissioner was in charge of civil administration branch and senior military officer was in charge of military branch.

Similarly for revenue, judicial and political purposes the division of Sindh as done by Napier continued during Pringles time also. During Pringles time, though no drastic changes were introduced in the administrative set up of the government but he made some amendments in the judicial system. To assist commissioner, in his judicial duties, the office of the 'Judicial Assistant was created', judicial military commissioners were

⁷⁵ Colonel Keith Young, *Scinde in the Forties* (Karachi: Indus Publication, 1994), p. 201

⁷⁶ R.D, Choksey, *op. cit*, p. 34.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p. 30.

⁷⁸ Hamida Khuhro, *The Making of Modern Sindh*, *op.cit*. p. 38.

abolished and regular tribunals were established. 'There were commissioner's magistrates, deputy magistrates and Kardars courts'.⁷⁹

'The court of Judicial Assistant was the final court of appeal and regulated all the procedure of civil and criminal law. Furthermore sentences passed by lower courts, (except the death and transportation for life punishment), were confirmed by him'.⁸⁰

No improvement was made in the clearance and maintenance of the canals during Pringle's time. As a result, the canal system deteriorated. 'Mr. Pringle, being aware of the military requirement of Sindh created Baluch and Sindh Battalions'.⁸¹

At the time of his appointment he was asked by the Bombay governor Mr. Clerk to make an extensive survey and prepare a comprehensive report on the working of the government departments so that they can be re-organized to meet the requirement of the civilian government. But he failed to prepare such report and was criticized by bureaucrats of Bombay government for neglecting his duties and was 'forced to resign in 1850'.⁸² Mr. Bartle Frere, a civil servant, was appointed by the governor of Bombay as the next Commissioner of Sindh. During his Commissionership many important changes were introduced which helped in the progress of Sindh.

Frere realized that in Sindh the main source of revenue was agricultural produce and the rate of the revenue imposed on agricultural land depended on the type of irrigation employed by the cultivators on their land.

As discussed earlier, canal department established by Napier was abolished in 1848-49 and its function was given to collectors. Pringle did not made any change in this set-up. But Frere realizing the defects in the previous set-up re-established separate canal department and with the assistance of Major Turner re-organized it and in 1854 for improving the working of the department he brought some changes. Such as for the 'maintenance and for cleaning of the canals, the work of hiring and payment of laborers was given back to Kardars. He created a separate agency, which was required to prepare yearly plans of the work to be done by the department and further to make periodical reports, and check malpractices in the department. Under his scheme 'every Division had Executive Engineer who was required to work for the improvement of canals. In this work one or more assistant surveyors' assisted him'.⁸³ This set up continued till the establishment of public works department. He created the post of Superintending Engineer who was the head of the canal department and was required

⁷⁹ Hughes *Gazetteer*, *op. cit.* p. 52. Also in Aitkin's *Gazetteer*, *op.cit*, p, 145.

⁸⁰ Aitkin's *Gazetteers*, *op. cit.* p. 439. It was in 1862 that with the introduction of criminal and civil procedure court the power to sanction death sentence were given to the commissioner in Sindh.

⁸¹ Ajazul Haq Quddusi, *Tarikh-i-Sindh*, (Lahore: Urdu Science Board, 1984), p. 96.

⁸² Hamida Khuhro, *Making of Modern Sindh*, *op. cit.* p. 129.

⁸³ *Ibid*, pp. 184 -185.

to report to the commissioner. Under this set up, long-term pursuit had been launched to store the water of Indus River. For this purpose, the Sukkur Barrage scheme was realized in 1923, which was completed in 1935.

Frere with minor changes adopted the same judicial system of the previous administration. Under him collectors along with the duties of revenue collection continued to perform their judicial function as a district magistrate also. However he observed that local people were not taking benefit from their judicial system. He further observed that one of the main complaints of the local people was that courts were too far away from their areas and as a result they have to travel a long distance to reach the courts. To provide justice at their doorstep, he decided to create more courts by giving limited judicial powers to Kardars. Therefore in '1851, he allowed Kardars to hear petty cases and was authorized to inflict punishment of a fine of Rs. 15 to 100 or imprisonment from 20 days to four months and flogging of not more than 25 stripes'.⁸⁴

At the time of the occupation of Sindh, Police and judicial system was closely linked together. Napier however separated them and created separate judicial and police department. Now the duty of Police was to prevent or detect crime where as magistrate was required to investigate the cases judicially brought before them by the police. Under Pringle and Frere the set up of Police department established by Napier continued.

From the ancient time in Sindh besides agriculture another important resource of revenue was trade. Sindh had its trading relations with "Persia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Central Asia and Europe. Thatta was a centre of textile industry with 5000 looms and had a commercial port". Other important commercial towns were "Bakhar, Rohri, Darbelo, Gambat, Kandiaro, Sehwan, Sann, Nasarpur, Shikarpur, Hyderabad and Sukkur".⁸⁵

The canal system was improved by Napier and later by Frere so to get more agricultural produces which in turn gave more revenue to the government. Similarly to increase revenue from trade, it was realized by Frere to increase the tariff and the trade activities had to be increased. To achieve this, the improvement in the basic infrastructure for trade was required. At the time of the appointment of Frere, he "found not a mile of bridged or metalled road, not a masonry bridge of any kind, in fact, not five miles of any cleared road".⁸⁶ With this idea he started various schemes for the improvement of roads, railway, harbor, bridges and *Serais* (rest houses). 'He constructed 126 miles of roads in 1851 and in 1852; some 207 miles of roads were constructed. He also planned and started the work of laying the first railway line between Karachi and Kotri (1858),

⁸⁴ Aitkin's *Gazetteer*, *op.cit.*, p. 439.

⁸⁵ Hamida Khuhro, *The Making of Modern Sindh*, *op.cit.* p. 195.

⁸⁶ Aitkin's *Gazetteer*, *op.cit.* p. 341.

which was finally completed in 1861'.⁸⁷ It was during his time the construction of 'Karachi Railway Station began'.⁸⁸ Thus in '1855 the Scinde Railway Company was established to introduce Railways into the Province of Sindh'.⁸⁹ Frere had also worked for the improvement of harbor and development of Port of Karachi.

At the time of the occupation of Sindh, it had no proper system of sanitation and drainage. To provide sewerage and garbage disposal facilities to people in 1846 Napier created a Board of Conservancy. Frere, however on '13 April 1853, abolished the Board and through imperial Act XXVI introduced municipal system in Sindh by founding the civic body for Karachi known as Karachi Municipal Corporation'.⁹⁰

Another very important administrative issue, which was solved by Frere, was his decision regarding the selection of the official language for running the business of the government. At the time of occupation Persian was the official language as well as language of teaching but people used to speak Sindhi. The Napier and his assistants face serious communication problem with the local people. To solve this Napier started a system of double interpretation. First Sindhi was translated into Persian and then Persian into English. Governor Clerk in 1848 advised Napier that Sindhi should be adopted as official language. But as Napier was interested in consolidation of his conquest and remained busy in the set up of the different departments of the administration, as a result, he did not change the official language and Persian was continuously used as official language.

It was in 1849, that Pringle decided to adopt Sindhi language as an official language. Lord Falkland, the Governor of Bombay agreed with Pringle in his selection of official language. At that time various alphabets were used for writing Sindhi script. They were 'Arabic, Gurmukhi and Khudawadi. Of these Arabic alphabets were more commonly used as compare to Gurmukhi and where as Khudawadi were special alphabets used by Banias only for maintaining their accounts'.⁹¹

In view of this, it became necessary for Pringle to select one form of alphabets for Sindhi. To solve this issue he appointed a committee. which was required to make a final decision regarding the selection of alphabets. 'Pringle in 1849 submitted a report to

⁸⁷ Ahmed Hussain Siddiqui, *op.cit.* p. 102.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p. 67.

⁸⁹ W.P. Andrew, *op.cit.* p. 70.

⁹⁰ Ahmed Hussain Siddiqui, *op.cit.* p. 46. The first managing committee of the corporation was consisted of three members: Captain Preedy (Revenue Officer), Mr. John McLeod (Collector of Customs) and Seth Naomal (The richest merchant of Sindh). The members of the managing committee used to inspect the Town daily in the morning to monitor the state of cleanliness.

⁹¹ B.H. Ellis, Report on Education in Sindh (Bombay: Bombay Education Society Press, 1856), pp. 7-9. Apart from these there were other varieties used in different areas of Sindh such as Thattai, Serai, Khwaja, memon type and Dehki. Also see Richard F. Burton, *Sindh and the Races that inhabit the Valley of Indus* (Karachi: Indus Publications, 1988).

the Governor of Bombay Lord Falkland, in which Stack proposed Khudawadi alphabets where as Burton propose Arabic alphabets'.⁹² To settle this controversy, Lord Falkland referred the whole matter to the Governor General of India who for final decision sent it to the court of Directors. By the time Directors sent back their decision in 1852. Pringle had left Sindh and Frere was now the Commissioner of Sindh. Though directors favored Arabic Alphabets but they suggested that another committee comprised of European and local Sindhis who were well versed in the language should be appointed. Therefore Frere in 1853, under Mr. Barrow Ellis the Deputy Commissioner appointed a committee, which proposed that both these alphabets should be used. Even the report of Mr. Ellis could not resolve this controversy. Then Frere himself finally decided to use Arabic Alphabets to write Sindhi Script. Thus for once and all, this controversy come to an end. This standardization of the alphabets led to the usage of Sindhi language as medium of instruction at the Primary level. As a consequence Frere in 1854 started a scheme for the spread of education in Sindh. Under this scheme he established 'vernacular primary school throughout Sindh and opened English schools, Engineering and normal schools at the district level'.⁹³

It was during his Commissionership that the first English newspaper named '*Daily Gazette*' started its publication from Karachi. Following this Gujarati community also brought out a newspaper '*Gujarati sansar*'.⁹⁴ He developed proper postal system and designed, with the aid of Mr. Coffey, the first postal stamp of India, issued in September 1854 known as 'Scinde District Dawk',⁹⁵ He constructed Dak Banglows on the main roadsides for the people carrying Dak (letters) from one place to other.

Thus by the time Frere left Sindh in 1859, after experimenting different administrative set up, finally the organization of administration of Sindh was completed and running of the administration become a routine affair but developmental work continued with every new Commissioner. For example, after Frere, during the time of J.D. Inverarity (1859-1862), municipalities were created in big towns throughout Sindh, 'Indus river conservancy department was established, Karachi – Kotri railway was opened (1861)⁹⁶ and 'Karachi chamber of commerce was founded (1860)'.⁹⁷

Similarly during the time of Samuel Mansfield (1862-67) 'Sindh court Act was introduced in Sindh (1866) under which judicial functions were taken away from

⁹² *Ibid.* p. 2.

⁹³ For detail see, Habibullah Siddiqui, *Education in Sindh - Past and Present*, (Jamshoro: Institute of Sindhology, 1987).

⁹⁴ Ahmed Hussain Siddiqui, *Karachi A pearl in Arabian Sea*, *op cit.* p. 74.

⁹⁵ Aitken's *Gezetteer*, *op.cit.* p. 147.

⁹⁶ Aijazul Haq Quddusi, *Tarikh-e-Sindh*, Vol. 3, p. 107, for further study see Herbert Feldman, *Karachi Through a Hundred years* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1960).

⁹⁷ Herbert Feldman, *op.cit.*, p. 1. The founding members of Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry were Mclver and Company, Barclay, Watson and Company, Fleming and Company, T. Lidbetter and Company, Finlay and Company, J.K. Dunolly and Company, and Ashbuner, Bell and Company.

Commissioner and separate courts of criminal judicature were created'.⁹⁸ The organization of 'Police Department was finally completed during the Commissionership of Major Sir William L. Merewether (1867-77). In 1862, telegraph was introduced in Sindh (Karachi) by Indo-European Telegraph Department'.⁹⁹ In '1883 electricity was provided to Sindh'.¹⁰⁰ In the year '(1883) Bombay Telephone Company provided the telephone facility to the inhabitants of Karachi'.¹⁰¹ For the development and extension of Karachi Port in '1887, Karachi Port Trust was created'.¹⁰²

The cumulative effect of improvement and development of Karachi harbor, opening of Karachi-Kotri and other railway tracks. construction of roads and bridges increased the trade activity which in turn increased the revenue of the government and people attached with trade became wealthy. When riches were showered on Karachi, many Parsis, Hindus and Muslims emerged in province. Such as, Eduljee Dinshaw Supariwala, Jehangir Kothari, Dubash and Katrae families of Parsis. Among the Memon, Abdullah Sabswani, Umer Haji Dossal and Haji Dossal Saddarwala came in light.

'In Agha Khanis Khoja Valjee, Heerjee (great grandfather of Mr. Jinnah) and Jaffer Fadool gained prominence. Laljee Lakhidas and Dongrass Jashi belonging to Gujarati Hindus become very wealthy. Haji Jehta Bhai Gokal and Haji Rehmatullah became prominent among Asna-e-Ashri Khojas. Many Shikarpuri families also turned wealthy. The name of Hashim Khan achieved prominence in wealthy Pathans'.¹⁰³

One of the major effects of the new political system introduced by British crown after 1857 was the development of political consciousness and desire to have a platform from which they could communicate their problems to the British administration of India. As a result number of associations came into being throughout India. In the end of nineteenth century several associations and political parties came into being in Sindh also. The first association, Arya Samaj was founded in 1875 by a Hindu, Swami Dyanand, which created a rift between Hindus and Muslims of Sindh. To reduce this rift, Sindh Sabha, a quasi-political association was organized which included Hindus and Muslims alike. Its aim was to work for the betterment of all the people of Sindh. Hassan Ali Effandi a Karachi Lawyer was the first Muslim to join it.¹⁰⁴ Because of the differences with his other Hindu party men, he resigned from Sindh Sabha and started a separate association for Muslims known as Anjuman-e-Islam (1880). 'The purpose of this association was the economic, social and educational uplift of the Muslims of

⁹⁸ Aitken's *Gazetteer op.cit.*, p. 439.

⁹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 364.

¹⁰⁰ Ahmed Hussain Siddiqui, *op.cit.*, p. 59.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, p. 59.

¹⁰² Herbert Feldman, *op.cit.*, p. 55.

¹⁰³ Ahmed Hussain Siddiqui, *op.cit.*, p. 73.

¹⁰⁴ For further information about the political growth in Sindh see K. R. Maikani, *The Sindh Story* (New Delhi: Sindhi Academy 1997).

Sindh'.¹⁰⁵ The differences that arose between him and his other associates led to the abolition of the Anjuman.

By this time the Muslims of India had realized that the only way to progress and survive in India is to take up the western education. Realizing the importance of western education in 1884, Syed Amir Ali founded Muhammadan Association. Effandi, following the footsteps of Amir Ali in 1884 opened a branch of Muhammadan Association, by the name of Sindh Muhammadan Association, in Karachi. This association opened primary schools known as '*Mulla Maktab*' (village based religious schools) throughout Sindh. In these *Maktab*s religious education along with the Arabic and Persian languages were also taught. To impart the higher education among the Sindhi Muslims, Effandi in 1885 started an educational institute by the name of 'Sindh Madrasat-ul-Islam' at Karachi. Sindh Muhammadan association remains effective till the separation of Sindh from the Bombay Presidency. Then came into being, another quasi-political association by the name of Sindh Educational Conference, which was mainly concerned with the education of the Muslims. Another important organization, which came into being in 1908, was Sindh Provincial Conference whose main purpose was to discuss the problems of Sindh and to present more liberal picture of Sindh'.¹⁰⁶

In 1909 Minto Morley Reforms gave a chance to Sindhi politicians to enter into Bombay Legislative Council and to raise voice for the betterment of the masses. 'Syed Allahdino Shah of Derbello, Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, Ghulam Muhammad Bhurgri, and Harchandrai Vishindas were the first representatives of Sindh elected to the Bombay Legislative Council'.¹⁰⁷ These leaders raised issues regarding the Muslim Mass education in Sindh, separate representation of Muslims in the local bodies and uplift of poor *haris* (cultivators).

Minto Morley Reforms were found inadequate; therefore in 1919 Montague Chelmsford Reforms were introduced to give adequate representation to Indians in the day-to-day administration. As a result the representation of Sindh on the Bombay Legislative Council increased. These political developments increased new interest in Sindhi Muslims who founded Sindh Muslim League branch on 1 November 1917 in Karachi. The idea was to create Muslim political organization to give free expression to the Muslim grievances and their legitimate aspiration to take an active part in government. During the years of league's early growth in Sindh, Pirs (religious leaders), politicians, Zamindars and the general public of Sindh took active part in Khilafat Movement. This movement politicized the Sindhi Muslim Communities.

¹⁰⁵ Dr. Abdul Jabbar Abid Laghari, *Jido Jahad-e-Azadi main Sindh Ka Kirdar* (urdu) (Lahore: Research Institute Of Pakistan 1992), p. 62.

¹⁰⁶ Hameeda Khuhru, *Muslim Political Organizations in Sindh 1843-1938, Sindh through Centuries*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 174.

¹⁰⁷ Dr. Abid Laghari, *Jido Jahad-i-Azadi Mein Sindh Ka Kirdar op.cit.*, p. 65.

Besides there had been another movement, which not only further politicized the Sindhi Muslim Community but also united them for a single cause, which was separation of Sindh Movement from Bombay Presidency. When local politicians started separation of Sindh movement (1908-1936), the politicians of major national level party Muslim League assisted them and because of the combined efforts of local and national level politicians, finally in 1936 Sindh was separated from Bombay presidency.

During the separation movement, other political movements such as 'Hurr movement (1921), Jamiat-e-Ulma-e-Sindh (1925), Khaksar Tehrik, (1932) came into being'.¹⁰⁸ In the early twentieth century in the next phase of political activities, Sindh took active part in Khilafat Movement and thus entered into the main politics of India.

Along with urban politics, people of the rural areas also got interested in the politics, so in 1930 Sindh Hari Committee was formed at Mirpur Khas, When the election of 1937 were announced several new parties came into being such as 'Sindh Azad party in 1935, Sindh United Party 1935, Sindh Muslim political party (1936), Sindh Sagar Party (1939)'.¹⁰⁹

Under these socio-political conditions in Sindh, many Sindhi Muslim leaders were born, grown up and got education. Among them was Sir Haji Abdullah Haroon, a Karachi merchant who played a prominent role in the politics, which will be assessed, in the next chapters.

¹⁰⁸ M. Qasim Soomro: *Muslim Politics in Sindh, (1938-1947)*, (Jamshoro: Pakistan Study Centre, 1989), pp 23-24.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 26-30.

CHAPTER III

FAMILY, CHILDHOOD AND ENTRY INTO POLITICS

Abdullah Haroon (1872-1942), 'the youngest son of Mian Haroon was born in Karachi'.¹¹⁰ His family belonged to 'Lohana tribe of Cutch'.¹¹¹ Lohanas' origin was from Loh in Kashmir, close to the border of Tibet. Lohana tribe migrated from Loh to different parts of India and branched off as *Cutchi Lohanas* and *Kathiawari Lohanas*. 'One of its branches migrated to Sindh and settled near the Delta of Indus River and became known as *Sindhi Lohanas*'.¹¹² 'After the fall of Sindh to Arab Muslim in 712 the Lohanas gradually came under the fold of Islam'.¹¹³ However, during the Soomras, Summas, Arghuns and Turkhans dynasties, due to unavoidable circumstances, most of the Lohanas migrated to Cutch and settled there. The Cutchi Lohanas came in contact with the Lohanas who migrated from Sindh and the former embraced Islam, and were called by the title of '*Momin*', the faithful. With the passage of time the word Alomin was transformed into Memon'.¹¹⁴

Abdullah Haroon's family came from Cutch to Karachi¹¹⁵ to make fortune in trade and business. His father Seth Haroon died in 1876 when Abdullah was only four years of age. Seth Haroon left behind him his widow, Hanifabai,¹¹⁶ two sons and a daughter, all of whom were the offspring's of different marriages. He did not get anything from his father's leftover assets. Abdullah's early life was spent under the protecting care of his mother. From his childhood he was used to a hard life. Even when he was six, his

¹¹⁰ Alhaj Mian Ahmad Shafi, *Haji Sir Abdoola Haroon: A Biography* (Karachi: Pakistan Herald Press, n.d.), p. 20.

¹¹¹ Cutch is a small state lying on the northwest coast of Bombay, It covers an area of 7,600 sq. miles and has a population of rather less than five hundred thousand. *Ibid.* p. 18.

¹¹² Lohanas in Sindh became important elements as Amils. Under Kalhora and Talpur Mirs dynasties, Lohanas held high posts in the administration. The main occupation of Sindhi Lohanas were trade and business, money-lending, Allen Keith Jones, *Muslim Politics and the Growth of Muslim League in Sindh 1935-1941*, unpublished ph. D. Thesis Duke University, U.S.A., 1977.

¹¹³ Karim Baksh Khalid, "Haji Abdullah Haroon", *Paigam* April, 1982, p. 6.

¹¹⁴ *A Biography, op. cit.* p. 18. Memons are said to be descendants of Lahanas converted to Mohammadianism in the middle of 15 Century by a saint from Baghdad named Sayed Yousif-ud-Din Kadiri. The wards migrated to Bhuj and spread to Bombay (and Cutch), but many remained in Sindh. *Aitkin's Gazetteer*, p. 177.

¹¹⁵ By 1858, Karachi was developing into a trading port and businessmen were becoming prosperous. Families such as Bohras and Parsis shifted from Bombay to Karachi. Karachi had trade with Afghanistan, Iran and other Persian countries mostly by way of Camels. In 1843-44, the total value of Karachi's trade was pounds 885,103 which increased to pound 2,683,650 in 1860 and in the beginning of twentieth century it exceeded then million pounds'. Herbert Feldman, *Karachi through a hundred years*, p. xx.

¹¹⁶ Hanifabai belonged to Cutch and came from the well-to-do "VATAO" family. When her husband died she was about 18 years old. Her brothers came to Karachi and tried to persuade her to accompany them back to Cutch but she refused. She did not want her son to be brought up on the charity of others even if they happened to be his own maternal uncles, *A Biography*, p. 19.

mother used to wake him up at dawn to fetch ration from the bazaar for the day. This taught him to feel his responsibility towards his mother and the home. His mother quotes:

"Once, while returning home from an errand, he dropped a *pie* (penny). As soon as he became aware of his loss, he retraced his steps in search of the missing coin but in the gathering darkness, he failed to find it. He gave it up as lost and hurried home to tell his mother what had happened. He explained to her that he had done his best to find the coin but had failed. She severely reprimanded him for his carelessness and sent him back with a lighted *dia* (tiny earthen lamp) to find the coin. As she used to relate this story in her later life she always said that though the lighting of the *dia* cost her more than a pie, it taught the young orphan priceless lesson".¹¹⁷

Abdullah Haroon was admitted to a Gujrati school at the age of six. 'His daily routine remained the same. He would get up at dawn; go to the bazaar for purchasing items for the house and after having breakfast would go to school wily nilly. He would spend most of his time in the afternoon in playing and would pay little attention to his studies. When his mother came to know about his truancy, she became angry. However, being a mother, she advised his son with love and affection to attend the school regularly and devote himself to studies. When she realized that her son was not a literary genius, she thought of other plans for his son. In an affectionate manner she told her son that because they were poor and could not afford the luxury of his wasting time at school indefinitely, he should start doing some sort of work to keep the home going. At the same time she would like him to continue his study a little longer so that he could at least read and write Gujrati, which would help him in carving out for himself a business career, She did not like to see him wasting his evening playing marbles. Therefore, she would buy him a tray full of small saleable items such as little toys, pencils, erasers, and shoelaces.

After his return from school he would sell these articles in the bazaar or the streets'.¹¹⁸ Initially Haroon felt embarrassed as his playmates were having a good time. But his mother reminded him gently that he had to earn for his house. Thus Haroon continued studying at Gujrati School in the morning and selling items in the evening. 'In 1887 he joined Sindh Madrassatul Islam but left the school within a year'.¹¹⁹

When grown up, Haroon felt dissatisfied with his meager earnings. He thought of doing some other work from which he could earn more money. 'He thus gave up selling items in the bazaar and took employment as a messenger in a firm of one of his

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 20-21.

¹¹⁸ *A Biography*, p. 21.

¹¹⁹ The name of Abdullah Haroon is mentioned in class Register of Second Standard in the Year 1887-88 session, *Dawn*, 26 September 1978.

relatives.¹²⁰ Thereafter he quit this job in 1887 and joined the firm of Seth Sala Mohammad, his brother-in-law (husband of his step-sister, Zuleikha), who was a reputed merchant, on a salary of rupees four per month (as a pocket money) in the hope of gaining experience of business which he could use as and when he would start his own. However, his mother allowed only half of this amount to be spent by him and he had to account for it to his mother.

When Haroon turned fifteen, his mother decided to marry him off. 'In 1888, she arranged her son's marriage with Rahima Bai, a girl from her own community. Out of this wedlock a daughter named Zuleikha was born.'¹²¹ This marriage was not a happy one but he maintained his wife for a long fifty years. Haroon's second marriage was arranged by his mother with her niece Rabia Bai in the hope that she would give him the love and care which he could not receive from his first wife. However, this marriage did not bring any satisfactory change in his life. As two marriages had not brought love and happiness in the life of Haroon, he yearned for a wife who could bring happiness and could be his true companion. 'In 1914, he married Nusrat who was daughter of an Indian Doctor, Niaz Ali. He faced disapproval of marriage from Nusrat's father because of the difference of faith between the two families; Haroon was a Sunni while Nusrat was a Shia'.¹²²

In the meanwhile, Haroon 'in 1889 went to perform Haj along with his mother'.¹²³ On return from Haj, Haroon joined the firm of his maternal uncle who was in the grain business. During his association with his Uncle, he learnt the mechanism of the grain trade. His uncle used to travel a lot due to his business. He once took Haroon to Cuttack in Orissa. This visit turned to be a turning point in his life. He learnt a lot in making business deals. On his return from Cuttack he remained with his uncle for few more years and continued learning business, especially in import and export, and dealings with foreign countries. After gaining enough experience he decided to quit his uncle's business to start his own career. 'To start his own business his mother gave him the money, which she had saved over the years'.¹²⁴ From this money he bought a bag of sugar from a local market and sold it on the street of Juna Market, Karachi. This small scale of his business could not satisfy him. He decided to become a middleman and supply sugar to small shops. For this purpose 'in 1899 he purchased a shop in Jodia Bazar from where he started supplying sugar to small shopkeepers as a wholesale

¹²⁰ Pir Ali Mohamad Rashidi, *Uhey Deinh Uhey Sheinh* (Sindhi) (Hyderabad: Sindhi Adabi Board, 1993), p. 178.

¹²¹ G.M. Sayed, *Janab Guzarium Jin Saan* (Sindhi) (Hyderabad: Sindh Adabi Board, 1979), p. 42. Also *A Biography*, p. 22.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 45

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 42 (The existing literature on the subject does not reveal the date of his first pilgrimage. But the estimated date must be around 1888).

¹²⁴ *A Biography*, p. 25, Haroon's brother in law Seth Saleh Mohammad gave Rs. 5,000/- each to Haroon and his brother Usman. Usman spent the amount on drugs and merry making, whereas Haroon under the advice of his mother started his business, which flourished. Pir Ali Mohamad Rashidi, *Uhey Deinh Uhey Sheinh* (Hyderabad: Sindhi Adabi Board, 1993), p. 179.

supplier'.¹²⁵ Haroon faced many twists and turns in business, but eventually established his business on a large scale. 'He imported sugar from Java and from other countries and soon earned for himself the title of Sugar King'.¹²⁶ He established business relations with 'Java, England, Germany, South Africa, Mauritius and New York (USA), before the outbreak of World War I'.¹²⁷

Haroon's hard work and honesty brought success in business. He was not: however, content to rest on his achievement. He retained his enterprising spirit and continued to expand his business. Haroon had ambitions to establish sugar factory of his own. 'With this idea in mind in 1930, he purchased a Zamindari at Motipur in Bihar. Where, he in 1935 established a factory with a capacity of handling 1,200 tons of sugarcane a day'.¹²⁸

Haroon's vast experience and knowledge of trade, industry and finance was not only recognized but often utilized by the Indian Government. 'Such as in 1929 he was appointed as member of the Central Banking Enquiry Committee, in 1932 he was sent to Ottawa as Indian government representative to attend the Imperial Economic Conference. He was offered the Director ship of the Reserve Bank which, because of political consideration he declined. He later on, as member of Central Legislative Assembly, was appointed as member of the Committee, for the allotment. of Reserve Bank shares, and was also made a Director of the Indian Transcontinental Airways'.¹²⁹

Towards the close of the year 1939 Haroon on the suggestion of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, President of the All-India Muslim League. 'he was appointed as the Director of the Mogul Line'.¹³⁰

Abdullah Haroon could not keep himself aloof from the politics of his era and 'from 1901 take off for public and political sphere of Sindh'.¹³¹ 'He became founding member of Karachi Club, which was established in 1907, and donated large sums of money to the Club'.¹³² By 1910 he obtained prominent position in Karachi. 'In 1910, Haroon joined Sindh Mohammadan Association (SMA)¹³³ founded by Syed Ameer Ali. (1849-1928)

¹²⁵ All account is given from *A Biography*, pp. 26-28.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 45-48.

¹²⁹ *Biography, op. cit.*, pp 49-52.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ G.M. Sayed: *op. cit.* p. 43. In one photograph Abdullah Haroon is with Sir Aga Khan at a gathering given in honor of Sir Aga Khan and in another photograph Haroon is with Mir Ayub Khan, Secretary of Sindh Mohammadan Association, Mr. Jamshed Mehta and Seth Osman Dossalani gathering during 1911 organized in honor of Hakim Ajmal Dehlvi in Karachi.

¹³² *Ibid*, p. 42

¹³³ *Ibid*

SMA, as a branch of National Mohammadan Association, aimed at 'promoting the well being of the Musalmans on the principle of loyal adherence to the British Crown'.¹³⁴

The policy of loyal adherence to the British Crown did not remain for long as the Khilafat-e-Usmania, the only institution of Muslims solidarity, came under serious military threat from Britain and its allies. From 1911 onwards, Europe was heading towards a global catastrophe in which Ottoman Empire had to take its position in the Balkan area. These developments had profound impact on the Muslims of India. To assist the Muslims of Turkey, Turkish Hilal-e-Ahmar, opened several of its branches in India. One such branch was opened in Sindh, known as "Sindh Hilal-e-Ahmar" on 8 October 1911. Mir Ayub Khan¹³⁵ was appointed its President while Haroon took the offices of Secretary and Treasurer.¹³⁶ By 1913, all the funds that were collected by Sindh Hilal-e-Ahmar were sent to Turkey. Sindh Hilal-e-Ahmar on 12 October 1913 issued a report regarding the transfer of funds. The report, prepared by Seth Abdullah Haroon, discussed the War of Tripoli and embodied certain proposals for the welfare of Sindhi Muslims also which were:

- i) "The institute for the learning of Persian and Arabic languages should be established at various centres in Sindh.
- ii) In English schools, Sindhi and Persian Languages should be taught as primary languages. Arabic should also be taught so that along with the western knowledge, religious knowledge is also imparted.
- iii) For college going Muslim students, a hostel with a mosque should be established.
- iv) For education of Muslims, Hon'ble Rais Ghulam Mohammad Burghari has introduced cess bill in the Bombay Council. We must work to get it passed. But if because of the opposition of Zamindars and Government, this bill is not passed, and then Muslims should help themselves and should start a fund for this purpose.
- v) For the accommodation and education of Muslim Orphans, and Orphanage Centre should be opened.

¹³⁴ D.A. Pirzada, *Growth of Muslim Nationalism in Sindh: Parting of ways to Pakistan* (Karachi: Mehran Publishers, 1995), p. 9. And also Mohammad Yousuf Abbasi, *Annals of the Central National Mohammadan Association 1878-1888* (Islamabad, NIHCHR, 1982), pp. 146-53.

¹³⁵ Mir Ayub Khan was then secretary of Sindh Muhammadan Association, Karachi. He took up the work for establishing Sindh Muslim League Branch in 1942, but he died the same year.

¹³⁶ Dr Khan Mohammad Panhwar, *Al-Wahid jo Sindh Ji Sahafat u-syasat an Alim-o-Adab Main Hiso* (Sindhi) (Karachi: Indus Publication, 1996), p. 82.

vi) Cooperative Societies should be established so that the Zamindars could obtain loan from them for the payment of Agricultural Tax (Dhul) and not from the moneylender's who charge exorbitant rates of interest.

vii) For the representation of rights of Sindhi Muslims, there is a need of Sindhi and English Language newspapers, and for the publication of these newspapers, efforts should be made".¹³⁷

'In April 1913, Haroon won a seat on the Municipal Committee of Karachi'.¹³⁸ He served on the Municipal Committee for seventeen years from May 1913 to 21 August 1934'.¹³⁹ During 'his long association of seventeen years with Municipal Committee, he worked for seven years on the Managing Committee. The electorate then was a joint one, that is, he sought the suffrage of all the citizens of his constituency irrespective of their creed and class and it speaks volumes for his popularity that an appreciating public reposed its confidence in him, which he retained, later on under separate electorates. He served on many other sub-committees such as on a Committee formed to define the words "religious ceremonies", a sub-committee to report on the removal of skins, hides etc. of cows, a sub-committee to report on the imposition of fresh taxes, a sub-committee to report on certain defect in the columns supporting the dome of the new Museum building and methods to be devised for removing them'.¹⁴⁰ Jamshed Mehta lauded Haroon's works and services in the following words:

"Abdullah Haroon was elected to the Municipality when there was joint election in the year 1913. This showed that he had confidence of all the Communities of Karachi ... he showed his capacity by his commonsense and keen intellect and above all his keen desire to serve the citizens, specially the poorer members of the city".¹⁴¹

Haroon was a self-made man and had emerged from poverty to prosperity and hence he always took great care to judge all questions from the poor man's point of view and had very good knack of putting himself in position of others when judging any question. Haroon was liberal minded and large hearted. Jamshed Mehta narrates Haroon's generosity that:

"Once he made a handsome offer to the Karachi Municipality of a large sum of one lac seventy five thousand rupees to build a model village in Layari Quarters, when it was proposed to build twelve villages for the population of that Quarter.

¹³⁷ G.M. Sayed, *op. cit.*, p. 44-45.

¹³⁸ *Sindh Official Gazette*. Govt. of Sindh, (1922-23), p. 145. At that time there was joint electorate in local boards and Municipal Committees.

¹³⁹ G.M. Sayed; *op. cit.* p. 45. *A Biography* p. 31, and *Sindh Official Gazette*, p. 146.

¹⁴⁰ *A Biography*, p. 32.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

Within a minute he accepted the suggestion made by me as the President to pay the entire cost of one village".¹⁴²

Haroon was punctual and regularly attended meetings. He was influential in municipality affairs and the officials could not ignore his contribution to the works and services for the city. Mr. Mehta admired his contribution in these words: "In Municipal work he was never known to be communal on any question. He gave his vote freely, whenever and wherever a question arose, on its own merits. He was respected highly by the members and the staff of the Municipality and he was always one of the most outstanding members of the Corporation. He was generally sought for in the Managing Committee as one of the colleagues, because his experience of life was wide and helpful".¹⁴³

Appreciating the contributions of Haroon Mr. E.D. Shroof stated that, "during his Municipal Councillorship, he served mostly on the Managing Committee of the Corporation and also on several important committees. He undoubtedly took active part and interest in the affairs of Corporation." He further said that "during the period that he was Municipal Councillor, he took keen interest in the developmental projects such as extension of Karachi towards the New Jail, Bunder Road Extension, Cooperative Housing Societies and Parks. He was a devoted worker to such an extent that he even made a contribution of Rs. 8000/= for the building of bathing *ghats* with drainage, in Lyari Quarters, separately for males and females".¹⁴⁴ Because of his experience of the Corporation, 'in 1913, for some time Haroon was appointed by the Government as the Honorary Secretary'.¹⁴⁵

Haroon was 'elected Vice-President, Sindh Muslim League Branch, in February 1920'.¹⁴⁶

He worked for the safeguards of the Muslim interests from the platform of the League. In '1920 he founded the newspaper *Al-Wahid* and donated funds to keep it running. Haroon converted *Al-Wahid* into Limited Company so as to maintain the rights of the Muslim Community politically, economically and from the standpoint of their share in public service'.¹⁴⁷ Haroon organized the 'Sindh Muslim League Employers' Bureau to help the unemployed to find suitable employment'.¹⁴⁸ This Bureau worked as a link between the employer and the employees and helped the former by providing a pool from which they could draw dependable workers whose integrity could be vouched for

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ *A Biography*, p. 32.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 33.

¹⁴⁵ G.M. Sayed, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

¹⁴⁶ Branch of Sindh Muslim League was formed on 1 November 1917. The decision was taken at a public meeting of the Muslims held at G.H. Khalikdino Hall, Karachi. This Hall is still there and converted in Public Library. D.A. Pirzada, *op. cit.* p. 15.

¹⁴⁷ *A Biography*, p. 56.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.* 57.

by a responsible organization. The sphere of Haroon's life steadily began to widen and his services as a public figure received acknowledgement from an ever-expanding circles. 'In 1923 he contested elections to the Bombay Legislative Council and returned successful from Karachi'.¹⁴⁹

During 1928, Haj Pilgrims faced difficulties in Karachi. Haroon took up the matter and moved a resolution in the Central Legislative Assembly in 1928. 'Government constituted the Haj Enquiry Committee and Haroon was appointed one of the members of this Committee. The present Haji Camp was set up under his supervision that provided accommodation to Hajis'.¹⁵⁰ Haroon was elected 'Chairman of Port Haji Committee in 1934 and worked in this capacity till 1937'.¹⁵¹

The social services rendered by Haroon are manifold. He was a pioneer of female education among Sindh Muslims. 'He started, in 1926, a girls' school in memory of his mother and named it after her 'The Hajiani Hanifabai Memon Girls School'.¹⁵² When hardly any Muslim girls in Sindh were being educated, he sent his daughters to English schools and thus set an example for others, He gave handsome donations for the construction of a ward in the Udhavdas Hospital in Shikarpur. He founded the Muslim Gymkhana in Karachi and erected a building for it, where the city's youth were provided facilities for sports. He donated money and built a complex in his wife's name, to serve as headquarters for the Girls Guide'.¹⁵³

Abdullah Haroon was a man of wider interests. He was a successful businessman, philanthropist, and respected politician. His achievements in public life are discussed in detail in next chapters.

Liaquat Ali Khan describes this personality in following words:

"Abdullah Haroon was a truly remarkable personality and an exemplar of many a rare virtue. He combined phenomenal success in trade and commerce with selfless political service to his province and his nation; and he gave of his wealth freely for charitable and national purposes. His uprightness in his personal dealings; his infinite patience and unflagging enthusiasm in every good cause; his genuine humility and constant remembrance that he had started his career from very humble beginnings; his capacity and willingness for hard work even when success was as completely his as it could be any man's...."¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁹ G.M. Sayed, op. cit, p. 49. Ibid p. 67. Hamida Khuhro, *Mohammad Ayub Khuhro: A life of courage in Politics* (Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd., 1998), p. 52.

¹⁵⁰ *A Biography*, p. 55, Sindh Official Gazette, op. cit. p. 402.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* p. 55.

¹⁵² *Ibid.* p. 39.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.* p. 56.

¹⁵⁴ Liaquat Ali Khan, cited in *A Biography*.

CHAPTER IV

ABDULLAH HAROON AND KHILAFAT MOVEMENT

In the early period of the Twentieth Century, Abdullah Haroon got involved in an important movement – the Khilafat movement. This movement not only politically matured him but also placed him among the leading Muslim leaders. As the movement had great effect on the political life of Haroon, therefore, before studying his role in this movement, a detailed account of the Movement is given to understand the actual nature of the movement.

The institution of Khilafat began after the death of 'Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H) in 632 AD when Hazrat Abu Bakr, who was the successor of the Holy Prophet, adopted the title of *Khaltfatr-Rasool-i-illah*, successor of Prophet of God'.¹⁵⁵ The successor of Hazrat Abu Bakr, 'Hazrat Umar simplified the title to *Khalifah*'¹⁵⁶ and the Caliph (An English version of *Khalifah*) became temporal and spiritual head of the entire Muslims of the World. The first four caliphs were all selected democratically. However, after the death of Hazrat Ali, Amir Mu'awiyah laid down the foundation of Umayyad Dynasty, which changed the nature of Khilafat from democratic institution to monarchy. Umayyads and the rulers of the successive Muslim dynasties such as Abbasids, Fatimid (Egypt) and finally Ottomans (Turkey) continued to use the title of Caliph as used by four early Caliphs and further strengthened the institution of Khilafat; as a result Caliph became the symbolic head of the Muslim rule, even outside of Arabia.

The Khilafat Movement started by the Muslims of India is directly related to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire of Turkey at the hands of different European nations. The Movement was particularly directed against the hostile attitude of Britain towards Turkey.

When the Turkish Empire was at the height of its power, it included the areas of the 'Balkans, Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, Arabia, Egypt and almost the whole of the North coast of Africa as far as Morocco'.¹⁵⁷ However, from seventeenth century Turkish Empire began to decline gradually. This process started with the loss of Hungary to Austria in 1699 and continued for more than two centuries till finally after World War 1

¹⁵⁵ I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent (610-1914): A Brief Historical Analysis* (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1999), p. 309. The word 'Khilafat' comes from *Khaltfah* an Arabic word, means one who comes after, a successor. For further information of Khilafat see T.W. Arnold, *The Caliphate* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, n.d)

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

¹⁵⁷ David Thomson, *Europe Since Napoleon* (Great Britain: Hazell Watson Viney Ltd, 1966), p. 340.

it ended with the 'treaties of Sevres (1920) and Lausanne (August 1923)'.¹⁵⁸ During the process of dissolution (1699-1914) in the nineteenth century Russia by 1815 annexed almost all the areas around Crimea. Turkish Sultan lost Algeria to France in 1830 and Greece in 1832 became an independent state. 'The Russo-Turkish war of 1877 resulted in the signing of Treaty of Berlin (1878), under which many areas were taken away from Ottoman Sultan. Austria was allowed to occupy and administer Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro were given complete independence as Sovereign states; and Bulgaria became an independent state under Turkish suzerainty'.¹⁵⁹ 'In 1896. Crete was taken away from Turkey and in 1881 France seized Tunisia and in 1905 Morocco was taken away from Turkey'.¹⁶⁰

This gradual decline of Ottoman Empire particularly soon after Russo-Turkish War (1876-78), the "Islamic World recognized the fact that the areas of Islamic independence was steadily narrowing".¹⁶¹ It forced the Muslim thinkers to find a solution to stop this process and to work for the revival of Muslim power in the world.

It was at this juncture that Jamaluddin Afghani (1838-97) presented the idea of Pan-Islamism. According to this doctrine, Afghani held that 'all Muslims of the World were brothers and they should unite against all those forces, which were working against Islam'.¹⁶² He suggested to the Muslims of the world that to "escape the fate of subjugation by the West and to liberate the Muslim lands, that had been incorporated in Western Empires", they should make "strong alliance and make joint efforts for their preservation and progress".¹⁶³ Pan-Islamism also included the doctrine that 'Turkey should be strengthened and supported. The Sultan was advised to invade India through Persia'.¹⁶⁴

Turkish Sultan Abdul Hameed (1876-1909) used this doctrine to obtain moral support from the Muslims of the world and reinforced his position as Khalifa of the Muslim World'.¹⁶⁵ The ideology of Pan-Islamism gradually spread in the Indian Subcontinent and the Indian Muslims recognized "Turkish Sultan as temporal ruler over the Ottoman dominions and as a Caliph he was accepted as supreme spiritual authority over all Muslims under whatever temporal government they may dwell".¹⁶⁶

¹⁵⁸ Stuart Miller, *Mastering Modern European History* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997), p. 306.

¹⁵⁹ David Thomson, *op. cit.*, pp. 463-466.

¹⁶⁰ I.H. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics* (Karachi: Ma'aref Ltd., 1974), pp. 229-230.

¹⁶¹ P.C. Bomford, *History of Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movements* (Delhi: Government of India Press, 1925), p. 110.

¹⁶² K.K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism* (Lahore: Adab Printers, 1989), p. 115.

¹⁶³ I.H. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

¹⁶⁴ P.C. Bornford, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

¹⁶⁵ *A History OF Freedom Movement*, Vol. III, Part I (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society), p. 102.

¹⁶⁶ T.W. Arnold, *The Caliphate* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, n.d.), p. 173.

It was under the influence of this doctrine that Indian Muslims developed interest in the Greco-Turkish War and raised funds to help the families of Turkish soldiers who had been killed. Furthermore in 1897, when Turkey won over Greeks in Thessaly, there was rejoicing over this victory in India. The renewed interest in Caliphate, led to the 're-introduction of the custom of mentioning the name of the Sultan of Turkey with his titles in the *Khutbah*'.¹⁶⁷ Thus, within the next decade, Sultan of Turkey was not only recognized and accepted as Caliph of the subcontinent¹⁶⁸ but also a genuine concern was shown by the Indian Muslims regarding the fate of Ottoman Empire.

During the nineteenth century with a view to stopping Russian expansion in Europe, British government supported Turkish Ottoman Empire against Russian assaults and was used as a barrier against Russian advance. But with the political decline of Turkish Sultan he lost his utility to Britain, and became a *sick man of Europe*. The British government then decided to gradually liquidate the Ottoman Empire and reversed its pro-Turkish policy. Under this changed policy, in Turco-Italian and Balkan Wars of 1911-12, British government left Turkey to its fate; as a consequence Turkey lost all her European territories except Constantinople. This attitude of Britain convinced the Indian Muslims that by keeping itself aloof from the Wars, British government indirectly helped Russia in the liquidation of the Ottoman Empire. This change in the British foreign policy towards Turkey perturbed the Indian Muslims and Britain was considered an enemy of Islam.

During the Balkan War, to convey the Muslim opinion to the British government regarding its attitude towards Turkey and to cover Balkan War, Muslim scholars founded different newspapers. Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar¹⁶⁹ founded *Comrade* on 1 January 1911 and started writing articles and speaking openly against British government. In one of his editorials, Muhammad Ali warned Great Britain that Muslim opinion had turned against them; therefore, they should "abandon their neutral policy towards Turkey, and stop courting Russia and make alliances with Muslims

¹⁶⁷ *Khutbah*, the official sermon in the congregational prayers of Fridays.

¹⁶⁸ Umayyads and Abbasids were recognized as de jure suzerains of the Empire of Delhi. During Sultanat period, Indian rulers such as Iltutmish, Muhammad b. Tughlaq, Feroz Shah and Tipu Sultan have secured recognition from Abbasid Caliphs to legalize their rule and to enhance their prestige in the eyes of their subjects. However, Mughals subscribed a new theory that each independent Muslim monarch was the Caliph within his own territories. The Mughal Emperors were, therefore, recognized to be Caliphs within the Mughal Empire. After 1858, with the removal of Bahadur Shah Zafar, the last Mughal ruler, the name of Emperor was removed from *Khutbah*. Then after 1897, the name of Sultan of Turkey came to be inserted in the *Khutbah* along with his titles. I.H. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, pp. 253-254.

¹⁶⁹ Muhammad Ali, and old student of Aligarh and Orator who spoke frequently in support of Aligarh and wrote articles on Aligarh affairs. He was an active member of Aligarh Old Boys Association and one of the non-resident trustees of Aligarh Institute. In 1911 when Aligarh Muslim University Movement was revived, he took an active part in it. One of the main demands of this Movement was that Muslim should have control over the University. But government refused this demand. Along with this refusal, the attitude of British government towards Turkey during Balkan War led to the development of anti-British feelings in his heart.

Kingdoms.¹⁷⁰ Because of his anti-British campaign, when in 1913, he reproduced a pamphlet entitled 'Come Over to Macedonia and Help Us' in *Comrade*, Indian government as a punishment imposed a heavy fine on his Press. Following his footsteps, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad¹⁷¹ founded *Al-Hilal* in June 1912. He wrote in favor of Ottoman Empire and criticized British government for its indifferent attitude towards Turkey and considered the British responsible for all ills in the Islamic world. The third important newspaper, which became the mouthpiece of Muslims during the Balkan War, was Zafar Ali Khan's¹⁷² paper *Zamindar*. Similarly, 'in 1912, Maulana Shibli Numani, a teacher at Aligarh College, started a newspaper *Muslim Gazette*, in which he suggested to the Indian Muslims to give up the loyalty to the government, so that Muslim politics could become independent.¹⁷³

These Muslim writers promoted the pan-Islamic ideology and through their papers convinced the Muslims that the "British government is no longer a safe custodian of Islamic interests".¹⁷⁴ As a result, Muslims lost confidence in the British government and mistrust of the intentions of British government towards Ottoman Empire became deep-rooted. This led to unrest and extremism among the Indian Muslims to such a level that in '1913 Abul Kalam Azad advocated the boycott of European goods'.¹⁷⁵ Similarly, in 'March 1913, *Aligarh Institute Gazette* published a *fatwa*, in which it was urged that Muhammadans, being brothers of the oppressed Turks, should curse those, who, seeing oppression, wished to help the oppressors, and that no opportunity should be lost to weaken the strength of the enemies of Turkey'.¹⁷⁶

The Balkan War not only affected the western-educated Muslims, but anti-British feelings grew among the Ulemas of Deoband¹⁷⁷ and Farangi Mahal.¹⁷⁸ Maulana Abdul Bari of Farangi Mahal, who was a strong supporter of Turkey, and of Turkish Sultan as Caliph of Islam, collected funds and dispatched medical mission under Doctor Ansari for medical assistance to the Turkish victims of War and to help the Turkish Red-Crescent in looking after the wounded soldiers. During the collection of funds, he met

¹⁷⁰ Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 23.

¹⁷¹ Azad was an A'alim turned journalist and a renowned Urdu stylist.

¹⁷² In 1910, Zafar Ali Khan took over the Editorship of *Zamindar*, a Lahore-based paper and in 1911 started against British government.

¹⁷³ I.H. Qureshi, *Ulmah in Politics*, op. cit., p. 233.

¹⁷⁴ P.C. Bomford, op.cit, p. 112.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid*, p. 112.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid*.

¹⁷⁷ The Dar al Ulum, Deoband, school was founded in 1867, in a mosque in Deoband in northwestern UP. For further detail, see Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement*.

¹⁷⁸ Farangi Mahal, a school, founded during the reign of Aurangzeb (1658-1707), is a jumble of old residences and courtyards in Lucknow. For further information, see Gail Minault, *The Khilafat Movement*.

Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali in December 1912.¹⁷⁹ Abdul Bari, seeing the enthusiasm and zeal of Ali Brothers for Ottoman Empire, decided to cooperate with them, to mobilize Muslim support for the Turkish Sultan. However when Turkey was defeated, the Indian Muslims felt that Turkey has become too weak and incapable of defending the Holy places of Islam. To help Turkey in preserving and protecting Muslims' holy places from non-Muslim aggression they decided to take practical step. 'Abdul Bari, in association with Ali Brothers (Muhammad Ali and Shaukat Ali) in 1913, founded *Anjuman-e-Khuddant-e-Ka'aba* (Society for the Servants of Ka'aba). Abdul Bari became its president; Mushir Hussain Qidwai and Shaukat Ali were appointed as General Secretaries'.¹⁸⁰ The chief aims of the Anjuman were 'to maintain the sanctity of Kaa'ba and other holy places of Islam and to defend them against non-Muslims' aggression'.¹⁸¹ Anjuman leaders planned to associate every single Indian Muslim in this mission. They decided to open branches of the Anjuman throughout India. Muslims were asked to become members with one rupee as membership fee for a year. It was decided that money thus collected would be divided into three parts.

- a) "The first to be given to Turkey to maintain the dignity and political independence of the sacred places.
- b) The second to be given to Islamic Schools, Orphanages and missionary societies.
- c) And the third reserved for the future defence of the Kaa'ba".¹⁸²

To popularize its ideology, the Anjuman, in 1914 started publishing a Monthly newspaper, entitled '*Khudaamul Kaa'ba*,' under the editorship of Shaukat Ali. But it was soon closed down because of the lack of funds'.¹⁸³ Though the aims of Anjuman were very attractive, they failed to attract large number of Muslims. Therefore, it soon became inactive. Though it failed, it brought Western educated Muslims and Ulema on one platform and paved the way for future cooperation.

With the coming of the First World War (1914), situation became more complicated. Muslims of India received the news that Turkey is thinking of joining Germany (Central Powers) against Allied Powers. This news disturbed the Indian Muslims. They desired that Turkey should not join the War. Several telegrams, explaining the Muslim concern over the Turkish decision to join Central Powers, were sent to the Sultan. As a last effort to prevent Turkey from joining the War, Abdul Bari, Muhammad Ali and Dr. Ansari

¹⁷⁹ In November 1911, Ali Brothers along with Aligarh students opened a relief fund and started collecting money for the Turkish people.

¹⁸⁰ Gail Minault, *op.cit*, p. 35.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid*.

¹⁸² *Ibid*.

¹⁸³ P.C. Bomford, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

sent a telegram to the Ottoman Sultan in August 1914. 'They pleaded with him that the Turks should think a thousand times before they joined the War. He was urged to maintain strict neutrality. If that was not possible then Turkey should join Allied powers'.¹⁸⁴ However, at the end of October 1914, Turkey, in spite of the Indian Muslims request, joined Central Powers, which made matters worse. This decision of Turkey placed the Muslims of India in a very awkward position. Their loyalties were divided between British, being the ruler of India and the Turkish Caliph who was their spiritual head. To defuse anti-British feeling and to satisfy the Muslims' anxiety, Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, 'assured the Muslims that during the War, the holy places of Islam would be protected'.¹⁸⁵ After this assurance, Indian Army, mostly consisting of Muslim soldiers, was sent to Europe, which fought for Britain and, therefore, against Turkey. Indian Muslims supported Allied Forces in the hope that in return of their loyalty and support, Allied Forces, especially British government will treat Turkey leniently, in case of its defeat.

When the news reached India that Turkey had joined Central Powers, the Muslim press once again became active and started writing articles on the fate of Turkey and also about the attitude of the Indian Muslims towards British government and the Caliph. Muslim newspapers like *The Daily Paisa Akhbar* and *Sher-e-Punjab* criticized Turkey's decision of joining the War against England and propagated the idea that Indian Muslims should remain unperturbed and stand by the British'.¹⁸⁶ However, there was another section of Muslim press such as *Comrade*, *Al-Hilal* and *Zamindar* which openly sympathized with the Turkish Ottoman Empire and criticized British Government. These newspapers further created resentment among Indian Muslims against the government and posed a security risk for the government. To control the spread of discontent and to keep Muslim agitation in control, Muhammad Ali and Abul Kalam Azad were interned (May 1915) during the War and their Press was confiscated'.¹⁸⁷

During the War in 1916, the Sharif of Mecca revolted against the Turkish Sultan and 'on 15 December 1916, British government recognized him as the king of the Hijaz'.¹⁸⁸ This action of British government further convinced the Indian Muslims 'that British government was responsible for breaking the solidarity of the Muslims to serve its own ends'.¹⁸⁹ Muslims became bitterer against the British and regarded Sharif of Mecca as a British stooge. In this regard Maulana Abdul Bari of Farangi Mehal, an ardent supporter of Ottoman Empire, issued a *fatwa*, in which he said that it was the "duty of the Muslims

¹⁸⁴ *History of the Freedom Movement*, Vol. III, op. cit., p. 161.

¹⁸⁵ S.M. Burke & Salim al-Din Quraishi, *British Raj in India: A Historical Review* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 148.

¹⁸⁶ Syed Razi Wasti, *Muslim Struggle for Freedom in British India* (Lahore: Book Traders, 1993), p. 293.

¹⁸⁷ I.H. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, op.cit., p. 244.

¹⁸⁸ S.M. Bruke & Salim al-Din Quraishi, op.cit., p. 148.

¹⁸⁹ P.C. Bomford, op.cit., p. 126.

to turn out the Sharif of Mecca and that it was also their duty to help the Caliph in recovering Mesopotamia and Syria".¹⁹⁰ Thus, it added fuel to the fire.

Muslim feelings were running high and situation became very critical for the government of India. During the War, as they needed the support from all the communities of India particularly from the Muslims, therefore, on the request of the Indian government, the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, on 5 January 1918, stated in the Parliament, "nor are we [Allied Forces] fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which are predominantly Turkish in race".¹⁹¹

When at international level above mentioned events were taking place, in India some very important political changes took place, which transformed the Muslim political outlook and further aggravated the situation.

The first of these developments was the foundation of All India Muslim League at Dacca in 1906 through which Muslims entered into the politics of India. The second development was the annulment of the Partition of Bengal in 1911. When in 1905 Bengal was divided, the new province carved out, turned out to be a Muslim majority province. The Muslims of East Bengal (the new province) hailed Indian government with the hope that new province will provide opportunities to the Muslims to improve their life. But Bengali Hindus agitated and refused to accept the division of Bengal. To pressurize Indian government, for the annulment, Hindus started *Swadeshi Movement* in which the British products were boycotted. Hindus asked the Muslim to join *Swadeshi Movement*. But Muslims refused and as a result communal riots took place. In spite of Hindu pressure, British Indian government assured the Muslims that in no circumstances the partition would be revoked.

During this period, the Indian Councils Act of 1909 was introduced in India, which gave the right for separate electorates to the Muslims. This concession further promoted among the Muslims the loyalty to the British government. But Congress leaders were enraged and resented this concession. As a result, the agitation, which was carried on by the Congress against the partition of Bengal, Communal tension intensified. Because of the continuous agitation, on the occasion of the coronation of the King Emperor on 12 December 1911, the partition was annulled by a Royal proclamation at Delhi.

The announcement of annulment thrilled the Hindus, but Muslims were disappointed. They felt that the government had cheated them. They began to think that loyalty to the

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 130. And also I.H. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, *op.cit.*, p. 256. For more information on Ulama of Farangi Mahall see Francis Robinson, *The Ulama of Farangi Mahall and Islamic Culture in South Asia* (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2005).

¹⁹¹ R.C. Majumdar, *History of Freedom Movement in India*, Vol. III (Lahore: Book Traders, 1979), p. 53.

government is not the way of fulfilling their demands rather it is the agitation that helps to achieve objectives.

In the meantime, the issue of the Aligarh Muslim University further created resentment against Indian government. Muslims desired to raise the Aligarh College to the level of an affiliating Muslim University. But in 1912, Secretary of State for India turned down the Muslim request. The refusal further disappointed the Muslims.

During this period, some educated Hindus started showing their sympathies for the Ottoman Empire. A leading Hindu newspaper, the *Gujratee*, in one of its editorial wrote that the "Turks who are defending their homeland deserve our sympathies. The Hindus are aggrieved to see the afflictions of the Turks, since they have made a mark in history and have contributed a lot towards the betterment of humanity. It is our heart-felt desire to see their Empire intact".¹⁹²

This changed attitude of Hindus (Congress) towards the Muslims' feelings and disregard of Indian Muslim feelings by the British India government on national (annulment of Partition of Bengal and refusal to grant the status of University to the Aligarh College) and international issues (indifferent attitude towards Turkey) encouraged Muslim League leaders, who believed in Hindu-Muslim unity, to work for it. As a first step, Muslim League revised its constitution in the Lucknow Session held in March 1913. According to the revised constitution, the objectives of League were 'to promote loyalty towards the British Crown, to protect and advance the political rights and interests of the Indian Mussalmans, to promote friendship and union between the

Mussalmans and other communities of India and to work for the attainment of a system of self-government suitable to India'.¹⁹³ These changes in the constitution of Muslim League especially the adoption of self-government as one of its objectives brought Muslim League and Congress close to each other, 'which resulted in signing of Lucknow Pact (1916)'.¹⁹⁴ Thus, during the War, Congress and Muslim League came closer and their relationship became cordial.

Throughout the WWI, Indians agitated for the reforms. And when finally in 1919, Montague Chelmsford Reforms were introduced, it dissatisfied both the Congress and League. As a result agitation of the Indians increased. To impose curbs against agitation, 'Lord Chelmsford appointed a committee to investigate anti-government activities of Indians and recommend legislation to suppress it. The committee presided over by Mr. Justice Rowlett of UK and consisted of four other members, two or who

¹⁹² Syed Razi Wasti, *op.cit.*, p. 259.

¹⁹³ Syed Sharifuddin Prizada (ed), *Foundations of Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents 1906-1947*, Vol. I (Karachi: National Publishing House Limited, 1969), pp. 264-272.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 392-397.

were Indians and two British officials in India'.¹⁹⁵ The recommendations of this committee 'passed into an Act, on 18 March 1919'.¹⁹⁶ The Rowlett Act provided for 'speedy trial of offences by a special Court, consisting of three High Court Judges. No right of appeal against the decision of this Court was given to the Indians. The Provincial Government was also given powers to search a place and arrest a suspected person without warrant and keep him in confinement'.¹⁹⁷

The Rowlett Act, which gave Executive wide and sweeping powers, was condemned at different levels by all the politicians of the India. The important result of this Act was that it united all the Indians against the British Government – Hindu-Muslim entente came into existence, and this unity helped Muslims to start a joint Movement for protecting the Khilafat.

At the end of War, Turkey was defeated and 'on 3 November 1918, she signed the armistice',¹⁹⁸ by which the hostilities between Allies and Turkey ceased. After the war, the question of defeated Turkey caused the Indian Muslims grave concern. They wished that 'the Ottoman Sultan should retain all his territory because only then would he be able to command the resources to enable him to maintain his status as the Khalifa of the Muslim world and the keeper of the holy places of Islam'.¹⁹⁹

During the delay in settling the status of Turkey after the War, articles appeared in various newspapers in Europe asking the Allies to give severe punishment to Turkey for allying itself with Germany. Along with these articles, the rumor that the Allied Powers will impose harsh terms on Turkey increased the anxiety of the Indian Muslims. Because of the assurance of the British government regarding the fate of Turkey, Indian Muslims had supported the British throughout the War. But now Muslims felt cheated by the British government. Muslims had no choice but to launch a protest movement to generate support for their demands and to force the British to change her Turkish policy. As the first effort to mobilize the support of the Khilafat 'on 20 March 1919, a public, meeting of 15,000 Indian Muslims was held in Bombay. This meeting set up a local organization named as *Majlis-i-Khilafat* or Bombay Khilafat Committee'.²⁰⁰ The meeting asked the "Indian government to make it sure that Constantinople would remain in Turkish hands; a delegation of Indian Muslims should attend Paris Peace Conference and recommended that the Indian Muslims deputation should meet the viceroy to acquaint him about the dissatisfaction of Indian Muslims regarding British government's attitude towards Turkey".²⁰¹

¹⁹⁵ *History of Freedom Movement*, Vol. III, *op. cit.*, pp, 1-2.

¹⁹⁶ Sir Micheal O Dawyer, *India as I knew it: 1885-1925* (London: Constable and Co. 1925),p. 266.

¹⁹⁷ *History of Freedom Movement*, Vol. III, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

¹⁹⁸ David Thomson, *op.cit.*, p. 570. For further information on Armistice see K.K. Aziz, *The Indian Khilafat Movement (1915-1933) A Documentary Record* (Karachi: Pak Publishers Limited, 1972), pp. 23-25.

¹⁹⁹ S.M. Burke & Salim al- Din Quraishi, *op.cit.*, p. 148.

²⁰⁰ *History of Freedom Movement*, Pakistan Historical Society, *op.cit.*, Vol. III, p. 215.

²⁰¹ Gail Minault, *op.cit.*, p. 73.

At this juncture Gandhi issued the pledge of *Satyagrah* (Non-violence resistance) and proposed general strike. 'On 6 April 1919, strike was observed throughout the country.'²⁰² Many Muslims also supported this strike. In short, on one hand this Act exacerbated the anti-British feelings among the Indians, and created a bad blood between the Government and the Indians. On the other hand, it united all the Indians against the British Government – Hindu-Muslim entente came into existence. This unity between the Hindus and the Muslims was witnessed throughout the Khilafat Movement.

Soon it was realized by the leaders of the committee that to pressurize Government, it was necessary to have support of all Indian Muslims. To make it broad-based organization, 'another meeting of Bombay Khilafat committee was held on 5 July 1919'.²⁰³ While describing their basic programme that is to urge the retention of the temporal powers of the Sultan of Turkey as Caliph, and to ensure his continued suzerainty over the Islamic holy places, the meeting resolved that to achieve these objectives 'the branches of Khilafat committee should be opened all over India. It was also decided to hold regular meetings of the committee in order to keep informed Muslims about Khilafat problems and to mobilize their support to create an effective pressure on the Government to keep Turkey and her Khilafat intact.'²⁰⁴

To generate more support for Khilafat issue a conference was held at Lucknow in September 1919, with Ibrahim Haroon Jafar presiding, an All-India Khilafat Committee was formed with Seth Chotani of Bombay as President and Maulana Shaukat Ali as Secretary'.²⁰⁵ 'On 17 October 1919, the Committee observed the *Khilafat Day*'.²⁰⁶ On this day, the Muslims all over India suspended their business, kept fast and offered prayers.

On 23 November the Khilafat Conference held its first session at Delhi under the chairmanship of A.K. Fazl-ul-Haq. In the meantime the Indian government announced that official peace celebrations were to start from 13 December 1919. At this Khilafat Conference, the leaders appealed to the Muslims not to participate in the official celebrations and hold protest meetings and to organize an effective movement against the government. It was also decided 'to send a deputation to England under the leadership of Maulana Muhammad Ali'.²⁰⁷ It was also decided that as the government had rejected Muslim demands, they would boycott British goods and will not cooperate

²⁰² History of Freedom Movement, Vol. III, opt. cit., p. 15.

²⁰³ Gail Minault, *op.cit.*, p. 75.

²⁰⁴ Dr. Ikram-ul-Hague Pervez, *The Contribution of Sindhi Muslims in Pakistan Movement* (Hyderabad: Institute of Sindhology, 1976), p. 107.

²⁰⁵ M. Naeem Qureshi, The Indian Khilafat Movement 1918-24, *Journal of Asian History*, 12.2 (1978), pp. 152-68.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁷ I.H. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics*, *op.cit.*, p. 261.

with the government. The scheme of non-violent non-cooperation was adopted on the advice of Gandhi.

Gandhi had displayed his sympathy for the cause of Turkey as early as 1918, because he thought that "such an opportunity of winning over the Muslims and forging the unity of Indian people to fight the British would not come in a hundred years".²⁰⁸ The issue before the Muslims was religious while that before Gandhi it was political. There were also other motives that actuated Gandhi to ally him with the Khilafat cause. He said in his two statements that: (i) "I have made the Khilafat cause my own because I see that, through its preservation, full protection can be secured for the cow and (ii) *Swaraj* is freedom for everyone - where there is complete freedom of opinion, that of the majority must prevail".²⁰⁹ For attainment of both these ends, Muslim consent was necessary; hence Gandhi found in Ali Brothers an effective means of influencing Muslim opinion in his favor. After the Delhi War Conference, he had written to the Viceroy bracketing the cause of Turkey with India's own cause of self-rule: "In the most scrupulous regard for the rights of those (Mohammadan) states and for the Muslim sentiment as to their places of worship, and your just and timely treatment of India's claim to Home Rule, lies the safety of the Empire".²¹⁰ Gandhi felt that Muslim demand about Khilafat was just and was ready to render all possible help to Indian Muslims to save their Khilafat. When the All-India Khilafat Conference was held at Delhi on 23-24 November 1919 under the chairmanship of Faz-lul Haq, Gandhi was elected its President. Motilal Nehru, Madan Moyahan Malaviya and Swami Shradhanand, also attended the conference. From Sindh, Seth Abdullah Haroon, Maulana Taj Mohamed Amroti, Pir Turab Ali Shah, and Jan Mohammad Junejo participated in the Conference'.²¹¹ On Gandhi's advice the Conference passed a resolution, 'asking all Indian Muslims to refuse to cooperate with the government unless the Khilafat and holy places of Muslims were treated in accordance with the Muslim wishes'.²¹² There was a spontaneous outburst of widespread popular feeling and sympathy with the Turks in their distress and a general willingness everywhere among the Muslims to undergo suffering for the Khilafat cause.

The failure of revolt of 1857 had reduced the influence of the Ulemas on Muslim politics, but the Khilafat Movement offered them the opportunity to stage a comeback. A new Muslim organization, the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind, came into being. To show solidarity with Khilafat conference, in December 1919, Muslim League, Congress, the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind and the Khilafat conference held their sessions simultaneously at Amritsar to demonstrate Hindu-Muslim solidarity. Ali Brothers, who had been interned four years ago, was released, and came to attend Khilafat conference. The Congress passed a resolution urging the British government: "to settle the Turkish question in

²⁰⁸ Syed Razi Wasti, *op.cit.*, p. 299.

²⁰⁹ M.S. Toosy, *The Muslim League and the Pakistan Movement* (Karachi: National Book Foundation, 1978), p. 31.

²¹⁰ S.M. Burke & Salim Al-Din Qureshi, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

²¹¹ *Al-Wahid*, 15 May 1920.

²¹² M.A. Toosy, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

accordance with the sentiments of Indian Muslims".²¹³ The Muslim League session was presided over by Hakim Ajmal Khan, who was also a prominent leader of Congress party. Gandhi, Motilal Nehru, Annie Besant, Srinivasa Sastri, Bamanji, Sharma, G. Nath Misra and Madan Mohan Malaviya among others attended the League session.

Meanwhile to further pressurize the Government — All India Muslim League called for an All India Muslim Conference (AIMC). The idea behind this Conference was to unite all the groups of Muslims and draw up a single programme for the future line of action regarding Khilafat issue. To convince the Muslims to attend the Conference, League said that by "attending this meeting, all the attendants would be discharging their duty to Islam".²¹⁴ Invitation was issued to all the Muslim Leaders of different groups and regions. This Conference was held in Lucknow in September 1919. Some "four hundred Muslim delegates attended the Conference from different regions of India, including Sindh, which was represented by Abdullah Haroon".²¹⁵ The Conference was 'presided over by Ibrahim Haroon Jafar. At this Conference an All Indian Khilafat Committee was formed with Seth Chotani of Bombay as President and Maulana Shoukat Ali as Secretary'.²¹⁶ At this Conference Muslims put forward their specific demands to the Government. The participants protested at the 'separation of Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia from the Ottoman Empire, as they explained that Khilafat was bound with the temporal power of Turkish Sultan and the division of Ottoman Empires was regarded by the Indian Muslims as an assault upon their religion. They also objected to the internationalization of Constantinople and the partition of Thrace'.²¹⁷ At the end of the Conference, it was resolved that the 'feelings of the Indian Muslims towards Turkey must be forwarded to the British Prime Minister. To make Indian Government realize the feeling of Muslims, it was decided to observe an All India Khilafat Day on 17 October 1919, during which special prayers, fasting, *hartal* (Strike), and public meetings were to be held all over the country and Conference also appealed to the Hindus for their support'.²¹⁸ The Conference also resolved to 'form the All-India Khilafat Committee, with headquarters in Bombay, and to establish local and regional Khilafat committees all over India and to open its branches down to the village level'.²¹⁹

The Muslim League at its Amritsar session in December 1919 which was attended by Congress leaders namely Gandhi, Motilal Nehru and Malaviya expressed "its deep disappointment" at the attitude of the British government towards the question of the Khilafat and warned that "under the circumstances the Musalmans would be fully justified to carry on all the possible methods of constitutional agitation open to them,

²¹³ S.M. Burke & Salim Al-din Quraishi. *op. cit.*, p. 216.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

²¹⁶ History of Freedom Movement, Historical Society, *op.cit*, Vol. III.

²¹⁷ Dr. Ikram-ul- Hage, *op.cit.*, p. 109.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*

²¹⁹ *Indian Muslims — A documentary record of Muslim struggle in India.*

including a boycott of the British Army, if it is likely to be used outside India for imperial and anti-Islamic purposes".²²⁰ It also placed on record its deep-seated and unshakable devotion to the sacred person of His Imperial Majesty (the Ottoman Sultan) as successor of Prophet (P.B.U.H) and head of Islam. M.A. Jinnah was as deeply concerned about the fate of the Sultan as any one also. This was demonstrated in the summer of 1919 when he led a deputation of the All-India Muslim League to London to plead the Sultan's cause. He forwarded a memorandum to Prime Minister Lloyd George with a letter dated 4 September 1919. The memorandum warned that "if Great Britain becomes a party in reducing HIM the Sultan of Turkey as the Khalifa of the Muslim world to the status of a petty sovereign, the reaction in India will be colossal and abiding".²²¹

On the decision of Khilafat conference held at Amritsar 1919, to secure assistance of the Viceroy for the fair treatment of Turkey by Britain and Allied Powers, the Khilafat deputation of thirty-five members met the viceroy Lord Chelmsford on 19 January 1920. The deputation which was led by Dr. Ansari, who read the address, 'included Abdullah Haroon, Ali Brothers, Abul Kalam Azad, Gandhi, Maulana Abdul Bari (Farangi Mahal), Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Saifuddin Kitchlew, Shradhanand Sannyasi and Pandit Ram Bhajdat and others'.²²² The address conveyed the wishes of 'Indian Muslims regarding the Khilafat question, Muslim [Caliph's] control over Jazirat-ul-Arab and other Muslim Holy places and about the full integrity, sovereignty and dominions, which Turkey possessed before the War'.²²³ It stated that 'Indian Muslims were worried about the fate of Khilafat as armistice was signed a year ago, but it was not yet clear what policy would be adopted by His Majesty's Government while dealing with Turkey. This delay has created a feeling of uneasiness among the Indian Muslim'. It further stated 'that Indian Muslims have always been loyal to British Empire, therefore, in return of their loyalty His majesty must give due consideration of their feelings regarding Khilafat while settling Turkish issue. In the end Viceroy was told by the members of the Deputation very clearly that any settlement, which meant to liquidate Ottoman Empire, or give control of Muslim Holy places to non-Muslim, or the institution of the Khilafat is abolished, will not be tolerated and acceptable to the Muslim world and particularly to Indian Muslims'.²²⁴ The Viceroy told the deputation that this "will [not] be recognized by the Allied Powers" and gave no hope that "Turkey would escape the punishment for deliberately drawing the sword in the cause of Germany".²²⁵

²²⁰ *Ibid.*

²²¹ S.M. Burke & Salim Al din Qureshi, *op.cit.*, p. 226.

²²² K.K. Aziz, *The Indian Khilafat Movement (1915-1933) A Documentary Record* (Karachi: Pak Publisher Limited, 1972), pp. 64-71. And also see I.H. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics, op.cit.*, p. 262.

²²³ *Ibid*, p. 75.

²²⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 64-69.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*

Disappointed at the Viceroy's reply, Khilafat committee decided to send an Indian Khilafat Deputation to England, to present the Indian Muslim anxiety over the Peace Settlement. To meet the expenses of the delegation Ali Brothers started fund raising drive. Their target was Ten Lakh Rupees, which even after two months (January, February 1920) of drive, was not achieved. Finally 'Seth Chotani, President of Khilafat Committee and Abdullah Haroon, President of Sindh Khilafat Committee', donated money'.²²⁶ In February 1920 a Khilafat delegation led by Muhammad Ali sailed for Europe. 'Mr. Fisher on behalf of the Secretary of State received the delegation on 2 March and on 19 March met the Prime Minister Lloyd George'.²²⁷ Muhammad Ali reiterated that "Khilafat must be preserved with adequate temporal power and that his [Caliph's] pre-war territorial status must be restored."²²⁸ Lloyd George, after listening to the deputation, replied that 'Turkey could not be treated differently from the defeated Christian Powers (Germany, Austria)'. He further said that 'the principle of self-determination would be applied to Empires, which had fortified their title to rule including Turkey'.²²⁹ After this fruitless attempt, the delegation went to France and Italy to gather support for Turkey. But they met with little success.

Meanwhile in India, Central Khilafat Committee met in Bombay on 12 May 1920, to discuss the meeting of Khilafat delegation and non-cooperation movement. Abdullah Haroon as one of the members of executive council of Khilafat attended this meeting. He urged the members 'to adopt non-cooperation in order to avoid independent action – it was not a clear announcement, but it showed that he wanted Muslims to keep non-cooperation peaceful'.²³⁰

While the Muhammad Ali delegation was still in Europe, the terms of the Treaty of Sevres were published on 15 May 1920 by the government of India. According to the treaty, 'the Sultan's empire was to be dismembered: the Arab lands were to become independent; Syria was to become a mandate of France, Mesopotamia and Palestine of Britain, Smyrna and Thrace were to be made over to Greece. But Turkey was allowed to retain Constantinople'.²³¹ On 28 May 1920 Mohammad Ali delegation sent an appeal to the Sultan of Turkey not to accept the peace terms, which contained the argument, that: "the Khalifa is the repository of the sacred Traditions of our Prophet (P.B.U.H), and, as your Majesty is aware, according to the most authentic reports, he commanded the Musalmans on his death-bed not to permit or tolerate any sort of non-Moslem control

²²⁶ Gail Minault, *opt. cit.* p. 85.

²²⁷ The other members of delegation were, Mawlana Saiyid Sulaiman Nadvi, Abdul Qasim, Syud Husain and Hasan Muhammad Hayat. Shoaib Qureshi and Abdur Rchman Siddiqi were already in England and joined the deputation there. I.H. Qureshi, *Ulema in Politics, op.cit.*, p. 263.

²²⁸ K.K. Aziz, *The Indian Khilafat Movement (1915-1933), A Documentary Record, op.cit.*, p. 97.

²²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 111.

²³⁰ Gail Minault, *opt. cit.* p. 100. Other members of the executive council were Seth Chotani; President Shaukat Ali; Secretary, Abdul Bari, Abul Kalam Azad, Abdullah Haroon, Dr. Ansari, Hasrat Mohani, Yaqub Hasaan and Pandith Rambhuj Dutt; members of executive council.

²³¹ *The Indian Annual Register 1921, Part-1, op.cit.*, pp. 185-192.

over any portion of the Jazeerat ul Arab, which included Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia as well as the region known to European geographers as the peninsula of Arabia. No Mussalman can therefore agree to the exercise of any control by mandatory of the powers in Syria, Palestine or Mesopotamia, and what no Mussalman can submit to consistently with his creed, the Successor of our Prophet (P.B.U.H) can submit to still less".²³² On the same day the Central Khilafat Committee organized a mammoth public meeting at Bombay and adopted non-cooperation as the only practical course of action. It was decided that the scheme of non-cooperation was to be implemented in four stages: (a) "renunciation of honorary posts, titles and membership of Councils; (b) giving up of posts under the government; (c) giving up of appointments in the police and military forces; and (d) refusal to pay taxes".²³³

At this juncture a new element of *Hijrat* (migration) entered in Khilafat Movement. On the failure of Mohammad Ali delegation, Ghulam Muhammad Aziz from Amritsar, under the influence of Mawlana Fadl-i-Ilahi of Wazirabad advocated the idea of *Hijrat* of Indian Muslims to Afghanistan. He in his 26 April 1920 telegram to the Viceroy conveyed the decision of migration stating that "Islamic injunctions make it impossible for the faithful any longer to remain under British rule peacefully. We have decided to migrate to Afghanistan thus carrying out the sacred commandments of Allah the Mighty".²³⁴ The idea soon became popular. People sold their properties and started migrating to Afghanistan. But when migrants became burden on Afghan economy, the government of Afghanistan stopped any more migrants in their country. The migrants had no other option but to return to India and on their return they were financially broken. As a result the *Hijrat* Movement collapsed and it served no purpose.

The All-Parties Conference met at Allahabad on 2 June 1920 under the auspices of the Central Khilafat Committee to formulate a response to the Treaty of Sevres. The Committee decided to launch a non-cooperation movement and appointed a sub-committee to give practical effect to the programme. The sub-committee consisted of 'Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Maulana Mohammad Ali, Mr. Ahmad Haji Siddik Khatri, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Dr. Kitchiew, Maulana Hasrat Mohani and Mahatma Gandhi'.²³⁵ Gandhi on this occasion in his speech explained the meaning of *Swaraj* for India and said that he had joined the Khilafat Movement to help the Mohammedans',²³⁶ for to him their success meant *Swaraj*. 'On 22 June, a memorandum, signed by a large number of leaders and ulema, was sent to the Viceroy stating that if their demands were not heeded they from 1 August would resort to non-cooperation. On the same date Gandhi

²³² *Ibid.*, pp. 183-184.

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

²³⁴ K.K. Aziz, *The Indian Khilafat Movement*, op.cit., p. 26.

²³⁵ P.C. Bamford, *History of the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat Movements* (Delhi, Government of India Press, 1925), p. 115.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*

also personally wrote to the Viceroy to explain his connection with and his conduct in the Khilafat question'.²³⁷

While in Europe the Allied forces signed the Treaty of Sevres with Turkey on 10 August 1920, to keep the flame of anti British feelings alive and to show their resentment against the Treaty, the Leaders decided to 'observe 31 August, 1920 as Khilafat day, throughout India'.²³⁸ In September 1920, the Congress held its session at Calcutta and adopted the resolution in favor of non-violent non-cooperation, which was confirmed at the Nagpur session held in December 1920.

Khilafat delegation returned from England in October 1920. Khilafat Committee then organized 'Khilafat Conference at Nagpur in January 1921. Several resolutions were passed at the Conference. Regarding Turkish Peace Terms, 'Conference reaffirms its earlier decision of not accepting the Peace Terms and further declared that Indian Muslims would continue their agitation against the Peace Terms, until Khilafat is restored'.²³⁹

When non-violent and non-cooperation became the joint programme, the 'Jamait-ul-Ulema Hind issued the *Fatwa* which was signed by nine hundred twenty five (925) eminent Muslim divines and sanctioned the programme of non-violent non-cooperation'.²⁴⁰

To popularize non-cooperation among Muslims a group of Ulamas including 'Azad, Kafayattullah, Abdul Bari and Azizur Rehman, issued a *Fatwa* addressed to all Muslims, in which non-cooperation was reiterated; service in the military or police was declared religiously unlawful and great sin since it involves firing on one's Muslim brethren'.²⁴¹

Propaganda intensified against the British government for not solving the Khilafat issue as desired by Indian Muslims and cooperation between Hindu-Muslim communities throughout 1921. Central Khilafat Committee continuously held meetings throughout India. One such meeting was held in Karachi on 8-10 July 1921. Mohammad Ali presided over this Conference. Other prominent leaders who attended this Conference were Ali Brothers, Dr. Kitchlew of Amritsar, Maulana Husain Ahmad Madni of Deoband, Maulana Nisar Ahmad, Pir Ghulam Mujaddid of Matiari in Sindh, and Sri Shankaracharya. All these leaders gave fiery statements, which alarmed the British bureaucracy and they started taking this ultimatum very seriously. This conference endorsed this *Fatwa* and made appeal to the people to carry out effectively the non-

²³⁷ S.M. Burke, *op.cit.*, pp. 218-219.

²³⁸ P.C. Bomford, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

²³⁹ *IAR*, 1921, Part 111, *op.cit.*, pp. 238-240.

²⁴⁰ Dr. Rajendra Prasad, *India Divided*, (Lahore, Siddiq Printers, 1978) p. 121.

²⁴¹ Gail Minault, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

cooperation programme. A numbers of other resolutions were also passed by this Conference. This meeting declared that as long as the 'demands of Indian Muslims regarding the maintaining of integrity of Khilafat and preservation of holy places are not fulfilled, they will continue their struggle'. 'The Conference congratulated Mustafa Kamal for driving the foreigners out of Turkish territory and warned the British Government, that if they fought with the Angora Government, then Indian Muslims will start civil disobedience and will demand complete independence along with the Congress'.²⁴²

Non-cooperation Movement started from 1 August 1920 and was suspended on 6 February 1922. During the period of twenty months of non-cooperation Hindu-Muslim alliance worked shoulder to shoulder for the dual cause of *Khilafat* and *Swaraj*. But during this period, in the year 1921 certain incidents took place which created a rift in Hindu-Muslim unity. One such incident occurred in the Malabar district of Kerala. Muslims of this area are known as Moplahs and were the descendants of the Arabs who had settled in this region over a thousand years ago. Like everywhere, the non-cooperation propaganda spread in Kerala. Being a Muslim majority area, Khilafat agitation was very strong. With the passage of time, because of the fiery statements of the Khilafat leaders, the religious feelings were intensified. As a result agitation took a violent turn. Maulana Mohammad Ali proceeded to Malabar but Government arrested him on his way to Malabar. He was then taken to Karachi where a case against him was registered and he was put in prison for two years. During the agitation Moplah committed atrocities against those Hindus whom they suspected of having gone over to the Government side. This created bitterness amongst the Hindus and as a result Hindu-Muslim riots started. To control the situation Government called in troops and martial law was imposed. An important effect of Moplah riots was the spread of communalism throughout India, which affected the Hindu-Muslim unity which began to wither.

In spite of Hindu-Muslim riots, leaders of Khilafat organization continued the non-cooperation movement. To cut down the momentum of the Movement, Government sent Shaukat Ali, Hussain Ahmed, Motilal Nehru, Jawarharlal Nehru, Lajpat Rai, Abul Kalam Azad, Deshbandhu Das and large number of Congress and Khilafat workers to jail. This resulted in further deterioration of the situation. In December session of 1921 the Congress met at Ahmadabad and decided "that along with the non-cooperation, civil disobedience movement should also be launched to put further pressure on the Government, to release all the prisoners. But before it could be launched, serious riots broke out at Chauri Chaur.²⁴³

²⁴² IAR, 1922, Part 1, *op.cit.*, pp. 238-240.

²⁴³ Tarachand, *History of the Freedom Movement in India*, *op.cit.*, p. 498.

On 5 February 1922 another tragic event occurred at Chauri Chaura, a small town in the district of Gorakhpur, Uttar Pradesh. Here a number of policemen came into conflict with a procession. To save themselves, policemen took refuge in the police station. The violent mob set the police station on fire, reducing the building and all men to ashes.

The incidents of Mophal and Chauri Choure affected the Hindu-Muslim alliance and created suspicion among them and as a result created division in the unity. Following a bloody riot at Chauri Choura in UP in early February 1922. Gandhi suspended civil-disobedience and non-cooperation movement. Soon after this Gandhi was also arrested and government sentenced him for six years. With its entire important leaders in Jail, the movement lost its momentum and the Movement was left without any guidance.

Meanwhile in Turkey, events moved with a fast pace and in their own way. The Kemalists after winning the battle for Anatolia decided to take away the temporal powers of the Sultan. 'In November 1922 the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara abolished the temporal powers of Khalifa, deposed Sultan Wahiduddin Muhammad VI and declared Abdul Majeed Effendi as a new Caliph'.²⁴⁴ Thus the Kemalists separated the spiritual duties of Caliph from his temporal power.

Khilafat leaders with a mixed emotion received this news in India. This action was contrary to the demands of the Khilafat organization. The Khilafat leaders tried to defend their position as best as they could. At the annual meeting of the Khilafat Conference in December 1922, it passed a resolution recognizing the new Caliph and expressed its pleasure at the restoration of the ancient practice of electing the Caliph. Dr. Ansari, the president of the Conference justified the action of Mustafa Kamal by maintaining that "Turks had not really separated the Caliph's spiritual and temporal powers, but had only made the Sultan a constitutional monarch. Praising his victories, they gave Mustafa Kamal a title of Saif-al-Islam (the Sword of Islam)".²⁴⁵

By the beginning of 1923, the masses had lost interest and Khilafat activities virtually came to an end. In July 1923, Turks concluded the Treaty of Lausanne with the European powers, relinquishing all connection. spiritual or temporal with the Arab World. Then in late October 1923 the Grand National Assembly declared Turkey a republic, 'with Mustafa Kamal as president and Ismet Pasha as prime minister, thus settling the question of who would exercise the temporal powers wrested from the Sultan'.²⁴⁶ On '1 March 1924 National Assembly of Turkey voted to depose the Caliph, abolish the Caliphate and banish all surviving members of the Ottoman House'.²⁴⁷ This announcement shocked Indian Muslims. Khilafat Leaders got divided over this action

²⁴⁴ Gail Minault, *op. cit.*, p. 2013

²⁴⁵ Dr. Abdul Jabbar Abid Laghari, *Jido Jehda Azadi Main Sindh Ka Kirdar* (urdu) (Lahore: Idara-e-Tahqiqat Pakistan, 1992), p. 255.

²⁴⁶ Gail Minault, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 203.

of Turkey. 'Mohammad Ali tried to convince Indian Muslims that they have to work for the re-establishment of Khilafat. Whereas leaders like Abul Kalam Azad advised Indians to leave Turkey to its own fate and concentrate on matters closer to home'.²⁴⁸ Thus split was created between Ali Brothers and their co-Khilafatist over the Turkish Government announcement, and the rise of communal antagonism in the provinces began to destroy erode of the Khilafat organization.

The Province of Sindh played a significant role in the Khilafat Movement unlike other provinces of India. During the Khilafat Movement Abdullah Haroon, like other Indian-Muslim political leaders also got involved in Khilafat issue and under his guidance the province of Sindh played a significant role in the Khilafat Movement, It was against the above-mentioned background that Haroon joined Khilafat Movement and spent huge amount of money for promoting the Khilafat cause.

Soon after the Delhi session of Central Khilafat Committee in which it was decided to open Khilafat committees in every nook and corner of India, 'Sindh Khilafat Committee (SKC) was founded in October 1919 by Abdullah Haroon'.²⁴⁹ Among others who joined SKC were Pir Turab Ali Shah Rashdi, Pir Anwar Ali Shah Rashdi, Maulana Taj Muhammad Amroti and Pir Saheb of Jhandey Waley, all powerful Pirs, whose followers were spread all over Sindh, to achieve all the objectives set forth by the Central Khilafat Committee. Haroon was elected President of Sindh Khilafat Committee. To spread the message of Khilafat Committee and to mobilize the support for Khalifa the Khilafat Day was observed on 21 October 1919. The Pirs and religious leaders took active part in organizing protest meetings in villages and towns of Sindh. Hindu-Muslim unity was also in evidence in various places but understandably the participants in the Khilafat Day were predominantly Muslims. On this occasion a meeting of Sindh Khilafat Committee was held under the president ship of Abdullah Haroon at Khalidino Hall, Karachi, on Friday 17 October 1919, which was attended by both Hindus and Muslim. Abdullah Haroon in his speech denounced the policies of British government towards Turkey. He said: "Besides the other duties of the Muslims, one of them was to select a Muslim King who would be capable of preserving their Islamic culture and who would also help in safeguarding the interest of Islam".²⁵⁰ The meeting passed these resolutions:

- (i) "That this Public meeting of the Musalmans of Karachi held under the auspices of Sindh Provincial Committee, after prayers for the continuance and permanence of the temporal power of the Khalifatul Muslimin, approves and adopts the proceedings of the All India Muslim Conference held at Lucknow on the 2 September 1919 and expresses its greatest anxiety over the threatened

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.* p. 205.

²⁴⁹ *All India Gazette*, 4 and 25 October 1919.

²⁵⁰ Dr. Ikram ul-Haq Pervez, *The Contribution of Sindhi Muslims en Pakistan Movement* (Hyderabad: Institute of Sindhology, 1984), p. 114.

dismemberment of Turkey and removal of the holy places of Islam from the Khilifa's control, and trusts that British Ministers will secure fulfillment of the pledge of the Right Hon'ble Lloyd George, given on behalf of the British Empire regarding Turkey for otherwise there will inevitable be created an upheaval among the Muslims threatening alike the peace and progress of the world in general and giving rise to strong and deep rooted discontentment within the British Empire in particular.

(ii) With a view to safeguard the integrity of the Turkish Empire and maintain the Ottoman Khilafat's necessary control over the holy places of Islam by means of carrying an effective propaganda in England and elsewhere, including the proposed organ of the Muslim opinion in London, this public meeting of the Musalmans resolve that a fund for proposed object be started and appeals be made to all brethren-in-faith and their sympathizers to make liberal contribution towards the same".²⁵¹

As the futility of the promises made by the British government became more and more evident, the Muslims of Sindh began to conduct more meetings to express their indignation and to put pressure upon the Government for the restoration of Khilafat. Thus the Khilafat Conference was held at Larkana in February 1920 under the president ship of Pir Syed Abu Turab Mohammad Rashidullah Shah. Among others, Abdullah Haroon addressed this conference. Maulana Shaukat Ali and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad also attended this conference. The Conference passed the resolution that "This Conference respectfully urges that H.I.M's Government should impress on the Peace Conference to settle the question of Khilafat, Holy Places and Islamic territories in accordance with Commands of God and His Prophet. Hindus and Mohammedans all over India are repeating such a demand, and therefore this Conference prays that His Majesty's Government may not be a party to any other settlement".²⁵² (See Appendix 1)

Renowned Hindu and Muslim leaders held the seventh session of Sindh Provincial Conference at Sukkur on 5-6 April 1920 under the president ship of Seth Abdullah Haroon. It was well attended. In his presidential address Haroon spoke on Khilafat question. He said that the British government and Allied statesmen have failed to fulfill their promises in regard to the status of Turkey and said: "I am not hopeful of Britain carrying out its entire promise".²⁵³ While criticizing the reply of British Premier to the Khilafat Deputation led by Maulana Mohammad Ali, Haroon said: "the reply of the Premier of Great Britain to our Khilafat Deputation is most ominous. It clearly foreshadows a peace settlement that falls short of the irreducible Moslem demands". He lauded the cooperation of Hindus towards the Khilafat cause and said: "I hope Muslims

²⁵¹ Dr. M. Yakoob Mughal (ed) *Studies on Sindh* (Hyderabad: University of Sind, 1988), pp. 116-7.

²⁵² *The Daily Gazette*, Karachi, 14 February 1920.

²⁵³ G.M. Sayed, *Sindh Ji Bombay Khan Azadi* (sindhi) (Hyderabad: Hydari Printing Press, 1968), p. 18; Also in Dr. Ikramul-ul-haq Pervez, *op. cit.*, p. 152, and *Biography, op. cit.*, pp. 238-47.

will ever remember the assistance given by the Hindus in making the Khilafat Movement a strong all-India movement. To all the cooperation of Hindus with Muslims in the Khilafat question will give nothing but the sincerest pleasure.²⁵⁴

An extraordinary Khilafat Conference was held at Holmsted Hall, Hyderabad, on 22 May 1920, which was presided over by Haji Abdullah Haroon. The main objectives of the meeting were to consider (a) "necessity of having proper rules and constitution for the Khilafat Conferences and meetings as in his opinion Khilafat Conferences were being held everywhere without proper authority or some sense of responsibility; (b) question of proper control over the raising of funds because at present anybody would raise a fund and spend as he liked; (c) to consider the action taken by Sindh Officials against Khilafat people at Dadu, Sehwan and Jacobabad; and (d) the question of non-cooperation with government on account of Peace Terms with Turkey".²⁵⁵ The meeting decided that 'Muslims should not in any case use violence against the government officials. Whatever action the government proposed to take against the Muslims who were taking part in non-cooperation would bear with courage. The meeting appointed a Committee to frame rules in connection with the maintaining of 'Khilafat Fund'. This committee was also given the task to inquire into all cases direct or indirect started by the government in connection with the Khilafat Movement and to advice necessary action in the matter'.²⁵⁶

Muslims of Sindh gave a greater impetus to the Khilafat Movement. P.C. Bamford, a senior official of the Intelligence Department of the government of India in the 1920s had compiled various proceedings of Khilafat conferences in Sindh. Khilafat Conference held at Hyderabad on 4-5 January 1920 approved of the Delhi proposals to boycott foreign goods. After denouncing the intrigues of those infidels who had criticized the acceptance of the Sultan of Turkey as the Khalifa of Islam, it was resolved that if Government failed to take suitable action against them, Mohammedans would have to deal with them according to the tenets of Islam. British were declared bitterest enemy of Islam and that if the decision with respect of Turkey was not satisfactory, Mohammedans would be compelled to obey the Outran and declare Jihad".²⁵⁷ At the Khilafat Conference held in Jacobabad on 2 May 1920, the president Maulana Taj Mohamed Amroti laid emphasis to adopt non-cooperation and *Hijrat* to Afghanistan and Asia Minor. Gandhi and Maulana Shaukat Ali attended Sindh Khilafat Conference held at Karachi on 23-25 July 1920. Maulana Shaukat Ali declared that 'if the demands

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁵ *The Daily Gazette*, 26 May 1920. Also D.A. Pirzada, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.* The others present in the meeting were: Pir Mahboob Shah, Sahibzada Abdul Sattar Jam, Pir Mahamed Imam Shah, Pir Turab Ali Shah, Niunishi Amin Dir, Shaikh Abdul Aziz, Jan Mohamed, Pir Anver Ali Shah and Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi.

²⁵⁷ *The Daily Gazette* 8 January 1920. Holmsted Hall Hyderabad was full to its capacity, there being about 1500 delegates and visitors present. Makhdoom Moulvi Ghulam Mohamed Malkani, Chairman of the conference read his address in Sindhi. There were many speeches on the resolutions about Turkey, the Khilafat and the interference of certain Mohammedan Officers in Sindh.

of the Indian Muslims in regard to Turkey were not granted, they should openly declare that neither the British were their rulers nor were they their subjects'.²⁵⁸

The historic All India Khilafat Conference was held at Karachi on 10 July 1921 under the president ship of Maulana Mohamed Ali. The prominent leaders who attended the Conference were Ali Brothers, Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, Jagat Guru, Sri Shanker Acharya of Shardha Pirth, Dr. Satyapal, Dr. Kitchlew, Maulana Abdul Bari, Abdul Majid Sindhi, Seth Abdullah Haroon and Vaswani. Seth Abdullah Haroon proposed Maulana Mohammad Ali for presiding over the meeting. In his speech he praised the work of the Maulana and further said that 'it was the good fortune of Sindh in having him here for this position'.²⁵⁹ Maulana Mohamed Ali in his speech said: "When Muhammad bin Qasim first came to Sindh, he was looked upon with contempt by Raja for his lack of equipment, but he was successful by God's will in spite of it. They had been deprived of Jazirat-ul-Arab and only permitted to sit as custodian of the holy graves, but before they did that I would wish that the entire Muslim world should be turned into a big graveyard".²⁶⁰ This conference passed 13 resolutions on various aspects of the Khilafat movement.

At the Khilafat Conference in Delhi in 1920 the *Hijrat* (literally exodus/migration) of Muslims to Afghanistan had been advocated. 'A *Hijrat* Committee was constituted in Peshawar, which undertook to provide the intending migrants all kinds of facilities and comforts'.²⁶¹ The Ulema issued a *fatwa* in November 1920 lending support to the move. Jan Mohammad Junejo from Sindh was appointed Secretary of the *Hijrat* Committee and his residence was made the office of that Committee. People turned up in large numbers to register their names as the prospective immigrants. In the same year Abdullah Haroon gave a message of consolation to the oppressed people of Sindh and Turkey on the occasion of Eid:

"Today is ID, but what a pity is that our brethren in Sindh are still suffering under the British oppression, there is no one to take care of the unfortunate victims of Samarna. There is a mourning in the palaces of the Sultan-i-Azam, Jaziratul-Arab and Constantinople are under the sway of an alien power, under such conditions how can we celebrate Id, forgetting all such atrocities effected against our Muslim brethren, they are subjected to great sorrows and sufferings, our sacred shrines have been usurped by non-Muslims. Under these circumstances the celebration of Id is just unimaginable".²⁶²

²⁵⁸ P.C. Bamford, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

²⁵⁹ *Daily Gazette*, 10 July 1921.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁶¹ Parshotom Mehra, *op. cit.*, p. 377.

²⁶² *Al Wahid*, 18 June 1920.

Ali Brothers, Pir Ghulam Mujadid Sirhandi, Sajjada Nashin of Matiari. Sindh and their comrades were arrested because of their emotional speeches at Karachi Khilafat Conference held on 8 July 1921. 'After their trial which commenced from 26 September 1921, they were convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years each'.²⁶³ Only co-accused who was Hindu, B.K. Tirathji was acquitted. Their conviction gave new life to the Khilafat movement and it was decided that the Khilafat message should be conveyed on the doorsteps of the Muslims of Sindh. Scores of meetings were held in every city of Sindh. First meeting was held on 11 September 1922 at Sukkur, then on 6 November 1922 at Panu Aqil, on 4 June 1923 at Gari-Yasin, on 9 January 1923 at Ghotki, on 23 February 1923 at Daharki, on 29 February 1923 at Ducan and on 30 November 1923 at Obaro. By then in every town and city of Sindh even the street boys could be seen raising the slogans, "O son! Give the life for the Khilafat".²⁶⁴ The all India Khilafat Conference at Nagpur in January 1921 while commending the efforts and spirit of the Sindh Muslims showed great sympathy with them. It resolved that "this Conference expresses its deep sympathy with those Muslims of the North-West Frontier and Sindh who have fallen victim to unjust official aggression in the Khilafat Movement and trusts that they will set an instructive example to their brethren by steadfastly enduring all hardships and troubles which have befallen them in rendering services to the cause of Islam... Sindh Government took unjust and oppressive ways ... for repressing the Khilafat Movement, thereby inviting disturbance and disorder for which they will be solely responsible".²⁶⁵

Lord Reading had seen for himself on his arrival in India how deeply concerned Muslims were about the Khilafat question. On 28 February 1922, he sent a telegram to London urging that the allies should evacuate Constantinople, give back to the Sultan his former sovereignty over holy places and restore Thrace and Smyrna to Turkey. He also sought permission to publish the contents of the telegram to convince the Indian Muslims that the Government of India was doing its best for the Khalifa. Montague, the Secretary of State, accorded his permission without obtaining the authority of the Cabinet to do so. He was a Jew, and he had angered many, including Prime Minister Lloyd George,²⁶⁶ for his more sympathetic attitude towards Turkey and India. Lloyd George now forced him to resign and terminated his political career.

Meanwhile in Turkey, events were following their own course. The helpless government of the Sultan, dominated by an international force of occupation at Constantinople, had signed the Treaty of Severs on 20 August 1920. But the Turkish nationalists, who under Mustafa Kamal Pasha's leadership built up a military force,

²⁶³ Dr. Iram ul Haque Pervez, *op. cit.*, p. 130

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁵ K.K. Aziz, *The Indian Khilafat Movement 1915-1933, op.cit.*, p. 174.

²⁶⁶ Lloyd George was strongly prejudiced against Turks. While decorating General Allenby with an order for the conquest of Palestine, for instance, he had referred to the campaign as a 'crusade' although two-thirds of Allenby's troops had been Muslims. S.M. Burke, Salim Al Din Quraishi, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

which in 1922 mounted an offensive against the Greeks and took Smyrna, did not recognize the treaty. On 1 November, Kamal proclaimed the abolition of the Sultanate and Mohammad VI fled from Constantinople on a British ship. Abdul Majid, cousin of Mohammad VI, was declared Caliph. Kamal's successes enabled him to obtain greatly improved terms through the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923. On 29 October, Turkey formally became a republic with Kamal Atatürk as President. and on 3 March 1924 the institution of the Khilafat, which had agitated the Indian Muslims so much, but whose incumbent had brought defeat and disaster to Turkey, was abolished.

The Khilafat and the Non-cooperation movements could not achieve the desired results as was expected by Gandhi. M.A. Jinnah at the All-India Muslim League session at Lahore on 24 May 1924 in his presidential address, while highlighting upon the failure of non-violence and non-cooperation movement by the congress said, "... the Khilafat organization which was carried on could not claim any better position and being the handmaid of the Indian National Congress, it persuaded practically the same policy and programme and it succeeded no more or better in giving effect to the programme which it had set up for self."²⁶⁷

With the Treaty of Lausanne and the abolition of the Khilafat by the Turkish National Assembly, the very existence of the Khilafat Committee became useless. But Haroon who in 1927 was elected president of Central Khilafat Committee still worked for the restoration of the Khilafat and tried his best to keep the original flame of the movement burning in the hearts of his colleagues and masses but he failed to do so, as the vitality of the movement had been drained away. Thus the movement failed to achieve its object and ended very quietly.

SUMMARY

The discussion in this chapter has introduced the main theme of Khilafat issue and the efforts made by Haroon along with the Muslims of other areas to save the institution of Khilafat.

After the defeat of Turkey in WW1, the attitude of British government towards Turkey became hostile. As a result, the feeling of resentment against British authorities ran high among Indian Muslims. Abdullah Haroon could not keep himself aloof from this situation and not only got involved in Khilafat movement from the very beginning but also became an ardent supporter of Khilafat cause. His interest in and his support for Khilafat issue can be judged from the fact that he represented Sindh at the First session of the Central Khilafat Committee held at Delhi in November 1919. In this session because of his enthusiasm, he was elected President of the Sindh Khilafat Committee and held this office till 1924. In this position he worked with his heart and soul and

²⁶⁷ M. Rafique Afzal, *Selected Speeches and Statements of Quaid-i-Azam* (Karachi: Research Society of Pakistan 1966), p. 131-2.

spent his money generously to promote the Khilafat cause. For example he contributed liberally in Sindh Khilafat Committee Fund, *Angora* fund (50,000, *Smyrna* Fund (15,000/-), and in *Mahajirin* Fund (25,000/-).

To gather support for Khilafat, under his guidance Sindh Khilafat Committee opened its branches in every nook and corner of Sindh. Furthermore to propagate Khilafat issue; he in 1920 founded a newspaper '*Al Wahid*' after the name of the Khalifa Wahid. The newspaper became the mouthpiece of Khilafat movement in Sindh. Because of Haroon's hard work and sincere efforts, in a short period, Khilafat movement became a mass movement.

Though, the Khilafat movement arose out of circumstances that had nothing to do with India, the movement affected Indian Muslim leaders especially Haroon in a positive way and brought to light the capabilities of Haroon as an honest leader. Throughout the movement he had shown the capability to make people follow him and successfully carried the masses with him. Haroon also demonstrated his capabilities as a genuine leader of the people of Sindh who in every Khilafat meeting, along with the Khilafat issue, had always discussed the local problems also, which made good impression on the people of Sindh.

Thus at the end of the movement Haroon emerged as a mature, balanced and honest leader and became a model of patient perseverance. These traits of his character were shown at their best in his efforts for the separation of Sindh from Bombay presidency, which is discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V

ABDULLAH HAROON AND SINDH SEPARATION MOVEMENT

Sindh lost its autonomy for the first time in history when the British made it a part of the Bombay Presidency in 1847; Sindh was one of the last territories of India annexed by the British. 'Sir Charles Napier defeated the Talpur Mirs of Sindh in 1843 at Miani and Dubba and remained Governor of Sindh from 1843-1847'.²⁶⁸ He aimed to establish a modern enlightened government in Sindh. (For further information on earlier relationship between Sindh and British government and for administrative reforms of Napier see Chapter 11) The Parsimonious British government however, wanted to administer the region in a typical colonial style. For this purpose soon after the departure of Napier in 1847 Sindh became a commissionership under the rule of a Commissioner in Sindh within the Bombay Presidency.

This annexation was an artificial one as there were many fundamental differences of geography, climate, language, economy, culture, race and heritage. To quote Dr. Harold H. Mann: "Cut off from the rest of the Bombay Presidency by the desert or by the sea, Sindh differs widely from it in physical features and climate as well as in language, dress and customs of the people".²⁶⁹ These differences hindered the material prosperity and political growth of Sindh. It resulted in growing dissatisfaction of Sindhis against the Bombay administration. As a result this arrangement the Commissioner of Sindh was uniquely placed with special powers to deal with the regional problems, necessitated by the fact that the presidency capital Bombay was thousands of miles away and was difficult for the governor to control Sindh from Bombay.

For this purpose, in 1868 the Sindh Act was passed, which invested the commissioner-in-Sindh with many of the powers of the Governor in Council. Thus, Commissioner-in-Sindh became virtually an independent ruler²⁷⁰ without the check of an Executive Council and adopted an autocratic system of administration. Whereas the Sindh bureaucrats, who largely came from Bombay, they reigned like mediaeval kings in splendid isolation. No irksome superior authority checked or questioned their actions and even if there were issues, which the Governors in Council had to decide, they were heavily dependent on the advice of the local Sindh Officers. Sindh therefore was

²⁶⁸ D.A. Pirzada, *op. cit.*, p.3; Ramsay Muir, *British History: A Survey of the History of all the British People* (London: George Philip and Sons, 1934), p. 577; and G. Anderson, *The Expansion of British India 1818-1858* (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1918), pp. 27-31.

²⁶⁹ M.A. Khuhro, *A Story of Sufferings of Sindh* (Larkana: M.A.Khuhro, 1930), p. 2.

²⁷⁰ D.A. Pirzada, *op. cit.*, p. 7. Also Allen Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

subjected to an undiluted form of British bureaucratic and paternalistic rule for about eighty years.

Soon after the departure of Napier from Sindh, the question of the future status of the Sindh arose. A study of the events shows that the main cause for the annexation of Sindh with Bombay was merely an outcome of the quarrel between Lord Ellenbrough, the then Governor General and the Government of Bombay Presidency. In order to avoid any further aggravation of differences as a virtue of the so-called necessity, Sindh was linked up with Bombay Presidency'.²⁷¹

At the time of Sindh's annexation with Bombay Presidency, 'there was some comment in the press as well as some thought in official circles that Sindh might be more suitably joined with the Punjab, a province with which it had greater affinities in religion, customs, nature of the soil and in many other respects'.²⁷² However, both the Provinces being contiguous and possess many common characteristics but Sindh was not annexed to the Punjab because of the prevalent chaotic conditions. As the British government had not achieved the complete pacification of the Punjab, therefore Punjab being out of question, Bombay was the only option left to the British government. Therefore, Sindh was annexed to the Bombay Presidency, which had nothing in common with Sindh.

During the early period, the local people of Sindh expressed their dissatisfaction over this arrangement in Press. Because of that, the government bureaucrats' restarted considering the necessity and advisability of amalgamating Sindh with the Punjab. When the government floated this idea, the local people opposed the amalgamation of Sindh with the Punjab. 'The reason for opposing the inclusion of Sindh in the province of Punjab was neither an administrative nor constitutional but it was the fear in the minds of Sindhis that Punjab could starve out Sindh's Irrigation Scheme by withdrawing to its own use all the available water of river Indus'.²⁷³ Thus, the local people very diligently opposed the idea of amalgamating Sindh with Punjab.

The study of the subsequent events shows that 'it was the business community of Karachi, whose business had suffered because of the attachment of Sindh with the Bombay Presidency, which in 1866 for the first time came up with the idea of Separation of Sindh'.²⁷⁴ The economic statistics shows that Sindh could not benefit from reforms introduced by British and otherwise Sindh gave more funds to Bombay than Bombay gave to Sindh'.²⁷⁵

²⁷¹ M.A. Khuhro, *A Memorandum On the Question of Sind's Separation from Bombay Presidency* (Before the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee) 1933, p.1

²⁷² M. Irfan, 'A Brief History of the Movement of the Separation of Sindh'. *Al Wahid* (Special Issue Number) 1 April 1936, p. 52.

²⁷³ Dr. M. L. Zardari, *Therik-i-Pakistan maan Sindh jo Hissu* (Sindhi) (Mooro: M.S. Kahn Zardai, 1984). p. 128.

²⁷⁴ Herbert Feldman, *Karachi through a hundred years: The Centenary History of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 1860-1960* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1960) p. xiv.

²⁷⁵ Sir Edwin Montague's *Indian Dairy*, p. 151.

Because of the continuous dissatisfaction expressed by the local Sindhis over the Government policies and administrative setup the British officials were from time to time confronting with the question of reorganizing the administration of Sindh. For example in 1883 Sir John Prescott Hewlett, Under Secretary of the Home Department, Government of India, recommended that Sindh should be placed under the administrative control of Punjab to have "a strong frontier administration".²⁷⁶ After the formation of the North West Frontier Province, this arrangement was not considered desirable. Moreover, he thought that such an arrangement would annoy the Bombay officials, as it would curtail their powers. Therefore, he abandons this idea. Again, in 1903, Sir Denzil Charles Ibbetson who expected to become Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab strongly supported administrative Union of Sindh with Punjab and in lieu of that; Berar was to be given to Bombay'.²⁷⁷ Lord Curzon, the then Viceroy and Governor General of India rejected this argument and argued that Punjab needed money for its own development and could not spare funds for Sindh. This lack of adequate finance of the Punjab could retard the development of Karachi.

Attempts were also made by the Punjab administration to get Sindh attached to Punjab, especially after the creation of North West Frontier Province (NWFP) that was carved out of Punjab (1901). Punjab government wanted to compensate the loss of its areas by acquiring the control of Sindh. Nevertheless, Lord Curzon the then Governor General rejected the proposal of Punjab.

The issue lay dormant for the time being. However, the administrative methods, adopted by the British administration and the insulting behavior of British bureaucrats towards local residents, made the local problems more complex and complicated. Thus. Sindh groaned heavily with an outburst of problems. Lord Harding had admitted this situation in these words, "un equally yoked people do not pull on well together and that the weaker party suffers on account of the contract".²⁷⁸ The grant of unchecked and despotic powers to the Commissioner in Sindh added fuel to the fire and fanned the flame of fury against the British Government and sowed the seed of the demand for the separation of Sindh from Bombay Presidency.

The question of the curtailment of the extra powers vested in the Commissioner-in-Sindh was first publicly taken up in 1901 at the Bombay Provincial Conference. Later it was continuously criticized in different sessions of Sindh Provincial Conference. It is clear from the study of the events from 1901-1920 that the questions of the curtailment of the powers of the Commissioner-in-Sindh and the provincial autonomy were first raised by the leading members of the Sindh Hindu Community. It was because they

²⁷⁶ Hamida Khuhro (ed.) *Documents on Separation of Sindh from Bombay Presidency* (Islamabad: Islamic University, 1982) Vol. I. p.xx. (hereafter Documents).

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. xx.

²⁷⁸ M.A. Khuhro, *A Convincing Case for Separation of Sindh* (Karachi: Naval Rai Chand, 1933), p. 7.

were far advanced in education and had a highly developed political sense as compare to the Muslims.

It was not until '1913, that the idea of separation of Sindh from Bombay was first rose in a major political forum'.²⁷⁹ A prominent Sindhi Hindu, Harchandrai Vishindas, Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Indian National Congress's annual session in Karachi alluded to the idea of separation of Sindh in his speech asserting that: "Sindh possesses several geographical and ethnological characteristics of its own which gave her the hallmark of a self-contained territorial unit".²⁸⁰ Harchandrai showed his fears and apprehensions that: "Punjab has been long casting very covetous eyes upon the Province (Sindh), and urging her claims to an annexation, which became most insistent after the announcement of territorial changes by His Majesty the King Emperor at the last Delhi Durbar. But Sindh has set her face resolutely against all such blandishments and prefers to continue a part of the Bombay Presidency until such time as destiny permits her, to her, own advantage, to attain to provincial Autonomy".²⁸¹

Thus, Vishandas used a national platform to publicize and gain support for a local issue. It was not his intention to raise the issue to the level that appeared to be an all-India demand; the notion of separation was still novel to many Sindhis and it would have been premature to introduce the idea at the national level.

The end of the First World War heralded a new trend in the politics of the sub-continent. The British Government therefore felt the need to move in the direction of reforms it had promised after the war for the evolution of a parliamentary system of government in India. To study the situation at first hand, Sir Edwin Montague, the brilliant and shrewd politician who was Secretary of State for India at that time, came to India in 1917. Among the problems that brought to his notice, one was that of the administrative set up in Sindh. Montague notices that:

"The interesting part of the discussions occurred when we came face to face with the separation of Sindh. The Sindh Provincial Conference, which came on behalf of the Congress Moslem League Scheme, wants the abolition of the Commissioner of Sindh pending the creation of a special Province. They do not want a special province at present because of the expense. The Sindh Mohammadan Association, which is conservative, wants Sindh separated as

²⁷⁹ By contrast, Sindh's commercial community, particularly Karachi's, has shown an interest in separation from Bombay as early as 1866. Herbert Feldman, *Karachi through a Hundred Years: The Centenary History of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry 1860-1960* (Karachi: OUP. 1960), p. xiv.

²⁸⁰ M.A. Zaidi, Shaheda Ghufraan Zaidi (ed.). *The Encyclopedia of Indian National Congress* (Delhi: S. Chand & Co. Ltd., 1979), V1: 393. D.A. Pirzada, op. cit., p. 41.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.* The prominent leaders who participated in the session of Congress included M.A. Jinnah, Lala Lajpat Rai, N.M.Samarath, D.A.Khare, D.E.Wacha, Bhupendra Nath Basu and Gokhaldas Kahandas Parekh.

soon as possible and meanwhile the commissioner kept. It is undoubtedly true that Sindh gives more funds to Bombay than Bombay gives to Sindh".²⁸²

In 1918 the Royal Commission of Reforms consisting of Mr. Montague and Lord Chelmsford, was actively involved in examining the proposals for constitutional changes, while prominent Sindh leaders and Sindh Provincial Organizations began to consider the position of the Province under the Reforms. The Provincial Political Conference a branch of Indian National Congress held its annual session and appointed a sub-committee to report on the desirability or otherwise of separating Sindh from Bombay. This sub-Committee consisted of one Parsi and six Hindu leaders, without single Muslim participation'.²⁸³ It debated on 30 April 1919 the following questions:

- (i) "The detachment of Sindh from Bombay Presidency and its amalgamation with British Baluchistan to form one province under a Lieutenant Governor with a Legislative Council.
- (ii) The detachment of Sindh from the Bombay Presidency and its amalgamation with Punjab to form one province under a Governor-in-Council.
- (iii) The continuance of Sindh as a part of the Bombay Presidency, but under the direct control of the Governor-in-Council necessitating the repeal of all powers to the Commission in Sindh over and above those held by the other Divisional Commissioners; and
- (iv) Autonomy of Sindh".²⁸⁴

The Committee rejected the proposal of amalgamation of Sindh with British Baluchistan and. with the Punjab. On the autonomy of Sindh, the Committee expressed the view that the interest of Sindh could be best safeguarded and developed if it had got its own government and recommended that "Sindh should be constituted an autonomous province with its own legislative and executive as Sindh was not deficit in its revenue compared with Assam".²⁸⁵ The other Political Parties of Sindh such as the 'Sindh Muhammadan Association, while completely satisfied with the then system of government, recommended to the Royal Commission no change, But if change was

²⁸² *The Documents*, p. xxiv, Allen Jones, p. 34. The Sindh Muhammadan Association did later join the cause for Sind's separation. Hamida Khuhro, *The Separation of Sindh and the Working of an Autonomous province: An Analysis of Muslim Political Organizations in Sindh, 1843-1938*, pp. 1-2.

²⁸³ The members of the Committee were: Jairmdas Daulatram, Durgdas Advani, Narain Anandi, Seth Herchandrai Vishandas, and Parsi members was R.K. Sidhwa, G.M. Sayed, *Sindh jay Bombay Khan Azadi* (S) (Kandiorao: Roshni Publication, 1989), p.20 Al-Wahid Special Edition, 16 June 1936, p. 35.

²⁸⁴ Report of the Sindh Reforms Committee on the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms Proposals, *Documents, op.cit.*, p. 14.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

inevitable then it demanded separation of Sindh'.²⁸⁶ Meanwhile, the 'Sindh Muslim League demanded the annulment of the Commissioner's Act'.²⁸⁷

Promoted by the Report and the far-reaching effects of some of the reforms embodied in it, some of Sindh's political leaders and organizations began to consider what position Sindh should assume under India's new political order. The leaders of Sindh's two major communities, H. Vishindas and G.M. Bhurgari, voiced a common theme in raising the separation issue once again. To give greater force, they made it consistent with the liberalizing spirit of the Montague-Chelmsford Report. 'Departing from the earlier notion of Sindh's cultural and territorial discreteness as sufficient grounds for Sindh's separation, Vishindas and Bhurgari now focused on the oppressive and autocratic rule of the Commissioner-in-Sindh as symbolic of Sindh's disadvantageous connection with Bombay'.²⁸⁸ The issues of separation and Sindh's Commissioner elicited not a uniform response from Sindh's major political organizations at this time.

Although in the Government of India Act of 1919, Sindh was not made a separate province, nevertheless, there was a clause in the Act, which entitled the representatives of the Sub-Province to make it into an independent province.²⁸⁹ During April 1920, Sindh Provincial conference held its seventh session at Sukkur under the president ship of Abdullah Haroon. In his presidential address, Haroon denounced the Act by saying that "It is sufficiently clear that the Act does not at all satisfy the needs of the country or the wishes of the people, as a whole".²⁹⁰ Even he was amazed by the contradictory views and opinions of Congress leaders like Annie Besant, Lokmmanya Tilak, B. Das and M.K. Gandhi. Haroon further said, "No responsible public men of any shade of political opinion, however extreme, have suggested our boycotting the Reforms. Every body ... agreed that we have to work the reforms and do our best to produce the greatest results from the Act. How far the Muslims will be able to make their share in the new councils it is impossible for me to say in view of the Khilafat question".²⁹¹

As there was a clause in the Act to demand sub-province into an independent province, 'I.S. Haji, a Sindhi gentleman, who represented Bombay city on the Bombay Legislative Council in 1921 and Presidency Magistrate in Bombay, gave notice of resolution under the above clause of the Government of India Act in the Bombay Legislative Council for the appointment of a Committee to take steps to separate Sindh from Bombay and to make it a Lt. Governor's province'.²⁹² The Council was dissolved before the resolution could come up for discussion.

²⁸⁶ Documents, *op.cit.*, p. 100.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.* p. 104.

²⁸⁸ Pir Ghulam Hyder, 'A Glimpse into the History of Sindh Separation, *Al-Wahid*, 1 April, 1936, pp. 49-50.

²⁸⁹ *Al-Wahid*, Special Edition, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

²⁹⁰ Presidential Address of Seth Haji Abdoola Haroon at the seventh session of Sindh provincial Conference, 1920, Sukkur. *A Biography*, *op. cit.* p. 238-250.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*

²⁹² *Al-Wahid*, Special Edition, *op. cit.* p. 53.

'In 1924 while in Sukkur jail, Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi wrote a pamphlet in Sindhi language, which contains a chapter on the indispensability and urgency of separating Sindh from Bombay'.²⁹³ The pamphlet was published in a series of articles in *Al-Wahid* of Karachi, which had hitherto been the only Muslim daily in Sindh. Since then the ball was set on rolling somewhat furiously and rapidly.

As a result of these articles though the Sindh Provincial Khilafat Committee took up the issue and set up a wide agitation throughout the length and breadth of the Province. but until 1925 the question of separation of Sindh was confined to Sindh only. Not all Indian political organizations had yet given any serious consideration to the claims of Sindh for separation. Meanwhile in 1925 Hindu Mahasabha held its annual session under the president ship of N.C. Kelkar. In his presidential address while discussing the question of communal settlement, Kelkar made a reference to Sindh along with other provinces in which the majorities could hold the minorities as hostages and thus unleash the tyranny. The idea of holding minorities as hostage for the first time was mooted by Kelkar and his words later on created communal bitterness. The separation of Sindh was from the very beginning a Sindh problem but the mention of it in the presidential address of the Hindu Mahasabha shows that the big Hindu leaders were looking at the movement, still confined to Sindh, as a part of a large communal settlement. Since 1913 it was again for the second time that another Hindu leader had furthered the idea of separation from the All-Indian platform.

During 1920, the question of Sindh's autonomy was advocated by G.M. Bhurgari from the platform of the All India Muslim League time and again. 'After his death in 1924 Abdullah Haroon took up the question as an All-Indian demand before the Sindh Muslims to give support to it'.²⁹⁴ Haroon thought that the proposal of separation of Sindh would never materialize unless it was made an all-India question. Therefore Haroon went to Aligarh to move a resolution regarding Sindh's separation in the All India Muslim League session held on 30-31 December 1924. There he found Sir Mohammad Shah already holding the idea of separation of Sindh. The All-India Muslim League Council discussed and unanimously passed the following resolution:

"Whereas there is no ground, ethnological geographical or otherwise, for the inclusion of Sindh within the presidency of Bombay, and whereas past-experience shown that such inclusion is in the highest degree detrimental to the best interests of the people of Sindh and to the development of that part of India, the All-India Muslim League is of opinion that Sindh should separate from Bombay and constituted into separated province".²⁹⁵

²⁹³ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁴ Allen Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

²⁹⁵ Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Foundation of Pakistan, op.cit.*, Vol. II: 73.

This was the turning point in the history of the movement for the separation of Sindh. For the first time it gained the support of the Muslims of India.

Meanwhile, in December 1925 while the sessions of the Indian National Congress and All India Khilafat Conference were being held at Cawnpore, the All India Muslim League was holding its session at Aligarh. Abdullah Haroon was a delegate from Sindh to all the three conferences. The delegates from Sindh to the Congress session demanded a change in the party's constitution suggesting 'that Sindh should get separate representation on the All India Congress Committee and not mingled with Bombay'.²⁹⁶ In effect they demanded Sindh to be treated as a separate province for the purposes of representation on the All-India Congress Committee and in the annual sessions of the Congress itself. Also as far as Khilafat Conference and the Central Khilafat Committee were concerned, Sindh was already treated as a separate province.

The separation issue received a tremendous impetus after its support from all India level parties. During 1926-27 Sindh Muslim leaders especially Haroon took up the question very seriously and raised this issue in all the meetings of Congress and Muslim league held in different parts of India. Because of the efforts of Haroon Muslim Conferences of all India character also raised their voice in support of the issue. While the Muslims of Sindh began to welcome the idea of separation from All India level platforms the Sindh Hindus belonging to Hindu Mahasabha began to feel nervous and turned against it.

To gather the support for the separation when in May 1927 the All India Congress Committee met at Bombay, Abdullah Haroon and Abdul Majid Sindhi attended the meeting and placed the case of separation. The All India Congress Committee endorsed the proposal and passed the resolution in favor of separation. The significant fact is that the other members from Sindh on the All India Congress Committee who were all Hindu leaders of note were signatories of the resolution. On the other hand the anti-separationists of Hindu community in Sindh also sent a deputation to discuss their fears. The Congress President assured the Sindh Hindu deputation of protecting their interests in independent province of Sindh.

Another important development of this period was that the separation question became a live issue and large number of articles was published. For example 'Abdullah Haroon and Jamshed N.R. Metha published pamphlets in favor of separation entitled 'Sindh Separation' where as Professor Chabiani of Delhi University and a Sindhi wrote articles against separation'.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁶ *Al-Wahid*, special edition, op. cit., p. 54.

²⁹⁷ G.M. Sayed, *Sindh jee Bombay khan Azadi* (Hyderabad: Arbab Noor Muhammad Palijo, 1947), p. 12.

To counter the Sindh Hindu agitation against separation in '1927 Sindh National League was formed'.²⁹⁸ To make Sindh Hindus agree to the separation of Sindh, in March 1928 a conference of Sindh leaders including Hindu and Muslim was held at Karachi. After a long discussion both the groups agreed to a pact which came to be known as 'Sindh Hindu-Muslim Pact'.²⁹⁹ Abdullah Haroon was one of the signatories of the pact. As a result of this pact Nationalist Hindus became more determined to push the movement more vigorously.

'In 1927 the communal riots of Larkana further crystallized Muslim sentiments in favor of Sindh's separation whereas these communal riots gave ground to Hindu leaders of Sindh to oppose Sindh's separation. These Hindus leaders had close ties with the All-India Hindu Mahasabha (a party against the separation of Sindh) which partly explained their stance on the separation issue'.³⁰⁰ These Sindhi Hindus found an articulate spokesman in a Delhi 'Professor Dr. H.L. Chablani, who wrote a pamphlet in 1927 opposing Sindh's separation on racial, political and economic grounds'.³⁰¹ Chablani argued that Sindh as an independent province would not be viable financially. This articulation started new debate over the financial autonomy of Sindh in case of independent province. The turns of events, however, suggest that Hindus' opposition of separate Sindh was the direct result of Larkana riots, Hindus in Sindh were a prosperous community that held the major share of business in Sindh. Larkana riots threatened their monopoly on business.

Meanwhile at the second Hindu Sammelan which was held at Sukkur in April 1927, the separation of Sindh was strongly opposed by the Chairman of the Sammelan Mr. Virumal Begraj. 'He in his speech gave a list of Hindu fears and tried to infuse terror into the mind of Hindus by portraying a horrible picture of Muslim Tyranny'.³⁰² To dismiss the fears of Hindus 'Mr. Jethmal Parsram through his article published in Daily New Times laid stress on the point that the Sindh Hindus stood to gain and not to lose by separation'.³⁰³ Similarly to clear the minds of Hindus Jamshed N.R. Mehta, president Karachi Municipality wrote an article in the '*Sindh Observer*' in which he proposed 'a small conference of leaders of both the communities, about ten from each community,

²⁹⁸ M.A. Khuhro, *Sufferings of Sindh* (Karachi: Wahid Art Printing Press, 1981), p. 50.

²⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 51 on 17 July 1928, Sindh Hindu-Muslim Pact was adopted for the Sind's separation. It declared that introduction of Joint electorates and Sind's separation with provincial Autonomy should be affected simultaneously.

³⁰⁰ The Mahasabha's position on separation was based on the premise that "on new province should be created with the object of giving a majority there in to any particular community". Thus the Mahasabha opposed separation because Sindhi Hindus were against it and, secondarily, because Sindh would be a deficit province. See the Mahasabha's evidence in Proceedings of the Round Table Conference. 12 Nov 1930, to 19 Jan. 1931, First Session (London: His majesty's stationery Office, 1931), p. 416. These proceedings are available in the Quaid-I-Azam Academy, Karachi.

³⁰¹ *A Biography*, p. 74.

³⁰² *Daily New Times*, 12 April 1927.

³⁰³ *Ibid*, 10 May 1927.

to clear the fears of Hindus and various other points'.³⁰⁴ Abdullah Haroon sent a letter to the Press 'welcoming the idea of the conference to dispel the fears of the Hindus'.³⁰⁵ But Hindu Sammelan did not accept this proposal. The decision gave an idea to the outside world that Hindus of Sindh are prejudiced, and are afraid, as a minority to even discuss the question whether on its own merit or as a matter of compromise.

In spite of the non acceptance of the proposal by the Sammelan the public meeting was held at Khaliqdina Hall at Karachi. Hindu separationists like 'Mr. Jethmal and Mr. Sidhwa, at the Conference, advanced strong arguments dispelling the fears of the Hindus'.³⁰⁶ At the same time the Sindh Mohammadan Association also invited the Hindu Mahasabha leaders to a meeting and discussed the matter on its merits. But Hindu Sammelan ignored all the efforts made by the separationists.

After the Sukkur riots to allay the fears of the Hindus, a compromise formula was worked out; Professor S.C. Shahani led the Hindu negotiating team while, Abdullah Haroon, M. A. Khuhro and Sheikhs Abdul Majid represented the Muslims. The formula released to the press, stated:

"We the representatives of the Hindus and Mohammadans greatly deplore the riots that took place in Sukkur, and the gang robberies and other atrocious acts that were committed in the district of Sukkur. It is our firm conviction that events of this kind are greatly harmful to the progress of the country and we express our profound regret at the unhappy and most deplorable happenings in the town and the district of Sukkur..."

"Under these circumstances we urge the government that a committee be appointed by them at once in consultation with us to enquire into the (a) causes of the tragic events (b) the adequacy and the timeliness of the measures taken by the authorities, (c) the allegations as to the hardships caused to some innocent people during the investigations (d) the conduct of the police and the Revenue officials in the course of their inquiry and investigation; (e) the promptness and sufficiency of the measures taken to bring real culprits to trial and to recover property stolen or looted, and (f) to concert measures required to remove the political, social, economic and educational defeat in the existing, situation revealed by the tragic events".³⁰⁷

A committee was set up consisting of the leaders of different communities under the chairmanship of a Parsi leader Jamshed Nusserwanji Mehta. Abdullah Haroon, Mohammad Ayub Khuhro, and Allah Baksh Soomro represented Muslims while Prof. Shahni, Lalchand Navalrai, and Dr. Hingorani represented the Hindu community. The

³⁰⁴ *Sindh Observer*, 12 May 1927.

³⁰⁵ *Biography, op. cit.*, p. 74.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁷ Hamida Khuhro, *Muhammad Ayub Khuhro: A life of Courage in Politics* (Karachi: Feroze Sons. 1998), p. 85.

Committee tried to recover stolen and looted property and returned it to the owners. It decided to consider and determine which of the pending cases should be withdrawn and, to restore goodwill and harmony among the people of two communities. The communal tension in Sukkur was reduced considerably and most of the matters were settled amicably.

By 1928 anti separationists Hindus have fully realized that because of its acceptance by Congress, Sindh separation movement had become very formidable. Therefore they decided that they have to devise some new method to attack this movement and to convince Congress to give up its support to the movement. So when in 1928 the meeting of the All India Congress Committee was convened the anti separationists Hindus argued that 'financially Sindh would not be self-supporting and therefore it had no right to be constituted into a separate Province'.³⁰⁸ The Hindus now took their stand on financial grounds. They persuaded the Congress Committee to appoint a sub-committee to look into the financial aspect of the issue. On the demand of Hindus the sub-committee was constituted which consisted of 'Abdullah Haroon, A. Majeed Sindhi, Jairamdas Daulatram, and Professor Chablani. Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas was appointed as the Chairman of this committee'.³⁰⁹

The members of the committee met at Bombay but could not reach to a decision. The sub-committee without the consent of Muslim members issued a report. According to which they tried to prove that "the deficit of the separate Province would amount to two crores".³¹⁰ But both Hindu and Muslim separationists wrote rejoinders to the allegations and strongly condemn the report. Abdullah Haroon while criticizing the report said that "financially Sindh could support itself and was capable of cutting its cost according to its cloth".³¹¹

The influence of this group of Hindus and the strength of their economic argument was revealed the following year at the level of all-India politics. While the financial controversy was still raging the Nehru Report, which formulated a framework for India's constitution, conceded the separation demand of Sindh. However, a few months later in June 1928, an All-Parties Conference was convened in Lucknow to discuss the Report. The Conference altered the Report's position of support for separation in line with the wishes of the anti-separationists Sindhi Hindus, and held that 'Sindh separation should be granted only after certain financial and administrative conditions had been met'.³¹²

³⁰⁸ G.M. Sayed, *Sindh jee Bombay Khan Azadi*, op. cit, p. 18.

³⁰⁹ M.A. Khuhro, *Sufferings of Sindh*, op. cit, p. 55.

³¹⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹¹ *Ibid.*

³¹² All-Parties Conference, 1928, Report of the Committee appointed by the Conference to determine the principles of the Constitution for India. (Allahabad: General Secretary, All India Congress Committee. 1928), p. 16.

This attachment of conditions to the separation demand was a setback to the Indian Muslims. They reacted with anger and dismay but also renewed their efforts to secure the separation demand. The All-India leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, declared heatedly at the December meeting of the All-Parties National Convention in Calcutta that "The Mussalmans feel that (conditional separation) is shelving the issue and postponing their insistent demand until doomsday and (they) cannot agree to it".³¹³ Also at the Calcutta meeting the Sindhi Muslim leadership led by Abdullah Haroon, submitted a representation urging that "the linkage of conditions to the separation demand be ended and that separation be undertaken as the majority of Sindhis have already so desired it and that its separation shall in no case be made conditional on the result of the financial and administrative considerations as recommended in resolution No. 4 of the All Parties Conference".³¹⁴

Abdullah Haroon was not contented with this. Therefore as soon as the Nehru Report was published, he on 28 November, 1928 sends an explanatory note to the members of the Nehru committee. Haroon commented on various clauses of the report and in doing so he drew attention on the clause regarding separation of Sindh. Haroon maintained that "those who are conversant with the controversy on the separation of Sindh know fully well that the majority of the people favor its separation. Organizations of all-India fame have accepted this demand and, accordingly, have recommended the separation of the province. At first, the separation was included in the famous Delhi-Muslim proposals. The All-India Congress Committee (May 1927) and the National Congress at Madras (December 1927) also supported this separation. In spite of the strong recommendations of these influential bodies one fails to understand why the All-Parties Conference at Lucknow...have made the separation conditional..."³¹⁵ Haroon demanded that "as the majority of the Sindh people want to make it clear that the separation should not be delayed" and "that the Nehru Report should be so amended as to accept the formation of Sindh into a separate province at the next meeting of the Nehruite Convention".³¹⁶ Haroon further clarified the point that "Separation should not be hinged on financial and administrative consideration". He brought the attention of the members of Nehru committee to the resolution passed by the Sindh Khilafat Conference, held at Sukkur on 27-29 October 1928 which reads: "Whereas the major portion of the population of Sindh (Muslims) is prepared to shoulder the cost of the administration of the separate province, and further, as any deficit can be made up by the Central Government, the simultaneous separation of the province with the coming into operation of the recommendation under the Nehru Report should not be made conditional on any financial enquiry but should be made absolute".³¹⁷ In the end of his

³¹³ All-Parties Conference, 1928, The Proceedings of the All-Parties National Convention (Allahabad: Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, Secretary, All-Parties National Convention. 1929).

³¹⁴ M. A. Khuhro, *A Story of the Sufferings of Sindh*, op.cit., p. 53. *A Biography*, p. 81.

³¹⁵ *A Biography*, p. 81.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*

³¹⁷ *Ibid.* p. 82.

letter he told the members that "if Sindh is not constituted as a separate province then they will carry on their present vehement and vigorous agitation until the separation becomes an established fact".³¹⁸ (See Appendix III)

Meanwhile at Lucknow convention on the Sindh separation issue after a long discussion a new formula was evolved, which was accepted by both the parties. According to the resolution; "with the inauguration of the Nehru Constitution, Sindh was to be separated from Bombay provided it was found financially self-supporting".³¹⁹ But even after giving their assent to the resolution the anti-separationists continued their agitation against separation. After a few months they convened a conference at Sukkur where they rejected the resolution on Sindh of Lucknow convention.

After the rejection of the Nehru Report by the Muslims, British government sends Simon Commission to India to discuss on the future constitution of India with the Indian politicians. It was under this intricate situation that on 12 November 1928 the Simon Commission began its sittings in Karachi to listen to the case for separation of Sindh, an issue which was to be finalized in the next constitution. The Commission was assisted by a Provincial Committee comprising Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, who was a member of the Governor's Executive Council as Chairman and Syed Miran Mohammad Shah, a lawyer and member of the Bombay Legislative Council from Hyderabad Sindh. The Muslim case was put up by the delegation from Sindh Mohammad Association led by Mohammad Ayub Khuhro. The case was forcefully presented and debated in detail. The All Sindh Hindu Association led by Professor H.L. Chablani put the case against the separation. Apart from expressing Hindu fears Professor Chablani concentrated on the financial aspects of the problem. His main argument was that Sindh was subsidized by the Bombay presidency Government and that the separated Sindh would not be able to support itself. This was the argument that was most likely to appeal to British official mind. It was also the argument that was played up by the Bombay Government, which was opposed to the detachment of Sindh from the Presidency. 'The Simon Commission gave its opinion against autonomy for Sindh, maintaining that the time was not yet ripe'.³²⁰ 'Syed Miran Mohammad Shah did not agree with the Commission's opinion and with the help of Jamshed Nusserwanji's pamphlet and on the advice of Jinnah and Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoola wrote a note of dissent'.³²¹ The decision of the Commission caused great disappointment in Sindh but the Sindh readership did not lose heart.

In March 1929, Muslim League held a session in Delhi in which Jinnah worked out an agreed Muslim formula, which included the basic and irreducible minimum Muslim conditions for constitutional settlement. 'The formula came to be known as the '*Fourteen Points of Mr. Jinnah*'. Regarding Sindh, point nine was quite clear and emphatic: 'Sindh

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*

³¹⁹ *Documents, op. cit.* p. 170.

³²⁰ *The Documents, op.cit*, p. 165-178.

³²¹ D.A. Pirzada, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52 also in *Documents, Minutes of Dissent*, p. 177.

should be separated from the Bombay presidency'.³²² However fair and urgent the case for separation might have appeared to the Muslims of Sindh and the rest of India, the British officialdom was strongly opposed to it and the Hindu extremist element took full advantage of their reluctance to concede autonomy for Sindh.

During the autumn of 1930, M.A. Jinnah came to Sukkur to appear for the defence in the '*boy in the box*' case lodged against Pir of Pagara (the Pir of Kingri Sharif Khairpur). Abdullah Haroon along with Khuhro reached Sukkur from Karachi to meet Jinnah. Haroon arranged luncheon in honor of Jinnah and invited other Muslim notables with a view to discussing with Jinnah the case for the separation of Sindh from Bombay. The lunch was arranged at the residence of the Mir of Khairpur at Sukkur. 'Haroon and Khuhro spoke about the separation issue. Jinnah listened to them with interest and said that he would undertake the task'.³²³ He had already lent his support to this demand from the platform of Muslim League and 'agreed to take up the issue whenever the opportunity occurred'.³²⁴

After the failure of the Simon Commission the British government decided to try and solve the constitutional problem of India through a series of Round Table Conferences. The first Round Table Conference was scheduled to begin in London on 12 November 1930. The separation of Sindh was to be one of the issues to be discussed at this conference and a subcommittee was specially appointed to examine the issue. One of the Muslim delegates to the conference was Jinnah. On his way to London to attend the conference, Jinnah stopped at Karachi for a short time. In Karachi he was chief guest at a dinner hosted by Sir Abdullah Haroon, M.A. Khuhro and G.M. Sayed. In a formal address at this dinner Khuhro requested Jinnah to advocate the cause of separation in London and Jinnah agreed to do so.

The Round Table Conference sub-committee on Sindh (Sub Committee IX) was chaired by Earl Russell and its members included 'Marquees of Zetland, Marquees of Readings, H.H. The Aga Khan, M.A. Jinnah, Dr. Shaffat Ahmed Khan, Sir Mohammad Shaft, Dr. B.S. Mooje, Mr. C.Y. Chintamini, Raja Narendra Nath, Sardar Sampuran Sing, Mr. M.R. Jayakar, Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, Sir Abdul Qaiyum, Mr. B.V. Jadhav, Sr. Phiroze Sethna, Mr. H.P. Mody, Sir Hubert Can and M. Issac Foot'.³²⁵ The committee discussed the matter in detail. There had been some determined opposition from Hindu diehards like Dr. Moonji. The Committee gave the following opinion:

"The sub-committee with two dissentient (Dr. Moonji) and Raja Narendra Nath) are impressed by the strength of the arguments in favor of separation, and they

³²² *Documents, op.cit.*, p. xxvi.

³²³ Hamida Khuhro, *op. cit.* p. 87-88.

³²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 88.

³²⁵ *Documents*, p. xi.

have come to the conclusion that the principle of separation should be accepted".³²⁶

Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto and Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah spoke before the sub-committee on behalf of Sindhi Muslims, as did M.A. Jinnah as the All-India League's spokesman. From among their arguments, the sub-committee cited those, which were most impressive and persuasive:

"The racial and linguistic differences between the inhabitants of Sindh and those of the presidency of Bombay proper, the geographical isolation of Sindh from Bombay, the difficulties of communication between the two and the insistence with which separation has been advocated".³²⁷

The sub-committee noted further in its conclusion the Bombay government's opposition on administrative grounds but decided that they were not 'inseparable'.

S.C. Shahani, Member Legislative council sent a telegram to the representatives of Round Table Conference, namely, Ramsay Macdonald, Wage Woodbin, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Dr. Moonje and M.R. Jayakar urging upon them to oppose the separation of Sindh. The telegram read:

"Your attention is drawn to recent two hundred incidents of dacoities in Sindh. Hindus of Sukkur and Rohri have been looted, molested and killed. Sindh should not be separated otherwise Hindus will be totally destroyed".³²⁸

Abdullah Haroon immediately sent telegrams to the British Prime Minister to combat the false allegations of Prof. Shahani:

"Prof. Shahani's opposition to Sindh's separation [is based] on concocted grounds and could not be considered. He has mentioned about dacoities, looting and killings of Hindus to create communal questions. Except for Sukkur District, there is no incident of dacoities. In Sukkur some incidents took place due to floods and bad economic conditions in which Hindus and Sikhs were also involved. Agriculturist class is under grip of moneylenders. Every agriculturist in Sukkur has to pay Rs. 500/= to the moneylender as interest. Attention is

³²⁶ Government of India, India Round Table Conference. 12 November 1930-19 January 1931 Proceedings of sub-Committees vol. IX (Submitted No IX (Sindh) (Calcutta: Government of India Central Publication Branch, 1931) p. 91. Now available in the Quaid-i-Azam Academy.

³²⁷ Proceedings of RTC, p. 91.

³²⁸ "S.C. Shahni to the representatives of RTC, Nov. 1930", *G.M. Sayed Collection*, Some letters of Politicians and workers, (Sindhi) p. 223.

drawn that since many years Hindu-Muslims demand for separation of Sindh is on historical, geographical, linguistic, economic and administrative bases".³²⁹

Meanwhile Haroon sent copies of his telegram to 'Secretary of State for India, H.H. Aga Khan, M.A. Jinnah, Dr. Shaffat Ahmed Khan, M.R. Jayakar, Sir Cowasjee Jehangir, Nawab Sir Abdul Qayum, Sir Pheroze Sethan, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, Sir Mohammad Shafi, Moulana Mohammad Ali and Dr. Moonji. Abdullah Haroon informed G.M. Sayed about the above situation and urged upon him to call the meeting of the Managing Committee of the Sindh Mohammadan Association with a view to discussing the prevailing political situation and to take appropriate action in this direction'.³³⁰ He also sent similar telegrams from the platform of Sindh Mohammadan Association to the above persons.

As a result of Haroon's efforts on 9 January 1931, Sindh Muslim Conference held its meeting at Jacobabad under the president ship of Haroon. This conference was attended by about one thousand Musalmans. At the suggestion of Haroon it was decided to form 'Sindh Muslim Legislative Association'. The conference passed, the following resolution on the separation of Sindh which was moved by Sayed Miran Mohammad Shah and supported by Moulvi Abdul Karam Chishti:

"This Conference is of the candid view that Sindh should be separated unconditionally. Except above the people of Sindh would not accept any reforms. The question of separation should not be seen from communal point of view. This resolution of the Conference should be sent to the Members of the Round Table Conference".³³¹

Because of the financial argument given by Hindu anti-separationists, under the decision of the Round Table Conference in 1931, Government of India appointed a committee under the chairmanship of Sir Miles Irving to report on the financial position of Sindh. The Committee conducted its inquiry from July to September 1931. The terms of reference for the financial enquiry committee were as follows:

"With reference to the report of sub-Committee ix of the Indian Round Table Conference, to examine carefully the probable revenue and expenditure of a separated Sindh and the security of the dept on the Sukkur Barrage and also to recommend an equitable adjustment of the financial commitment for which Sindh may properly be considered liable".³³²

³²⁹ Haroon to the Prime Minister British Cabinet London Nov. 1930, G.M. Sayed, *op. cit.* p. 221-222.

³³⁰ Haroon to G.M. Sayed, 18 November, 1930. *Ibid*, p. 221.

³³¹ Proceedings of the Sindh Muslim Conference held at Jacobabad. 9 January 1931, G.M. Sayed, *op. cit.*, p. 225-229.

³³² *Report of the Sindh Conference, 1932.*

Haji Abdullah Haroon from Delhi wrote to G.M. Sayed and advised him that 'a committee of Musalmans may be appointed which should collect the facts and figures and produce before the above Committee'.³³³ Haroon further pointed out that 'as in Punjab a movement has been launched to secure the interests of Northern provinces of India like Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and North-West Frontier, therefore, we must support that movement'.³³⁴

Among those who gave evidence before the Committee were Sir Abdullah Haroon, M.A. Khuhro, Syed Miran Mohammad Shah and Prof. Gokhale. The anti separationists who gave evidence before the committee were Chablani, Dewan Bhojsingh and Dr. Hingorani. Some influential voices were raised in favor of separation and Rewachand Thadani, Rustom Sidhwa and Prof. Bhateja wrote newspaper articles to prove that Sindh's financial position was strong.

A committee issued a questionnaire on the additional cost of the separation of Sindh. Haroon's financial acumen found full scope for expression and after he had sent his replies to the questions asked, he carefully studied the statement of the probable income and expenditure of separated Sindh prepared by the Sindh Finance Committee and offered his own remarks on the Committee's forecast which, he said, were based on the assumptions that (1) 'the financial settlement between the Central Government and the provincial Government would remain unchanged, (2) the cost of administration would continue to be top heavy (3) the Indianization of services would continue to be as slow as at present and (4) there would be no expectation of any economy or retrenchment in expenditure'. Haroon made an altogether different analysis of all these aspects of the question, and collected facts and figures from official sources in support of his own conclusions, and published them in a pamphlet, which he submitted to the 'Chairman, Sindh Financial Enquiry Committee, at Poona on 24 August 1931'.³³⁵ He further opined that:

"The work of the Sindh Conference is proceeding. The Hindu delegates are putting all sorts of hitches in the working of the Conference. If it is proposed that economics be affected to cut down expenditure, they cry and say that administration will deteriorate. If it is proposed that basic figures of revenue assumed by the Irving Committee are very excessive and must be greatly reduced. Yesterday, Muslim representatives volunteered that they will pay one anna in the rupee more land revenue, which will bring 9 lakhs in the beginning and Rs. 15 lacs in 1944. The Hindus said that there being Hindu Zamindars holding 40 percent land, they cannot agree to additional taxation. Let such taxes be devised as fall upon the shoulder of the Muslims who stand for separation".³³⁶ (See Appendix IV)

³³³ Haji Abdullah Haroon to G.M. Sayed, 29 Jan. 1991. G.M. Sayed, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

³³⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 229-232.

³³⁵ *A Biography*, p. 63.

³³⁶ *Ibid*. p. 64.

The Miles Irving Committee as it came to be called came to the conclusion that 'separated Sindh would start its career with an initial deficit of Rs. 108.45 lakhs'.³³⁷ The Irving Report was submitted to the second Round Table Conference, which met in November 1931. Gandhi also attended this session but the conference could come to no satisfactory conclusion on the constitutional issues concerning India. The Prime Minister of England Mr. Ramsay Macdonald gave his '*Communal Award*' and accepted the principle of the separation of Sindh subject to finding means for financing it. He further said: "To find these means, the directive was given that we therefore intend to ask the Government of India to arrange for a Conference with representative of Sindh for the purpose of trying to overcome the difficulties disclosed by the report of the expert financial investigation which has just been completed".³³⁸

Following the suggestion of the Prime Minister, Government of India organized a conference with the following terms of reference:

"The Sindh Conference is being set up in accordance with the understanding given by the Prime Minister in the course of his statement to the Round Table Conference at the close of its second session on the 15th December of last year. His Majesty's Government has accepted in principle the proposition that Sindh should be constituted a separate province if satisfactory means of financing it can be found. The purpose the conference is to try to overcome the difficulties disclosed by the report of the expert financial investigation made by the Irving Committee last summer. The Chairman, having met the representatives of Sindh, will report the result of the Conference to the government of India".³³⁹

The members of the Conference were 'A.F.L. Brayne, Chairman, Main Ali Bakhs Mohammad Hussain, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto, Mr. Lalchand Wavlrai, Abdullah Haroon, Mir Bande Ali Talpur, K.B.M.A. Khuro, K.B. Allah Baksh Mohammad Umar, Prof. H.R.K. Batheja, Prof. H.L. Chablani, Hoshang N.E. Dinshaw, Mr. H. Dow, Diwan Bahadur Murlidhar Jerandas Punjabi, Mr. E.L. Price and Qazi Abdur Rehman'.³⁴⁰

The Conference met at 'Karachi on 25 April 1932 and carried investigation until 17 May 1932'.³⁴¹ The Conference gave a favorable report on the separation of Sindh. Mr. Batheja member of the Brayne Sindh Conference submitted a report that "Sindh's deficit could be met through additional revenues through Sukkur Barrage Land".³⁴²

³³⁷ *Irving Committee Report*, p. 58.

³³⁸ *Documents, op. cit.* p. 12.

³³⁹ *The Documents*, p.xli.

³⁴⁰ G. M. Syed, *Sindh Jee Bombay Khan Azadi* (Sindhi) op. cit. p. 84.

³⁴¹ *AFM*, Vol. 241:44.

³⁴² Proceedings of Political Conference of Leading Muslims held on 1 September 1932 at Karachi at the residence of Khan Bahadur Wali Mohammad Hassan Ally, *AFM*, Vol. 241:44.

Abdullah Haroon in his letter to Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for India noted, "I need not reiterate the importance of Sindh separation. The question of deficit is being exaggerated; the financial difficulty can be solved easily by just distribution and equitable readjustment between the Government of India, Bombay Government and the future government of Sindh".³⁴³ But the Hindu members of the conference who were opposed to the proposal of separation, expressed the view that a decision on the principle had been reached at the Round Table Conference in the absence of any Hindu representative of Sindh and that the real meaning of the conclusion of Sindh subcommittee lay in the statement of its Chairman that if Sindh cannot show that it can stand successfully on its own feet, the separation does not take place. The Prime Minister's statement, they feared, would be interpreted as going beyond this.

The strong and effective campaign of the anti-separationists served to further politicize the Muslim community and reinforce unity in the ranks of the Sindhi Muslim leadership. Unlike the Hindus there was no division among the Muslim elite over the issue of separation, but similar to their opponents in the Hindu camp, Sindhi Muslims leaders formed their own informal organization called Sindh Azad Conference early in 1932, to provide a platform for the cause of Sindh separation. 'Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto was appointed its Chairman, M.A. Khuhro Vice Chairman, Sheikh Abdul Majid, Secretary, and Abdullah Haroon, Treasurer'.³⁴⁴ This formation of an exclusively provincial level organization on the part of the Sindhi Muslim elite was significant in at least two ways. It provided a basis for Sindhi Muslim strength and unity by bringing together the landed aristocracy and the Muslim middle classes on the single-issue platform of separation. But beyond that it reflected among them a growing sense of a regional, largely Muslim, Sindhi identity, which was reinforced by arguments they chose to advance their cause of separation. They continued the old arguments of Sindh's cultural discreteness and the unjust Bombay connection but they evolved new arguments to counter the thrusts of the Hindus. The Sindh Azad Conference was scheduled to be held on 27-28 March 1932 at Khaliqdina Hall at Karachi on the insistence of Haji Abdullah Haroon. Sir Mohammad Iqbal gave his assent to preside over the Conference. However, the conference was postponed on the advice of Sindhi Members of Bombay Council'.³⁴⁵

The emergence of the Sindh Azad Conference was noteworthy in another sense for it had a bearing on the theme of provincial all India relations. The Sindhi Muslim elite was compelled to form their own provincial organization chiefly because of the aforementioned reasons and as the national Muslim organizations had failed to provide any

³⁴³ Haroon to Sr. Samuel, Hoare, Secretary of State for India. 1 November 1931. Archives of Freedom Movement, *Abdullah Haroon Collection*, Vol. II. p. 38-40.

³⁴⁴ *Daily Gazette*, 2 September 1932, p. 5.

³⁴⁵ Haji Abdullah Haroon, Chairman, Reception Committee Azad Sindh Conference, 18 February 1932 to Sayed Ghulam Murtaza Shah, Qazi Abdur Rehman and S.M. Shafi, G.M. Sayed, *op.cit.*, pp. 232-233.

leadership at the provincial level. But despite the All-India League's inability to furnish organizational leadership for the Sindh separation cause, it continued to support the issue at its meetings as did the other Muslim national organization, the All-India Muslim Conference. Thus the pattern of harmonious local-centre Muslim relations established in the 1920s and based on a common allegiance to the goal of separating Sindh from Bombay continued into the 1930s and the final years of the separation movement.

Sindh Azad Conference met on 15-16 April 1932 at Hyderabad Sindh. It was the most representative gathering that had ever taken place in Sindh. The resolution on the separation of Sindh was moved by Khuhro and was cabled to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for India and H.H. the Aga Khan, by Syed Miran Mohammad Shah, Secretary of the conference. The Conference further observed that "The Sindh Muslims do not wish to be hood winked by the Sindh Hindus by accepting their impracticable conditions, imposed at the so called Allahabad 'Unity Conference', which on the other hand makes Sindh separation impossible. We emphatically desire that this question be decided on its own merits and that Sindh should immediately and unconditionally be separated from the Bombay presidency and constituted a separate province".³⁴⁶

The year 1932 witnessed hectic activities by both the protagonists and antagonists of the 'separation' so as to make the strongest case for the second Round Table Conference to be held in November on which the Reforms that were expected to be announced would depend. On 18 April 1932 Sindh Azad Conference met at Karachi under the president ship of Sheikh Abdul Majid. The leading participants in the Conference were Khuhro, Abdullah Haroon, Haji Mir Mohammad Baluch, Syed Miran Mohammad Shah and G.M. Sayed who was the Chairman of the Reception Committee. 'The Conference passed the resolution on separation of Sindh'.³⁴⁷ In the same year 16 September was celebrated throughout Sindh as 'Sindh Separation Day' with great enthusiasm. On 15 November the Second Azad Conference met at Hyderabad under the president ship of Allama Yusuf Ali. The Conference passed its resolution supporting separation and also set up a permanent body 'Sindh Azad Conference'. On 5 February, the working committee of Sindh Azad Conference met to work out measures to counter the Hindu propaganda. The committee appointed Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi to publicize the cause of separation and to counter Hindu propaganda. The battle in the struggle for separation continued.

In 1932 Haroon went to Ottawa to attend the economic conference. On his way to Ottawa while he was in England, Haroon prepared a memorandum of separation case and circulated it to all members of the House of Commons to inform them about the exact situation and feelings of the Muslims of India.

³⁴⁶ Hamida Khuhro, *op. cit.* p. 99-100.

³⁴⁷ Hamida Khuhro, *op.cit.*, p. 101.

At last the labor and efforts of Abdullah Haroon and other Muslim leaders were rewarded and on '24 December 1932, the Secretary of State for India announced the definite decision of the British government to separate Sindh from the Bombay Presidency and establish an independent, autonomous Governor's province in Sindh'.³⁴⁸ There can be little doubt that the findings of the Brayne Committee and Muslim efforts played an important part in determining the issue of Sindh's separation. On this occasion, Abdullah Haroon issued the following statement to Associated Press of India on 27 December 1932:

"On this occasion when Sindh has been definitely separated from Bombay, on behalf of the people of Sindh I thank all members of the Round Table Conference, specially the British Government and Sir Samuel Hoare.

It is matter of great rejoicing, that after five years' of hard work Sindh has been finally liberated from the Bombay yoke. It is the firm belief of Muslims, as well as a number of Hindus and Paresis of Sindh that separation would do immense good to Sindh ... I know Sindh Muslims will be very jubilant, but they must understand that their responsibility is, indeed, very onerous. They will have to act in such a way that no community Hindu, Christian, Parsi, or European mercantile community can have any just grievance. As a businessman, I assure my Hindu brothers that I greatly appreciate the fact that the Hindu community of Sindh is an asset in fact a jewel, to Sindh. They control trade and capital and they are far more educated than Muslims. Not only that. The Bhaibund community of Hyderabad Sindh and the bankers of Shikarpur are bringing into Sindh from all parts of the world not less than two crores of rupees a year, and if any future Sindh Government behaved highhandedly towards Hindus, then it will indirectly do incalculable harm to the Muslim community, because Hindus' wealth will be diverted from Sindh to other provinces, thereby leaving Sindh the poorer. I will do whatever lies in my power to do justice, not only to the Hindu community, but also to all other minority communities".³⁴⁹

Haroon also sent congratulatory telegrams to His Excellency the Viceroy and H.H. the Aga Khan, The telegram to the Viceroy read:

"Four million people of Sindh Jubilant on great occasion of Sindh becoming independent federal province and thanking your government for getting Justice done".³⁵⁰

In his telegram to Aga Khan, Haroon requested him that "on behalf of Sindh please convey my heartiest thanks to all Round Table Delegates especially Muslim Delegates

³⁴⁸ Allen Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 50

³⁴⁹ *Abdullah Haroon Collection*, Vol. I, pp. 76-77 Pakistan National Archives, Islamabad.

³⁵⁰ *Biography. op.cit.*, p. 85.

whose labors crowned with success. Sindh and Muslims of India never forget your Highness Service which you rendered."³⁵¹

Haroon also sent letters to Sindh leaders as under:

"Before I propose to say anything in this respect, I should like to offer you and the people of Sindh my heartiest congratulations on the momentous success and pray to God to make our dear Sindh a glorious and prosperous unit in the Federation. It is really a matter of great joy that our hard labor resulted in success and, after the eighty-five years continuous repressions of Bombay, Sindh has been made an autonomous Governor province".

"We will be failing in our duty, if at this stage, the people of Sindh do not give expression to our heartiest thanks to delegates of the Round Table Conference, especially Muslims, and particularly British Government, who exercised their labors day and night continuously for the auspicious talks and met the people of Sindh with justification... One thing more, i propose that happiness should be celebrated throughout Sindh. Every house, institutions and religious places is decorated with lights, flags, etc. to celebrate our success, as was done by Sindh Musalmans on the occasion of Samama's conquest. I hope, after few days, you will hear the whole programme, and I am sure, you will respond to it to the utmost extent of our call, and participate in making this unique day in the history of India a success".³⁵²

After the announcement of separation the Government of India constituted a Sindh Administrative Committee to work out the mechanism for the separation of Sindh from Bombay. The administration as well as the infrastructure necessary for the new capital of Sindh Karachi had to be established for the new province. The Chairman of the committee was Sir Hugh Dow who was considered an expert in Sindh finances, especially the administration of the Sukkur Barrage finance. Abdullah Haroon and Khuhro were the Sindh Muslim members on the Committee who represented the majority of the people of the province. Sir Abdullah was a highly experienced public man who gave his full support to Khuhro who dealt with the detailed administration work, the knowledge of which was required for effective participation in the Committee. There was a meaningful co-ordination between the two men, who were dealing with Dow who was more interested in pairing the structure down to its bare bones rather than giving a good working administration to Sindh.

In the mean time, Haroon received a report that the Government of India had detailed Mr. Nixon to examine the financial separation of Sindh with the Bombay Government

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*

³⁵² Haroon to Sindh Leaders, 26 December 1932, *Ibid*, p. 84-85.

so to determine the liabilities of the new province in respect of debts and capital expenditure. In this connection, Haroon on 29 July 1935 wrote a letter to the Sir Percy James Grigg, a finance member of the government of India. While giving facts and figures, Haroon said:

"The question of separating the Finance between the Government of Bombay and Sindh is very complicated. It requires strenuous work to get justice as the seriousness of this matter equitably deserves. The public of Sindh have great anxiety in this respect and desire seriously to obtain an unbiased scrutinization and justness in the matter of separation of our liabilities which is a big thing to be considered for our future welfare".

Haroon therefore suggested "that the Government of India for the purpose of scrutinizing minutely the items of debts and assets of finance should very kindly appoint a Committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. J. Nixon or any one from the Finance or the Audit Department of the Government of India which may reasonably settle the finance issue. If, however, it is not possible for the government of India to appoint some such committee of experts at present, then I would, Sir, request that at least Mr. G. Kaula (who had worked on Sindh Administrative Committee and who I think was retired Assistant Auditor General) may be deputed to collaborate with Mr. J. Nixon".³⁵³

The provincial autonomy to Sindh was given a prominent place in its new Constitution for India, the Government of India Act, 1935, intended to finally satisfy the insistent Indian demand for greater constitutional advice. Under the authority of the 1935 Act, Sindh was declared a separate province on 1 April 1936, thus bringing victory to the Sindhi Muslims who were engaged in a long and sometimes bitter struggle to secure the goal of an autonomous Sindh province

Summary

Sindh separation movement has manifold bearings upon the Sindhi leadership. In the beginning of the twenties the issue of separation was eluded by the Hindu leaders from the platform of the Congress.

The Hindu leaders, especially the Hindu Mahasabhatists, opposed the issue of separation on account of their economic and political interests. They also feared that in separated Sindh, they would be in a minority and at the mercy of Muslims, and there would be 'Muslim Raj in Sindh'.

Upon the conclusion of the Sindh separation movement, the Sindhi Muslim leadership appeared to have reached a pinnacle of political success. They had achieved a broad

³⁵³ *A Biography*, p. 87-91.

measure of unity among themselves. They had established close relations with the all-India Muslim leadership and they emerged as the new brokers of power in the new autonomous province. The question remained, would the Muslim leadership in Sindh manage to maintain and consolidate their positions of political strength or would they instead prove unequal to the task of shouldering the burden of leadership and responsibility. This would be seen in next chapters.

CHAPTER VI

PUBLIC LIFE OF ABDULLAH HAROON (1913-1935)

British Prime Minister Lloyd George's announcement on 20 August 1917 had significant impact on the Indian politics. It stated that "the policy of His Majesty's government is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire The British Government and the government of India on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement of the Indian peoples. must be judges ... and they must be guided by the cooperation received from those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred, and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in their sense of responsibility".³⁵⁴

The effect of the announcement on the Indians was that the people belonging to every walk of life such as lawyers, journalists, professionals, businessmen and industrialists began to join the Congress and Muslim League. In the meanwhile, the British Government introduced Montague-Chelmsford Reforms (1919) improving the existing system introduced by the Minto-Morley Reforms in 1909. Sindh region was given sufficient representation on the Bombay Legislative Council. Under these Reforms, 'Abdullah Haroon contested election to the Bombay Legislative Council in 1923 and succeeded in winning a seat, which he retained till 1926'.³⁵⁵

Haroon's public and political life started in 'April 1913 when he contested and won a seat on the Municipal Committee of Karachi'.³⁵⁶ The electorate then was a joint one, that is, he sought the suffrage of all the citizens of his constituency irrespective of their creed or class, and it spoke volumes of his popularity that an appreciating public reposed its confidence in him, which he retained. He served on the Municipal committee for seventeen years from 1913 to 1917 and then from 1921 to 1934. In 1923 the Governor of Bombay His Excellency Freeman Thomas Baron Willingder of Rathan visited Karachi and was accorded King's reception by the Municipal Councillors, businessmen and lawyers. He was given welcome address highlighting the civic services of Councillors to the citizens to which 'Haroon was one the signatories'.³⁵⁷

³⁵⁴ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 25 August 1917.

³⁵⁵ Hamida Khuhro, *Mohammad Ayub Khuhro A Life Of Courage In Politics* (Karachi: Ferozsons Ltd, 1998), p. 52.

³⁵⁶ *Biography*, *op. cit.*, pp. 31-32. Also see, Administration Report of Karachi Municipality 1912-1913. KMC Library and Federation of Pakistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Haroon contested election from Ward 5 on the seat fallen vacant on account of the death of Municipal Councillor Nasir Lutufali on 8 April 1913.

³⁵⁷ *Administration Report of Karachi Municipality*, *op. cit.* 1923-24.

In addition to the usual everyday work of his own committees, Haroon's services were requisitioned for important and unusual sub-committees, which needed sane judgment and constructive thought. For instance, he served on a sub-committee formed to define the words 'religious ceremonies' a sub-committee to report on the removal of skins, hides etc, of cows, a sub-committee to report on the imposition of fresh taxes, a sub-committee to report on certain defects in the columns supporting the dome of the new museum building and methods to be devised of removing them. Off and on for seven years he worked on the Managing committee. N. R. Mehta, the President remarked about the Municipal work of multifarious nature done by Haroon in the following words:

"In the Municipal work he was never known to be communal on any question. He gave his vote freely, whenever and wherever a question arose, on its own merits. He was respected highly by the members and the staff of the Municipality and he was always one of the most outstanding members of the Corporation. He was a self-made man and had seen good days from poverty and therefore he always took great care to judge all questions from the poor man's point of view and had very good knack of putting himself in position of others when judging any question".³⁵⁸

During his association with Karachi Municipality, Haroon started Jamia Islamia Yatim Khana in 1923 for orphans and poor Muslim children with accommodation for boarding of sixty boys'.³⁵⁹ The students were taught both the vernacular and English language, as also a trade to make them capable of earning their livelihood. Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah during his visit to Yatim Khana remarked in the visitors' book that: "This is one of the typical institutions in which vocational or manual training are combined with ordinary education. Institutions like this are the greatest desideratum of the country. These don't turn out boys who add to the disgruntled but those who can find work for themselves".³⁶⁰

Four years after he was elected to the Karachi Municipal Committee, Haroon in 1917 joined the Congress Party in Sindh. During WWI, Muslim League and Congress decided to join their forces to pressurize Great Britain for the introduction of self

³⁵⁸ Mr. E.D. Shroff remarked about Haroon's work that 'During the period that he was Municipal Councilor, Karachi grew considerably and most of the improvements that are visible today, such as extension of Karachi towards the New Jail, Bunder Road Extension, Co-operative Housing Societies, Recreation Grounds and Parks in various quarters, were made during his councillorship and he took great interest in the Committees appointed for the purpose. *Biography, op. cit.*, p. 33.

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p. 58.

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.* Sir Sultan Ahmad remarked about Yatim Khana that: "I feel gratified that my own views about the necessity of vocational and manual training in such schools have found practical recognition. It is suicidal for everyone to think of law or Government service. These two departments can absorb barely an insignificant proportion of humanity. What should the rest do? That is the problem which in its own modest way is being solved at this school".

government for India. As a result, in 1916 a constitutional plan known as Lucknow Pact (Congress-League Scheme) was signed between these two major political parties, which changed the political ideas of many classes of Indian society. One such community was the business community which after the announcement of British Prime Minister Lloyd George (20 August 1917) came to realize the effectiveness of their community in shaping the policies of the government as they affected the commerce and trade and industry of India. As a result, businessmen and industrialists started joining the Congress and Muslim League. It was against this background that Haroon joined the Congress. With joining the Congress party in Sindh, Haroon's spheres of political activity increased manifold and when in October the same year Muslim League's Sindh Branch was formed, 'Haroon became its secretary and in 1920 he was elected President of the Sindh Provincial Muslim League'.³⁶¹ Thus he had dual membership of League and the Congress. The Sindh branch of the Congress organized Sindh Provincial Conference in 1920 at Sukkur. Abdullah Haroon was appointed as the President of the Conference. In his presidential address, he explained the goal of the Congress, as being the establishment of self-government in India but he made clear that the goal could not be achieved without the Hindu-Muslim unity. Haroon urged upon the "young Muslims and Hindus to stand shoulder to shoulder to nobly fulfill their mission".³⁶² He laid emphasis on the Congress to work out the reforms and said: "... that most of the Indian Musalmans are of the same origin as the Hindus, there can be nothing that can really be an obstacle in the Hindu-Muslim entente. In the past, as history amply proves Hindus and Muslims have been the best of best neighbors, sincere friends, and faithful comrades and a little, on both sides, would strengthen the solidarity between the two communities and mould them into one, great nation".³⁶³

From 1920 onwards, Abdullah Haroon took active part in the two movements namely, Sindh-Khilafat Movement and the Sindh Separation Movement to separate Sindh from Bombay Presidency and make it independent province³⁶⁴ (See chapters four and five). After the failure of the Khilafat Movement under the given political situation, Haroon diverted his attention to the elections of 1923 for the Bombay Legislative Council and won his seat, which he retained until 1926.

Abdullah Haroon attended the session of the Council held in 'March 1923, which was presided over by Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoola'.³⁶⁵ For the First time, delegation of powers to

³⁶¹ D.A. Pirzada, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

³⁶² *Abdullah Haroon Collection (AHC)*, National Archives of Pakistan Islamabad, Vol. II: 40-41. Also see *Biography*, *op. cit.*, p. 238-51.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁴ See for details chapters in this study.

³⁶⁵ The others who attended the meeting from Sindh included Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, Shah Nawaz Bhutto, Mohammad Ayub Khuhro, Khan Saheb Seraj Imam Baksh Khan Jatoi of Nawabshah; Khan Saheb Karim Baksh Khan Jatoi of Mehar in Dadu District, Khan Sheb Sher Mohammad Khan Bijarani of Upper Sindh Frontier district; Jan Mohammad Khan Bhurgari the brother of Rais Ghulam Mohammad Bhurgari, Sayed Ghulam Nabi Shah of Thararkar, Mukhi Jethanand, Haji Gul Mohammad Khamiso, Haji Fazal Mohammad Leghari, Sayed Mohamamd

the Commissioner-in-Sindh, of local government, both under Special Act and the Local-self Government Act, came under discussion and severely criticized the Commissioner-in-Sindh powers as he had been acting as King without any check of the Council or the Government of Bombay. The meeting could not support the arguments advanced under "peculiar position" and "special circumstances of the Sindh province." It was, felt essential that the Commissioner should exercise the powers of government for most purposes and "this fact is sufficient to justify his separate existence".³⁶⁶

After the elections of 1937, Sir George Lloyd the Governor of Bombay appointed Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah minister of Sindh. Ever since his appointment, he had been able to keep what was popularly known as the 'Sindh team' effectively under his influence. The Sindh block had invariably supported government in the Council. It was the idea of Sir Lloyd to create this block, and he was satisfied with the success it achieved. George Lloyd launched the 'Back Bay Reclamation Scheme', of which Sir Ghulam Hussain and Abdullah Haroon along with other Muslim members of the Council were the big supporter of the Lloyd Barrage scheme in Sindh, which, it seemed, was a great measure of reform, which Sindh witnessed during its annexation with the Bombay Presidency. The squander mania associated with these projects came in the hands of Hindu opposition members of the Council namely Dr. M. R. Jaykar and K.F. Nariman for a political attack and called them 'Lloyd Raj'. 'During these political exposures of what was termed as 'Lloyd's Folly' and 'Back Bay Bungle' the brunt of defence fell on Ghulam Hussain and Haroon. By skilful party maneuvers and a judicious distribution of jobs and patronage, they managed to spike the Congress guns in a political division in the Council'.³⁶⁷In the session of 'June 1923, the team of Sindh members of the Council got passed supplementary grant of Rs. 56 Lacs for the construction of the Barrage from the Council, which met in June 1923, despite severe opposition from diehard Hindu members on the Council, namely, Trivedi, Rao Sahib Harilal Dessai, Lalji Narayanji and Mahatma Gandhi'.³⁶⁸

On 23 July 1924, the Bombay Legislative Council resumed its session which was attended by Haroon. He moved an amendment to Clause 5 of the Karachi Port Trust Act 1886, which was, meant for securing 'adequate representation of Indian Commercial Interests'. As a result, the Government of Bombay appointed a Select Committee with Haroon as one of its members, to consider and suggest amendments in it. The Committee submitted its report on which Haroon wrote a note of dissent to the effect that 'he did not agree with regard to the adequacy of the representation of Indian interests and the propriety of naming the Indian mercantile bodies to be given representation on the Board of Trustees for the Port of Karachi and that the majority of

Kamil Shah, Nur Mohammad Vakil, K.B. Jan Mohammad Pathan, Pir Rasool Baksh Shah of Ghotki, Durgadas Advani, Bhojsingh Pahlajani and others., Hamida Khuhro, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

³⁶⁶ *Indian Annual Register*, 1922-23, *op.cit.*, Vol. I, p. 424.

³⁶⁷ Press cutting in Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah's papers (n.d.) (GHHP).

³⁶⁸ *Indian Annual Register*, *op.cit.*, 1922-23, Vol. I. p. 323.

the members of the board of trustees should be Indian non-officials'.³⁶⁹ He suggested that 'in Section 5 the number should be raised from 14 to 15, so that there should be eight Indian non-officials and seven other members on the Board of Karachi'.³⁷⁰ The relevant section 5 of the Act was amended and passed on the third reading of the Bill.

On 29 July 1924 the House deliberated on the question of 'Revision of settlement of agricultural taxes in Sindh' to increase revenue of the government. Haroon moved the resolution that "no revision of settlement be undertaken or enforced before the expiry of 20 years from the date of the revision".³⁷¹ The motion was admitted for discussion. Thereafter Haroon gave the history of 'revision settlement' since 1874, and hoped that the government would accept it. He drew the attention of the House to Chatfield Report in which the government in 1901 laid down the policy that 20 years' settlement should be made'.³⁷² Haroon gave detailed convincing arguments in support of his motion which was later adopted.

During his association with the Bombay Legislative Council Haroon raised number of issues of public interest. For example. 'he wanted to get passed reforms in connection with Sindh, as its merger with Bombay Presidency was quite unnatural. isolating Sindh politically and administratively'. Similarly he 'demanded from the Council to sanction religious holidays for the Muslim community on occasions such as Shab-i-Mairaj, Shab-i-Qadr, Jumat-ul-Wida and Haj. On other occasions he suggested to the Council 'to recommend to the government to issue instructions to all government departments to send their advertisements to all provincial dailies irrespective of their political affiliations'. He also suggested that 'Karachi Municipality should be empowered to determine the number and location of liquor shops within its jurisdiction'. On another occasion, he recommended 'the removal of the disqualification clause with respect to candidature at municipal, local board and legislative council election, of persons convicted of political or other offences not involving moral turpitude'.³⁷³

During his association with Bombay Legislative Council, Haroon raised his voice to solve the issues related to Sindh. Nevertheless, the problems were not solved according to his desire. Dissatisfied with the slow response of Bombay Council to the issues of Sindh, he in 1926, at the time of next elections, decided to take the issues of Sindh at a higher level. 'Haroon contested and was elected to the seat in the Central Legislative Assembly (1926), where he represented Sindh for sixteen years'.³⁷⁴ In 1928, he moved a resolution in the Central Assembly in connection with the Haj traffic. The Government

³⁶⁹ *Bombay Legislative Council Proceedings* (hereafter *BLCP*). Appendix 5. pp. 899-900. The other members included: G. H. Thomas, V.A. Grantham, B., G. Pahalajani, Lalji Narainji, R.D. Shinde. K.E. Dadachanji and Hudson.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid*.

³⁷¹ *Ibid*, 29 July 1924, p. 598-603.

³⁷² *Ibid*.

³⁷³ *BLCP, op. cit.* 19 February 1925, p. 19.

³⁷⁴ *Biography, op. cit.* p. 51.

responded by appointing the Haj Enquiry Committee to enquire in the matter and 'Haroon was appointed one of its members'.³⁷⁵ After investigation, the Committee recommended that the grievances of pilgrims should be redressed. Haji camp was constructed under his personal supervision. Due to his keen interest in the welfare work of the pilgrims, the Port Haji Committee elected him as its chairperson from 1934 to 1937'.³⁷⁶

Because of his thorough grasp in all matters relating to trade and finance, the government requisitioned his services off and on. In 1929, he was put on the Central Banking Enquiry Committee. In 1932, the British Government extended invitation to Abdullah Haroon to represent India on the Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa in Canada. Ottawa Agreement reached between His Majesty's Government and the Government of India for reviving Empire trade because of recognition of Imperial unity and advantages of mutual cooperation in trade. Haroon was one of the signatories to the Trade Agreement. High tariff walls were erected by almost all countries to keep out foreign imports. This policy had ruined international commerce to the extent of at least fifty percent. India produced raw materials but she was getting low rates for its produce, and sometimes found it difficult to sell some of its raw produce. It was therefore necessary for India to consider seriously that its produce should be sold otherwise agriculturists would be under great difficulties. In order to sell goods it had become essential for India to enter into preferential trade agreements either with the United Kingdom, the Dominions or some other countries.

The Ottawa Agreement came under discussion in the Assembly. There was great criticism on the agreement. In opposition, Dr. Ziauddin and B.N. Misra said that "the Agreement had affected Indian trade with countries outside the British Empire". The others who opposed the agreement were B. Das and Sitarama Raju who said that "India was in a mood of cooperation with England but on equal terms as partners and not as a subject race and the balance of advantages would obviously be against India", therefore, "preference should begin at home and quoted large number of extracts from the opinions of leading Indian merchants and associations against the agreement".³⁷⁷ Ranga Iyer opposed the agreement because in his opinion it would cripple the development of iron and steel industry. During the course of debate, Haroon said, "I have already signed the agreement... I have been hearing many arguments in opposition to it. But after hearing them, I am glad to say that they did not convince me that I have done any wrong to my country".³⁷⁸ After a long discussion, finally the Assembly approved the Trade Agreement.

³⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 55.

³⁷⁶ Ibid.

³⁷⁷ *Indian Annual Register, op.cit.*, 1932, p. 131-32.

³⁷⁸ *Indian Legislative Assembly Debates*, 9 November 1932, pp. 1926-27. Vol. VI (hereafter as *LAD*).

From 1925 until the time of introduction of the Government of India Act 1935, India had been undergoing a constitutional crisis. The Simon Commission, which came in 1928, was boycotted by the Congress and the Muslim League on different pretexts. However, while Jinnah was abroad, the Congress president Dr. Mulhtar Ahmed Ansari chaired the All-Parties Conference, which resolved to appoint a Committee led by Motilal Nehru to draft a nationalist constitution. 'The Committee submitted a report, which came to be known as Nehru Report'.³⁷⁹ Abdullah Haroon made counter proposals to the Nehru Report, and sent it to the members of the Nehru Committee. He said that owing to some essential omissions, the Report has failed to unite the various diverse national elements for achieving national unity. He further said that "the Nehru Report has not provided adequate safeguards for the minorities" and that "the representation of the Muslims in the legislative assembly was inadequate".³⁸⁰ (See Appendix III).

When the Nehru Report came before the Legislative Assembly at Simla, Pandit Moti Lal Nehru was seen canvassing support for his constitutional scheme with the object of having a resolution passed by the Assembly approving the principles embodied in the Nehru report. Muslim members of the Central Legislature felt an imminent danger to the political existence of the Muslim Community; therefore they issued a manifesto from Simla on 10 September 1928, which, was signed among others by Abdullah Haroon. The Manifesto stated, "We want to make it quite clear that no constitution will be acceptable to the Mussalmans unless it provides effective and adequate protection of their interests".³⁸¹ The signatories of the manifesto and numerous other members of the Provincial legislatures and several leading Mussalmans from provinces throughout the country met at Delhi on the 31 December 1928 in an All India Muslim Conference under the presidency of Aga Khan. The Conference decided that, "in view of India's vast extent and its ethnological, linguistic, administrative and geographical or territorial divisions, the only form of government suitable to India's conditions was a federal system with complete autonomy and residuary powers vested in the constituent states. The right of the Muslims to elect their representatives on the various Indian Legislatures through separate electorates was now the law of the land and Muslims could not be deprived of that right without their consent. In the provinces in which Mussalmans constitute a minority, they shall have a representation in no case less than that enjoyed by them under the existing law. It was essential that Mussalmans should have their due share in the Central and Provincial Cabinets".³⁸² The Muslim League

³⁷⁹ Stanley Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 105.

³⁸⁰ *Haroon Collection*, File II: 71-99. See also *Biography*, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-70. Pandit Nehru sent a complimentary copy of Nehru Report to Abdullah Haroon. Haroon viewed that all Indian communities, especially the Minorities should unite to achieve and strive for the goal of Self- Government and with the safeguards provided to them under the Swaraj Government these Minorities may enjoy their rights as equal partners in the Commonwealth of Indian. The Minorities will not make heavy sacrifice unless the protection of their rights and interests receive statutory recognition. The edifice of Swaraj can be built only on the foundations of practical considerations and not on sentimental grounds.

³⁸¹ *Biography*, *op. cit.* p. 93.

³⁸² *Biography*, *op. cit.* p 94, and *Indian Annual Register*, 1928, Vol. II, p. 128.

rejected the Nehru Report. 'Subsequently, Jinnah submitted his 14-Points, which became a milestone in the history of Muslims' struggle in India'.³⁸³

During this period, the Muslim League was divided into two factions, the Jinnah and the Shari group. Instead of obliging himself with any of these, Abdullah Haroon joined the All India Muslim Conference (AIMC) formed by the Aga Khan in 1930. On 18 March 1930, a meeting of the Executive Board of the All India Muslim parties Conference was held at New Delhi under the leadership of Maulana Mohammad Ali. At this meeting, the attitude of the AIMC towards the All Parties Conference came up for the discussion. In this meeting Abdullah Haroon moved a resolution observing that: "the executive Board of the All India Muslim Conference welcomes the reunion brought about by the organizers and request the League to join the All India Muslim Conference".³⁸⁴ The discussion on this resolution centred on the question 'whether the Shafi League was to merge into the Jinnah League or vice versa. It had become necessary to consider the resolution because the Shafi League had already joined the All India Muslim Conference'.³⁸⁵ The meeting eventually decided that those members of the Executive Board who were members of the League should press this point at the next Council meeting of the League. 'The meeting urged upon the Muslims not to participate in the civil disobedience movement launched by the Congress, which was designed to frighten the government into accepting 'Dominion Status' with the communal settlement embodied in Nehru Report'.³⁸⁶

To remove the constitutional deadlock in India, three Round Table Conferences (RTC) were held in London from 1930-1932, in the convening of which Jinnah had played a significant role. At the RTC, the League and the Congress delegates presented their viewpoint, and the Muslim delegates demanded safeguards for the Muslims under the constitution. 'In the meanwhile, on 5 April 1931, a special session of the All India Muslim Conference held at New Delhi, Sangham Theatre, which was, attended by Abdullah Haroon'.³⁸⁷ The Conference reiterated the demands made by the Muslim League that (i) "the Muslim community should have 33½ percent representation in the Federal Legislature (ii) the weightage at present enjoyed by the Muslim community in the provinces in which it is a minority be maintained, similar weightage being given to other minorities in Sindh, the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan (iii) the small Muslim majority in the Punjab and Bengal shall in no way be impaired in relation to their representation to the legislatures".³⁸⁸ The Conference approved the decision of the RTC that 'Sindh be separated from the Bombay and constituted into a separate

³⁸³ For further information on Jinnah's fourteen points see Khalid bin Sayeed, *Pakistan the formative phase (1857-1948)* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001).

³⁸⁴ *Indian Annual Register, op. cit.* Vol. 1, pp. 347-8.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁸⁷ *Indian Annual Register, op. cit.*, Vol. 1, pp. 284-89. Among those present were Sir Mohammad Shafi. Sir Abdul Qayum, Sir Akbar Khan, Malik Feroze Khan Noon. Dr. Ziauddin Ahmed. Mr. Abdul Aziz and Maulana Hasrat Mohani.

³⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

governor's province and demanded that such separation should take place prior to or simultaneously with the inauguration of the new constitution, the financial adjustments being so arranged as to make the provision for the availability of sufficient resources for development.³⁸⁹ Abdullah Haroon spoke in favor of separate electorates for the Muslims. He further said that "passing of the resolution would not make it acceptable to the government or the Hindus. They should work on agitation in its favor in order to create the necessary sanction behind it".³⁹⁰

Jinnah received cold attitude at the RTC and decided to live in London. Later on he told his experience at the RTC that: "I received the shock of my life at the meeting of the Round Table Conference. In the face of danger, the Hindu sentiment, the Hindu mind, the Hindu attitude led me to the conclusion that there was no hope of unity. I felt very pessimistic about my country. The position was most unfortunate. The Mussalmans were like the No-Man's Land; they were led by either the flunkeys of the British Government or the camp followers of the Congress. Whenever attempts were made to organize Muslims, toadies and flunkeys on the one hand and traitors in the Congress camp on the other frustrated the efforts. I began to feel that neither could I help India, nor change the Hindu mentality nor could I make the Musalmans realize the precarious position. I felt so disappointed and depressed that I decided to settle down in London".³⁹¹

While Jinnah was in London, the Muslims rank and file in India was in disarray. A section led by Nawab Ismail Khan resigned from the All India Muslim Conference on the ground that "Muslims should be left to decide for themselves whether to join the Congress or not".³⁹² Abdullah Haroon sought advice from Aga Khan and Jinnah who were in France and London respectively. He received response from both of them whose advice was identical in nature. Jinnah's advice was that 'Musalmans must stand united and press their demands by constitutional methods. It would be unwise to join unlawful movements such as the Congress'. Jinnah further asked Haroon that 'he should make it clear that the Musalmans are not opposed to responsible self-government provided safeguards to the Muslims were embodied in the constitution'. Aga Khan said that 'a delegation of Muslim leaders should wait upon the Viceroy and insist on concessions in Bengal, Punjab, and Sindh and immediate promise of residuary powers and autonomy of provinces. As regards the question of separate or joint electorates, he should ask plebiscite of Muslim voters to decide'.³⁹³

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁹¹ Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The Nation's Voice, Towards Consolidation: Speeches and Statements March 1935-March 1940.* (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy. 1992), pp. 233-34.

³⁹² *Biography, op. cit.* p. 96.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*

As a follow up to the advice of Jinnah and Aga Khan, Haroon immediately called the meeting of the Working Committee of All India Muslim Conference under his chairmanship at New Delhi on 31 March 1932. The purpose of the meeting was to give effect to the resolution of the Lahore meeting of All India Muslim Conference held on 22 March 1932. The resolution was to the effect that 'as the RTC has not conceded to the Muslim demands, therefore it was not possible for Muslims to continue to cooperate with the RTC and its sub-committees which were preparing a constitution in the absence of the decision that full Muslim demands will be embodied therein'. The Conference also demanded 'the immediate introduction of provincial autonomy in all provinces in British India simultaneously while the details of the federation scheme are being explored and worked out'.³⁹⁴ Haroon in his statement said that, "All India Muslim Conference is struggling hard to achieve the immediate objective of securing acceptance of the Muslim demands in regard to communal representation and the safeguards in the future constitution of India and to direct all the Muslim public to immediately start a movement for achieving those objectives of the Conference."³⁹⁵

The question of communal grievance between Hindus and Muslims over the representation could not be decided in the RTC. Therefore, in August 1932, the British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald announced the Communal Award and declared his government's decision to give to the North-West Frontier full status of a Governor's province and separate electorates were retained. Thus the British government accepted the two major demands of the Muslims. But at the same time the government gave weightage to the Hindus and Sikhs of Bengal and Punjab respectively, which reduced the numerical majority of Muslims in these areas. Jinnah urged Britain's government to "give provincial autonomy without delay simultaneously with responsibility at the centre in British India", recognizing, as he did, the total impossibility of getting the princes to agree to any federal scheme. He further advised his British friends, as MacDonald intimated, to "decide the communal question provisionally. I say this because, if the British government settles the communal question and made a substantial advance towards real responsibility at the centre in British India, both Hindus and Mohammedans will realize the earnestness on the part of the government and the bulk of the people will accept their decision".³⁹⁶

The Communal Award shocked the Muslim community therefore Haroon sought a meeting with Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for India, which was granted to him but as he had to hasten to India to attend the Legislative Assembly session hence he missed the opportunity of meeting Sir Samuel Hoare. Haroon then wrote to Hoare informing him that 'the Communal Award had aroused dissatisfaction among the Muslim community'. He pointed out that 'the Award had deprived the Punjab and Bengal Muslims of their constitutional majorities through separate electorates, while the

³⁹⁴ *Indian Annual Register, op.cit.*, Vol. I, March 1932, p. 307.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 307-308.

³⁹⁶ Stanley Wolpert, *op.cit.*, p. 129.

Hindus in Madras, UP., CP., Bihar and Orissa form majority, have been guaranteed statutory majority. The weightage of Muslims have been decreased in some provinces where they are in a minority'. He further stated that 'in case of Sindh's separation, the question of financial difficulty had not been solved, nor any mention about the reforms in Baluchistan been made'.³⁹⁷ Haroon also raised the following objections:

1. "The Hindus will manage to form majorities in all the provinces and it is, therefore, improbable that they will include any Muslim in the Cabinet and the Communal Award is silent as regards the inclusion of the Muslims in the Cabinet.
2. The Public Service will be the monopoly of non-Muslims if there is no statutory safeguarding of a certain portion of the public services for Muslims.
3. The Communal Award is silent about the measure of Muslim representation in the Federal Government".³⁹⁸

As the Communal Award became the real test of the Indian Muslims, 'a joint meeting of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim Conference, Council of the Muslim League and Jamiat-ul-Ulema Hind, was held at Delhi on 20 November 1932 under the chairmanship of Sir Abdullah Suhrawardy'.³⁹⁹ Over 50 members of these political bodies attended the meeting, which included Abdullah Haroon. The meeting gave its opinion against the desirability of introducing joint electorate, as contemplated in the Allahabad proposals; Haroon also supported this view.

It became clear that under the leadership of Abdullah Haroon the All India Muslim Conference was striving hard to get secured the safeguards of the Muslim community because the All India Muslim League was totally dead and without leadership. 'Housed in a rented portion of a building in an area in Delhi where the Muslim population predominated, the Muslim League, the only body the Indian Muslims look for help, was poorly financed and, its ill-equipped office was managed by a poorly paid assistant secretary and a messenger. Most of its members were in arrears in the payment of their subscription. It had no press and no newspaper to articulate its position and views directly and independently. In its limited upper hierarchy, counsels were divided and although there was a general realization that the position of the Muslims dispersed all over India was being run down, there was hardly, from any quarter, any logical thinking on how to salvage it'.⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁷ Abdullah Haroon to Sir Samuel Hoare. Secretary of State for India. 1 November 1932. *Haroon Collection, op.cit.*, File III: 6.

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹⁹ *Indian Annual Register*, November 1932, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, p. 297.

⁴⁰⁰ See for details, Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, Pp.xxv-xxx.

Abdullah Haroon attended the meeting of the Executive Board of the All India Muslim Conference held on 5 March 1933 at New Delhi. At this meeting, the question of amalgamation of the All India Muslim League with All India Muslim Conference came up for discussion'.⁴⁰¹ However, it was decided to place the question before the Council of the Muslim League, which met immediately after the above meeting. At this meeting, Sir Mohammad Yaqub moved the resolution for amalgamation of the two organizations and proposed that a joint committee should be appointed to draft the constitution for the joint organization. Masood Ahmed raised the question about the incompetence of the Council to give its decision. Abdullah Haroon thought that 'the question should be dropped, if it was likely to create ill feelings among the members'. He asserted that 'he himself did not want to do away with the Muslim League, and pleaded that the question should be decided by voting'.⁴⁰² However, at the next meeting of the Council of the League it was viewed that the name of the united body must remain 'All India Muslim League', as "it carries with it a glorious tradition of achievement worthy of its name".⁴⁰³

Because of the opposition to the Communal Award, the British Government issued White Paper for future constitution for India and the Communal Award was made an integral part of it. Haroon organized the meeting of the Executive Board of the All India Muslim Conference on 26 March 1933. The Board expressed its "profound disappointment with the scheme of reforms outlined in it" because "the scheme fails to meet the demand of the Muslim community as embodied in the various resolutions of the All-India Muslim Conference".⁴⁰⁴ In a resolution, the Muslim Conference suggested 'radical changes in the White Paper demanding: grant of the largest measure of fiscal administrative and legislative autonomy; curtailment in the governor's and Governor-General's powers; to make the ministers responsible to the legislature; provincial governments must have effective control over the Imperial Services and complete control over the provincial and other services; no weightage or other privileges should be given to the states; fundamental safeguards for the protection of the personal law, education and culture of the Muslims should be incorporated in the constitution: introduction of reforms in Baluchistan, and the electoral qualifications of the landholder's constituency should be reduced in Bengal, Bihar and single-seated constituencies be changed into multi-seated ones in each province by the single transferable vote'.⁴⁰⁵ Haroon in a detailed letter to Maulana Shoukat Ali stated that he agreed with the views of Sheikh Abdul Majid that "proposals which have been agreed to by the British in favor of Muslim community in Communal Award should be endorsed by our Hindu brethren and that they should not in any case be made the

⁴⁰¹ *Indian Annual Register*, March 1933, *op.cit.*, Vol. 1. p. 303.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.* p. 409.

⁴⁰³ Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op. cit.* p.xxv fn.3. Also *Muslim League Documents*, Vol. 210 pp. 7 and 16.

⁴⁰⁴ *Biography*, *op. cit.* p. 110.

⁴⁰⁵ *Indian Annual Register*, March 1933, *op. cit.* Vol. 1, pp. 590-92.

subject of discussion or touched. The only solution of the problem which remains open to us is that we should decide those points amicably which have been sent aside by the British and not mentioned in Communal Award".⁴⁰⁶

In the mean time to make All India Muslim Conference a more effective political body, a meeting of its Executive Board was called on 15 February 1934 under the president ship of Aga Khan. 'At this meeting new office-bearers were elected: Nawab Sir Mohammad Ahmed Saeed Khan of Chattari as Chairman, Seth Abdullah Haroon as Secretary,⁴⁰⁷ 'Sir Mohammad Iqbal, Dr. Shafaat Ahmed Khan and Shafi Dadoodi were elected as permanent Vice-presidents. The meeting passed a series of resolutions encouraging the agitation to get the Communal Award altered, demanding safeguards of the essential and vital interests of Muslims, a statutory guarantee of Muslim representation to various services, guarantee of one-third of seats for Muslims in the upper federal chamber by separate electorates, representation of Muslims in the central and provincial cabinets by those commanding the greatest Muslim following in legislature, protection of Muslim personal law and reforms in Baluchistan'.⁴⁰⁸

Meanwhile Haroon joined in the discussion on the Indian Finance Bill in the Assembly on 17 March 1934. He demanded from 'the government to grant provincial autonomy to Baluchistan, but he was sorry to say that the government could not consider Baluchistan fit to be created as an autonomous province'. He pointed out that "neither RTC nor the White Paper has made any suggestion with regard to Baluchistan. He further said that under the circumstances "I am suggesting that at least local self-government should be given to Baluchistan, and side by side with that, the Press and the platform should be made open to them to put their grievances before government."⁴⁰⁹ The Finance Bill was again debated in the Assembly on 27 March 1934. Haroon emphasized upon the government that North-West Frontier Province must be made an independent province".⁴¹⁰ Though Haroon was elected from Sindh but he not only raised issues related to the Muslims of Sindh but also took active part in the discussion about the problems of the Muslims of other areas and demanded the safeguard of their interests.

Though Haroon failed earlier to unite Muslims, he did not lose hope, therefore made another effort to bring all the different Muslim organizations together and tried to make them realize that under the changed political situation the only option left to them was to accept the white paper. In this connection Haroon wrote a letter to several top ranking Muslim leaders in which he appealed that "the All India Muslim Conference and all Muslim organizations including All India Muslim League should accept the

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p. 110. Haroon to Maulana Shoukat Ali, 25 April 1933

⁴⁰⁷ *Indian Annual Register*, April 1934, op. cit. p. 316. Vol. I.

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid*.

⁴⁰⁹ *CLAD*, op.cit., 17 March 1934, pp. 2415-6.

⁴¹⁰ *Ibid*, 27 March 1934, Vol. III, p. 2829.

scheme of Communal Award and the White Paper though they are not entirely to our satisfaction'. He suggested to the Muslims "that they should organize themselves to fight the elections and to capture as many seats as possible in the next assembly elections".⁴¹¹ He further said: "We want their modifications in certain direction, for which we shall gradually and constitutionally agitate in the light of memorandum that the Indian Delegation have submitted to the Parliament under the presidency of His Highness Sir Aga Khan."⁴¹² Haroon received a poor response from Khan Bahadur Haji Rahim Bux, and Dr. Shaffat Ahmed Khan. They were of the view that "no life is left in either of these two bodies, the Muslim League and the Conference. This does not mean that they should be abolished ... for effective electioneering work they are useless and nobody is going to vote for a candidate chosen by these bodies unless he has built up his own influence".⁴¹³ However, 'Abdul Hafeez from Dacca, Mohammad Yaqub from Moradabad and Ahmed Said from Naini Tal agreed with the idea of Haroon'.⁴¹⁴ Abdul Hafeez suggested that 'he should issue statement explaining the policy and opinion of the Muslim Conference on the subject',⁴¹⁵ while Mohamamd Yaqub was of the opinion that Council of the Muslim League and the Board of the All India Muslim Conference should convene a joint meeting and decide upon the future policy to be pursued".⁴¹⁶ The new development, however, took place in the Indian political scene with the return of M.A. Jinnah from London who declared that "at the end of four years I found that the Musalmans were in the greatest danger. I made up my mind to come back to India, as I could not do any good from London".⁴¹⁷ He convened the meeting of the Council of Muslim League from 1-4 April 1934 at New Delhi, which was attended by about forty members. A few more nationalist Muslims namely, "Asif Ali, Nawab of Chattari and others attended the second session of the meeting on 2 April 1934".⁴¹⁸ The Council resolved "that they accept the Communal Award so far as it goes, until a substitute is agreed upon by the various communities and parties to secure such future constitution for India, as would be acceptable to the country".⁴¹⁹ The Council requested Abdullah Haroon to undertake the work for organizing and reviving the League Branch in Sindh.⁴²⁰

The question in connection with the future constitution of India became the provocative question for the Muslim Community, as there were no adequate safeguards to them in either the Communal Award or the White Paper. The Working Committee of the All

⁴¹¹ Haroon's circular letter to the Muslim leaders, 22 May 1934. *Haroon Collection, op. cit.* Vol. III.

⁴¹² *Ibid.*

⁴¹³ Biography, *op. cit.* pp. 112-3.

⁴¹⁴ Abdul Hafeez to Haroon, 21 May 1934; Mohammad Yaqub to Haroon 24 May 1934 and Ahmed Said to Haroon, 23 May 1934, *Haroon Collection, op.cit.*, Vol. III.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁷ Dr. Waheed, *op. cit.* p. xxi.

⁴¹⁸ *Indian Annual Register*, April 1934, *op. cit.* Vol. 1. pp. 317-9.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 319.

India Muslim Conference held its meeting on 13 August 1934 at Simla. Among others, Abdullah Haroon attended the meeting. It decided "that necessary legislation be undertaken by the British government during the course of this year and enacted before the middle of 1935 so as to constitute provincial legislature before the end of 1935."⁴²¹ Haroon's resolution related to Sindh stated that "Sindh should immediately be given the status of a separate province under the existing constitution and that under the new constitution it should have the same status and power as other autonomous provinces of India", was passed.⁴²²

During 1935, Abdullah Haroon attended the sessions of the Central Legislative Assembly and spoke on the question of adjustment of accounts of separated Sindh with the Bombay government; rate of interest on Sukkur Barrage Debts, prevention of impact of foreign rice, and about bad conditions of roads in Sindh".⁴²³

The Sixth Annual Session of the All India Muslim Conference was held on 28 March 1936 under the president ship of Abdullah Haroon at Delhi. Khan Bahadur Haji Wajihuddin, Chairman of the Reception Committee, in his address eulogized the services of Abdullah Haroon, and expressed hope that "under his patronizing care and guidance. their new programmes of economic and social uplift of Muslims would take long stride towards its ultimate glorification".⁴²⁴ This was the time of provincial elections to be held under the new constitution, and each and every political party was trying to come out with a more promising economic and political manifesto to ensure better results in the polls. In his presidential address, Abdullah Haroon declared the objective of the manifesto of the All India Muslim Conference as being "to abolish all taxes on kerosene oil and matches, tax the rich for the benefit of the poor. Save the agricultural classes by providing from money-lending classes for their debts to be paid off through the agency of Panchayats instead of law Courts".⁴²⁵ Haroon further said that the whole of India was in the grip of poverty and destitution and the plight of the Muslim community was particularly bad. He suggested that the radio could be used for spreading knowledge of the latest methods of cultivation, as a means to increase productivity. Let Muslims learn the lesson from the glorious life of the Prophet Mohammad (P.B.U.H) who reformed the morals and manners of his community in Arabia and gave them character.

The struggle over framing of constitution ended with the introduction of new Constitution for India entitled 'Government of India Act 1935 by the British

⁴²¹ *Indian Annual Register*, August 1934, Vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 309-10.

⁴²² *Ibid.*

⁴²³ See for details Haroon's speeches in Legislative Assembly Debates, 6 Feb. 1935, pp. 646-7, 11 Feb. April, 1935 pp. 650-51 and 6 March 1935, op. cit. Vol. II p. 1744.

⁴²⁴ *Indian Annual Register*, March 1936, op. cit. Vol. I, pp. 304-5.

⁴²⁵ *Ibid.* The classes of Hindus were doing the business of giving loans to the agricultural classes especially the Muslim on excessive rate of interest. When they were unable to repay the loans the Hindu Panchayats were to settle the matters of loans leading to the confiscation of lands of Muslim Zamindars

Government. The provincial elections held under 1935 Act and thereafter, Haroon took vital interest in provincial politics in Sindh.

SUMMARY

The public life of Abdullah Haroon started from 1884 when he joined Mohammadan Educational Conference. From then onwards, the sphere of his public life began to widen and till his death (1942) he remained as one of the main leaders of Muslims of India.

It is clear from the discussion of this chapter that, from every platform, whether as member of Karachi Municipality (1913), or as a member of Bombay Legislative Council (1923), and Central Legislative Assembly (1926). Haroon always worked for saving the interests of Sindh and at the same time made efforts to solve the problems faced by Muslim community of India.

Another important feature of Haroon's public life was that until 1938 he was a non-communal person. He always believed in Hindu-Muslim unity and worked towards it. But the performances of Congress ministries in Hindu majority provinces (1938-1939) convinced him that Hindus and Muslims are two different communities and Hindus will never give any concession to the Muslims therefore they could not be trusted. This changed him from non-communal to a communal individual and then from onward Haroon worked only for the welfare of the Muslim community. This is discussed in the next chapters.

CHAPTER VII

FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS OF 1937

For the purpose of elections, the Government of India Act 1935 had incorporated the Communal Award of 1932. 'Two of its principal features were separate electorate and weightage for the minority community's representation'.⁴²⁶ Thus in Sindh, which was separated from the Bombay Presidency, separate electorate meant primarily two kinds of seats, Mohammadan and non-Muslim or General, as they were called. Because the Muslims were the majority community, they received the largest number of seats in the Assembly, that is 34 out of 60, but because of the weightage given to the minority communities, chiefly the Hindus; the number of Muslim seats was less than what it would have been, had their population percentage been the criterion for seat allocation.⁴²⁷ Explaining this situation G.M. Sayed stated, "As the latter experience showed, Sindh was handicapped at the very out-set by many factors. The Hindus who formed 27% of the population were given 40% representation in the Sindh Legislative Assembly. This increase representation became all the more effective as a result of the small number of members in the Assembly which was fixed at 60".⁴²⁸

The decision to hold provincial elections in the country at the beginning of 1937 stimulated a reorganization of existing Muslim provincial parties. such as the Unionist Party in the Punjab or the Krishak Paroja Samity in Bengal and at the same time the creation of new provincial political bodies. Nearly all the political parties decided to participate in the elections of Provincial Legislature. "The Congress decided to contest the elections explicitly in order not to work the constitution but to combat and destroy it and Muslim League, while equally opposed to the federal provisions, fought in order to use the provincial part of the Act for 'what it was worth'".⁴²⁹

Previously, Sindh had sent thirteen representatives to the Bombay Assembly, a small body of men, elected on a very limited franchise. Now there were "60 seats to be filled for the newly established Sindh Assembly, and the total strength of the electorate had been raised to 639,043".⁴³⁰ Given Sindh's lowly place in the literacy tables, its largely rural structure and the absence of small peasant proprietors, and abundance of

⁴²⁶ Dorothy Norman, *Nehru The First Sixty Years* (London: 1965), p. 363.

⁴²⁷ Muslim population according to the census 1930 was 70.7 percent.

⁴²⁸ G.M. Sayed, *Struggle for New Sindh* (Sehwan Sharif Sain Publishers, 1996), p. 14.

⁴²⁹ H. V. Hudson, *The Great Divide* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 62.

⁴³⁰ Z.H. Zaidi, 'Patterns and Trends of Sindh Politics (1936-1940) *Contemporary South Asia* (1996), pp. 19-45. Of these thirteen, nine were rural and four were urban seats. In nine rural seats, two were General (non Muslim) and seven were Muslim seats. Of the urban four seats there was one each for General, Muhammadan, Landholders and Commerce.

backward, right-less tenants, this meant that the property and educational qualifications for the vote had been pitched quite low. 'Even so, the size of constituencies was much smaller than in other provinces. Whereas the average number of voters per seat was 15,000 in the Punjab, about 23,400 in the United Provinces, and some 26,000 in Bengal, in the province of Sindh its candidates had to woo only about 10,000 voters per seat.⁴³¹ The distribution of the 60 seats was as follows:⁴³²

General urban	3
General rural	15
Women general urban	1
Muslim urban	2
Muslim rural	31
Women Muslim urban	1
Landholders	2
Europeans	2
Commerce & Industry	2
Labour	1
Total	60

FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES

Soon after the announcement of the provincial elections hectic activities started in Sindh to make efforts to device means for the successful working of the Provincial Autonomy so to make separation a real success. Though, every Muslim leader wanted to work for the improvement of the conditions of the people and the welfare of the Province but they engrossed in petty issues which resulted in personality clashes. Because of their personal struggle for power they could not present a united front against Congress and Hindu Mahasabha. As a result three new Provincial parties were formed by Muslim leaders of Sindh namely Sindh United Party, Sindh Azad Party and Sindh Muslim Political Party.

i) Sindh United Party

To discuss the strategy for the formation of political party G.M. Sayed took initiative and invited other leaders of the province to form a party. He called a meeting at his residence in the Muslim Colony, Karachi, under the chairmanship of Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah. The meeting deliberated (i) "to prepare its programme for the purpose of running the government on real democratic lines (ii) to decide whether the said party be attached to an all-India organization or be made independent and (iii) to decide whether the said party be formed on communal or non-communal lines".⁴³³

⁴³¹ *Delimitation of Constituencies Committee Report*. I. p. 97.

⁴³² *Ibid.*

⁴³³ Khadim Hussain Soomro, *Allah Bux Soomro: Apostle of Secular Harmony* (Sehwan Sharif: Sain Publishers, 2002), p. 18 Also in G.M. Sayed, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

However, before holding the meeting Sayed consulted some of the leading Hindus and Muslims in the Province and sent them a draft programme in the form of a questionnaire. The Hindus could not attend the meeting due to their allegiance with the All India Congress. However in this meeting no decision was reached in connection with the formation of the political party. 'After the failure of this meeting two more meetings were held after which it was agreed that new Party should be formed on Provincial and non-communal basis and for the time being it should have no affiliation with any All-India party'.⁴³⁴

To give final shape to this agreement Haroon called a meeting at his residence which was attended by representatives of all the Muslim groups except by 'Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah and Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto. Amongst Hindus R.B. Hotchand Chandumal, Rewachand Thandhani and Dingo Thadhani attended the meeting. At this meeting a Committee was appointed to draft a Constitution of the proposed party on the lines of the Justice Party of Madras and the Unionist Party of the Punjab'.⁴³⁵

Soon after this meeting, *The Times of India* on 20 May 1936 published an article under the title "Political Situation in Sind" which stated that 'Seth Abdullah Haroon had set the ball rolling to form a Unionist Party along the lines of Unionist Party of the Punjab drawing adherence of both Hindus and Muslims'.⁴³⁶ The letter of invitation and the constitution of the proposed party was sent 'strictly confidential' to several political minded persons in Karachi. 'The proposed meeting was an effort to reconcile the differences between Abdullah Haroon, Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah and Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto'.⁴³⁷ This was done, as there was an apprehension that Haroon's party could not have much chance against such stalwarts as Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah or Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto. Again in early June, it appeared in *Daily Gazette* 'that Abdullah Haroon, an elected member of the Sindh Azad Conference sub-Committee, was attempting to form a Unionist Party by bridging the gap between Sir Ghulam Hussain and Shah Nawaz Bhutto and himself'.⁴³⁸ Soon afterwards Haroon called an informal meeting at his residence. Among those attending were Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, Sir Shah Naqi, M.A. Khuhro, Allah Baksh Umer Soomro, Mian Mohammad Shah and Hatim Alavi. Though Hidayatullah attended this meeting but it could not bring Haroon and Hidayatullah close to one other. Haroon announced the

⁴³⁴ G.M. Sayed, *op.cit.*, p. 15.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁶ *Quaid-i-Azam Papers* (hereafter QAP) Press cutting File, no. 208 :3.

⁴³⁷ D.A. Pirzada, Hatim Atavi: *Pillar of Pakistan Movement* (Karachi: Mehran Publishers, 1994), p. 69.

⁴³⁸ QAP, Press cutting of *Daily Gazette*, 1936, File 208. p. 3. The personal feud between Hidayatulla and Bhutto goes back to the days when both represented Sindh in the Bombay Legislative Council. While Hidayatullah was Bhutto's senior in age and political experience, he lacked Bhutto's eminence as a member of one of Sindh's most powerful political families. Hidayatullah, born in Kashmir and a Hindu convert, was a self-made man politically as his Knighthood attested to but his political ambition suffered a setback when in the early 1930's the Bombay Governor passed over him to select Bhutto to serve as his close advisor. Since that time the two became political enemies. Allen Jones. *op.cit.*, fl.n. p. 73.

programme of the party which was agrarian-oriented reflecting the main concerns of Sindh political leadership to redress the indebtedness of the agricultural sector. He said that to "achieve the progress of the Province" would be the "paramount consideration of this Party". Elaborating the party programme Haroon said that as "Ninety percent of the Sindh population depends for its livelihood on agriculture" therefore as long as rural population "remain barely clad and ill-fed", the province will not progress. Therefore this Party will give "utmost consideration" for the improvement of the economic conditions of the rural people because their "backwardness will retard the progress". For this he said the party will introduce "modern and scientific methods of cultivation. full facilities of cottage industries will be provided and road communication will be improved".⁴³⁹

The party was inaugurated at Haroon's house where the Provincial Governor Graham and all the important officials from the Governor House as well as the political leadership were present. Haroon in his speech explained the reasons for the creation of SUP as to deal with the problems faced by the people of the province such as "rural indebtedness and oppression, corruption and inequitable tax burden".⁴⁴⁰ The Sindh United Party (SUP) was formed and its aims were released in the press on 9 June 1936, Haroon became its Provisional leader'.⁴⁴¹ Despite the participation of Hidayatullah and Bhutto in the inauguration of SUP, because of the rivalry between them they did not formally join the party. Haroon again extended invitation to Hidayatullah and Khuhro to join the Sindh United Party and sent them draft constitution, and aims and objects of the party. 'He further requested them to attend the party's convention on 31 October 1936'.⁴⁴² In reply, Khuhro remarked that the party has been formed in "surreptitious manner" and that the formation of the party "is not based on any altruistic motives but that... you and your co-workers had some personal aims to serve".⁴⁴³ Because of the indifferent attitude of the top Sindhi Muslim leadership SUP could not attract large number of people. Haroon got convinced that in order to keep the party alive he must convince political stalwart like Hidayatullah and Bhutto to join the party who were the real power brokers in the Sindhi Muslim politics. 'Finally the convincing of Haroon paid off and these two leaders decided to join the party'.⁴⁴⁴ At the party's meeting held at the residence of Haroon on 31 October 1936, office bearers were elected with Abdullah Haroon as party leader, Shah Nawaz Bhutto and Hidayatullah as deputy leaders,

⁴³⁹ A *Biography*, op.cit., p. 118- 21 and also in *Civil and Military Gazette* (hereafter CMG) 10 June 1936.

⁴⁴⁰ *Al Wahid*, 1 April 1936, p. 6.

⁴⁴¹ CMG, 10 June 1936. See also QAP, F. 891, pp. 20-22.

⁴⁴² Haroon to Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, 16 October 1936, *Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah Papers* (hereafter referred to GHHP)

⁴⁴³ Khuhro to Abdullah Haroon, 20 October 1936, GHHP.

⁴⁴⁴ Sindh Governor Graham informed the Governor General Linlithgow that Hidayatullah agreed to join SUP after Haroon established an electioneering fund of Rs.50, 000 and gave in writing not to desire cabinet seat. Graham to Linlithgow, Linlithgow Papers.

Mohammad Hashim Gazdar and Khuhro as secretaries. At the last minute Syed Miran Mohammad Shah was taken as the representative of the G.M. Sayed group'.⁴⁴⁵

Initially it was proposed that the party should fight on a broad front, including members of other communities, and in this, as in its title, 'there is clear evidence that its foundation owed something to non-Sindhi leaders to the inspiration of the Aga Khan and Fazl-i-Husain'.⁴⁴⁶ Both these leaders were anxious to organize parties in various provinces on the pattern of the Unionist Party of the Punjab. Their efforts bore some fruit as it was not a mere coincidence that Bengal, Bihar and Sindh each had an organization calling itself the United Party and that attempts were even made to float a United Party in the UP. What survived of the original purpose was thus only a negative opposition to the claims of the Muslim League. The launching of all these parties had been calculated to counter Jinnah's move on 21 May 1936 to form a strong Central Parliamentary Board of the Muslim League for the purpose of contesting election. However, in Sindh, as in Bihar, Orissa, and the North-West Frontier, no Muslim League boards were established. Fazl-i-Husain was jubilant and wrote to the Aga Khan: "You know perfectly well that the Punjab is the key of Indian Muslim politics because of the strong attitude we have taken. Sindh is following in our footsteps. North-West Frontier is doing the same and to a minor extent Bengal and UP is also coming into line. Thus Jinnah's parliamentary Board is already broken up".⁴⁴⁷ Though, Haroon as a member of the Central Legislature belonged to Jinnah's group. But at the time of 1937 Provincial elections 'he under the influence of Sir Aga Khan and Fazli-i-Hussain decided to organize a party on a non-communal lines'.⁴⁴⁸ Because of the weightage, the majority status of the Muslims of Sindh and Punjab has suffered. Fazl-i-Hussain believed that the only way left to the Muslims to "get a solid majority and to form a strong ministry they must contest elections along with other communities something they would miss if they campaigned on communal lines". In the Frontier and Sindh the Muslims had a large majority but in Fazli's view "there was no particular advantage for the Muslims in those provinces to campaign in communal parties as the governor could interfere in the formation of cabinets in the name of protecting the minorities".⁴⁴⁹ Under the influence of these views of Fazl-i-Hussain, Haroon got convinced that the Muslim League should not interfere in the provincial elections but should confine itself to activities at the central level.

Thus Sindh United Party rejected the hegemony of the Muslim League and its all-India interests, but it failed to find any positive policy, such as Fazl-i-Husain had created with

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, and *Al Wahid*, 1 November 1936.

⁴⁴⁶ *Star of India*, 15 June 1936 For further information on Fazl-i-Hussain see Azim Hussain, *Fazi-i-Hussain* (Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1946).

⁴⁴⁷ Z.H. Zaidi, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-45.

⁴⁴⁸ QAP, File. no. 208 A Biography, *op.cit.*, p. 121.

⁴⁴⁹ Syed Nur Ahmed, *From Martial Law to Martial Law — Politics In The Punjab, 1919-1958* (Lahore: Vanguard Books Ltd, 1985), p. 137.

his 'country party' alliance of agrarian interests. Hurriedly brought into existence, it had therefore to seek to mobilize a following where it could from the land and property-owning elite of the country side. Such men had little need of financial or party support. Locally, they already were dominant and could translate their economic power and social influence over their tenants. 'United Party did not include in its manifesto any programme for the revitalization of agriculture, dependent as that was upon the amelioration of the condition and land rights of the *haris*. Attainment of dominion status, economy at the centre, the modification of laws and the bringing of them into conformity with public opinion in collaboration with any such all-India organization as the party from time to time might decide to work with'.⁴⁵⁰

Later on, in very first meeting of the convention due to differences with regard to the election of 'Miran shah as a third deputy leader Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah left the meeting of SUP and on 2 November 1936 formed his own political party on communal lines, namely Sindh Muslim Political Party (SMPP), with the object of working the new constitution'.⁴⁵¹ Hidayatullah defending his defection stated that 'in the original set up of the party there was no post of third deputy leader and it was created by Haroon to gratify G.M. Sayed'.⁴⁵² In an answer to Hidayatullah allegation regarding the post of third deputy leader Haroon declared that 'the post was accepted by the party meeting' and in support of Miran Shah's election he said that "Miran Shah had been in the fore front of organizing and canvassing for the party while Hidayatullah had kept aloof and only offered to join the party in return for a prominent place in the party leadership".⁴⁵³ Soon after the defection of Hidayatullah other leaders like 'M.A. Khuhro, Mir Bandeh Ali Talpur and Noor Mohammad also left SUP and joined SMMP'.⁴⁵⁴ Due to these defections the internal strife among the SUP leadership became public and it gave serious blow to the image of the party. Haroon lost all hope of reconciliation and become disheartened of the situation resigned from the post of President Ship of SUP. However on request of Bhutto, 'Haroon accepted the post of Deputy Leader which felt vacant after the defection of Hidayatullah. The post of President was then filled by Bhutto'.⁴⁵⁵

The entire political environment in Sindh was surcharged with difference and dissensions so acute; on account of vested interests and personalities that the public was at a loss which way to take and whom to follow. For example with a view to exposing Haroon, 'Ghulam Hussain informed Sir Aga Khan that Haroon has been using his name and a portion of money which he had left with Haroon for general welfare of the Muslims of India as a whole, for the SUP in which neither Ghulam Hussain nor Sir Shah

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵¹ QAP, F. 891, pp. 20-22. Also in GHHP.

⁴⁵² GHHP, press cutting of Civil and Military Gazette (CMG) 3 November 1936.

⁴⁵³ Allen Jones, *op.cit.*, p. 86.

⁴⁵⁴ CMG, 3 November 1936.

⁴⁵⁵ A Biography, *op.cit.*, p. 123 and also in AHC, Vol. V.

Nawaz Bhutto have any say'.⁴⁵⁶ Aga Khan strongly urged upon Haroon that he should explain the whole affair to Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah. He further said that "it is a very great pity that in such a small province as Sindh eminent Moslems like yourself, Sir Shah Nawaz and Sir Ghulam Hussain cannot pull together and cannot so to say build a very strong government based on popular interests".⁴⁵⁷ Aga Khan wrote to Ghulam Hussain, "I do not wish in any way to be associated with any particular party in my beloved native province of Sind, and I implore you, Sir Shah Nawaz and Seth Haroon to meet and build up a strong Moslem political party which should then associate with such Hindus as will join it and build up a strong government for the new province, with the deliberate object of carrying out reform and legislation to bring about the general prosperity of Sind".⁴⁵⁸ As instructed by Aga Khan, Ghulam Hussain approached Haroon, but Haroon's reply was "I am sorry I could not understand the meaning of your letter and as such I am unable to comply with it".⁴⁵⁹ Similarly Sheikh Abdul Majeed Sindhi in a statement published in *Daily Gazette* of 15 June 1936 described SUP as "a frantic effort on the part of some well known Muslim reactionaries to secure their own position in the future government".⁴⁶⁰ In reply to the criticism leveled by Majeed, Haroon in his statement of 17 June 1936 denounced the charges as unjustified and uncalled for and pointed out that when Majeed "failed to get a good response he went for shelter to Jinnah's Muslim League". This in his opinion was an unwise choice. Haroon emphasized the non-communal character of his party and was of the view that "attempt to set up a communal party in the future assembly to follow the All-India Muslim League line would prove disastrous for Sind".⁴⁶¹

ii) Muslim League

Jinnah returned from Britain to India by the end of 1934. He had encountered, the first and foremost, the task of welding together the divided, disorganized and ill-equipped Muslim community, besides the most formidable task of handling the two powerful adversaries, the Congress and the British Imperial power. Notwithstanding the weak political position of the Muslim League, it decided to enter the field and contest provincial elections.

⁴⁵⁶ Aga Khan to Abdullah Haroon, 26 October 1936, GIMP, Aga Khan stated that 'I suggest your making it clear that my money has not been given for anything but all India purposes and a general revival of Islamic thought and culture through the Conference (AI] India Moslem Conference) and the various assemblies and legislatures rather than in any spirit of partisanship or in the interest of any particular province.

⁴⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁸ Aga Khan to Ghulam Hussain, 26 October 1936, *GHHP*. Aga Khan wanted reforms (i) better distribution of roads and water as well as connections with various other parts of India (ii) special legislation to protect agricultural classes from money lenders (iii) easy loans for agricultural purposes (iv) better education through facilities in cultural approach with Punjab, North West and Baluchistan (v) development of sanitation and (vi) intensive taxation of the well-to-do urban classes by provincial authorities for the carrying out of nation-building work amongst the masses.

⁴⁵⁹ Abdullah Haroon to Ghulam Hussain, 17 November 1936, *GHHP*.

⁴⁶⁰ *Daily Gazette*, 15 June 1936.

⁴⁶¹ Khalid Shamsul Hasan, *Sindh's Fight For Pakistan* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1992), p. VI.

The provincial part of the Act of 1935 gave Jinnah an opportunity of not only entering the election arena but also, in the process, of making the Muslim masses aware of the need to consolidate their position and mobilize their resources under the banner of the League. Hence, in the very first annual session of Muslim League held from 11-12 April 1936 at Bombay, which he presided, 'Jinnah was authorized to constitute Muslim League Parliamentary Boards in different provinces in India'.⁴⁶² One of the resolutions declared that for the twin purposes of strengthening "solidarity of the Muslim community" and securing "for the Muslims their proper and effective share in the provincial governments" it was essential that Muslims should organize themselves as one party with an advanced and progressive programme. Jinnah was appointed "to form a Central Election Board under his president ship, consisting of not less than thirty-five members, with powers to constitute and affiliate provincial Election Boards in various provinces".⁴⁶³ This was the first time in its history that the Muslim League had undertaken a programme of mass contract. The election manifesto of the League stated 'that it stood for the repeal of all repressive laws; for resisting economic exploitation of India; for reducing the heavy cost of administration and diverting funds to nation building; for the nationalization of the army; and for the social, educational and economic uplift of the rural population'.⁴⁶⁴

From Sindh, 'Sheikh Abdul Majid, Hakim Fateh Mohammad Sehwani, Moulvi Mohammad Sadiq Khadda and Mohammad Hashim Gazdar were taken on the Central Parliamentary Board — all were Karachi based — none was taken on the Board from the rural area to disseminate league's manifesto in rural-based population'.⁴⁶⁵ To find out the chances of the Muslim League Parliamentary Board's position in Sindh, Jinnah decided to visit Sindh. Jinnah wrote to Alavi, the secretary of the SAP, that he would be visiting Sindh and asked him to convene a meeting of leading Muslims of Sindh in this connection. To organize a gathering Alavi planned to arrange a dinner in honor of Mr. Jinnah and approached a number of prominent Muslims of Karachi to attend it. 'But none of them showed any willingness to attend meeting with Jinnah 'as they thought it would annoy the Hindus and prejudice their chances of election'.⁴⁶⁶ Regarding this situation Alavi stated: "The Sindhi leadership's outlook was so narrow and selfish that they could think only in terms of the immediate prospects of their individual election and had no conception of the great and vital issues with which Muslim India was going to be faced. They did not listen to the sane and selfless advice of the man who had made the separation of Sindh from Bombay one of the main planks of his political programme

⁴⁶² Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-47.

⁴⁶³ *AFM*, File no. 204. p. 23.

⁴⁶⁴ Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway To Pakistan* (Lahore: Brothers Publishers, 1993), p. 417.

⁴⁶⁵ Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-47. And also in S. Pirzada, *Foundations Of Pakistan*, Vol. II, *op.cit.*, p. 262-263

⁴⁶⁶ Jamiluddin Ahmed (ed.), *Quaid-i-Azam as seen by his Contemporaries* (Lahore: Publishers United Ltd., 1966), p. 60.

and had been mainly responsible for winning for Sindh the status of a self-governing province".⁴⁶⁷

Furthermore the appointment of the leaders from Sindh on Central Parliamentary Board was not approved by Sindh's League circles. Hatim Alavi in this connection wrote to M.A. Jinnah criticizing his choices. He said that 'Abdul Majid had just joined the Congress amidst such fanfare and that there was much bad blood between Majid and Gazdar eliminating any possibility of the two working together. In addition, Alavi was critical of the fact that all four were Karachites and he raised the question of who would represent the interior, rural Sindhi Muslim interests'.⁴⁶⁸

In another effort Jinnah assigned the task to Hakim Fateh Mohammad Sehwani, one of the members of the Sindh Parliamentary Board, to bring closer the two leaders, namely, Abdullah Haroon and Majid who were fundamentally different and politically poles apart. 'He along with Moulvi Mohammad Sadiq Khadda endeavored to bring about the compromise between these two antagonistic and warring leaders to carry out the programme in Sindh similar to the one lay down by the Muslim League Parliamentary Board, but were compelled to abandon the attempt in despair'.⁴⁶⁹ Due to insincerity of leaders, they were forced to adopt a policy of neutrality towards the parties in existence.

Jinnah visited Sindh in late 1936 to persuade Sindhi Muslims to contest the elections on the Muslim League tickets, but he received frosty reception. As a result League did not succeed in nominating even a single candidate and no League Parliamentary Board was formed in Sindh. Thus personal rivalries prevented the formation of Muslim League Party in Sindh.

iii) Sindh Azad Party

During the Sindh Separation Movement to popularize and to mobilize the mass support for the separation issue 'Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi on 18 August 1932 formed the Sindh Azad Conference and became its provisional leader',⁴⁷⁰ *Daily Al Wahid* edited by 'Majeed became the mouth piece of the party'.⁴⁷¹ Later on 'Sindh Azad Conference was made a permanent body with Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto as its president, M.A. Khuhro vice President and Syed Miran Shah as Secretary'.⁴⁷²

⁴⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁸ QAP, F. 208, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁶⁹ Hakim Fateh Mohammad Sehwani to Jinnah, 7 October 1936, QAP, F. 821, p. 27.

⁴⁷⁰ *Daily Gazette*, 10, September, 1935.

⁴⁷¹ Muhammad Qasim Soomro, *Muslim Politics in Sindh (1938-1947)* (Hyderabad: Sindh University Press, 1989), p. 29.

⁴⁷² Syed Miran Mohammad Shah, *Sindh Ki Ahlaidgi Ki Tarikh* (Urdu) (Karachi: 1936), p. 118.

After the announcement of provincial elections Majeed in 1936 started reorganizing the Conference and after preparing the political ground in a combined meeting of Karachi Khilafat Committee, the Sindh Hari Association and the Sindh branch of the Jamiyyat-Ulema-i-Hind, converted the Conference into Sindh Azad Party'.⁴⁷³ In a press statement Majeed explaining the policy of SAP stated that his party would work for the 'retrenchment of administrative expenditure in Sind, revision of the land revenue system, equitable distribution of water for cultivation, the improvement of the economic position of peasants and landlords, the protection of agriculturalists from moneylenders and medical relief and primary education in rural areas'.⁴⁷⁴ Prominent leaders of the new party were 'Pir Illahi Bakhsh, a small but educated land-owner from Dadu district; Hakim Fateh Mohammad Sehwani, a Karachi physician who had close connections with the Congress party; and two landlords who were also tribal chiefs, Rais Ali Marri and Rais Ali Mohammad Khero'.⁴⁷⁵

Jinnah at the Annual Session of Muslim League held in Bombay in April 1936, was authorized by the League to form a League Central Parliamentary Board. Using this authority 'Jinnah in May 1936 appointed Majeed on the Sindh Provincial Parliamentary Board'.⁴⁷⁶ In 1935, Majid attended a Karachi meeting of the League called by Mazhar Alavi, a U.P. Barrister, who had come to organize the League in Sindh. At this meeting, which was attended by about two hundred Karachi Muslims, Majid expressed his opinion that the League in Sindh should not be called "a branch of the All-India Muslim League but the Sindh Azad League so that it may remain unfettered in its activities and not subject to the control of the centre".⁴⁷⁷ He also wanted that 'Sindh Provincial Parliamentary Board should also be the Executive Committee of the SAP as well'.⁴⁷⁸ But Jinnah refused to accept the proposal as a result the relation between Jinnah and Majeed became strained and Majeed had to give up the desire of getting the assistance of League in the elections and thus like other parties of Sindh SAP also contested elections as a provincial party.

Election Results

Jinnah failed to award the Muslim League ticket to a single candidate in Sindh therefore; his party went out of the field. Besides Sindh United Party, Sindh Muslim Party and Sindh Azad Party the other parties who participated in the election were the Congress and Hindu Mahasabha. The elections were held in January-February 1937. 'The provincial percentage of votes polled in contested constituencies was only fifty four point three (54.3)'.⁴⁷⁹

⁴⁷³ Allen Jones, *op.cit.*, p. 56.

⁴⁷⁴ *Al Wahid*, 1 April 1936 p. 80-81.

⁴⁷⁵ Allen Jones, *op.cit.*, p. 56.

⁴⁷⁶ Jamil-ud-din Ahmed, *Historic Documents of the Muslim Freedom Movement* (Lahore: United Ltd, 1970),), p. 195.

⁴⁷⁷ Allen Jones, *op.cit.*, p. 59.

⁴⁷⁸ *Daily Gazette*, 20 February 1937.

⁴⁷⁹ *Sindh Government Gazette*, (Karachi: Government Of Sind, 1937), p. 44.

The results of the elections for Provincial Assemblies indicated that Congress victories were mainly in Hindu constituencies. 'Out of 1,585 seats, the Congress captured 711. The Congress contested on 58 Muslim seats and won only 26. On the other hand, the Muslim League showing was not very impressive. Out of 485 Muslim seats, the League captured only 104 Muslim seats. It won a substantial number of seats in the Hindu majority Provinces, but in the Muslim majority Provinces it had a dismal performance. However, league did not contest on all the Muslim seats. In the Punjab out of 86 Muslim seats, the League contested on 7 seats, and won only one seat. In the United Provinces, it contested on 35 seats and won 29; in Madras 10 out of 11; in Assam 9 out of 34; in Bengal, 37 out of 119; in Bombay 20 out of 209. In Bihar, Orissa, NWFP (36 Muslim seats) and Sindh (37 Muslim seats), no Muslim League candidates were set up'.⁴⁸⁰ The poor performance of the League in the elections was because the League had hardly been adequately reorganized when it fought elections, with few or no provincial and district branches, with limited financial and propaganda resources, and that, too for the first time on an all-India basis. 'It faced the Congress, which had an efficient organization and elaborate machinery for publicity, and enjoyed enormous financial backing from the Industrial magnates of India. With hardly six months to organize the election machinery and, apart from the Congress, confronted as it was with warring elements, local jealousies and rivalries, it could hardly be expected that the League would make much headway'.⁴⁸¹

In Sindh, Muslim candidates contested the elections on the tickets of three provincial parties namely SUP, SMPP and SAP. No Hindu contested elections on the Sindh United Party ticket. Among Hindus some of them stood as independents and others on Congress ticket. In Sindh Legislative Assembly, the party position after the elections was as under: (See Appendix VI)

Sind United Party	22
Congress Party	08
Sind Muslim Political Party	04
Sind Azad Party	03
Sind Hindu Mahasabha	11
Independent Muslims	09
Independent Hindus	02
Labour	01

The table shows that in terms of candidates and parties returned, the elections produced an Assembly as scattered and divided as Sindh itself. 'First, there were the four non-party men representing European, Commercial and Industrial interests. Of the

⁴⁸⁰ Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan*, Vol. 1 (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1969), p. ixviii, see also H.M.Seervai, *Partition of India Legend and Reality* (Bombay: Emmenem Publications, 1989) p. 19.

⁴⁸¹ Chaudry Khatiquzzaman, *op.cit.*, p. 152.

general seats, eleven went to Sindh Hindu Sabha, eight to Congress, two to Independent Hindus and one to Independent Labour. Of the Muslims' seats, one was of doubtful affiliation, twenty two were held by the triumphant United Party. the largest single party in the Assembly, four seats and three went to Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah Muslim Political Party and Abdul Majid's Azad Party respectively, and nine Muslim Independents held the rest'.⁴⁸²

The most surprising defeats in the elections were of Abdullah Haroon from Karachi and Shah Nawaz Bhutto from Larkana, both leader and deputy leader of the SUP. 'Haroon was defeated by Allah Baksh Gabole a Baluch candidate in the North Urban Karachi constituency of Lyari where Haroon had spent money on charitable works, established orphanages, and schools and helped the people of this most disadvantaged Muslim majority district in every way he could'.⁴⁸³ But Haroon's money and his generosity became an issue against him in the 1937 election. 'The voters communicated the message to Haroon that unless he gave them money and buildings, they would not vote for him'.⁴⁸⁴ But Haroon refused to be bought and the voters turned against him. It is believed that the reason behind the success of Gabol was that as he was himself a Baluch he used the Baluch card to get the Baluch votes as Lyari was predominantly a Baluch area. From this constituency Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi also filed his nomination papers. But he was not a serious candidate and ultimately lent his support to Allah Baksh Gabol.

'Sheikh Abdul Majid who had no background of political work in Larkana and was only known for his reputation as a Khilafat leader opposed Bhutto in his hometown'.⁴⁸⁵ He therefore, took a big risk by offering himself for elections against Bhutto who was Advisor to the governor and had full government support. In order to achieve victory on the morning of polling day, handbills were distributed amongst the voters purporting to contain a message from Dr. Ambedkar, the Indian Scheduled Caste leader, that if Sindh Muslims would accept and elect a newly converted Muslim, that Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi was, as their representative the entire Scheduled caste community would become Mussalman. Believing in the genuineness of the statement majority of the voters voted for Majid and he won'.⁴⁸⁶

Some of the successful candidates of the 'Sindh United Party were Mohammad Usman Soomro and Mohammad Hashim Gazdar from Karachi, Miran Mohammad Shah, Mir Ghulam Ullah, Makhdoom Ghulam Haider Zaheeruddin from Hyderabad; Mir Allahadad Khan and Syed Ghulam Nabi Shah from Tharparkar, Rais Rasool Bux Uner, Mohammad Ali Shah and Syed Noor Mohammad Shah from Nawabshah; Jan

⁴⁸² *Daily Gazette*, 16 and 18 February 1937.

⁴⁸³ Hamida Khuhro, *op. cit.* p. 142.

⁴⁸⁴ Interview with G.M. Sayed, quoted by Allen Jones, p. 111.

⁴⁸⁵ *Ibid*, p. 141.

⁴⁸⁶ Khalid Shamsul Hasan, *op.cit.* p. VII

Mohammad Khan from Shahdadpur; Pir Ilahi Bux and G.M. Sayed from Dadu, Khan Bahadur Amir Ali Lahori from Larkana, Allah Baksh Khan from Sukkur and Khan Bahadur Sher Mohammad Bijarani from upper Sindh Frontier'.⁴⁸⁷ Almost all the Muslim members returned were zamindars, and though they included a fine collection of Khan Sahibs, Khan Bahadurs, Sardar Bahadurs, Knights, OBE's and MBE's, only a minority had any command or understanding of English. 'Few of the successful candidates had any previous parliamentary or political experience: for many, this had been their first election and none were distinguished by any long affiliation to any political party. Even those who had returned on party tickets owed their success more to their personal influence than to any declared principle or conviction. United they might be by class, but factional and personal rivalries kept them often sharply divided. It was hard to see how such a miscellaneous sixty assemblymen could be organized so as to provide firm and orderly government. In these circumstances, politics in Sindh was 'largely a matter of personal and local prejudices'.⁴⁸⁸

MINISTRY FORMATION

Soon after the elections, the question of forming a ministry arose. Governor Graham was given the task to select the head of Sindh's first Cabinet. But as none of the parties secured absolute majority in the Assembly, therefore he found himself in a difficult position. Though SUP won 22 seats and emerged as a leading party in the Assembly, but Graham was of the opinion that "the party label means very little, I shall have to do a lot more analysis before I decide whether to offer two seats in my ministry to the SUP or one to them and one to the SMP".⁴⁸⁹

Meanwhile on the political front taking advantage of the uncertain situation Hidayatullah, the leader of SMP started different maneuvers to influence other groups in the Assembly to accept him as the candidate for the premiership. Regarding this in an interview published in Daily Gazette, he reported to the press that, "we are quite ready to work in the legislature in cooperation with all communities, including my own, on the basis of principles and policies".⁴⁹⁰ He, later on, declared that he had "asked the successful candidates from the various communities for their cooperation with his party enabling it to form the ministry".⁴⁹¹ To gather support he was probably encouraged by the Governor of Sindh, Sir Lancelot Graham as he knew Hidayatullah from his Bombay days. To clear his position on the selection of Hidayatullah as the Chief Minister of Sindh who only had three seats in the Assembly out of sixty, namely Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, K.B. Khuhro and Mir Bundehali Khan, Graham in a

⁴⁸⁷ Dr. Mohammad Liaq Zardari, *Tehrik-e-Pakistan Mein Sindh Jo Hisso* (Moro: Mohammad Salim Khan, 1984), pp. 339-344.

⁴⁸⁸ *Daily Gazette*, 16 and 18 February 1937.

⁴⁸⁹ Allen Jones, *op.cit.*, p. 120.

⁴⁹⁰ *Daily Gazette*, 19 February 1937.

⁴⁹¹ *Ibid*, 26 February 1937.

letter to the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow, reported that "Hidayatullah is probably the ablest politician in Sindh and is determined to be the Chief Minister in the first government."⁴⁹²

Graham's choice for Hidayatullah was strongly criticized by the prominent leaders that his action exposed his insensitivity to democratic principles and plunged Sindh into a recurrent cycle of political instability. G.M. Sayed opined: "Provincial autonomy ... received a heavy blow even at the moment of its inception ... Graham conveniently cast the fundamental principle of democracy to the wind and summoned Sir Ghulam Hussain to form the Ministry although he commanded the strength of only three members".⁴⁹³

Meanwhile governor who wanted to get support from the SUP to form combined Muslim party in the Assembly started negotiations with the leaders of SMP and SUP along with the Independent Badin faction which agreed to form a new party. 'They agreed to recognize Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah as the Chief Minister and either Shah Nawaz Bhutto or Allah Baksh as one of the ministers, depending on whether Bhutto would be able to secure a seat. They also agreed to rotate the Assembly president ship among cooperating parties after every two years. The party would be non-communal and would cooperate with the Hindus'.⁴⁹⁴ The scheme for a united front collapsed when, according to Governor, "Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto decided he would not accept Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah as chief minister".⁴⁹⁵ So at this juncture, Graham finally decided to ask Sir Ghulam Hussain to form the government as he thought him the "most competent man in the province".⁴⁹⁶ By now SUP had been split into three factions with the result that "Hidayatullah was able to wean some of its members. He also won over the eleven members of the non-Congress group of Hindus on the promise of giving speaker's slot to them".⁴⁹⁷ After securing his position on '22 March 1937, Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah resigned from the membership of the Indian Legislative Assembly, to be appointed as the Chief Minister of Sindh'.⁴⁹⁸

On 27 April 1937 the Sindh Legislative Assembly met at Karachi at the Assembly Hall, at 11:00 A.M. being the first day of the first session of the First Legislative Assembly, pursuant to section 62 (3) of the Government of India Act 1935 the 'Governor Lancelot Graham appointed Diwan Bahadur Hiranand Khemsing to be Chairman of the Sindh Legislative Assembly before whom the members would take oath or affirmation of

⁴⁹² Graham to Linlithgow, *Linlithgow Papers*, Islamabad, National Documentation Centre.

⁴⁹³ Sayed, *op. cit.* p. 7. See Abdul Hamid, *Efforts at the Consolidation of the Muslim Position, History of the Freedom Movement*, Vol. 3, Part 2 (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1963), pp. 1909-1936.

⁴⁹⁴ *Daily Gazette*, 9 March 1937.

⁴⁹⁵ Allen Keith Jones, *op.cit.*, p. 121, see also G.M. Sayed, *Janaib Guzariam Jin Saan* (Sindhi) (Hyderabad: Sindhi Adbi Board, 1973).

⁴⁹⁶ *GHHP*, Graham to Viceroy, 19 March 1937.

⁴⁹⁷ G. M. Sayed, *Janaib Guzariam Jin Saan*, *op.cit.*, p. 25.

⁴⁹⁸ Ghulam Hussain to Secretary Indian Legislative Assembly (ILA) 22 March 1937, Secretary ILA to Ghulam Hussain, 25 March 1937, *GHHP*.

allegiance to His Majesty the King-Emperor and took their seats in the Assembly until the office of the speaker was filled. On the same day 56 assemblymen took the oath. Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah was sworn in as chief minister along with Mukhi Gobindram⁴⁹⁹ and Mir Bandeh Ali⁵⁰⁰ as ministers. By picking Gobindram, leader of the Hindu Mahasabha, he brought over to his side the largest bloc of Hindus. Hidayatullah, along with one Minister Ship also offered to them the Speaker ship of the Assembly. The rich bargain that Hidayatullah offered them in the form of more than their due share of offices led them to support him. On the other hand Hidayatullah also offered a seat in the Cabinet, to Mir Baluch group of which Mir Bandeh Ali was the leader, readily agreed to join the government. They included Mir Ghulam Ali Khan, Mir Mohammad Khan Chandio, Kaiser Khan Bozdar, Mir Zenuldin Sunderani, Allah Baksh Gabol, Sohrab Khan Sarki and Jaffer Khan Burdi'.⁵⁰¹ This block had remained independent during the election, with some leanings, became a crucial swing block in the post-election jockeying for power and office. It represented a natural choice for Hidayatullah especially considering the only alternative for support of two new blocks instead of coming to terms with his rival, the SUP. Thus by gaining the support of these groups by Hidayatullah, SUP lost all hopes to form the government and was left in lurch.

The Congress was out of consideration for Hidayatullah because it was still undecided about office acceptance as on 18 March 1937 the All India Congress Committee by its resolution declared that the Congress will accept the offices in provinces where the Congress commanded a majority in the legislature, provided the assurances were given that the Governor will not use his special powers of interference or set aside the advice of ministers in regard to their constitutional activities. 'However the government gave these assurances and the Congress formed the ministries'.⁵⁰²

Meanwhile at the meeting of SUP held on 3 April 1937 it decided to sit on the opposition benches with the objectives "to criticize Government on sound lines so as to create public opinion and political consciousness in Sindh and to awaken Government to their defects and persuade them to eradicate the same".⁵⁰³ In this meeting, 'the resignation of Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto from the post of the party president was accepted

⁴⁹⁹ Mukhi Gobindram was a forty year old Hyderabad merchant and as his title 'Mukhi', suggests, he was head of Sindh Hindu Panchayats. Before being elected to the Assembly, he had served for fifteen years on Hyderabad Municipal Council and presided over several social welfare organizations that managed schools, dispensaries and industrial homes for men and women, Daily Gazette, 23 March, 1937. See also the *Sindh Legislative Assembly Debates*, Vol. I, 1937, cited in Khadim Hussain Soomro, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-25.

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid*, Mir Bandeh Ali a big Jagirdar of Hyderabad and Dadu districts and a member of the Manikani branch of the Talpur, the former rulers of Sindh. He had been educated at Aligarh and Cambridge and before his election to Sindh Assembly, he had represented Hyderabad district in the Bombay Legislative Council.

⁵⁰¹ Ian Talbot, *Provincial Politics and Pakistan Movement* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 56 see also K.B. Sayeed, *Pakistan: The Formative Phase* (Karachi: OUP), p. 84.

⁵⁰² H. V. Hudson, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-66.

⁵⁰³ G.M. Sayed, *Struggle For New Sindh*, *op.cit.*, p. 16.

and in his place Abdullah Haroon was made the officiating leader and Allah Baksh Soomro, was made the Parliamentary Leader of SUP'.⁵⁰⁴ To achieve these objectives 'SUP decided that in the Assembly they will criticize the government in their speeches, interpolations, cut motions and through different resolutions. Similarly to train and educate the public of Sindh regarding the public affairs of the government the party decide to organize public meetings throughout Sindh'.⁵⁰⁵ Thus at the beginning of the first session, SUP and Congress sat on the opposition benches with an idea to create problems for the government.

The first incident which became the test of his government was the election of Speaker. On this occasion as promised by Hidayatullah, he nominated Bhojsingh, a Sukkur leader, as the candidate of the government and Sheikh Abdul Majeed Sindhi was nominated by Sindh United Party. Ghulam Hussain, with the assistance of Hindus got elected Bhojsingh Pahlajani who had been Deputy President of Bombay Council from 1920 to 1930, as Speaker instead of Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi. Thus Hidayatullah ministry fell in the hands of Hindus and initially depended mainly upon their support to run the government. These members started making demands every now and then as a price for the continuation of their support to him. This situation compelled Hidayatullah to seek the support of SUP to increase his support in the Assembly to avoid defeat.

Through the intervention of Pir Sahib Sahibzada Abdul Sattar Jan Sarhandi an agreement was reached between Hidayatullah and the Sindh United Party and as a result the new 'Democratic Coalition Party' was formed in the Assembly, in which ten members of the SUP agreed to join'.⁵⁰⁶ According to the agreement a 'Working Committee was formed to advice and guides the Ministry in legislative measures and other matters of principle and policy. An agreed programme was drawn up for the Ministry to be carried out under the instructions of the Committee. The arrangement worked well and decisions carried out by the government such as exemption of grazing fee from land revenues, reduction of grazing fee in forests, recovery of *Taccavi* loans in easy installments, abolition of Commissioner's and Collector's Chair Parwanas and abolition of Nomination of Local Bodies under the instructions of the committee are example of the understanding and cooperation existed between the government and the committee'.⁵⁰⁷

Under this arrangement Sindh Assembly's budget session was commenced from 3 August to 1 September 1937. The Premier Ghulam Hussain introduced the budget proposals for 1937-38. A report had been brought out revising the system of assessment

⁵⁰⁴ Sharif al Mujahid, *Quaid-i-Azam and His Times* (Karachi: Quaid — Azam Academy, 1990), p. 328. After resigning from the party post, Bhutto joined the Bombay Public Service and left the political ground forever.

⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁵⁰⁶ *AFM*, Vol. 241, p. 59.

⁵⁰⁷ G.M. Sayed, *Struggle for New Sindh*, *op.cit.*, p. 18.

in the Barrage zone; a sliding scale was introduced for cotton, rice and wheat, whereby the cess was related to the prices prevailing in the season to be assessed; for all other crops there was a flat rate. Although theoretically the Governor could simply have imposed the new settlement, this was not expedient in practical terms. On 7 August 1937, a reluctant Mir Bandeh Ali, as Revenue Minister, moved a resolution accepting the revised settlement. It was immediately attacked; Heranand Khemsing, a Hindu zamindar, and Allah Bakhsh, both tabling resolutions condemning the settlement; 'the out-turn and prices of cotton and wheat, they urged that had been exaggerated, while the costs of cultivation were much understated'.⁵⁰⁸ Bandeh Ali's resolution did not cut much ice in an Assembly dominated by Zamindars; Gazdar proceeded to quote Britain's precedent in refusing to pay back even the interest on U.S., war loans. Others drew a touching picture of the Zamindars 'poverty'. Dr. Hemandas R. Wadhwani spoke of Zamindars who used to pay him Rs. 100 to come to their village to deal with a mere headache but who now waited till they had double-pneumonia before being drawn to his hospital on bullock carts, paying eight annas as in-patients. 'Confronted by an assembly of Zamindars who could scarcely be brought to admit that the Barrage was beneficial, let alone be induced to increase the irrigation assessment to pay for it, Hidayatullah announced the 'formation of a committee to consider charges for watercourses, and in the meantime postponed recovery'.⁵⁰⁹

On 5 August, motions were moved with regard to the freedom of press and police tyrannies. The Chief Minister observed that his government had removed the ban on newspapers and inquiries were being made to restore the press securities. "Police was necessary", said the Premier, "but if alleged police tyrannies were reported, they would be investigated. Without the police there would be no protection and no nationalization.

The Premier declared before the House that 'his government has introduced many reforms in the province, and more money was being spent on irrigation system because without irrigation there could be no nationalization'.⁵¹⁰

On 19 August after a long discussion on the budget, it was finally approved. On this occasion Hidayatullah explained the policy and programme of his government. He said that the government was purchasing things made mostly in India. The government had accepted the suggestions made in the House and were calling an informal conference of the members of the House to consider the various measures regarding employment and economic betterment. He said that a 'Retrenchment Committee had been appointed and the government was purifying the administration as well. As regards the depressed classes, the premier promised that he would educate them. With reference to parliamentary secretaries, the premier said that they were making them as responsible as the ministers and would ask them to answer questions in the Assembly. The

⁵⁰⁸ Z.H. Zaidi, *op.cit.*, pp. 19-45.

⁵⁰⁹ *IAR*, July- December, Vol. II, 1937, p. 274.

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Secretaries have been made responsible to look into the grievances of the public for immediate redressal'.⁵¹¹ This was the first session of the Sindh Assembly after the introduction of provincial autonomy. The session ended with success.

However, the opposition against the government's policy and programme was building up. There also seemed that some Sindhi leaders felt gravitated towards the Muslim League. to seek its support. Mohammad Hashim Gazdar, General Secretary of the SUP informed the All-India Muslim League's Secretary that the "position of Muslims of Sindh forming eighty three percent of the population has become rather bad. We consider certain measures absolutely necessary for social and economic amelioration of the masses (Muslims) in the province. As the ministerial party has made a pact with Hindus and the Governor is said to be party of it, it is difficult for the opposition to carry any measure in the assembly on the initiation of any member of the opposition".⁵¹² He urged upon the Muslim League "to pass a resolution requesting Sir Ghulam Hussain and the Governor of Sindh to help us in passing these measures ... without the League agitation, I am afraid the pact with Hindus would stand and ruin Muslims".⁵¹³ In this connection the SUP called the meeting at the residence of Abdullah Haroon to consider the Tact which the chief minister had entered into with the various groups of the Assembly jeopardizing the national progress of the province and creating general discontentment to the great detriment of the peace and prosperity of the province; Gazdar's Land Alienation Bill and other bills which would give relief to agriculturists'.⁵¹⁴

By the end of 1937, Hidayatullah ministry was stumbling and for this there were many reasons. For example by then the 'Minister Mukhi Gobindram resigned owing to personal reasons'.⁵¹⁵ For filling his seat there were two candidates namely 'Nichaldas C. Vazirani and Dr. Hemandas Wadhwani'.⁵¹⁶ As Sir Ghulam Hussain was against Vazirani, he therefore appointed 'Dr. Hemandas Wadhwani in place of Mukhi Gobindram, although the Hindu Party had supported the candidature of Nichaldas'.⁵¹⁷ In this situation Hidayatullah was supported by a majority of the Muslim members of

⁵¹¹ *Ibid* pp 275-76.

⁵¹² Mohammad Hashim Gazdar to Secretary AIML, 29 September 1937, *Archives of Freedom Movement* (herein after AFM) Vol. 170, pp. 19-20. Gazdar wanted to get passed the 'Land Alienation Bill'. Bill controlling money lending business and fixing ratio of interest; Bill for increasing educational facilities and bill for fair share to Muslims in services.

⁵¹³ *Ibid*.

⁵¹⁴ Combined letter of Abdullah Haroon, K.B. Allah Bakhsh and Gazdar to Party MLA's, 23 July 1937, *AHC*, Vol. III, pp. 20-21 Mr. Gazdar's Land Alienation Bill was meant to deprive the Hindus in Sindh of the right to purchase land in future.

⁵¹⁵ The firm which Gobindram owned dealt in cotton. After he joined the Cabinet he could not look after its affairs and the firm suffered huge losses. Gobindram decided to leave the Government and devote himself to rehabilitate his business.

⁵¹⁶ Physician and a Lawyer from Jacobabad.

⁵¹⁷ Nichaldas to Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, 19 October 1937 and Heranand Khemsing to Ghulam Hussain, 19 October 1937; Partabrai to PS to Governor, 20 August, 1937, *GHHP*.

the Assembly. The result was that the Hindu public opinion was aroused against the ministry. The death of Bhojsingh, who was the speaker of Sindh Assembly, created further division between the ministry and the Hindu members of the Assembly. The Muslim members of the assembly wanted to give the speaker ship to a man of their own community and accordingly 'Syed Miran Mohammad Shah was proposed for the post as a Coalition candidate. The Hindus, who had obtained a lien on the post, tried to retain it for their own community and set up Mr. Pamnani as their candidate against Syed Miran Mohammad Shah. The Coalition candidate was duly elected and appointed as the new Speaker'.⁵¹⁸ This further inflamed the Hindus; Nichaldas published lengthy letters in the press and also issued appeals to all the Panchayats in Sindh. Thus a regular campaign was started against Hidayatullah ministry. As a result all the members of the 'Hindu Independent Party except the Minister and his Parliamentary Secretary withdrew their support to Hidayatullah and went over to the opposition'.⁵¹⁹ They also did not approve the legislation proposed by Coalition Party in respect of money lending and land alienation as it adversely affected their interests. When they could not bring Hidayatullah around their view point, they plotted the ministry's fall. The Budget session of 1938 gave them this opportunity.

Furthermore Sir Ghulam Hussain also angered Khan Bahadur Allah Baksh, the leader of the SUP of whom he had a support. Hidayatullah ordered that no contracts of the Public Works Department (PWD) with which Allah Baksh had close ties, were to be awarded to any Member of the Legislative Assembly. This order affected the business interests of Allah Baksh. Another reason for Allah Baksh to turn against the Chief Minister was that he did not approve an exchange of land to which Allah Baksh was entitled'.⁵²⁰ As a result he induced his friends to support him to defeat the ministry.

In view of the above situation the Muslim members of the Assembly such as Majeed, Miran Shah, Allah Baksh and G.M. Sayed decided to influence Hidayatullah to increase the number of the ministers of the cabinet from three to six. 'They wanted that Allah Baksh, Khuhro and Nihchaldas be appointed as additional Ministers'.⁵²¹ Through them these Muslim leaders wanted to have control in the government. Hidayatullah refused to accept this proposal unless it was officially requested by the Sindh United Party. On the insistences of Hidayatullah SUP officially communicated the decision to him. 'Though Hidayatullah was in favor of the expansion of the cabinet but because of the reluctance of the governor who was prepared to increase the number of Ministers from three to five and not to six, the numbers of the cabinet Ministers was not increased'.⁵²² But this arrangement was not acceptable to SUP therefore Hidayatullah left this issue unresolved.

⁵¹⁸ D.A. Pirzada, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

⁵¹⁹ *Sansar Samachar*, January-February 1938.

⁵²⁰ Hamida Khuhro, *op. cit.* p. 147.

⁵²¹ *IAR*, January-June, Vol. 1 p. 274.

⁵²² *GHHP*, letter of the governor Graham to Hidayatullah, 18 February 1938.

Thus by the early March 1938 when the Sindh Assembly met to discuss budget the above mentioned points of differences had turned into major issues and all the enraged parties decided to cooperate one another to topple the government. Arrangements were complete to defeat the government. On the very first day of the budget session eight members of SUP namely Allah Baksh, G.M. Sayed, M. Usman Soomro, Ghulam Nabi Shah, Rasool Bux Khan, Pir Illahi Bux, Jaffer Khan Burdi and Khair Shah all resigned from the Democratic Coalition Party. A combined letter of resignation addressed to Mir Bandeh Ali, General Secretary of the Democratic Coalition Party stating: "We members of the United Party resign from your party as the programme and principles have not been realized"⁵²³ was handed over to him. As a result Hidayatullah ministry was defeated when a token cut motion was carried by 23 votes against 22. Finally on 22 March 1938 Hidayatullah tendered his resignation to the governor and went out of the office. The Governor in a letter to the viceroy commented that Hidayatullah strategy pinpointed the reason why he fell from power: "the weakness of Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah is that he had no programme of his own and was prepared to accept anybody else's in receiving promises of support".⁵²⁴

Governor accepted the resignation letter and called Khan Bahadur Allah Baksh to form the Government. Thus it was in this way that the first Ministry of Sindh fell.

SUMMARY

As soon as the provincial elections of 1937 were announced by government the unity achieved during separation movement came to an end and personal rivalries once again erupted among the Sindhi Muslim politicizations. This division resulted in the establishment of three political parties namely Sindh United Party, Sindh Muslim Political Party and Sindh Azad Party formed by Haroon, Hidayatullah and Majeed respectively. The primary objects of all these parties were to improve the conditions of the people of Sindh and to work for the welfare of the province. To them all India issues never occupied an important place in their party programme and thus they kept themselves away from Muslim League and emerged as provincial parties.

It is also clear from the narration of the events that Muslim leaders had joined particular Party in their self interest and not because they were interested in the Party programme. Similarly people voted for a candidate on ethnic, religious and personal reasons rather than for a party. In this respect the defeat of Haroon and Bhutto at the hands of Gabol and Majeed who used ethnic and religious cards to win elections.

Furthermore, Graham on the basis of his personal liking and disliking instead of asking SUP to form the government, he entrusted the government to Hidayatullah. Thus from

⁵²³ IAR, *op.cit.*, p. 275.

⁵²⁴ Graham to Governor-General, *Linlithgow Papers*, p. 125-193, 24 March, 1938, p. 36.

the very beginning in Sindh the democratic principals were neglected and democratic process was hampered by the British themselves. This action of Graham not only fractured the parliamentary system but it started an unending inter-group intrigues among Muslim factions which not only made Hidayatullah Ministry insecure but it affected the working of subsequent ministries also.

Thus the big promises made during election campaign regarding the working for the welfare of Sindh and its people were all forgotten by the Muslim members of the Assembly and when their demands were not met by the government they decided to topple the government. Taking advantage of the resentment that existed between the government and Muslim groups, Congress helped the enraged Muslim group to dislodge Hidayatullah Ministry. This gave the chance to the Congress to have upper hand in running the administration and imposing its will on the later Muslim premiers which is discussed in the next chapters.

CHAPTER VIII

ALLAH BAKSH MINISTRY AND SINDH MUSLIM LEAGUE PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE 1938

The Provincial elections results of 1937 showed that League won seats in Muslim minority provinces, but the claim of Muslim League representing entire Indian Muslim community was rejected by the Muslims of Muslim majority Provinces. As the Muslims who won, were not League members. Therefore the Muslim victories were not League victories. For example, in Bengal and Sindh local Muslim provincial parties (Krishak Paroja Party, Sindh United Party) won maximum seats. In N.W.F.P, Muslims who won belonged to Congress. Whereas in Punjab, the Muslim-Hindu-Sikh coalition that is the Unionists became predominant in Assembly. As Muslims who won were not members of League, it had little control over Muslim members in Muslim majority Provinces.

Similarly the Congress victories had come in mainly Hindu majority provinces and became the most powerful party in these provinces. The important conclusion to be drawn from the results of the 1937 elections was that a religious balance had emerged; the Congress victories were won only in Hindu majority provinces; in Muslim majority provinces various Muslim groups and independents won.

After winning the elections, the Congress refused to accept office unless the 'safeguards' clauses in the Act were repealed and the Governors gave the undertaking not to interfere in administration of the provinces. The repeal would have required an amendment of the Act and there was the danger of opposition from the minorities. In order to conciliate, the Viceroy issued a declaration assuring that Governors would not interfere in the administration and their special powers would not be used unnecessarily'.⁵²⁵ On this assurance the Congress in July 1937 formed ministries in seven provinces.

While dealing with the Muslims in the formation of ministries in Hindu majority provinces, Congress had two choices, either to cooperate with the League or to ignore and override it. Meanwhile Jinnah even before the elections were held had announced that Muslim League was ready for compromise and conciliation with the Congress. But the Congress chose the second option. Congress was of the viewpoint that Coalition would not provide for 'Congress Raj'. Furthermore, the campaign for the social uplift and for combating British imperialism it would be better conducted if carried on less than one direction. 'By keeping Muslim members out of the Cabinet it intended to remove the communal aspects of politics and thought that Cabinet solidarity could be

⁵²⁵ Saleem M.M. Qureshi, *The Politics of Jinnah* (Karachi: Royal book Company, 1988), p. 95.

better achieved if ministries were homogenous. Thus the Congress claimed to be the *de facto* representative of all the Indian people, whereas other parties represent different communities. Because of this viewpoint Congress thought that in Congress majority provinces the idea of coalition form of government, with Muslims will not work. Therefore, no separate Muslim representation was necessary and no coalition with the Muslim League could be entertained'.⁵²⁶

The Congress further argued that if the League leader supported the Congress programme they should join the Congress and work from within. Thus the Congress decided to seek the elimination of the League opposition, not by cooperating with it but by absorbing it. "The Congress declared that why should an overwhelming majority in the Legislatures hamper itself by an alliance with so small, so weak, and, in its opinion, so reactionary a body as the League, merely because it was Moslem".⁵²⁷ The Congress thought that elimination of the Muslim League in Muslim majority provinces would lead to its elimination in the rest of India and "once the League which, whatever its weakness, was the only party capable of organizing a common Moslem opposition throughout India, was out of the way",⁵²⁸ the Congress would have unchallenged and unobstructed say all over the country. Acting on this principle developed in the U.P., which also applied to the rest of the Congress provinces, the Congress told the League that no coalitions would be formed. A couple of Muslims might be appointed ministers provided, they were told: You "abjure your party and forswear your policy and programme and liquidate the Muslim League".⁵²⁹ The terms issued by Maulana Azad, the Congress president on which the Muslims might join the government were considered highly insulting and provocative for the Muslim League and Jinnah.

In the six provinces where Congress governments had been formed, Congress ruled with authority and arrogance. A Congress parliamentary board had been set up as the 'Congress ministries' watchdog. Unlike the situation in the Muslim League, the discipline exercised by the Congress high command over the Congress governments and parliamentarians was also total. No one could ignore the central edict without risk to one's political career. This and 'the hoisting of the Congress flag at official functions, the introduction of the Hindi language and script in schools together with singing of the song *Bande Mataram* almost sealed the situation, The Congress intrusion in the Princely states, especially where rulers were Muslims or were sympathetic to their Muslim subjects aggravated the position further'.⁵³⁰

⁵²⁶ V.A. Smith, *The Oxford History of India* (London; Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 817-18.

⁵²⁷ R. Coupland, *India, A Restatement* (London; Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 181.

⁵²⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵²⁹ Saleem M.M. Qureshi, *op.cit.* p. 96 also in Choudhary Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway to Pakistan* (Lahore, 1993), p. 161.

⁵³⁰ Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.* p. xxxvii.

After the rejection of the Congress for coalition governments, and its arrogant attitude towards Muslim League, instead of going along with the Congress, Jinnah embarked upon organizing the League. The League started a policy and programme of "mass contact"⁵³¹ as an encounter to the Congress, which had already started movement of 'Muslim mass contact in order to bring them within the Congress fold on the basis of a socialist programme'.⁵³² From July 1937 the month in which the Congress formed the ministries up to the mid October 1937 the month in which League annual session was held in Lucknow, Jinnah issued press statements, toured and made speeches at large gathering of Muslims at Bombay, Gaya, Simla and Lucknow. He met and discussed the political situation with the influential Muslim leaders in Punjab, Bengal and Assam namely Sir Sikandar Hayat; Moulvi Fazlul Haq and Mohammad Saadullah. 'As a result, a general swing in Muslim support for the League took place, which could be observed in the outcome of the by-elections that took place from 1937 onwards. Of the 61 by-elections for the Muslim seats held between 1937 and 1943, the League won 47, independent Muslims 10, and the Congress Muslims only 4. Of the 14 legislature by-elections the League won 7 and the Congress 2.'⁵³³

The success of the mass contact programme was witnessed at the Muslim League annual session held at Lucknow on 15-16 October 1937 under the President ship of Jinnah, which was the striking success of the League. Jinnah in his presidential address said: "The present leadership of the Congress, especially during the last 10 years, has been responsible for alienating the Musalmans of India more and more, by pursuing a policy which is exclusively Hindu; and since they have formed governments in the six provinces where they are in a majority, they have by their words, deeds and programme shown, more and more, that the Musalmans cannot expect any justice or fair play at their hands..."⁵³⁴ On this occasion the premiers of the Punjab 'Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, A.K. Fazlul Haq of Bengal and Sir Mohammad Saadulla of Assam merged their parties and joined the League'.⁵³⁵

The session through a resolution criticized and protested against the 'formation of ministries in certain provinces by the Congress in flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of the Government of India Act 1935 and instrument of instructions and condemned the Governors for their failure to enforce the special powers entrusted to them for the safeguards of the interests of the Musalmans and other important minorities'.⁵³⁶ By another resolution the session emphatically 'disapproved the scheme

⁵³¹ Saleem M.M. Qureshi, *op.cit.*, p. 97.

⁵³² Jawaharlal Nehru's presidential address and the Lucknow Congress Resolution on the mass contract, April 1936, *Report of the Forty ninth Session of the Indian National Congress* (April 1936), pp. 31-32 & 4-92.

⁵³³ R. Coupland, *op.cit.*, p. 184.

⁵³⁴ Presidential Address of Jinnah at Lucknow annual session of the League, October 1937. Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, pp. 176-182

⁵³⁵ *Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from October 1937 to December 1938*, (Delhi: All India Muslim League, 1944), p. 10.

⁵³⁶ *Ibid.* And also in Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, Resolution No. 7. p. 577.

of the all India Federation as embodied in the Act and opposed its introduction urging upon the British Government to refrain from its enforcement as it considered the scheme to be detrimental to the interests of the people of India generally and the Muslims in particular'.⁵³⁷

Though Abdullah Haroon was defeated in the provincial elections, he did not lose interest in politics. He attended the reception organized in honor of Jinnah in Simla on 18 September 1937. M. A. Jinnah was presented an address on behalf of the Muslim community expressing their complete confidence in his leadership and urging upon him to further "elucidate the ideals of the Muslim League which would be acceptable to all political parties in India, stressing the need of making complete, independence (of India) as the political ideal of the League".⁵³⁸ Replying to the address Jinnah said: "There is no difference between the ideal of the Muslim League and that of the Congress or any other recognized political organization in the country, the ideal being complete freedom for India. There cannot be any self-respecting Indian who favors foreign domination or does not desire complete freedom and self-government for his country".⁵³⁹ Jinnah appointed a new Executive Council for the League in which 'Sir Abdullah Haroon and Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi were taken as members from Sindh'.⁵⁴⁰

Reverting to the Sindh affairs, after the defeat of Hidayatullah Ministry on 22 March 1938, which remained in power for a year, the Governor, asked Allah Baksh Soomro a leader of SUP to form the government. He on 23 March was sworn in as Chief Minister with the support of Nichaldas Vazirani and his group the Hindu Independents, seventeen Muslims (including twelve of the SUP assembly men), three Europeans and two independents (Muslims).⁵⁴¹ He took Nichaldas and Pir Illahi Bux as ministers in his cabinet. The premier, Allah Baksh, on 29 March, announced the intended policy of his government which was to pursue the "programme of the Indian National Congress and the parties which helped to form the government had long been before the people of the province. There is no doubt that there are many items in the programme of the Congress which the public of Sindh would appreciate and support. It will be the duty of my government to carry out these items, having regard to the circumstances of the province".⁵⁴² Allah Baksh entered the office, as Graham noted "with a load of ill-will on his shoulders" and with so many times servers ever ready to change sides, and an assembly which was a "collection of individuals rather than a body of two or three parties",⁵⁴³ the new ministry was as insecure as the old one. Nevertheless, it survived

⁵³⁷ Resolution No. 9. *Ibid.*

⁵³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 174. Others who attended the reception included Sir. N.N. Sircar, Sir Sultan Ahmed, Sir Jagdish Parshad, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Mr. Desai, Mr. Aney, Maulana Shaukat Ali, B.D. as and Sir Maher Shah and others members of Central Legislature.

⁵³⁹ *Civil & Military Gazette*, 21 September 1937.

⁵⁴⁰ Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 256.

⁵⁴¹ *IAR*, Jan.-June 1938, Vol. 1, pp. 274-84.

⁵⁴² *Ibid.*

⁵⁴³ Z.H. Zaidi, *op.cit.*, pp. 19-45.

until the spring of 1940. However, under the situation. Allah Baksh began to work for survival by cultivating good relations with the Governor. G.M. Sayed depicted the situation in these words: "as for the suppression of bureaucratic tyranny in Sindh, the Khan Bahadur found that official good will was necessary for smooth working of his government and more so for the individual favors that he found necessary for retaining the allegiance of many of the M L A's".⁵⁴⁴ He was immediately indebted to the Governor for proroguing the assembly soon after his installation as Chief Minister, a procedural move that had given him a breathing space and a chance to 'look around for support'.⁵⁴⁵ He also sought the support of the Congress, for the real balance, which promised to give his ministry 'a reasonable time'⁵⁴⁶ to prove its worth. Hidayatullah had claimed on 24 March 1938, the day after Allah Baksh had taken office, the support of 28 of the 60 members of the assembly. However, it was fortunate for Allah Baksh that though Hidayatullah did his best to 'return the compliment'; by using the Congress group to bring down the ministry, Congressmen showed that they feared him as Graham worded it, "more than any Greek".⁵⁴⁷ Allah Baksh Ministry included three Hindu ministers namely 'Dialmal Daulatram, Dr. Hemandas Rupchand Wadhwani, Nichaldas Chatumal Vazirani and Miss Jethibai Tulsidas as Deputy Speaker. The three Muslim ministers were Haji Mohammad Hussain Talpur, Allah Baksh Mohammad Umar, Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah and Miran Mohammad Shah as Speaker'.⁵⁴⁸

As the ministry had the support of Congress Party the Muslims generally were not happy with the formation of Allah Baksh Ministry. Therefore the main opposition leaders Hidayatullah, Khuhro, Majid and Gazdar in order to generate public opinion against the ministry on 28 March 1938 organized a public meeting in Karachi. The meeting declared 'Allah Baksh as a traitor and emphasized that the only way to protect the interest of Sindhi Muslims and to counter the Congress is to organize Muslim League in Sindh'.⁵⁴⁹ Similarly Majid also denounced the Allah Baksh Ministry but Haroon was the only Muslim leader who was against the criticism leveled against Allah Baksh and felt that such criticism would stiffen antagonism among various factions of the Muslim members of the assembly'.⁵⁵⁰

Very next day on '29 March G.M. Sayed, Abdul Majid and Gazdar called a public meeting of the Muslims of Karachi held in the Khaliqdina Hall in an attempt to explain to the public the aims and intentions that had inspired them in bringing the new Ministry into being. But public was bitter and was of the opinion that Allah Baksh's forces had breached the Muslim unity just to secure office. As a result meeting ended in

⁵⁴⁴ G.M. Sayed, *op.cit.*, p. 15.

⁵⁴⁵ Z. H. Zaidi, *op.cit.*, pp. 19-45.

⁵⁴⁶ *Indian Annual Register* (hereafter *IAR*), Jan-Jun 1938, Vol. I. pp. 274-275.

⁵⁴⁷ Z.H. Zaidi, *op.cit.*

⁵⁴⁸ *IAR*, *op. cit.*

⁵⁴⁹ *Daily Gazette*, 29 March 1938.

⁵⁵⁰ Khalid Shamsul Hasan, *op.cit.*, p. IX.

a fiasco'.⁵⁵¹ Thus it was under this negative public opinion the new ministry started its working.

Soon after assuming the power, Allah Baksh realized that the support of the Muslim M.L.A's for his ministry depended on individual favors and, that Hindu members would only support his government if the programme of his ministry was not against their vested interests. On the other hand it was expected that as Allah Baksh was the leader of SUP the new ministry would work on party programme. As Allah Baksh did not want to alienate the Hindus which would endanger the stability of his Ministry, therefore in order to retain his Ministry and for the smooth working of his government, he decided to give up party programme and carry on his government on personal rather than party lines. Though several meetings of SUP were held in which Allah Baksh was enquire to execute party programme. But he was not ready to go along with the party programme which he believed will destabilize his ministry.

During this conflicting situation the question of 'enhancement of Land Assessment, which had been left undecided by the Hidayatullah Ministry came up for discussion in the Assembly'.⁵⁵² To deal with this issue in July 1938 Allah Baksh Ministry published the Gorwalla Report which recommended 'the enhancement of revenue rates in the shape of a 'sliding scale' which meant that when the prices went up the assessment on agricultural produce would also rise automatically'.⁵⁵³ Soon after the publication of this report it was severely criticized and strongly opposed particularly by the Muslims who were mainly engaged in agriculture. SUP in the meantime passed a resolution for the postponement of the Assessment bill because it was believed that this system would deprive the farmer of all the profits. Congress and Hindu independents also recommended for the postponement of the Bill for further scrutiny before reaching the final decision. On the other hand Governor was pressurizing Allah Baksh to pass this bill. He tried to amass the support of the Muslim members of SUP of the assembly but failed.

As he could not further resist the governor's pressure therefore he gave in. In spite of the requests of the parties which had brought his Ministry into power the Land Assessment Bill was passed by the Ministry. As a result the differences between SUP and Allah Baksh widened and the Party broke up and some of the members went on the opposing side. In view of this situation to keep his ministry intact Allah Baksh switched over openly to Congress and succeeded in convincing the Congress members

⁵⁵¹ *Sindh Observer*, 30 March 1938.

⁵⁵² At the time of separation of Sindh, one of the main problems for the government of India was to decide about the mode of payment to be adopted by the future government of Sindh for the payment of construction of the Lloyd Barrage at Sukkur. This issue had been discussed in different official committees such as the Financial Enquiry Committee, Brayne Conference and the Sindh Administrative Committee, and was proposed that land revenue could be enhanced by some kind of 'sliding scale' based on the rise and fall in prices, could be imposed to increase the revenue for the payment of Barrage.

⁵⁵³ *Al Wahid*, 20 July 1939. see Hamida Khuhro, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

to support him. Thus by backing Allah Baksh Sindh Congress Party members of the Assembly had worked in opposed to the declared policy of Congress Party which was not to increase taxes.

With the defection of Allah Baksh from SUP Haroon along with Majid began thinking that the only way to counter the Congress was the revival of the Muslim League in Sindh. In this connection to get the support of Sindhi Muslims for the formation of Muslim League a meeting was held at Karachi. Majid presided over the meeting, which was attended by about 3,000 people. 'They viewed Allah Baksh's openness with Hindus and his dependence on them for support as traitorous and they were fearful that his Congress-dominated programme would repeat in Sindh the scenario of Congress oppression in Muslim minority provinces'.⁵⁵⁴ Majid introduced a resolution calling upon Sindhi Muslims to accept the leadership of the All-India Muslim League and to begin establishing League branches in the towns of the provinces. 'Earlier in February Majid called a meeting at his Karachi home to form provincial Committee to establish a Muslim League branch in Sindh. The following office-bearers were elected at the meeting: Majid as President, Sir Abdullah Haroon Vice-President and G. Allana Secretary to be assisted by Mazhar Alavi and Hassan Ali Mohammad Baluch as Treasurer'.⁵⁵⁵ In April 1938, Sheikh Abdul Majid left for Delhi to 'give correct perspective of the situation in Sindh to Jinnah and persuade him to come to Sindh and exert his pressure to bring together all Muslims under one banner'.⁵⁵⁶

However, before the above meetings, Hatim Alavi in his telegram to Jinnah wrote about worst political conditions in Sindh that: "League's greatest need is to effectively answer Jawaharlal's criticism that Leagues has all officers but no soldiers. Muslims being educationally, economically and politically backward, League must creatively work on all the three fronts. Sindh Muslims have greatest confidence in your leadership. Humbly suggest you to renounce practice and devote undivided attention to your un shepherd community. May we not expect this from one combining the sweet name of Mohammad and Ali?"⁵⁵⁷

After meeting with Jinnah in Delhi, 'Majid, President of the Sindh League, prepared a scheme with a view to strengthening the League in Sindh and proposed to establish 400 branches of the League throughout the province and enroll 50,000 members. It was further proposed to hold meetings in every village to call upon the Muslim members of the Sindh Assembly to sign the League pledge'.⁵⁵⁸ Abdullah Haroon's declaration in April 1938 to join the Muslim League gave the League a new life. He stated that 'the only purpose of the Muslim League was to unify the Muslims and create a healthy

⁵⁵⁴ Hamida Khuhro, *op.cit.*, p. 157.

⁵⁵⁵ Allen Keith Jones, *op.cit.* p. 144.

⁵⁵⁶ *Hindustan Times*, 9 April 1938.

⁵⁵⁷ Hatim Alavi to Jinnah, 15 October 1937, *AFM*, Vol. 179, p. 56.

⁵⁵⁸ Press cutting in *QAP*, F. 812.

consciousness among the Muslim Masses'.⁵⁵⁹ On 21 April 1938 Haroon issued rejoinder to Bhulabhai Desai's speech in which he said that he could not understand the Muslims' grievances. Haroon said that the "Muslims in the Congress governed provinces are not treated in a more liberal manner. They want us to merge into the Congress not only politically, but also to relinquish our culture, language and religion", and further appealed "to the Muslims to unite under the banner of the All India Muslim League and organize themselves in such a manner that their voice would be heard in the innermost recesses of the Congress. They should stand on their own legs and not rely on the British Government as the safeguards that have been provided in the constitution are of no value".⁵⁶⁰

Haroon toured Hyderabad where he hoisted Muslim League flag. In his speech he laid emphasis that "ninety million Muslims of India are ready to sacrifice their lives for the honor of this flag. It is a symbol of Muslim unity and sacrifices" and that "we Muslims will never submit to the dictates of the Congress Command".⁵⁶¹ He further stated that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was negotiating with the British statesman and if alliance was made between the Congress and the British Government "the Indian Muslims would fight up to the last for getting their birth right".⁵⁶² Haroon wrote to 'Syed Ghulam Shah, a prominent and influential member of the Sindh Assembly, who was inclined towards Congress, exposing the mentality of the Congress leaders and tried to bring him to accept the policy and programme of the League'.⁵⁶³ Inside the Assembly, Haroon endeavored to bring unity among the Muslim assemblymen and persuaded Majid and Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah to join the Muslim League Party. After great efforts and reconciliation, Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah and Majid "showed their willingness to support the Allah Baksh ministry provided he and his Muslim members were prepared to pledge themselves to the policy and programme of Muslim League and agree to form one solid and united Muslim League Party in the legislature and carry out the policy and programme of the Muslim League inside and outside the legislature".⁵⁶⁴ While the personal efforts were being made by Haroon for the revival of Muslim League in Sindh, to get assistance from central leaders of Muslim League, in June 1938 Haroon and Majid went to Bombay to discuss with Jinnah about the re organization of the League in Sindh and also about pressuring Allah Baksh to leave Congress and affiliate with Muslim League.

Although the work of organizing the Muslim League in Sindh went ahead, the difference of opinion erupted between Abdullah Haroon and Abdul Majid Sindhi. Majid resented the idea to get money and new workers for the League simultaneously.

⁵⁵⁹ Alien Keith Jones, *op.cit.* p. 144.

⁵⁶⁰ *Hindustan Times*, 23 April 1938.

⁵⁶¹ *Daily Gazette*, 24 April 1938.

⁵⁶² *Ibid.* 1 July 1938.

⁵⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁴ Abdullah Haroon to Jinnah, 4 May 1938, *AFM* Vol. 241. Also *QAP* F.612: 1

'He compiled a list of 1,000 sympathizers who could each contribute ten rupees a year. Haroon thought this was 'impractical' and suggested an alternate scheme of writing to friends around the province and requesting their voluntary help. He felt volunteers were more useful than paid-workers at least in getting the League office established and start functioning. Another difference was that Haroon felt it imperative to establish an office in Karachi first and then organize the mofussil offices (district). Majid set out to work immediately for the organization of an office in the rural areas'.⁵⁶⁵ Haroon even reported to Jinnah that he was greatly puzzled about the approach of Majid in organizing the League branches because at some places "black flags and hostile demonstrations were witnessed. At one place the feelings of the Muslims ran so high that the police force was called from the headquarters to maintain peace and order".⁵⁶⁶ Haroon assured Jinnah 'his willingness to work as a lieutenant under the leadership of Majid provided he refrained from unconstructive methods towards League organization'.⁵⁶⁷

However, Majid tried to put the record straight and reported to Jinnah that the primary branches of the league were being formed in distant towns and villages. But complained that members of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Sindh who were members of the Congress as well and supporters of Allah Baksh ministry organized hostile demonstrations in cooperation with Hindus at two places but the situation remained under control. He appealed to Jinnah 'that if at present moment he could not visit Sindh, then at least he should send Maulana Hasrat Mohani or Maulana Shaukat Ali to prepare the ground for his visit'.⁵⁶⁸

Meanwhile on the question of levying new taxes, the chief' minister made it clear to the governor that it was difficult for him to put pressure on the Muslim assembly men. He, therefore, asked the governor to use his influence with some of the Muslim assemblymen to convince them that this measure was essential to wave the debt on Sukkur Barrage. In order to see the matter through, Graham had postponed his scheduled leave in June 1938. But even with such backing, Allah Baksh found himself in no position to face the Assembly as new alliances were being formed to dislodge him. In view of these threats, the governor advised him to put off assembly session as long as he could. This decision, which the Viceroy readily approved and said: "I quite agree with you that the longer Allah Baksh can put off meeting of the Assembly the better".⁵⁶⁹

⁵⁶⁵ Haroon to Majid, June 18, 1938, *QAP* F.274; Majid to Jinnah 17 May 1938, *QAP* F. 274, pp. 109-10. Haroon informed M.A. Jinnah that he would try to persuade the Muslim groups in the Assembly to join the Muslim League but it will take a little time as they are afraid lest the other party may play their tricks and thereby again come into power. Haroon to Jinnah 15 May 1938, *QAP*, F.174, p. 5.

⁵⁶⁶ Haroon to Jinnah, 4 May 1938, *AFM* 14, Vol. 241:13.

⁵⁶⁷ Haroon to Jinnah, 6 July 1938, *QAP* F.274.

⁵⁶⁸ Majid to Jinnah, 17 May 1938, *QAP*, F.16, p. 109.

⁵⁶⁹ Z.H. Zaidi, *op.cit.*, p. 19-45.

With Allah Baksh's support, the government on '16 July 1938 passed the orders for the revision of the revenue settlement'.⁵⁷⁰

The publication of the new rates resulted in a fresh move to coerce the ministry out of office. The decision was attacked in all quarters and Allah Baksh's had to 'live in an atmosphere of ceaseless intrigue'. Allah Baksh's reaction was to seek 'new allies by increasing the number of ministers from three to five. Graham had not been willing to adopt this course when Hidayatullah requested it during 1937. Now, however, he readily agreed, but it was not enough for the Congress, which could neither maintain Allah Baksh in office nor secure his resignation'.⁵⁷¹

Scathing condemnation of the Sindh Congress and the determination of the Muslims to 'unite under the Muslim League banner' and to overthrow the Allah Baksh ministry were expressed at the public meeting held at Khaliqdina Hall, Karachi, under the president ship of Abdullah Haroon. The meeting urged upon the 'governor to call a special session of Sindh Assembly in order to see whether the ministry still enjoyed its confidence as the governor had prorogued it for indefinite period to give respite to Allah Baksh to seek support. Sir Ghulam Hussain deprecated the suggestion that he had joined the League for the purpose of regaining the premiership. He added that he did not want a minister ship. The present ministry, he said, had forfeited the confidence of the people and he appealed to those present specially to boycott the ministers and their supporters'.⁵⁷² Abdullah Haroon on this occasion said: "We want to regain the lost supremacy which we enjoyed for 9000 years before the advent of Sikhs and Marathas" and appealed to the "Muslim assemblymen to join the League and work for the betterment of the province as a whole".⁵⁷³ Pir Mohammad Rashdi announced that he had resigned from the Congress and joined the League. So did G.M. Sayed. In his press statement Sayed said that "he is convinced that no fair and honorable deal can be expected from the Congress which is determined to keep Mr. Allah Baksh in office evidently to satisfy the demand of communalist Hindus, and he has therefore resolved to stand in opposition in order to minimize the intensity of the suffering to which the Congress by its short sighted policy will subject Sindh".⁵⁷⁴

In the meantime, the opposition moved a vote of no confidence against the ministry. At this occasion Haroon informed Jinnah about bright chances for forming a Muslim Ministry in Sindh, as 27 out of 34 Muslim assemblymen were 'ready to sign the League pledge'.⁵⁷⁵ He further said that 'all Muslim members' could join the League provided the Muslim mass opinion was stimulated through provincial League conference to be

⁵⁷⁰ *Daily Gazette*, 17 July 1938.

⁵⁷¹ Z.H. Zaidi, *op.cit.*

⁵⁷² *Statesman*, August 8, 1938.

⁵⁷³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁴ *The Times of India*, 13 August 1938.

⁵⁷⁵ Haroon to Jinnah, 12 August 1938, QAP, F.1090, p. 57.

organized at Karachi, by the end of this month and requested for a suitable date on which Jinnah would be able to preside'. Haroon urged Jinnah to send him 'League pledge forms for getting them filled and signed by the Sindhi Muslim legislators'.⁵⁷⁶ A joint statement was issued under the signatures of Abdullah Haroon, Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, G.M. Sayed, Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, Hashim Gazdar and Syed Khair Shah appealing to the Sindh people to observe August 12 as Sindh Anti-Ministry Day with the object of getting relief for the people from arbitrary orders of the ministry. 'They urged the Governor to call a special session of the Assembly to afford opportunity for representatives of the people to censure the ministry'.⁵⁷⁷ The Governor showed his uneasiness and reported to the Viceroy that his Chief Minister was "having a very difficult time, and we all live in an atmosphere of ceaseless intrigue".⁵⁷⁸

In an effort to bring about a compromise, the government party member G.M. Sayed invited the All India Congress High Command to visit Sindh. On the request Sardar Patel, Kirplani and Maulana Azad in August 1938 came to Karachi. They, along with the local Congress Assemblymen, held negotiations with the Muslim assemblymen; the venue of the meeting was at Sharda Mandir. The prominent Muslim assemblymen present in the negotiations were Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, M.A. Khuhro, G.M. Sayed, Gazdar, Khan Bahadur Gabole, Allah Baksh and Mrs. Allana. Sheikh Abdul Majid flatly refuse to participate in the discussion as in his opinion Sardar Patel had already committed to support the Allah Baksh ministry. Sir Ghulam Hussain gave free expression to his complaints against the ministry and the provincial Congress party. 'As an alternative to the Allah Baksh ministry, he was reported to have expressed readiness to join the Congress party and carry out the Congress programme with his reservation that he would not submit to the so-called control of the Congress high command'.⁵⁷⁹ He however, along with Khuhro and Sayed tried to induce Patel not to support the Allah Baksh ministry. The negotiations could not obtain breakthrough and were aborted. Congress decided to support Allah Baksh ministry if the ministry carries out the Congress programme and policy in Sindh, while rejecting the League's offer to 'Congress-League coalition ministry'.⁵⁸⁰

Allah Baksh took the opportunity of conveying his grievances to Patel, Azad and Kirplani and accused the Congress party of letting him down although he had come into office relying on their support. The Congress policy in other provinces had been to

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁷ *Statesmen*, 7 August 1938.

⁵⁷⁸ Z. H. Zaidi, *op.cit.*, pp. 19-45.

⁵⁷⁹ Press cutting QAP, F.814, p. 114.

⁵⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, regarding the possibility of a coalition ministry, Dr. Choitram Gidwani, President of the Sindh Provincial Congress Committee said that 'it is true that offers have been and are being made to the Congress to form a coalition ministry but the party has not accepted, nor can it accept such officers. I have been personally strongly opposed to the formation of a Congress coalition ministry from the very start and still hold that view'. *The Times of India*, August 13, 1938.

oppose any increase in the revenue assessment. In Sindh, however, it had to be otherwise, for the Congress could not afford to let their new ally slip into the lap of the Muslim League. As a condition for support, the Congress decided, therefore, upon a compromise. 'The settlement orders were to be postponed for a year in order to allow time for consideration of objections and for discussion in the Assembly and meanwhile they would continue the support for Allah Baksh'.⁵⁸¹ However, the governor intervened, warning Allah Baksh that he would not be allowed to withdraw from "his part of the bargain": "I have told him quite frankly that I would rather lose my ministry than put up with the dictation from the Congress".⁵⁸² There upon Allah Baksh revealed that the Working Committee of the Congress was in favor of allowing the increase in the revenue but that Azad was against such a course, and that the Working Committee was anxious to conciliate Azad because through him 'they hope to increase their influence among the Muslim community'.⁵⁸³ But Graham was sure that Allah Baksh would never let him down. In the end, however, the provincial needs were allowed to take precedence over Azad's objections. The Sindh Congress agreed not to press the issue of the increase assessment, and thus Allah Baksh was saved. The Viceroy Lord Linlithgow appreciated the efforts of the Sindh governor and said: "Let me once tell you how glad I am that you have taken so firm a stand with Allah Baksh in this matter of the barrage rates. What you tell me of his attitude in the light of the pressure you have brought to bear upon him is very definitely satisfactory and I hope sincerely that it will be possible to hold him to it".⁵⁸⁴ The Congress, however, adopted a two-was policy after the 1937 elections. In the non-Congress provinces with majority, its efforts were to prevent the League from forming a government or to destabilize the governments, which were not purely Congress. In the provinces where Congress governments had been formed, the Congress ruled effectively with authority and arrogance and Congress Parliamentary Board had been set up as the Congress ministries' watchdog⁵⁸⁵ and as a result the control of Congress high command over the party governments and parliamentarians was absolute.

In early July 1938, Abdullah Haroon and Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah created an alliance between their two families through the marriage of two of their elder children - Haroon's daughter was wedded to Hidayatullah son. The Governor of Sindh maintained this alliance as part of Sir Ghulam Hussein's plan to get revenge on Allah Baksh, the chief minister of Sindh.⁵⁸⁶ Nevertheless, Hidayatullah still saw the League as a possible stepping-stone back to power.

⁵⁸¹ Choitram said that the object of his visit to Bombay 'is to see Vallabhbhai Patel in connection with the draft agreement between the ministry and the Congress regarding postponement of the operation of the assessment orders for one year, as government require ratification of the agreement by the parliamentary sub-committee. Also Z.H. Zaidi, *op.cit.*, pp. 19-45.

⁵⁸² *Ibid.*

⁵⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁴ Lord Linlithgow to Graham, 20 December 1938, cited in Khadim Hussain Soomro, *op.cit.*, pp. 44-5.

⁵⁸⁵ Congress Parliamentary Board comprised of Vallabhahbai, Rajendra Prasad and Maulana Abdul Kalam.

⁵⁸⁶ Allen Keith Jones, *op.cit.*, 189. Also in Z.H. Zaidi, *op.cit.*, pp. 19-45.

Due to the untiring efforts of the Sindhi Muslim leaders, the League' activity intensified. As a result in all "138 primary branches were formed in various districts of Sindh: Larkana 24, Hyderabad 16, Tharparkar 20, Nawabshah 16, Sukkur 13, Jacobabad 9, Karachi 7, Dadu 16 and Karachi city 17".⁵⁸⁷

On August 31, a meeting was held under the president ship of Abdul Majid, which was attended by 100 Karachi elite. At this meeting the working committee was enlarged with the inclusion of twelve members. A parliamentary Board consisting of Abdul Majid, Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, Abdullah Haroon, M.A. Khuhro and Sir Bandeh Ali Khan Talpur was constituted. 'To improve the position of League in Sindh the meeting resolved to hold a provincial conference as a preliminary step to establish a full-fledged Muslim League ministry during October 1938 under the president ship of Jinnah'.⁵⁸⁸ For that purpose a Reception Committee with Haji Sir Abdullah Haroon as chairman and Ali Mohammad Rashdi as General Secretary was constituted. To make the conference a success, it was resolved to hold public meetings in different wards of Karachi to create political consciousness among the Muslims, particularly in connection with the present political situation. As a first step on 2 September 1938 the League office issued an appeal to Sindhi Muslims to join the League (ignoring the disunity in their own ranks) and focused instead on Hindu exploitation as the reason why Muslims in Sindh were powerless and why no legislation had been passed to benefit the rural masses. The appeal stated: "The Muslims of Sindh are aware of the reason why we have come to feel the necessity of organizing Muslim League movement (*sic*) in this province. The necessity is being increasingly felt after the recent political development which are an outcome of the determination on the part of the Hindus, more particularly those who are sailing under the Congress colors, to rule the Muslim majority in the province by a mere process of exploitation".⁵⁸⁹ As a result a number of meetings were held throughout Sindh such as at Sukkur, Larkana, Dadu, Hyderabad, Nawabshah, Thatta and Shikarpur. Meanwhile when these meetings were being organized Haroon personally got in touch with the All-India Muslim leaders to make connection of Sindh province with the centre and to request them to visit Sindh. 'Haroon's efforts succeeded, when Makhdoom Murid Hassan Khan, Maulana Zafar Ali, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Moulvi Fazlul Haq, Premier of Bengal, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Premier of the Punjab, Raja of Mahmudabad, Raja of Pirpur, Choudhy Khaliquzzaman, Nawab Ismail Khan and Jamaluddin agreed to visit Sindh'.⁵⁹⁰

The Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference commenced its sessions during 8-12 October 1938 under the president ship of M.A. Jinnah. 'He along with Sir Ghulam Ali

⁵⁸⁷ Majid to Sec. All-India Muslim League, 30 November 1938, *AFM*, Vol. 241: 71.

⁵⁸⁸ Abdul Majid to Jinnah, 2 September 1938, *QAP*, F.516, p. 3 also in *AIIIC*, a letter of Haroon to Nawab Ismail Khan.

⁵⁸⁹ An appeal to Sindh Muslims issued from the Sindh Provincial Muslim League office on 2 September 1938, *Biography*, *op.cit.*, p. 128-30 also *AF*, Vol. 242, p. 1.

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

Khan Talpur, head of the former ruling family of Sindh travelled by Bombay Mail from Ahmadabad and on 7 October arrived at Karachi'.⁵⁹¹ He was accorded a warm reception. The League workers provided him with three aid-de-camps with uniforms as his personal guards. M. Fazlul Hussain, a scion of a Delhi family, and Mahmood Haroon second son of Sir Abdullah Haroon and Munawar Hussain, the second son Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah were the Aid's. Three aeroplanes of the Karachi Aero Club escorted the special train of Jinnah from Drigh road to the City Railway station and announced its arrival to the waiting crowd by flying low over the city. Abdullah Haroon and Ali Mohammad Rashdi received Jinnah. He inspected the guard of honor provided by the Muslim National Guards, a newly founded organization of dagger-clad volunteers, with Yousuf Haroon and Anwar Hidayatullah in command'.⁵⁹² After the inspection, Sir Ghulam Hussain garlanded him and then Sir Abdullah Haroon introduced him to the distinguished visitors and citizens lined up on the platform, among them were 'Sir Karimbhai Ibrahim, Raja of Mahmudabad, Maulana Shaukat Ali, the honorable Pir Illahi Bux, Nichaldas C. Vazirani, leader of Hindu Maha Sabha, Miran Mohammad Shah, Seth Partabrai, Jamshed Nusserwanji, Hatim A. Alavi, the Mayor of Karachi, G.M. Sayed, Mir Bandeh Ali Khan Talpur, Mir Allahdad Khan Talpur and number of other Muslim MLA and Municipal Councillors'.⁵⁹³

Jinnah was invited to a dinner on October 7, at Karachi Club where different speeches were delivered. 'The hosts were Sir Abdullah Haroon, Sir Ghulam Hussain and Khan Bahadur Abdul Sattar. M.A. Jinnah stated that he was proud to be a Sindhi and also that he was born in Sindh'.⁵⁹⁴ He gave a solemn assurance that in Sindh he would not chalk out a program which would, in any way, whether by words or deeds, go against the legitimate rights of the Hindus, who were in minority here. He appealed to the Hindus as well as the Muslims of Sindh to help him in achieving the object which was very near his heart and which would raise the head of Sindh before the other provinces of India. He concluded: "I am proud of Sindh but if you help me in achieving this object, I shall be more proud than I have ever been in my life".⁵⁹⁵

At the opening session of the Conference, Sir Abdullah Haroon, Chairman, Reception Committee, in his welcome address recounted efforts on the part of distinguished Muslim leaders in the course of the last fifteen years to arrive at a settlement with the Hindu majority community and pointed out how a solution was as far off now as it ever had been. He severely criticized the attitude of the majority community for not approaching the question with a determination to arrive at an amicable settlement. He believed that the sole obstacle standing in the way of a permanent solution of the problem was the unwillingness of the majority community to appreciate the true

⁵⁹¹ *Times of India*, 8 October 1938.

⁵⁹² *The Observer*, 8 October 1938.

⁵⁹³ *Ibid* See also *IAR* 1938, Vol. 2, p. 352.

⁵⁹⁴ *Daily Gazette*, 8 October 1938. Also Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, pp. 278-80.

⁵⁹⁵ *Ibid*. And also in *Times of India*, 8 October 1938.

position and face it squarely. He further stated that "as long as the majority community failed to recognize the deep rooted suspicion of the minorities that their interests were not safe in the hands of the majority and unless they were afforded adequate safeguards and protection there was no prospect of a solution of the problem and if the patience of Muslim India is tried to its utmost capacity, it might have no alternative left but to seek their salvation in their own way in an independent federation of Muslim States".⁵⁹⁶ Haroon then referred to the happenings in the provinces where the Congress was ruling and said "the very culture, religion and the existence of the Muslim community were in jeopardy and they had despaired of getting any justice at the hands of the majority community. We have nearly arrive at the parting of the ways and until and unless this problem is solved to the satisfaction of all it will be impossible for anybody to *save India from being divided into Hindu India and Muslim India both placed under separate federation*".⁵⁹⁷ He further stated: "the Muslims are wide awake today and no efforts to dupe or coerce them will bear any fruit. On the contrary those, who have chosen to masquerade under the cloak of nationalism, must know that nationalism which believes in depriving the minorities of its inherent rights is not going in any way to accelerate the freedom of India. Muslims have left no stone unturned to strengthen the fight for India's freedom, although at no time will it 'be possible for them to agree to any proposition involving a mere change of masters'.⁵⁹⁸

Haroon then warned that the recent happening in Czech-Slovakia would be repeated in India if the majority community persisted in their unreasonable attitude and stand in the way of Muslims realizing their ambition. In this connection, Haroon urged his Muslim brothers to establish closest contact among themselves in India as well as with coreligionists in other countries'.⁵⁹⁹

Haroon then dwelt at length on the Sindh ministerial tangle and declared that 'the Congress party had connived with the Hindu Mahasabha to deprive the Sindhi Muslims of having a ministry enjoying their confidence. He maintained that there was no use shutting their eyes to the realities of the situation and ignoring the fundamental factors. He assured the minorities in Sindh that if they play their part rightly the Muslim League would afford all facilities for the minorities to have their legitimate right safeguard'.⁶⁰⁰

In his presidential address M.A. Jinnah said: "Now that your province is an independent entity the greatest responsibility rests on the shoulders of the Musalmans of Sindh for the welfare and the progress of your province. Not long ago the

⁵⁹⁶ IAR July-December 1938, Vol. II, pp. 352-3. Also in *Sindh Observer*, 9 October 1938. Also in A.M. Zaidi, *The Demand for Pakistan*, Vol. V (Delhi 1978), p. 117-9.

⁵⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹⁹ Dr. Ghulam Ali Allana, *Pakistan Ki Tehrik. Mein Sindh Ka Hisa* (Urdu) (Karachi: 1983), p. 50.

⁶⁰⁰ *Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference Report*. (Hereafter SPML).

Musalmans in Sindh were divided and torn into groups but today I am happy to find that there is a wonderful public spirit, solidarity and unity demonstrated and with proper organization if you mobilize and harness your powers there is nothing to prevent the Muslims League of your province from assuming the reins of the Government of your province. It is in your hands now. You must remember that it is your duty and responsibility which calls upon you to conduct the affairs of the Government in Sindh". He further said that "I tell you that Karachi is my birthplace and I cannot adequately express how deeply anxious I am for its welfare and how cordially I wish your province to rise to its full stature and play your great and rightful part in the counsels of Muslim India. Musalmans of Sindh have another sacred duty to perform and a far graver task in front of them and it is that aspect which I want to impress upon you. In the all-India Muslim struggle against the various forces which are out to destroy and divide the Muslims by means of corruption and dishonest propagandas you have to guard yourself against it and stand solid behind the All India Muslim League which is the only authoritative and representative organization of the Musalmans of India".⁶⁰¹

Jinnah pronounced a long charge sheet against the Congress high command and warned it against the continuance of its policy towards the Muslims and the Muslim League. He said: "The Congress, with seven provinces wants to dominate over Muslims. They want to impose on us a Hindu Raj, culture and philosophy ... I have made it clear that as long as there is life in me I will never allow the Congress to do this. As long as the Congress does not come to us as equal there can be no peace in this land. It is a matter of life and death for Muslims. If you Muslims still do not see danger, I now give you the alarm".⁶⁰² In conclusion, regarding the political situation which the Musalmans had to face Jinnah advice 'to build up our own power' they should not rely upon any one else but on themselves.

The other speakers at the Conference included 'Fazlul Haq, premier of Bengal, Sir Sikandar Hayat, and Premier of the Punjab, Khan Fakira Khan, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan and Nawab Makhdum Mohammad Hussain. They narrated how Congress ministers have treated Muslim minorities, eulogized the League leaders' services, and congratulated Sindh Muslims on planting the Muslim League flag on the land of Islam'.⁶⁰³

The Conference adopted several important resolutions focusing on 'the cancellation of the mandate and full independence for Palestine, efforts to organize the League nationwide and socio-economic uplift of the Muslims, and more important was

⁶⁰¹ For complete presidential address of Jinnah see Dr. Ahmed. *op.cit.*, pp. 281-7. Also in *AFM* Vol. 242, Document No. 9 is the Proceeding of Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference, 8-12 October 1938.

⁶⁰² *Ibid.*

⁶⁰³ *Ibid.*

Resolution No. 5 on 'Communal settlement'.⁶⁰⁴ The one part of resolution showed the scope of Congress misrule where it had formed the governments:

"Whereas it (Congress) had deliberately established purely Hindu rule in certain provinces by forming ministries either without Muslim ministers or with Muslim ministers having no following among Muslim members, in direct and flagrant violation of the letter and spirit of the Government of India Act, 1935 and the instruments of instructions.

Whereas the ministries so formed have established a sort of rule, which has for its aim the intimidation, and demoralization of Muslims, the extermination of the healthy and nation-building influences of Muslim culture, the suppression of Muslim religious customs and their religious obligations and elimination of their political rights as a separate community.

Whereas Congress has superimposed the authority of its High Command, a sort of fascist dictatorship, over the working of the Congress ministries to prevent the healthy growth of parliamentary conventions and establishment of constitutional traditions, to deprive the Muslims of their due share and have refused to reconstitute ministries in consonance with the constitution, having due regard to the rights and interest of Muslims".⁶⁰⁵

The next part of the resolution further denounced the Congress but this time in the context of the Muslim majority provinces:

"Whereas it (Congress) has in open defiance of the democratic principles persistently endeavored to render the power of the Muslim majorities ineffective and impotent in the North-Western Provinces, Bengal, the Punjab and Sindh by trying to bring into power or by supporting coalition ministries not enjoying the confidence of the majority of Muslim members and the Muslim masses of those provinces".⁶⁰⁶

The next part of the resolution denounced the All-India federation as embodied in the Government Act of 1935,

"Further this conference records its emphatic disapproval of the scheme of the All-India Federation as embodied in the Government of India Act 1935, and is opposed to its introduction and urges upon the British Government to refrain

⁶⁰⁴ Resolution was moved by Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi and seconded by K.B. Gurmani, Abdullah Haroon, Syed Abdul Latif Shah and Maulana Abdul Hamid Badauni.

⁶⁰⁵ *AFM*, Vol. 242, Document No. 9.

⁶⁰⁶ *Ibid*.

from its enforcement as it considers the scheme to be detrimental to the interests of the people of India generally and those of the Muslims in particular.

That this Conference further declares that no constitution by whosoever framed will be acceptable to the Muslims of India unless it conforms to the principle enunciated above and is prepared in consultation with and accepted by the All India Muslim Leagues."⁶⁰⁷

The other part of the resolution created the sense that the Muslims are a 'separate nation' and India in reality was not one nation but two. and that the Muslim League be asked to devise a new constitution for India. It resolves:

"Whereas the evolution of a single united India and united Indian nation inspired by common aspirations and common ideals being impossible of realization on account of the caste-ridden mentality and anti-Muslim policy of majority community, and also on account of acute differences of religion, language, script, culture, social laws and outlook on life of the two major communities and even of race in certain parts.

This conference considers it absolutely essential in the interests of an abiding peace of the vast Indian continent and in the interests of unhampered cultural development, the economic and social betterment, and political self-determination of the two nations known as Hindus and Muslims to recommend to All India Muslim League to review and revise the entire question of what should be the suitable constitution for India which will secure honorable and legitimate status due to them, and that this Conference, therefore recommends to the All India Muslim League to devise a scheme of constitution under which Muslims may attain full independence".⁶⁰⁸

Sir Abdullah Haroon and his secretary Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi in close collaboration with Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi authorized the initial draft of this resolution, which contained the radical portion. A conscious effort was made in drafting the resolution with a view to demonstrating the Muslim solidarity between the two Muslim blocs in Sindh. So deep was their sense of anger and frustration with Congress' treatment of Muslims in both blocs that they abandoned hope of ever reaching a settlement with the Congress in future. In this way their profound hatred of Congress produced in them a new awareness that Muslims by themselves must discover their own political destiny.

⁶⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁸ *Ibid.* And also in the files of Sindh Provincial Muslim League, Vol. III. The resolution was passed in amended form. The original version of the resolution was 'That this Conference therefore recommends to the All India Muslim League to devise a scheme of Constitution under which Muslim majority provinces, Muslim native states and areas inhabited by a majority of Muslims may attain full independence in the form of Federation of their own with right to admission to any other Muslim state beyond the Indian Frontiers to join the federation and with such safe guards for non-Muslim minorities as may be conceded to the Muslim minorities in the non-Muslim Federation of India'.

The adoption of this resolution signified that for the first time the Muslim League had defined India as being home of two separate nations and at the same time advanced the claim of political self-determination as a legitimate means for the achievement of separate nationhood. 'This resolution marked a new departure in League thinking which prepared the way for the establishment, two years later, of its ultimate goals of Pakistan. It was in this respect, as a forerunner of the historic Lahore Resolution in March 1940 that the resolution No. 5 of the Karachi Conference achieved its true historical distinction'.⁶⁰⁹

When this resolution was introduced Jinnah was averse to it. He said that "the Government is still in the hands of the British. Let us not forget it. You must see ahead and work for the ideal that you think will arise 25 years hence".⁶¹⁰ But when he realized that Haroon and other Sindhi leaders were determined to adopt this resolution 'he decided to let the resolution pass with the idea that it would serve as a trial balloon and would indicate the depth of support within the Muslim community for the ideological notions implicit in the resolution'.⁶¹¹

The resolution was severely criticized by Hindu press. Haroon in an answer to the Hindu criticism gave an interview to the Muslim Voice and thanked Hindu press for popularizing the idea of Pakistan among the Muslims as they "don't have press of their own to propagate this idea".⁶¹²

On 9 October the Working Committee of the Muslim League held a prolonged discussion on its reply to be sent to the Congress Working Committee's letter approved at its Delhi session on 'the unity talks'.⁶¹³ The Working Committee met at Abdullah Haroon's residence under the president ship of Jinnah. Among those who participated were: Sir Abdullah Haroon, Maulana Shaukat Ali, Raja of Mahmudabad, Sir Currimbhoy Ebrahim and Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan. The following reply approved by the Working Committee was sent to the Congress President, Subhas Chandra Bose: "The Muslim League is still ready to proceed with the negotiations for settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question on the basis defined by my letter and would appoint its representatives to meet the Committee that may be appointed by the Congress on the

⁶⁰⁹ Papers presented at the *International Congress on Quaid-i-Azam, 19-25 December 1976*, Vol. II, pp. 119-20 (Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad).

⁶¹⁰ Proceedings of Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference, *op. cit.*

⁶¹¹ Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Quaid Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Pakistan* (Karachi: Format Publications, 1989), pp. 30-31.

⁶¹² *A Biography, op. cit.*, p. 135.

⁶¹³ Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p 635. The letter of Congress President's of 2 October 1938 to Jinnah reads, 'Your letter of 2 August 1938 has been place before me though there are inaccuracies in your letter no purpose will be served by dwelling on them. The substance of your letter seems to be that the League does not expect the Congress, whether implicitly or explicitly, acknowledged its status as the authoritative Muslim organization of India. If this view is accepted by the League, I am authorized to state that the Working Committee will confer with the Committee that may be appointed by the League to draw up the terms of settlement'.

footing indicated by us in our three resolutions of the 5 June 1938 already communicated to you".⁶¹⁴ On the same day, Karachi's District Boards formally welcomed the Muslim League and its leaders. Sir Sikandar hoisted the League's flag with its silver crescent moon and star, after which M.A. Jinnah was presented with an Urdu address on a silver tray and handed him over the keys of Karachi city by the Mayor of Karachi City, Hatim A. Alavi. On this occasion he said, "it is a matter of pride of the Town of Karachi that Mr. Jinnah, a person of such great eminence and a well-known statesman, should have been born and bred within her embrace". He was also called the 'great Guide and Commander of the Muslim community'.⁶¹⁵

During the course of Conference, 'Muslim members of Sindh Assembly showed their desire to form the Muslim League Party in the Assembly'.⁶¹⁶ On the evening of 9 October, Jinnah along with Sikandar Hayat, Fazlul Haq met Allah Baksh, Premier of Sindh who earlier refused to join forces with the League. By that time Sindhi Muslims were divided into four groups: 'Allah Baksh and his colleague, Pir Illahi Baksh, with the support of 7 members; Hidayatullah group consisting of about 13 members ; Mir Bandeh Ali, the leader of a Baluch group, had the support of 7 members; and lastly G.M. Sayed, who had a following of 6 members'.⁶¹⁷ Jinnah wanted that the groups should sit together and iron out their differences so that Muslim leaders can form a strong and united front against Congress. The others who attended the meeting were Pir Illahi Baksh, G.M. Hidayatullah Mir Bandehali Talpur, G.M. Sayed and Sheikh Abdul Majid. After his arrival in Karachi on 7 October, Jinnah met with some twenty-six Muslim members of the assembly at Abdullah Haroon's residence, convincing them all to join the League. In 9 October meeting Jinnah met the leaders of all four groups and after prolonged discussions and agreement was arrived at and finally Jinnah was able to persuade Allah Baksh to join his party as well. Jinnah reported the outcome of this meeting to the Associated Press in these words "It was agreed that one solid party of the Muslim members of the Sindh Legislative Assembly, should be formed as Muslim League Party".⁶¹⁸ Allah Baksh and his entire Muslim ministers promised to resign, then a provincial League party election was to be held to choose the new leader by 'unanimous vote' or "in default he should be nominated by Jinnah and the party would abide by his choice".⁶¹⁹ Early the next morning, however, Jinnah learned that Sindh's leader of the Congress party had wired Sardar Vallabhahbai Patel, President of the All India Congress Parliamentary Board, to alert him to the League's intentions, and

⁶¹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶¹⁵ Stanley Wolpert, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

⁶¹⁶ Jamil ud Din Ahmed, *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Vol. 1 (Lahore: 1968), pp. 64-70.

⁶¹⁷ Ashique Hussain Batalvi, *Hamari Quomi Jud-o-Juh., May-December 1938* (Urdu) (Lahore: *Al-Bayan*, 1966), p. 149.

⁶¹⁸ Stanley Wolpert, *op.cit.*, p. 164. Also in *The Time of India*, 14 October 1938 and in *Star of India*, 10 October 1948.

⁶¹⁹ *Ibid.* The agreement was signed by Allah Baksh, Pir Illahi Bux, Sir Hidayatullah, Mir Bandeh, G.M.Sayed, and Abdul Majid. For complete agreement see Jamil ud Din Ahmed, *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah. op.cit.*, pp. 65-66.

'when they met at 11 o'clock on the 12 October 1938 at Haroon's residence Allah Baksh backed out of the agreement' and took up the blatant position that 'he and his supporters would join the League Party only if he was assured beforehand that the party would agree to elect him as the parliamentary leader and allow him to continue as Chief minister'.⁶²⁰ Shocked by Allah Baksh's behavior Jinnah still felt it worth fighting for 'unity at any cost' and sent his closest Sindh Deputy, Sir Abdullah Haroon, to appeal to Allah Baksh. After the meeting Haroon came to the conclusion and reported next morning to Jinnah that Allah Baksh was in the hands of the Congress Party'.⁶²¹ Thus the hopes for forming the League ministry were dashed. The Congress was jubilant for the defeat of Jinnah's efforts.

As soon as Malik Barkat heard the bad news, he said that Jinnah would never forget or forgive Sardar Patel for having "cheated" him for Sindh, "robbing" his home province out from under him. "You had almost achieved a triumph but the dogs of the Congress have snatched from you the cup of victory", and added "I have not the least doubt that the Musalmans of Sindh will teach a lesson this traitor Allah Baksh".⁶²²

Hatim Alavi gave the account of 'unity conference. Accordingly when Jinnah came to Sindh for the conference he found bickering and schisms among the Muslims mostly on personal grounds. He called them one by one and heard their stories down to the last detail. He let them speak their mind until they had no more to say. He then asked them, 'Do you have anything more to say?' "No, nothing, that is all, no more was invariably their reply'. And then he gathered them all together and spoke to them. He said he realized that 'they expected him to arbitrate in each and every one of the cases, to give to one and take from another, to support one and abandon another'. He reminded them of 'their great aim of unity and asked them how they could make any progress if they were all quarrelling with one another'.⁶²³ He used the metaphor of dirt in a water pitcher. "If you throw dirt into a pitcher and then drink the water, it will be distasteful and upset you. But if you let the dirt settle, then the water will be clear and you may drink from the pitcher with no ill effect".⁶²⁴ So he exhorted them to settle their difference by forgetting them by putting their disagreements behind them instead turning and working for the great aim of strength and unity. He said he could arbitrate; it may satisfy their heads but not their hearts. This appeal was effective, for Jinnah was able to get the Muslim Leaders to agree on a common position in regard to the Sindh ministry during the conference's deliberations.⁶²⁵

⁶²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶²¹ G.M. Sayed, *Struggle for New Sindh, op.cit.*, p. 20.

⁶²² *The Times of India*, 15 October 1938.

⁶²³ Papers presented at the *International Congress on Quaid-i-Azam, 19-25 December 1976*, Vol. II, pp. 119-20 (Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad.)

⁶²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶²⁵ *Ibid.*

Not only the Congress but Garret, the acting Governor also assured support to Allah Baksh because the governor feared that if the League ministry is formed then revised assessment bill would be reverted back. He wrote to Lord Brabourne on 12 October: "Allah Baksh saw me in the afternoon and told me that the discussions were to continue and that he with his supporters was unwilling to accept Jinnah's proposals. He says that Jinnah is using every effort to avoid the loss of prestige. which he personally will suffer if he fails to secure the formation of a League ministry in Sindh. Allah Baksh is not a strong character but his views are moderate and he has scruples about throwing over his Hindu supporters. He is of course under very severe pressure and is much worried, but he will I think hold to his present views".⁶²⁶ Even the Hindu press was jubilant on the breakdown of talks. *The Hindustan Standard* under the title 'Sindh Grave of Muslim League' commented: "Mr. Allah Baksh has refused to be terrorized into the glory of having set up the first Muslim League government. We can understand Mr. Jinnah's chagrin. He would have very much liked to pay the High Command with League government, as President Bose is playing with seven Congress governments. Like the enraged serpent swinging. its hood all round, this disappointed leader is abusing Congressmen and Congress minded Muslims. We pity him — alas that Mr. Jinnah should have drawn upon himself the pity on his countrymen. He dug the grave of Islam in India. Mr. Allah Baksh has saved his community from being swallowed into it. May Mr. Jinnah finds peace in his own political grave; if he feels lonely, may Mr. Haq (Fazlul Haq) lie by side with him".⁶²⁷

Haroon could not ignore these remarks and immediately issued a rejoinder: "I hope to be able to prove with only a fortnight's labor that the League has dug the grave of all organizations that have unnecessarily chosen to come into clash with it. The League message has reached almost every corner of the province and the enthusiasm with which the people rallied round us during the presidential tour clearly indicated that the Sindhi Muslims are today more alert and more active than this critic seem to think... The members of the Sindh Congress, by supporting the present Ministry at the coast of their own decisions, declarations, principles and professions have dug the grave of the Congress movement once and for all".⁶²⁸

Though Allah Baksh backed out of the pact, however, '27 Muslim assemblymen joined the Muslim League'.⁶²⁹ Abdullah Haroon, G.M. Sayed and Mir Bandeh Ali Khan condemned Allah Baksh's attitude having failed to honor his own unqualified pledge which proved how "he makes and breaks his promises, pledges, undertakings and engagements" being unworthy premier.⁶³⁰ While condemning the Congress they felt

⁶²⁶ Hamida Khuhro, *op.cit.*, p. 163.

⁶²⁷ Quoted by *Sindh Observer*, October 20, 1938.

⁶²⁸ *The Times of India*, 24 October 1938.

⁶²⁹ Ian Talbot, *Provincial Politics and the Pakistan Movement, The Growth of the Muslim League in North West and North East India 1937-47* (Karachi : Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 41.

⁶³⁰ *Daily Gazette*, October 15, 1938.

that "the entire Congress today is on its trial on the Sindh question. Any new solution to accommodate the ministry tantamount to subterfuge",⁶³¹ while Majid declared the decision of the Congress to support the Allah Baksh government as "a declaration of war upon the Sindh Muslims" and said "We accept the challenge and Congress will be mainly responsible for the consequences thereof".⁶³² Jinnah, however, viewed that to meet the Congress' challenge, it would be necessary for the Muslims to organize the League province-wide. For this purpose, he appointed various committees on district level to carry out the propaganda and inform about League's policy even in remote areas of Sindh. The Committee consisted of 'Sir Abdullah Haroon, Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, M.H. Gazdar, K.B. Gabole, Moulvi Sanaullah and Ali Mohammad Rashdi was entrusted with the work of Karachi city'.⁶³³

Though Allah Baksh backed out of the agreement Jinnah decided to counter Congress Muslim League Parliamentary Party should be created. For the establishment of Muslim League Parliamentary Party elections were held at Haroon's house in which Hidayatullah was elected Leader, 'Mir Bandeh Ali of Mir Group as Deputy Leader, Khuhro as General Secretary and Gazdar, Mir Ghulam Ali and Noor Mohammad Shah as Assistant Whips'.⁶³⁴ For a harmonious working of League in Sindh it was decided to establish close liaison between the parliamentary party and the Muslim League organization outside the Assembly.

M.A. Jinnah then along with all-India leaders namely, Raja of Mahmudabad, Maulana Jamal Mian and Sindh leaders namely Sir Abdullah Haroon, Sheikh Abdul Majid, M.H. Gazdar, Khuhro, Kazi Fazlullah and Pir Ai Mohammad Rashdi toured Larkana, Jacobabad and Sukkur, all districts of upper Sindh. His tour evoked the greatest enthusiasm and thousands of people flocked to the station to receive him. Jinnah held conferences with local *Sardars* (Heads of Tribes) to cajole them to join the Muslim League. In gatherings, he explained the League's policy and programme and exhorted the Muslims to join the League, which was the sole representative body of the Indian Muslims. He urged upon them to awake from their slumber and agitate for their rights.

Allah Baksh government issued instructions to officials all over Sindh that Jinnah's tour must be made a failure at any cost. As a result he was only able to address the public meeting at Larkana where Khuhro and Kazi Fazlullah over powered the government machinery. Abdullah Haroon in a press statement said that "Rumors are current that in

⁶³¹ *The Sindh Observer*, October 19, 1938.

⁶³² *The Daily Gazette*, October 16, 1938.

⁶³³ *Daily Gazette*, 16 October and 20 October 1938. *The Sindh Observer*, 9 October 1938. The Committee consisting of Rais Mohammad Yousuf Chandio, Moulidino in Karachi district; Kazi Fazlullah, M.A. Khuhro and Moulvi Khushi Mohammad would work in Larkana district; K.S. Pir Rasool Baksh Shah Nazar Ali Afgan and Ghulam Nabi Afgan in Sukkur district, G.M. Sayed and wadero Dur Mohamamd Burio in Dadu; Syed Khair Shah, Syed Noor Mohammad Shah in Nawabshah district; Pir Ghulam Mujadid Sirhandi, Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur, Rais Ghulam Rasool Bhurgari in Hyderabad District; Shah Abdul Hakim and Nabi Bux in Jacobabad District.

⁶³⁴ Hamida Khuhro, *op.cit.*, p. 164.

order to break the Muslim solidarity and to make the Muslim majority in the province effective, the Sindh Congress Assembly Party has entered into secret pact with the present Ministry to avert the enforcement of Wardha decision to remain neutral. It is believed that the Congress Assembly members have given in writing to Khan Bahadur Allah Baksh that in case the High Command refused to change the Wardha decision, they would resign from Congress organization in its true colors as a Hindu body. Any new solution with a view to accommodating the ministry will be tantamount to a subterfuge".⁶³⁵

When interviewed by the correspondent of Associated Press, Jinnah observed: "there had been wonderful awakening among the Muslims of Sindh ... I do not attach any importance to the formation of ministries as an acid test of our struggle. The main purpose for which I am in Sindh is to organize the Muslims under banner of the League throughout Sindh. My mission has succeeded beyond my expectations and I see a bright future of Sindh Muslims".⁶³⁶ Thus by the time Jinnah left Sindh the political environment of Sindh had changed and Muslim League gained foothold in the soil of Sindh.

Jinnah left Sindh on 21 October 1938 but immediately after the departure of Jinnah; Sindhi leaders started drifting in different directions. The disunity was apparent at the Sindh League Council session held in the last week of November 1938. The session was attended by about thirty members of whom only five were of the members of the Sindh Legislative Assembly. The meeting was presided over by Khuhro and its task was to elect the President of the Muslim League in Sindh. There was no unanimity as the contest took place between Haroon and Majid, the later being backed by Hidayatullah who was bitterly opposed to Haroon. The vote was tied and Khuhro put his casting vote in favor of Haroon, who in his opinion would make a more feasible president of the party. Hidayatullah was much more interested in having a president he could manipulate and saw Majid as filling this role. Khuhro who had been a close associate of Hidayatullah had now begun to distance himself from him since he had shown himself as a single minded self-serving politician in the period after his removal from office and during Jinnah's visit when efforts to organize the Muslim League party were being made. In the elections for the provincial party offices, therefore, 'Khuhro threw his weight behind Haroon who was elected as League's President and Majid as General Secretary'.⁶³⁷ 'G.M. Sayed and M.A. Khuhro were elected its Vice Presidents, Ali Mohammad Rashdi and Ghulam Nabi Pathan as Joint Secretaries'.⁶³⁸

⁶³⁵ *The Time of India*, 19 October 1939. The Ulema and Nationalist Muslims of Sindh declared on the other hand that the Muslim Leaguers are fermenting feelings of hatred among two communities, trying to poison the political atmosphere in Sindh and sow seeds of communal discord. They condemned that this was irresponsible and mischievous agitation and hoped that the Muslims of Sindh would attach no importance to the cry of the league but live peacefully as good neighbors, winning the confidence of all sister communities.

⁶³⁶ *The Tribune*, 21 October 1938.

⁶³⁷ Hamida Khuhro, *op.cit.*, p. 165.

⁶³⁸ *Al Wahid*, 28 November 1938.

In spite of the differences among the Muslims by the end of 1938 the organizational structure of the Sindh Muslim League was completed.

SUMMARY

The study of this chapter reveals that like during the Hidayatullah Ministry the Sindhi Muslim leadership was still divided in the Allah Baksh time period and continued the self centred and personalized politics. Personal rivalries and intrigues still played an important role in making political decisions. As a result of the disunity the Sindhi Hindus with the support of the Congress emerged as a powerful political group which started controlling the politics of the province.

Furthermore the defection of Allah Baksh from SUP proved to be a final nail in the coffin of the United Party. The end of SUP brought a political vacuum in Sindh and Allah Baksh tried to fill the vacuum by the Congress support. The end of SUP, the non cooperative attitude of Allah Baksh and the support of Congress to his Ministry forced the Muslim leaders of Sindh to take the assistance from outside of the province.

Meanwhile the failure of SUP made Haroon to realize that his decision of establishing a non-communal party which he thought was more suitable for Sindh and that it would work for the betterment of Sindh was erroneous. The communal politics of Congress convinced him that non communal parties like SUP cannot be successful. Haroon therefore reached to the conclusion that the only way Muslims can challenge the control of Congress and displace the Hindu control from the ministry is that they should be united and organized on communal lines.

This realization made Haroon attracted to the Muslim League and he joined the League at the Lucknow session held in October 1937. Though Haroon joined the League but he continued to support Allah Baksh and SUP in a hope that Allah Baksh will unite the Muslims of Sindh and would work for the uplift of the people. But the continues refusal of Allah Baksh to follow the SUP programme pushed Haroon more closer to Muslim League and its communal ideology.

During Allah Baksh Ministry one of the most important events was the Karachi meeting of the Sindh branch of Muslim League, presided over by Jinnah and attended by all the important leaders of League. Haroon in his welcome speech affirmed Muslims and Hindus as two separate nations and demanded a separate homeland for Muslims. He also asserted that Muslims as a nation has a right of political self determination which he thought as a legitimate means for the achievement of separate nationhood.

Haroon speech became a central point of discussions and on the basis of his speech the resolution was passed in which India was declared as not one but two nation State. It

was the first time that League had defined political India as two separate nations. Thus it was the first declaration of two nation theory from the platform of League.

To review the outcome of the Conference it can be said that the resolution reserved its historical importance and it became a prelude to Lahore Resolution of 1940 which will be discussed in the subsequent chapters.

The study also reveals that the most important result of the Karachi meeting and the visit of Jinnah was the establishment of Muslim League Assembly Party in the Sindh Assembly. This was a great achievement for Jinnah as in the elections of 1937 League had not won any seat and was nonexistent in the Assembly. By the joining of Muslim leaders like Haroon, Hidayatullah, Mir Bandeh Ali and G.M. Sayed, Muslim League emerged as an important political force in the politics of Sindh and finally by the elections of office bearers of Sindh Provincial Muslim League, League gained a foot hole in the political soil of Sindh.

CHAPTER IX

RUN UP TO LAHORE RESOLUTION

The significance of resolution of Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference held on 8-12 October to the Government can be judged from the report of the Intelligence Bureau, Home Department, Government of India: "The Karachi presentation of the idea of separate federation goes further than 'Pakistan scheme', and provides for the inclusion of all the states and provinces in which Muslims are in a majority in India".⁶³⁹ It further states that "many regard the plan as impracticable, but there are those also who argue that the present general tendency in the world, especially as exhibited in recent events in Europe, is for every cultural unit to have its own geographical home".⁶⁴⁰ Severe criticism of the resolution came from Hindu press as it began talking of 'Pakistan'. Abdullah Haroon in his interview, published in *The Moslem Voice* said: "our gal being Pakistan (in one form or another), that is independent states for Musalmans under a separate federation of their own".⁶⁴¹ However, the clearer picture of 'separate federation' is available from the reminiscences of Mr. M.A. Khuhro:

"It was during his stay in Karachi (October-November 1938) that the question of a demand for a separate homeland for Muslim i.e. Pakistan was discussed by some of us with Mr. Jinnah at the residence of Haji Haroon, where he was staying for the first time. Prior to that, no such idea had been properly mooted or discussed. Mr. Jinnah told Abdullah Haroon to get whatever material was available in order to prepare the case for this demand of Pakistan in case no proper settlement regarding the rights and privileges of Muslims could be reached with the Hindu majority community, mainly the Congress party, who were demanding independence without any prior settlement with the Muslim community".⁶⁴²

Latter Haroon sent copies of Karachi Conference's resolutions to His Highness, the Aga Khan, to seek his advice on the separate Muslim federation. Aga Khan in his reply opined: "the only possible early federation is either British India Federation or with elected members from States — this is a statement of fact not approval or advocacy ... Is your League likely to advocate Packestan (Pakistan) as the final policy of Moslems? If so the sooner public opinion is prepared gradually the better".⁶⁴³ Haroon answered with

⁶³⁹ Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Pakistan* (Karachi: Hurmat Publication 1989), pp. 30-31.

⁶⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴¹ *Biography*, p. 135.

⁶⁴² Prof. A. H. Dani, *Quaid-i-Azam and Pakistan* (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, 1981), p. 170.

⁶⁴³ Aga Khan to Haroon, 20 December 1938, QAP. F.274, p. 15.

the conviction that 'the League has no other alternative but to secure a separate Federation'.⁶⁴⁴

Coming back to the situation which existed after the elections of 1937, though the differences between Congress and League bubbled up before the elections but it was assumed by the League that the Congress along with the League would form coalition ministries in the provinces where Congress won the majority. In this connection speaking at Nagpur on 1 January 1937, Jinnah said that Hindus and Muslims should present a united front and stand and work together for the freedom of their motherland. It was the objective of the League to send out the best representatives in the new legislatures "who would cooperate with other progressive groups for the uplift, progress and freedom of the motherland".⁶⁴⁵ At about the same time, Nehru demeans the League by declaring that there were "only two forces in the country, Congress and the Government, and others must line up".⁶⁴⁶ Jinnah refused to accept Nehru's proposal and said: "there is a third party in this country and that is Muslim India", and further declared that "we are not going to be dictated by anybody. We are willing as equal partners to come on a settlement with our sister communities in the interests of India".⁶⁴⁷

In July 1937, the Congress decided to form Ministries. Then arose the question whether the Ministries should be formed in coalition with Muslim League or not. It was decided that in all those provinces such as Bihar, Orissa and Central Province, where the League had won a single seat coalition ministries would not be formed. It was in Bombay and the United Provinces that the Muslim League had won significant number of seats and it was in these two provinces that the League hoped it would be invited by Congress to form coalition ministries. 'In Bombay the League had won 20 out of 29 Muslim seats and in the United Provinces the 64 Muslim seats were shared as follows: Muslim League 26; Independent Muslims 28; National Agricultural Party 9; and Congress Muslim'. B.G. Kher who headed the Congress ministry in Bombay, was inclined to ask the League to join his administration but had to defer due to the Congress ban on coalition'.⁶⁴⁸

To form the coalition ministries in the United Provinces, the Congress wanted to strike a deal and in July 1937 gave the following terms to the League, which were:

"The Muslim League Group in the United Provinces Assembly shall cease to function as a separate group. The exiting members of the Muslim League party

⁶⁴⁴ *AHC*, Vol. III.

⁶⁴⁵ *The Tribune*, 3 January 1937.

⁶⁴⁶ Quoted by Jinnah in his speech on 3 January 1937 at Calcutta, *Star of India*, 4 January 1937.

⁶⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴⁸ Latif Sherwani (ed). *Pakistan in the Making: Documents and Readings* (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1987), p. 548.

in the United Provinces Assembly shall become part of the Congress Party. The Muslim League Parliamentary Board in the United Provinces will be dissolved and no candidates will thereafter be set up by the said Board at any by election".⁶⁴⁹

League considered these terms as its "death warrant"⁶⁵⁰ as a separate political party, therefore the terms were rejected and the hope for a coalition government fell through. "This was a most unfortunate development", lamented *Azad*: "If the UP League's offer of cooperation had been accepted the Muslim League Party would for all practical purposes have merged with Congress ... Mr. Jinnah took full advantage of the situation and started an offensive, which ultimately led to Pakistan".⁶⁵¹

Congress Ministries

After the rejection of the terms by the League, Congress thought that it was not the time to pamper and strengthen the League but an opportunity to teach it a lesson and eliminate it as a political force. Congress therefore established homogeneous Ministries composed of its own members. Congress did appointed Muslims as Ministers but only those who were the members of the Congress.

Soon after the establishment of Congress ministries Muslims started complaining against their arrogant behavior towards them. As a result on '20 March 1938 the Council of Muslim League regarding the ill-treatment and injustice meted out to the Muslims by the Congress Ministries passed a resolution on the basis of which a special Committee was appointed to collect information regarding the Muslim complains.⁶⁵² League asked Syed Mohammad of Pirpur to inquire into the protests. *Pirpur Report* was published on 15 November 1938. It included a summary account of events in all the provinces. The report attacks the Congress 'closed door' policy and cites it as proof that parliamentary government as practiced in Britain is unworkable in India. Another report was prepared by M.S. Shareef of Bihar Provincial Muslim League known as *Shareef Report* and published in March 1939. The report consisted of all the atrocities inflicted by Hindus in Bihar. According to these reports the Muslim complaints against Congress ministries, 'were the hoisting of the Congress tricolour flag on buildings under the management of local authorities; the singing of *Bande Matram* at the opening of proceedings of the legislature which was in callous disregard of the feelings of Muslims and the League considered that song not merely anti-Islamic and idolatrous in its inspiration and ideas but definitely subversive of the growth of genuine nationalism

⁶⁴⁹ K. K. Aziz, *Muslim Under Congress Rule 1937-1939* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1978), p. 115.

⁶⁵⁰ B.N. Pandey, *Break up of British India* (London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 146.

⁶⁵¹ Jawaharlal Nehru, *An Autobiography* (London: Bodley Head, 1955), p. 480.

⁶⁵² Dr. Rajendra Prasad, *India Divided* (Lahore: Book Traders, 1978), p. 146. The members of the committee were: Raja Syed Mohammad Mehdi Saheb (Chairman), Mr. Ali B. Habibullah (Secretary), K.B. Haji Rashid Ahmad, Syed Ashraf Ahmad, Moulvi Abdul Ghani Mian Ghiasuddin Syed Zakir Ali, Syed Hasan Reyaz and Syed Taqi Hadi.

in India; the encouragement of Hindi at the cost of Urdu; the introduction of Gandhi's scheme of 'Basic Education' in villages; and the behavior of the members of Congress - as if they were officials with executive powers and not merely members of a political party'.⁶⁵³ In this connection third report was prepared by Mr. Fazl ul Haq. It was entitled 'Muslim Sufferings under Congress Rule' and came out in December 1939. Mr. Haq regarding the object of Congress Ministries said: "they set about to impose their will on the Muslim minorities. And was their will? ... 'Mother Cow' must be protected Muslims must not be allowed to eat beef. The religion of Muslims must be humbled because was not this the land of the Hindus. Hence the forbidding of *azan* (the call to prayer), attacks on worshippers in mosques, the passage of noisy processions before mosques at prayer time". He further found out that "Cow sacrifice is prevented, Muslim butchers are assaulted, Pigs are thrown into mosques, the *azan* is denounced and interrupted, Muslims shops are boycotted, Muslims are prevented from using the village well".⁶⁵⁴

Interestingly, the government of India also viewed *Bande Mataram* with great disfavor. The Home Member Sir Henry Craik wrote to Lord Baden Powell, the founder and head of the Boy Scouts Movement, on 30 March 1937 to complain that *Bande Matram* had been included in the national songs in the book *Scouting for Boys in India* and to request that it be dropped "quietly in the next edition". He gave two reasons for objecting to the song. First, though "the song itself is 'generally' harmless, it originated as a 'hymn of hate' against the Muslims". Second, the "*Bande Mataram* had become the war cry of the terrorists in Bengal and although the words simply meant 'Flail Mother', they were commonly shouted as a slogan by terrorists when committing outrages".⁶⁵⁵

In spite of these Muslim complains Jinnah still had not lost hope for the settlement of Hindu-Muslim question and appealed to Gandhi who had withdrawn from active politics to his Wardha Ashram retreat to personally enter in to negotiations to seek some sort of nationwide Hindu-Muslim agreement. Gandhi replied: "I wish I could do something but I am utterly helpless. My faith in unity is as bright as ever; only I see no daylight out of the impenetrable darkness and, in such distress, I cry out to God for light".⁶⁵⁶

⁶⁵³ Resolution No. 7 of Lucknow session, Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 576. See Syed Mohammad Mehdi of Pirpur, Report of Inquiry Committee appointed by the Council of All India Muslim League to inquire into Muslim Grievances in Congress Provinces (Delhi : Liaquat Ali Khan, 1938) popularly known as *Pirpur Report* ; Report of Inquiry Committee appointed by the Bihar Provincial Muslim League to inquire into some Grievances of Muslims in Bihar (Patna : Bihar Provincial Muslim League, 1939) known as *Shareef Report*.

⁶⁵⁴ Fazl-ul Haq, *Muslim Sufferings under Congress Rule* (Calcutta: Bengal Provincial Muslim League, 1939), p. 20. 24 Also in K.K. Aziz, *op.cit.*, p. 388-419.

⁶⁵⁵ S. M. Burke & Salim Al Din Qureshi, *op.cit.*, p. 317.

⁶⁵⁶ Durlab Singh (ed), *A Complete Record of Unity Talks* [between Jinnah and Congress leaders] (Lahore: The Hero Publications, n.d.), p. 20.

Leagues Organization

In the meantime Congress to intensify the support of Muslims started Muslim mass contact movement. Disheartened at the response of Gandhi and the Congress mass contact programme left Jinnah with no alternative but to start its own Muslim mass contact programme and organize the League from its grassroots level. In this Connection a public meeting was organized at Simla on 20 September 1937, which among others was attended by Abdullah Haroon, Jinnah on this occasion said: "It is no crime if I wish to make my community strong as long as my activities are not anti-national, are not obstacles in the way of the freedom of the country and not against any community. If I make my community strong, independent and patriotic during my lifetime I will feel that the purpose of life has been achieved".⁶⁵⁷

After months of public meetings when the annual session of the Muslim League held on 15-18 October 1937 at Lucknow it was attended by all the important Muslim leaders. The presence of these leaders proves the success of League's mass contact programme. At this session the League resolved to work towards the "establishment in India of full independence in the form of federation of free democratic States in which the rights and interests of the Muslims and other minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded".⁶⁵⁸ Jinnah in his presidential address complained that "on the very threshold of what little power and responsibility is given, the majority community have clearly shown their hand: that Hindustan is for Hindus". He alleged that the responsibility of the British Government "is no less in the disastrous consequences which may ensue. It has been clearly demonstrated that the Governor and the Governor-General, who have been given the powers and special responsibility to safeguard and protect the minorities under the Constitution which was made by Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, during the controversy of the assurances demanded by the Congress party. have failed to use them and have thereby been a party to the flagrant breach of the spirit of the Constitution and the Instrument of Instructions in the matter of the appointment of Muslim ministers".⁶⁵⁹ Jinnah also emphasized that the Muslims had to organize fully in order to "acquire that power and strength which must come from the solidarity and the unity of the people".⁶⁶⁰

The session was significant in many ways. The leaders of the Muslim majority provinces such as Punjab and Bengal which previously had not supported the League accepted Jinnah's proposal. As a consequence 'Sikandar Hayat Khan, Fazlul Haq, and Mohammad Saadulla, premiers of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam respectively, all joined the League along with their followers in the provincial legislatures'.⁶⁶¹ This was a visible

⁶⁵⁷ *Civil & Military Gazette*, 21 September 1937.

⁶⁵⁸ Resolution No. 8 of Lucknow session, Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 577.

⁶⁵⁹ *Star of India*, 16 and 17 October 1937. Also Stanley Wolpert, *op.cit.*, p. 155.

⁶⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶¹ S.M. Burke, *op. cit.*, p. 319. Also in *MR*, 1938, Vol. II, p. 344.

acknowledgement that League was now an all-India party of the Muslims and Jinnah was their leader.

At the session a comprehensive programme of socioeconomic and educational reforms was proposed, committing the League, "to fix working hours for factory workers and other laborers; to fix minimum wage; to improve the housing hygienic condition of the laborers and make provision for slum clearance, to reduce rural and urban debts and abolish usury; to grant a moratorium with regard to all debts, whether decreed or otherwise" and ultimately "to devise measures for the attainment of full independence and invite the cooperation of all political bodies working for full independence of India".⁶⁶²

On the complains of the Muslims of Hindu Majority provinces the Muslim League then appointed a committee to submit the report about the atrocities of Congress government against the Muslims. The Committee submitted a report called '*Pirpur Report*' depicting the highhandedness and hostilities of Hindus as community towards Muslims and alleged that Congress workers and officials either connived with Hindu mobs that tried to prevent Muslims from exercising their religious and cultural rights, or were simply incapable of protecting the rights of Muslims. For example, the report stated that "in the village of Khairatia in Bihar, some trouble arose when the sugarcane of the one Muslim peasant was being cut. Hindus assembled near the field and a crowd of many thousands attacked the Muslims, who were overpowered. They fled for their lives and some of them took shelter in their houses and some in a mosque. The Hindu rioters who came from neighboring villages, started looting and setting fire to the Muslim houses. Even the mosque was not spared by the Hindus who attacked the Muslim there with spares, *lathis*, and *brickbats*. A number of Muslims were injured and many had spear wound..."⁶⁶³ The Report further stated that "Hindus were hindering processions on the occasion of festivals celebrated by Muslims. Hindus placed obstacles in the way of the Muslims carrying *tazias*; Hindus would not let Muslims call Azan; Hindus would play music before mosques and the Muslims being in a very small minority, would have to yield".⁶⁶⁴ The Congress and British officials did not believe in the report. Sir Harry Haig reported to Lord Linlithgow that "except that they do not have the general political influence and the pull in petty local matters that the supporters of the Ministry have. In essence the grievance is not a religious one, though it assumes an intensely communal form. It is political, and is due to the fact that the community is in opposition. It would largely cease to exist if the Muslim League had a share in the government".⁶⁶⁵

⁶⁶² Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, Resolution No. 14 of League Lucknow Session, October 1937, pp. 578-79.

⁶⁶³ Anita Inder Sing, *The Origins of the Partition of India 1936-1947* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 35.

⁶⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p. 35-6.

At the next special session of the League held at Calcutta on April 17-18, 1938, Jinnah as a president regarding the work of reorganization of League reported that "in every province, district Leagues had been established and during the previous six months they enrolled members not by hundreds, not by thousands but by lakhs".⁶⁶⁶ Jinnah further stated that "there was also Muslim League party functioning in seven out of the eleven provinces, and the large majority of Muslim members in those provincial assemblies belonged to the Muslim Leagues Party". He also declared that the Muslim League claimed "the status of complete equality with Congress". He was still willing to live and let live and said he would welcome an understanding on economic and political matters, "but we cannot surrender, submerge or submit to the dictates or the ukase of the High Command of Congress which is developing into a totalitarian and authoritative caucus, functioning under the name of the Working Committee, and aspiring to the position of a shadow cabinet in a future republic".⁶⁶⁷ He then declared that, "Honorable settlement can only be achieved between equals and unless the two parties (Congress-League) learn to respect and fear each other there is no solid ground for any settlement".⁶⁶⁸

In mid-May 1938, Jinnah reconstituted the Executive Council of the League. 'Sir Abdullah Haroon and Sheikh Abdul Majid were taken on the Council from Sindh'.⁶⁶⁹ This Council of the League met at Delhi on 4 December 1938 under the president ship of Jinnah. The Council through a resolution appointed a Foreign Committee and Inland Deputation Sub-Committee (with powers to co-opt) and Haroon became its chairman. The other members were Nawab Sahib Mamdot, Raja Saheb of Mahmudabad and Aurangzeb Khan. The task given to the committee was:

- 1 "That deputation of Ulama and well-known leaders of Muslim minority provinces: U.P., Bihar, Orissa, C.P. and Madras etc., be organized to tour through the Punjab, N.W.F. Province and Sindh in order to acquaint the Muslims of these provinces of the repressive policy of the Congress ministries towards the Muslim minorities.
2. To organize a deputation to tour throughout the Islamic countries to remove the misunderstanding created by the Congress leaders that the Muslims of India are not patriots and that they are betraying the interest of their motherland.

⁶⁶⁶ M.A. Jinnah's, Presidential Address at the special Session of All India Muslim League, Calcutta, 17 April 1938 (The Alliance Press Ltd., 24 Theatre Road Calcutta). Also Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, pp. 241-46.

⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁹ *Statesman*, 18 May 1938. The other members of the Council were A.K. Fazlul Haq, Sir Nazimudin, Mr. Abdul Rehman Siddiki, Raja of Mahmudabad, Nawab Ismail Khan. Maulana Shaukat Ali, Mr. Khaliquzzaman, Syed Abdul Aziz, Mr. Muhammad Ashique, Sir Ali Mohammad Khan Dehlavi, Sir Currimbhoyh Ibrahim, Syed Abdul Rauf Shah, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Khan Sadullah Khan, Mr. Aurangzeb Khan, Sir Syed Saadulla, Mr. Abdul Matin Chowdhry, Malik Barkat Ali and Haji Abdul Sattar Essak Sait.

3. To organize a third deputation to put the real conditions in India before the various nations and expose the Congress attitude towards the minorities of India".⁶⁷⁰

At this meeting, Jinnah gave clear cut warning to Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Premier of the Punjab for his speech in Simla in which he made an unconditional offer of support to the British Government in case of war breaking out. Jinnah said: "you cannot divide your soul into two. If you are in the League you owe primary allegiance to the League. We cannot tolerate a prominent leader of the League making pronouncements on vital issues ... He must be careful in making offers to the British Government and the Congress. He is just like a member of a Cabinet, and any member of the Cabinet who makes such a statement without consulting his colleagues has to go out of the cabinet".⁶⁷¹ Z.H. Lari moved the resolution stating that Sikandar's statement "in no way reflects the opinion of the Muslims of India and warns responsible members of the Muslim League against making pronouncements of such a nature without reference to the League".⁶⁷² Sikandar Hayat opposed the resolution; therefore at the intervention of Jinnah the resolution was withdrawn.

Haroon as a member of the Working Committee of the League attended its meeting held on 2-3 July 1939 under the presidentship of Jinnah. The meeting resolved 'that a Palestine Fund be opened forthwith for the relief of the dependents of those who lost their lives or suffered in the struggle for independence and for the protection of the First Qibla of Mussalman. The Committee consisting of Sir Abdullah Haroon, Abdur Rahman Siddiqui, Haji Abdul Sattar Haji Essak Sait and Choudhry Khaliquzzman was to devise ways and means of collecting money for the Palestine Fund and remitting the same to Palestine through the President of the All India Muslim League'.⁶⁷³

Mean while to solve the Khaksar-U.P dispute Sir Abdullah Haroon along with Jinnah, Sir Ziauddin and Sir Abdul Rahim, President of the Legislative Assembly visited U.P in 1939. On their arrival they received the salute of 500 uniformed Khaksars at their camp at Karol Bagh just outside Delhi. Inayatullah Khan Mashriki who had founded Khaksar Movement in 1931 was imprisoned by the government in August 1939. He was released in October the same year. Jinnah had three meetings with Inayatullah within two days and discussed with him the 'Khaksar policy.' "I cannot hope to advise", said Jinnah "on the Khaksar U.P. dispute until all the facts are before me. The U.P. Government has already provided me with a full statement of the case. Now I want the Khaksar one. Then I can sum up and give my point of view".⁶⁷⁴ The participation of Haroon in these

⁶⁷⁰ Proceedings of Muslim League Council meeting, held on 4 December 1938, Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, pp. 614.

⁶⁷¹ *Hindustan Times*, 5 December 1938.

⁶⁷² Dr. Waheed, *op.cit.*, p. 614.

⁶⁷³ *Ibid.* p. 641.

⁶⁷⁴ *Star of India*, 24 October 1939.

meetings proves that by 1939 he had become a close and confident associate of Jinnah and one of the top leaders of League.

On the other hand League's growing popularity roused an anxiety within the rank and file of the Congress. However, Jinnah still wanted settlement of Hindu-Muslim problem. In this connection there was exchange of letters between 'Jinnah and Nehru and between Jinnah and Bose, the president of the Congress but the correspondence led to no settlement'.⁶⁷⁵ During these negotiations, on 4 and 5 June 1938 the Working Committee of the League held its session which was attended by Abdullah Haroon, passed two important resolutions. The first declared that it was "not possible for the All-India Muslim League to treat or negotiate with the Congress the question of the Hindu-Muslim settlement except on the basis that the Muslim League is the only authoritative and representative organization of the Muslims of India". The second resolution stated that it was "not desirable to include any Muslim in the personnel of the proposed committee that may be appointed by Congress' to discuss the communal question with the League".⁶⁷⁶ Bose wrote to Jinnah on 25 July 1938 that "it was impossible for Congress to admit that the League alone represented all the Muslims of India". He argued that, "There are Muslim organizations which have been functioning independently of the Muslim League. Some of them are staunch supporters of Congress. Moreover, there are individual Muslims who are Congressmen, some of whom exercise no inconsiderable influence in the country. Then there is the Frontier Province which is overwhelmingly Muslim and which is solidly with the Congress".⁶⁷⁷ He claimed that Congress was "in no sense a communal organization" because, though the largest numbers of persons to be found among the Congress registers were Hindus, it had a "fairly large number" of Muslims and members of other communities as its members. Jinnah rejected the plea of Bose out rightly in his letter of 2 August, which stated: "The Council of the League is fully convinced that the Muslim League is the only authoritative and representative political organization of the Musalmans of India. This position was accepted when the Congress-League Pact was arrived at in 1916 at Lucknow and ever since, till 1935 when Jinnah-Rajendra Prasad' conversation took place, it has not been question ... The Council is aware of the fact that there is a Congress coalition government in the North-West Frontier Province and also that there are some Muslims in the Congress organization in other Provinces. But the Council is of opinion that these Muslims in Congress do not and cannot represent Musalmans of India, for the simple reason that their number is very insignificant and that as members of Congress they have disabled themselves form representing or speaking on behalf of the Muslim community".⁶⁷⁸

⁶⁷⁵ S.M. Burke & Salim Qureshi, *op.cit.* p. 329. Also G.A. Allana, *Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: The Story of a Nation* (Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd., 1967). pp. 279-81. For further details see Durlab Singh, *op.cit.*

⁶⁷⁶ Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, pp. 628-30.

⁶⁷⁷ S.M. Burke & Salim Quraishi, *op.cit.*, p. 329. The object of the Jinnah-Rajendm Prasad talks (23 January-I March 1935). which ended in failure, was to find a basis of agreement to replace the Communal Award.

⁶⁷⁸ G. Allana, *op.cit.* p. 279-80. Also in Burke, *op.cit.*, pp. 329-30.

In April 1939 Gandhi took initiative and asked Jinnah to meet him and Azad but Jinnah refused to meet with Azad or any other non-League Muslim leader. Gandhi then agreed to come alone to Jinnah's house in Bombay on April 28. Gandhi reached Jinnah's home before noon. Both the leaders met privately for three and a half hours. During the meeting Gandhi 'jotted down' notes of their talks, which he later transmitted to Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Bose. He was very depressed at the outcome of the meeting. He wrote to Jawaharlal Nehru:

"I am carrying on, but it is galling to me to think that I have lost the self-confidence that I possessed only a month ago ... I have mentioned this to help you to examine the proposals on their merits ... you will not hesitate summarily to reject it if it does not commend itself to you. In this matter you will have to give the lead".⁶⁷⁹

Nehru gave the task of breaking the dead lock to the Congress President Bose, who came to Bombay and met with Jinnah in early May 1939. But those talks resolved nothing, only making the growing distance between Congress and the League more publicly apparent. Then the Patna session of the League (26-29 December 1939) authorized the Working Committee of the League to resort to 'direct action' if and when it decided to do so, 'to redress' the grievances and to 'protect' the 'elementary rights of the Musalmans of Bihar, the U.P. and C.P., three Hindu Majority provinces from which most 'atrocities' against Muslims had been reported. That unanimously carried resolution was what Jinnah called a 'revolutionary,... departure from the past', for until this juncture the League 'had been wedded only to the policy of constitutional progresses'.⁶⁸⁰ Jinnah showed indignation that Congress had "killed every hope of Hindu-Muslim settlement in right royal fashion and fascism". He complained that "Congress was absolutely determined to crush all communities and cultures in this country and to establish Hindu Raj".⁶⁸¹

The gap between League and Congress was further widened with the publication of the Fazlul Haq report on the charges of 'Muslim Suffering under Congress Rule' which came to light before the end of 1939. The report was prepared on the interviews of more than '100 Muslims (from Bihar, the United Provinces, and the Central Provinces) who were violently attacked, killed, or looted between July 1939 and August 1939. In all these cases local officials were charged with aiding Hindus and ignoring the complaints or cries of Muslims under attack'.⁶⁸²

⁶⁷⁹ Stanley Wolpert, *op.cit.*, p. 161.

⁶⁸⁰ Resolution No. 4 of Patna Session held on 26-29 December 1939, Dr. Waheed Ahmed, (Ed) *op.cit.*, p. 582.

⁶⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸² Fazl-ul-Haq, *Muslim Sufferings under Congress Rule*, *op.cit.*

World War-II

On 23 August 1939, a German-Russian pact was signed in Moscow. Under its terms, not only did each party promise to refrain from attacking the other but also not to join any group of powers 'which is directly or indirectly aimed at the other party'.⁶⁸³ Having secured the neutrality of his big and bitter enemy, Hitler invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. England and France, who had committed them to defend Polish independence, declared war on Germany. On 10 June 1940. Italy declared war on France and Great Britain. Later when the Japanese made a surprise attack on the naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and brought the United States of America into the conflict, the European war developed into World War II.

In India, the Viceroy saw it fit to proclaim that India was at war and to sought the support for war from the Congress and the League on 11 September 1939, Lord Linlithgow read out to both houses of the Central Legislature the King's message explaining that 'preparations for implementing the federal part of the Act of 1935 has been suspended because of the war'.⁶⁸⁴ Regarding this the Working Committee of the League in a resolution passed on 18 September 1939 made the Muslim League's official response to the situation created by the war. As a constitutional lawyer, Jinnah recognized that India did not have the same constitutional status as those members of the Commonwealth who enjoyed dominion status and were thus completely independent. The League therefore did not criticize the Viceroy for declaring war on India's behalf. The Working Committee's resolution appreciated that the federal scheme had been suspended but urged that it would be abandoned altogether, because the experience of the working of the provincial part of the 1935 constitution had "resulted wholly in a permanent communal majority and the domination of Hindus over the Muslim minorities". Such constitution was "totally unsuited to the genius of the peoples of the country which is composed of various nationalities and does not constitute a national state".⁶⁸⁵ The Committee expressed its deep sympathy for Poland, England, and France, but felt that "real and solid" support to Great Britain could not be "secured successfully" until the Governors were called upon to exercise their special powers to protect the rights of the Muslims in the Congress-governed provinces. It further urged the British Government that "no declaration regarding the question of constitutional advancement for India should be made without the consent and approval of the All-India Muslim League, nor any constitution be framed and finally adopted by His Majesty's Government and the British parliament without such consent and approval".⁶⁸⁶ The resolution further stated that if the government desired full

⁶⁸³ R.R. Palmer and Joel Colton (eds), *A History of the Modern World Since 1815* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995), p. 842.

⁶⁸⁴ *Central Legislative Assembly Debates*, 11 September 1939.

⁶⁸⁵ Liaquat Ali Khan, *Resolutions of the All-India Muslim League December 1938-1940* (Delhi: National Printing and publishing House, nd), pp. 25-8. Also Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, pp. 644-46.

⁶⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

cooperation of the Muslims, "it must create sense of security and satisfaction amongst the Musalmans and take into its confidence the Muslim League, which is the only organization that can speak on behalf of the Muslim India".⁶⁸⁷

Meanwhile the Congress Working Committee also held its meeting on 8-15 September 1939 and decided: "The Congress has further laid down that the issue of war and peace for India must be decided by the Indian people and no outside authority can impose this decision upon them, nor can the Indian people permit their resources to be exploited for imperialist ends". It further viewed: "But India cannot associate herself in a war said to be for democratic freedom when that very freedom is denied to her, and such limited freedom as she possesses, taken away from her".⁶⁸⁸ The Congress inquired from the Viceroy the particular aims of war and war efforts which were declared by Lord Linlithgow in his public statement on 17 October 1939 that the "aims of British policy remained that India should attain Dominion Status". At the end of the war the British government would "be prepared to regard the scheme of the 1935 Act as open to modification in the light of Indian view". In his statement Viceroy also assured the minorities that during the discussion with regard to constitutional modifications, their views and interests would be given due weight as had always been done in the past. As to the immediate problem of securing "the association of public opinion in India with the conduct of war" Congress advice that the right solution would be "the establishment of a consultative group, representing all major political parties in British Indian and the Indian princes, over which the Government would himself preside".⁶⁸⁹

But Viceroy's assurance that the British government would honor its pledge to grant Dominion status to India was described by Congress as "an unequivocal reiteration of the old imperialist policy"⁶⁹⁰ and could not make them budge from their position. Rajendra Prasad, President, Indian National Congress, convened a meeting of the working Committee at Wardha on 22 October 1939. The Committee passed a resolution calling upon the 'Congress Ministers to tender their resignations and appealing to the nation to end all internal controversies and to act unitedly'.⁶⁹¹ On the direction of the Congress Party by '15 November, the ministries in all the Congress-ruled provinces resigned and were replaced by the direct rule of the Governors under section 93 Act'.⁶⁹²

Meanwhile the political situation in Sindh remained unchanged. Although the Allah Baksh ministry had the support of the Congress, it could not resign. It was only on very

⁶⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸⁸ Resolution of Working Committee Meeting of Congress, Wardha, 8-15 September 1939, Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 819.

⁶⁸⁹ S.M. Burke, *op.cit.*, pp. 344-5.

⁶⁹⁰ Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 819.

⁶⁹¹ G.S.P. Ambastha, *Freedom Movement and Role of Congress Leaders* (New Delhi: Classical Publishing Company, 1995), p. 323.

⁶⁹² Sir Reginald Coupland, *India: A Restatement* (London. 1945) p. 196 and also in Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1989), p. 48.

rare occasions that Allah Baksh raised issues calculated to be for the good of the province. Normally he was far too busy keeping himself in office and to pay attention to the wishes of the Governor. However, on the eve of the war, Allah Baksh did bring the subject of opening recruitment in the Army to Sindhis. He felt it a disgrace for his province that even the Baluch Regiment should have no Baluchi in it. The Governor took up the matter with the Viceroy who wrote that in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, Sindhis were unlikely to be of "great value as combatants" and that it would be disservice to the Baluchi if an attempt was made to recruit them: "the Baluchi as a whole being nomad, who dislikes settled life, uniform and discipline, he has in the past tended to desert freely".⁶⁹³ Some nine months later the Governor moved again on Allah Baksh's behalf, writing to the Viceroy to ask him to change the age limits for recruitment, then 21 to 27 to 18 and 30. This change, however, was not meant to benefit the province, but to provide for the under-age son and nephew of the Chief Minister both in the first year of their college and also to accommodate the son of an upper Sindh Zamindars who had been turned down as being too old. 'Though the Government of India was not prepared to lower the age limit, the age limit for temporary commissions was raised to 30'.⁶⁹⁴ As far as the war was concerned, even before the declaration of the war, the 'Governor had secured an assurance from Allah Baksh of his ministry's wholehearted cooperation in all activities connected with the war efforts'.⁶⁹⁵ Therefore during the war the relationship between the Governor Graham and Allah Baksh remained cordial.

Day of Deliverance

As a first step after the resignation of the Congress ministries, Jinnah on 6 December 1939 appealed to the Muslims all over India to observe Friday, 22 December as "the day of deliverance and thanks giving as a mark of relief that the Congress governments have at last ceased to function". He urged upon the district, provincial and primary Leagues all over India to hold public meetings and pass the resolution: "That the Congress ministries both in the discharge of their duties of the administration and in the legislature have done their best to flout the Muslim opinion, to destroy Muslim culture, and have interfered with their religious and social life and trampled upon their economic and political rights".⁶⁹⁶ Jinnah appealed to the 'Governors and their Councils of Advisers to inquire into legitimate grievances of the Muslims and the wrongs done to them by the outgoing Congress ministries'.⁶⁹⁷

The 'Day of deliverance' was observed all over India. In Sindh it went unobserved as most of the leaders of the League were in jail due to Manzilgah Mosque riots in Sukkur city. So the Governor of Sindh reported the Government of India: "The Muslim League Deliverance Day was a poor thing in Sindh and actually provoked no excitement

⁶⁹³ Z.H. Zaidi, *op.cit.*, pp. 19-45.

⁶⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹⁶ *Star of India*, 7 December 1939. And also in B.N. Pandey, *op.cit.*, p. 150.

⁶⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, also in Hector Bilito, *Jinnah, Creator of Pakistan* (New York: 1955), p. 124.

anywhere. We told the District Magistrate, Sukkur. that he must decide on the facts known to him whether the celebration should be allowed in Sukkur District and he decided that it should not be allowed. I have received a letter from him this morning in which he says there was no excitement at all on the subject, i.e. on the prohibition of meetings and processions".⁶⁹⁸

In spite of the imprisonment of the leaders, Muslims of Karachi on 22 December under the president ship of Haroon organized a meeting at Khaliqdina hall. Haroon in his speech explained the reasons for celebrating the Deliverance Day and thanked the people for celebrating it. At this meeting a resolution was passed in which it was demanded that 'Governors of all those provinces where Congress ministries were installed should look into the grievances of the Muslims and give justice to them'.⁶⁹⁹

In this connection Jinnah presided over the meeting in Bombay. Besides Muslims, there were a large number of Parsis and members of the Independent Labour Party Dr. Ambedkar. Prominent among the Parsi citizens at the meeting were Sir Byramjee Jejeebhoy and Sir Dinshaw Petit. Jinnah urged upon all minorities to stand united. He said that our grievances were against the Congress High Command and not against the Hindu community. "The policy of this fascist Grand Council", he said "is based on falsehood and hypocrisy. We must expose them".⁷⁰⁰ Jinnah expressed satisfaction at the success of 'Deliverance Day'. He said: "I am happy to find that the deliverance day was observed through India with complete success in an orderly and disciplined manner".⁷⁰¹ During 1939 some significant events occurred in Sindh which changed the political scene of Sindh significantly. There were defections in the Muslim League, which put the League's position in Sindh in an awkward and weak position. Among the defectors were Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, leader of the League Assembly Party and the Mir Talpur Group led by Mir Bande Ali Talpur. In January 1939, the opposition was to move no-confidence motion against Allah Baksh Ministry. Allah Baksh tried to bribe some of the assemblymen offering minister ships. He thus negotiated with the leader of the League Parliamentary Party, 'Sir Ghulam Hussain and the Deputy Leader Mir Bande Ali, both of them promised to resign from the League Parliamentary party'.⁷⁰² The Governor was privy to these negotiations, who in turn notified the Viceroy that "I have at the suggestion of my Chief Minister had a long talk with Sir Ghulam Hussain ... I understand that he is dissatisfied with the attitude of the Muslim League' and that 'he is ready to join my ministry, bringing with him those who are not fanatically devoted to the Muslim League'.⁷⁰³ Both Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah and Allah Baksh assured

⁶⁹⁸ Hamida Khuhro, *op.cit.*, pp. 185-186.

⁶⁹⁹ *Al-Wahid*, 24 December 1939.

⁷⁰⁰ *Star of India*, 23 December 1939.

⁷⁰¹ *Ibid*, 26 December 1939.

⁷⁰² Hamida Khuhro, *op.cit.*, p. 167. Proceedings of the Sindh Legislative Assembly, 4-18 January 1939, *IAR*, January-June 1939, VII, pp. 282-89.

⁷⁰³ *Ibid*.

the Governor that he could have no trouble over the assessment issue. Hidayatullah promised with the Governor that he would not move the no-confidence motion but it would be moved by one of the "advanced Muslim Leaguers".⁷⁰⁴ Thus once again the lusts of power made the Sindhi Muslim leadership less loyal to the party and more to their interests.

Sindh Assembly resumed its winter session from 4-18 January 1939. As arranged, G.M. Sayed moved a motion on 10 January in which Premier was asked to get the vote of confidence from the assembly. In his speech Sayed accused the Premier "of having inflamed the whole country by his obstinacy and defiant attitude and conduct". He further said that instead of curtailing expenditure, he was creating new posts without seeking the sanction of the Assembly. In this connection Sayed cited the examples of the "appointment of ICS Officers, a Deputy Secretary for the Revenue Department, a Deputy Secretary for the Finance Department and an Officer on Special Duty".⁷⁰⁵ Khuhro and Gazdar criticized the ministry and called Allah Baksh "super-dictator without the dictator's sense of responsibility."⁷⁰⁶

On 12 January the no-confidence motion was defeated by '32 votes to 7'.⁷⁰⁷ In his speech the premier made a disclosure of a plot to kill him, unless he joins the Muslim League. He said: "I would rather die than join the league".⁷⁰⁸ Khan Bahadur Gabole, Deputy Speaker, who had resigned from the Muslim League Party spoke as an independent member and said that it was a matter of shame that the Muslims were fighting amongst themselves. He wanted to know from the House "what the alternative scheme" before the ministry was thrown out. Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah who resigned from the leadership of the Muslim League party also "wanted to know from the mover of the motion a practical alternative scheme for working Reforms", in case the ministry was thrown out. He further said: "In the alternative, if the Hindu Party formed a coalition with the Muslim League, he would vote for it". He pointed out that this House had to do something for the province, which was faced with chaos and deadlock and that "his hopes of Muslims had been shattered and he did not hope for unity among them..."⁷⁰⁹ Due to defection of Hidayatullah and Mir Bande Ali, the League's strength in the assembly was shattered badly, and there was no hope of League ministry in near future. Manzilgah Mosque riots Allah Baksh's ministry became stable with the joining of Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah and Mir Bande Ali group. The Government was at liberty to pass or reject any bill as the opposition had little voice to protest against any government action. However, the ministry received set back when serious communal riots broke out in October 1939 over the disputed status of Manzilgah Mosque and

⁷⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰⁵ *JAR*, January-June 1939, Vol. I, pp. 282-9.

⁷⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰⁷ R. Coupland, *Indian Politics 1936-1942* (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), p. 67.

⁷⁰⁸ *Ibid.* *JAR*, January-June 1939, *op.cit.*

⁷⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

Musafirkhana (rest house for travelers), opposite Sadh Bella Mandir in Sukkur, Syed Mohammad Masum Shah built Manzilgah Mosque an old doomed building adjacent to the *Musafirkhana* situated on the Indus River in Sukkur city in the year 1602 that is during the reign of Akbar, whereas Sadh Bella *Tirath* (Temple) was built in the year 1828. Manzilgah building was being used as a place of worship by the Muslims even at the time the foundation was of a Tirath Sadh Bella. 'After the fall of Sindh to British in 1843 for some time the British Government used this Manzilgah building as an office and for residential purposes by the military officers Later restored it as a Mosque at the request of the Muslims'.⁷¹⁰

In 1920 the Sukkur Muslims put up the demand for restoration of the Mosque but the mosque was not restored and the issue continued unresolved by the government. Similar claims were advanced again in 1932 and 1933 when it was briefly occupied by 'trespassers'. During the period of Hidayatullah ministry (1937) the demand for the restoration of the Manzilgah mosque gained vital importance. Hidayatullah impressed upon the Governor that Manzilgah should be restored as mosque, but the Hindus objected because of nearness of Mosque to Sadh Bella, a place of Hindu pilgrimage. The argument continued under the Allah Baksh ministry. Muslim ministers maintaining that Manzilgah was a mosque, Hindu ministers resisting the claim and counter-urging not only that Sadh Bella was a centre of their devotions, but also that Manzilgah was in fact a temple. 'Though Allah Baksh pressed the Governor to hand the building over to the Muslims, but the matter was allowed to drift unresolved'.⁷¹¹

When Hidayatullah could not solve this issue the Sukkur Muslims sought the support of the Muslim League. At the request of Muslims of Sukkur, the District Muslim League Sukkur passed the resolution recommending to the Sindh Provincial Muslim League (SPML) to take up the issue with the government'.⁷¹² As a result in 1938 SPML passed a resolution in which 'the government was asked to hand over the mosque to the Muslims'.⁷¹³

Latter Abdullah Haroon and M.A. Khuhro met with chief minister Allah Baksh to place before him the League's demand for restoration of the Mosque to the Muslims, but they were not hopeful of the action of the government. The chief minister realized that if he restored the Mosque to the Muslims, he would lose his Hindu support and will be out of power as Hindu ministers in the cabinet opposed the restoration of Mosque to the Muslims.

The Sindh Muslim League fully involved itself in the conflict and to deal with the problem and to negotiate the matter with the government met at Sukkur and formed a

⁷¹⁰ *Daily Gazette*, 17 August 1937. Also in *Biography*, *op.cit.*, p. 157-8.

⁷¹¹ Z.H. Zaidi, *op.cit.* pp. 19-45.

⁷¹² *Reminiscence of the Day of Deliverance* (Islamabad: Ministry of Education, 1976), p. 72.

⁷¹³ *Daily Gazette*, 14 October 1938.

Restoration Committee. 'Abdullah Haroon was appointed its President, Khuhro, Vice President and G.M. Sayed, Kazi Fazlullah, Ghulam Nabi Pathan, Sheikh Wajid Ali of Shikarpur and Pir Ghulam Mujaddid as members of the Committee'.⁷¹⁴ 'Abdullah Haroon took up the issue with the Governor of Sindh and the chief minister but the mosque was not restored to the Muslims'.⁷¹⁵ The Committee's first meeting held on 22-23 July 1939 at Sukkur. In the absence of Haroon, Khuhro presided over the meeting. The Committee decided the following course of action:

1. "Strong resentment was expressed against the malicious policy of the Ministry then in Office.
2. Muslim members of Sindh Assembly were asked to press the government for release of the mosque and if their demand could not be accepted, then they should withdraw their support in order to bring the Ministry down.
3. It was decided to make it clear to the Sindh Muslims that if their representatives did not abide by the decision of Manzilgah Committee they must not be elected in future.
4. 18 August 1939 was declared as Manzilgah Day, and to mark it, public meetings might be arranged in all the villages and towns of Sindh expressing concern and dismay and the Muslim members might be asked to quit the Ministry.
5. Sindhi Muslims in general and branches of the Muslim league in particular, were requested to obey the instructions and to register the volunteers who should ensure the loyalty to the party.
6. If the Ministry did not accept the Muslim demand, All India Muslim League volunteers would be asked to court arrest to have the Manzilgah, on October 1. The Secretary of Manzilgah Committee was directed to call the meeting of the Committee and to register at least five thousand volunteers. To lodge the protest a fund of Rs. 10,000 might be collected".⁷¹⁶

The meeting also appointed a sub-committee comprising Aga Nazir Ali Khan, Syed Mehboob Shah, Wajid Ali Shaikh and Dr. Yamin to collect funds and enroll volunteers for the Manzilgah mosque. These resolutions were sent to Central League office and to the Sindh government but Sindh government paid little heed to them. On the same dates the Sindh League's Working Committee met at Karachi under the chairmanship of Sheikh Abdul Majeed. The Committee passed a resolution demanding the 'Manzilgah

⁷¹⁴ Hamida Khuhro, *Mohammad Ayub Khuhro—A life of courage in Politics* (Lahore: Ferozsons. 1998), p. 127.

⁷¹⁵ Haroon reported the result of his meeting with the Governor and the Chief Minister of Sindh to M.A. Jinnah in his letter of 2 October 1939, QAP, F.274, p. 35.

⁷¹⁶ *Al-Wahid*, 26 July 1939.

restoration and outlined a plan for a province-wide agitation to raise a sum of rupees 50,000 and recruit 10,000 volunteers'.⁷¹⁷

To defuse the situation government issued a press note saying that "matter should be decided in a calm atmosphere" and Muslim leaders "should not launch Satyagraha but wait for the decision of the government".⁷¹⁸ This press note caused split in the Muslim leaders thinking regarding the approach towards the issue. For example Haroon and Khuhro wanted to adopt moderate methods such as petitions, appeals and press statements to pressurize the government into accepting the demand where as the other group led by Majid and comprised of Sukkur Muslims, favored agitation to force the government to bow before the Muslim demand.

Haroon's chief interest during these months was the demand for separate homeland, being the chairman of the Foreign Committee which was in the process of considering the various schemes for the partition of India; he devoted most of his energy to that cause while Manzilgah was only a minor issue. Therefore he along with Khuhro did nothing except for making appeals to the government. These circumstances gave ascendancy to the radical wing of the League, led by Majid, Therefore, in order to retain their leadership in the Sindh League, Haroon and Khuhro were compelled to support the radical methods of *Satyagraha*, although they hoped to adhere to their action of maintaining a public front issuing appeals and writing letters, which is evident from the Governor Lancelot Graham's communications to the Viceroy'.⁷¹⁹

In view of the League's decision, Haroon cut short his stay in Delhi, returned to Karachi, met the governor on 25 September 1939 and informed him that the Muslim claim for restoration of the mosque "is so strong that it cannot be brushed aside merely for consideration of prestige or its bearing on the future of political parties".⁷²⁰ He also requested for concrete proposal for the settlement of the issue, so that 'it could be considered by the League Working Committee, due to meet on 29 September'.⁷²¹ After his interview with Governor, Haroon informed Jinnah that his frantic efforts to settle the issue with the Governor had no breakthrough as the Governor "declined to interfere in the matter and simply advised me to see the Chief Minister".⁷²² Then on the evening of 29 September Haroon and Khuhro met Allah Baksh and carried on negotiations with him and to have a firsthand information about the Muslim feelings invited him to Sukkur on 1 October, the day the League had decided to launch Satyagraha. On the same day the Sindh Muslim League abolished the War Council and appointed Wajid

⁷¹⁷ Allen Keith Jones, op.cit., p. 188.

⁷¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

⁷¹⁹ QAP, F,274, p.38.

⁷²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷²¹ Haroon to Jinnah, 2 October 1939, QAP, F, 274, p. 35.

⁷²² Taking an instance from the Khalafat methods, when Gandhi was appointed as dictator.

Ali as a 'Dictator'.⁷²³ On his visit to Sukkur talks were held between Allah Baksh and the League leaders and Sukkur Muslims but these talks also failed. 'In the result, the Saiyagraha had to begin on the same day'.⁷²⁴ Haroon informed Jinnah: "the Musalmans whom I had prevented for so many days from coming into conflict with the government grew so restive and impatient that they have launched Satyagraha from 1.0 'clock yesterday. Thousands of Mussalmans men and women are present in the League Satyagraha camps out of which 339 have courted arrest on the first day".⁷²⁵

Thus when Sindh government did not make any announcement as a result Muslims on 1 October 1939 started civil disobedience Movement. Haroon was assigned duty to stay in Sukkur and lead the agitation. When the agitation gained strength, Allah Baksh ordered Haroon to leave Sukkur and Khuhro was put under house arrest. After wards G. M. Sayed led the agitation. The Muslims adopted Satyagraha as their instrument and proceeded to occupy the building. *Jathas* (group of armed people) flooded into Sukkur and the police forces being inadequate, no effective resistance was offered to them and on '3 October the building fell into the hands for the Muslims, hence for the time being the possession of the Mosque was restored'.⁷²⁶ Soon Restoration Committee demanded that the 'fait accompli' should be recognized as law full. To enforce the demand 'the houses of the Muslim ministers were picketed by the volunteers'.⁷²⁷ The situation became so grave that the governor used his special powers to maintain peace and law and order, on 7 October issued an ordinance permitting 'local authorities to make arrest and allowing the detention on suspicion and strengthening the powers of the courts'.⁷²⁸

To solve this crisis Haroon and Jinnah met with the Viceroy on 13 October 1939 and discussed with him the seriousness of the situation arising out of the Manzilgah issue. On the advice of the Viceroy, Haroon again discussed the issue with the Governor and the Chief Minister Allah Baksh. In this meeting a formula proposed by Jinnah came under discussion which stated that "Government should announce their decision within one month and Restoration Committee agrees to suspend Satyagraha and evacuate the Mosque and Building pending the decision, and the government should withdraw the Ordinance".⁷²⁹ As a result the Sindh Ordinance was promulgated on 14 October 1939 by the Governor but at the same time investing the government with special powers outside the ordinary law to deal with the Muslims' agitation. The new ordinance empowered the government to make arrests without a warrant. The Muslims became outraged by the Ordinance. At the same time Hidayatullah who was Home Minister in the cabinet put forward some proposals to the League leadership. He proposed 'that if

⁷²³ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷²⁶ Shaikh Abdul Razzaq, *Sukkur: Past and Present* (Sukkur: 1962), p. 162 See also G.M. Sayed, *Uhay Deanh Uhay Sheenh* (Sindhi) (The Lions of those days) (Hyderabad: Sindhi Adabi Board, 1980) Vol. III, p. 233.

⁷²⁷ *Al Wahid*, 5 October 1939.

⁷²⁸ *Ibid*, 8 October 1939.

⁷²⁹ Haroon to Allah Baksh Chief Minister, 28 October 1939, *QAP*, F. 274, p. 42.

the buildings restored, the mosque and the grounds would be opened for the use of the Muslims as a Library or for some such secular purpose but not as mosque. Hidayatullah proposal was rejected by Haroon and by other Muslim leaders and negotiations failed'.⁷³⁰ Once again, the 'Governor of Sindh advised Haroon to have the issue of Manzilgah settled with the Chief Minister, Allah Baksh'.⁷³¹ Jinnah's formula which came under discussion was in response to the Government's offer that the Ordinance would be withdrawn if the league called off the Satyagraha and evacuate the building. And the Government would take a decision on the status of Manzilgah within six weeks. The negotiations failed and the matter remained unresolved because the Congress and the Hindus threatened Allah Baksh to discontinue their support on which his ministry had sustained.

After the failure of the talks to reassert its authority, the government arrested some 800 Muslim volunteers and reoccupied the building. 'On 19 November members of the Restoration Committee were arrested and sent to jail. After the detainees had been released, violent disturbances followed between Hindus and Muslims in the town of Sukkur and in the surrounding talukas. Shortly after, a severe outbreak of murder and looting of Hindus at the hands of Muslims ravaged the area'.⁷³² To control communal wrath military police was posted in Sukkur and the adjoining districts and talukas. "During these riots by December 1939 142 Hindus and 17 Muslims were murdered. Six Hindu women were abducted and subsequently brought back. About 164 houses were burnt down, most of which belonged to Hindus. As many as 467 houses were plundered and the loss amounted to Rs. 653,000".⁷³³

After suffering an immense loss Sindhi Hindus sent a telegram to Gandhi urging him to appoint 'Enquiry Committee, to visit Sukkur and assess the loss suffered by them'.⁷³⁴ Gandhi instead of solving the issue 'advised Sindhi Hindus to migrate'.⁷³⁵ The subsequent 'migration of Hindus highlighted the mishandling of the situation by the government'.⁷³⁶

Thus the riots were due to the failure over a period of three and a half months to deal effectively with threats to public order and the indecision and delay which the government showed in dealing with the agitation. On this situation the Viceroy

⁷³⁰ QAP, F.274, p. 64.

⁷³¹ Governor of Sindh to Haroon, 27 October 1939, *Ibid*, p. 41.

⁷³² Z.H. Zaidi, *op.cit.*, pp. 1945.

⁷³³ Official statement on loss to the person and property in Sukkur communal riots, *Civil and Military Gazette*, 18 January 1940.

⁷³⁴ Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, (Delhi: The Publication Division) Vol. LXX, pp. 391-2.

⁷³⁵ The Evening News of India, 6 January 1940.

⁷³⁶ Mahatma Gandhi advised the Hindus of Sindh to make *Hijrat*: "If no honorable local settlement is arrived at and if the local residents do not feel able to defend themselves and their families and possession non-violently or violently ... They should vacate the place in which they live in perpetual fear of their lives and the honor of their women folk'. *Civil & Military Gazette*, 9 January 1940.

commented, "Crimes were committed with impunity and incidents were permitted which were incompatible with firm and impartial administration".⁷³⁷

The Governor had failed to appreciate the seriousness of the situation as he himself admitted: "Actually I think it is correct to say that I was misled by my chief minister, who was himself misled by informants".⁷³⁸ Graham lost his grip upon events, and blamed the League leaders for the riots. Complaining to Linlithgow he said: "they (League leaders) had callously made use of the Manzilgah as an object of their own selfishness".⁷³⁹ But contrary to the view of the Governor, the League leader Abdullah Haroon assured the Hindus of Sukkur, that the Muslims were prepared to come to a reasonable understanding with them: "I bear my Hindu friends no ill-will", he said "even if they bug and keep in office the present ministers for mere sentimental reason, or to satisfy the personal yearnings of only a few individuals".⁷⁴⁰

Though Gandhi asked Sindhi Hindus to migrate but the traders of local Hindu community were by no means prepared to abandon their dominant position in the business life of the Province. They preferred to listen to the Hindu Mahasabha leaders 'who declared that their previous opposition to the separation of Sindh from Bombay had been more than justified and proposed that, failing re-annexation to Bombay, the control of law and order should be resumed by the Governor'.⁷⁴¹ The Hindus leaders also demanded for the suspension of the Constitution, but this was a course which the Governor was not prepared to adopt as he said: "I am prepared to admit that the politicians of Sindh are not at present worthy of the constitution which has been presented to them, but they will not begin to learn the lesson of their unworthiness if the constitution is suspended".⁷⁴² When the demand of Hindus was turned down, Hindus Mukhis created a Federation of village Panchayats, formulating their 'Fourteen Points' which included: "appointment of tribunal to settle the Manzilgah issue; imposition of punitive police on Muslim villages; compensation to Hindu sufferers, prosecution of offenders irrespective of personal or political consideration; fifty percent share in the police service and other departments, increase in the number of policemen at the police stations; arms licenses to Hindus; transfer of collector of Sukkur and seizure of unlicensed arms".⁷⁴³ Hindus sent their demands to Allah Baksh threatening him that if he failed to act upon them before the ensuing assembly session, they would withdraw their support to his government. For the purpose of retaining Hindu support intact Allah Baksh government started registering criminal cases against League leaders as a result about '800 Muslims were arrested and put into jail'.⁷⁴⁴ Seeing all this Haroon

⁷³⁷ Z.H, Zaidi, *op.cit.*, pp. 19-45.

⁷³⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴⁰ *Deccan Times*, 14 January 1940.

⁷⁴¹ R.Coupland, *op.cit.*, p. 69.

⁷⁴² Z.H. Zaidi, *op.cit.*, p. 19-45.

⁷⁴³ *The Eastern Times*, 26 January 1940.

⁷⁴⁴ *Civil & Military Gazette*, 21 January 1940.

urged upon Jinnah to prevail upon the 'Viceroy for the dissolution of the Sindh Assembly to save the Muslims of Sindh from the repressive actions of the Allah Baksh government and to drive benefits from provincial autonomy'.⁷⁴⁵

The government appointed an Inquiry Committee into the Sukkur riots headed by Justice Weston. After thorough investigation in which the members of both the communities were interviewed Mr. Weston in January 1941 submitted his report to the government. He pronounced that "originally the disputed building was constructed for use as a mosque".⁷⁴⁶ Weston in his report blamed the 'government for failing to take prompt decision on time and its interference with the executive officers on the spot had been one of the causes of the general lowering of respect for law and order'.⁷⁴⁷ Regarding the role of Muslim League in the issue Weston ascribed this incident as the 'political man oeuvres of the League who took up the quarrel in order to strength their own position and to force the Allah Baksh government out of office'.⁷⁴⁸ The government accepting the findings of Weston, 'entrusted the whole building (Mosque and *Musafirkhana*) to a board of management consisting of Muslims on the understanding that the building would be used as a mosque, but that the existing processional and other religious rights of the Hindus in the vicinity should be maintained'.⁷⁴⁹

Thus the old issue was solved. Muslims had won but Muslim League was not happy with the settlement as the site was not handed over to them but to a board.

On 26 January 1940, the two Hindu ministers tendered their resignations as they no longer could with stand the attacks on their fellow Hindus and also for failing to protect their community. Taking advantage of this new development no confidence motion was again moved against the Allah Baksh ministry, which was this time supported by the Hindu legislators also. Allah Baksh thereupon announced on 4 February 1940, that since he found it impossible to carry on in the face of the opposition gathering against him he would tender his resignation, which he did on the following day. The Governor was very averse to the resignation of the ministry, and had been supported by the Viceroy who asked him to appeal to "the provincial patriotism and sense of duty of the good Sindhis whether government or opposition — even if the supply of those commodities seems at times a trifle short".⁷⁵⁰ Therefore, Graham set the tendered resignation on one side and opened 'discussions with the leaders of the various groups such as Hindu Independents, Congress and the Muslim League'⁷⁵¹ and tried to convince them to allow

⁷⁴⁵ Haroon to Jinnah, 23 December 1939, *QAP*, F.274.

⁷⁴⁶ Abdul Majid to Jinnah, 25 January 1941, *QAP*, F.445, p. 2.

⁷⁴⁷ Report of the Court of Enquiry appointed under section 3 of the Sindh Public Inquiry Act to inquire into the Riots at Sukkur in 1938 (Karachi: Government Press, 1940), p. 34.

⁷⁴⁸ *Ibid.* p. 50.

⁷⁴⁹ *Al Wahid*, 20 March 1941.

⁷⁵⁰ Z.H. Zaidi, *op.cit.*, pp. 19-45.

⁷⁵¹ *Hindustan Times*, 15 February 1950. *Civil & Military Gazette* 15 February 1940. The Governor sought assistance from the party leaders for getting over the constitutional deadlock and for forming alternative acceptable Ministry.

Allah Baksh ministry to work. But he failed and on 21 February 1940, Seth Doulatram Mohandas of the Hindu Independent Party formally presented a motion of no confidence. Graham made his last effort to save the ministry therefore instructed the Speaker that a new date should be allotted for the discussion. He proposed to Linlithgow that he might keep his ministers in office, taking to himself as government "the power of the Legislative Assembly to provide supply for the departments".⁷⁵² On 26 February when finally no-confidence motion was introduced in the assembly, there was a division in the house as 29 members voted each way. The Ministry was salvaged through the casting vote of the Speaker — an event that to Zetland, the Secretary of State, appeared to have a distinctly 'Gilbertian flavor'.⁷⁵³ Thus for the time being Allah Baksh's ministry was saved. But the final moment came 'on 14 March 1940 when a combination of the Independent Hindu Group, the Muslim League and the Baluch groups defeated the government when grants were being voted'.⁷⁵⁴ Describing this situation the Governor wrote to the Viceroy: "I do not suppose that any collection of people professing to be parliamentary representative has ever behaved in a more irresponsible manner".⁷⁵⁵ A new nationalist Ministry under the premiership of Mir Bande Ali was formed on '18 March 1940, only five days before the historical Lahore Resolution by the Muslim League on 23 March 1940 was passed'.⁷⁵⁶

Between April 1937 and March 1940 fifty-eight Acts were passed. None touched upon the socio-economic issue other than land revenue; none was aimed at ameliorating the conditions of the *Haris* (farmers) remote figures in the Assembly of Zamindars and none was planned to put the backward Sindh on the road to education and industrial progress. For example when Mr. Sidhwa during the assembly session suggested that the 'government should launch new industries in order to fight unemployment; Khuhro replied that it was up to businessmen and not to Government to establish such projects'.⁷⁵⁷ On the whole the House was dominated by Zamindars who were insensitive to the interests of non-Zamindars and poor class. A remark made by Hidayatullah in the assembly in connection with unemployment among the illiterates is an ample proof that the Zamindars were only interested in their own problems. He said: "I am unable to get a good cook. Butlers serve for a week or a fortnight at one place, and then run away to another employer".⁷⁵⁸ In a similar vein Heranand Khemsing

He expressed the view that if the necessary cooperation was not forthcoming from the present ministry, he would be compelled to appeal to the electorate in case the political crisis persisted and the budget was not passed in time to enable the constitution to work after 1 April, he might have to suspend the constitution for a limited time so as to enable him to get the necessary funds for carrying on the administration of the province till the new assembly was formed.

⁷⁵² Z.H. Zaidi, *op.cit.*, pp. 19-45.

⁷⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁴ *Civil & Military Gazette*, 16 March 1940.

⁷⁵⁵ Governor to Viceroy Linlithgow, Linlithgow Papers, *op.cit.*

⁷⁵⁶ D.A. Pirzada, *op.cit.*, p. 125.

⁷⁵⁷ Zaidi, *op.cit.*, pp. 19-45 Sindh Legislative Assembly Debates, 1937.

⁷⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

supported the setting up of the Sindh Famine Relief Fund. He agreed that there was no likelihood of serious famine in Sindh but money was needed to grant relief "on those occasions when calamities trouble the *haris*, making the Zamindars lot miserable".⁷⁵⁹ Poor men problems were rarely discussed in the assembly, rather assemblymen were more interested in to provide relief to Zamindars. It was widely agreed that the debates on the cutting of salaries of ministers were largely symbolic as the ministers were so rich that they did not really need the salaries anyway. 'Even N.A. Bechar, the Labour Member, an ardent champion of labor class was said to have an income of Rs. 25,000 per annum form land'.⁷⁶⁰ Support for the hairs came almost entirely from the Congress benches, though in the matter of revising the revenue assessment they spoke only in general terms, not especially of the hairs. Bechar attacked the Zamindars for the inefficiency of their cultivation, warning that "those days when people could sit merely as parasites living on the fat of the land are going to end very soon".⁷⁶¹ He reminded the House that the 'Zamindari system was going to be abolished in U.P. Failing abolition he recommended that unsold Barrage lands should be converted into huge state farms on the Russian model, to set an example to the wasteful large Zamindars'.⁷⁶² The proposition was taken up by 'Gabole and Gazdar as a good way of combating unemployment received some support from Khuhro; he agreed that large units were needed to introduce modern agricultural methods, but defended big Zamindars and refused to be a part of any socialist planning'.⁷⁶³

The other salient feature of the Assembly's activities was the absence of any coherent, constructive programme, before or after the elections, rather it depended on the Governor as the sole element of continuity and stability. In the absence of party discipline, clear-cut popular programme and even stable personal loyalties, no chief minister ever felt secure they therefore avoided facing the Assembly for as long as possible. Copland has defined the rule of the provincial governor under the 1935 Act as that of a constitutional sovereign, who only enjoys, in Begehot's words "the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, the right to warn".⁷⁶⁴ The constant shifts of the loyalties of Sindhi politicians and the fluidity of Sindh politics gave to the Governor a much more role and authority in the affairs of the province. Thus the interference of the governor increased with the passage of time as the Muslim politicians failed to make proper use of the power given to them.

Lahore Resolution

The mistreatment of the Muslims under Congress Ministries compelled the Indian Muslims to declare at Meerat Divisional Muslim League Conference on 25 March 1939

⁷⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶² *Ibid.*

⁷⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁴ R. Coupland, *op.cit.*, p. 40.

that it was now impossible for the Muslims and Hindus to live together in India. Muslims are a nation and not a minority community. In his presidential address, Liaquat Ali Khan said:

"I want an independent India where Muslims have power and freedom, for the Muslims is a nation and not a community. It would be a travesty to dismiss 90 million people with a glorious past as a community. Although Hindus and Muslims live in the same country, they live differently because their religion, culture and civilization are different. Muslims do not favor the pseudo-nationalism that the Hindus have borrowed from Europe. If Hindus and Muslims could not now live together amicably in India—and it had become almost impossible for them to co-exist under the same regime—then they might be able to do so by dividing the country on a religious and cultural basis".⁷⁶⁵

The next day, Working Committee of the Muslim League set up a Committee to examine various schemes (will be discussed latter) put forward by Muslims of different areas. Jinnah was to head the Committee and eight others including 'Abdullah Haroon, Liaquat Ali Khan, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Sir Khwaja Nazimuddin of Bengal and Sardar Aurangzeb Khan of N.W.F.P., were empanelled'.⁷⁶⁶ The meeting opposed the Scheme of Federation embodied in the Government of India Act 1935 and denounced the provincial part of the Act because it had utterly failed to safeguard even the elementary rights of the Muslim minorities in various provinces. Haroon inquired from Jinnah when the sub-committee would first meet to consider the schemes of reforms. He stated that Dr. Latif's scheme (see Appendix IX) had evoked 'lot of criticism in the press in the North. Muslim papers have supported the 'Idea of giving Musalmans separate homeland' said Haroon and Hindu papers have not first ridiculed and then 'characterized it as a dangerous scheme from the Hindu point of view'. He further stated that Muslims in the North were enthusiastic towards the idea of separate homeland and had formed a branch of the 'Anjuman-e-Pakistan'. The Muslims of United Provinces have given the movement an organ of its own under the very name of Pakistan'.⁷⁶⁷ However, the sub-committee never met under the chairmanship of Jinnah and the meetings were presided by Haroon.

The demand of separate Muslim states as lay down in the Lahore Resolution and the various schemes earlier proposed by Muslims for the Muslim states have a long history. Prior to the Lahore scheme there have been many individuals who had expressed their ideas regarding the solution of the Indian communal crises. For example 'John Bright a British Parliamentarian (1811-1889) on 24 June 1885 in a debate on India in the House of Commons suggested that India should be divided onto five independent presidencies equal in ranks with their own Council with Capitals at Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Agra

⁷⁶⁵ *Star of India*, 27 March 1939.

⁷⁶⁶ Dr. Waheed Ahmed (ed), *op.cit.*, p. 638.

⁷⁶⁷ Haroon to Jinnah, 22 April 1939, QAP F.353, p. 18.

and Lahore'.⁷⁶⁸ Wilfred Blunt who visited India during the viceroyalty of Lord Ripon (1880-1884) states in his book *Ideas about India*: India is far too vast a continent and inhabited by races far too heterogeneous to make amalgamation in a single assembly possible for representatives elected on any conceivable system".⁷⁶⁹

Among the Indian Muslims Sir Syed Ahmed Khan the Muslim social reformer and the originator of the 'Two Nation Theory', who clearly stated that Hindus and Muslims are not one but two deferent Nations and that separation is inevitable'.⁷⁷⁰ Abdul Halim Sharar (1860-1924) an editor of the Urdu Weekly '*Muhazzib*' in his 23 August 1890 editorial writes: "Times are such that the religious rites of one nation cannot be performed without injuring susceptibilities of the other. Nor is there the element of patience to ignore insults, if things have reached such a stage, it would be wise to partition India into Hindu and Muslim provinces and exchange the population".⁷⁷¹ In 1920 Abdul Qadir Bilgrami suggested 'partitioning of India between the Hindus and the Muslims'.⁷⁷² In 1921 Nadir Ali a local lawyer of Agra wrote a pamphlet in which he suggested 'partition the only solution to the Hindu-Muslim problem'.⁷⁷³ Similarly in 1923 Sardar Gul Khan President of Anjuman-i-Islamia of Dera Ismail Kahn appeared as witness before the N.W.F Committee appointed by the government of India under the Chairmanship of Sir Dennis Bray, to report upon the administrative relationship between the Settled Districts of the N.W.F. Province and the Tribal Areas and upon the amalgamation of the Settled districts with the Punjab said: we would very much rather see the separation of the Hindus and the Mohammedans, 23 crores of Hindus to the South and 8 crores of Muslims to the North. Give the whole portion from Raskumari to Agra to Hindus and from Agra to Peshawar to Muhammadan".⁷⁷⁴ Maulana Hasrat Mohani in 1921 in his presidential address at Ahmadabad 'described the existence of Muslim-majority provinces such as Kashmir, Punjab, Sindh, Bengal and Assam as a compensation provided by the nature to them though they are in minority. Thus Muslim majority Provinces act as a balancing factor in a bi-national India'.⁷⁷⁵ Then in 1924 he asked the Hindus to: "(a) recognize the bi-communal (Hindu-Muslim) basis of the future Independent Indian States; (b) convert the Muslim majority provinces into Muslim states and the Hindu majority provinces into Hindu states; and (c) create an Indian Federation of these states and place it under a supreme National Government composed of Hindus and Muslims. Thus he rejected the demand of Hindus of

⁷⁶⁸ Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan* (Lahore: The All Pakistan Legal Decisions, 1963), p. 38.

⁷⁶⁹ Jamil Wasti, *My Reminiscences of Choudhary Rahmat Ali* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1982), p. 42.

⁷⁷⁰ Richard Symond, *The Making of Pakistan* (London: John Murray, 1950), p. 32.

⁷⁷¹ Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, *op.cit.*, p. 58.

⁷⁷² Jamil Wasti, *op.cit.*, p. 43 and also in I.H. Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent* (Karachi: Ma'areef Printers, 1977), p. 338.

⁷⁷³ Choudhary Khaliquzzamam, *Pathway to Pakistan*, *op.cit.*, p. 238.

⁷⁷⁴ Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, *op.cit.*, p. 96 also in I.H. Qureshi, *op.cit.*, p. 339.

⁷⁷⁵ Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Foundations of Pakistan* (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1969), p. 559.

Dominion Status for India and by demanding the National Government for India he damped the hopes of Hindus to have hegemony."⁷⁷⁶

In the same year a Hindu Leader Lala Lajpat Rai wrote a series of articles entitled *From Ravi to Brahmaputra* in deferent English dailies in which he proposed the solution of Hindu-Muslim problems. He suggested "the partition of Punjab into two provinces, the Western Punjab with a large Muslim majority to be Muslim-governed province; and the Eastern Punjab with a large Hindu-Sikh majority to be non Muslim governed province".⁷⁷⁷ He in his writings proposed a "partition of India in which Muslims were to have four Muslim States: (1) the Pathan province or the North-West Frontier; (2) Western Punjab; (3) Sindh; and (4) Eastern Bengal".⁷⁷⁸ This unambiguous proposal of partition of India on part of Lajpat Rai means that a fundamental change in the thinking of same Hindu leaders had taken place and finally they have accepted the separate Muslim nationhood and the impossibility of the absorption of them in a single country.

Between 1925 and 1929 the idea of a separate Muslim States gained popularity among Muslims and meanwhile Hindus started giving negative statements on the scheme. In 1928 Shastri suspected that "the Muslims demand for the creation of autonomous Muslim States along the north-west border is actuated by a desire to acquire means of exerting pressure in emergencies on the Government of India".⁷⁷⁹ Nehru in the Nehru Report (1928) rejected the 'novel suggestion' of the Muslims 'that they should at least dominate in some parts of India'.⁷⁸⁰ In the same year a book entitled '*The Indian Moslems*' written by an unidentified Indian Muslim elucidate the two nation theory and on its basis pleaded the Muslim case for separate homeland. He emphasized that "within the frontier of India live two nations, the Moslem and the Hindu ... This is a fundamental fact on which Indian society is based, and any constitution which is not founded on it will come to the ground".⁷⁸¹ Similarly at the 'All Parties Convention of 1928, Aga Khan advocated independence for each Indian Province'.⁷⁸² In the Delhi session of the 'Muslim All Parties Conference, the Muslims insisted upon the fullest autonomy for the provinces'.⁷⁸³

Thus by 1929 Congress had backed out from the Lucknow Pact (1916) and through Nehru Report (1928) intended to deprive the Muslims of a few safeguards provided to them by the British Government. And when 'Jinnah in 1929 presented his Fourteen

⁷⁷⁶ Choudhary Rahmat Ali, *Pakistan, The Father Land of Pak Nation* (Cambridge: The Pakistan National Liberation Movement, 1939), p. 216.

⁷⁷⁷ Dr. Abdus Salam Khurshid, *History of the Idea of Pakistan* (Karachi: National Book Foundation, 1977), p. 51.

⁷⁷⁸ Matloob-ul-Hasan Saiyid, *Jinnah - A political Study*, (Lahore : 1945), pp. 327-30.

⁷⁷⁹ Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan, op.cit.*, p. 117.

⁷⁸⁰ Report of the Committee appointed by All Parties Conference 1928; published by the General Secretary All India Congress Committee, pp. 28-29.

⁷⁸¹ Dr. Abdus Salam Khurshid, *op.cit.*, pp. 53-54.

⁷⁸² Pattabhai Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress*, Vol. I (Bombay: 1946), p. 334.

⁷⁸³ I. H. Qureshi, *op.cit.*, p. 340.

Points in which he presented the Muslim demands for the future constitution of India and demanded that separate electorate be maintained, weak federal centre with residuary powers vested in provinces'.⁷⁸⁴ But Congress refused to give any importance to them. As a result a last opportunity for solving the communal problem through Constitution was lost forever.

Haroon did not lose hope. He along with Aga Khan in 1929 organized a session of All India Muslim Conference at Delhi. Aga Khan presided the session which presented the demands of the Muslims which were, "separate electorate, federal system at the centre with autonomy for provinces, safeguards for Muslim education, language, religion, personal laws and charitable institutions". Regarding the future political set up of India the conference passed a resolution. This resolution demanded "the recognition of Muslim majorities in the Punjab and Bengal, separation of Sindh from Bombay as a province, introduction of constitutional reforms in N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, complete provincial autonomy, representation through separate electorate and a ban on legislating on any inter-communal matter without the approval of the three-fourth majority of the concerned community'.⁷⁸⁵ The Regarding the formation and acceptance of the constitution the conference announced that "no constitution, by whom so ever proposed or devised will be acceptable to Indian Muslims unless it conformed with the principles embodied in this resolution".⁷⁸⁶

Thus by the end of 1929 communal tension deepened the constitutional crises. In order to end this crisis the British government announced the convening of a conference at London in which all the important political leaders of India were invited. The conference was held from 12 November 1930 to 19 January 1931. The Muslim delegate under pressure accepted joint electorate and eliminated all chances of Muslim securing majorities in Punjab and Bengal.

Being disheartened at the performance of Muslim delegate in the Round Table Conference (RTC) Dr. Muhammad Iqbal⁷⁸⁷ realized that to solve the problems of North-West of India the Muslims should evolve their own line of action. Therefore in the 21 November 1930 issue of *Inqilab*, a daily news paper published from Lahore, he called upon the Muslims of Northern India to hold a conference of their own in order to discuss the problems they faced at the moment. He make clear to the Muslims that "as long as Centre's hold on the province is not weakened, constitutional reforms are not introduced in Sindh, N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan, and the Muslim majority is not secured in the Punjab through separate electorate, the political existence of the Muslims of Northern India will remain in danger". To safeguard their interest Iqbal asked the

⁷⁸⁴ Dr. Rajendra Prasad, *op.cit.*, pp. 131-132.

⁷⁸⁵ K. K. Aziz, *The All India Muslim Conference 1928-1936: A Documentary Record* (Karachi: National Publishers House, 1972), p. 30 and also in Dr. Abdus Salam Khurshid, *op cit.*, p. 65.

⁷⁸⁶ *AIR*, Jun-Dec, 1928, Vol. II, pp. 415-416.

⁷⁸⁷ Dr. Muhammad Iqbal was a poet and an important Muslim leader of Punjab.

Muslims of Sindh Punjab. N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan "to rise to the occasion and take practical steps".⁷⁸⁸

In order to give a final shape to his idea of holding a conference on '23 November 1930 Iqbal convened a meeting of the leading Muslim citizens of Lahore'.⁷⁸⁹ It was decided that to make this conference successful all the Muslim members of the legislatures of the four provinces were to be invited. 'To make it more representative along with them it was decided that the Muslim members of the municipal committees and district boards, representatives from various Muslim organizations and leading personalities of all the four provinces will also be invited. On this occasion Majeed Malik was elected as Secretary and Nawab Saadat Ali Khan as Financial Secretary of the conference'.⁷⁹⁰

On 4 December 1930 another meeting of the committee was held at the residence of Iqbal. Here the Conference was named as 'Upper Indian Muslim Conference'. A few days later, 'Abdullah Haroon joined this committee and started mobilizing public opinion in Sindh in support of the project'.⁷⁹¹

As Iqbal was convinced that the four North-West provinces of India should be grouped together therefore at the occasion of Muslim League session of 1930 held at Allahabad he in his presidential address spoke against the idea of an All India Federation and said, "I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh, and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single State, Self-governing within the British Empire or without the British Empire. The formation of a consolidated North-West Muslim State appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India."⁷⁹²

The idea of Iqbal of North-West State 'within or without British Empire' came at a time when RTC was in session and Muslim leadership at RTC was dejected and Muslims of India were confused. In this critical juncture of time Iqbal presented his own scheme which was severally criticized by British and Hindus. *The Indian Daily Mail* of Bombay in its 31 December 1930 issue published a dispatch of Mr. F.W. Wilson in which he stated that "Ramsay Mac Donald was highly displeased with the views expressed by Iqbal".⁷⁹³ In another dispatch from London published in the *Leader* of Allahabad in its 4 January 1931 issue stated that the British as well as Indian Circles in the RTC expressed

⁷⁸⁸ Dr. Abdus Salam Khurshid, *op.cit.*, p. 66.

⁷⁸⁹ The participants of the meeting were Dr. Khalifa Shuja-ud-Din, Syed Mohsin Shah, Sardar Habibullah, Syed Maratab Ali Shah, Nawab Saadat Ali, Haji Mir Shams-ud-Din, Mian Feroz ud Din Ahmed, Majeed Malik (Editor, *Muslim Outlook*), Ghulam Rasul Mehr and Abdul Majeed Salik (Editor, *Inqilab*), Syed Habib (Editor, *Siyasat*), Dr. M. Sharif Mian Haq Nawaz, Moulvi Fazl -ud-Din, Malik Muhammad Din, Fazal Karim, Abdullah, Mahbub ilahi, Khan Bahadur Mir Aziz ud- Din, Khan Sahib Khair-ud-Din and Ghulam Mohy-ud-Din Qasuri.

⁷⁹⁰ *Ibid* p. 67.

⁷⁹¹ *Ibid* p. 68.

⁷⁹² The Presidential Address of Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, Allahabad Session, December 1930 (Delhi: All India Muslim League, 1945), p. 12.

⁷⁹³ *Indian Daily Mail*, 31 December 1930.

resentment against what it called an assault made by Iqbal on the idea of an all Indian constitution being worked out there'.⁷⁹⁴ Hindu press criticized Iqbal's proposal and called him 'fanatic, dangerously prejudiced, narrow-minded and mean Muslim of Northern India who wanted to revive the old Muslim rule in India'.⁷⁹⁵ Earlier Muslims did not express any opinion on the plan. It was only in *Inqilab* that the editorials in favor of Iqbal's proposal were published. Meanwhile 'Haroon got convinced of Iqbal's plan and took initiative and started popularizing the ideal placed by Iqbal before the Muslims of Sindh'.⁷⁹⁶

To design a new constitution for India three Round Table Conferences were held at London. During the Third Round Table Conference (17 November 1932 to 24 December 1932) Muslim delegate could not endure the joint Hindu-British pressure and acquiesce on the proposal to form an All India Federation. In return of this Hindu showed their willingness to accept the Muslim demands such as: Sindh be separated from Bombay, the N.W.F.P. be up graded to the status of a Governor's province and introduction of separate Electorates for Muslims and recognition of the statutory Muslim majorities in Punjab and Bengal. On seeing the ineffectual position of the Muslim delegate Rahmat Ali⁷⁹⁷ met the members of Muslim delegate and tried to convince them 'to withdraw their demand for the Indian Federation, withhold their participation in framing the Indian Federal Constitution and ask for a separate federation of our north-western homelands'.⁷⁹⁸ To place more pressure on Muslim members Rahmat Ali distributed a pamphlet along with a forwarding letter, entitled '*Now Or Never: Are We To Perish For Ever*' to the Muslim participants of the Conference.⁷⁹⁹

In forwarding letter Rahmat Ali stated that, "I am enclosing herewith an appeal on behalf of the thirty Million Muslims of Pakistan⁸⁰⁰, who live in Northern Units of India-Punjab, North Western Frontier (Afghan) province, Kashmir, Sindh and Baluchistan. It embodied their demand for the recognition of their national status, as distinct from the other inhabitants of India, by the grant to Pakistan of a separate Federal Constitution on religious social and historical grounds".⁸⁰¹ In the pamphlet NOW OR NEVER Rahmat Ali proposed a scheme for the division of India and demanded creation of a separate Federation of Pakistan, "by which we mean", as they stated, " the five Northern units of

⁷⁹⁴ Dr. Abdus Slam Khurshid, *op.cit*, p. 77.

⁷⁹⁵ *Ibid.* p. 77.

⁷⁹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 80.

⁷⁹⁷ Rahmat Ali was a post-graduate student at Emmanuel College of Cambridge University.

⁷⁹⁸ Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, *op. cit.*, p. 133

⁷⁹⁹ Rahmat Ali in January 1933 drafted a Declaration entitled *NOW OR NEVER* and issued it on 28 January 1933. The three co-signatories were Khan Muhammad Aslam Khan Khattak, an Oxford man; Sahibzada Shaikh Muhammad Sadiq who then belonged to one of the Inns of Court in London; and Khan Inayatullah Khan who was at that time studying at veterinary College in England.

⁸⁰⁰ Earlier I was not included in the word PAKSTAN, It was added to make the intonation easy.

⁸⁰¹ Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, p. 27.

India viz. Punjab, North-West Frontier Province (Afghan Province), Kashmir, Sindh, and Baluchistan".⁸⁰²

When he did not achieve any encouragement and support for his scheme from the Muslim delegate he decided to go to the public and get their support in favor of his plan. He then launched the '*Pakistan National Movement*'.⁸⁰³ To popularize his thoughts and to generate public opinion he started a 'weekly newspaper Pakistan'⁸⁰⁴ and distributed leaflets and handbills among the Muslims.

The Hindu leaders reacted offensively at this proposal. 'Rai Saheb Mehr Chand Khanna, Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Frontier, the Punjab and Sindh Hindu Conference, expressed his fears regarding the Pakistan Movement'.⁸⁰⁵ Professor Rai, Vice-Principle, Sanatana Dharama College, Lahore, expressed his apprehensions on the scheme in an article in which he wrote that, "It is well-known that all the strategic positions for the defence of India lie in these five North-Western provinces. Once an enemy crosses the Pabbi Hills near Lalamusa, he has no natural obstacles to face him right up to Calcutta. We know that the Muslims took more than 300 years to conquer the Punjab, but once they had become masters of the land of five rivers, the conquest of the rest of India was an easy job. Within ten years after the defeat of Prithviraj at Taraori, the whole Northern India north of the Vindhya hills was subdued and became a part of the Muslim Empire. If a Muslim federation for the five North-Western provinces is established as is demanded by some Muslims the federal government for the rest of India would not be worth the paper on which its constitution may be drawn".⁸⁰⁶ In another article he alleges that "the development of Pakistan mentality in the North-west is as dangerous to the Hindus and the Sikhs as they undoubtedly are to the Government".⁸⁰⁷

Whereas, the thoughts of the British towards Pakistan Movement can be judged from the article of 'Mouse' the known authority on military affairs published in the *Statesman* of Delhi dated 3 August 1933. His statement shows his anxiety. He stated that some "Muslims dream of an Indian Muslim Confederation and through it they want to revive the old Mughal glories in Hindustan which will split the Federation from top to bottom".⁸⁰⁸

⁸⁰² *Ibid.* p. 135, Rahmat Ali was the inventor of the name Pakistan. About the composition of the word Rahmat Ali explained it in these words. He said; 'It is composed of letters taken from the names of all our homelands— 'Indian' and 'Asian'. That is Panjab, Afghanistan (N.W.F.P.), Kashmir, Iran, Sindh (including Kachch and Kathiawar), Tukharistan, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan'. Choudhary Rahmat Ali, *Pakistan: the Father Land of Pak Nation*, *op.cit.*, p. 225.

⁸⁰³ For more information on Pakistan Movement see Rahmat Ali's *Pakistan: The Father Land of Pak Nation*.

⁸⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰⁵ Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, *op.cit.*, p. 139.

⁸⁰⁶ *Civil and Military Gazette*, 19 August 1934.

⁸⁰⁷ *Tribune*, 12 October 1935.

⁸⁰⁸ Dr. Abdus Salam Khurshid, *op.cit.*, p. 85.

Hindus also start expressing apprehensions. Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, a liberal Hindu leader pronounced that "should the British concede the Muslim demand, the Hindus would regard it as an act of treachery against India".⁸⁰⁹ On the other hand no Muslim leader supported the idea of Rahmat Ali or his Pakistan Movement. Even Dr. Iqbal agreed to work within the framework of an Indian Federation on the basis of Jinnah's Fourteen Points.

By 1937 Iqbal seem to have fully acknowledged the idea of Muslims to have separate states and started convincing Jinnah to agree to the idea. In this regard the confidential letters of Iqbal to Jinnah are sufficient prove to it. He clarifies to Jinnah that in his view point's 'the only method for the solution of the Constitutional and communal crisis is to have not one but two independent Muslim States, one in the North-West of India and the other, in Bengal'⁸¹⁰ and he wanted that Muslim League in the Lucknow session of 1937 should adopt the ideal of establishing two separate Muslim states. But Jinnah did not consider this idea to be feasible for the Muslims and in the 1937 session he

announced that "the Muslim League stands for full national democratic self-government for India".⁸¹¹ But the unwarranted behavior of the Congress ministries towards Muslim minorities raised the tension between Congress and League. As a result some Muslim leaders started seriously thinking on the lines of Iqbal. One such leader was Abdullah Haroon. He from the very beginning was committed to the idea of Iqbal as when Iqbal convened an Upper Indian Muslim Conference Haroon was the first to respond from Sindh.

In October 1938 the Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference was held at Karachi under the president ship of Jinnah. Haroon as Chairman Reception Committee in the course of his address said that the "existence of the Muslim community was in jeopardy and Muslims had no hope of getting any justice at the hands of the majority community". He warned that "if the communal issue is not solved to the satisfaction of all, it will be impossible for anybody to save India from being divided into Hindu India and Muslim India, both placed under separate Federation".⁸¹² Under his direction Conference passed a resolution, in which it was demanded that "India may be divided into two Federations, viz, Federation of Muslim states and the Federation of non-Muslim states". The conference then insisted that "Muslim League should devise a scheme of constitution under which Muslim-majority provinces, Muslim Native states and areas inhabited by a majority of Muslims, may attain full independence in the form of a Federation of their own with permission to any other Muslim state beyond the Indian Frontier to join the Federation, and with such safeguards for non-Muslim

⁸⁰⁹ *Ibid.* p. 87.

⁸¹⁰ *Ibid.* p. 99.

⁸¹¹ *AFM*, the Presidential Address of Jinnah, Lucknow Session 1937. p. 25.

⁸¹² *IAR*, 1938, Vol. II, p. 45-47.

minorities as may be conceded to the Muslim minorities in the non-Muslim Federation of India".⁸¹³

Thus for the first time All India Muslim League adopted a resolution in which not the separation but the division of India has been demanded.

The passing of Karachi resolution of 1938 gave a clear picture of the way the mind of Haroon was working at that time. While discussing the situation with Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi a close companion, Haroon showed his gratefulness to Hindu press for popularizing the idea among Muslims. He alleged that the more Hindu papers oppose and criticize the idea the more they would popularize it among the Muslims. He very convincingly stated that "we have to achieve what the Hindus call Pakistan. I am convinced that this is the only solution of the problem. But we must prepare the ground for it".⁸¹⁴ He knew that Jinnah was not fully convinced of the division of India, he therefore did not settle down but started thinking as how to mould the public opinion in favor of the resolution and how the League be prevailed upon to implement the recommendation. After a lot of thinking to achieve the above mentioned objectives Haroon decided to sent Rashdi on a tour of Punjab and Frontier provinces "to see (a) what had been the reactions of Karachi resolution and of the Hindu press comments on the Muslims (b) to select suitable persons from among the Muslims who would support the scheme (c) to study the general conditions in the two Muslim majority provinces, whether they could be induced to work for the idea (d) to contact Allama Mashriqi of the Khaksars and see whether his support could be secured in this connection (e) to see which other Muslim organizations in the provinces are most likely to be prevailed upon for the support (f) to approach the Muslim Urdu press in the Punjab to take up this course (g) to secure the services of some capable men to prepare literature on the subject (h) to get the opinion of the Muslim leaders of these provinces".⁸¹⁵ Rashdi did undertake this visit.

Just two months after the passage of Karachi resolution League at its annual session held at Patna in December 1938 authorized its President to adopt such course as might be necessary with a view to exploring a suitable constitutional alternatives to the Government of India Act, 1935, which would safeguard the interests of Muslims and other minorities in India'.⁸¹⁶

Thus League was changing its guidelines.

⁸¹³ For details see chapter VIII.

⁸¹⁴ *A Biography, op.cit.*, p. 135.

⁸¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 137.

⁸¹⁶ Resolutions of the All India Muslim League, Patna Session, 1938 (Delhi: All India Muslim League, nd), pp. 1-4 Also in Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *The Nation's Voice* (Karachi: Quaid-i- Azam Academy, 1992), p. 585. *IAR*, 1939, Vol. II, p. 350.

After Karachi Conference (October 1938) till the Patna session(December 1938), to discuss the implementation of the resolution 'Haroon remained in constant communication with Jinnah and Muslim Leaders and took a number of steps to advance the general cause of a separate federation of Muslim provinces and states'.⁸¹⁷ He in 1939 in a public statement stated that "He (Jinnah) is contemplating to put forth some alternative scheme of reforms, which may provide independent homelands for the Mussalmans in different parts of India where they may be able to pursue their own policy of progress without molestation from the Hindu-ridden centre".⁸¹⁸ Thus Haroon along with other Muslim leaders were trying to convince Jinnah for the need of separate Muslim states.

The important effect of the Karachi resolution was that League started changing its principles and Muslims from various walks of life took the resolution seriously and started forming different schemes for the division of India. The year 1939 saw various schemes proposed by Muslims for separate Muslim states. Therefore as a next step the Working Committee of League on 26 March 1939 at its meeting at Meerat resolved to appoint a committee "to examine various schemes already propounded by those who are fully versed in the Constitutional developments of India".⁸¹⁹ The committee was headed by Jinnah and the other members were, 'Abdullah Haroon, Sikandar Hayat Khan, Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan Saheb, Syed Abdul Aziz Saheb, Khwaja Nazimuddin, Abdul Matin Choudhri Saheb, Sardar Aurangzeb Khan Saheb, and Liaquat Ali Khan was appointed as the Convener of the Committee'.⁸²⁰ For the endorsement of the resolution on 8 April 1939 it was placed before the Council of the League. On this occasion 'Jinnah accepted that there were several schemes before the committee which after examining those schemes would produce a scheme which would be in the best interest of the Muslims'.⁸²¹

After 1938 Congress started malicious propaganda against Muslim in the American and British newspapers and magazines. To counter the negative Propaganda in 1939 League opened a Foreign office and appointed Haroon as its President. Along with the purpose to establish contact with foreign countries particularly with Muslim countries additional purpose of this office was to join closer together the various Muslim organizations in the different provinces. To establish contact with the foreign countries he took an entirely different approach. He sent letters to the newspapers of different countries such as 'Iran, Iraq, Syria, Najd, Hedjaz, Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, China Algeria and Tunis and asked them whether they would agree to exchange with India

⁸¹⁷ Dani (ed). *Quaid-i-Azam and Pakistan* (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam University, 1981),p. 170. *Biography, op. cit.*, p. 135-142.

⁸¹⁸ *A Biography, op.cit.*, p. 147.

⁸¹⁹ *Resolutions of the All India Muslim League From March 1939 to March 1940* (Delhi: All India Muslim League, n.d.), p. 1. Also in *IAR*, 1939, Vol. I, p. 374.

⁸²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 2.

⁸²¹ *IAR*. 1939. Vol. 1, p. 374.

information of mutual interest'.⁸²² He further requested to the writers of these countries to extract relevant information from foreign papers to circulate them among the Mussalmans in India either directly or through publication in papers. At the same time he made an appeal to the Indian Muslim newspapers in which he ask form the 'local writers to send to foreign papers a fortnightly dispatch of events in India so that the political circles in those countries can get the true picture of the problems faced by the Muslims in India'.⁸²³ Under his guidance offices in 'Basrah, Baghdad, Damascus and Palestine were opened to do propaganda work for the League'.⁸²⁴ Thus from 1939 to 1940 Haroon was not only busy in developing contact with foreign countries and clearing the name of the Muslims but at the same time got involved in examining different schemes put forwarded by Muslims as an alternative to the Act of 1935.

Before moving ahead it seems here necessary to discuss the various schemes put forward by Muslim politicians and intellectuals. Apart from the schemes proposed by Dr. Iqbal and Rahmat Ali (already discussed) there were four other significant schemes which were examined by the League Committee.

The first scheme was pronounced by Dr. Syed Abdul Latif.⁸²⁵ He in 1939 published his scheme in form of a booklet entitled 'A Federation of Cultural Zones for India' which came to be known as 'Latif scheme'. Dr. Latif in his scheme proposed the division of India into 'four cultural zones for the Muslims and eleven for the Hindus'.⁸²⁶ The four Muslim cultural Zones according to him were: "(I) North-West Block consisted of Sindh, Baluchistan, Punjab, N.W.F.P., and Indian States of Khairpur and Bahawalpur (2) North-East Block consisted of Eastern Bengal and Assam (3) Delhi-Lucknow Block extending from the Eastern border of Patiala to Lucknow and rounding up Rampur on the way (4) The Deccan Block embracing the Dominion of Hyderabad and including the districts of Kurnool, Cuddapah, Chittore, North Arcot and Chinglepet down to the City of Madras". The scheme provided for a "week centre and all the zones were to be joined in All India Federation".⁸²⁷ (See Appendix IX) Towards the end of 1939, Haroon wrote a foreword to Dr. Latif's publication '*The Muslim Problem in India*'. Commenting on the scheme of Dr. Latif he stated: "The Hindu-Muslim problem in India has grown so serious since the inauguration of provincial autonomy in the country that the Muslims see no other way of consolidating their future except carving out cultural zones or separate homelands for themselves. When the Act of 1935 was being shaped in the House of Parliament, the Muslim leaders could not foresee that their Hindu Brethren would exploit the new constitution so as to lay the foundation of a Hindu Raj, and

⁸²² *Biography, op.cit.*, p. 152.

⁸²³ *Ibid.*

⁸²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 153.

⁸²⁵ Dr. Latif was a teacher at Osmania University, Hyderabad Deccan.

⁸²⁶ Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai (Eds) *Speeches and Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921-1947*, Vol. II (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 444.

⁸²⁷ Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan, op.cit.*, pp. 154-155 and in *IAR* 1939, Vol. I, p. 366-370.

swamp the country with their culture and reduce the Muslims to the position of a subject people. But the experiences of the last two years have opened their eyes, so much so, that they are now able to see the danger lying ahead of them have resolved to fight the Act of 1935 till it is replaced by a better one".⁸²⁸ He considered this scheme as a sort of amendment to the Act of 1935. (See Appendix XII) In his own scheme Haroon recommended the 'division of India into two separate federations each reflecting the strength of one of the two major communities. The main body of the Muslim Federation would be the North-West area and the Kashmir'.⁸²⁹

From Punjab in 1939 a scheme called *Confederacy of India* was circulated by 'A Punjabi'.⁸³⁰ This scheme had the support of Nawab Sir Shahnawaz Khan of Mamdote, President of the Punjab Provincial Muslim League who was the publisher of this booklet. Because of this the scheme was popularly known as 'Mamdote Scheme'. The scheme suggested the division of India into "five countries" which were; 1) *The Indus Regions*, including Punjab, Sindh, N.W.F.P., Kashmir, Baluchistan, Bahawalpur, Dir, Swat, Chitral, Khairpur, Kalat, Las Bela and Kapurthala; 2) *Hindu India* included United Provinces, Central Provinces, Bihar, Orissa, Assam, Madras and Bombay; 3) *Rajasthan* comprising the states of Rajputana and Central India; 4) *The Deccan States* incorporated the states of Hyderabad, Mysore and Bastar; 5) *Bengal* included Eastern Bengal and districts of Sylhet and Tripura. These five countries were to be re-assembled in a Confederacy of India".⁸³¹ (See Appendix XI)

The third scheme was prepared by Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan.⁸³² He in July 1939 published his scheme entitled '*Outlines of a Scheme of Indian Federation*'. He recommended a two-tier Federation - a regional and an All India Federation. India was to be divided into following seven zones.

"Zone I. Assam, Bengal (minus one or two western districts in order to reduce the size of the 'Zone' with a view to approximate it to other 'Zones') + Bengal States and Sikkim.

Zone 2. Bihar + Orissa (plus the area transferred from Bengal to Orissa).

Zone 3. United Provinces and U.P. States.

Zone 4. Madras + Travancore + Madras States and Coorg.

⁸²⁸ *Biography, op.cit.*, p. 328.

⁸²⁹ Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan, op.cit.*, p. 152.

⁸³⁰ The author's real name was Mian Kifayat Ali, a retired Major of the Indian army who had a special fondness for Dr. Iqbal and Sir Fazl-i-Husain.

⁸³¹ Khalid Bin Sayeed, *Pakistan the Formative Phase 1857-1948* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 110-111.

⁸³² Sir Sikandar was the Premier of Punjab and a member of the Working Committee of the All India Muslim League.

Zone 5. Bombay + Hyderabad + Western India States + Bombay States + Mysore and C. P. States.

Zone 6. Rajputana States (minus Bikaner and Jaisalmer) + Gwalior + Central India States + Bihar and Orissa States + C.P. and Berar.

Zone 7. Punjab + Sindh + N. W. F. P. + Kashmir + Punjab States + Baluchistan + Bikaner and Jaisalmer".

Under this scheme each 'Zone was to have regional Legislature consisting of representatives from both British India and Indian States Units included in that zone. Furthermore the regional representatives were to collectively constitute the Central Federal Assembly and One-third of the total number of representatives in the Federal Assembly was to be the Muslims'.⁸³³ (See Appendix VIII)

The last important scheme which was studied by the committee was prepared by Syed Zafarul Hasan and Dr. Mohammad Afzal Husain Qadri, the two professors of the Aligarh Muslim University. According to this scheme 'British India was to be divided into three independent sovereign States namely Pakistan Federation, Bengal (Muslim States) and Hindustan. Pakistan Federation was to be consisted of Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan; Bengal included the adjacent districts of Pumea (Bihar) and the Sylhet Division (Assam); while Hindustan comprised of rest of India. To protect the Muslim interest the scheme suggested the migration of Muslims from Muslim minority areas to Muslim majority areas'.⁸³⁴ (See Appendix X)

As an outcome of these developments by the mid of 1939 Jinnah was finally convinced that Congress had misused the provincial part of the constitution of 1935. In his speech of 5 August 1939 he declared that the conduct of the Congress after the elections of 1937 had convinced him that "a democratic system of parliamentary government", favored by the Congress because it was "a matter of counting heads", was an "impossibility" in "such a vast Country with different nationalities".⁸³⁵

In January 1940, *Times* and *Tide*, London, published an article by Jinnah on '*The Constitutional Maladies of India*' which clearly shows the change that had take place in the thinking of Jinnah. He argued in it that the "root cause of India's constitutional ills was the fact that democratic system based on the concept of a homogenous nation such an England's are very definitely not applicable to heterogeneous countries such as India". He said that "India is inhabited by many races...often as distinct from one

⁸³³ Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, op.cit, p. 176 and also in Khalid bin Sayeed, *Pakistan: the Formative Phase*. op.cit., p. 112.

⁸³⁴ Sir Maurice Gwyer and A. Appadorai, (Eds), op.cit., p. 462-465.

⁸³⁵ *Times of India*, 7 August 1939.

another in origin, tradition and manner of life as are nations of Europe". He said Hindus and Muslims "are in fact two nations representing two distinct and separate civilizations ... both these religions are definite social codes which govern not so much man's relation with his God as man's relation with his neighbor". While the Muslim League stood for a free India it was "irrevocably opposed to any federal objective which much necessarily be parliamentary system of government...a constitution must be evolved that recognizes that there are in India two nations who both must share the governance of their common motherland. In evolving such a constitution, the Muslims are ready to cooperate with the British Government, Congress or any party so that the present enmities may cease and India may take its place amongst the great nations of the world". By calling Hindus and Muslims two nations Jinnah was clear in his mind for partition of India — he lost hope that Hindus and Muslims could live together contentedly and made their "common motherland a great nation".⁸³⁶

Thus by the beginning of 1940 the League Leadership has began to think to prepare a plan of their own to solve the constitutional problem. To accomplish this on 1 February 1940, Haroon at Delhi presided over a meeting of the 'Foreign Committee with the authors of the various alternative constitutional schemes submitted to the League'.⁸³⁷ It resolved to recommend that the Working Committee of the League "state its mind in unequivocal language with regard to the future of the Indian Muslim nation. India's Muslims were a separate nation entitled to self-determination".⁸³⁸ The resolution reads:

1. "The Muslims of India, who constitute 90 million of people, are a separate nation entitled to the same right of self-determination, which has been conceded in respect of other nations.
2. The Muslims of India shall in no case agree to be reduced to position of a minority on the basis of extraneous and foreign considerations or for the sake of any political convenience or expediency.
3. That in order to make the Muslim right of self-determination really effective, the Muslims shall have a separate national home in the shape of an autonomous state.

⁸³⁶ Dr. Waheed Ahmed (Ed), *op.cit.*, p. 641.

⁸³⁷ The nine schemes were those prepared by the Nawab of Mumdot, Dr, Abdul Latif, Mr. Rizwan Ullah, Dr. Afzal Hussain Kadri, Khan Bahadur Kifayat Ullah, Mr. Asadulla of Calcutta and also the Pakistan Scheme and the Khilafat Scheme of the Muslim Students Federation. *Civil & Military Gazette*, February 3, 1940. For more information about the schemes see Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*.

⁸³⁸ *Resolutions of the All India Muslim League from December 1938 to March 1940*. (Published by Hon. Secretary All India Muslim League), p 27.

4. That the Muslims living in the rest of India shall be treated as the nationals of the aforesaid Muslim state and their rights and privileges shall be fully safeguarded.
5. That any scheme of Indian reforms interfering with these basic principles should be stoutly resisted by the Indian Muslim nation still it has achieved the aforesaid objective".⁸³⁹ (See Appendix XIII)

The meeting's resolutions were sent to Liaquat Ali Khan and M.A. Jinnah for placing before the Working Committee, which began its session on 3 February 1940. The question of separate homeland for the Muslims was seriously considered and it was decided to propose it officially at the open session to be held in March 1940. A Subject-Committee of nine members was appointed to sit from day-to-day to draft a detailed constitutional scheme incorporating the fundamental rights declared in the resolution. On 3 February the Working Committee of the Muslim League, which was attended by Abdullah Haroon, considered the resolution of 1 February and decided:

The Committee considered the question of Muslim demands and future constitution of India. The following broad outlines were agreed to:

- i) "Musalmans are not a minority in the ordinary sense of the word.
- ii) British system of democratic parliamentary party system of government is not suited to the genius and condition of the people.
- iii) Those zones which are composed of majority of Musalmans in the physical map of India should be constituted into Independent Dominions in direct relationship with Great Britain.
- iv) In those zones where Muslims are in minority, their interests and those of other minorities must be adequately and effectively safeguarded and similar safeguards shall be provided for the Hindus and other minorities in the Muslim zones.
- v) The various units in each zone shall form component parts of the Federation in that zone as autonomous units".⁸⁴⁰

Next day Jinnah met the Viceroy Lord Linlithgow and conveyed to him that the Muslim League in its open session at Lahore was going to demand for the partition of India.

⁸³⁹ *Ibid*, p. 29.

⁸⁴⁰ Resolution No. 14 of the Working Committee of the League held from 3-6 February 1940. *AFM*. Vol. 126, pp. 30-7. Also Dr. Waheed Ahmed, ed., *op.cit.*, p. 651.

To draft a constitutional scheme to be announced at Lahore session was not an easy task for the Subject-Committee because the relationship between All India Muslim leadership and provincial leaders were very flimsy.

The working of Act of 1935 in the provinces forced the Muslim leaders to take some concrete steps for the protection of Muslims through the constitution. The fear of Congress rule in independent India forced the Muslim leaders of deferent areas to make a joint effort to save Muslims from future Congress rule. This situation made them to join Muslim League. The leaders of Muslim majority areas such as Punjab, Sindh and Bengal and of Muslim minority areas had their own particular interests to join League. Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, the Premier of Punjab and other leaders of the Unionist Party were against the communal policies of League and were against the establishment of League in Punjab. Similarly in Bengal Fazlul Haq and his Krishak Paroja Party was also not in agreement with Jinnah and therefore did not allow the formation of League in Bengal. Whereas in Sindh the Muslim leader like Haroon was also against the communal outlook of League and therefore formed his own provincial party by the name of Sindh United Party. But when in 1938 League adopted the idea of Provincial Autonomy as its main demand as opposed to the Congress which wanted a strong Centre, the leaders of Punjab, Sindh and Bengal backed Muslim League.

On '14 October 1937 Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan entered in an alliance with the Muslim League known as Sikandar-Jinnah Pact'.⁸⁴¹ Basically this agreement acknowledged the 'supremacy of All India Muslim League in the province of Punjab and stipulated that in any forth coming election or by-election Muslim Leaguers and Muslim Unionists would act unitedly. However, the Pact did not provide for a complete incorporation of the Unionist Party into the Muslim League; instead, it laid down a framework for close cooperation between two political entities that were allowed to retain their separate identities'.⁸⁴² Through this pact he wanted to prevent in roads of League in the Punjab and at the same time wanted to use League to restrain Congress. Fazlul Haq of Bengal also agreed to take help from League but was not ready to accept its interference in the internal politics of Bengal. The recognition of the utility of League for protecting their political interests made the leaders of Sindh to organize the 1938 Karachi Conference and compel the leaders of Punjab and Bengal to attend the Conference.

On the other hand the leaders of Muslim minority areas like U.P., Bihar, Orissa etc, wanted that League should work for the 'strong representation of Muslims at the centre in order to give adequate security to the minority province Muslims'.⁸⁴³

⁸⁴¹ Ikram Ali Malik, *Sikandar Jinnah Pact Aur Punjab Ki Muslim Siyasat 1937-1940* (Urdu) (Lahore: Salman Publishers, n.d.), p. 3.

⁸⁴² Iftikhar Haider Malik, *Sikandar Hayat Khan (1892-1942) A Political Biography* (Islamabad: 1985), p. 77.

⁸⁴³ Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meet Publications, 1999), p. 55.

Thus at this decisive juncture it was required of the Committee to draft such constitutional scheme which was to give provincial autonomy to the Muslim majority provinces and at the same time give greater representation of Muslims at the Centre also. Just before the session of Muslim league, the working committee finally met on 21 March 1940 at the residence of Nawab Sir Muhammad Shahnawaz of Mamdot to prepare the final draft of the resolution. The meeting was attended by 'Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, Khawja Nazimuddin, Abdur Rehman Siddiqui, Muhammad Ashiq Warsi, Liaquat Ali Khan, Muhammad Ismail Khan, Begum Muhammad Ali, Malik Barkat Ali, Sardar Aurangzeb Khan, Saadullah Khan, Abdus Sattar Essah and Abdullah Haroon'.⁸⁴⁴ The Committee, under the Chairmanship of Jinnah, after long and careful deliberations, drafted the Lahore Resolution. 'Haroon claimed that the resolution was drafted in the light of an outline placed by him in the hands of the Quaid-i-Azam in the shape of a small memorandum in February 1940'.⁸⁴⁵

The Muslim League held its Twenty Seventh Annual session at Lahore on 23-24 March 1940. More than 60,000 Muslims gathered inside the gigantic tent erected in Minto Park (now Allama Iqbal Park). Loud shouts of 'Zindabad' welcomed Jinnah as he rose to walk to the microphone. He started speaking in Urdu, but soon shifted to English, apologizing to the mass audience as he gestured towards the press corps: "The world is watching us, so let me have your permission to have my say in English".⁸⁴⁶ In his presidential address Jinnah said that, "Musalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation and they must have their homeland, their territory and their state. We wish to live in peace and harmony with our neighbors as a free and independent people. We wish our people to develop to the fullest our spiritual cultural, economic, social and political life in a way that we think best and in consonance with our own ideal and according to the genius of our people".⁸⁴⁷

M.A. Jinnah's address lowered the final curtain on any prospects for a single united independent India. On 23 March 1940 the resolution was proposed by Fazlul Haq, premier of Bengal, and seconded by Choudhary Khaliquzzamam and others including Haroon. Its most important part ran:

"...That it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the

⁸⁴⁴ Dr. Shafique Ali Khan, *The Lahore Resolution Arguments For and Against* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1988), p. 1.

⁸⁴⁵ Letter of Haroon to Quaid-i-Azam dated 11 February 1941. *QAP*, Vol. VII, p. 12.

⁸⁴⁶ Stanley Wolpert, *op.cit.*, p. 180. See also Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *The Pakistan Resolution and the Historic Lahore Session*, *op.cit.*, p. 45.

⁸⁴⁷ Dr. Waheed Ahmed, ed., *op.cit.*, pp. 486-95.

areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the North Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign".⁸⁴⁸ (See Appendix XIII)

The resolution was supported by the Sindh Muslim leadership, namely Khuhro, Abdul Majid G.M. Sayed and Abdullah Haroon. Supporting the resolution Haroon pointed out that "it was a well-known fact that the Muslims come to India through Sindh. The Muslims of Sindh were the first to meet this question, which was now before the League. In 1938, the Muslim League passed a resolution for establishing Independent States in the North-Western and the Eastern Zones. Since then, various constitutional schemes had been framed, and they were now being examined by a command that it was the duty of the Muslims to pass it without any hitch".⁸⁴⁹ Speaking on this occasion Haroon warned the Hindus that if the 'Muslims in Hindu provinces were not justly treated; the Hindus in the Muslims Provinces would be treated in the same way in which Hitler treated Jews. He hoped that the proposal embodied in the resolution would be acceptable both to the Hindus and the British, as there was no better solution of the thorny problems'.⁸⁵⁰

The resolution was unanimously adopted on 24 March 1940.

The public reaction to the Resolution was varied. The next morning the Hindu Press came out with big headlines - 'Pakistan Resolution Passed', although the word was not used by anyone in the speeches nor in the body of the Resolution. Thus the Nationalist Press supplied to the Muslim a slogan, which immediately conveyed to them the idea of a State. Khaliquzzaman recalled: "it would have taken long for the Muslim leaders to explain the Lahore Resolution and convey its real meaning and significance to them. Years of labor of the Muslim leaders to propagate its full importance amongst the masses were shortened by the Hindu press in naming the resolution the Pakistan Resolution".⁸⁵¹

The Hindu reaction was predictably hostile. The British, whose attitude matter the most, were indifferent. Linlithgow wrote to the Secretary of State Lord Zetland on 24 March 1940 that he did not "attach too much importance, to Jinnah's demand for the carving out of India into an indefinite number of so-called 'Dominions' which was as preposterous and incapable of acceptance as that which Congress was putting

⁸⁴⁸ Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Foundation of Pakistan*, Vol. II, op.cit., pp. 340-41. For complete draft of Lahore Resolution see Appendix IVX.

⁸⁴⁹ *Ibid.* pp. 343-44.

⁸⁵⁰ *Ibid.* And also in *Files of Sindh Provincial Muslim League*, Vol. III, Karachi, AFM, p. 78. Also in Ikrarn Ali Malik, *Muslim League Session 1940 and The Lahore Resolution (Documents)* (Islamabad: NiHCR, 1990), p. 108.

⁸⁵¹ S.M. Burke, *op.cit.*, p. 350. Also in Choudhary Khaliquzzaman, *Pathway To Pakistan op.cit.*, p. 237.

forward".⁸⁵² In the House of Lords, Zetland said on 18 April 1940 that the acceptance of that Lahore Resolution "would be equivalent to admitting the failure of the devoted efforts of Englishmen in India over a long period of concentrated effort: for those labors have been based upon the assumption that even in the admitted diversity of India, a measure of political unity could be achieved sufficient to enable India as a whole to take its place as an integral unit in the British Commonwealth of Nations".⁸⁵³

Mahatma Gandhi reacted very angrily and called the resolution "vivisection which cannot be tolerated", and declared: "I would employ every non-violent means to prevent... My whole soul rebels against the idea that Hinduisms and Islam represent two antagonistic cultures and doctrines. To assent to such a doctrine is for me denial of God".⁸⁵⁴ He said that "when it comes to actual decision, Muslims will want vivisection. Their good sense will prevent them...their religion will forbid the obvious suicide which partition would mean. The two nation theory is an untruth. The vast majority of the Muslims of India are converts to Islam or are descendants of converts. They did not become a separate nation as soon as they become converts".⁸⁵⁵

Abdullah Haroon while refuting Gandhi's claim for 'united India' said: "I would advise Gandhi to secure freedom for Hindus by not hindering others from achieving the same objective or by trying to dominate over them. The experience of two and half years rule of the Congress has imparted one final lesson to the Musalmans that they should under no circumstances subject themselves to the Hindu majority rule".⁸⁵⁶ He advised Gandhi to "give up his dream of placing the united India beneath the heels of Hindu Dom, and face the facts as they are".⁸⁵⁷

After the passage of Lahore Resolution, Haroon came back to Karachi and to show the support of people of Sindh for the Lahore Resolution, organized meetings of deferent branches of Sindh Muslim League and passed resolutions in favor of an independent Muslim state. The resolutions were: i) "that the Muslim masses of Sindh fully supported the Lahore Resolution. ii) That the Muslims of Sindh extended their confidence in the leadership of the Quaid. iii) That the Muslims would not accept any constitution which was not acceptable to All India Muslim League".⁸⁵⁸

Furthermore as a member of the Working Committee of League Haroon presided over the Pakistan Day celebrations held in Karachi on 19 and 21 April 1940. He made apples to all the branches of 'Sindh League to spread the Muslim League's message of Pakistan

⁸⁵² Dr. Kaniz F. Yusuf, Dr. M. Saleem Akhtar and Dr. S. Razi Wasti (eds) *Pakistan Resolution Revisited* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, (1990), p. 63.

⁸⁵³ Waheed-uz-Zaman, *Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah: Myth and Realty* (Islamabad: 1976), p. 60.

⁸⁵⁴ Nursingdas Agarwala, *The Hindu Muslim Question* (Calcutta, 1951), p. 68.

⁸⁵⁵ Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, *op.cit.*, Vol. 71, p. 388.

⁸⁵⁶ *The Times of India*, 9 April 1940. *Biography, op cit.*, p. 187.

⁸⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵⁸ *Al-Wahid*, 27 April 1940.

throughout the province especially among the rural masses of Sindh'.⁸⁵⁹ Haroon by organizing the meetings made an effort to explain and propagate Lahore Resolution among the masses of the Sindh so to create public support for the League demand of Pakistan.

SUMMARY

In this chapter an attempt has been made to understand the Manzilgah Mosque issue, the relationship between Congress Ministries and Muslims and the reasons for the passing of Lahore Resolution and to review the role of Haroon in them.

It is clear from the study that after the refusal of Allah Baksh to join Muslim League and his continuous support to the Congress made Sindh Muslim League leaders very annoyed. They were of the view point that the only way to establish League Ministry in Sindh is to remove him from the office of the premiership. The study reveals that League leaders used the Manzilgah Mosque issue the worst communal crises of the Sindh, to disgrace Allah Baksh and finally used it to defeat his ministry. But it was only Haroon who behaved sensibly throughout the crises. To avoid the rise in the communal tension Haroon tried to solve the problem through establishing dialogues between Hindus and Muslims. Like the previous issues in Sindh he worked for the development of cooperation between Hindus and Muslims and become known as a moderate leader of League.

After the elections of 1937 Congress ministries were formed in Muslim minority provinces. The authoritarian behavior of the ministries towards Muslims, the arrogance of the Congress leadership and the apathetic attitude shown by the Governors of these provinces towards the hostile Congress ministers convince the leader like Haroon that they cannot trust Congress and the provincial part of the constitution was of no good to the Muslims as it has proved to be a complete failure to protect Muslims from intimidating attitude of the Congress. So he began to think an alternative plan for the future safeguard of the Muslims which provincial part of the 1937 constitution was not able to provide to the Muslims.

An added problem in this constitution was the provision of weightage given to the minorities. In Sindh which was a Muslim majority area the weightage' reduced their numerical strength in the Assembly and as result Muslim members became hostage of Congress which played the role of king maker in Sindh politics and thus badly affected the working of the Assembly. This harmful role of Congress convinced Haroon that the only solution to these problems was the separate state for the Muslims of India.

Therefore on the occasion of Sindh Provincial Muslim League Conference in 1938 to solve the constitutional crisis Haroon proposed to divide India into Hindu India and

⁸⁵⁹ Allen Jones, *op.cit.*, p. 218.

Muslim India. As a result SPML Conference passed a resolution which proposed separate Muslim state in India. After the acceptance of Karachi Resolution by Jinnah, Muslim belonging from different walks of life proposed their own constitutional schemes. Latter considering the interest and keenness of Haroon in popularizing the Karachi Resolution, Jinnah asked him to examine the feasibility of these schemes. After a detail analysis of these schemes he in February 1940 prepared a memorandum and sent it to Jinnah.

Latter Haroon claimed that it was in the light of the memorandum presented by him to Jinnah that the final draft of Lahore Resolution was prepared. Thus the idea of separate Muslim state pronounced by Haroon at the Karachi Conference of 1938 finally took the shape of Lahore Resolution in which Muslim League accepted the creation of separate Muslim state as its ultimate goal. The main idea behind the Lahore Resolution was to ensure the constitutional safeguards for the Muslims in case of future Congress rule. Thus the Resolution was the Muslim reaction to the rule of the Congress Party in Hindu majority Provinces during 1937-1939.

Hence the idea proposed by Haroon in the Karachi Conference became a forerunner of the Lahore Resolution. Therefore it can be rightly said that Haroon and Sindh was the pioneer of the partition scheme as adopted in the form of Lahore Resolution.

CHAPTER X

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF MIR BANDEH ALI TALPUR

In March 1939 Muslim League introduced no-confidence motion against Allah Baksh Ministry. To save his premiership Allah Baksh offered 'Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah the Home and Mir Bandeh Ali the Revenue Minister ships in his cabinet.'⁸⁶⁰

They could not resist the temptation and therefore along with their supporter, deserted the League. As a result the strength of the Muslim league Assembly Party was reduced to seven members, comprising 'Shaikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, G.M. Sayed, M.A. Khuhro, M.H. Gazdar, Noor Muhammad Shah, Khair Shah and Ghulam Muhammad Khan Isran'.⁸⁶¹

At the same time the mishandling of the Manzilgah Mosque issue created doubt among the Hindu members of the Assembly about the capability of Allah Baksh to handle the situation effectively and to provide security and protection to the Hindu community. To decide about the future course of action Mr. Nihchaldas Vazirani, one of the two Hindu Ministers, summoned a meeting of representatives of Sindh Hindu Panchayats at Karachi. This meeting gave directive to their Ministers to withdraw from the cabinet and sit in opposition. Accordingly the two Hindu Ministers tendered their resignations and come over to the opposition. This pull out of the Hindu Ministers deprived Allah Baksh the required majority to remain in the office. Hence he had no alternative but to resign. But Governor refused to accept his resignation in a hope that he will be able to save his Ministry by convincing the member of the Assembly to continue their support for Allah Baksh. After failing in his attempt to gather support for Allah Baksh, Governor asked him to stay in the office until a new government could be formed.

This situation led the different groups in the Assembly to enter into negotiations with other group to form a new Ministry. For example, the Federation of Sindh Hindu Panchayats appointed a committee and authorized it to carry on the negotiation with any party who was ready to give assurance for safeguarding the interests of the Hindu community. The main issues which they wanted to be tackled by the new government were: 1. "Appointment of a Tribunal to inquire into i) causes of Sukkur riots, and ii) the Muslim claim that Manzilgah was a Mosque building. 2. Payment of compensation to sufferers of Sukkur riots. 3. Non-interference with the procedure of law so far the Sukkur riot cases were concerned. 4. Percentage of communal representation in

⁸⁶⁰ Hidayatullah was the Leader and Mir Bandeh Ali was the Deputy Leader of Muslim League Assembly Party.

⁸⁶¹ Khalid Shamsul Hasan, *Sindh's Fight For Pakistan* (Karachi: Shamsul Hasan Foundation, 1992), p. X.

services. 5. Adequate measures for the protection of life and property in the disturbed areas. 6. Introduction of joint electorates in Sukkur and Shikarpur municipalities".⁸⁶²

Similarly Khuhro, the leader of Muslim League Assembly party seeing this situation 'started making efforts to remove Allah Baksh and establish League Ministry'.⁸⁶³ He was of the view point "the plight of the Muslims in the wake of the Manzilgah agitation required a sympathetic government".⁸⁶⁴ He was fully convinced that if for the formation of League Ministry they had to compromise with the Hindus to get their support he was ready to do so. To convey his thoughts to Jinnah he on 3 February 1940 sent a telegram in which he wrote: "Muslim public opinion and my Assembly Party strongly favor reasonable compromise with the Congress. League and Congress combined could form stable Ministries in provinces following national programmes ameliorating condition Muslim masses in majority provinces. Allah Baksh Ministry here exploiting disagreement between two parties. Respectfully urge for honorable settlement and save Sindh".⁸⁶⁵ He sent copies of this telegram to Sir Sikandar Hayat and Haroon who was in Delhi. Haroon on receiving this telegram as a president of Sindh provincial Muslim League he sent a telegram to Khuhro instructing him that "Leaguers should resist entering into an alternate coalition ministry as such an outcome would jeopardize Muslim interests".⁸⁶⁶

As Khuhro had made up his mind therefore to induce Haroon to agree to his arrangement he telephoned him and tried to change his mind by persuading him that the League should seize the opportunity to assume power and office, especially since Allah Baksh—the League's arch enemy, was now out of the way'.⁸⁶⁷ After long and difficult arguments Khuhro was able to convince both Haroon and Jinnah to consent Sindh League to make efforts for the formation of coalition Ministry with Hindu Independent Party. In this regard on 20 February Haroon issued a Press statement which said: "If the Muslim League assembly Party can be a party to the formation of a coalition ministry in Sindh, I do not understand what there is to prevent the consummation of such a development, especially as this is bound to bring good relations and brotherliness between the two communities in Sindh".⁸⁶⁸

Afterwards Muslim Leaguers entered into negotiations with the Hindus. In the mean time Nihchaldas prepared 21 demands of Hindus which were discussed during the meetings. Hindus offered their support to the Muslims provided their 21 demands (See Appendix XIV) were accepted and asked the Muslim to do away with the Muslim

⁸⁶² G.M. Sayed, *Struggle for New Sindh* (Sehwan Sharif: Sain Publishers, 1996), p. 64.

⁸⁶³ After the desertion of Hidayatullah and Bandeh Ali, Khuhro was made the leader of the League Assembly party.

⁸⁶⁴ Hamida Khuhro, *Mohammed Ayub Khuhro — A Life of Courage in Politics* (Lahore: Ferozsons Ltd, 1998), p. 190.

⁸⁶⁵ *Ibid.* p. 191.

⁸⁶⁶ Allen Jones, *Muslim Politics and the Growth of the Muslim League in Sindh, 1935-1941*, An unpublished Ph. D thesis, Duke University, 1977, p. 204.

⁸⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶⁸ *Daily Gazette*, 20 February 1940.

League party in the Assembly and creating a new party known as the Sindh Nationalist Party. Finally Muslim League Leaders accepted all the demands of Hindus.

After the attainment of the accord the next issue to resolve was the selection of the new Premier. G.M. Sayed has described this situation in these words, "before this when Allah Baksh came into power, the Governor had accepted him with the support of 23 members. But this time, when the Khan Bahadur was to be ousted from office, the Governor thought it fit to demand the strength and support of 31 members before he would call upon any one to form Ministry. To satisfy this demand of the Governor, we had to find out additional members".⁸⁶⁹ Muslim first got in touch with Pir Illahi Bux who agreed to support them but under the Allah Baksh pressure he went back from his word of honor. Then they make contact with Mir Bandeh Ali Khan. He agreed to join the new party in the Assembly only if he was made the Premier. Muslims discussed this development with the Congress but it did not give any assurance of support to Bandeh Ali. With this negative response of the Congress it was left to the Muslims either to form the Government with Mir Bandeh Ali or to give up the idea. As Muslim members were desperate to form Ministry therefore they accepted Mir Bandeh Ali as a new Premier of Sindh.

In the mean time Mir Bandeh Ali brought together the support of Hindu Independents and the League members enough to form the ministry. As a result the Governor of Sindh, Sir Lancelot Graham called 'Mir Bandeh Ali to form the Government. On-18 March 1940 he was sworn in as Chief Minister of Sindh'.⁸⁷⁰ His team of ministers included, G.M. Sayed, Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, M.A. Khuhro belonging to the Muslim League; Rai Sahib Gokhaldas Mewaldas of the Congress and Nihchaldas Wazirani of Hindu Sabha'.⁸⁷¹ Bandeh Ali emphasized the need for communal harmony and explained that the formation of his National Party in the Assembly was "outward manifestation of the in born desire of communal accord and mutual good will" in which the "minority communities share willingly the burden of joint responsibility".⁸⁷² Despite the Ministry's outward show of sincerity and commitment in confronting the difficult task of restoring the communal peace, few had much hope that the ministry would survive very long. *Civil & Military Gazette* in an editorial expressed its serious doubts that "the National Party may be said to prove not so much miracle of political unity as the truth of the old adage of politics furnishing instances of strange bed fellow", as the leaders of blocks have shown themselves in the past to be of a "very mercurial temperament politically and proved militant against the permanence of the previous ministries".⁸⁷³

⁸⁶⁹ G.M. Sayed, *op.cit.*, p. 70

⁸⁷⁰ *Fortnightly Report of the Governor*, 1940.

⁸⁷¹ *Civil & Military Gazette*, 19 March, 1940.

⁸⁷² *Ibid.* Also *Daily Gazette*, 20 March, 1940.

⁸⁷³ *Civil & Military Gazette*, 21 March 1940.

On 21 April 1940, Council of the Sindh League met under the president ship of Sir Abdullah Haroon, which gave its support to 'Mir Ministry showing its confidence in it'.⁸⁷⁴ The resolution stated:

"The Council is confident that Sindh Assembly National Party will run the administration of the province in such a manner that the legitimate and fundamental rights of all the communities in the province are fully protected and every section of the population enjoys the fullest measure of the sense of security".⁸⁷⁵

The Hindus on the other hand presented 21-point demands to Mir Bandeh Ali and said that if accepted, then they would support the ministry. To get the support of Hindu members of the assembly Mir Bandeh Ali agreed to implement the demands. The Council of the League considered these demands and opined: "While this Council is in favor of ensuring to the Hindu minority the medium amount of security in all respects; it is also of the view that three or four out of the 21-conditions, on the basis of which the new government has been created, are such that there will be difficulties left. in the achievements, in the fullest measure of the purpose of re-establishment of inter-communal peace and harmony which the Council understands, is the real object behind the new arrangement".⁸⁷⁶ The League wanted full control over the Mir Ministry for two reasons - firstly, to carry out the economic uplift of the poor masses; to make large scale membership of the League and secondly, to popularize the League objectives to achieve its goal of Pakistan. Therefore, the Council prepared the 'Instrument of Instructions' for the guidance of the Ministers owing allegiance to the Muslim League. The instructions were sent to the ministers of PWD, Education and Finance, for implementation and progress to be reported to the Council from time to time. According to the 'Instrument of Instructions'

- i) "A Tribunal consisting of Muslim League and Hindu representatives to be presided over by an officer of District Judge position shall be immediately appointed to investigate into the complaints of bribery, harassment, wrongful confinement, extortion, intimidation etc., being preferred

⁸⁷⁴ Proceedings of Council of Sindh Provincial Muslim League, 21 April 1940, QAP, F.580, pp. 31-4. Those who attended the meeting included: Sheikh Abdul Majid, G.M. Sayed, and Khuhro Ministers, Syed Ali Mohammad Rashdi, General Secretary of the League, K.B. Ghulam Mohammed Khan Isran, Syed Khair Shah Syed Hussain Bux Shah. Mohammad Bux Mangrio. Chaudhry Ghulam Mohammed. Moulana Sanaullah, Moulvi Mohammed Ismail, Aga Nazar Ali Khan, Haji Naziruddin, Aga Ghulam Nabi Khan Sarhandi, Shaikh Wajid Ali, Mohammed Hasan Sohro, M.H. Gazdar, Maulana Zahoarul Hasan, Aga Abdul Sattar, Syed Hisamuddin Shah, Syed Mohammed Ishaq Shah, K.B. Mohammed Ismail Khan and Syed Ghulam Hyder Shah.

⁸⁷⁵ *Ibid.* Resolution was moved by Ali Mohammad Rashdi and supported by Aga Ghulam Nabi Pathan and adopted unanimously after six hours discussion, in the course of which the three ministers of the Muslim League Party were also heard.

⁸⁷⁶ Enclosure with the letter of Syed Ali Mohammad Rashdi, General Sec., SPML to Ministers of PWD, Education and Finance Dept., April 22, 1940, QAP, F.917, pp. 28-35.

against police officers and their 'Mushirs' who investigated cases arising out of Sukkur riots. The Government should abide by the verdict of that Tribunal in awarding punishment to guilty persons.

- ii) The operation of the Frontier Regulation in the Districts of Larkana, Karachi, Dadu and Jacobabad, of the Criminal Tribes Act and the Badmashi Section throughout Sindh, be stopped immediately by an executive order, with a view to protect people against oppression and harassment.
- iii) The constructive programme laid down in the League Working Committee Resolution of January 12, 1939 and in the Constitution of the League should be enforced before next Budget session.
- iv) Ministers shall hold no executive posts in the organization (Muslim League).
- v) The Premier shall not issue statements regarding All-India matters, which are opposed to the general policy of the Muslim of India, represented by the All-India Muslim League.
- vi) Joint electorates shall not be introduced in the local bodies".⁸⁷⁷

The Sindh League was sincere in its endeavors to ease up the communal tension mainly arising out of the disputed status of Manzilgah Mosque Sukkur. Its Working Committee authorized Sir Abdullah Haroon to seek cooperation of the various organizations and public men representing the minority community – the Hindus – through public opinion and joint efforts. Therefore, Haroon issued invitation to 'Hindu organizations for the joint Conference but they turned down his request'.⁸⁷⁸ The Sindh League also discussed the question of communal peace in Sindh with the deputation of Hindu Sabha and it was agreed that, "the Hindu Sabha would join its hands with Muslims for communal peace through stabilization of the present government; Hindu Press would adopt less quarrel some tone in presentation of news and views; League President, Sir Abdullah Haroon would explore various avenues for bringing sense of security and would seek cooperation of Pir of Bharchundi in this connection; and the Premier and League President would visit Sukkur and try to bring Hindus and Muslims together for evolving agreed formula for communal peace".⁸⁷⁹ Haroon got in touch with the Pir Sahib of Bharchundi and secured his assistance. Pir of Bharchundi asked his disciples to

⁸⁷⁷ *Ibid.* Also in K.K. Aziz, *Muslim Under Congress Rule 1937-1939* (Islamabad: NIHCR, 1979), p. 100.

⁸⁷⁸ Statement issued by Sindh Provincial League Office, 10 November 1940, *Abdullah Haroon Collection* (hereafter referred to *AHC*), Vol. 4.

⁸⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

cooperate and help in bringing peace in the province. However, the Hindus did not approve the agreement.

The Governor was not satisfied with the Premier and his team of ministers because of the continuous friction and intrigues among them, which created an atmosphere of mistrust. In this regard Governor reported to Viceroy saying that, "Mir Bandeh Ali relies on his status as a representative of the last ruling dynasty of Sindh. You have had a talk with him and you will not be surprised to hear that he is utterly incompetent as minister and, if possible more incompetent as Premier. He has no capacity for inspiring his colleagues or controlling them and he has been guilty himself of interfering most improperly in matters not within his portfolio".⁸⁸⁰

However, the Governor was satisfied with the conduct of Sheikh Abdul Majid, a converted Hindu, about whom he said "with no property and no interests of corrupt nature but something of the fanaticism of a convert in the first generation". He further said: "I like him personally and my finance Secretary reports of him that he is honestly endeavoring to understand the position and is prepared to accept advice. He is, or recently has been Secretary of the Sindh Branch of Muslim League but I have never found him tiresome on that account".⁸⁸¹ As regards G.M. Sayed, Graham stated that "he does not appear to bear any malice but neither his colleagues nor I find him an easy person ... I find him rather a strain on my patience and on one occasion I rather lost control at a cabinet meeting and told him he was talking nonsense. He protested and I withdrew my remarks ... We have been rather good friends ever since; but his characteristic has not changed".⁸⁸² Governor's remarks regarding M.A. Khuhro were more bitter, serious and insulting. He said "in the first place Khuhro is quite shameless in his attempts to secure promotions for Muslims and discouragement in every form for Hindus in P.W.D. Khuhro is probably one of the most dishonest men ever sworn in as Minister. He is entirely shameless as a liar and has no objection to be told that he is a liar".⁸⁸³ Governor and his Secretary Public Works Department were busy endeavoring to prevent Khuhro from corrupt deals and he was certain that a time would not arise when he would have to ask Viceroy to consider the evidence against Khuhro to justify his dismissal. In concluding remarks, Graham said: "I remember being warned by Brabourne before I came here that should find Khuhro the most dishonest man in Sindh; but I was not aware that I should have the pleasure of having him as one of my ministers".⁸⁸⁴

Governor, however, showed extraordinary respect for the Hindu ministers, namely, Rai sahib Gokhaldas and Nichaldas Vazirani. His opinion about Rai Sahib was that he was

⁸⁸⁰ Hamida Khuhro, *op.cit.*, p. 200.

⁸⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

⁸⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

"a rather solid pleasant Hindu Zamindars with less education than the ordinary Hindu in politics and more educated than the ordinary Zamindars", and "we get on quite happily together and I have no complaints against him", He described Vazirani as "capable and ambitious but beyond his ambition he has no particular axe to grind except the Hindu axe".⁸⁸⁵

Meanwhile to reduce the communal tension Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, the Finance Minister, with the close cooperation of G.M. Sayed, Jethmal Parsram and some other Hindus formed a secular organization entitle 'Sindh People's Association, where Hindus and Muslims were to meet, discuss controversial issues and keep in touch with public opinion and educate it on the right lines'.⁸⁸⁶ Furthermore the Association was to 'inspire a sense of confidence in the minds of the rural population and to promote unity between the two communities for communal peace'.⁸⁸⁷ Its first meeting was held on 18 June 1940 under the chairmanship of Sheikh Abdul Majid. He stressed the necessity of organizing volunteer corps in the city (Sukkur) for civic guard duty. Jethmal Parsram said in this address that the Association "wanted to establish a volunteer federation in Karachi and to open branches throughout Sindh", and referring to the Sukkur Manzilgah Mosque dispute he said that "he intended shortly to proceed to Sukkur, where he would persuade the Hindus to settle the Manzilgah question amicably with the Muslims and handover the Manzilgah to them unconditionally".⁸⁸⁸ However, the Association could not live long because of the hostile attitude of the Congress. There were many reasons for this attitude. Firstly, "as the new party was non-communal in its nature and provincial in its scope, it did not enjoy the favor of the Congress, as the latter considered it to be a likely rival which, as it gained strength, might weaken the Congress in Sindh, where its position had already deteriorated and its reputation had suffered owing to its wrong policies". Secondly, "Congress, which had lost in K.B. Allah Baksh its stalwart as a nationalist Muslim premier was anxious to bring him back into office, therefore, it considered the Association as an impediment in its way".⁸⁸⁹

Meanwhile during Mir ministry the communal hatred and criticism between Hindu and Muslim communities continuously grew. It not only weakens the ministry further but it found itself unable to end the continuing cry of fear and insecurity especially among the Hindus in upper Sindh. Occasional robbery or murder or assault became the order of the day. These crimes reached a climax in July 1940 when the murder of Mr. Pamnani a Congress Hindu member of the Assembly was committed.

⁸⁸⁵ *Ibid*, p. 200.

⁸⁸⁶ G.M. Sayed, *op.cit.*, p. 73.

⁸⁸⁷ J.H. Taunton to Conrad Smith, 10 July 1940, cited in Khadim Hussain Soomro, *op cit.*, p. 77.

⁸⁸⁸ *Ibid*.

⁸⁸⁹ G.M. Sayed, *op.cit.*, pp. 73-74.

'Communal tension further increased particularly after it was suspected that the son of Pir Bharchundi, a Muslim spiritual leader, was involved in the said murder'.⁸⁹⁰ The Governor of Sindh expressed his view that the communal peace would not be restored in Sindh until the Government's final judgment on Manzilgah Mosque was announced. In the mid 1940s, Haroon was apprehensive about the weak position of the League and therefore continued to look for ways to enhance the party's influence, particularly over its ministers in the cabinet. Haroon saw an opportunity to utilize the Manzilgah issue for the benefit of the League, by using it to bring pressure on the League ministers to conform to the League's policy and discipline. So he wrote a letter to the ministers 'calling on them to resign, giving as reasons their support of joint electorates and their failure to give adequate relief to the Muslims arrested in Sukkur'.⁸⁹¹ The ministers ignore the letter. To put pressure on the ministers Haroon called the meeting of the Sindh League Council in early July. 'At the meeting Haroon introduced a motion that the League ministers should resign as they had betrayed the Organization. This motion was defeated. However, another expressed confidence in the ministers'.⁸⁹² Thus the ministers again emerged victorious in the second confrontation with Haroon. The outcome suggested that the majority's sentiment in the League were still on the side of the ministers and that Haroon who was trying to keep the provincial League in line with the policy of the All-India Muslim League, now found himself politically isolated within his own party. Thus the League in Sindh had become more responsive to the political currents and issues in the province than to the dictates of the parent League and its all-India considerations.

While Haroon directed his attention to organizing the League, the League ministers rejoiced over their victory in the intra-party struggle. Regarding this in writing to the Viceroy, Graham mentioned, "My Muslim League ministers claim to have had a great triumph over Sir Abdullah Haroon at the Muslim League meeting".⁸⁹³ The success of the ministers was, however of little benefit on the wider stage of ministerial politics in Sindh. In fact, ironically, the outcome of confrontation between Haroon and the ministers placed the ministers in a weaker position because by prolonging their quarrel with Haroon, they sacrificed any formal League support, which could have served to strengthen their hand in the ministry.

During the War Haroon was appointed member of the Governor's War Committee. He was extended invitation from Governor to attend its meeting on 20 June. 'Haroon turned down the invitation because of the resolution of the all-India Muslim League on the policy of the League over the war affairs'.⁸⁹⁴ However, the Governor enquired from

⁸⁹⁰ QAP, F.580, pp. 32-4.

⁸⁹¹ Allen Keith Jones, *op.cit.*, p. 217.

⁸⁹² *Ibid.*

⁸⁹³ Graham to Viceroy, 25 July 1940, *Linlithgow Papers*, Correspondence of Linlithgow from 1936-1942, National Documentation Centre, Islamabad. F.256, pp. 85-6.

⁸⁹⁴ Haroon to PS to Governor, 20 June 1940, *AHC*, vol. 4: 32.

Haroon "whether you wish to withdraw your acceptance of a seat on that Committee, or whether it is your desire that the matter should be kept pending as decision of the All-India Muslim League".⁸⁹⁵ Haroon, however, wished the Governor to keep the matter open pending as the decision of the Muslim League. Haroon stated, "in fact, the decision of the League depended upon the negotiations which would be carried on between the Viceroy and Jinnah – it was however for the Governor to think if the work of the Committee would suffer, he would be prepared to withdraw from the Committee."⁸⁹⁶ However, 'Haroon resigned from War Committee as per the decision of the Muslim League'.⁸⁹⁷

Meanwhile political situation in Sindh, as reported in the press, became unsatisfactory because of the 'efforts being made chiefly by the officials and to some extent by the Hindus to put the Moslems in the wrong'.⁸⁹⁸ There was strong move by these parties to create detrimental conditions for the Muslims. To clear the situation Haroon called a meeting of the League Working Committee and the Council on 6 November 1940. He requested Jinnah to attend the meeting, as in fact, it was to be decided whether the "present League ministers should continue or resign". Haroon was eager to seek guidance of Jinnah at this critical hour, as he feared that "if an unsound decision is arrived at in this meeting it will recoil on the general Moslem position in the field of Indian politics".⁸⁹⁹ Jinnah's reply was not encouraging as he said: "I do not see really what useful purpose will be served by my coming to Karachi, when even the 35 members of your Assembly are hopelessly divided", and "it would be unwise for me to come and jump into the unknown".⁹⁰⁰ Jinnah, however, advised Haroon to organize the Muslims of Sindh on the League platform, which would bear fruit.

The unstable political situation continued and the relations between the two communities deteriorated further. Responding to this negative trend, appeals from various quarters issued, calling for a climate conducive to communal peace. The Hitvada reported that 'Abdullah Haroon has sent a resolution dated 6 October 1940 passed by the Working committee of the Sindh Provincial Muslim League to Gandhi expressing the hope that the Hindu organizations in Sindh would cooperate with him in easing the communal situation'.⁹⁰¹ In response, Gandhi addressed a message to Abdullah Haroon and offered his help and cooperation in fostering an atmosphere of communal harmony in Sindh and said: "I wrote as a friend, not as an opponent... But

⁸⁹⁵ PS to Governor to Haroon 21 June 1940, *Ibid*.

⁸⁹⁶ Haroon to PS to Governor, 20 June 1940, *AHC*, vol. 4: 34.

⁸⁹⁷ Haroon to Sharif, 7 July 1940, *Ibid*. Also *Bombay Chronicle*, 24 June 1940.

⁸⁹⁸ Haroon to Jinnah, 19 October 1940. *QAP*, F.274: 124, Also Agenda of the Sindh League, 22 October 1940, *AHC*, Vol. 4.

⁸⁹⁹ Haroon to Jinnah, 1940, *Jinnah Papers, Jinnah's correspondence with Sindh League Leaders from 1936 to 1942*. Quaid-i-Azam Papers Cell (*QAP*), Islamabad.

⁹⁰⁰ Jinnah to Haroon, 26 October 1940, *QAP*, F. 274:128.

⁹⁰¹ Indian Annual Register, July-December 1940, Vol. II, p. 34. Also *Collected works of Mahatma Gandhi*, Vol. LXXIII, p. 97. (Hereinafter to be *CWMG*).

you can expect me to help in the production of a friendly atmosphere in Sindh".⁹⁰² Gandhi also instructed the local Congress leaders that "the sole concern of Congress in Sindh should be to rid the province of the terror that is raging there. If they cannot do that, they better retire from public life".⁹⁰³ Gandhi also sent a nationalist Muslim lady, 'Amtul Salam to Sindh to help local leaders in Sindh in preventing the murders of Hindus and requested Haroon to help her in her endeavors'.⁹⁰⁴

Meanwhile disheartened by the behavior of the ministers, G.M. Sayed wanted some change inside the ministry. Sayed, the minister of Education in August 1940 told his colleagues that he felt "a strong urge to resign rather than take upon my shoulders the odium of the existing stage of affairs".⁹⁰⁵ As he contemplated resigning, Sayed considered ways in which he could resign and yet at the same time strengthen the prospects for more progressive Sindh. So he approached Allah Baksh with an offer of two cabinet seats (his own and Abdul Majid's) with a view to persuading the former chief minister to join hands with the Leaguers as a preliminary step to forming a united front of Muslims in the Assembly although he knew Allah Baksh would never join the League as he had already backed out of the agreement with Jinnah in October 1938 and proved to be the bitter opponent of the League. Sayed was convinced that once the Muslims in Sindh formed a solid and united block the power and influence of the new vested interests could be broken and concrete steps could be taken for the uplift and betterment of the poor, mostly Muslim masses. Sayed's hopes were not fulfilled at this time, as Allah Baksh turned down his offer saying he would not consent to be merely a minister and added that the only condition under which he would join was if "Mir Bandeh Ali retired in his favor and his old enemy K.B. Khuhro, resigned from the ministry altogether".⁹⁰⁶ At the same time there was also rift between the League ministers and the Governor over policy matters. Governor reported against the ministers to Viceroy saying that, "my secretaries find Khuhro and Sayed most difficult to get on with. Each one of them appears to enjoy snubbing his secretary and dismissing his notes in a very summary fashion".⁹⁰⁷

The Congress High command took advantage of precarious political situation in Sindh. To settle the ministerial controversy, Abul Kalam Azad, President of the Congress came to Karachi in November 1940. G.M. Sayed, Khuhro and Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, the League ministers went to welcome Azad at the Airport. They also entered into negotiations with him regarding the ministry affairs without the League approval. This

⁹⁰² M.K. Gandhi to Abdullah Haroon 12 October 1940, QAP, F.274-123.

⁹⁰³ M.K. Gandhi to Chotiram Gidwani, dated nil, CWMG. Vol. LXXIII, p. 153.

⁹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p. 154.

⁹⁰⁵ *Daily Gazette*, 28 August 1940 also in G.M. Sayed, *Struggle for a New Sindh* (Sehwan Sharif: Sain Publishers, 1996), p. 60.

⁹⁰⁶ G.M. Sayed, *op.cit.*, p. 61.

⁹⁰⁷ Governor's letter to the Viceroy, Linlithgow Papers, *op.cit.*, 1940.

discussion culminated in signing of the agreement on 21 November, between Khuhro, Sayed and Azad, which became a secret document. The agreement ran:

1. "That Sheikh Abdul Majid will resign and K.B. Allah Bux will be taken up in his palace, as Minister.
2. By about 15 February Mir Bandeh Ali will resign his premiership and either Sir Ghulam Hussain or K.B. Allah Baksh shall become the premier.
3. If Mir Bandeh Ali decides to stay as minister one of the two gentlemen K.B. Khuhro or G.M. Sayed shall make room for him".⁹⁰⁸

To implement the '*Azad Agreement*' Majid refused to resign, however, 'G.M. Sayed resigned from the minister ship and made room for K.B. Allah Baksh who was taken up as minister in his place'.⁹⁰⁹ His inclusion in the ministry was welcomed by the Congress and by some members of the Hindu party, but not in Muslim League circles. G.M. Sayed's action was treated in the League camp to be Azad's bidding; therefore, the Congress became jubilant as some clauses of *Azad Agreement* were implemented. The *Daily Gazette* in its 23 November issue remarked about the negotiations: "Moslem ministers kick out Haji Abdullah Haroon's pronouncement ... Moslem ministers instead of calling on Haji Abdullah in the morning went and called on the Congress President".⁹¹⁰ G.M. Sayed stated about his action that "I realized that though I had not acted with the due circumspection in making this agreement on my own initiative, yet as a responsible man, it was my bounden duty to keep my word. I therefore immediately proceeded along with K.B. Allah Bux Soomro to the Government House and placed my resignation in the hands of Governor".⁹¹¹ The resignation of Sayed was accepted on 23 November 1940 and on the same day Allah Baksh was sworn in. To manage this situation a '16-member Joint Parliamentary Advisory Committee comprising representatives' form among all the different parties in the Assembly was appointed with the object of advising and assisting the government in legislative and other matters'.⁹¹² The Governor reported to Viceroy about the reshuffling of the ministry due to intervention of Azad.⁹¹³ He stated: "Two of my Muslim League and also by the premier along had suggested the return of Allah Bux to me before the Maulana came

⁹⁰⁸ G.M. Sayed and Khuhro to Nihchaldas Vazirani, 22 November 1940, QAP, F.274. Also in "Report of Abdullah Haroon". 21 November 1940 AHC, Vol. 4, p. 35.

⁹⁰⁹ Khadim Hussain Soomro, *Allah Bux Soomro: Apostle of secular harmony* (Sehwan: Sharif: Sain Publishers, 2002), p. 102.

⁹¹⁰ *The Daily Gazette*, 23 November 1940.

⁹¹¹ G.M. Sayed, *op.cit.*, p. 93.

⁹¹² Khadim Hussain Soomro, *op.cit.* The members of Parliamentary Committee were: Mir Bandeh Ali Khan (in the chair), G.M. Sayed (Secretary), K.B. Muhammad Ayub Khuhro, Shaikh Abdul Majid, Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, Pir Illahi Bux, Mohammad Hashim Gazdar, Mr. Newandram, Nihchaldas, R.S. Gokaldas, R.K. Sidhwa, Mr. Naraindas Beechar, Dr. Choithram, Mr. Fraser (European) One form Hindu independent and Allah Bux Soomro.

⁹¹³ Graham to Conran Smith, 5 December 1940 cited in Khadim Hussain Soomro, *Ibid.*

here, and at the request of the premier I had discussed the matter with Allah Bux ... Mir has given an undertaking that he will vacate the post of premier before the next budget session. I do not really know who is responsible for obtaining this acquiescence on the part of Mir, but I have never concealed from him my own frank opinion that he is entirely unfit for the minister".⁹¹⁴

Haroon was at Delhi when new developments took place in Sindh on account of arrival of Congress' President. He however, sensed some foul play by the Congress; therefore, he sent telegram to Majid, Khuhro and Sayed not to negotiate with Azad as it "would be harmful in the League's interests" and requested them to wire true position about what was happening there. Only Khuhro replied which was "nothing decided yet".⁹¹⁵ The political situation appeared to be so serious that Haroon and Ali Mohammad Rashdi had to cancel their further stay in Delhi and reached Karachi on 21 November, G.M. Sayed and Khuhro disclosed nothing to Rashdi about their intention of entering into an agreement with Azad. On the evening of 21 November, Haroon came to know about the 'Pact' entered into by them with Azad. To grasp the situation Haroon issued a press statement declaring that "Muslim League had not authorized any individual minister to represent it in the negotiations with the Congress President, therefore the Sindh League, as an organization stands committed to nothing in this connection unless a specific decision was taken from the Sindh League Council."⁹¹⁶

Haroon prepared the charges against the League ministers, namely, Majid, Sayed and Khuhro for their misconduct and for tarnishing the reputation of the League and sent these charges to Jinnah. Haroon was not sure whether the League High Command and Jinnah or the Council of the Sindh League, which was commanded by the ministers, would approve his action. His allegation against Majid was, "That he being a member of the League violated resolution No. 1 of the Working Committee, All-India Muslim League passed on 2 and 3 July 1939, by negotiating with the President of the All-India Congress Committee. The question of Hindu-Muslim settlement in the province of Sindh which is implied by the nature of the composition of the Cabinet which has been brought into existence as a result thereof. That he has agreed to work under non-League Muslim Premier and with K.B. Allah Baksh, President Azad Conference ... and an avowed enemy of the Moslem League".⁹¹⁷

Regarding the allegations against Sayed and Khuhro Haroon stated, "That they violated the Working Committee All India Muslim Leagues' resolution of 2 and 3 July 1939 is so

⁹¹⁴ Graham to Viceroy, 12 December 1940, *Ibid.*

⁹¹⁵ Report of Abdullah Haroon, 21 November 1940, *ANC*, Vol. 4, p. 35. The General Secretary Ali Mohammad Rashdi from Delhi by wire requested Sayed not to have anything with Azad.

⁹¹⁶ Haroon's Press Statement, 21 November 1940, *Ibid.* Also *QAP*, F.274, p. 131.

⁹¹⁷ Report of Abdullah Haroon sent to Jinnah, 21 November 1940, Jinnah's correspondence with Sindh League leaders from 1939-1942, *Muslim League Achieves*, Karachi. Azad Conference was held by the Congress under the president ship of Allah Baksh where he denounced the Pakistan' and abused the Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

far as they negotiated and arrived at a settlement with the Congress President on the basis of a secret agreement with him. That they did it in defiance of the letter of the President, Provincial Muslim League dated 21 November 1939. That these defiant actions under-mined the prestige of the League".⁹¹⁸

Jinnah was not in a position to take severe action against any Muslim League leader, because by doing that he could lose support of some powerful Sindhi Muslim leaders at the time when the League had given wider publicity to the goal of Pakistan. So Jinnah's position in Sindh was that "you can bring the horse to stream but cannot force him to drink".⁹¹⁹ These Sindhi leaders were powerful in the provincial politics and loved very much to remain in power in any way. Therefore Jinnah had to deal with the situation politically and had to put them under control, while Haroon had to seal his lips and wait for the political situation to become conducive in Sindh.

In the mean time some Hindu members of the Assembly started criticizing the Pact and Nihchaldas for being party to this arrangement. The Hindu Press denounce the pact and to break the Muslim harmony described it as a blow to the Muslim League organization in Sindh. Whereas the Congress party members started intrigues and stressed Allah Baksh not to rest satisfied till he had obtained a guarantee from Muslim members who had signed the Pact that he would shortly be made the Premier. 'In case his demand was not accepted they advice him to break the Ministry and form his own, with their support'.⁹²⁰ The result of all these activities was that friction grew among the Muslim members of the Assembly.

To settle the matter Jinnah on 16 December 1940 visited Karachi. During his stay in Karachi he held meetings with various people belonging to all communities and also prominent Muslim and Hindu leaders and come to the conclusion that after the formation of coalition Ministry, Muslim League in Sindh had received a set-back. Though the settlement was not endorsed by the Sindh Provincial Muslim League but in the interest of the League he was ready not to interrupt it. After a long and difficult discussions Jinnah could not persuade the Muslim members to become responsible to League and became well aware of the disunity that existed among the Muslim members of the Assembly. In this discouraging situation Jinnah suggested 'that the only honorable course left to the League ministers was to come out of the Ministry and allow other groups to conduct Government as best as they could'.⁹²¹

Jinnah also held meeting with the Governor of Sindh in which he complained that the Muslim League had no voice in the settlement of policy matters. Jinnah therefore advised the Governor to 'dissolve the present assembly with a view to forming a stable

⁹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹¹⁹ QAP, F.274. p. 134.

⁹²⁰ G.M. Sayed, *op.cit.*, p. 96.

⁹²¹ Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, *op.cit.*, p. 200.

ministry. However the Governor turned down advice of Jinnah'.⁹²² In an interview to *Star of India* Jinnah about the Congress in Sindh observed that, "One aim of the Congress in this province seems particularly to create disruption and disunity between Muslim although a large body of Hindus disapproved of it and in fact are opposed to such maneuvers".⁹²³

The Sindh League Council held its session in the presence of Jinnah that considered and surveyed the entire situation with regard to the organization of the League in the province, both inside and outside the legislature. Jinnah issued instructions that the Premier Mir Bandeh Ali Khan and the ministers K.B. Khuhro and Shaikh Abdul Majid to form a League party within the assembly by the end of January 1941 and then the political situation would be considered *de novo*. It was decided that 'Muslim League members of the assembly to join the Muslim League Party and establish complete solidarity and unity between Muslims'.⁹²⁴ The Council appointed a 'committee of seven members with G.M. Sayed as chairman, to organize a widespread campaign for the formation of League committees all over Sindh and to educate the masses on the policy of the League'.⁹²⁵ The Congress presumed these steps of the League in negative sense. Dr. Choitram, President of Sindh Provincial Congress Committee, in an interview said: "Though in ordinary circumstances no importance be attached to the premier's (Bandeh Ali's) signing of the Muslim League pledge yet in as much as it affects Maulana Azad's arrangement, it is a matter of concern ... that he would meet Maulana Azad at Lahore on December 27 to discuss the latest development in the province and decide the attitude of the Congress party in the Assembly".⁹²⁶

The beginning of the year 1941 became the real test for Jinnah and Haroon on two issues: (i) to keep the League ministers under their control over the ministerial tangle arising out of the implementation of 'Azad Pact' by the League ministers, and (ii) on the introduction of Joint electorates in Corporations accepted by Mir Bandeh Ali for seeking support from Hindu assemblymen to his ministry, which was against the declared policy of the League.

Joint Electorate Controversy

At the time of the formation of the ministry, Mir Bandeh Ali accepted 21-Point demands of the Hindus for their support. One of the demands was the introduction of joint electorates in Corporations in Sindh province. The Council of the Sindh League, chaired by Abdullah Haroon in April 1940, considered these demands and incorporated its

⁹²² *Ibid.*

⁹²³ *Star of India*, 26 December 1940.

⁹²⁴ *The Leader*, 26 December 1940.

⁹²⁵ The other members of the Organization Committee were: Kazi Fazullah, Advocate, Larkana, Mr. M.H. Gazdar, M.L.A. Karachi, Mr. Ghulam Nabi Khan Pathan, Zamindar, Sultankot, Mr. Yousuf A. Haroon, Karachi (son of Haroon), Pir Abdul Sattar Jan Sahib, Tando Saindad, Sayed Hassan Baldish Shah, Zamindar, Mehrabpur, Sakrand, and Mr. Fakir Muhammad Mangrio, Zamindar, Mirpurkhas.

⁹²⁶ *The Leader*, 27 December 1940.

decision on the point of joint electorates in the 'Instrument of Instructions' to be followed by the League ministers, which ran as under:

"Joint electorates shall not be introduced in the local boards without a plebiscite being taken from the people. The decision will be by majority of votes'..... 'The Joint electorates Act to be so amended that if after three years period any community demands that the system of joint electorates be substituted with separate electorates system, the operation of Act in respect of the particular municipality and in respect of the community, which so demands, shall be withheld by an executive order".⁹²⁷

Mir Bandeh Ali's government prepared the Joint Electorates Bill with the help and assistance of the Hindus and placed, for the first time, before the House in the second week of December 1940. However, the Bill could not be taken up because of lack of unanimity among the members on certain details, especially the League members declined to support the Bill. As a result the Assembly was adjourned sine die at the request of Mir Bandeh Ali. In his interview at the end of session the Premier said: "The Assembly has not been prorogued and it will meet again whenever it is found necessary so that the remaining government measure, namely. the Joint Electorate Bill might be passed".⁹²⁸

On 22 December 1940 the question of introduction of joint electorates was placed before the Sindh League Council presided over by Haroon. The Council strongly opposed it. Recalling the League's 1937 resolution adopted at Lucknow that the introduction of joint electorates was an all-India question, the Sindh League called upon the League ministers and Muslim members of the Assembly to persuade Mir Bandeh Ali that "not to proceed with the Joint Electorate Bill failing which they must oppose the measure at every stage".⁹²⁹ Shaikh Abdul Majid, Education Minister, in a conversation with the press, said that the "League members would convince their colleagues in the Assembly of the desirability to withdraw the Joint Electorate Bill in view of the opposition of the Muslim community as every legislation should have the support and backing of the people".⁹³⁰ For the time being Jinnah had been successful in getting the unanimous stand of the Sindh Muslim assemblymen on the question of joint electorate, and declared: "That the Muslims (of Sindh) will not accept a measure which purports to introduce a system of joint electorate for local boards and municipalities for reasons already given ... no province has any right to come to a decision or any agreement contrary to the resolution of the All India Muslim League without their sanction. I hope the Sindh Assembly and the government will not force the issue at this juncture".⁹³¹

⁹²⁷ 'Instruments of Instructions' by Sindh League Council, 22 April 1940, QAP, F.917-35.

⁹²⁸ *The Leader*, 15 December 1940.

⁹²⁹ *Ibid*, 26 December 1940.

⁹³⁰ *Ibid*.

⁹³¹ *Star of India*, 26 December 1940. Also Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, p. 106.

After this Haroon became more active to see that the Sindh Government could not pass the Joint Electorate Bill. He, therefore, wrote to the Muslim members of the Assembly informing them that the Bill was coming before the assembly on 10 December 1940 and urged them to oppose the bill. He asserted that "if the bill is passed, it will not bring any unity and contrary to this it will prove detrimental to Muslim interests".⁹³² Haroon took up the question with the Premier also and requested him to 'advise the government not to hold elections in Borough Municipalities on the basis of joint electorates Act already passed, and to drop altogether the proposal to introduce joint electorate in the local boards'.⁹³³ Haroon's protest was placed before the Advisory Committee of the Assembly which declared that as the 'Act introducing joint electors was passed by the unanimous vote of the House including the votes of the Muslim League members and Ministers, this measure should receive the fullest support and trial, and warned him to see that no propaganda was carried on against this measure'.⁹³⁴ Haroon brought the situation to the notice of Jinnah to seek his advice. Jinnah in his irate mood said: "I really cannot understand why you should have addressed the letter to Mir Bandeh Ali, Chairman Advisory Board of Sindh Assembly". He issued strict instructions to Haroon, Mir Bandeh Ali, Khuhro and Majid to firmly stand by the resolution passed on 20 December 1940.⁹³⁵ He assured that the All-India Muslim League was bound to support and would take up the matter in the next meeting of the Working Committee in February. He further informed Haroon that he had issued instructions to G.M. Sayed and he would not force his views "on you and it is therefore for you to be firm and decide the question".⁹³⁶

The Council of the League decided to meet at Sukkur on 26 January 1941 to decide upon the question of joint electorate. Despite Jinnah's instructions, Haroon and Sayed continued to occupy opposite political position. Why these leaders adopted this attitude? The answer lies in the difference of their outlooks. Sayed was primarily concerned with provincial issues such as the progress and welfare of Sindh and whereas Haroon was guided by all-India considerations such as the reputation and prestige of the All-India Muslim League. Thus the differences between Haroon and Sayed serve as another instance of division among the Sindh League leadership along lines of principle rather than personal interest and beyond that, further evidence of their growing political maturity. So, Sayed before attending the meeting at Sukkur, wrote two letters, one to Haroon and another to R.K. Sidhwa, Secretary, All-Parties Government Advisory Committee. To Sidhwa, he assured that he had written to Haroon not to oppose the working of the joint electorates in the Borough Municipalities

⁹³² Haroon to Muslim members of the Assembly 19 December 1940, *AHC*.

⁹³³ Haroon to Bandeh Ali, 6 January 1941, *QAP*, F.371, p. 64.

⁹³⁴ Bandeh Ali to Haroon, 16 January 1941, *QAP*, F.274.

⁹³⁵ Jinnah to Haroon, 20 January 1941, *Jinnah's correspondence with Sindh League Leaders from 1941 to 1942*, 2 Volumes. Syed Shamsul Hasan Collection, Karachi.

⁹³⁶ *Ibid*.

because "these were introduced by the common consent of all the parties. though we were wrong in taking the step against the decision of the All India Muslim League, but that was an innocent and unintentional error and not a deliberate defiance of our party, and we, who were a party to it, cannot go back upon it and create trouble for what has been the result of our own doing".⁹³⁷ However, Sayed made it clear to Sidhwa that joint electorates to be introduced in the remaining local bodies would be opposed by the Muslim League. The same views were expressed by Sayed in his letter to Haroon.

Haroon could not agree with Sayed's views and opinions on the question of joint electorates and said that joint electorates was ruinous not only to the Muslims of Sindh but also to the Muslims of India and its acceptance would be "to cut our own throats. which you with open eyes are ready to accept". He also brought to the notice of Sayed that on the insistence of Ghulam Hussain and Pir Illahi Bux the Advisory Committee passed the resolution to put in force the joint electorates in Municipalities and even threats were extended to him. Haroon further said to Sayed: "In my opinion it would be better for us to stick to the All-India League policy and if defeated to sit in opposition and suffer twice as much under an inimical ministry than to let the Muslim community suffer at our hands".⁹³⁸ Sayed's views on the issue of joint electorates were also rejected by Jinnah that "Musalmans should have nothing to do with the elections under the system of joint electorates", and explained that, "Regarding your arguments about the joint electorates Act in the Borough Municipalities the Government of the day to which you were a party surely did not make the measure sacrosanct, It is not the first time in history that the Governments have enacted laws, which are opposed by people including the party members both inside and outside the legislature; and I can cite numerous instances when the government had to repeal or modify such laws. It does not preclude the Muslim public to condemn the measure."⁹³⁹

The correspondence exchanged between Sayed and Haroon on the joint electorates and the one addressed to Sidhwa were placed before the Sindh League Council in its meeting held on 26 January 1941. The Council passed the resolutions and Sayed was requested to get the joint electorate elections postponed for one year. Khuhro informed Jinnah that "We have explained the entire position to the Advisory Committee on 29 January that in pursuance of the resolution of the Provincial Muslim League, we will have to oppose the measure'. He further informed that 'the Committee in order to meet the wishes of the Muslims had deferred the bills sine die and thus there was no likelihood of these bills coming up in the next March sessions".⁹⁴⁰

⁹³⁷ G.M. Sayed to R.K. Sidhwa, January 1941, QAP, F. 460, p. 38. Also Sayed to Haroon, 24 January, Sayed Papers, correspondence of G.M. Sayed, *Quaid-i-Azam Papers Cell*, Islamabad.

⁹³⁸ Haroon to Sayed, 18 January 1941, QAP, p. 460.

⁹³⁹ Jinnah to Sayed, 31 January, 1941, QAP, F.640, p. 43.

⁹⁴⁰ Khuhro to Jinnah, 30 January 1941, AHC, Vol. V, p. 93.

Jinnah showed his satisfaction when he came to know from the press reports that the Sindh Government had decided to drop the joint electorate bills that were likely to come up before the Assembly in its next session. He, therefore, wrote to impress upon Khuhro that "the Borough Municipalities where joint electorates Act has already been passed should be suspended or withdrawn because the Muslim League can never accept it".⁹⁴¹ The Sindh League continued to exert pressure and in the end its efforts were rewarded. The League led a successful campaign to boycott the Tharparkar District Local Board elections and partly as a result of this, the second Joint Electorate Bill was allowed to lapse'.⁹⁴² Thus Haroon became successful in his efforts. However, it was due to Jinnah being on its side that the League brought the ministers under its authority and discipline on the issue of joint electorate.

Ministerial Tangle

After the settlement of Joint electorates issue the 'Congress High Command sent a telegram to G.M. Sayed for the implementation of the remaining clauses of the pact'.⁹⁴³ 'Sayed assured Azad that he would adhere to the Pact'.⁹⁴⁴ In response, Sayed wrote a confidential letter to Khuhro stating that "our promise for Mir Sahib to resign from his premiership and Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah to be given a seat on the cabinet and also to select the new premier is approaching, and I feel it is my duty to see that our word given as honorable person is duty honored".⁹⁴⁵ Sayed opined that 'Khuhro, Shaikh Abdul Majid, Sir Ghulam Hussain and Khan Bahadur Allah Baksh, after the resignation of Mir Bandeh Ali from the office of Premiership, should carry on the ministerial duties for the remaining period, and K.B. Allah Baksh be made the premier'.⁹⁴⁶ In fact, Sayed wanted to select Allah Baksh first as the Chief Minister and then to ask him to join the League and carry out its policy and programme.

G.M. Sayed sent a copy of his letter, addressed to Khuhro, to Haroon. Haroon could not agree with the views of Sayed and said, "That so called Azad's agreement was between some ministers in their individual capacity (excluding Shaikh Sahib who has publicly denied his association with it). Secondly instead of Shaikh Sahib you resigned the minister ship, which means that just in the beginning only the agreement was broken". He further opined that "first of all the Muslim members and ministers have to try to keep this ministry in power, if they have no hope then the Muslim League Ministers should resign and allow others to conduct the government and remain in opposition".⁹⁴⁷

⁹⁴¹ Jinnah to Khuhro, 8 February 1941, *QAP*, F,365.

⁹⁴² Haroon to Abdul Hamid, Patna, 18 January 1941, *QAP*, F.274, p. 167.

⁹⁴³ Abul Kalam Azad to Sayed, December 1940, *QAP*, F.460, p. 15.

⁹⁴⁴ Sayed to Abul Kalam Azad, 1 January 1941, *Ibid*, p. 16.

⁹⁴⁵ G.M.Sayed to Khuhro, 12 January 1941, *G.M. Sayed Collection, op.cit.*

⁹⁴⁶ *Ibid*.

⁹⁴⁷ Haroon to Sayed, 15 January 1941, *Ibid*. p. 83.

Haroon made it clear that "the Muslim League Ministers cannot cooperate with any other party unless the premier may be a Muslim Leaguer" and "on your assumption we cannot bring down the Muslim League prestige forever" by making Allah Baksh, bitter enemy of the League as chief minister. He urged upon Sayed "not to spread your views so hotly which might harm the Muslim community and before deciding we must meet together and discuss the whole matter among ourselves and then decided".⁹⁴⁸ However, Sayed became adamant to honor his agreement with the Congress and his view in the ministry making affairs became against the declared policy of the League. He said, "According to the agreement to which I was and am a party Mir Saheb has to resign on or before the 15 of February and Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah has to take place in the Cabinet. Who is to become Premier is to be decided by the Moslem Members of the Assembly. There will be no objection if either Sir Ghulam or K.B. Allah Baksh is appointed as Premier. This is the word given by me and I am in honor bound to stand by it, irrespective of consequences".⁹⁴⁹

Haroon's policy was clear in connection with the ministry affairs. He, while disagreeing with the views of Sayed requested him to adopt the League's instructions. He was disheartened due to unreasonable actions of Sayed and said, "I see from the present trend of affairs that this very Muslim solidarity which you (Sayed) are anxious to maintain is already leading to extricate ourselves for the last few years".⁹⁵⁰ Haroon then declared the League policy stating that, "the individual undertaking given by Sayed to Congress President without taking the party in confidence should not be cared for; Mir Sahib should not resign from the premiership; and the Premier should be a Leaguer or the two League ministers should withdraw".⁹⁵¹

Sayed failed in his endeavors to make Haroon agree to his views regarding making Allah Baksh the premier of Sindh. However, he still assured the local Congress Leader R.K. Sidhwa that "I will again take a risk of giving another trial to Allah Baksh to become a premier irrespective of his political views, in view of the peculiar conditions of the province".⁹⁵² He further stated that "I do not know how the Muslim League circles will take to this opinion of mine, but if they chose to decide upon any course other than this, it will certainly be against my wishes and at their own responsibility".⁹⁵³ This was an open rebellion of Sayed against the League's declared policy on the one hand, and on the other was a support to the Congress.

⁹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴⁹ G.M. Sayed to Haroon, 17 January 1941, *Ibid.*

⁹⁵⁰ Haroon to Sayed, 18 January 1941, *Ibid.* p. 13.

⁹⁵¹ Quoted by Sayed from the letter of Haroon of 15 January, in his letter dated 24 January 1941 addressed to Haroon, *Ibid.* p. 27.

⁹⁵² G.M. Sayed to R.K. Sidhwa, Secretary. All-Parties Government Advisory Committee, 24 January 1941, QAP, F.460, p. 37.

⁹⁵³ *Ibid.*

When Sayed realized that he cannot persuade Haroon, he took up the matter with Jinnah stating that: "You are aware that as a result of the compromise and settlement between the Muslim groups in the Assembly it was agreed that Hon'ble Mir Bandeh Ali Khan should resign his post as the premier. The agreed date for this resignation is approaching and my letter to K.B. Khuhro bears upon the position that we have to face".⁹⁵⁴ Sayed explained that although his 'second trial' to Allah Baksh to become the premier would involve risk, but he assured Jinnah that "the work entrusted to me by you is a missionary one and I intend to continue my efforts at persuasion and preaching for some time more until the transitory period for the strengthening of our organization. but in spite of my personal views and judgment, I assure you my implicit obedience to you".⁹⁵⁵ Jinnah sent a very polite answer to Sayed saying: "I am deeply touched by your transparently sincere note of loyalty. It is very good of you to say that you have accepted me as your leader. No greater tribute could have been paid to me by a man of your position. Believe me I wished to work with you as your colleague and comrade for a cause which we all have at heart".⁹⁵⁶ However, regarding the ministry's affairs, Jinnah differed with Sayed. He said, that "the so-called '*Azad Pact*' is a pure maneuver and no such arrangement between some individuals can, by any stretch of imagination, be called a pact and I am sure that you along with your colleagues in the ministry will stand loyally by the instructions of the League".⁹⁵⁷ Jinnah further declared that "the individual ministers have no Muslim League party behind them in the assembly, and have no sanction of the League in the province of Sindh". Under these circumstances, "if the League ministers could not carry on the government, the only honorable course for them would be to resign from the ministry and sit on the opposition benches".⁹⁵⁸ He declared that the Provincial League was the final authority to approve of a coalition in the Assembly or to resign. On receiving the advice from Jinnah, Haroon called for the meeting of the Working Committee on 12 February 1941. While appreciating Jinnah's advice to be of 'immense value' he stated: "but my difficulties were such that the influence of Khuhro and others did not allow me to act according to my views. You will know the ideas of Mr. G.M. Sayed which instead of helping us (is) creating difficulties".⁹⁵⁹

As conflicting reports were appearing in the press regarding the Sindh ministry affairs, Jinnah issued instructions to Haroon that "he had come to know from Mir Bandeh Ali that he was not bound to resign on 15 February", hence "no question arises of anyone of the members of the Muslim League in the ministry resigning and the present ministry must continue". He further instructed that, "in case Mir Bandeh Ali was bound to resign, then Khuhro and Shaikh Abdul Majid, the two League ministers, should also

⁹⁵⁴ G.M. Sayed to Jinnah, 12 January 1941, *QAP*, F.460, p. 17.

⁹⁵⁵ G.M. Sayed, to Jinnah, 24 January 1941, *Ibid*, p. 32.

⁹⁵⁶ Jinnah to G.M. Sayed, 29 January 1941, *QAP*, F.460, p. 45.

⁹⁵⁷ Jinnah to Khuhro, 8 February 1941, *QAP*, F.365, p. 26.

⁹⁵⁸ *Statesman*, 8 February 1941.

⁹⁵⁹ Abdullah Haroon to Jinnah, 8 February 1941, *QAP*, F.274, F.274, p. 192.

resign and if they could not form the ministry without Mir Bandeh Ali as what the Muslim League considers proper then let others form the ministry and we shall as honorable men occupy the opposition benches. And, if any of the ministers acts against it, the Council of Sindh League should take disciplinary action against him for having acted in his individual capacity over the head of the Muslim League".⁹⁶⁰

On the persuasion of Jinnah, Sayed was pacified. In the meanwhile, Khuhro the most resourceful, if not the most scrupulous had been busy building his own power base so he could manipulate Congress and the League in his favor to strengthen his hold on office. Regarding the resignation of the premier Khuhro wrote to Jinnah: "I have also seen your letter dated the 30 January 1941 to Shaikh Abdul Majid and of 2 February 1941 to Sir Haji Abdoola Haroon. I am afraid the letter of Mir Bandeh Ali has not conveyed to you the full implication of his understanding. In fact the Mir Saheb had on his own free choice given a verbal understanding to Maulana Azad that he intended to resign of his own free will on account of some of his private affairs by the middle of February 1941 and he conveyed this fact to His Excellency the Governor as well".⁹⁶¹ He further said that he fully agreed with the views of Sayed "that the unity of the various Muslim groups in the Assembly is most essential and should be achieved and preserved at all costs",⁹⁶² indicating that he was placing Sindhi Muslim political solidarity above any commitment to the League's policy and programme. A few days later Khuhro gave concrete expression to his views by securing approval at a 'Muslim League Assembly party meeting for a compromise reached with the non-League Muslims, bringing Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah into the ministry and producing a cabinet, on the Muslim side, of two leaguers and two non-leaguers'.⁹⁶³ Khuhro went to Delhi to try and persuade Jinnah to give his support to the measure. Haroon was already in Delhi and Jinnah hoped that Mir would accompany Khuhro so that he could hold talks with all three leaders together and elicit from them a strong commitment to uphold the League's policy. Mir Bandeh Ali was unable to come as the Sindh Governor was away. However, Jinnah was able to persuade 'Khuhro to abandon his compromise proposal and endorse instead of League's position'.⁹⁶⁴ Thus Jinnah gradually succeeded over a period of weeks in bringing Sayed, Shaikh Abdul Majid and Khuhro together onto the League's platform but it still remained to secure Mires firm commitment. The Sindh premier, in a letter to Jinnah expressed support for Khuhro compromise proposal but Jinnah was now hopeful that as Khuhro had yielded, Mir would follow suit. So he sent a strong reply to the Sindh Premier, rebuking the compromise position and appealing to Mir Bandeh Ali to join with his other colleagues in standing firm on the League policy of continuing the present ministry. He requested to Bandeh Ali "not to resign from the premiership otherwise it would be disastrous for you and the party that

⁹⁶⁰ Jinnah to Abdullah Haroon, 2 February 1941, *QAP*, F.274, p. 191.

⁹⁶¹ Khuhro to Jinnah, 8 February 1941, *QAP*, F.365, p. 6.

⁹⁶² *Ibid.*

⁹⁶³ Khuhro to Haroon, 14 February 1941, *G.M. Sayed Papers*, Sindh (hereinafter as *GMSP*).

⁹⁶⁴ Allen Jones, *op.cit.*, p. 242.

you now represent as well as the Sindh Provincial Muslim League and to All-India Muslim League... You must have noticed the interview of Nihehaldas wherein he has taken to a very pious attitude that so far as the two Hindu Ministers and their party are concerned they are willing to cooperate with Muslim members of the Assembly, and therefore now the quarrel and dispute is passed on the Musalmans".⁹⁶⁵

To discuss the ministerial crisis created due to Azad Pact Haroon on 12 February 1941 called the meeting of the Sindh League Working Committee. Although the decision was deferred, yet it was clear from Haroon's statement that he was turned down by the Working Committee. Haroon stated that "If the purpose of reshuffling the cabinet is to secure greater goodwill and fuller cooperation of all major organizations and parties in running the government, I hope that the League will not be compelled to go in opposition".⁹⁶⁶ However, Jinnah saved Haroon's position and gave implicit instructions to the ministers.

After returning from Delhi, Khuhro had a meeting with K.B. Allah Baksh and a new formula for formation of ministry was discussed and agreed upon. According to the formula the 'premier would be chosen from the Muslim League and one of the three ministers of League would resign and in his place one minister would be taken from K.B. Allah Baksh's party'.⁹⁶⁷ He conveyed this proposal to Jinnah saying that it had the approval of Mir Bandeh Ali because in his opinion it was 'reasonable' looking at the conditions in the province, and that "I will place this proposal of K.B. Allah Bash before the Parliamentary Party meeting which I have called on 2 March and I will apprise you of their decision".⁹⁶⁸ Jinnah became annoyed at the attitude of Khuhro. He rejected his proposal outrightly and issued status quo in the matter. He requested to G.M. Sayed who was at his native place Sann, district Dadu, to go to Karachi and stand solidly together with Mr. Bandeh Ali, Majid, Khuhro and Haroon. His advised Sayed "to allow the status quo" but "if Mir Bandeh Ali has to resign for his private and personal reason which you know and I am also informed about it then you must be included in the ministry with a Muslim League Premier", and that if neither of that "is possible then you must face the vote of no-confidence and resist it if you can".⁹⁶⁹

G.M. Sayed, realizing his hopes of winning Allah Baksh over to the League were in vain, 'he yielded to Jinnah's pressure and reaffirmed his commitment to the League organization'.⁹⁷⁰ Sayed's submission to the will of Jinnah was an important step in the long-term establishment of the League in Sindh. For Sayed, though not a big landlord had a status similar to a Pir's and hence was very effective in attracting the Sindhi

⁹⁶⁵ Jinnah to Mir Bandeh Ali, 19 February 1941, *QAP*, F.218, p. 13.

⁹⁶⁶ Typed script of Haroon's statement issued to press, 13 February 1941, *AHC*, Vol. V. p. 107.

⁹⁶⁷ Khuhro to Jinnah, 23 February 1941, *QAP*, F, 365, pp. 12-13.

⁹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶⁹ Jinnah to G.M. Sayed, 27 February 1941, *QAP*, 460, pp. 63-4.

⁹⁷⁰ Sayed to Jinnah, January 24, 1942, *GMSC*.

Muslim rural classes, such as Zamindars and *haris* alike, to the League's fold. Under Sayed's leadership when he became the President of the Sindh League after the death of Sir Abdullah Haroon in May 1942, the League could establish '441 primary branches and a total membership grew to 156,097 by the beginning of 1943'.⁹⁷¹ The scale the League party organization continued to grow from this time on.

The Sindh Assembly session commenced from 26 February to 2 April 1941 in an uncertain condition. Debate took place on the resolution recommending 'special class' for political prisoners in Sindh. The resolution found all-round support. Members of the Congress benches urged the necessity for greater prison reforms. Sir Ghulam Hussain urged the enactment of special legislation for the definition of 'political offences'. He said that 'decency required special treatment for political prisoners; they should not be lodged with ordinary criminals. The minister for prisons, Abdul Majid agreed with the principal of the resolution and supported Sir Ghulam Hussein's views'.⁹⁷²

However, as pre-arranged, the opposition withdrew the entire one rupee cut motions on 6 March 1941. On Opposition benches 34 members were present, comprising 16 Muslims supporters of Khan Bahadur Allah Baksh, 11 Hindus and 7 Congressites. Under the circumstances, Premier Mir Bandeh Ali Khan, M.A. Khuhro and Shaikh Abdul Majid, three League ministers, tendered their resignations to the Governor. This followed the action of Allah Baksh, Nihchaldas Vazirani and Rao Bahadur Gokhaldas, the other ministers in announcing their resignations and crossing the floor during the session. Khan Bahadur Allah Baksh, a bitter enemy of the League was once again summoned by the Governor to form the ministry and he was sworn in as 'Chief Minister on 7 March 1941 for the second time with Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, Pir Illahi Bux, Nihchaldas Vazirani and Rao Sahib Gokhaldas as ministers'.⁹⁷³ The Congress declared its support to Allah Baksh ministry unlike previously. Allah Baksh worked for the promotion of Hindu interests by implementing the Congress dominated policy and programme.

SUMMARY

It is observed from the study of this chapter that the political intrigues, personal rivalries and the vested interests of politicians not only remained unchallenged but they grew more during the Ministry of Mir Bandeh Ali.

Though the Manzilgah Mosque issue was resolved but the communal tension continued to exist. To achieve communal harmony Mir Bandeh Ali with the help of the Hindu and Muslim members of the Assembly formed Nationalist government. But due to the lack of cohesion amongst the Ministers and the absence of definite policy and programme

⁹⁷¹ Muslim League Committee of Action (Inspection report) 1944-5, Vol. 200 cited in Allen Jones, *op.cit.* p. 234. Fn, 2.

⁹⁷² *IAR*, Jan.-June, 1941, Vol. I, pp. 253-7.

⁹⁷³ *Ibid.*

the government could not work properly. Furthermore there was a lack of mutual understanding and sense of responsibility among the cabinet ministers.

Another important aspect of Mir Ministry was the development of rift between Haroon and Provincial League. Haroon tried to unite all the Muslim members of the Assembly on the League platform and persuaded them to follow League policies but due to the personal ego and self interest the unity among the Muslim rank could not be achieved.

The inefficiency of the Mir ministry led to a political crisis which could not be controlled by local politicians and eventually the central leaderships of League and Congress were drawn in. But their involvement in the local crisis did not improve the situation.

Though Haroon failed in uniting the Muslim politicians finally in the end, due to the persistence and diplomacy Jinnah was able to bring all the politicians who had deserted League back into the fold of Sindh Provincial League. This unity remained intact during the entire second term of Allah Baksh as Sindh League members remained in opposition and when on 10 October 1942 he was dismissed as a sequel to the Quit India movement Sindh League under the Premiership of Hidayatullah then formed a full-fledge League Ministry in Sindh.

CHAPTER XI

LAST DAYS OF ABDULLAH HAROON

After the passing of Lahore resolution Lord Zetland, Secretary State for India, commented his apprehensions on Muslim demand in these words: "if separate Muslim States did indeed come into existence in India, as now contemplated by the All-India Muslim League, the day would come when they might find the temptation to join an Islamic Commonwealth of nations will nigh irresistible. More particularly would this be the case with the North-West of India, which would, in these circumstances, be a Muslim State conterminous with the vast block of territory dominated by Islam which runs from North Africa and Turkey in the West to Afghanistan in the East".⁹⁷⁴ But the attitude of British cooled down because of the fact that India was deeply affected by the German bombardment of spring 1940 and many thought that Britain might fall, which could bring the Germans to India through the Mediterranean and the Suez canal. Indians may have had their own differences with Britain but no one wanted Germany to win.

Under these serious circumstances, the British explored the avenues of cooperation during the war, with the Congress and the Muslim League. Congress taking advantage of the situation held the sessions of Congress Working Committee from early June 1940 to 7 July 1940 and it resolved that it was "more than ever convinced that the acknowledgement by Great Britain of the complete independence of India" was "the only solution of the problems facing both Indian and Great Britain". The Committee therefore demanded that declaration to that effect "should be immediately made and that as an immediate step in giving effect to it, a provisional National Government should be constituted at the Centre without delay". The Committee declared that "if these measures are adopted it will enable Congress to throw in its full weight in the efforts for the effective organization of the defence of the Country".⁹⁷⁵ The dictates of the Congress were not acceptable to Britain; therefore the Congress resorted to 'Quit India Movement'.

Meanwhile Abdullah Haroon was appointed as a member on the Karachi City War Committee by the Governor of Sindh and invited Haroon to attend its meeting in June 1940. Haroon showed his inability to attend. "The reason" he explained "that as a member of the Executive Committee of the All-India Muslim League, I am bound to

⁹⁷⁴ S.M. Burke & Salim Al-Din Quraishi, *op.cit.*, p. 351.

⁹⁷⁵ *The Encyclopedia of Indian National Congress*, Vol. Twelve, 1939, pp. 428-31. Also Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *Nation's Voice* Vol. II, (Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam academy, 1996), p. 559 and S.M. Burke, *Ibid* p. 353.

obey its dictates".⁹⁷⁶ Still the Governor needed his assistance on the Committee, therefore he enquired from Haroon "whether you wish to withdraw your acceptance or it is your desire to consult the Muslim League".⁹⁷⁷ Haroon was cautious and not in a hurry to break off the relations in huff with the governor, therefore in his communication he said: "I would desire to keep the matter open pending till a decision of the All-India Muslim League" and added that "it will depend upon the negotiations which are to be carried on between his Excellency the Viceroy and Mr. M. A. Jinnah".⁹⁷⁸

To decide about the cooperation with the government the session of the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League was held on 16 June 1940. It was resolved that, in view of the grave world situation, 'a basis for cooperation should be found between the government and the Muslim League and such other parties as were willing to shoulder the defence of the country, and authorized Jinnah to get in touch with the Viceroy to explore the possibilities in that direction'.⁹⁷⁹

Jinnah interviewed the Viceroy on 27 June and on the basis of his meeting, he on 1 July submitted in writing the League's terms for cooperation. These were: "that no pronouncement should be made by the government which would militate against the principle for the division of India laid down in the Lahore resolution; that no interim or final scheme of constitution should be adopted without the previous consent of the Muslim India; that to mobilize the full resources of the country for the war effort Muslim India leadership must be fully trusted as equals and have an equal share in the authority and control of the governments, central or provincial; that the Executive Council of the Viceroy should be enlarged within the framework of the present constitution and Muslim representation must be equal to that of the Hindus if Congress came in, otherwise they should have the majority of the additional members; that in the provinces which were under the direct rule of the Governor under Section 93, non-official advisers should be appointed, the majority of whom should be Muslims, and where coalition ministries could be formed it would be for the parties concerned to come to an agreement amongst themselves; that there should be a War Council to be presided over by the Viceroy and to which the Princes should be invited to join to advise the government with regard to matters connected with the prosecution of the war; and finally, that the representatives of the Muslims on the War Council, on the Executive Council and among the non-official advisers of the Governors in Section 93 provinces should be chosen by the Muslim League".⁹⁸⁰ Congress had always talked of 'democratic' constitutional solutions, which meant that the Hindu majority in the country would always have the final say in policy matters. Jinnah, having claimed that

⁹⁷⁶ Haroon to PS to Governor of Sindh, 20 June 1940, *AHC*, Vol. 5, p. 16.

⁹⁷⁷ PS to Governor to Haroon, 21 June 1940, *Ibid*, p. 17. Also A Biography, *op.cit.*, p. 159.

⁹⁷⁸ Haroon to PS to Governor, 22 June 1940, *Ibid*, p. 18.

⁹⁷⁹ See resolution of the working Committee meeting held on 15-17 June 1940 in Dr. Waheed Ahmed Vol. II, *op.cit.*, p. 489.

⁹⁸⁰ S.M. Burke, *op.cit.*, pp. 353-54.

the Muslims and the Hindus were two separate nations, could now demand that the international practice of allowing every nation equal representation, irrespective of area and population, should be followed.

Jinnah convened the Working Committee meeting in Bombay on 31 August-2 September 1940. The committee reaffirmed the League's Pakistan demand and noted with satisfaction the viceroy's "clear assurance that no future Constitution, interim or final will be adopted by the British Government without the Muslim League's approval and consent".⁹⁸¹ It did not, however, accept the viceroy's offer regarding the membership of the Executive Council. Later that month committee requested Linlithgow to 'reconsider' his proposal and authorizing Jinnah to 'seek further information and clarification'.⁹⁸² Under the instruction of the Working Committee, Jinnah informed the viceroy that a prior condition to the League's willingness to join any expanded executive council or war advisory council was an understanding that "in the event of any other party (Congress) deciding later on to be association ... it should be allowed to do so on terms that may be approved of and consented by the Muslim League". Linlithgow considered Jinnah's demands as "obstructive".⁹⁸³

The above developments necessitated Jinnah to hold the session of Working Committee, which was held on 22 February 1941 at Delhi, presided over by Jinnah. Among others who attended the meeting was Abdullah Haroon. The meeting denounced and disapproved the pronouncements of Amery, Secretary of State for India, which created apprehensions that, His Majesty's Government was still contemplating the possibility of a constitution "based on the economic and political unity of India". It declared that the Lahore Resolution "is the only solution of India's constitutional problem

which will ensure peace, harmony and satisfaction among all elements, interests and inhabitants of this vast subcontinent".⁹⁸⁴ The committee further resolved that 'every year 23 March should be observed all over India by the Muslim League for explaining the principles of the Lahore Resolution properly know as the Pakistan Resolution as the only permanent and peaceful solution of India's constitutional problem. It further resolved that after every three months a Muslim League Week be fixed to explain policy and programme of the League to the Muslims throughout India by the provincial and district Leagues; enroll more members and take up constructive programme for the purpose of the uplift of the Musalmans in the matter of their economic, social and education conditions'.⁹⁸⁵

⁹⁸¹ Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, p. 495.

⁹⁸² *Ibid.*

⁹⁸³ Stanley Wolpert, *op.cit.*, p. 188.

⁹⁸⁴ *Star of India*, 20 December 1940.

⁹⁸⁵ Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 502-3.

In the August 1940 Offer, the Viceroy had stated that he would soon expand his Executive Council by inviting Indian representatives to join it and would also establish War Advisory Council. But he had to postpone the expansion because the major political parties were "not prepared to take advantage of the opportunity offered to them".⁹⁸⁶ Eventually he decided to proceed without the help of the political parties and in July 1941 enlarged his Executive Council to 12 beside himself, of which 8 were Indians and 4 British. At the same time National Defence council was set up. It consisted of some 30 members chosen by the Viceroy to represent British India and the princely states. These changes however, had little effect on nationalist opinion in India, which regarded the Viceroy's appointees as 'yes-men' of the government. Of the eight Muslims who had agreed to serve on the National Defence Council, five were members of the Muslim League. These five were Sikandar Hayat, Fazlul Haq and Saadullah the Premiers respectively of the Punjab, Bengal and Assam and the Nawab of Chatari and Begum Shah Nawaz. They had accepted the Viceroy's invitation without consulting or seeking permission of the Muslim League and Jinnah.

To deal with this serious situation Jinnah called the meeting of the Working Committee in August 1941 at Bombay. Sir Sikandar, Fazlul Haq and Saadullah tried in vain to argue that they had joined the viceroy's defence council as provincial premiers, rather than as representatives of Muslim opinion. Jinnah gave them no option but to quit the council or leave the League. Sikandar, after a long private talk with Jinnah agreed to abide by the decision of the Committee. His resignation and that of Sir Saadullah followed Sikandar's submission immediately from the viceroy's defence council. Fazlul Haq, however, proved less flexible; and though he promised to resign from the viceroy's council, he was slow about doing it. But he did resign from both the National Defence Council and the Working Committee of the League, "as a mark of protest against the arbitrary use of powers vested in the President", voicing the strongest opposition to Jinnah's leadership. The premier of Bengal argued that "recent events have forcibly brought home to me that the principles of democracy and autonomy in the all India Muslim League are being subordinated to the arbitrary wishes of a single individual who seeks to rule as an omnipotent authority even over the destiny of 33 Millions of Muslims in the province of Bengal who occupy the key position in Indian Muslim politics".⁹⁸⁷

Begum Shah Nawaz and Sir Sultan Ahmed unlike Sir Sikandar, Fazlul Haq, and Assam's Saadullah, refused to resign from the Viceroy's council and were, therefore, expelled from the Muslim League for five years. For Begum Shah Nawaz it was a particularly bitter pill to swallow, since she had been so close to Jinnah during the Round Table Conferences in London. She later returned to the League's fold, but only after her half decade of banishment. Jinnah in October, in his Eid day message to the

⁹⁸⁶ S.M. Burke, *op.cit.*, p. 359.

⁹⁸⁷ Stanley Wolpert, *op.cit.*, p. 193.

Muslims explained the situation in these words, 'The Government in the teeth of our opposition ... tried to maneuver and wean some of our members by associating them with this scheme'.

The Working Committee of the Muslim League met on 28 October 1941 in Delhi. From Sindh, Abdullah Haroon and G.M. Sayed were invited to attend the meeting, which was chaired by Jinnah. The meeting was called to consider the future course of action to be adopted in the Central Assembly session, which was to begin on 27 October. Such as, to show the Muslim resentment and disapproval of the manner in which the expansion of the Governor-General's Executive Council was carried out, the National Defence Council was constituted and the attitude of the viceroy and his majesty's government revealed by these acts. The meeting appointed a committee consisting of Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Nawab Muhammad Ismail, G.M. Sayed and Maulana Mohammad Akram to decide and suggest in what manner the feelings of Muslims of India should be expressed in the Central Legislature. On the decision of the Committee, Jinnah withdrew the League's elected members from Central Legislature, at this time more forcefully, to impress upon the viceroy his dissatisfaction with the government's behavior, and he called for a clear declaration of British policy towards all Muslim countries, demanding that Great Britain affirm its non-intervention policy with regard to universal Muslim "sovereignty and independence".⁹⁸⁸ He also appointed Ispahani to Fazlul Haq's seat on the Working Committee who tendered his resignation from the Working Committee and the Council of the League. The meeting demanded to submit the explanation within ten days, and also to withdraw the allegations leveled by him against the President of the League.

Fazlul Haq submitted his explanation to the Working Committee, which met on 16 November and chaired by Jinnah. In his letter he categorically stated that: "I have always been a loyal member of the League, have never hesitated to carry out its mandates...have never hesitated to obey it ... my resignation from the National Defence Council amply proves it".⁹⁸⁹ Fazlul Haq's letter of apology came up for discussion before the meeting of the Working Committee. 'His apology was accepted. Among six others. Abdullah Haroon voted for the resolution'.⁹⁹⁰

To solve the Indian constitutional problem Sir Stafford Cripps' mission reached India on 23 March 1942. On 29 March Cripps first publicly disclosed the contents of the Declaration by reading it out at a press conference. It stated that the British Government had "decided to lay down in precise and clear terms the steps which they propose shall be taken for the earliest possible realization of self-government in India". He further said that the object was "the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a

⁹⁸⁸ Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, p. 524-26.

⁹⁸⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 517-8.

⁹⁹⁰ *Ibid*. The others who voted in favor of the resolution were Malik Barkat Ali, Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Haji Sattar Ishaq Seth, Maulvi Latifur Rehman and Nawab of Mamdot.

dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs".⁹⁹¹ Cripps held discussion with Congress leaders and M.A. Jinnah but his proposals failed to achieve the desired results. On 12 April, disheartened Cripps wired Churchill saying that, "There is clearly no hope of agreement and I shall start home on Sunday".⁹⁹²

To consider Cripps' proposal the Working committee of the Muslim League held its session from 27 March - 11 April 1942 and issued its resolution shortly after Congress rejected it. The resolution stated that, "The Committee, while expressing their gratification that the possibility of Pakistan is recognized by implication by providing for the establishment of two or more independent Unions in India regret that ... no alternative proposals are invited. In view of the rigidity of the attitude of His Majesty's Government with regard to the fundamentals not being open to any modification, the Committee have no alternative but to say that the proposals in the present form are unacceptable".⁹⁹³

For the purpose of achieving the goal of Pakistan, Jinnah had appointed '21-member Working Committee in May 1940, and from Sindh, Sir Abdullah Haroon was taken on it'.⁹⁹⁴ The Working Committee at its meeting held in 'June 1940 gave the task of auditing the accounts of the League to Haroon and Haji Abdus Sattar Seth'.⁹⁹⁵ Haroon invited Jinnah to come to Sindh to attend the meeting of Working Committee of Sindh on 6 November 1940 "to give guidance at this critical hour in the life of our province" because the political situation has become unsatisfactory because "of the efforts of the officials and to some extent by the Hindus to put the Moslems in the wrong".⁹⁹⁶ Haroon also wanted Jinnah to give the approval of the Sindh League's programme for popularizing the Pakistan scheme in the general public. In another letter Haroon informed Jinnah that the work of League's organization is too poor because the existence of the district leagues was only in name. He further said that there were 200 primary League branches all over Sindh with 10,000 members on the roll. Haroon however, said that "propaganda on large scale is being made by me from the Central office and all sorts of literature, posters handbills, and other relevant material regarding Moslem League activities are sent to primary branches, and press regularly".⁹⁹⁷

Jinnah acceded to Haroon's request and arrived at Karachi on 15 December 1940. This was his first visit to Sindh after the passing of Lahore Resolution. Never before in living

⁹⁹¹ S.M. Burke, *op.cit.*, p. 364.

⁹⁹² *Star of India*, 12 April 1942.

⁹⁹³ Stanley Wolpert, *op.cit.*, p. 203. Also Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, p. 529.

⁹⁹⁴ *Statesman*, May 2, 1940.

⁹⁹⁵ *AFM*, Vol. 129, pp. 77-85.

⁹⁹⁶ Haroon to Jinnah, 19 October 1940, *QAP*, File 274:70.

⁹⁹⁷ Haroon to Jinnah, 10 November, *AHC*, F.S. p. 72.

memory was the Khalikdina Hall at Bunder Road and its approaches were crowded as there were people on that day to hear Jinnah. Accompanied by Sir Abdullah Haroon, Jinnah arrived at 7:00 p.m. Abdullah Haroon, President of Sindh Provincial Muslim League, and introduced Jinnah to the audience.

Jinnah in his speech explained the 'Pakistan Scheme' saying that Pakistan was the only solution of Hindu-Muslim tension and "under Pakistan scheme it shall be our duty to protect the rights of the minorities and we shall expect same treatment from the Hindus in the majority provinces". Declaring the territorial jurisdiction of Pakistan, Jinnah said, "I will only say that Pakistan exists today on the physical map of India, the nature has made Pakistan and includes Sindh, Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Bengal. And we say it today that in the parts of India where Muslim are in majority...is a Muslim Independent government".⁹⁹⁸ Jinnah then urged the Muslims of Sindh to organize themselves as a disciplined army and carryout a constructive programme for uplift of the Muslim masses, educationally, socially, politically and economically with their own press and propaganda machinery.

Next day Sir Abdullah Haroon in a capacity of president of the City Muslim League organized a meeting of the Muslims of Karachi with Jinnah at Arambagh a recreation ground. At the meeting Muslims of Karachi passed a unanimous resolution emphatically reiterating their full confidence in the leadership of M.A. Jinnah and assuring him that the Muslim of Karachi "are fully prepared to obey his commands and to make sacrifices that may be involved in achieving the goal of Pakistan".⁹⁹⁹ The other important participants were, Rao Bahadur Hotchand Chandumai, Syed Miran Mohammad Shah, M.A. Khuhro, Shaikh Abdul Majid, Syed Ali Mohammad Rashidi and M.H. Saiyid, Secretary to M.A. Jinnah. On this occasion Shaikh Abdul Majid and Mohammad Hashim Gazdar also delivered speeches. They declared that if the 'Congress and the Hindus had real desire for independence then Pakistan is the only way to achieve that objective. If the Congress accepted Pakistan then an amicable settlement was sure to come'.¹⁰⁰⁰ Mir Jafar Khan Jamali from among the audience announced a donation of Rs. 2,000 towards starting a Muslim newspaper and further donation of Rs. 10,000 was announced to organize the Muslims under the Muslim League.¹⁰⁰¹

During his visit the Karachi Municipal Corporation in the presence of a large gathering including the Premier, Mir Bande Ali and the ministers Abdullah Haroon presented an address of welcome to Jinnah. In his speech Jinnah appealed to Hindus and Muslims to live like friends and work together for the advancement and amelioration of the conditions of the people of Sindh. He also 'attended the dinner party arranged by

⁹⁹⁸ *Civil & Military Gazette*, 17 December 1940.

⁹⁹⁹ Public speech, Rambagh recreation ground, Karachi 23 December 1940. Typescript. QAP. File 972, pp. 29-30.

¹⁰⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰¹ *Ibid.*

members of the Council of Sindh Anglo-Indian Association and Jinnah assured them that the Muslim League would extend support to the Anglo-Indian community within the Muslim majority provinces'.¹⁰⁰²

The Twenty-eighth annual session of the Muslim League held in Madras at Peoples Park from 12-15 April 1941 was a clear show that the Muslim League was moving fast towards the achievement of Pakistan. At the meeting a very warm welcome was awarded to Jinnah. Looking cheerful, Jinnah stepped forward and smilingly acknowledged the welcome accorded to him. From Sindh, among others, Sir Abdullah Haroon attended the session. Jinnah spoke extempore and said "We have defined in the clearest language our goal about which Muslim India was grouping in the dark. and the goal is Pakistan".¹⁰⁰³ The special feature of the session was the presence of a large number of non-Muslim leaders. The session amended aims and objects of the League in its constitution as under:

"The establishment of completely independent States formed by demarcating geographically contiguous units into regions which shall be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Musalmans are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western zones of India, shall be grouped together to constitute independent states, as Muslims free national homelands in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign".¹⁰⁰⁴

Speaking on the above resolution, Abdullah Haroon said that a 'matter under dispute was always referred to a court of law, which determined what was to be taken by which party. Here India was under dispute between the Hindus and Muslims. and he held that the same principle should be applied'.¹⁰⁰⁵ The session appointed a committee consisting of 'Abdullah Haroon, Raja Saheb of Mahmoodabad, Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, Hasan Ispahani, I.I. Chundrigar, Dr. Jaffrey, Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmed and Hussain Imam with powers to co-opt with a specific task to chalk out a five-year plan for the educational, economic, social and political advancement of the Muslims'.¹⁰⁰⁶

After returning from Madras, Haroon at once started the work of organizing League branches in Sindh. 'He toured Hyderabad and Nawabshah districts from 27-30 April 1941 to attend the Workers Conference. At the conference plans for Sindh League organization were discussed'.¹⁰⁰⁷ Regarding this meeting Haroon informed Jinnah that 'G.M. Sayed had left for Dadu and Larkana to organize the League's activities and to

¹⁰⁰² *Star of India*, 20 December 1940.

¹⁰⁰³ S. Sharifuddin Pirzada, *op.cit.*, Vol. II, p. 371.

¹⁰⁰⁴ S. Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Ibid*, Vol. II, p. 372. Also Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*, pp. 458-66.

¹⁰⁰⁵ *Ibid*, p. 376. Also *The Times of India*, April 16, 1941.

¹⁰⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p. 373-4.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Haroon to Jinnah 3 May 1941, QAP, File 274, p. 213.

propagate its goal of Pakistan'.¹⁰⁰⁸ On 3 May Haroon sent a cutting of *Daily Gazette*, which contained an article by Gazdar and Ghulam Ali, both Leagues' legislators. He complained that "the sentiments expressed by these gentlemen amply show how difficult it is to work and how progress can be achieved in such circumstances".¹⁰⁰⁹ While concluding his letter, Haroon said: "However, leaving aside such considerations or tendencies of fellow workers, I have been doing my utmost to do all that lies within my power to revise and accelerate League's mission in Sindh".¹⁰¹⁰ Meanwhile G.M. Sayed regarding the League organization on 28 May 1941 reported to Jinnah about his tour of twenty villages where branches of League were formed. He further informed him 'about the successful holding of two conferences of the League-one at Larkana and the other at Sultankot; district Sukkur under the president ship of Nawab Murid Hussain of Multan'.¹⁰¹¹ Jinnah showed happiness about the success of 'Sukkur conference in his letter of 6 June 1941 to Haroon'.¹⁰¹² He said: "I am glad that Sayed and others with your full cooperation are carrying on work of organizing Mussalman of Sindh".¹⁰¹³

While G.M. Sayed was busy in organization of League in Sindh 'Dr. Sayed Abdul Latif of Hyderabad Deccan approached him through his letter of 15 May 1941 showing his desire for the rapprochement between the Congress and the League. However, Sayed was clear in his mind and wrote to him that, Partition of India is the only solution of the problem'.¹⁰¹⁴

In January 1942, the Viceroy paid a visit to Sindh. Haroon in a well thought out memorandum placed before him the vital facts, which were related to the affairs of Musalmans in Sindh. The memorandum elucidate the apprehensions of Muslims of Sindh; 'that Muslims of Sindh felt that their claim for a certain proportion in the services of the Central Government has not hitherto met with due reorganization; remission of the Barrage debt which affects chiefly the Muslim agricultural population; relaxation in enforcement of the provisions in respect of Indian Arms Act; the fresh elections to the local legislature should not be postponed; measures to improve the law and order situation and political instability'.¹⁰¹⁵

As announced by the League, Pakistan day was celebrated all over India on 23 March 1942. In Delhi a 'mile-long procession was taken out in the afternoon and in the evening a mammoth public meeting with an attendance of no less than 50,000 was held at Urdu Park in observance of the Pakistan Day. Sir Abdullah Haroon unfurled the League

¹⁰⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹¹ G.M. Sayed to Jinnah, 28 May 1941, *Shamsul Hassan Collection*, Vol. HD-II, p. 148, (hereinafter as *SHC*).

¹⁰¹² QAP File. 274:224.

¹⁰¹³ Jinnah to Haroon, 13 May 1941, QAP, File 275:217.

¹⁰¹⁴ Sayed to Abdul Latif, 28 May 1941, *SHC*, Vol. HD-II, p. 150.

¹⁰¹⁵ *A Biography, op. cit.*, p. 188-192.

Flag'.¹⁰¹⁶ Jinnah addressed the meeting and said: I can say without fear of contradiction that the Muslim League stands more firmly for the freedom and independence of this country than any other party. We are asking for justice and fair play. We have no design upon or sister communities. We want to live in this land as a free and independent nation.

We are not a minority but a nation".¹⁰¹⁷ Liaquat Ali Khan explained at length about the demand of Pakistan. The others who addressed the gathering were Abdullah Haroon, Maulana Jamal Mian of Firangi Mahal, Maulana Abdul Hamid of Badaun and Sir Syed Raja Ali.

Abdullah Haroon attended the Annual session of the Muslim League held under the president ship of Jinnah at Allahabad on 3-6 April 1942. At this session he supported the resolution that 'a committee be appointed to take forthwith all necessary and effective measures for the protection of life, honor and property of the Musalmans in consultation with the provincial Leagues and to submit a weekly report to the President of the steps taken to carry out the above-mentioned objects'.¹⁰¹⁸

Haroon worked untiringly to achieve the goal of Pakistan as the aim of the Muslim League and Jinnah. The Foreign Committee, of which he was chairman, was assigned the task, after the Lahore Resolution to work out on its principles where the Muslim States to lie. The Committee met on November 1940 under his chairmanship, and those who attended the meeting included: Maulana Ghulam Rasool Meher, editor, *Inqilab*, Lahore, Nawab Sir Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot, Rizwanullah, MLA of UP, Dr. Afzal Hussain Kadri, Dr. Syed Abdul Latif, Choudhry Akhtar Hussain, a Punjabi and Syed Ali Muhammad H. Rashdi. The committee after examining the position of Muslim population in India recommended that 'one Muslim state could be formed in the North-West and the other in the North East where the percentage of Muslims stood in the vicinity of 63% in the North West and 54% in the North East'.¹⁰¹⁹ The committee also recommended that "the Muslim State in the North-West should be constituted of the Provinces of Sindh, British Baluchistan, N.W.F.P. and the Punjab with the Delhi province amalgamated with the Punjab, in view not merely of its racial and cultural affinity with it but because of its long historic connections with Muslim. Of the total population of these areas of 3.24 crores the Muslim population stood at 2.04 crores.¹⁰²⁰ With regard to the other Muslim sovereign state in the Northeast, the committee recommended that it "should include the province of Assam and Bengal (excluding Bankura and Midnapur districts) and the districts of Purnea from Bihar whose population was rationally and culturally akin to that of Bengal. The total population of

¹⁰¹⁶ *Dawn*, 29 March 1942.

¹⁰¹⁷ *Ibid*, also in *Nation's Voice*, Vol. II, op.cit., p. 405-410.

¹⁰¹⁸ *Dawn*, 3 May 1942 and *Civil & Military Gazette*, 29 April 1942.

¹⁰¹⁹ For full report of the Committee see D.A. Pirzada, op.cit., pp. 207-22.

¹⁰²⁰ *Ibid*.

these areas stood at 5.70 crores out of which Muslim population stood at 3.09 crores that is 54%. Among the non-Muslim population roughly 32% were scheduled classes, 6% Tribal and 4.0 lakhs Christians".¹⁰²¹ The Committee recommended inclusion of Native States numbering 23 in the North-West Muslim State where Muslim population was 58.50 lakhs out of total population of one crore.

This was his last public appearance as soon after his return from Allahabad session Sir Abdullah Haroon died of heart failure on 27 April 1942. From humble office boy and hawker of second-hand clothing he rose to become a merchant prince, capitalist, landlord and prominent politician. His death was condoled by people from every walk of life including politicians, ministers of Sindh cabinet and consulates of Islamic countries. 'The offices of the Muslim League all over the province as well as all the primary schools of Karachi, markets and Memon community institutions were closed down'.¹⁰²² A large number of League workers from the whole province attended the funeral prayer. Quaid-i-Azam was deeply grieved to hear the news of his death. He said:

"Sir Abdullah was one of the strongest pillars of the Muslim League and rendered great services, not only to the Musalmans of Sindh, but also to Muslim India as a whole. As a member of the Working Committee of the Muslim League, he made very valuable contribution to its deliberations. With his keen business instinct he made himself a very valuable member of the Working Committee".¹⁰²³

Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan in his condolence message said that, "Sir Abdullah Haroon was a pillar of strength to the Muslim League and one of its most sincere and zealous leaders. He was a staunch Pakistanist. His death is an irreparable loss to Muslim India in general and Sindh in particular".¹⁰²⁴ Sir Muhammad Yakub, the former advisor of Nizam's Government said that "Sir Abdullah Haroon's death is as great and irreparable loss to Muslim India and the All India Muslim League loses one of its most enthusiastic and sincere supporters in him. He was a zealous and untiring worker and a true patriot."¹⁰²⁵

Abdullah Haroon's services to the humanity as philanthropist and social worker were countless. He spent money liberally on the 'Muslim orphanage in Karachi, on education institutions in Bombay and Sindh. He was a pioneer of female education among Muslims. He established a Hajiani Hanifabai Girls School to commemorate his mother; in which more than 200 Muslim girls were receiving education'.¹⁰²⁶ He also started

¹⁰²¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰²² *Daily Gazette*, 28 April 1942.

¹⁰²³ *Dawn*, 3 May 1942, *Civil & Military Gazette*, 29 April 1942.

¹⁰²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰²⁶ *Daily Gazette*, 29 April 1942.

Jamia Islamia and *Yatimkhana* (orphan house) named after his own name where students, in addition to religious and secular education, were taught professions to enable them to earn livelihood. He was non-communalist in thinking, which can be proved by the fact that he gave donation of Rs. 10,000 to Hindu Girls High School managed by Mai Hardevi. On his death Mai Hardevi commented in these words: "In Haroon's death India had lost a great and noble son".¹⁰²⁷ Haroon was also the founder and president of Karachi Muslim Gymkhana and of Karachi club and a director of *Daily Gazette* and many business enterprises.

The man who laid down the idea of partition of Indian in October 1938 in his speech at the Sindh Muslim League Conference at Karachi could not see the homeland for Indian Muslims in August 1947 when Pakistan emerged on the map of the world as an independent country.

Summary

Just two years after the passage of Lahore Resolution. Haroon died of heart failure in 1942. During the last days of his life Haroon spent his time and energy for two main objectives. Firstly, in organizing and consolidating Sindh Provincial Muslim League and secondly, popularizing the idea of Pakistan in the general public. Though he died too soon but his idea of separate independent Muslim state was finally achieved by League in form of Pakistan.

¹⁰²⁷ *Ibid.*

CONCLUSION

Haroon at the time of his death was among the richest and successful businessman of India. He started his business as a hawker boy by selling small items on the street of Karachi. He then worked as an assistant under his brother in law and later entered in sugar business. By diligence, application and integrity he become successful and this business earned him the title of sugar king.

Haroon's political career starts from 1905 when he entered the Municipal life of Karachi as member of the then Karachi Municipality, Since then he remained a councillor for twenty six year till 1931 when he left for Ottawa to attend the Imperial Economic Conference whereas in all India level he entered politics in connection with the Khilafat Movement and was the President of the Sindh Provincial Khilafat Committee from 1919 to 1924. He was latter elected President of All India Khilafat Conference. In recognition of his political understanding, he was appointed the President of the Sindh Provincial Political Conference and President of the Sindh, Provincial Muslim League since 1920. He was a member of the Bombay Legislative Council (1923 to 1926), a member of the Central Legislative Assembly, and a member of the Works Committee of the AIML. His advice and guidance in AIML was very valuable to the body and he was held in high esteem by the members of the league. Along with these he filled many other important posts public, private, social, educational charitable in Karachi and outside.

Unlike Jinnah and many other Muslim leaders, Sir Haji Abdullah Haroon started his political career as an active member of the Indian National Congress and came into contact with Mahatma Gandhi, Maulana Mohammad Ali and Maulana Shaukat Ali, the two renowned 'Ali Brothers', and number of others. He joined the Congress in 1917, and due to his loyalty, Gandhi once said of him "I could trust this man with a blank cheque".¹⁰²⁸ During the same year in October the Sindh Muslim League branch was established and Haroon joined it. He not only took active part in the Khilafat Movement from 1920-1924 but also devoted generously to the Khilafat Fund and during this period he and his family wore khaddar clad and boycotted all foreign goods. In 1919 Haroon was elected president of the Sindh Provincial Khilafat Committee, and held this office until 1924. During the Khilafat movement Hindu-Muslim cooperation was witnessed. But because of the communal riots Hindus stopped their cooperation with Muslims. The sudden removal of cooperation from the Hindus and the abolishment of the institute of Khilafat by Kamal Ataturk (1921) left the Muslims emotionally frustrated and intellectually confused. This is clear from the fact that even after the abolishment of Khilafat, the Khilafat Committee, lost its utility but it continued till 1927. Though Khilafat Movement ended in a failure, it deeply affected Haroon. He learned the art of

¹⁰²⁸ *Daily Gazette*, 28 April 1942.

delivering speech, pursuance and leadership, the qualities which were polished and effectively used during Sindh Separation Movement. The contribution of Haroon in this movement placed him among the front line leaders of Muslim of Sindh in particular and of India in general.

During this period the next movement in Sindh was 'Separation of Sindh from Bombay presidency' to give it a status of independent province. In 1925, Haroon's thoughts turned to miserable plight of his province and at a session of the Muslim Conference at Aligarh he tabled a demand for the separation of Sindh from the Bombay presidency. The next year at the Leaders Conference in Delhi, he moved a resolution calling for separation. In 1930-1932 when a Round Table Conference was organized in London to solve the Indian constitutional deadlock, Haroon started on reorientation of Muslim politics and appealed to the Aga Khan and Jinnah in London to return to India and take part in guiding Muslim politics. In fact Sindh Separation movement was the start of the growth of Sindhi Muslim nationalism and their politicization as Sindh had remained isolated since it was annexed to the Bombay Presidency. These movements resulted in the evolution of purposeful leadership in Sindh. These leaders namely Sir Abdullah Haroon, G.M. Sayed, M.A. Khuhro, Sheikh, Abdul Majid Sindhi worked for the spread of the concept of one nation among the Muslim of Sindh. By successful launching of Sindh separation movement, the Sindhi Muslim leadership reached a pinnacle of political success: they had achieved a broad measure of unity among themselves, they had established close relations with the all-India Muslim leadership and they became the new brokers of power in the new autonomous province of Sindh.¹⁰²⁹

But, the responsibility of breaking the unity obtained during Khilafat and Sindh Separation Movement fell on Sindh leaders, who, instead of reviving and re-organizing the Muslim League in Sindh, bent upon establishing their own political parties to fight 1937 provincial elections and to work for the provincial autonomy. For instance, Abdullah Haroon formed Sindh United Party (SUP) patterned along the line of Fazl-i-Hussain's non-communal, largely rural-based Unionist party in the Punjab.¹⁰³⁰ Haroon was convinced that if provincial autonomy in Sindh was to work to its fullest potential, there must be full cooperation between the two major communities Hindus and Muslims as the separation of Sindh movement had aroused 'communal feelings',¹⁰³¹ Haroon's strong desire for harmonious communal relations precipitated his break with the Muslim League. 'When the Muslim League Central parliamentary Broad published

¹⁰²⁹ Sindh was separated from Bombay Presidency and given a status of separate independent province under the Government of India Act 1935, in April 1936.

¹⁰³⁰ For some months the Aga Khan, religious and spiritual leader of Shia Ismaili Khwaja sect, Fazl-i-Hussain and Abdullah Haroon had been preoccupied among themselves with the political future of the Indian Muslim community. In late 1935, the Aga Khan drafted his view into a statement, which Fazl commented upon and Haroon consulted. This conferring by these three leaders, according to Haroon's biographer, quickened the birth of the Sindh Unity Party'. A Biography, p. 121. For origins of the Unionist Party of the Punjab, see Azim Hussain, Fazl-i-Hussain (Bombay: Longmans. Green & Co. 1946), pp. 249. 381-3.

¹⁰³¹ *Daily Gazette*, January 21, 1936.

its manifesto. Haroon interpreted it to be too communal for him and he tendered his resignation'.¹⁰³² While Haroon took the action of severing his League ties on his own, his action was likely part of a larger design, 'engineered by the Aga Khan and Fazl-i-Hussain, to undermine Jinnah's efforts to create a strong Board'.¹⁰³³ The Aga Khan and Hussain wished to see parties organized in the Muslim majority provinces based on allied inter-communal agrarian interests. Thus, there was an outside support for the formation of a Sindh United Party.

It is evident from this study that apart from the establishment of SUP, the formation of other political parties was based on self interest and personalities rather than on principle. This is apparent in the action of Hidayatullah who on the issue of his appointment on the post of president, defected from SUP to start his own party, to out flank Bhutto and Haroon for personal political supremacy and influence.

However, Haroon failed to keep the politics in Sindh non-communal. He received great setback in the election of 1937 at the hand of his rival Khan Sahib Allah Baksh Gabol (no party). Haroon's interest in the welfare of the Lyari residents could not find fruition at one point during his tenure as a Municipal Councillor in Karachi from 1921-1934. He offered 'Rs. 175,000 to build a model village in the Lyari quarter and later contributed Rs. 8,000 to a scheme to provide bathing *ghats* and drainage in Lyari'.¹⁰³⁴ Shaikh Abdul Majid also attempted to play a part in Haroon's defeat. He knew he could not out vote Haroon but he hoped by contesting the seat to take votes away from him. So Majid did it and Haroon failed to mesmerize with lofty, vague party promises to the voters who offered their loyalties along kinship and religious attribution as articulated by Majid and Gabol. The Sindhi electorate behaved cautiously and responded to their fundamental loyalties to kinship. In most cases, the traditional elite of the province, the landlords, the religious leaders and the tribal chiefs, were elected to represent them. Most of these leaders were attracted to the Sindh United Party because its claims to be a non-communal, agrarian-oriented Sindhi party seemed to be just that Sindh needed as it embarked on its new course as an independent and autonomous province. But in affiliating themselves with the Sindh United Party, the leadership was motivated more by self-interest than by party interest and, as a consequence, the Sindh United Party failed to become a strong, tightly-knit party, a fact reflected most sharply in the defeat of its two chief leaders, Haroon and Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto in their own home towns Karachi and Larkana.

However, after the defeat of Muslim league in 1937 provincial elections, Jinnah's thinking changed altogether and he started League's organization from its grass roots to deal with powerful adversaries like Congress and the British. The installations of

¹⁰³² Allen Keith Jones, *op.cit.*, p. 75.

¹⁰³³ Z.H. Zaidi, '*Politics in Sindh, 1937-1940, Durbari Politics*'. Paper presented at the International Seminar on Sindh Through the centuries, Karachi, March 1957. Also *Ibid.* p. 76.

¹⁰³⁴ A *Biography*, *op.cit.*, pp. 32-33.

Congress ministries at the provincial level and their adherence to a policy of absolute authoritarianism *vis-à-vis* other parties, combined with the experiences of the Muslim classes and masses with what, in their eyes, was an aggressively Hindu Raj were the decisive factors which sparked the separatist phase of Indian Muslim national evolution the crystallization within the community of the collective desire to seek complete political independence through the acquisition of their own nation-state.

Though the League could not win a single seat in Sindh, however, Muslim provincial parties at provincial level won the majority seats reserved for the Muslims. The Governor denied the opportunity to call the Sindh United Party of Abdullah Haroon to form the government on the plea that it had no leadership and appointed Hidayatullah as the Chief Minister. This action of the Governor aggravated factionalism and disunity among Muslim leaders which was witnessed in the coming years. Mean while, Abdullah Haroon was approached by the League high command to organize the League in Sindh, as a result of which 138 branches of League were established up to October 1938. The reason why Haroon decided to join League was that his defeat in the election and the appointment of Hidayatullah, a leader of an insignificant rival party. to the post of Chief Minister disappointed him and he lost all hope for his party to form government. Moreover the large scale defection of members of SUP to support Hidayatullah in the hope to get governmental favors finally gave a final blow to the existence of SUP as a dominant party. These developments made him realize that he cannot continue his political career at provincial level. Therefore to satisfy his political ambitions he joined League.

Haroon's effort of holding the Conference of Sindh League in October 1938 was a significant achievement as it was attended by All-India Muslim Leadership. Haroon in his welcome speech at the conference suggested that if the "communal question" could not be settled, it would be better to divide India into "Hindu India and the Muslim India and placed under separate federations".¹⁰³⁵ Haroon along with other Sindhi leaders, namely Sheikh Abdul Majid Sindhi, Khuhro and G.M. Sayed at the conference drafted and got passed a resolution, which for the first time declared the Indian Muslims as a 'nation and not the minority, that India in reality was not one nation but two, one Hindu and one Muslim and setting a goal of the Muslim League to work for the separate Muslim State in India through partition of the country if the communal settlement was impossible'.¹⁰³⁶ Thus for the first time the concept of 'Two Nation' and final object of League was formally presented by Haroon from the platform of League and for the first time Hindus and Muslims were well-defined by Muslim League as two separate nations.

¹⁰³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰³⁶ *AFM*, Vol. 242. Document No. 9. Resolution No. 5 of the conference on 'communal question'.

Haroon did not stop his efforts here but as a President of League's Foreign Committee he popularized the idea of independent federation of Muslim states by proposing his own scheme and also asked other Muslim leaders to suggest other schemes for the Muslim federation. It was on the basis of these schemes received by Foreign Committee that the final draft of Lahore Resolution was prepared. Thus Haroon was the initiator of the idea of Pakistan.

After the elections of 1937, Muslim members of the provincial assembly were divided into different factions and factional politics became the order of the day. Haroon wanted to bring to an end the divisions among the Muslim members and tried to form League Ministry to unite them under it. In spite of his efforts the division among Muslims were so intense that 'he could not form a League ministry by imposing his will on Allah Baksh and the negotiations failed mainly due to the machinations of the Congress, which gave its support to him'.¹⁰³⁷ Even Jinnah was shocked to see the slippery nature of some of the Sindhi Muslims because the negotiation with Allah Baksh was carried out under Jinnah's care.

But, Haroon along with other Sindhi Muslims succeeded in toppling down Allah Baksh ministry by using the communal demand for the Manzilgah Mosque's restoration to the Muslims. In this campaign, Haroon launched a two-way strategy. On the one hand he acquired in his favor, a consensus of opinion on the issue of the Muslims not only in Sindh province, but also from all-India leadership; on the other hand, he removed the difference and disunity within the Sindh League camp for seeking unified support on the issue. However, still the Governor of Sindh could not give League a chance to form the ministry; he preferred to form a Nationalist ministry under Mir Bande Ali. The pro-government group of Sindh Leaguers extended its support to Mir Ministry. But 'Haroon and his group remained loyal to the League and opposed the group who joined the government, particularly over the League ministers' support for joint electorates, which directly contravened the All-India League's long-standing policy of separate electorates'.¹⁰³⁸ In spite of disunity among the League leaders, they formed League Assembly party which was dominated by the League ministerial group and the League party organization which was headed by Haroon.

During the period of the Mir government, the formal division within the League leadership continued with the two groups struggling for supremacy, G.M. Sayed and Khuhro on the hand, and Haroon with the blessing of League Command on the other. On the persuasion of Haroon, Jinnah in a clever move designed to bind the Sindh leaders even closer together issued a press statement stating that all the Sindh Leaguers have promised to stand together and back the League's policy and programme. Haroon did this because he informed Jinnah that Mir Bande Ali and Khuhro were saying that

¹⁰³⁷ *Times of India*, 14 October 1938. Also Dr. Waheed Ahmed, *op.cit.*

¹⁰³⁸ See for details controversy between Haroon group on one hand and Khuhro & Sayed group on the other in this study in Chapter Mir Ministry.

they 'have got their own ambitions and choices which they cannot overlook at any cost'. He used to advise his associates that it was more honorable to sit in the opposition benches than to be dictated by a few individuals. 'Do not sell your souls for power' was his constant cry. which to his great distress was not always heard by these colleagues. The League ministers with their concern for restoring amicable communal relations in Sindh represented the provincial perspective while Haroon's group, with its prosecution of All-India League policy, stood for the centre's position. The clashes between the two groups brought nothing but further weakened the League position and brought back the League's bitter enemy Khan Bahadur Allah Baksh in power again as Chief Minister of Sindh with the support of the Congress as its policy in Sindh was to continue to cooperate with the government despite the resignation of Congress governments elsewhere.

Quaid-i-Azam [Mr.Jinnah] often came to Karachi at the invitation of Abdullah Haroon and then Haroon's home on Victoria Road would become a centre of feverish political activity. Muslim League meetings would be held here, and unofficial discussions would sometimes go on till late in the night. The credit for organizing the Sindh League goes to Haroon, in spite of the fact that Allah Baksh Government made great hindrances and difficulties in way. For example, when Jinnah toured upper Sindh in the third week of October 1938 along with all India leadership who had come to Sindh to attend the sessions of the Sindh League Provincial Organization, Allah Baksh government issued orders to the government officials to see that Jinnah should not address the public meetings. As a result, Jinnah was only able to address a public meeting at Larkana, organized by powerful leaders, namely Khuhro, Kazi Fazlullah and others. He would always advise his fellow workers that "no organization is worth the name unless its members remain disciplined and that is the fundamental thing upon which the edifice of future expectations and success can be built".¹⁰³⁹

In early 1942 Cripps Mission came to India and it declared that the British government had 'decided to lay down in clear terms the steps which they proposed shall be taken for the earliest possible realization of self-government in India'. The object was "the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and the other dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs".¹⁰⁴⁰ Jinnah's reaction to the scheme came at Allahabad League's session on 3 April. He said the Muslims felt "deeply disappointed that the entity and integrity of the Muslim nation had not been expressly recognized". The document showed that Pakistan was treated as "a remote possibility" and that there was "a definite preference for a new Indian Union".¹⁰⁴¹ is The League rejected the proposals but its Working

¹⁰³⁹ *Daily Gazette*, 27 April 1945.

¹⁰⁴⁰ S.M. Burke, *op.cit.*, p. 364.

¹⁰⁴¹ *Ibid.* p. 366. Wolpert, *op.cit.*, p. 203, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. I, pp. 748-50.

Committee resolution expressed gratification that the possibility of Pakistan was recognized by implication.

Abdullah Haroon in his statement said that the "British have indirectly accepted our principle. Pakistan is now inevitable. It is bound to come sooner or later. My purpose in life is at last achieved. Life as no more interest or excitement for me; I have had more than I deserved. Now our children shall be free citizens of a free nation".¹⁰⁴²

Soon after the passing away of Haroon in April 1942, the Leaguers in Sindh realized the efforts of Haroon to bring unity within the rank and file of the Muslim leadership. They were able to integrate their conflicting loyalties to the League on the one hand and to their region and caste or clan on the other. They realized that without the firm implantation of the League in Sindh, they would not be able to make their voice heard for the demand of Pakistan, as without the Sindh's inclusion, Pakistan would be in the air. So they decided to accept this responsibility by accommodating their conflicting loyalties',¹⁰⁴³ to moderate their personal political ambitions and to obey the commands of the League High Command. Thus a few months after his death in October 1942 a full-fledged Muslim League Ministry in Sindh under the premiership of Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah was formed who submitted his unconditional loyalty to the League and Jinnah.

Abdullah Haroon's success in political and social life was largely due to his determination, integrity of character, quick perception, keen intellect and above all honesty of purpose. Apart from Bhurguri, the only other Muslim leader from Sindh who could influence Muslims and attain himself an important place in an all India Muslim politics was Abdullah Haroon.

Apart from his political, educational and commercial activities, he was the Founder and President of Karachi Muslim Gymkhana and President of the Karachi Club. a Director of the Daily Gazette and many other business enterprises.

Haroon interests were not merely in politics and business. He had Philanthropic heart and he spent money very liberally on the Muslim Orphanage in Karachi, on educational institutions in Bombay founded by his own community of Memons. Muslim League drew liberally from his purse and in Karachi he spent generously on all local institutions without distinction of caste and community.

A very important feature of his character was his relationship with other communities. After breaking away from Congress, Haroon developed some bitterness against the Congress and his policy but he did not lose the friendship of his old friends in the

¹⁰⁴² *Daily Gazette*, 27 April 1945.

¹⁰⁴³ *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*, Vol. 2, November 1963. pp. 17-32.

Congress with him and he moved with the same old cordiality. Differences of opinion in politics did not come in the way of Haroon to maintain his old personal, business and social relation with the members of other communities in Sindh.

At the bottom of his heart, Haroon was for moderate courses, for give and take for compromise, for nationalism and for *Swaraj*. He was never a predetermined and as he was a businessman all his life therefore he knew the value of compromise and moderation.

The League's ascension to power in 1942 marked the beginning of a period of strong League Ministries in Sindh and when 3 June Plan was announced by the British for the partition of India the province of Sindh was the first to join new nation-state of Pakistan. Pakistan emerged on the world's map as an independent state on 14 August 1947 and Sindh provided it its first capital, Karachi, the home town of Sir Abdullah Haroon.

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APPENDIX I

THE KHILAFAT DAY IN SINDH

The Presidential Address OF Seth Haji Abdullah Haroon Sahib

The following is the full text of the address delivered by Seth Haji Abdullah Haroon, President of the Khilafat Meeting, held in the Khalikdina Hall on Friday, the 17th October 1919: -

In the name of God the most Merciful and compassionate, Praise be to God and blessings and peace to the Holy Prophet.

Brethren in Faith and Fellow Countrymen!

I feel it may duty to express thanks for your having conferred upon me the distinguished honor of presiding over this assembly. I certainly realize that far abler personages are present in this meeting, who are better entitled to this high position but it is my religious duty also to place my humble services at your call in a matter that has thrown all Muslims in a profound grief and thus work shoulder to shoulder with you.

Muslim Conference at Lucknow

You all fully know that having been startled by the intentions which European Powers entertain towards our Grand Khilafat and Turkish Empire and overwhelmed with fears that by the proposed dismemberment they will inevitably cause disruptor in our religious duties, which the Islamic world cannot tolerate and submit to quietly, an all India Muslim Conference was held at Lucknow on 21 September 1919, for the purpose of placing our demands before the Government and raising a protest against the proposed partition of Turkey, which the Allied Peace Council was contemplating. In this Conference it was resolved that on a particular day all Indian Muslims should raise their united voice so that it may prove effective and convincing. This is therefore that day on which we are gathered together here for the purpose of giving vent to our wounded feelings and horror, which the events have necessarily created in our minds.

If you expect to hear from me a strong and stirring speech, I would like to be excused for telling you that you will not be fully satisfied, because considering my inability and limited resources it is quite impossible for me to meet with your wishes. But you will surely hear from me all that should emanate from the heart of a true follower of Islam,

and feel that a wave of pain is striking at my heart in the same manner as it has touched and broken yours.

The Question of Khilafat

Among other duties which are enjoined upon Muslims, the one is that they should select a Muslim Sovereign who should look after the civilization of Islam and spiritual progress of its followers:. The Holy Land, the cradle of Islam, known by the name of Jaziratul Arab, as defined by the Founder of Islam (May the blessings and peace be on him) should remain in his possession and control. It is also indispensable that he should be so mighty and powerful as to claim the leadership of the large population of Muslims, the right of preserving the purity of the Faith and defending the Holy Land. The Law of Islam has given the sacred title of "Khalifatul Mussalmin" to such a Sovereign. The Muslims, in accordance to the teaching of religion, have always been recognizing this high Ideal and conducting their life in conformity with this distinct commandment.

Since this world-wide and terrible conflict has ended; the Muslim world does not find that pleasure which would be natural in the mind of every person in view of the righteous principles formulated at its culmination. Quite contrary to our expectations we find from that day, deep sensation of pain and injury because our Khilafat and the Ottoman Empire which was one of the opponents of the Allies, is not being treated in the manner we were assured of and which justice and righteousness demand. It is not necessary to say that all followers of Islam, young and old alike, are overshadowed with gloom. All shades of opinion among Muslims have always and in all possible forms been representing their views and necessities. The Muslim League, the London Central Islamic Society and other Muslim Bodies by means of memorials. petitions etc. have thrown sufficient light on their afflictions.

It has been generally seen that besides political bodies and Anjumans, those people who are little concerned with such discussions, are also anxious and full of fears on this problem because this is such a precious Islamic Principle that no Mussalman, of any caste or creed, can afford to ignore it. It is therefore that the people of those sects of Islam, which are little interested in the problem of Khilafat, also have been feeling on this problem.

Holy Places

Keeping in view the orders of our religion, we Mussalmans firmly believe that the Holy Land, which, in the Laws of Islam is called "Jaziratul Arab", and the boundaries of which have been described on several occasions from the religious point of view, must always remain under the Sovereignty of Mussalmans. Therefore the Mussalmans, all over the world, cannot even for a moment see the control of non-Muslims over any part of the Holy Land without feeling that it clearly means an undue interference with our religious responsibilities. During the war, in order to comfort their minds, the

Mussalmans were given promises in most clear words to the effect that the war will not affect the position of the Holy Land, that they will have more liberty than before and that they will not have to remain under the control of any non-Muslim Power. But now with great regret are the Mussalmans seeing that those who made these promises, are forgetting their those words by means of which it was always sought to keep the Muslims at ease.

The Allied Aims of War and Pledges of Statesmen

On the declaration of war, Mr. Asquith, the then Prime Minister, declared "We are fighting to vindicate the principle, in these days when material force sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the development of the mankind, *that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of International Good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and overwhelming power.*"

The Rt. Hon'ble Mr. Lloyd George, the present Prime Minister of Great Britain in the memorable speech delivered on 5th January 1918, while explaining the war aims said "Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its Capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race." And in another speech, which was principally addressed to His Majesty's Muslim subjects, he pronounced thus ".... We do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the Homelands of the Turkish race with its Capital at Constantinople".

President Wilson in the 12th of his Fourteen Points, advanced as the basis for the conclusion of the war, spoke of the "assured Sovereignty" of Turkey being safeguarded. And in his speech at the tomb of Washington on 4th July 1918, he insisted on "the settlement of every question, whether of territory or Sovereignty, of economic arrangement or of Political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other Nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery."

The Allied Peace Council

In face of these clear and unequivocal pledges given by responsible statesmen, His Majesty's Muslim subjects were naturally led to be at rest as regards the integrity of their religious supremacy, because with Muslims all other Asiatic people believe in the sanctity of the pledges given by responsible ministers. It is an irony of fate that we see the reply given by the Allied peace Council to the Turkish Delegates diametrically opposed to the lofty principles, quite unjust, and tending to create alarm and indignation. The apprehension has been confirmed that some fanatical and selfish powers are designing to occupy and control the territories of the Khalifatul Mussalmin in the ill-used name of justice and equity and for this they persuade the world to believe that the Turks are devoid of the capacity to rule. This must be remembered that the neighboring hostile and greedy Christian Powers never allowed the Turks a moment of

respite to put their house in order and by their intrigues involved them into perpetual wars and the internal risings, the events which persons well-versed in History are well aware of. Any other Nation would have succumbed long ago to these dire onslaughts. The Turks alone had the courage to face their numerous enemies and to put down their rebellious Christian subjects for centuries together.

Now the Muslims have quite realized that this is the first step to violate their principles of religion. Considering all the present and past events, the Muslims are perfectly justified to think that they are being driven into such a catastrophe as appears to be a fatal blow to their religious aims and ideals. This feeling becomes still more aggravated when they perceive that the charming pledges and the lofty principles of equality of nations and self-determination declared at the conclusion of the war were only advanced to be applied to those enemies of the Allies, who in comparison to the Islamic Power, Turkey, are decidedly more dangerous to the peace of the world in general and the Allied supremacy in particular. But the same in connection with our Khilafat are thrown overboard. Now we are confronted with the result of those efforts, by which after all the Khilafat, cherished by the forty crore followers of [Islam, is to be annihilated, thus causing an intense injury to the civilization of Islam and our spiritual duties and progress.

The Proposed Dismemberment of Turkey

The schemes, which the Council of the Peace Conference proposes to enforce, show that practically whole territory of the Khalifat-ul-Mussalmin is to be detached from his sovereignty, including those portions of his dominions in which the Turkish nation is predominant. The British Government wants to have a Mandate for Mesopotamia, and France is to have all rights of a Mandate over Syria, and in Palestine is being created a Jewish State. The Islamic World has invariably protested against these designs and the British Ministers have been reminded of their pledges and also of the bitter and grave consequences which the breach on their part is fraught with. It was made clear to them that many of the provinces, which were thus unjustly to be snatched from Turkey, besides being included in the Holy Land (Jaziratul Arab), were so connected with the past brilliant history of Islam that foreign domination there was a cruel test of their peaceful and solemn feelings. The principles of justice and equity (if they have the same meaning in the dictionary of Europe, as is understood by the simple but sincere Asiatic) would demand that these provinces be granted the right of self-determination and allowed to remain under the suzerainty of the Khalifatul-Mussalmin, so that the spiritual relations between the different factors of Muslims be not rent asunder.

Turkey and Bulgaria were equally responsible for declaring war on the Allies but it is so painful for the Muslims to see the Islamic Territory being broken into pieces by the advocates of righteousness, while the Bulgarian aspirations which she could not attain before the war, are being supported, and she is being given the chance of extending her territory to the sea. Our grief becomes still more unbearable when we see that for the

imaginary persecutions of the Christians, which were circulated by the Government of the Czar, millions of avenging hands are raised in Europe against the Muslims. On the other hand, is this not barbarity and violation of all human instincts that when poor Muslims are plunged into the welter of tyranny and persecutions by the Christians, as by the Greeks recently in Smyrna these Champions of righteousness deafen their ears, which were so alert to hear the slanderous voice against the Muslims. No sympathetic expression has yet been heard from any quarter of Europe on the cries of brutal murders and acts of violation committed by the Greeks.

The Turkish Government is thus blamed for atrocities on subject races, specially Armenian massacres. The spokesman of the Allied Peace Council described this as the serious crime of the Turks. Is it not a well-known fact that Christian subjects and particularly Armenians have been notorious for their risings against the lawful authority? In the present war, the Armenians, at the instigation of Russian took arms to stab the Turks at the back when they were busy in their operations against Russia in the Caucasus. What forms of treatment the followers of Christian morality approve of in such a case? We see that most civilized Governments, even in time of peace, do not hesitate to crush the *unarmed* opposition without discrimination. Why then should the poor Turks pay the penalty of being strangled, if they dealt with the rebels, as they deserved to be dealt with?

The disappointment of the Mussalmans is still more increased when they find that the responsible Ministers of our British Government, which always proudly claims to be a "Great Islamic Power", are plunged deep in the same bigotry. When the same Mr. Lloyd George, whose clear promises have been narrated above, remembers the war in Palestine as a "*Crusade*", we cannot help doubting his intentions and purposes.

Obligation of the British Government towards Mussalmans

We have no reason to find fault with other European powers, if they do not pay heed to our cries and lamentations. But our own Government, which always proudly reiterates to be patron of the great Islamic population, and justly so, cannot set itself free of the concomitant obligations. Our restlessness is aggravated when we find the Ministers of the Crown actively forward in the scheme of the dismemberment and partition of Turkey and solicitous of secret treaties, ignoring their solemn pledges.

Mussalmans did not shed their blood and pour out money like water, to see their aspirations dishonored in the Peace Council and the Victory, in which they took prominent part, to be designated as the Victory of the "War of the Crusade". Now when we realize the situation, our hearts become greatly lacerated.

The Existence of Turkey is essential and Useful for Great Britain

It will be idle to repeat how the interests of Great Britain are closely bound up with the stability and continuance of the Ottomon Caliphate because so far as the Indian political

complications are concerned, those noble Englishmen who remember the services rendered by the Ottoman Caliphate during the War with Tippoo Sultan and again on the occasion of the great Indian Mutiny of 1857, do not lose sight of their importance. Besides, the Islamic World views the existence and ascendancy of Turkey as vital to their religious needs. In this world-wide conflagration it has been proved beyond doubt and acknowledged that the British cannot do away with the sympathy of the vast population of the Mussalmans for the strength and economical advantages of their great Empire. Again, if a generous hand is extended to a people, (whose life and conduct is entirely religious) in a matter of high importance touching their beliefs and affections, they will appreciate it passionately and that policy will be a great asset to secure their permanent loyalty, gratitude and devotion which are their national virtues.

On this occasion it is advisable that I should reproduce for you a portion of the speech of that just and true Englishman, Mr. Marmaduke Pickthall, who, in the true sense of the world, deserves to be called a friend and well-wisher of the British Government. He says:

"What fools we are, deliberately to go and anger Asia in order to please Powers of Europe, which we have to bribe. Europe is commercial. The European nations sell their faith. Asia is, no doubt, inferior to Europe in this respect and others as is self-evident. But if you want undying faith and loyalty, a passionate devotion which never fail you at a pinch, a pure enthusiasm for ideals not commercial nor political, but righteous, just and human, then go to Asia and seek by all means in your power to win the heart of Asia.

"If I had the ear of the British Government at this juncture, I would say: 'Step forth and with a generous gesture save Turkey now; and if any Power opposes you, I promise you an army of 10,000,000 of Muhammadans who will fight for you against that Power with wild delight. Save the Muslims Empire now, and you save England from dishonor. Destroy it and you wreck the British Empire.'"

I beg to be pardoned if I frankly warn Ministers of the Crown against the blunder they are committing by utter disregard of the Muslim feeling, taking them to be the feelings of a dormant and dying nation. They forget the Law of God That Virile Nations Die Not, and they lose sight of the struggle of Nations, once fallen, for their rise. They must remember that their haughtiness and breach of faith is acting as a lash for the sleeping Muslim Nations. The time has come when the Muslims are face to face with novel political situation, and with it the deplorable attitude of the Ministers of the Crown entails serious issues.

The Duty of the British Government

Brethren, from what has been narrated above, it is quite clear what we Mussalmans demand. It is the moral duty of the Government to honor our imperishable feelings,

based on the rights we claim as seven crore subjects of the Crown. The formal excuse that Great Britain has no control over the decisions of the Allied Peace Council cannot be entertained as valid. The events have confirmed the conviction that if the British Government were to use prestige and weight with a sincere desire and induce the Entente Powers, it will be impossible for them to turn away from the British and particularly when our demands are within the limits of the principles formed as the basis of peace.

Suppose that the Entente Powers in their thirst for territory disregard the brilliant and valuable part played by England, by which they have attained now the position of settling the politics of the world, then for the British it will be the real test of their sincerity and good intentions by which they have always soothed the Muslim mind and in that case they should not give their support to the Peace Treaty out of deference to the conviction of the seven crore Muslim subjects of the Crown. If the British Ministers cannot prevail upon the Peace Conference, and the treaty is passed in such terms as are opposed to the demand of the Islamic world, and contrary to the pledges of President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George and it should be the duty of the British Nation to reject it when the same is finally placed before the Parliament for ratification.

The Duty of the Mussalmans

As to what should be the duty of the Mussalmans in this connection, I would convey to you the message of the venerable member of our Community the Hon'ble K.B. Ibrahim Haroon _rafter, given by him in conclusion of his address delivered on 21st September 1919 as President of the All-India Muslim Conference Lucknow. That is:-

"After this, the question rises, what should be the attitude of the Muslims if the fate of Turkey is not decided agreeably. There is only one answer to this, and that is that we shall never recognize that decision of the Peace Conference, which insults forty crores Muslims of the world and destroys their hopes. Such a treaty can, in no circumstances, be binding on us, as was conveyed to the Prime Minister in a resolution of the All India Muslim League Council, passed on 27th August 1919, to the effect that Indian Muslims were not prepared to acknowledge any settlement which is against their demands and wishes. Eventually, the Muslims will be perfectly justified to pursue all constitutional means and utilize their material resources in the cause of Islam".

Propaganda of the Muslim Objects

In conclusion, it is necessary to say that the organized fanaticism and unsympathetic attitude of Europe and America towards the Islamic world, which has quite blinded them to treat Muslims with even common human courtesy, is due to the fact that the ill-informed and short-sighted press of those Countries has fanned, by false and unfounded allegations, the flames of great racial prejudice against Islam, and particularly against the Turks. These dastardly attempts are not the peculiarities of the

Press of any particular country, but generally this hysteria has spread like an epidemic in all those countries. Therefore, it is imperatively necessary that through the medium of a journal and by other means, a movement, slow but sure, should be set on foot to contradict those calumnious charges which have driven the misrepresentation to such a high pitch.

Realizing the importance of this idea, of our respected leader H.H. Sir Aga Khan, the Hon'ble G.M. Bhurguri and other Muslims residing in England, and our newly converted Muslim brethren, especially Mr. Marmaduke Pickthall, are striving hard in this direction. I think this auspicious work must have been regularly commenced from September last. You very well know that for such purposes, a coordinate effort and a large fund are necessary. Perhaps, many from among us may be unaware of the fact that the European Nations spend thousands of pounds annually on purposes, which can influence the public opinion in their favor. It appears from a fresh letter, received from H.H. Sir Agha Khan that the Greeks spend twenty thousand pounds and the Armenians ten thousand pounds annually on their detestable propaganda. The present events demand that we stand more in need of making use of such means. Can there be any other more pressing occasion than this to try and test our established generosity and large heartedness? The spirits of our those ancestors, whose lives and treasures were sacrificed for the National welfare, are at this time expectantly looking for our liberality to see how far we act to defend and preserve our religious and national existence. In fact, our life is only meant to be sacrificed in the path of God, the Almighty, Who has ordered us to say "Our prayers, our sacrifices, our lives and our deaths are all for God, the Lord of the worlds."

Will the Nation entrusted by God with such clear Commandments allow its momentary wealth to be kept back from being spent in a cause acceptable to Him?

Thanks

I would lack in the discharge of my duties if I do not express deep sense of gratitude towards those righteous English man including several retired Officials and our new Muslim brethren, who, for right and justice and in the best interest of the British Government, are whole-heartedly denouncing the dismemberment of Turkey. They have invited the British Ministers and their Nation to turn their attention to the practice of that virtue, which will enable them easily to win over the hearts of the Muslim world and which will leave the ineffaceable impressions of gratitude on their minds.

Gentlemen, I cannot control the deep feelings of gratitude, which have been naturally created in my mind as well as in the mind of all my co-religionists, by our fellow-countrymen, sympathizing with us in our present hour of trial. How auspicious are these days for us, when we the sons of Mother India feel that touch of real injury and pain, which results from the calamities of one another. The expression, that I and my co-

religionists are on this account thankful to our Hindu and other brethren, is a mere formality but in fact their fraternal inclinations towards us are far superior and stronger to be appreciated in suitable terms. This reciprocal unity is a happy augury of the bright future of our Motherland.

Conclusion

Gentlemen, in wishing you farewell, I will remind you that it is our religious obligation to press our demands, and God forbid, if our efforts prove futile, Islam will, undoubtedly, receive a server blow. But it is my firm belief that the existence of Islam and its integrity do not depend on any particular Nation. Several nations have come and gone, having served the cause of Islam in the Divine Light. which will never wane, for, the Great God has promised:-

"Verily we hath sent down the Quran and Verily, We shall protect it."

The darkness of the night forestalls the Dawn of the Sun of Glory with fresh splendor and brilliancy.

PEACE BE UNTO YOU
AMEN

APPENDIX II

Sindh Provincial Khilafat Committee's Manifesto

The following *Manifesto*, issued in Sindhi by the Sindh Provincial Khilafat Committee, was distributed broadcast in Sindh:-

"Hold Ye Fast the Rope of God and be not divided. To uphold the Grand Khilafat is our Religious Duty."

All our Muslim brethren are well aware of the fact that our Holy Faith strongly enjoins upon us that we must maintain our spiritual relations and ties with a Muslim Sovereign; who is in every way both powerful and independent; competent to advance the cause of Islam and defend it against the aggression of hostile people; and who must be in possession of the Holy Land and the sacred places of Islam and must be strong enough to protect them. It is our duty to own spiritual allegiance to him. The Law of Islam has called such a Sovereign by the sacred title of Khalifat-ul-Mussilmeen and Amir-ul-Mussalmeen (Khalifa of Muslims and Commander of the Faithful). Our Holy Prophet, (May the blessings of God be on him) has enjoined that whoever dies, without recognizing the Imam (Khalifa) of the time, will die the death of ignorance (Ignorance was the period preceding the advent of Islam when the people were idolaters). This saying makes it clearly manifest how far we Muslims, are religiously bound to stick to our fealty to the Khilafat. At all times have the Muslims, by general agreement, unanimously recognized such a Muslim Sovereign as is possessed of all the requisite qualifications of the Khilafat, to be their Khalifa and religious guide; because the existence of the Khalifa is absolutely necessary for the stability and safety of Islam and for the maintenance of the religion in its purity.

It is for the last four centuries or so that, by the unanimous verdict of the learned in religion and law and the agreement of the people, this high office has remained vested in the illustrious Turks. Since neither then, nor now, was there any Islamic people worthy of that high office. They have ever offered their lives as sacrifices at the altar of Islam. Even to-day the whole Islamic world proclaims aloud that besides His Majesty Waheed-ud-din Muhammad VI (May his kingdom and glory be everlasting) there exists no other Sovereign fit to be entrusted with the duties of the office of the Khalifa.

Allied Peace Council and the Islamic Khilafat

It is regrettable to find that the reply given by the Allied Peace Council to the delegates of the Khilafat and Turkish Government is extremely discouraging and bound to cause uneasiness, if not consternation. This has revived and fully confirmed the apprehension that some self-aggrandizing powers burning with fanaticism and earth-hunger, by

declaring the so-called unfitness of the Turkish Government to rule, are plotting in the name of justice and righteousness, the occupation of its territories, thus affording reasonable ground for fear that our religious beliefs, and acknowledged Muslim allegiance to the Khalifa may be meddled with. Endeavors are being made to put us in the embarrassment, which we consider a great calamity to our religious feelings and obligations. These depressing replies have decidedly confirmed the belief in the Muslim mind that the principles of justice and equality of nations, formulated on the conclusion of the war, are being deliberately set aside in dealing with the Khilafat and we fully realize that by the destruction and undermining of the Khilafat, our Islamic Civilization and spiritual progress will receive an incalculable injury.

Our Prayer to the British Government

Now we have only a ray of hope in our British Government which rules over the majority of the Muslims in the world and which has invariably prided itself on being the greatest Islamic empire of the day. The present British Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, has given several times distinct pledges as on an occasion, describing their aims and objects for entering into the war, he said; "Nor are we fighting... to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which are predominantly Turkish in race". And, again, on some other occasion he declared:- "We do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the Home lands of the Turkish race with its capital at Constantinople".

In the beginning of the War and thereafter from time to time we were assured that the Holy Lands and sacred places will in no way be interfered with.

We may respectfully approach the British Government that they may use their influence with the Allies, who seem to have trampled down the principle of Self-determination, and are now full of insatiable thirst for territory, and compel them to recognize the religious aspirations of the Muslims and get the suzerainty of the Khalifa maintained over the provinces which were before the war, under his rule. If this is not done, the fall of the Khalifat is inevitable, which event will certainly create intense bitterness and resentment among the Muslims.

Under the circumstances the All-India Muslim Conference, held at Lucknow on 21st September 1919, resolved that on the 17th October 1919 all Muslims should offer Friday Prayers, bow their heads before Almighty God and pray that He may, through His mercy and grace, relieve us of this calamity. Our sacred Religion has ordained that at the time of misfortune we should invoke the blessings of God, as none else can save us from distress.

On that day, (Friday, 17th of October) we must organize meetings for the purpose of beseeching our Government that they may strongly place our religious demands before the Peace Conference. After holding the meetings, the resolutions passed should be

wired to His Excellency, if the telegraph office be within reach, and copies of the same should be forwarded to the office of the Sindh Provincial Khilafat Committee, Karachi. If a telegraph office cannot be resorted to, then only copies of the resolutions should be sent to the office of the above Committee.

Seth Haji Abdullah Maroon.

Maulvi Abdul Karim Daras.

Maulavi Mahamed Sadik.

Fakir Mahamed Durrakhan Hakim.

Shamisuddln Ahmad.

Mir Mohamed Baloch.

Haji Jan Mahamed.

Haji G. H. Kassam.

APPENDIX III

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS OF SETH HAJI ABDOOLA HAROON AT THE SINDH PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE 1920, 7TH SESSION, SUKKUR

Brother delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen!

I am not using the language of mere formality when I thank you for the singular honor you have done me, by summoning me to preside at this the 7th Sindh Provincial Conference. To be frank, I have done nothing to deserve such a mark of favor, and knowing, as I do my incapacity for such an office, I wish your choice had fallen on a worthier head than myself but since your mandate has come to me, I am here, in obedience to it; and I have every hope that I can count upon your support, in conducting the discussions on the various subjects that are to come before us, for our consideration.

OUR GOAL

When we look to the past grandeur of our Motherland and the height to civilization it attained, at the time when all the world around was sunk into ignorance and barbarism, the conviction becomes irresistible that the future can have nothing but sunshine, in store for us, only if we have the will to dedicate ourselves to the service of the country. The future bright as it promises to be, rests with us alone. It depends not so much on the Acts of Parliament as it does upon our own patriotism and sacrifice, for our efforts in the future as in the past are to mould the Acts of Parliament. No nation has become great without an exertion from within. It is therefore a sign of happy time that our country men are every day increasing in numbers stepping forward to strive for the great ideal for which the Indian National Congress has labored so long. With the mention of the name of that august assembly, our thoughts go back, in grateful remembrance to the sacred memory of the immortal souls of Dadabhoy Naoroji, Allan Octavian Hume, George Yule, Ananda Mohan Bose, Sir Henry Cotton, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Tybjee and Pherozshah Mehta who, in their farsightedness, more than a generation ago prepared the national plank for us to stand upon and hold aloft the national banner of the United India. The plank is on firmer foundation than even before, being broad based on an immensely larger popular support. The organization of the Congress has its roots and branches scattered all over the country. The message of Home Rule has been carried to the masses and there is today a measure of political awakening, which is so much a wonder even to those who started the work, as it is a great hope for the early attainment of our goal. That goal is "Government of the people for the people", and has been variously styled Home Rule, Self Government, Responsible Government, all of which mean but the same thing. To achieve that end of

our ambition, we, the children of the soil, should achieve that end of our ambition, we, the children of the soil, should close our ranks even it be at some sacrifice and make a united stand. As a member of a democratic faith my advice to you can only be to press on vigorously, until the goal is reached. Mother-India, with a glorious past that knows no parallel will have a still more glorious future that will place it at the forefront of the nations of the world. I have visions of the India of the future - the greatest democracy of the world - molding by its high example the life and thought of its sister nations, whether of the West or the East. How distant or rather how near that future is to be is a matter which lies in the hands of this and the next generation of India's young men and I hope and trust and pray that young Moslems and young Hindus, standing shoulder to shoulder will nobly fulfill their high mission.

REFORMS

There is a rude awakening as we turn from the enchanting visions of the future to the facts of the present, for we realize how little headway we have made towards that future. The first step vouchsafed to us in that direction is the Reform Act, which was placed on the Statute Book in December last. The skeleton of that act was outlined nearly two years ago in the Montague-Chelmsford report, and although the Act has given us a stronger and a more powerful frame and here and there a vigorous muscle or two has been added the outline remains materially unaltered. Flesh and blood have yet to be supplied by the formation of numerous Rules and Regulations. The outline has undergone elaborate analysis, discussion and criticism during these two years, and I do not think any good purpose would be served by my entering, at this stage, into a discussion of the scheme at it originally was or as it was partially improved by the joint Parliamentary Committee. Nor will the full effect of the Act be correctly known, until the Rules supply the flesh and blood to the skeleton. But it is sufficiently clear that the Act does not at all satisfy the needs of the country or the wishes of the people, as a whole. The Amritsar Congress formed the platform for the presentation of three independent shades of opinion. There were those, who led by Mrs. Besant, gratefully welcomed the Reforms Act as a substantial step. There were other who led by Lokrarnanya Tilak and Mr. Das held that the Act was inadequate, un-satisfactory and disappointing, there were again those who led by Mahatama Gandhi were of the opinion that although the Act was inadequate and unsatisfactory, it yet constituted a step forward and should be worked in a spirit of cooperation. Among the delegates of the Amritsar Congress the first view found hardly any support, while the respective support of the latter two views was never put to the test, for a compromise was effected between them, at a later stage and the Congress adopted the compromise, I am myself of the same view, as the Congress eventually took. But I feel that no good purpose is served by discussing as to which of the three parties held the correct view. The Reform is there on the Statute Book, good, bad or fair; and it is not in our power to make amendments in it. We have no alternative beyond working it or boycotting it. No responsible public men of any shade of political opinion, however extreme, have suggested or boy-totting the Reforms. Everybody who is anybody is agreed that we

have to work the Reforms and do our best to produce the greatest results from the Act, while, in no way, giving up work for achieving our goal, How for the Moslems will be enabled to take their share in the new Councils it is impossible for me to say, in view of the Khilafat question. But otherwise all round, in every province, the attention of political workers is being more and more drawn to the approaching formation of reformed councils, and the work of educating and guiding, the new electorates is a subject of consideration among them. Let us therefore not be still fighting a dead issue, as to which adjective is most suitable to be applied to the Act. It is not wisdom at this stage, to be quarrelling over the transient point of dispute in what words to describe the Act. It is there as a hard fact and no amount of praise or condemnation can alter its character or increase the power it confers on the people. Let us rather - or those among us who want to participate in elections either as candidates, or voters or as worked out by the people's representatives in the new councils and commence the work of educating the electorate in light of these. Let us not unwisely waste our energies in fighting between ourselves as to what the Act is or not. Let us rather utilize our energies in fighting with Government to see what the rules are going to be. We have been neglecting this important work and will have reason to repent our negligence. As I have said above Mussalmans may not be able to take part in the Council elections, and all that I have said above has no reference to the Moslem community. Let me say by the way that the Khilafat question has assumed national significance; we shall just have to define our policy as nationalists, should the Muslims decide to withdraw from the Reformed Councils. A delicate and difficult task indeed! On the right solution of which I believe the honor of our motherland and nation depends considerably.

THE PUNJAB TRAGEDY

Another All-India question of outstanding importance is the great Punjab Tragedy, of last year. I do not want to go with the familiar history of that period. It is written in letters of blood on the heart of the nation. Nor would it be appropriate to anticipate the conclusions of the official Committee of Inquiry whose report will soon be before the public. But that does not prevent us from coming to this irrefutable conclusion, based on the evidence of official witnesses themselves, that the disturbances at Amritsar were the direct results of a deliberate and calculated policy of repression by the deportation of popular leaders and that the horrible butchery of the 13th April last the Jallianwalla Bagh will remain the darkest page in the history of the British Rule in India. The terrible inhumanity of the Martial Law period, when it is fully exposed, will be an indelible blot on the British nation, and if properly known to the other nations of the world will ruin the reputation of Great Britain, as a love of liberty and freedom. India can never forget the spring of last year, and I have not the least doubt that the National Week, 6th to 13th April will be universally observed in India, by all sections of the people; and I hope that the sum of 10 lacs will be oversubscribed. We should also appreciate Mahatma Gandhi's advice that it is the sacrifice of the people who died, which is being memorialized and not the butchery of those who killed. No other advice could have proceeded from one

who is an Apostle of Love and an Abhorrer and Hate and I feel sure the speakers at the functions during the National week will remember the distinction thus made.

THE KHILAFAT QUESTION

There can be no doubt of the fact that the situation in India in regard to the Khilafat Question is so serious that it overshadows everything else and I fervently pray all may yet be well. The sincerity of British and Allied statesmen is being put to the test and solemn pledges made by them at a time of crisis await to be fulfilled. I am not hopeful of Britain carrying out its entire promise. The thirst for annexation and exploitation is still a living force in European politics and the policy of grab seems to override all considerations. The reply of the Premier of Great Britain to our Khilafat Deputation is most ominous. It clearly foreshadows a peace settlement that falls short of the irreducible Moslem demands. Nothing but Constantinople is evidently to remain with the Sultan-Khalif and that too under the kindly gaze of the Allied Artillery, if the actual military occupation of the seat of Khilafat is not prolonged indefinitely. Mr. Lloyd George had pledged, in January 1918, with all true solemnity befitting the occasion of a public declaration of the Allied war Aims that. "We are not fighting to deprive Turkey of Constantinople or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which predominantly Turkish in race," and yet in reply to Mr. Muhammad Ali's statement, he is reported to have said that in Thrace the Mussalman population was in a considerable minority and in Symrna the majority of the population was non-Turkish. Are facts to be twisted to suit policy? Are broken pledges to be followed by perversions of facts? Is British statesmanship all-bankrupt The sky is dark and the Muslim World is in greater unrest than it has been for centuries. The sky is very dark but whatever be the eventualities of the situation, I hope Muslims will ever remember the assistance given by the Hindus in making the Khilafat movement a strong All-India Movement. To all the well wishers of the country the cooperation of Hindus with Muslims in the Khilafat question will give nothing but the sincerest pleasure. It is the sympathy at the time of one's grief that is valued most, and I know that the hand of fellowship and company extended by them in the hour of sorrow has quickened the hearts of Muslims to its innermost. As the questions has assumed a national importance, I trust every step would be by joint decision.

THE COMMISSIONER'S POWERS

Having touched these All-India matters of the vital importance to the nation, I would wish to come at once to a consideration of the leading questions of Provincial interest and there can be not two opinion that the one question, which must engage our attention, before all others, is that of the position and powers of the Commissioner-in-Sindh, under the Reform Act. In para 214 of the Montague-Chelmsford report, the distinguished authors, after stating some reasons why one man's themselves thus:- "To our minds; however there is an overriding reason of greater importance than any of these. The retention of the administration of a province in the hands of a single man preclude the possibility of giving it a responsible character." In view of this very clear

emphatic statement, our complaint is that in matters, whether in transferred or reserved departments of governmental activity in which the Powers of a Governor in Council or Governor, Ministers have already been delegated to the Commissioner-in-Sindh, the Minister and the improved Executive Council cannot effectively determine the course of administrative action in Sindh, so long as the Commissioner enjoyed those delegated powers; and to the extent to which final disposal of matters, which in other divisions the Ministers alone can dispose of, remain with the Commissioner-in-Sindh, responsible government will be non-existent many powers of direction and control over local self-governing bodies are conferred on the present Governor-in-Council. Under the Delegation Act (Commissioner-in-Sindh's Act, V of 1868) a large number of these powers have been delegated to the Commissioner-in-Sindh. With the introduction of the Reform Act the Powers of the Governor-in-Council, in this behalf, will ipso facto devolve on the responsible Minister in charge of the Local Self Government, and the electorate obtains, through their, representatives, the power of controlling the administration of the department. But if the Commissioner-in-Sindh continues the enjoyment of his present delegated powers in respect of local self-governing bodies, the Minister in charge of the portfolio cannot respond to the pressure of the electorate of the Council, so far as Sindh is concerned, since he has not final voice in the department so long as the delegation holds good. This only means that Sindh does not get any material benefit from the Reforms Act, so far at least as the Transferred Subjects are concerned. In regard to Reserved Subject also, it will be denied much of the advantages of an improved Executive Council with larger Indian representation in it. If Sindh is to receive the full benefit, of the new Reforms there is no alternative left to the Government but to take up at once the question of placing the Commissioner-in-Sindh, in the same position, as the Commissioners of other divisions of the Presidency. Public opinion of all shades is dead against the present exceptional position of the Commissioner-in-Sindh and ever since the question of India Reforms was taken up by the political leaders of the country, this local reform has been the subject of consideration in the public Ares and at the political conferences of the Province. The people Hindus and Muslims are not convinced that the local autocracy must end and I feel sure that they will neither get nor give peace until this is done. The antiquated reasons on which the exceptional treatment of Sindh was based, have no longer any application unless it be that Sindh has seen no progress during the 77 years of British rule, and earlier the Government of Bombay revises the present system of administration the better it will be for both the people and the Government.

REPRESSION IN SINDH

I do not base the above on any particular incidents of Sindh Administration and my reference to two of them should not be taken as arguments or illustration in support of our claim. But they are of such great importance from other points and bear so vitally on the relations between the people and the Government that I feel I must make a pointed reference to them.

Brother Delegates, you all know of the aberration of mind, which the unfortunate of Sindh official underwent, during April last. They appeared to have been obsessed with the happenings in Punjab and losing their balance completely they launched on a policy of repression in a province than which none other wore a more peaceful appearance. They started with indiscriminate house-searches at Karachi, of men above all suspicion of conspiring against Government in any fashion and thought it wisdom to prosecute Mr. Durgadas, B. Advani and Mr. H. D. Mariwalla for a small leaflet alleged to have been seditious, which should not have, in any case, upset the peace of mind of any sober mind. But it unfortunately did and undue and severe sentences were passed against both of them. In Hyderabad incidents were even worse. Six respectable political workers of the town, including a man of the position of the Hon'ble Mr. M. Bhurgri were made the victims of a conspiracy by the officials. A false "first report" was trumped up against them, whose truth the Government themselves had to deny, in the Bombay Council. Five of them were arrested and let on heavy sureties and personal recognizance's, but the concocted plot was exposed and the Local officials had to beat a retreat with such farce as they could command. In the meantime another trial for sedition was launched at Hyderabad and this time the popular Editor of "the Hinvasi" Mr. Jethmal Parsaram became their victim. Mr. Jethmal fared no better than his Karachi friends but thanks to His Majesty's proclamation, and our friends were released, after a month's excellent mental physical training, and are again back in our midst working for the country, each according to his lights.

SINDH OFFICIALS AND KHILAFAT

Another illustration of Rowdyism in Sindh was the mean attempt of some officials. I am ashamed to say Mussalman officials at least they profess to be so - to use their official position and influence to set on foot and maintain an anti-Khilafat agitation in Sindh. Under the belief that illiterate mass of Sindh Muslims, already living in great dread of officialdom, offered the best material for a propaganda which country to the beliefs and feelings of practically the entire Moslem community of India, two Mussalman officials, occupying a position of great trust and influence stooped to any and every means to make Mussalmans declare false views and propagate false beliefs. This artificial agitation against the Khilafat was carried on with a high handedness, boldness and impunity which greatly compromised the position of the Commissioner-in-Sindh and the Bombay Government, and when open allegations of the methods employed to coerce Moslem opinion were made in the press, the Sindh administration chose to remain quiet for a long time and the two officials went on managing the stage show for months, the public came naturally to believe that the Government wanted this agitation and the officials were mere agents. I am glad to say that the Government was ultimately made to realize the grave inadvisability and inexpediency of this belief gathering more strength or acquiring any plausible basis, by its continued silence and H. E. the Governor of Bombay had to warn the officials not to take any part in the movement. While we are thankful that the Government saw the wisdom of a public disavowal and condemnation of the officials, we must reiterate here our demand for a full and

independent inquiry into the allegations of coercion employed by those officials and their underlings. Does Government expect that all who have been victims of this coercion and those who have suffered for their courageous stand for what they regard and truth must pocket the insults, the threats and worse because Government has a tender regard for the prestige of an official who has abused his powers. Is this a wise or statesmanlike attitude to take up in such a matter? The Larkana Khilafat Conference put their case for an enquiry before the Government of Bombay, in the form of a memorial and appointed a deputation to wait upon his Excellency the Governor. Not only was the deputation denied a personal interview, but also the enquiry itself was refused. One cannot appreciate the logic of the Government position. If the allegations of the public so openly and persistently made are false, government will have proved, beyond dispute, the correctness of their present position viz that they do not think there is ground for any complaint of coercion and Government will have a strong and effective argument for future use, if public made unreasonable demands for inquiry on any other matters. If however the allegations are proved to be correct, government will only have given an opportunity to punish the guilty for an offence actually proved, and to punish the guilty official or non official is one of the functions of the government, and we shall have deserved the thanks of government for helping it to discharge its functions aright. I hope that Sir George Lloyd yet see the reasonableness of our request and concede it at an early date.

THE 19771 MARCH

His Excellency Sir George Lloyd, in speaking of the warning he had administered to the government subordinates on account of their taking part in the anti Khilafat movement spoke of it as a "religious controversy," and now the government circularizes the Khilafat movement to be a political one, and we have probably therefore the spectacle of a number of District Magistrates in Sindh, making as much use of the Bombay District Police Act as they possibly could, in gagging the Muslims. The Khilafat movement, as it has repeatedly been urged is essentially a religious movement, and therefore any interference with it is calculated to cause, as experience shows, the greatest possible resentment, Indians are a peaceful people. They want to live and let others live; and therefore in the case of such a people unnecessary provocation is at once justifiable. In Karachi section 42 of the Police Act was promulgated in the Municipal and cantonment areas, while in Hyderabad, Sukkur and some other places notices under it were served on individuals. Not satisfied with the extremely elastic and all embracing wording of the section, the District Magistrate of Hyderabad went out of his way and beyond the scope of the section in notifying that the "declaration of any class of persons" as "Khaffirs" or "outcastes" or similar expressions are within the scope of the order..." It is well known that in the Holy Quran the word "Kaffir" occurs pretty often. and suppose a man read a portion having that word, will section 42 of the Police Act, as understood by the magistrate make him liable to a prosecution? If it does it is a clear interference with the religious liberty of the people. "Outcastes" again do not form a class by themselves. They are at the most as has always been the case, a few

individuals. Therefore giving them the position and dignity of a "a class" of people is an absurd attempt to prevent people from adjusting their social relations with these individuals, who have, by their behavior dropped out of the community. It is therefore clearly outside the province of a magistrate to take upon himself the supervision of the social matters of the community. Here in Sukkur, we have read in the papers in what manner our much-respected Chairman of the Reception Committee. Mr. Virumal Begraj has been served with "summons" by a Police subordinate. Such unnecessary and often times vexatious exhibitions of the official powers do not serve any useful purpose, but they go a long way in creating estrangement between the officials and the people, and the sooner Sindh officialdom shakes off its old traditions of displaying its strength, on unnecessary occasions, the better it would be for all concerned.

HINDU MUSLIM UNITY

Brother delegates! In spite of the whole atmosphere being surcharged with deep anxiety and the sky being overcast with dark clouds, there is a welcome silver lining. The onrush of a feeling of oneness among the Hindus and Moslems of India, at this time of grave crises, has deepened the foundations of the Hindu Moslem Unity, and this partnership, in distress, will, I hope, one day blossom in partnership in happiness, when our goal is achieved. The unity between the two communities is not a new thing. It is as old as the coming of Islam into India. The religion and the everyday conduct of Moslems can permit of no barrier to separate them from their neighbors. The Hindus and moreover if it be remembered that most of the Indian Mussalmans are of the same origin as the Hindus, there can be nothing that can really be an obstacle in the Hindu-Muslim entente. In the past, as History amply proves Hindus and Muslims have been the best of neighbors, sincere friends, and faithful comrades and a little, on both sides, would strengthen the solidarity between the two communities and mould them into one, great nation. It cannot be denied that petty jealousies over petty objects, and backward state of modern education, among Muslims, had contributed a good deal, to great in recent times, a feeling of distrust among the educated sections of the two communities. Happily the masses, to very great extent remained unaffected, by the feelings of the educated strata and with a little effort at sincerity towards one another Hindu-Muslim unity has come to have a remarkable revival. I am certain that the spread of education, among Muslims, will prepare them to take their share of the national obligations more readily than they have done in the past. I already see that one of the greatest results of the present Hindu-Muslim entente is the spirit of nationalism that is taking a firm root in the Muslim mind and as time goes on Muslims will be found to be working for the good of the country not less enthusiastically and strenuously than the Hindus. Muslims cannot afford to neglect the interest of the Indian Nation, just as Hindus should not remain indifferent to the comparative backwardness of the Muslims. Each needs the other, and each must exert to cooperate with the other. I trust that steps would be taken to bring home to the masses the message of Hindu-Muslim unity, and I have every hope that the unpleasant criticism we sometimes hear,

in the Civil Courts, about the high rate of interest charged in the mofussil, will have ere long, ceased to exist.

I find from the public press that the Hindus of Sindh have not been given their due share of the seats, available for the Hindus of the whole Presidency, on the new provincial Legislative Council. Between these two sections of the same community, the distribution of the representation on the reformed councils has not been fair and just. The voting strength of Sindh Hindus entitles them to four seats, whereas they have been given only two. The fact that Government and the National Congress and Muslim League have recognized the claim of a minority to receive favorable treatment further strengthens the claim of the Sindh Hindus, and I think that the Mussalmans of Sindh as Sindhis, ought to extend their whole-hearted support to Sindh Hindus, in obtaining from the Bombay Hindus, two additional seats to make up their fair share of representation. I understand that the Hindus have placed their case before the Reform Commissioner appointed for Bombay province, but the claim has not yet been conceded to. I hope that the claim will be placed and strongly pressed before higher authorities and that it will receive the cordial support of the Mussalmans of Sindh.

JOINT RECONCILIATION BOARDS

Since a long time the suggestion of forming joint Reconciliation Boards, to adjust civil and communal disputes, without the intervention of Courts, has been, before the public; and it is a great pity that we, in Sindh, have all along slept over it. Private arbitration would not only save time and money, but would considerably diminish the number of such cases and would give a healthy tone for the life of the people. It seems to me that the Joint Boards should be created not only to settle disputes between Hindus and Muslims, but also between Hindus and Hindus and between Muslims and Muslims themselves. The time is now ripe for giving a practical shape to the proposal and so far as I can see the public is really to respond Social relations between the two communities, particularly in large towns also stand in need of reconsideration and I would urge the leaders to devise means for their reconstruction in view of the growing harmony and the present day demands of the Society and Nation.

SWADESHI

Necessity has successfully goaded our people, in Sindh, to prefer the *Khathas* to the costly blanket, and as a substitute for the foreign flannel and woolen cloth prepared in the desert has been made use of in a large quantity. The demand for woolen materials prepared in the desert far exceeds the supply, but I hear, on reliable authority, that a little financial assistance to the weavers would bring to Sindh larger stock, than has hitherto come. It is not only the woolen materials that we can get locally so cheaply, but decent cotton cloth for shirting and other purposes would easily become procurable and is obtainable even now, though its quantity may not be sufficient. The necessity for cheaper and more durable cloth is very great and urgent. Once the Swadeshi material, howsoever coarse it may be, is on market, there remains not the least necessity for

canvassing for it. All that it needed is capital, and I venture to hope that our leading men in the Province. Peers and Zamindars and Capitalists will take steps to advance some money to weavers. who are now abandoning their ancestral profession to enable them to restart their work. It would be advantageous to have a system of exhibitions of the country made cloth at the fairs, so numerous in Sindh. Every village or a group of villages should have enough of handlooms to meet the demands and already Swedshism in cloth is so much in prominence in Sindh that it only requires putting our shoulder to the wheel. We mercantile class in the commercial centres are quite absorbed in foreign trade and speculation thereby acting as agents of the exploiters. We have been certainly great sinners to our motherland and children of the soil past, present and the future. Time has come when we should make amends and devote suffice attention to country made articles and provide them in the market: I see a wave of enthusiasm all round in this respect and people are eager to patronize even with some sacrifice. I fervently beg and appeal to my fellow businessmen to open eyes and the bright possibilities before them and invest their capital for the great good of Bharat Land.

RASAI COMMITTEE

Nearly two years have passed away, and we do not know anything about the results of the labors of the Rasai Committee. We have seen it in the past and we see it till today that whenever a Committee is appointed by Government to investigate any Sindh grievance, the publication of the report of it takes a number of years. The evils of Rasai Lapo and Cheer and there, and it is the duty of the Government to take immediate steps to issue their orders without further delay.

I least expect improvement in these evil systems, whatsoever be the recommendations of the Committee or the orders of the Government. In my opinion landholders, who are victims of this extortion are they to blame and they prepare themselves to be men. I call upon the Zamindars, most of whom profess the same faith as I, to join hands in the working of national regeneration. In the Quran we find a passage conveying deep meaning in which God has said that, no change will come into the lot of any Nation unless it take pains to do so. You possess heads and hearts to realize and understand famine, poverty, pestilence, all sorts of evils, disease, and high mortality are order of the day in our Beautiful Country. O'do knows that you have lost much of your vitality, by subjection rivalry amongst yourselves and lethargy and your case is evidently hopeless. In India if any class has suffered most it is yours and those under you.

APPENDIX IV

Napier Road,
Karachi, 28th November 1928.

To
The Members of the Committee of the Nehru Report,
Allahabad.

Dear Sirs,

I must state that owing to essential omissions the Nehru Report has failed to unite the various diverse national elements for the purpose of achieving national unity. It first declares that its goal is Dominion Status. The framers of the Report perhaps know better than others that freedom is not acquired by merely asking but that it is won by sacrifice. For such sacrifice what provisions have they made for the safety of the Minorities? The Minorities will not make heavy sacrifice unless the protection of their rights and interests receive statutory recognition. While strongly suggesting for the statutory recognition of the Rights of the Minorities, I do not for a moment wish to imply that I have lost faith in the statesmanship and judgment of the members of the Nehru Report and of the All Parties Convention. The possession of such a faith need not make one shut his eyes to the facts as they exist in the political situation of the country. Some would think that such an argument coming from a nationalist might weaken national forces, but the truth lies the other way. It is because I want to have confidence in place of distrust, concord in place of discord unification of diverse national elements in place of the present disintegration that I have strongly put forth the claims of the Minorities for that way alone lies the path of national solidarity and progress. The edifice of *Swaraj* can be built only on the foundations of practical considerations and not on sentimental grounds.

There are two ways to achieve freedom, armed revolt or agitation on constitutional lines. Looking to the present condition in the country the former is not only impracticable but it is absurd to talk of it. The second alternative presupposes basic unity amongst the various peoples living in our dear country. As the Nehru Report has not provided adequate safeguards for the Minorities, I wonder, whether these Minorities would unite in the constitutional struggle. As the other communities are strong enough to press their claims I will attempt to place before you what Muslims think of your Report. As their representative in the Legislative Assembly I shall be failing in my duty, if I did not place their genuine fears before the Nehru Committee and the other political organizations in the country. The views, which I have expressed in this pamphlet I have acquired in my daily, contact with the Muslims and have also discussed the same with the influential leaders of the province.

I feel sanguine that these suggestions on the Nehru Report which I am herewith offering will receive proper and adequate consideration when the same are being considered by the All Parties Convention so that our country may win the admiration of the world in the same manner as the States of Eastern Europe have done. The just and equitable treatment which these States have accorded to the minorities living in their respective territories is a bright chapter in their national history. Let us all strive to have a similar record in the annals of our dear motherland.

Section relating to the Rights of the Muslim Minority as incorporated in the Fundamental Laws of the Indian Constitution.

SECTION-I REPRESENTATION IN THE LEGISLATURES

Being a man of business it is not possible for me to devote that amount of time which may be required either to make counter proposals to the Nehru Report or to draft a Constitution for the future governance of our dear mother-land. I believe that the study of Constitutional history requires not only special aptitude but also great ability especially when one has to evolve a Constitution for the future progress of the Motherland and to provide adequate safeguards for the Minorities inhabiting this Sub-continent of ours. Constitution making may be the work of specialists or scholars but on this account it should not and ought not to preclude lay citizens from contributing their humble quota towards the progress of their country. At this critical juncture in our history, I believe, one should express one's views on the essential features of our constitution of the future. It goes without saying that the value of such views would be proportionate to the experience one may have acquired in the service of one's community and country. On receipt of a complimentary copy of the Nehru Report from Pandit Motilal Nehru, I immediately began to read the report very carefully in the light of my 25 years work for ways by which all Indian communities, specially the Minorities should unite to achieve and strive for the goal of Self-government and with the safeguards provided to them under the *Swaraj* Government these Minorities may enjoy their rights as equal partners in the Commonwealth of India.

Clause 1 - It shall be expressly incorporated in the Indian Constitution that the Muslims shall be guaranteed one-third of the total strength of the elected representatives in the Central House of Representatives and that this strength shall be reserved under the system of Joint Electorates.

Explanatory Note:- In support the one-third representation for the Muslim Minority in the Central Legislatures, I give below the opinion of Mir Shuaib Qureshi, a member of the Nehru Committee, who strongly puts forth the Muslim

demand viz., that one-third of the seats in the Central Legislatures should be reserved for the Muslims, but unfortunately his proposal was not agreed to the other members of Nehru Committee.

The representative nature of Mr. Shuaib Qureshi's proposal will be clear from the fact that many Muslim influential leaders of All-India fame have supported him.

(For further information on the subject see Nehru Report. page 55, and the Delhi-Muslim proposals of March 1927).

How far the Nehru Report needs modification will be more evident when one finds that even its staunch advocates namely, Dr. Ansari, (President Indian National Congress and also of the All Parties Conference), Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Maulana Zafar Ali Khan (Editor, the *Zamindar*, Lahore) Maulana Habibur Rehman of Ludhiana and others at the Sindh Khilafat Conference, agreed to the one-thirds representation of the Muslim Minority in the Central Legislatures. (See Schedule A No. 1)

Clause 2: - In the provinces of Bengal and the Punjab representation of the Muslims shall be fixed on population basis under the system of mixed electorates with the reservation of seats, such reservation should continue until such time as the Muslim desire it.

Explanatory Note:- In support of this Clause, I refer to the Resolution of the Sikh League held in October 1928, at the Gujranwala (Punjab). The League has practically repudiated the agreement arrived at the All Parties Conference, Lucknow. Further, it has asked for the reservation of the seats with representation in excess of their population strength, in the Provincial as well as in the Central Legislatures. In spite of the support given to the Nehru Report from some Khilafat leaders of the Punjab one cannot shut his eyes to the fact that a majority of Punjab Muslim leaders desire reservation of seats on the same lines as the Sikhs. Therefore, I hope that the above demands will be conceded to the Muslims.

Clause 3:- In the provinces where the Muslims are in a minority they shall be guaranteed adequate representation in excess of their population strength and these shall be reserved under the system of Joint Electorates.

Explanatory Note:- In such provinces the Nehru Report has accorded reservation of seats on population basis to the Muslims and has also permitted them to contest general constituencies, While appreciating this claim one cannot but judge its utility in the light of past knowledge. At present in the general constituencies wherever Non-Muslims are in a majority my past and present

experience shows that the Muslims candidates have not been returned. Therefore the clause loses its value. The opposition of Muslim is increasing in volume owing to the fact that the Rights given them under the Lucknow Pact (1926) are being taken away. Therefore, I strongly suggest that, to achieve national unity the Minorities should be given representation in excess of their population. As a practical proof of this policy I suggest that in the provinces of the N.W.F.P. Baluchistan, and Sindh where the Muslims form a majority they should grant the Hindu minority representation in excess of their population. By such policy we conciliate the minority and yet keep the effective strength of the majority unimpaired.

Clause 4:- In the Indian Constitution it shall be expressly provided that in the "Cabinets" of the Central and the Provincial Legislatures and adequate number of Muslim Ministers shall be appointed. In provinces where Muslims are in a Minority the Governors in the "Instrument of Instructions" may be directed in clear language to give particular attention to the racial, religious and cultural development of the Muslim Minority.

(See Schedule B No. 1).

Clause 5:- That the provinces of N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan shall enjoy the same form of government as is at present enjoyed by the other provinces of India and further that whatever reforms may be introduced hereafter in the other provinces shall also be introduced in N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan at the same time.

Explanatory Note:- In support of the above I may state that the introduction of the Reforms in these provinces is long overdue treatment in this connection in the past has been far from satisfactory. That this subject is in the forefront of Indian Politics will be clear from the fact that the Indian Legislative Assembly passed a Resolution in its favor. The Delhi Muslim proposals also have recommended to the same effect.

Clause 6:- The provinces of N.W.F.P., Baluchistan and Sindh shall be constituted into separate provinces and that these shall form separate units in the Federal States of the Commonwealth of India as outlined in the Scheme of H.H. the Aga Khan. It is desirable that the Hindu Minorities in these provinces should be given representation in excess of their population. Similarly the Muslim Minorities in Bombay. Madras, Assam, U.P. C.P.. Ajmere-Merwara, Delhi and other Provinces should be given representation in excess of their population.

Note:- In support of the part relating to the Federal System, I may mention that the Sindh Khilafat Conference has also passed a similar Resolution (See Schedule A No. 3). In my opinion if the Minorities are represented in excess of their population mutual goodwill and confidence would be produced resulting the

reaction of an atmosphere, which would ultimately lead to national unity and solidarity.

Clause 7:- It shall be expressly laid down that the provincial Legislatures shall guarantee an effective representation to the Muslims in the Municipalities and in the district Local Boards. The electoral constituencies of such local bodies shall be so arranged as, firstly, to keep the strength of a majority community in the local bodies unimpaired, and secondly, to grant the minority community representation in excess of their population, with reservation of seats under the system of joint electorates.

Explanatory Note:- None will deny the important part played by the local bodies in the making of a nation. Local Bodies mould the destiny of a nation by conducting and controlling its education. I feel that such training grounds should provide for the cultural development of all the communities living within its areas. Unless the Muslims the adequately represented in the Municipalities and the Local Boards they cannot contribute their share to the growth and the progress of the Indian nation. If the Separate Electorates, which they enjoy in such Local Bodies. are taken away under the watch-ward of Nationalism, I am afraid opposition to the Nehru Report would increase not only in volume but in intensity. Therefore, I suggest that the above clause should receive statutory recognition.

Clause 9:- That the Muslim Minority shall be assured of an adequate representation in the various services maintained by the Central and Provincial Governments, the Municipalities and District Local Boards. Especially where the Muslims are in a Minority their representation in the Services should be greater than the actual strength of their population warrants. Similar rights should be given to the Hindus wherever they are in a minority.

Explanatory Note:- (a) As the Muslims hitherto had not been adequately represented in the services and in the educational institutions they carried on vehement and vigorous agitation in Sindh for their adequate representation in the services and in the educational institutions. As a result of their agitation the Bombay Government in the educational institutions reserved 50 percent seats for the Muslims to the extent of 50 percent. That is the other 50 percent in the services were given to the Non-Muslims although their population in Sindh is only 26 percent. Similarly, it is desirable that in the provinces where the Muslims are in a minority the reservation of seats in the Educational Institutions should be provided for them and representation in the services should be fixed on the same lines as has been accorded to the Non-Muslims in Sindh.

(b) For a Clause similar to the latter part of the above stipulation see Schedule B. No. 2.

Clause 9:- As regards the Franchise it shall be expressly laid down that "Adult Suffrage should be introduced, failing which the Franchise should be so adjusted as to bring the voting strength of the Muslims in the Central and the Provincial Legislatures, and in local bodies on the basis of their population.

SECTION-2

RELIGIOUS AND EDUCATIONAL CLAUSE FOR THE MUSLIM MINORITY

Before proceeding to enumerate adequate safe-guards for the educational, religious and cultural development of the Muslim Minority, I will refer to the Nehru Report and show to what extent its educational and religious clauses do not adequately provide for and protect the Rights of the Minorities.

In the previous section, I have stated that the an adequate representation of the Muslim Minority in the Imperial Provincial and Subordinate services is absolutely necessary firstly, because the preponderance of the one community does not in the long run conduce to the efficiency of the service and secondly the Muslims should be given the chance to serve the land of their birth. Again the working of the various provisions relating to the racial, religious and cultural development of the Muslims can receive fair attention only if an adequate representation is guaranteed to the Muslims in the Services. As the Clauses relating to the Services in the Nehru Report (Art: 82 page, 121) do not effectively provide for the representation of the Minorities, I have provided a separate clause to this effect. See supra Section 1, Clause 9.

As regards the education of the backward communities, it is obvious that the Nehru Report (Clause 72, Part the promotion and protection of their educational interests. Hence the following clauses relating to the educational, religious and cultural development of the Muslims should receive statutory recognition, and then alone will the Muslims be able to enjoy peaceably their Rights as equal partners in the Commonwealth of India.

Clause 1:- The Muslims shall have the right to establish, manage and control and charitable, religious and social institutions and schools and other establishments for instruction and education with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein.

(See Schedule B. No. 3).

Clause 2:- The educational institutions belonging to the Muslims shall be entitled on the basis of population to an equitable share of the funds allowed for religious and educational purposes out of the Central, the Provincial, the Municipal, the Local Board or the state Budgets and that the Muslims shall be entitled to administer the affairs and to direct and supervise the religious, charitable or educational institutions with full powers subject to the laws promulgated to maintain public law or order, that is, so long

as the activities of the Muslim charitable, religious, cultural or social institutions do not contravene the law of the land, the state shall not in any way hinder or hamper their work.

(See Schedule B. No. 4).

Clause 3:- On the application of the Muslim citizens responsible for the education of at least thirty children the State or the Local Bodies shall provide either minority schools or minority classes as the case may be. The maintenance of such minority educational institutions shall be provided on the same principles as the maintenance of the other State Institutions.

(See Schedule B. No. 5 and 6)

Clause 4:- The needs of the Muslims as regards Public Education shall be supplied by a proper organization of the Educational Institutions concerning firstly: -Elementary schools and elementary classes employing the minority language as the language of instruction as under:-

- (a) Minority courses dealing with: The teaching of School lessons and religious education to be imparted in the national language of the Muslim Minority.
- (b) The competent State authority shall see that the Minority schools are not placed at a disadvantage in the allocation of the credits provided for such purpose in the Budgets mentioned above. (For Clauses similar to (a) and (b) (see Schedule B. No. 7).
- (c) The Educational Authorities of the State must abstain from exercising any pressure however slight with a view to obtaining the withdrawal of requests for the establishment of the schools for the benefit of the Muslims. (See Schedule B. No. 8).
- (d) The Educational Department of the State shall undertake not to authorize in any school the use of books or pictorial material liable to offend the national or religious sentiments of the Muslims. Further, it shall ensure that in the lessons given at the State Schools the national and intellectual qualities of the Muslims are not improperly depreciated in the eyes of the pupils. (See Schedule B. No. 9).

Clause 5:- The Religious training of Muslim children in all the State Schools shall be directed and controlled by the Muslim Cultural Unions which shall be constituted for such purpose. (See Schedule B. No. 10).

Clause 6:- The Central, the Provincial and the Local Bodies, while making provision for primary education shall also establish vocational schools, or vocational classes and in such institutions an adequate number of seats shall be reserved for the Muslims on the basis of population.

Clause 7:- Similarly provisions for the reservation of adequate number of seats shall be made for the Muslims in Secondary Education, and also in the administrative and executive branches of the Indian Universities. Chairs of Islamic History and civilization shall be created in provinces where Muslims are in a minority. Effective representation shall be guaranteed to the Muslims in all the universities, which are maintained and controlled, from the Central and Provincial Budgets or in the universities which may hereafter be created by the Central and Provincial Governments.

Clause 8:- The Official language of the Commonwealth of India shall not be imposed on the language of instruction in the private schools established managed, supervised, and maintained by the Muslims Educational Organizations.

Explanatory Note:- The Nehru Report (Page, 62) recommends the encouragement of the Provincial language. In so doing it does not take into consideration the national language of the minorities inhabiting such a province. Fortunately for the minorities, All Parties Conference removed this defect by laying down in clear and explicit words the following resolution:-

(Nehru Report Resolution No. 9, page, 165)

- (1) "The protection of the right of the minorities to give instruction to their children in schools through the medium of their own language and such script as may be in vogue among them.
- (2) The use of Hindustani as the language of the Commonwealth with the right to use either Hindi or Urdu character as the ordinary scripts, the use of English being permitted.
- (3) The use in every province of its provincial language as the Official language with the liberty to use Hindustani or English.

In view of the above resolution it shall be provided that the Muslim Minority shall be allowed to use their own language and script in areas where they are in a minority."
(Also see Schedule B. No. 11).

Clause 9:- That the Commonwealth of India shall not prevent or debar the Muslims from inviting from Islamic countries teachers, literary doctors and other similar personnel necessary for their cultural development and for keeping alive their national

associations. That the Sea Customs Act shall not be made to operate in discriminatory manner towards such cultural works. Further the Muslims Organizations shall not be prevented from receiving gifts for purely religious purpose from their co-religionists abroad. (See Schedule B. No. 12).

Clause 10:- The National Calendar should consist only of national public holidays but the Muslims, the Hindus and the other communities shall be entitled to enjoy their religious holidays as sectional holidays. (See Nehru Report page 102, Chapter VII). Fundamental Laws, Clause 4, Part XI Also see Schedule B. No. 13).

Clause 11:- The Muslims shall not be compelled to perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or religious observances and shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend courts of Law or to perform any legal business during the period fixed for Friday *Namaz*, *Id Namaz* etc., (See I. Resolution No. 3, Clause 6 of U.P. All Parties Muslim Conference held on November 5th, 1928). (II Schedule B. No. 14).

Clause 12:- That the Commonwealth of India shall provide for the establishment or Arbitration Boards consisting of half Hindus and half Muslims at important and convenient centres to amicably settle the questions of Cow-slaughter and Music before Mosques or such other cognate matters. In cases of friction these communities shall place their case before the permanent Joint Committees of every legislature elected under Clause I, Section III of these stipulations.

Explanatory Note:- It is surprising how the members of the Nehru Report who otherwise in the drafting of the Report have sent so much of their energy have conveniently forgotten to suggest remedies for these two very important questions which almost daily affect the peaceful relations of the two important communities. The absence of provisions for settlement of these questions leads one to wonder at the motives of the members of the Nehru Committee. Perhaps they feared that their recommendations would not be accepted by two communities, hence their convenient silence over it. But in so doing they have committed blunder of the first magnitude.

Recently in some places where the Hindus preponderate the Slaughter of Cows for daily consumption at Municipal Slaughter Houses was prohibited to the Non-Hindu Minority without any valid reason. In the teeth of the Non-Hindu opposition the Hindus by their over-welcoming votes carried their resolution and thus interfered in the exercise of the legitimate civil rights of the Non-Hindu Minority. The Collectors of the respective districts used their power of veto and thus made the resolution of the Hindus e.g. of Sukkur and Shikarpur Municipalities nugatory. Instances such as these can be multiplied; but for the purpose of illustration the above will perhaps be sufficient. They amply bear out

the bigoted nature of the Hindus, thus completely shaking the confidence of the Non-Hindus in the Hindus. Hence on this vital problem the Muslims also need assurance. As regards the question of music before mosques the high-handedness of the Hindus has been so unjustifiable that the Muslims need adequate safeguards on this question, too.

Clause 13:- Whereas the Non-Muslim Judiciary at present finds it difficult to decide Islamic cases relating to marriage, divorce, inheritance and such other cognate matters and as on account of the intricate points involved in such cases the decisions of such Non-Muslim Judges in some cases go against the established conventions and the tradition of the Muslim Law, the creation of special tribunals for such purposes shall be expressly provided in the Indian Constitution.

Clause 14:- In spite of the passing of the Auwkaf Act of 1923 it is found by experience that Wakf-properties are not managed as they should be; hence the Commonwealth of India shall appoint a minister of Auwkaf at the Head Quarters and adequate and effective staff at important and convenient centres to manage and conduct and supervise Wakf properties on the same line as is done in the Muslim States of Turkey, Iraq and Egypt and in the Fresh Dominion of Morocco and Tunis.

SECTION-3 GENERAL CLAUSES

Clause 1:- Any bill, resolution, proposal and amendment of inter-communal character shall not be introduced, discussed or passed in any Provincial or Central Legislatures, if three-fourths of the representatives of the community concerned, Hindus or Muslims are opposed to such a measure.

A permanent Joint Committee representing both the communities in proportion of fifty percent each from every Legislature should be elected in the beginning of its sessions. These committees shall have the power to decide whether a certain question is of inter-communal character or not. (Resolution No. 1 clause 5 of the Sindh Khilafat Conference).

Note:- As the utility of the above clause is apparent there is no need to give an explanation in support of it.

Clause 2:- That no State Law or Measure shall in any manner directly or indirectly attempt or contemplate forcible denationalization of the Muslims and if such measures be attempted they shall be deemed illegal.

Explanatory Note:- As the Muslims in the Central Legislatures would remain in a minority of the one to three and as all power is vested in the Central Legislatures

(See Fundamental Laws Clause 4 (I) Page 191 of the Nehru Report) it means that the Non-Muslims would always be in power. This cannot be contemplated with equanimity by the Muslim Minority unless they are assured that no State Law or measure shall in any manner directly or indirectly contemplate forcible denationalization of the Muslim Minority. The Incorporation of this important clause in the Indian Constitution is very essential because the Nehru Report robs the Muslims with one hand of whatever little it concedes to them with the order, e.g. the Central Government would veto the acts of a Provincial Government without providing adequate safeguards for the retention of the independence of the Provincial Legislatures in vital international affairs.

At present the members of the Committee of Nehru Report have failed to recommend one-third representation for the Muslims in the Central Legislatures. From this one can imagine what the conditions of the Muslims would be when the Nehruites are actually in power. Hence to assure the Muslims it shall be provided in the Indian Constitution that no Census figures shall be manipulated to the detriment of the Muslims nor shall they be interfered with in their national customs and costumes, nor any other attempt direct or indirect shall be made to denationalize them. It is my firm belief that the cultural development of the Muslims can only be assured if adequate safeguards, such as the above are provided. Then and then alone can they enjoy peaceably their rights as equal partners in the Commonwealth of India. (See Schedule B. No. 15)

Clause 3:- That no Legislative and administrative measure either of the Central Government or Provincial Legislature or the Local Bodies shall establish any differential treatment towards Muslim citizens. That other State measures shall not be interpreted or applied in a discriminative manner to the detriment of the Muslim citizens.

Explanatory Note:- In view the fact that recently in places where communal riots have taken place the Muslims suffered from the economic boycott of the Non-Muslims: to avoid this it shall expressly be stated that the enforcement of such anti-communal boycott when applied to the detriment of any community it shall be deemed illegal. (See Schedule B. No. 16).

Clause 4:- In order effectively and properly to supervise the working of the Muslim Fundamental Laws contained in this Section and in the two preceding ones the competent Ministerial authorities who may be entrusted with carrying out of the present stipulations shall consult and cooperate with the ministers and of the minorities subject to the public law or order. (See Schedule B. No. 1).

Clause 5:- In order to ensure that the petitions emanating from the members of the Muslims Minority and relating to the interpretation of application of the Fundamental Laws should receive uniform and equitable treatment from the administrative officers,

the Central Government of Commonwealth of India shall establish Offices for the Muslim Minority at convenient and important centres. (See Schedule No. B. 17).

Clause 6:- In the Commonwealth of India it shall be clearly laid down that the provisions contained in this section and in the two preceding ones shall be recognized as Fundamental Laws and that no Law or Regulation or Official action shall inflict or interfere with these stipulations nor shall any Law, Regulation or Office order prevail over them. (See Schedule B. No. 18).

Clause 7:- It shall be expressly postulated in the Indian Constitution that the adequate safeguards provided in the preceding stipulations shall constitute obligations of supreme importance and shall be placed under the guarantee of the Commonwealth of India. They shall not be modified without the assent of the two-thirds majority of the Muslim Minority and that any difference of opinion as to either its application or interpretation shall be placed before the Supreme Court to be constituted hereafter. Further that these Fundamental Laws with come into force on the day of their publication by the Commonwealth of India.

Explanatory Note:- Clause 87 of the Nehru Report (page 123) lay down that the Central Legislatures may by law, repeal, alter or amend the Indian Constitution. It is clear that no minority can contemplate to enjoy peaceably its Rights when a Sword of Damocles in the shape of the above clause hangs over their heads. Under such circumstances the minority cannot place confidence in the rule of the majority. Hence this Clause of the Nehru Report should be amended in favor of the Minorities. The All Parties Conference, Lucknow, on the suggestion of Mr. Chagla, Secretary, Bombay Provincial Muslim League, has already recommended to the Nehru Report to amend this Clause 87 in favor of minorities. When amended it should run as follows:-

It shall be expressly laid down in the Indian Constitution that no law, stipulation or provision relating to the Muslim Minority shall be repealed, amended or altered without the consent of the two-thirds majority in the Central Legislatures." (See Schedule B. No. 19).

CONCLUSION

Having briefly pointed out in the preceding sections the Rights and Interests of the Muslim Minority and the great importance of incorporating the same in the Constitution of the future Commonwealth of India it might be now interesting to review the effects of the Nehru Report on the political situation of the country. No keen observer will fail to remark that its publication was like a bombshell on the national camp; it scattered the national workers far and wide and postponed the chances of national unity and solidarity. In the mass mind created a feeling for exciting demonstrations and dislike or constructive work. I believe this was not the occasion to

publish the Report. The Report has accentuated the existing divergences not only between one community and another but also in the various communities, themselves. At this critical juncture the lack of cohesion in the elements, which constitute our nation, will certainly be adopted by all true patriots.

To portray this process of disintegration in national life - the various Memorandums submitted to the Simon Commission amply bear this out - is a painful task at all occasions but it is specially so on an occasion when one has to disagree with the co-workers in a national cause. On such occasions the higher sense of duty to one's country should be placed above all considerations of personal friendship and acquaintance. It is because I feel that the harm caused by the Nehru Report to the progress of the nation can only be repaired if the minorities are given adequate and effective safeguards which are essential for their development nay for their very existence, that I have placed the aims of Muslim Minority for the consideration of the Nehru Committee and the All Parties Convention.

The other communities viz, the Europeans, the Anglo-Indians and the Parsis are sufficiently well organized and powerful to press their claims. Their large vested interests would certainly prompt any framer of Indian's Constitution, to give all possible facilities to their capital for expansion for two reasons, firstly on account of their inalienable and primary rights as the citizens of the Commonwealth and secondly in the interests of the development of the country itself. The claims of the Marathas in Maharashtra and the Non-Brahmins in Madras should be favorably considered by the advanced caste Hindus. Similarly the Muslims and the Hindus in the Punjab should recognize the Sikhs as an important Minority. The Indian Christian community - a community daily increasing in numerical strength should be granted adequate and effective safeguards for their religious and cultural development. On the basis of citizenship, as well as on ethnological grounds, the safeguards for the protection of this Community should receive statutory recognition. The grant of equal political privileges and rights to the Depressed and Untouchable Classes should be provided in clear and explicit words in the Constitution. I believe that the amelioration of the social conditions of the depressed and the other backward classes should be the primary duty not only of the Government but of the members of the other advanced communities also. Since the laws of Manu were first put into operation, five thousand years ago, the condition of the suppressed classes has been a stigma on the social structure of Hindu Society and as the Hindus form a majority of the population in India, the stigma more or less has become national. As a result of the fallen condition of our depressed brethren our reputation in the International World has suffered a great deal. But this is not enough. Internally, other communities knowing the fallen condition of the Depressed Classes legitimately feel and fear that under a *Swaraj* of the caste-Hindus their political rights and privileges might be taken away; and socially they might be reduced to the state of Pariahs. It is therefore that I opine that the proof of our fitness for self-Government lies not in the various installments of reports we might get, but in the

degree of fair treatment we shall accord to the backward and the depressed communities and to the minorities living in our dear motherland.

Some people are prone to argue that the demand for adequate and effective safeguards for the Minorities in India is a novel suggestion of the communally blind leaders of the Muslims. I have reason to believe that those who advance such views are either ignorant of world conditions or, if they are aware of these, they purposely do not wish the public to know lest their case for superiority over the minorities may be weakened. Such people conveniently forget that the settlement of the question of Irish Independence was arrived at only when Southern Ireland agreed to the demands of Ulster. Similarly the liberal and equitable treatment of the Copts Minority by the lamented Zagloul Pasha cemented and strengthened the demand of the Egyptians for Independence. The rights accorded by the States of Eastern Europe to the minorities living in their territories are amply borne out in the Clauses quoted in Schedule B. of this pamphlet. All this should give good for thought to members of the major communities. I am sure that if they adopt a statesmanlike and liberal attitude the problem of India would be settled to the satisfaction of all concerned. Once the various communities unite there will be enthusiasm in the, efforts to sacrifice, and coordination in their activities to achieve, Self-Government and then we shall enter the promised land of *Swaraj*.

APPENDIX V

From,
Seth Haji Abdoola Haroon, M. L. A.
Napier Road, Karachi

August, 24, 1932.

To
The Chairman,
The Sindh Financial Enquiry Committee, (Camp). Poona.

Subject:- SEPARATION OF SINDH - FINANCIAL ENQUIRY

Sir,

I have the honor to submit, in response to your invitation, my views on the financial aspect of the question separation of Sindh from Bombay Presidency. I have already submitted, on the 18th instant, my replies to the questionnaire issued by your Committee in regard to the additional cost of the Separation of Sindh. Now I beg your permission to offer my general remarks on the Sindh Financial Enquiry Committee's forecast of the probable Income and Expenditure of Sindh after its separation from Bombay Presidency. I have carefully studied the Statement of the probable Income and Expenditure of separated Sindh as prepared by the Sindh Finance Committee, with the Notes accompanying it. The Statement seems to have been prepared on the following assumptions:-

- 1) The financial settlement between the Central Government and the Provincial Governments will remain as it is at present.
- 2) The cost of administration will continue to be as top-heavy as at present.
- 3) The Indianization of services will continue to be as slow as it is at present.
- 4) There is no expectation of any economy or retrenchment in the present expenditure.

2 On the above assumptions the Committee has estimated a probable ordinary income of Rs.195 lakhs and probable ordinary expenditure of Rs. 2256.48 lakhs, showing a probable deficit of Rs. 32.48 lakhs.

3. That Sindh should in that manner be shown as a deficit province should cause no

surprise when it is well known that on the basis of the financial settlement between the Central Government and the Provincial Governments, as it exists now, most of the Provinces in India are deficit provinces, (vide figures given on page 363 of Volume 1 of Simon Commission Report). If those provinces are to be saved from continuously recurring annual deficits somehow Sindh also can be expected to avoid becoming a deficit province.

4. In my humble opinion the forecast of the Committee will have to be considerably changed in the light of the following consideration:-

1. The proposals made by Sir Walter Layton regarding the financial settlement between the Central Government and the Provincial Governments, with a view to make provision of additional and adequate financial resources for the provincial Governments must be taken into consideration, and it even should be expected that by effecting all necessary retrenchment in Central Government expenditure on Army, etc., the proposals of Sir Walter Layton will have to be so revised as to provide even more financial resources for Provincial Governments than proposed by Sir Walter Layton. According to the proposals of Sir Walter Layton, Sindh shall get an additional income of about 7 lakhs of rupees by way of behalf its share from Income-Tax alone. If the Government of India is compelled, as it should be, to make some considerable cuts in much of its unnecessary expenditure and specially Army Budget, the Provincial Governments can even be assigned more sources of income than proposed by Sir Walter Layton.
2. It being an accepted truth that the services in India are more highly paid than in any other country in the world it must be expected that the future Provincial Governments shall very much reduce the present top-heavy cost incurred on the services. The present economic conditions and the present market-value of capable administrative officers go to prove that Sindh shall be able to recruit people for Public Services on terms cheaper than those obtaining now.
3. Retrenchment and economy being now the talk of the day in all countries of the world, it must be admitted that there are many superfluous and unnecessary posts which can be abolished forthwith, without any detriment to the future progress of Sindh. Whatever economy I intend to propose shall not be inconsistent with the real moral and material progress of the province. I shall show herein below that at present we have many officers and appointments which, if abolished, will, besides effecting considerable saving, be conducive to greater efficiency and quicker dispatch and disposal of Government work than is now the case.

Besides, by stricter popular control over spending departments, it can be ensured that all that Govt. now does at a heavy cost the same may be one with some sense of real economy.

4. Full Provincial autonomy and Local Self-Government for India will have no meaning, if we are not enabled soon hereafter, gradually but continuously, to Indianite all our Public Services. If European element, being the most highly paid is gradually diminished and replaced by Indians of requisite merits as it is bound to be within a short course of time, we should expect that Public Service, manned chiefly by competent Indians will be cheaper than now.
5. I shall now, in the light of the above four main considerations offer my remarks on the estimates as framed by the Committee:

STATEMENT OF PROBABLE REVENUE.

6. The Committee provisionally assume the Land Revenue to be Rs. 10,885 lakhs. Their assumption is based on the figures for Land Revenue Administration Report of the Bombay Presidency, for the year 1927-28, describes the year on page 99 and onwards as follows, so far as Sindh is concerned:-

"The season during the year was far from satisfactory the river went on declining and fell much below the irrigating level early in September and did not rise again, as a result of which the crops generally suffered from deficiency of water and there were heavy remissions on that account. Locusts visited Sindh again and caused damage to standing crops. Owing to an excessive and unprecedented rainfall in the Thar Parkar and Hyderabad Districts in the end of July, serious floods occurred in those districts and caused widespread destruction of *Kharif* crops and loss of cattle, house and other property. A large number of persons were thereby rendered homeless. Floods also occurred in the Karachi District. but the damage caused there was not so great as in the above two districts. After the floods and apparently in consequence of them a terrible pest known as "Mahlo" did considerable damage to the crops in the Tando Division of the Hyderabad District, and Shahbunder Division of the Karachi District. Government immediately adopted relief measures on a very extensive scale, viz. grant of *Takavi* loans, free grants of money from provincial revenues, free grants of timber from forests and government waste lands, and liberal remissions and suspensions of land revenue".

7. It would therefore be unsafe and inadvisable to rely on the figures for the year 1927-1928. The year 1928-29 was also not satisfactory, and the year 1929-30 was, of course, the worst. The Committee itself admits the years 1928-29 and 1929-30 to be years of floods, with big remissions and postponements of land revenue collections. The Land Revenue Administration Report of the Bombay Presidency including Sindh, for the year 1928-29, describes the situation in Sindh on page 99 and the following pages as under:-

"... No deficiency of water was felt except on the tails of certain canals. The cotton crop was however damaged to some extent by the severe winter frost. The rainfall was scanty throughout the year as a result of which the *barani* tracts suffered. Rabi crops and the fruit gardens were, however, severely damaged by frost and the remission on this account were heavier than in the previous year.

8. The year 1929-30 was an unprecedented year in the history of Sindh. In the words of the Land Revenue Administration Report, page 101, for the year 1929-30:-

"The season under report was far from satisfactory. The year moreover witnessed an unprecedented rainfall. The heavy rainfall and High River and the consequent breaches in the river and canal banks caused widespread destruction of *Khariif* crops and severe losses of cattle and house and other property. After the floods subsided, a considerable area was shown with Bajri crop, and it was expected that this crop would give some relief on maturity. but these expectations were not realized, for the *Khariif* crops including Bajri, were badly damaged by locusts which kept hovering all over Sindh. The cotton crop was further damaged to a considerable extent by the early frost of December 1929. The prospects of Rabi were at first good. but those crops, too, suffered badly from the effect of frost".

9. It would therefore be most unreliable to base Land Revenue Income on the figures of these three years 1927-30. The Land Revenue collected in these three years has not been according to expectations because of the unprecedented causes of nature, as described above, which necessitated large remissions and suspensions. The figures for the three years 1927-1930, according to Land Revenue years are as follows:-

Year	Year's Land Revenue Demand	Year's Remissions	Year's Suspensions	Year's Collections.
	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
1927-28	1,14,89,074	15,47,862	2,45,762	97,67,610
1928-29	1,18,22,553	5,68,105	84,495	1,11,64,559
1929-30	1,33,76,740	25,43,569	6,41,161	1,01,54,461
Total	3,66,88,367	46,59,536	9,71,418	3,10,86,630
Average	1,22,29,456	15,53,179	3,23,806	1,03,62,210

10. From the perusal of the above figures it is clearly established without the least shadow of a doubt that far from falling oil in total Land Revenue Demand, there has been a steady, increase in it. This phase of it is not temporary one. It is permanent tendency inasmuch as there is increased cultivation with rice and other flow crops in place of other not-flow crops. The majority of Sindhis, who formerly idled away winter time, have taken to Rabi crop seriously, and the lands, which otherwise lay fallow for two or even three continuous years. are being cultivated now in alternate years. Total revenue demand increased from the year 1927-28 to 1928-1929 by 3.34 lakhs and from the year 1928-29 to 1929-1930 by 15.54 lakhs. I would therefore without consideration of post Barrage conditions, place the total Revenue demand for the year, when Sindh is separated, at least at Rs. 135 lakhs, the demand for 1929 being Rs. 134 lakhs.
11. The years 1927-28, 1928-29 and 1929-30 as pointed out above, have been very exceptional. The remissions have been unusual, as shown in details below, in lakhs of rupees:-

Year	Owing to Locusts & Pests	Owing to Frost & Adverse Winds	Owing to Kalar	Owing to Floods	Owing to Deficiency in Water	Total Remissions
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12. It cannot be expected that we shall always have such locusts and pests as in 1929-30 or even as in 1927-28, or such adverse winds and forest as in 1929-30 or even as in 1928-29, or such floods as in 1920-30, or even as in 1927-28, or such severe deficiency of water as in 1927-28. In a normal year under normal conditions, the total suspensions should not exceed Rs. 0.85 lakh as in 1928-29 or at most Rs. 0.90 lakh, and the total remissions should not exceed Rs. 4.10 lakhs as normally they may be as under:-

OTHER HEADS OF REVENUE

13. Excluding Land Revenue, the Committee has provisionally assumed a probable income of Rs. 84.15 lakhs from all other Heads of Revenue. In my opinion a probable income of Rs. 105 lakhs, instead of Rs. 84.15 lakhs. can safely be estimated owing to the following reasons:-

1) Owing to popular control and responsible Government, there will be fewer chances of leakage of Government revenue. When Sindh gets full Provincial autonomy the popular elected legislators will have to feel their responsibility and put forth all possible efforts to increase income from the existing sources and even to tap fresh sources of income. I shall illustrate my point thus. At present it is believed that some Tuppedar and Supervising Tuppedar conspire among themselves and give undue benefit to Zamindars, by taking from them Lapo, which is a sort of commission, and in return showing some of their cultivated lands as uncultivated and thus depriving Government of its dues. Some Zamindars are also thus, in a way, aiding in this kind of leakage of Government revenue. But as soon as Sindh has its own Government and full Provincial autonomy, people will feel that it is their own Government and with a responsible Government of their own, the electors as well as the elected representatives will feel themselves bound to expose all corruption and dishonesty, and to have it crushed and stopped. Public opinion is bound to progress and develop for the better and assert itself. If now some people tolerate corruption and jobbery, it is because they do not exactly feel that the Government is their own. No merchant looking after his own business will allow big holes to be made in his sources of income. Similarly, in separated Sindh with full Provincial Autonomy, people will not allow leakage with the revenue of their own Government.

2) Similarly, in other Departments, e.g. Forests, Excise, etc., leakage of revenue will be much less than it is now believed to be the case.

3) With our own Government we shall be in a better position to industrialize and successfully utilize Sindh's natural resources, and with the development of Karachi as the seaport nearest to Europe, and the first Airport of India, our prosperity is bound to grow resulting in bringing more and more income to our Government Treasury.

4) Income from Stamps is bound to increase with the growing prosperity of Sindh after the Sukkur Barrage project is completed.

5) According to Sir Walter Layton's financial proposals Income tax, Salt-tax and other taxes are expected to add about 12 lakhs of rupees to the income of Sindh as a separate Province.

14. Thus as shown above, additional income of Rs. 20.85 lakhs may be expected to accrue as under:-

By Stoppage of leakages in Revenue	Rs. 6.85 lakhs
Additional revenue from Stamps	Rs. 2.00 lakhs
According to Sir Walter Layton's proposals	Rs. 12.00 lakhs
	Total Rs. 2.85

15. The figures of total Revenue will thus be as under:-

Particulars	Assumed by the Committee (in lakhs Rs.)	Assumed by me (in lakhs Rs.)	Difference. (in lakhs Rs.)
1. Land Revenue	108.85	130	21.15
2. Other Heads of Revenue	84.15	105	20.85
3. Capital Receipts and Interest	6.4	6.4	-
Total:	199.4	241.4	42

STATEMENT OF PROBABLE EXPENDITURE

16. The Committee has assumed the probable total expenditure to be Rs. 262.92 lakhs, including the expenditure on Pensions, Debt, Interest and Famine Relief, as under:-

1. Expenditure charged to Revenue	Rs. 225.48 lakhs
2. Expenditure on Pensions	Rs. 13.75 lakhs
3. Debt and Interest	Rs. 21.89 lakhs
4. Famine Relief Fund	Rs. 1.80 lakhs
	Total Rs. 262.92 lakhs

17. As a business man, I consider that to be unusually heavy expenditure for Sindh. According to the Committee, the probable total income is estimated to be Rs. 199.40 lakhs but I have estimated it to be Rs. 241.40 lakhs. Taking my figures of income and the Committee's figure of expenditure as the basis, the income and expenditure per head of the population of Sindh including debt and pension charges will be as under, as compared to what it is in other provinces of India (figures of 1929-30) vide page 363 of Simon Commission's Report, Volume 1:-

	Sind	Madras	Bombay	Bengal	U P	Punjab	Burma	Bihar & Orissa	C P	Assam
Area in thousand square miles	46.50	142.30	123.60	76.80	106.30	99.80	233.70	83.10	99.90	53.00
Population in millions	3.30	42.30	19.30	46.70	45.40	20.70	13.20	34.00	13.00	7.60
Total expenditure in crores	2.63	17.71	16.00	11.93	12.39	11.49	11.38	6.12	5.27	2.98
Expenditure per head in rupees	7-15-6	4-3-0	8-4-8	2-8-10	2-11-8	5-8-10	8-9-11	1-12-10	3-12-8	8-14-11
Total Revenue in crores	2.41	17.56	15.72	11.85	13.09	12.54	11.55	5.85	5.56	2.84
Revenue per head in rupees	7-4-10	4-2-6	8-2-4	2-8-7	2-11-11	6-0-11	8-12-0	1-11-6	3-14-8	3-8-9

18. The more I scrutinize the Statement given above, the more I feel that there is vast scope of reduction expenditure. As a businessman I feel that Rs. 8/= should not be the expenditure per head, in Sindh, as assumed by the Committee, and without detriment to the moral and material progress of Sindh we can cut down all unnecessary expenditure and by necessary economy produce a balanced budget for Sindh as a separate Province. In view of that, I shall herein below offer my criticism of the figures of probable expenditure as assumed by the Committee.

LAND REVENUE

19. The Committee assume the expenditure under this head to be Rs. 14.37 lakhs made up as follows:-

General establishment, Land Records,	
Assignments and Compensation	Rs. 13.95 lakhs.
Cost of Cadastral Maps printed at Poona	Rs. 0.30 lakhs.
English charges	Rs. 0.12 lakhs.
TOTAL	Rs. 14.37 lakhs.

20. The Bombay Retrenchment Committee appointed in July 1921 had already advocated the abolition of Supervising Tuppedar and reduction of the number of Tapas by 10 to 15 percent., vide page 58 of its Report. Supervising Tuppedar are mere post office passing the correspondence between Mukhtarkars and Tuppedar. They check the accounts of Tuppedar before they are checked by the Mukhtiarkar and his office and the Deputy Collector and his office. The result is that Mukhtiarkar's office carries on only perfunctory inspection relying on Supervising Tuppedar's supposed honesty and carefulness of inspection. If instead of travel inspections, we had an effective inspection by Mukhtiarkar and his office that would be a better check. There would be in all about 250 Supervising Tuppedar in Sindh, and every Supervising Tuppedar costs, including his horse allowance and the pay and horse allowance of his Kotar, about Rs.

105 per month. With their abolition Sindh will save to the extent of Rs. 3, 15,000.

21. Thus I estimate the expenditure to be 11.22 lakhs as shown below:-

Item	Assumed by Committee (in lakhs) Rs.	Assumed by me (in lakhs) Rs.	Difference (in lakhs) Rs.
General establishment, Land Records, Assignments and Compensations	13.95	10.8	3.15
Cost of Cadastral Maps	0.3	0.3	-
English Charges	0.12	0.12	-

SALT AND EXCISE

22. While assuming probable figures in the year of separation, the Committee seems to err on the side of an over-estimate. The expenditure charged to Sindh on the combined Salt and Excise Department in Sindh rose from 2.08 lakhs in 1927-28 to Rs. 2.17 lakhs in 1929-30. During the same time it fell from Rs. 52.1 lakhs to Rs. 44.87 lakhs in the Presidency.

23. The Committee now assumes the expenditure to be Rs. 3.64 lakhs made up as follows:

- | | | |
|----|---------------|-----------------|
| 1. | Compensation | Rs. 0.25 lakhs. |
| 2. | Establishment | Rs. 2.14 lakhs. |
| 3. | Cost of Opium | Rs. 1.25 lakhs. |

24. The expenditure on establishment must be reduced in Sindh, in the same proportion (15 percent.) as it fell in the Presidency from the year 1927-28 to 1929-30. In the year of separation it must be 15 percent less than it was in the year 1927-28, i.e. it should not exceed Rs. 1.75 lakhs, resulting in a reduction of Rs. 0.39 lakhs.

25. As Khairpur State is a self contained unit for excise purposes no compensation will be paid to the State.

26. Thus I estimate the expenditure to be 3.23 lakhs as shown below:

Item of Expenditure	Assumed by Committee (in lakhs) Rs.	Assumed by me (in lakhs) Rs.	Difference (in lakhs) Rs.
Compensation	0.25	0.25	-
Establishment	2.14	1.75	0.39
Cost of Opium	1.25	1.25	-
Total	2.64	3.25	0.39

STAMPS

27. Stamps yielded Rs. 177.15 lakhs revenue in the whole Presidency in the year 1929-30. The expenditure during the same year was Rs. 2.47 lakhs or Rs. 1,386 per lakh of revenue. As the Committee provisionally assume the revenue of Rs. 20.3 lakhs, the expenditure must therefore be assumed to be Rs. 28,000 excluding cost of stamps and Sindh's share of the receipt of Rs. 13,000 from Posts and Telegraphs Department on account of postage work. But the Committee assumes it to be Rs. 43,000. By so reducing the expenditure as not to allow it to exceed the proportion as set forth above I should like it to be estimated at Rs. 0.28 lakh as against Rs. 0.43 lakh assumed by the Committee, resulting in a difference of Rs. 0.15 lakh, excluding cost of stamps and Sindh's share of receipts from Posts and Telegraphs Department.

FORESTS

28. The cost of forest administration in Sindh is proportionately much higher than that prevailing in the Presidency and that in spite of the fact that the Presidency forests are a valuable asset and Sindh forests yield only grass and fire-wood, but no valuable timber. Sindh Forest Circle comprises only 1147 square miles out of 14,904 square miles in the whole of the Presidency that is 113th of the whole Forest area of the Presidency. The average expenditure for the triennium 1927-30 on establishment in the Presidency was Rs. 22.32 lakhs. Its 13th part i.e. Rs. 1.72 lakhs should be the utmost probable expenditure in Sindh in the year of separation.
29. Nine Officers out of a cadre of 51 posts in the Bombay Forest Service are apportioned to Sindh. As the existing forests in Sindh are in excess of Sindh's present needs and there is likelihood that part of the areas will be disforested as stated by the Committee, expenditure must fall to that extent.
30. There has been a progressive fall in the expenditure on conservancy, as shown below:-

1927-28	Rs. 0.97 lakhs.
1928-29	Rs. 0.85 lakhs.
1929-30	Rs. 0.57 lakhs.

When the actual expenditure in 1929-30 in Rs. 57,000. I see no reason why the Committee should take it as Rs. 80,000 for the year of separation. I take it to be Rs. 60,000 even a little more than what it was in 1929-30.

31. The forests of Sindh, are not all as valuable as those in the Presidency, and I do not see why they should not be transferred to Local Boards, which I think can make greater income from them than is now the case. At present when the expenditure on Forests is assumed to be Rs. 3.98 lakhs the income is assumed to be Rs. 6.60 lakhs, resulting in a net income of Rs. 2.62 lakhs only. I am sure the Local Boards concerned will be prepared among themselves to pay even 3 lakhs of rupees to Government as an annuity if forests are transferred to them, and even then they will also have some income from them for themselves.
32. Assuming that the Federal Department will continue as at present, I estimate the expenditure to be Rs. 2.50 lakhs as under:-

Item of Expenditure	Assumed by Committee (in lakhs) Rs.	Assumed by me (in lakhs) Rs.	Difference (in lakhs) Rs.
Compensation	0.80	0.60	0.20
Establishment	3.00	1.72	1.20
Cost of Opium	0.18	0.18	-
Total	3.98	2.50	1.48

Expenditure on average disbursement includes expenditure on Commissioner in Sindh and his office, General and Treasury establishment, and Sub-divisional establishment.

32. It is to be remembered that the Bombay Retrenchment Committee appointed in July 1921 strongly recommended the abolition of 3 Huzur Deputy Collectors and 4 more Deputy Collectors viz. of Upper Sindh Frontier District, Ratodero, Ubavaro and Nawabshah sub-divisions and conversion of 4 Daftardars into Chitnises of Mukhtiarkar's grade, conversion of 2 City Magistrates of Hyderabad and Sukkur into Resident Magistrates and conversion of 5 Mukhtiarkars into Mahalkaris.

The Committee mentioned that far from affecting efficiency in any way the abolition of these posts would conduce to quick dispatch of work and increased efficiency. I would go a step further and maintain that all posts of Deputy Collectors should be done away with. Under Land Revenue Code the Deputy Collectors have no inherent powers except those delegated to them by the Collectors. In practice, the Deputy Collectors merely act as Post Offices between the Collector and the Mukhtiarkars. However, if only posts of 3 Huzur Deputy Collectors, 6 Deputy Collectors and 4 Daftardars are abolished as the Retrenchment Committee in 1921 envisaged, the saving would amount, in the words of the Committee on page 96 of their Report, to Rs 77,332. But if all the posts of Deputy Collectors including 4 Daftardars, but excluding Huzur Deputy Collectors are abolished and rightly, in the interests of both economy and quicker dispatch of work, the saving would amount to at least Rs. 2 lakhs.

33. The posts of Huzur Deputy Collectors is an anomaly, especially when most of the Treasury work is done at the Imperial Banks. They can well be replaced by their Head Accountants. Sense of economy, and no less sense of efficiency, demand that at least these posts in as much as they are superfluous, should be abolished. At least Rs. 25,000 can thus be easily saved.
34. The General Treasury establishment in the whole Presidency costs Rs. 40.39 lakhs. If we exclude the savings to the extent of Rs. 25,000 due to abolition only of Huzur Deputy Collectors, the same item in Sindh costs us Rs. 11.13 lakhs in the same year i.e. 1929-30. The population of Sindh is 1/10th of what it is in the Presidency. The expenditure in Sindh must therefore proportionately be Rs. 40.39 i.e. Rs. 6.73 lakhs. The total income of Sindh for 1929-30 was hardly 1/9th of the estimated income of Bombay (15.72 crores). As expenditure must be in proportion to income, it should never have risen beyond Rs. 40.39/6 i.e. Rs. 4.5 lakhs. The arithmetical mean of the expenditure on the basis both of population and income would be Rs. 6.73 plus 45/2 i.e. Rs. 5.61 lakhs. and it is quite reasonable to take this figure as the probable expenditure under this item for the year or separation. As the expenditure excluding Huzur Deputy Collectors incurred in 1929-30 under this item was Rs. 11.13 lakhs, it can be safely assumed that when Sindh becomes an autonomous province and Sindh Government has the power of effecting retrenchment, and it tries its best to relate expenditure to revenue and to population, the expenditure will be Rs. 5.61 lakhs instead of Rs. 11.13 lakhs under the head "General and Treasury Establishment".

35. As I have pointed out in my replies to the Questionnaire, issued by the Committee, the present Commissioner's Office will be transformed into the Government Secretariat and expenditure on it has been shown as expenditure due to separation. As we will stand in no need of a Commissioner, the present expenditure of Rs. 3.05 lakhs on the Commissioner and his office will assuredly be a saving.
36. The difference between my assumption and the Committee's assumption of expenditure on average disbursements on General Administration will be Rs. 10.82 Lakhs, which amount I want to reduce as shown below.

Cost of posts of Deputy Collectors and their offices	Rs. 2.00 Lakhs.
Abolition of 4 Huzur Deputy Collectors and necessary reduction in other establishment	Rs. 5.77 Lakhs.
Abolition of Commissioner's office	Rs. 3.05 Lakhs.

Item	Assumed by Committee (in lakhs) Rs.	Assumed by me (in lakhs) Rs.	Difference (in lakhs) Rs.
Average Disbursements	20.99	10.17	10.82
Deduct for Political work	0.10	0.10	..
Pay and Leave Salary	0.01	0.01	..
Drawn in Bombay Expenditure in England	0.70	0.70	..
Local Fund Audit	0.50	0.50	..

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

37. The Judicial Commissioner's Court will suffice as the highest Court of Justice for the Province as in the Central Provinces, and there is even scope for reducing the number of Judicial Commissioners by at least one as they have not much work to do in these days of commercial depression. The number of original suits - filed in the Judicial Commissioner's court in the year 1931 upto now is not more than 175. As the work is slack, there is no reason why establishment should also not be correspondingly decreased. There can thus be made reduction of at least Rs. 40,000 in the expenditure on the Judicial Commissioner's Court.
38. Law Officers (Moffussil) in the Presidency cost Rs. 4.41 lakhs in 1929-30. It ought to cost Rs. 1.1 in Sindh in proportion to our population. The

Committee assume it to be Rs. 2.15 lakhs. There is thus possibility of a reduction of Rs. 1.05 here also.

39. Criminal Courts in the Presidency proper cost Rs. 2.74 lakhs averagely per year during the triennium. They cost Rs. 1.4 lakhs in Sindh during the same time. Criminal Courts are in excess of Sindh's needs, and they must be made proportionately equal to Presidency Courts and Presidency population. They must cost Rs. 0.70 lakh at the most, thus making a reduction of at least Rs. 0.70 lakh.
40. The total estimated expenditure under this head "Administration of Justice" instead of Rs. 11.93 lakhs should therefore be assumed to be Rs. 9.78 lakhs in view of reductions as shown above.

POLICE

41. It goes without saying that the Police force should be maintained in proportion to population. If we accept this principle, the Police Force in Sindh must cost us 116th of the average cost of the same in the whole Presidency where it amounted to Rs. 174.26 lakhs on an average during the triennium. It must, therefore cost us under no circumstances more than Rs. 174.2616 i.e. Rs. 29.04 lakhs. Now that retrenchment is the order of the day, I feel no necessity of Rs. 2 lakhs being spent on the reorganization scheme. English charges being Rs. 0.90 lakh the total expenditure according to me should not be more than. 29.94 lakhs, while the Committee assumes it to be Rs. 38.8 lakhs.
42. The fact that Police Expenditure in Sindh is very high, unnecessary and out of all proportion to income, or to the purpose of spending, can easily be proved C.I.D. expenditure in Sindh for the year 1929-30 amounted to Rs. 1,36,468 (page 135 of Civil Budget Estimates of 1930-31) and to Rs. 2,84,103 in the Presidency Proper, excluding Sindh and Bombay City. The Criminal Investigation Department is maintained to keep watch over those who, the Government have reason to believe, disturb internal order. Owing to revolutionary propaganda in the Presidency Proper and the consequent danger to internal order and tranquility the C.I.D. maintained in the Presidency Proper should have been excessively higher than in Sindh, but the reverse has been the case. Although recently the Presidency proper, specially Gujrat, has been the hot-bed of lawless activities, yet, proportionately Sindh, inhabited by a majority population of law-abiding Mussalmans, has been saddled with a C.I.D. expenditure of Rs. 1,36,468 as compared to the whole of the Presidency proper where it cost only Rs. 2,84,100, There is a large scope or curtailment in this expenditure on

Criminal Investigation Department and it should in no case exceed Rs. 60,000.

43. A few years back Government itself had formulated a sub Divisional scheme by which sub-divisions were to be put under the charge of an Inspector or a Deputy Superintendent of Police. If only Inspectors were given the charge of sub-divisions and there were no Deputy Superintendents at all, there can be a saving of Rs. 60,000 at least the efficiency of the Police Force would under no circumstances be impaired with the abolition of the posts of Deputy Superintendents. With due deference to the incumbents of those offices, I maintain that their work is of a general character which can well be performed by Inspectors.
44. If all the above considerations are taken into account before Sindh is separated, the cost of Police should be Rs. 29.94 lakhs instead of Rs. 38.8 lakhs, as assumed by the Committee.

XIII IRRIGATION WORKING EXPENSES
Miscellaneous Irrigation Expenditure
Civil Works

45. The average expenditure on original works and repairs in Sindh under the above three different heads during the triennium, on an average has been as under:-

Working Expenses of Irrigation Works	Rs. 32.32 Lakhs.
Miscellaneous Irrigation Expenditure	Rs. 16.29
Civil Works	Rs. 11.53
Total	Rs. 60.14 Lakhs

46. The Budget figures for the year 1931-32 put the expenditure on original works and repairs in Sindh, under the revenue head XIII, at Rs. 26.81 lakhs. Retrenchment is the talk of the day. The Government of India and the Provincial Governments have accepted the principle of economy and are putting this principle into practice. If under the stress of economy, the Bombay Government will manage the, works with Rs. 26.81. lakhs in the year 1931-32, the Government of separated Sindh will manage to do the same work for a smaller amount inasmuch as it will justify itself by effecting due retrenchment wherever possible Rs. 26.81 lakhs can however be safely relied upon as the probable expenditure on original works and repairs under this head XIII, when Sindh is separated.

47. The actual expenditure, under head 15, on original works and repairs amounted to Rs. 13.8 lakhs in the year 1928-29. The years 1927-28 and 1929-30 when expenditure under this head was higher were exceptional years of floods. The year 1928-29 was, as I have shown in my Statement of the probable revenue of Sindh, a fairly good season and the figures of this year are a fair index to what expenditure under this head in separated Sindh would be. It will be safe to take that figure of 1928-29 i.e. Rs. 13.8 lakhs as the probable figure for the year of separation.

48. The establishment charges on original works and repairs under the three heads XIII, 15.41 are abnormally high. As a layman and a merchant, with whatever little experience I have got in the work of buildings, I can safely say that our establishment charges on our private building constructions hardly amount to 2 percent of the cost of work. The first-class European firms which utilize the services of European Architects, Surveyors, etc., spend at the most 5 percent on establishment charges. The Government spend the stupendous proportion of about 28 percent on establishment charges, including tools, plant and English charges. This is very high, unnecessary and out of all proportion to the cost of works. If the Government establishment expenditure is for reasons which need no recapitulation, very high, it must not be allowed to go beyond at the most 12½ percent of the cost of works.

49. The total cost of original works and repairs under the three heads, assumed by the Committee is Rs. 60.14 lakhs and the total establishment charges are put at the figure of Rs. 16.86 lakhs. I have assumed the total cost to be Rs. 52.14 lakhs and establishment charges at 1/8th of the cost of works, i.e. 52.14/8 i.e. Rs. 6.51 lakhs.

50. The figures for the different three Heads XIII, 15 and 41 will therefore be as under:

Assumed by Committee (in lakhs) Rs.				Assumed by me (in lakhs) Rs.			
Head	Cost of workers	Establishment tools, Plants, English Charges	Total	Head	Cost of workers	Establishment tools, Plants, English Charges	Total
XIII	32.32	9.90	42.22	26.81	3.35	30.16	12.06
15	16.29	4.59	20.88	13.80	1.72	15.52	5.36
41	11.53	2.37	13.90	11.53	1.44	12.97	0.93
Total	60.14	16.86	77.00	52.14	6.51	58.65	18.35

OTHER HEADS OF EXPENDITURE

51. I accept the figures assumed by the Committee provisionally for other departments. While accepting those figures, I will fail in my duty if I do not bring it to the notice of the Committee that those figures are on the side at' over estimate. In all departments salaries are very high and even the Bombay Government is now realizing the necessity of making a cut of 6 percent in all salaries, though the popular demand is to cut higher salaries by about 10 to 20 percent.

52. Although I have accepted the figures of Expenditure assumed by the Committee for Education, Public Health, Medical Relief, Agriculture, etc., my idea is that expenditure on salaries in those departments is bound to be curtailed and savings thus effected will be utilized for the development of the real work of those very departments, by providing additional amenities and facilities so far as those nation building departments are concerned. With decreased grades of pay for all new entrants in Public services, with a gradual reasonable cut in salaries of the existing members or the various services, and with abolition of many superfluous posts, and reduction of allowances of all kinds, there can be a decent saving which I should propose all to be utilized, for furtherance of Primary Education and general welfare of the rural population of Sindh.

PENSION, DEBT AND FAMINE RELIEF

53. I regret, I have not been able to get at any reliable records or data on which to base my criticism so far as figures assumed by the Committee for Pensions, Debt and Famine Relief are concerned. I, therefore, provisionally, for the present, accept the figures as worked out by the Committee, subject to my belief that the Committee will further thoroughly scrutinize every item and see that Sindh is not burdened with any unjustifiable liabilities.

SUKKUR BARRAGE

54. I have also not discussed the post-Barrage conditions and the Sukkur Barrage Debt and Sindh's liabilities in connection therewith, as sufficient material has not been officially placed before us, so far, in that connection. But I am quite clear in my mind that the Government of Bombay must first render accounts to Sindh for all the net savings, (with compound interest accrued thereon) from the Capital irrigation Works of Sindh. Principal G. N. Gokhale, a competent Engineer and an expert Irrigation Officer, now Principal of the N.E.D. Engineering College. Karachi, has estimated those savings to amount to about 15 crores of rupees in all, which Bombay Government has to credit to the account of Sindh's

Capital Irrigation Expenditure. Apart from that consideration, Sukkur Barrage will bring additional Land Revenue on new land to be cultivated, 9110th of which at least will have to be credited to the Irrigation Capital Account, and besides Land Sales will amount roughly to 75 lakhs per year if land is sold on easy installment system. Under these circumstances, Sukkur Barrage, on a commercial basis, will not only pave its way so far as Debt and Interest are concerned, but even 1/10th of the additional Land Revenue, owing to new lands being brought under cultivation, will go to increase our ordinary Revenues for ordinary expenditure.

CONCLUSION

55. All things considered, including ordinary expenditure, additional expenditure owing to separation, Pensions, Debt, and Interest and Famine Relief Fund, my estimate of the figures, excluding the Sukkur Barrage is as follows, vide Appendix A attached herewith:-

Ordinary Receipts	235.00 Lakhs.
Capital Receipts	6.40 Lakhs.
Total Receipts	241.40 Lakhs.
Ordinary Expenditure	180.13 Lakhs.
Additional Expenditure Owing to separation	6.00 Lakhs.
Pensions, Debt and Famine Relief	37.44 Lakhs.
Total Expenditure	223.57 Lakhs
Net Surplus	223.57 Lakhs

56. As shown above, my estimate is that the total expenditure of Sindh should not exceed Rs. 224 lakhs, which works out at a cost of Rs. 6-12-7 per head of Sindh's Population. while putting it at Rs. 263 lakhs as assumed by the Committee it will work out at a cost of Rs. 7-15-6 per head of our population, as shown in the Statement attached to Para 18 above. Considering the fact that the following Provincial Governments have been able to carry on at a much lower cost per head of population as shown below, I cannot understand why Sindh should not hold its own, by spending not more than Rs. 6-12-7 per head of its population:

1.	Madras Spends	Rs. 4-3-0	Per head of Population
2.	Bengals Spends	Rs. 2-8-10	Per head of Population
3.	United Provinces spends	Rs. 2-11-8	Per head of Population
4.	Punjab spends	Rs. 5-8-10	Per head of Population
5.	Bihar and Orissa Spends	Rs. 1-12-10	Per head of Population
6.	Central Provinces spends	Rs. 3-12-8	Per head of Population
7.	Assam Spends	Rs. 3-14-11	Per head of Population

It is an accepted truth that institutions have to subserve life and not life to subserve institutions. If general considerations of Sindh's welfare and prosperity have already made it an accomplished fact that it should be constituted into a separate Province, the problem of finance should not be difficult of solution. Institutions do not make life and therefore want of funds for gigantic palatial buildings and maintenance of very highly paid officers and offices, which may not be absolutely necessary. shall not be allowed to stand in the way of Sindh being given an opportunity to shape its own destinies according to its own peculiar needs 'and the requirements of the present times. There is nothing therefore that can shake me in my belief that Sindh by spending at the most Rs. 6-12-7 per head of its population will be a more prosperous and happier Province than those which spend from Rs. 1-12-10 (Bihar and Orissa) to Rs. 5-8-10 (Punjab) per head of their population. as shown above in this paragraph.

57. T, according to my calculations, have arrived at a surplus of Rs. 17.83 lakhs at least and that by in no way impairing the material and moral progress of the Province. So far as nation-building departments are concerned. I have estimated no reduction in the expenditure assumed by the Committee, except that I have suggested reduction in salaries and allowances, as in all other departments. and devotion of all those savings also for the development and progress of real nation building work of education. etc.

58. That the case of Sindh's separation, on grounds other than those of Finance, has already been proved to the hilt is a fact. The financial aspect, which is now being examined by the Committee, in my opinion, is also quite hopeful. But even if the cost of administration should-necessarily be more extravagant than I have suggested and there should be no surplus of Rs. 17.83 lakhs as estimated by me, or even if by some other methods of calculations, there should be shown to be a net deficit of Rs. 10 to 20 lakhs, I do not think that will in any way be a sufficient reason to prevent the strong demand of Sindh's separation being granted. If Sindh is a deficit Province, Bombay is already so, and it will of course be hard on Bombay to have Sindh as a burden on its shoulders in that case. Those anti-separationists who frighten us by so manipulating the figures as to show deficit of crores of rupees for administering Sindh have done a distinct service to Bombay Presidency which will have now seriously to consider why it should have Sindh tacked on to itself, if it is a deficit province. Even on that financial ground, Sindh must at once be separated from Bombay Presidency its own problems and be the master of its own destinies.

59. Should there at all be any deficit in the separated Sindh, the Government of India can be trusted to help Sindh forward for some years by grant of reasonable annual subventions, as are given by the Central Government to some

other provinces also especially the Frontier Provinces. Sindh had been a backward province for many years. and as a Frontier, Sindh possesses greater importance to India than the North West Frontier Province, Sindh being the Frontier of India by sea, air and land. It will therefore not be unreasonable to expect the Central Government, for a fixed number of a few years in the beginning, to render whatever little financial assistance may be considered necessary to enable Sindh to enjoy full Provincial autonomy, as the Central Government has been subsidizing the other Provinces, the figures for some, for the year 1929-30, being as under:

North West Frontier British	Rs. 2,75,64,748
Baluchistan	Rs. 83,72,576
Ajmer and Merwara	Rs. 29,82,5

60. I shall repeat that in my opinion Sindh finances can be so organized as to have no deficit. But if a deficit is discovered and Central Government does not come to our help, I am sure, in the interests of their Province, the people of Sindh will be found willing and ready to help themselves by discovering fresh sources of income by imposing on themselves new and fresh taxation. But these questions which will be better gone into after the Committee finishes its labors and discovers any deficit which, as I have shown above, will not be the case, as according to me there ought to be some surplus, if not actually Rs. 17.83 lakhs, as estimated by me,

I have the honor to be.

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

HAJI ABDULLAH HAROON, M.L.A

APPENDIX VI

THE SINDH FINANCIAL ENQUIRY COMMITTEE QUESTIONNAIRE AND REPLIES OF ABDULLAH (ABDOOLA) HAROON.

QUESTIONNAIRE IN REGARD TO THE COST OF THE SEPARATION OF SINDH.

REPLIES OF SETH HAJI ABDOOLA HAROON, MLA, NAPIER ROAD, KARACHI:

I. Head Quarters Establishment.

Q-1. *What will be the cost of the Governor and his staff?*

The following figures, giving the expenditure incurred in Assam under this head, are quoted for information:

	1927-28	1928-29	1929-30	Average
<i>Salary of Governor (5,500)</i>	0.66	0.66	0.73	0.68
<i>Sumptuary allowance Staff and Household</i>	0.61	0.52	0.52	0.55
<i>Contract Allowance</i>	0.09	0.11	0.10	0.10
<i>Tour expenses</i>	0.18	0.29	0.24	0.24
<i>Expenditure in England</i>	0.03	0.01
<i>Discretionary grants</i>	0.21	0.24	0.24	0.23
<i>Total</i>	1.84	1.88	1.89	1.87

A-1. The Cost of the Governor and his staff in Sindh should be not more than Rs. 1,12,000 as shown below:

Salary of Governor (5,500)	0.48
Sumptuary allowance Staff and Household	0.06
Contract Allowance	0.25
Tour expenses	0.10
Expenditure in England	0.12
Discretionary grants	0.10
Total	1.12

Q-2. What will be the composition of the Governor's Council?

A-2. The Cabinet of H. E. the Governor should consist, of three Ministers.

Q-3. What will be the cost of the Governor's Council?

A-3. The cost should not exceed Rs. 72,000 at Rs. 2,000, each per mensem.

The following figures, giving the expenditure incurred in Assam under this head are quoted for information:

	1927-28	1928-29	1929-30	Average
Executive Council (2 members at 3,500)	1.06	0.99	1.07	1.04
(2 ministers at 3,500)	1.07	1.01	0.85	0.98
Total	2.13	2.00	1.92	2.02

Q-4. What will be the number of members of the Legislative Council?

The number of members in the Assam Council is 53 but it is anticipated that there, will be a considerable increase under the new constitution. Sindh supplies at present 17 out of 72 elected members of the Bombay Council, and the Simon Commission contemplated the councils of Major Provinces being from 200 to 250 in number. The populations of Assam and Sindh are, according to the note circulated at the request of Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto to Sub Committee No. IX of the Round Table Conference, 6.70 and 3.27 million respectively.

A-4. When the Simon Commission has recommended about 200 members for the Legislative Council of Bombay with a population of about 2 crores, we should have 32 members for about 32 lakhs of people in Sindh.

Q-5. What will be the cost of the Legislative Council? The following figures giving the expenditure incurred in Assam under this head quoted for information:-

	1927-28	1928-29	1929-30	Average
Provincial Legislative Council	0.60	0.73	0.51	0.61
Election Expenses	0.55	0.19
Total	0.60	0.73	1.06	0.80

A-5. The cost of the Sindh Legislative Council should be as under, compared to what it in Assam, as we shall have a smaller Council and lower scale of allowances, etc.

Provincial Legislative Council	0.20
Election Expenses	0.15
Total	0.35

Q-6. What secretariat organization will be necessary at the head quarters of the separated province?

The Civil Secretariat in Assam (excluding the Public works department Secretariat) comprises the following superior establishment:-

1 Chief Secretary to Government (3,050).

1 Secretary to Government (Transferred Departments (2,450).

1 Secretary to Government (Finance & Revenue Departments (2,550)

1 Under Secretary to Chief Secretary (850)

1 Under Secretary (Transferred Departments (800).

1 Secretary to Government Legislative Department) who is also Secretary to the Legislative Council, Superintendent and Remembrance of Legal Affairs, Administrator General and Official Trustee (2,700).

1 Assistant Secretary (Finance and Revenue Departments.

1 Registrar.

The Cost of Civil Secretariat in Assam has been as follows.

	1927-28	1928-29	1929-30	Average
Civil Secretariate	3.48	3.71	3.78	3.66
English Charges	0.39	0.30	0.65	0.45
Total	3.87	4.01	4.43	4.11

A-6. The Civil Secretariat (excluding P.W.D. Secretariat) Secret ad should be as follows:

1. Chief Secretary 1,500
2. Secretary to Government 1,200 (Transferred Departments)
3. Secretary to Government 1.200 (Finance & Revenue Dept)
4. Secretary to Government (1.200)
(Legislative Department)

Who would also be secretary to the Legislative Council, Superintendent and Remembrance of Legal Affairs, Administrator General and Official Trustee.

5. Superintendent 800

5,900
6,000
Rs. 72,000

As this would be a small province, there would be no necessity of an Under Secretary to the Chief Secretary or an Under Secretary (Transferred Department) or an Assistant Secretary (Finance and Revenue Departments). The Superintendent will do what the Registrar Assam.

As all this should be Indian Staff, no English charges will arise.

The total cost will be as follows:

Civil Secretariat	0.72
General Establishment	1.00
Total	1.72

Clerical establishment in the office of the Commissioner-in-Sindh costs Rs. 93,000.

Q-7. What additions, if any, will be necessary to the existing Public Works Department establishment to enable it to undertake such Secretariat work as may be required in respect of that department?

A-7 Instead of making any addition to the existing Public Works Department establishment, there is much scope for retrenchment. Instead of two Chief Engineers there should be one, and he with his staff may undertake such secretariat work as may be required in respect of his department. Thus P.W.D. expenditure instead of being increased should be curtailed to the extent of at least one lakh of rupees.

II-HEAD QUARTERS ACCOMMODATION.

Q-8. To what extent will the existing Government buildings in Karachi require alterations or additions in order to provide for:

- a) *The Governor and Staff,*
- b) *The Legislative Council,*
- c) *The Secretariat.*

A-8. The present Government House which accommodates the Commissioner-in-Sindh should be made to accommodate the Governor and his staff, by making necessary changes, if required the Legislative Council should be housed in Frere Flail

for the present and the Secretariat in the premises in which the Commissioner's office is now situated.

Q-9. *What is likely to be the cost such alterations or additions?*

A-9. Unless requirements are definitely known, the cost of addition and alterations for Head quarters accommodation cannot be exactly told, but it should be understood that all additions and alterations should not cost more than a lakh of rupees.

III-OTHER GENERAL ADMINISTRATION

Q-10. *Will it be necessary to have a Revenue Commissioner in Sindh?*

It may be mentioned that there are two Commissioners in Assam, their cost being.

	1927-28	1928-29	1929-30	Average
Commissioners	1.66	1.64	1.63	1.64
English Expenditure	0.31	0.31	0.33	0.32
Total	1.97	1.95	1.96	1.96

A-10. No Revenue Commissioner in Sindh will be necessary. It is already the general view now-a-days that the post of a Revenue Commissioner is unnecessary and this view has been many times expressed in the Bombay Government Retrenchment Committee appointed in 1921 which was also of opinion that the posts of Deputy Collectors, Assistant Collectors, Assistant Collectors, and Supervising Tappedars are unnecessary. If all these posts are abolished there will be saving of about 4 Lakhs.

Q-11. *If a Commissioner is necessary, will additional accommodation for him and his office be necessary and, if so, what will be the cost?*

A-11. In view of reply to No. 10 above, question does not arise.

IV. OTHER HEADS OF EXPENDITURE. LAND REVENUE

Q-12. *It is understood that the Department of Land Records in Sindh is under the administrative control of the Commissioner in Sindh, the highest officer of the department employed in Sindh being the Superintendent of Land Records, and that the duties of the Settlement Commissioner and Director of Land Records are confined to Inspection, examination and report, which he performs without any control over, or interference with, the local authorities. Is this superior inspection and examination essential and if so, what arrangement should be made to secure it after separation?*

A-12. The existing duties of the Settlement Commissioner and Director of Land Records, so far as Sindh is concerned, can be ably performed by the Superintendent of Land Records in Sindh and external supervision or direction will not be necessary.

EXCISE

Q-13. It is understood that the Commissioner in Sindh is the controlling authority in respect of excise in Sindh and is invested with the same powers, under the Bombay Abkari and Opium Acts as the Commissioner of Excise. Sindh is a self-contained unit for excise purposes, with its own establishment (except that the Superintendent of Salt and Excise is borne on the general Presidency cadre), but it is inspected annually by the Commissioner of Excise. Is this superior inspection essential and, if so what arrangement should be made to secure it after separation?

A-13. External Inspection will not be required. The present Superintendent of Salt and Excise will be designated as Commissioner of Salt and Excise.

STAMPS

Q-14. It is understood that the stamp Office, Karachi, is a self contained department under the Collector of Karachi, who is ex-officio Superintendent of Stamps for Sindh, the Commissioner in Sindh being the Chief Revenue Controlling authority under the Stamp Act, and that no additional expenditure under this Read would be necessary in the event of separation. Is this correct?

A-14. The assumption that no additional expenditure will be required is correct.

FORESTS

Q-15. It is understood that the senior office of the Forest Department in Sindh is the Conservator of Forests who is under the control of and benefits from the advice of the Chief Conservator. Is the continuance of such superior control and advice essential, and, if so, what arrangements will be necessary to secure it after separation? If it is considered that the Conservator can efficiently supervise the department in Sindh without superior control or advice, will any addition to the existing pay of the post be necessary in view of the additional duties which the incumbent will discharge?

A-15. No valuable Timber except firewood is available in our forests. A highly paid officer like the present Conservator is not required. It will be more economical to transfer forests to Local Boards for a fixed annual sum to be credited by them to Government.

REGISTRATION.

Q-16. It is understood that the highest-paid officer of the Registration Department in Sindh draws Rs. 290/- a month and that he has the expert advice of the Inspector General of Registration. Is such advice essential and, if so, what arrangement should he made to secure it after separation? Would it be possible to combine the duties of advising on registration with those of the existing Superintendent of Land Records? If so, would any addition to the pay of the latter post be required?

A-16. External advice and inspection will not be necessary. Superintendent of Land & Records can also perform the duties of advising on Registration. As his pay is already high, no addition to his pay will be required,

SCHEDULED TAXES

Q-17. The expenditure on the collection of Scheduled Taxes in Sindh varies only from Rs. 300 to Rs. 450 a month and it is assumed that separation would necessitate no addition to this amount. Is this correct?

A-17. The assumption that no additional expenditure will be necessary is correct.

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

Q-18. It is understood that an Act has been passed to convert the Court of the Judicial Commissioner into a Chief Court but that on financial grounds, the project has not been proceeded with. What is the estimated cost, initial and recurring, of this proposal? Is the change essential? It is mentioned, for information, that it appears from the accounts of 1929-30, that Assam has no court of final jurisdiction, but merely pays an annual contribution to the Calcutta High Court for the purpose and that the highest judicial tribunal in the Central Provinces IS a Judicial Commissioner's Court.

A-18. The present Court of the Judicial Commissioner in Sindh should suffice as the highest Court of Justice, as in the Central Provinces. On the other hand there is scope for reduction of the number of Judges of the Judicial Commissioner's Court, as they have not much work to do in view of the present economic depression.

Q-19. It is further understood that a project has been prepared for the creation of a new judicial district at Nawabshah, but that the matter is in abeyance on financial grounds. What is the estimated cost, initial and recurring, of the proposal? Is its execution essential?

A-19. At present it is not necessary to open a new Judicial District at Nawabshah.

Q-20. *What arrangements could be made in the event of separation, for the performance of the duties now performed by the Administrator General and Official Trustee?*

A-20. The duties of the Administrator General and Official Trustee shall be performed by the Secretary, Legislative Department, as is the case in Assam.

JAILS AND CONVICT SETTLEMENTS.

Q-21. *It is understood that Sindh has three full-time Superintendents of Jails and that superior supervision is provided by the Inspector-General of Prisons.*

A-21. At an average cost of Rs. 25,000 per annum one man, viz. Inspector General of Hospitals and Prisons can combine the superintendence of Prisons with that of Civil Hospitals in Sindh.

What arrangements will be made for in the event of separation? Will it be necessary to have a separate inspector-General of Prisons for Sindh? If so, what will be the cost (a) of the officer and his office, and (b) of the accommodation which they will require? Would it be possible to combine the superintendence of prisons with that of Civil Hospitals? It is mentioned, for information, that this is the case in Assam where the cost of inspection and general superintendence of jails during the triennium ending 1929-30 has been, excluding English charges.

	1927-28	1928-29	1929-30	Average
<i>Inspection & general superintendence</i>	0.33	0.38	0.43	0.37

Q-22. *It is understood that the question of the establishment of a separate organization for the settlement of criminal tribes in Sindh is under consideration. Is such an organization essential? Will a full-time Criminal Tribes Settlement Officer be required? If so, what will be the cost (a) of the officer and his office, and (b) of the accommodation which they will require? If not, are any arrangements necessary in order to enable advice to be obtained in regard to criminal tribes? What arrangements would be suitable for the purpose.*

A-22. The question of an organization for Criminal Tribes in Sindh at present is not so essential and may well be left to the future Government of Sindh.

Q-23. *It is understood that there are no juvenile jails, reformatories or Borstal schools in Sindh, and that Sindh has to rely on the Presidency for such institutions. What proportion do the inmates coming from Sindh bear to the total population of these institutions? Would it be possible, in the event of separation, to continue the present system? If so, what would be a fair amount for Sindh to pay for the facilities afforded?*

23. There are very few juvenile prisoners sent out of Sindh. In case the present system is to be continued, Sindh would bear a fair and proportionate cost for its juvenile offenders being kept at Borstal institutions in the Bombay Presidency.

POLICE.

Q-24. It is understood that the Commissioner in Sindh is the Head of the Police Department and that its administration is largely in the hands of the Deputy Inspector General, the Inspector General being consulted on important questions. Is such consultation essential and if so, what arrangements could be made to secure it after separation? If not, would it be necessary to increase the pay of the post of Deputy Inspector General in view of the increased responsibility which would attach to the appointment.

A-24. The Deputy Inspector General of Police possesses no less powers than the Inspector General of Police in Bombay and, therefore, without any additional cost, his designation may be changed into Inspector General. His pay need not be increased.

Q-25. It is understood that a reorganization scheme has been sanctioned for the Sindh Police at a cost of nearly Rs. 4 lakhs. Does this amount include the additional police expenditure, estimated at 1.13, required in connection with the formation of the new district at Dadu and Guni? It is further understood that about 1.50 have been provided on account of the organization in the budget for current year. Is the completion of the scheme essential? If so what will be the additional expenditure to be incurred on it 1932-33 and subsequent years?

A-25. There is vast scope for retrenchment of the police force in urban areas which have always been treated by Government with great partiality to the detriment of rural areas. The urban and rural forces can be so adjusted as to involve no new additional cost.

Q-26. There is no Police Training school in Sindh. In the event of separation, would it be possible for the Sindh Police to continue to make use of the Presidency School and, if so what would be a fair amount for Sindh to pay for this facility? The amount spent by the Government of Bombay on the school during 1929-30 excluding English charges has been:

	1927-28	1928-29	1929-30	Average
Police Training School	1.05	1.15	1.12	1.11

A-26. Sindh Police can continue to make use of the Police Training School, Nasik, and the necessary cost of training students from time to time will be paid by Sindh Government.

PORTS AND PILOTAGE

Q-27. *The only expenditure on pay and allowances under this head is incurred wholly in Sindh, and presumably no addition to it would be entailed by separation. Is this correct?*

A-27. The presumption, that no additional expenditure will be necessary is correct.

EDUCATION (TRANSFERRED)

Q-28. *It is understood that the senior educational officer in Sindh is the Educational Inspector, whose work is conducted under the general supervision of the Director of Public Instruction. Would it be possible for the Educational Inspector to undertake the duties of Director of Public Instruction in Sindh and, if so, would any increase in his pay be necessary in view of the greater responsibility which would be attached to his appointment?*

A-28. The Educational Inspector can well perform the duties of Director or Public Instruction especially as Primary Education is now wholly in the hands of Local Bodies which previously was in his hand&: There should be no increase in his pay.

Q-29. *If the Educational Inspector undertook the duties of Director of Public Instruction, could he do so in addition to his own duties, or would separate Inspectorships be necessary?*

A-29. No separate post of Educational Inspector in Sindh will be necessary.

Q-30. *It is understood that, in so far as higher and specialized education is concerned, there are at present two Arts Colleges in Sindh Teaching up to the M.A. standard in certain subjects and up to the B.Sc. standard only in Science. In addition, there is a Civil Engineering College which teaches Civil Engineering only. There are no institutions which impart the higher or specialized education imparted in Bombay by those mentioned below against each of which is shown the average grant made by the Government of Bombay during the triennium ending 1929-30:-*

Bombay University	1.22
Royal Institute of Science	1.80
Training college of Secondary Teachers	0.62
Sydenham College of Commerce	0.99
School of Arts	1.37
Total	6.00

This sum excludes direction and English Charges. There are further, no institutions for imparting training in mechanical and electrical engineering such as the College of Engineering Poona, on which the Government of Bombay spend, on an average, 3.32 a year, nor for giving

technical training of a standard equal to that of the V.J. Technical Institution, which receives a grant of about 1.25 in the event of separation, what arrangements will he made for the higher and specialized training of Sindh students? Will it be possible to arrange for a certain proportion of to be reserved for Sindh students in the institution in Bombay? If so, what proportion should be so reserved and what would be a fair amount for Sindh to pay to the Government of Bombay for the facilities thus afforded?

A-30. Sindh will contribute a reasonable amount for the upkeep of Bombay University until, we establish our own University, but we will not be bound to pay any funds to outside institutions where we will send our boys for higher education, as those boys aided by the Sindh Government if necessary will bear their own cost of education. Besides, it is to be noted that an insignificant number of Sindhi students is taking advantage of the four educational institutions named in the question.

EDUCATION (RESERVED).

Q-31. Is it desirable that Sindh should have its own University? If so should it be of the residential or affiliating type and what would be the cost?

A-31. In view of reply to question No. 30 above, it is not necessary to have a new University at present for Sindh.

Q-32. It is understood that there are three European Schools in Sindh, the Grammar High School, Karachi, with 139 boys, the St Joseph's Convent High School, Karachi, with 291 girls and the European Middle School, Kotri, with 20 pupils. The jurisdiction of the Inspector of European Schools. Bombay, at present covers Sindh. In the event of separation, what arrangements would be made for such inspection? Would it be possible for the present system to continue and, if so, what would be a fair amount for Sindh to pay to Bombay for the facilities afforded?

A-32. The Director of public Instruction in Sindh will be quite competent to look after the three European Schools in Sindh but if the European Community so desire, the present system may continue and Sindh shall pay a fair amount of the cost proportionate to number of boys.

MEDICAL

Q-33. At present the Government of Bombay make a yearly grant to the Bombay Medical Council, for the registration of medical practitioners of about 0.05. Is it desirable that Sindh should continue to make use of this Council and share its cost? If so, what would be a fair contribution?

A-33. Sindh will have its separate Medical Council at an estimate cost of about Rs. 1,000/= per year.

Q-34. The Medical Department in Sindh is under the Surgeon General with the Government of Bombay In the event of separation; win a separate Inspector General of Civil Hospitals for Sindh be required? If so, what will be the cost of such an officer and of his office, and of the accommodation which they will need? Would it be possible to combine the superintendence of civil hospitals with that of jails (see question 21)? As already mentioned, this is the case in Assam, where the cost of medical direction is about 0.50.

A-34. The Medical department in Sindh will be under the control and guidance of the Inspector General, of Prisons and Hospitals at a total cost of Rs. 25,000 per year as shown in reply to Question No. 21 above.

Q-35. It is understood that there is no medical college in Sindh, would it be possible to arrange for places to be reserved for Sindh students in the Grant Medical College, Bombay, towards the expenses of which the Government of Bombay contribute about 3.45? If so, what proportion of places should be so reserved and what would be a fair amount for Sindh to pay for the facility afforded?

A-35. Sindh will manage to educate its students for Medical degrees, either in Bombay or Lahore, wherever it may be economical, till such time when a Medical College can be started in Sindh.

PUBLIC HEALTH

Q-36. It is understood that the senior officer of the Public Health Department in Sindh is the Deputy Director of Public Health, and that the Director of Public Health, visits Sindh at least once a year, and oftener, if necessary, and tours through the area for from 4 to 8 weeks. Is the continuance of such superior inspection essential, and, if so, what arrangements should be made to secure it after separation, If it is considered that the Deputy Director can efficiently supervise the department in Sindh without superior control or advice, will any addition to the existing pay of the post be necessary in view of the additional responsibilities, which the appointment will entail?

A-36. The Assistant Director of Public Health, with the changed designation of Director of Public Health will be well able to look after the Public Health Department without any additional cost.

Q-37. It is understood that there was, up to the present year, a Sanitary Sub-Division in Sindh working under the Superintending Engineer, Public Health Department, but that this has since been abolished. In the event of separation will a Public Health Engineering Establishment be necessary in the separated province? If so, what will be the status of the officer in charge of the organization and what will be its cost?

A-37. A separate Public Health Engineering Establishment is not necessary as the work can be well undertaken by P.W.D. whenever required.

Q-38. At present the services of the Consulting Surveyor to the Government of Bombay are available to Sindh in connection with such matters as town-planning, valuation, land acquisition, etc., and an office is maintained in Karachi for the purpose. The average cost of the Consulting Surveyor and his staff is 1.40; of the Karachi office 0.18. Is it essential that, after separation, Sindh should continue to have access to the Consulting Surveyor to the Government of Bombay? If so, what would be a fair amount for Sindh to pay to the Government of Bombay for the facility.

A-38. The activity of the Consulting Surveyor is chiefly confined, to Karachi City, and the work of this department can be undertaken by Karachi Municipality as before, and those Local Bodies which have schemes of Town planning etc., on hand.

Q-39. It is understood that in view of the agricultural development proposed to be undertaken under post-Barrage conditions, the Agricultural Department in Sindh has recently been separated from that of the Presidency and placed in charge of an officer who is independent of the control of the Director in all administrative and financial matters. The Department in Sindh has, however, still a call upon the services of certain presidency officers such as the Agricultural Chemist, Economic Botanist, Live Stock Expert, and Plant Pathologist. The amount included in the Presidency budget for 1931-32 on account of these officers is about 0.45 Are these services necessary to Sindh and, if so, what arrangements will be necessary to secure them after separation? If it is desirable that Sindh should still be free, to utilize the services of the officer; in question, what would be a fair amount to pay for the facility?

A-39. The special expert officers named have not been of any great use to Sindh so far and it appears the Agricultural Department, as constituted at present, will be well able to do without their assistance and guidance. If however, at any time, their advice is needed, it will be reasonably paid for.

Q-40. It is understood that the Veterinary Department is administered by the superintendent Civil Veterinary Department, Rajputana and Sindh, working under the Commissioner in Sindh, and that no additional expense would be incurred on separation. Is this correct?

A-40. No additional expenditure will be necessary for the Civil Veterinary Department.

Q-41. In respect of Cooperation, it is understood that the highest paid officer in Sindh draws Rs. 250-750 and that he is under the general control of the Registrar of Cooperative Societies. In the event of separation, what arrangement would be made to secure superior control and advice?

Would it be possible to combine the duties Registrar of Cooperative Societies with those of the Chief Agricultural Officer in Sindh as has been done in Assam? If so, would any addition to the pay of the latter post be required.

A-41. It is to be remembered that the officer in charge of Cooperative Societies has been specially designated Deputy Registrar with a view to enable him to exercise certain powers of the Registrar which in the Presidency have not been delegated to Assist.

Q-42. It is understood that there are at present no separate institutions in Sindh designed to give higher agricultural education or veterinary instruction on the lines of the Poona Agricultural College and the Bombay Veterinary College. In the event of separation, what arrangements will be made for the training of Sindh students in these subjects? Will it be possible to arrange for a certain proportion of places to be reserved for Sindh students in the institutions in Bombay? If so, what proportion should be so reserved and what would be a fair amount for Sindh to pay to the Government of Bombay for the facilities so afforded? The Government of Bombay incurred during the triennium ending 1929-30 an average annual expenditure to the extent of 0.71 on the Bombay Veterinary College and about 1.90 on the Poona Agricultural College.

A-42. Sindh will pay a fair amount of cost for training its students for Agriculture and Veterinary College Courses, whenever seats would be available for them, and if seats are required to be reserved for them, a fair share of expenses will be paid.

INDUSTRIES

Q-43. Until 1929-30 the expenditure under the head industries in Sindh was negligible; and since that year almost the only direct expenditure incurred has been in connection with weaving and dyeing schools and, demonstrations. It is understood, however, that the Bombay Department of Industries supplies commercial information and technical advice to the public in Sindh in connection with existing and new industries and that the services of the Director, the Industrial Engineer and the Industrial Chemist are at Sindh's disposal, if required. Is a continuance of these facilities necessary and, if so, what arrangements should be made to secure them after separation? The cost to the Government of Bombay of the Director, the Industrial Engineer and the Industrial Chemist is about 0.58; if it is desired to retain the right to call for their services, what would be a fair price for Sindh to pay for the facility? In the alternative, is a separate Department of Industries required in Sindh and, if so what would be its cost? Would it be possible to combine the post of Director of Industries with that of Director of Agriculture and Registrar of Cooperative Societies, as has been done in Assam?

A-43. The expenditure now incurred on Industries by Bombay Government is chiefly on establishment and therefore not useful.

MISCELLANEOUS DEPARTMENTS

Q-44. What arrangements would be made, on separation, for the following activities on which the Government of Bombay spent the following average amounts annually during the triennium ending 1929-30

<i>Labour investigation</i>	0.81
<i>Inspector of Steam Boilers and smoke nuisances</i>	1.55
<i>Inspector of Factories</i>	1.24

It is understood that the highest paid boiler inspector in Sindh draws Rs. 400-600 and the highest paid factory inspector Rs. 600-1100. Is any superior supervision required; if so, what arrangements should be made for it and what will be its cost? Is there any organization for labor investigation in Sindh? If not, is any such organization required and what will be its cost?

A-44. According to the needs of Sindh the present expenditure on Miscellaneous Departments in Sindh is more than enough and with it all the three Miscellaneous Departments named can well be managed.

STATIONERY AND PRINTING

Q-45. *It is understood that at present all stationery, etc., is supplied to offices in Sindh by the Stationery Office, Bombay. The number of indenting offices in Sindh is 236 compared with about 1,464 in Bombay proper. Will a separate Stationery Office be required for Sindh after separation and, if so, what will be the cost?*

A-45. The Commissioner's Press Sindh will be the Press of the future Sindh Government and can well serve as the centre for supplying stationery and printing to all indenting offices in Sindh. No additional cost will be required.

PUBLIC WORKS

Q-46. *It is understood that two Chief Engineers are already employed in Sindh, the Chief Engineer Lloyd Barrage and Canals Construction being responsible for the Barrage project, and the Chief Engineer in Sindh for the remaining work. Other than the possible expenditure referred to in question 7, will any additional outlay on Public Works establishment be necessary owing to separation?*

A-46. No additional outlay on the Public Works Department establishment will be required. Rather there is scope for much saving by amalgamating Sukkur Barrage and the Public Works Department establishment and by abolishing one post of a Chief Engineer and many other posts of Superintending Executive and Assistant Engineers, etc.

Q-47. It is understood that an Electrical Inspector on a pay of Rs. 1,575 is employed in Sindh under the general supervision of the Electrical Engineer, Bombay. Is such superior supervision essential?

A-47. No outside supervision will be necessary. There is scope retrenchment even in the present expenditure incurred on the Electrical Engineer and his staff because there is much less work for him than he is paid for.

Q-48. The Consulting Architect to the Government of Bombay is also Consulting Architect for Sindh. What arrangement will be made, after separation, for architectural work? Would it be possible for the present system to continue and, if so, what would be a fair amount for Sindh to pay to Bombay for the, facility? The cost to the Government of Bombay of the Consulting Architect and his office is about 0.92 excluding English charges.

A-48. There is no necessity of a Consulting Architect to Government of Sindh as ordinary architectural work can be undertaken by P.W.D., and very rarely in cases of a gigantic building being built; the services of any private architect will be requisitioned by debiting the charges to the cost of the building in question.

GENERAL

Q-49. In the event of separation can the various posts in Sindh be staffed by the officers normally station in the province or have officers to be driven from Bombay to till leave vacancies? If the latter is the case, will a leave reserve be required in the various Services? If so, what reserve will be required in each Service for which at present there is a joint cadre for Bombay and Sindh, and what will be the approximate cost?

A-49. In the event of separation various posts in Sindh will be staffed by officers normally stationed in Sindh to fill leave vacancies, and for that Sindh will not depend on the Bombay Government.

Q-50. Is there any other expenditure (excluding that default within the Statement of Revenue and expenditure already circulated, any sums which Sindh may be adjudged liable to pay in respect of interest, pensionary charges or famine contribution, and expenditure true directly attributable to the Lloyd Barrage Project) which will fall to be met by Sindh in consequence of separation?

A-50. There will be no additional expenditure, other than that described above. We rather look forward to a great rise in revenue owing to the Sukkur Barrage. The Government of Sindh, Possessing full powers of provincial autonomy, will be competent to cut its coat according to its cloth and effect necessary retrenchment. The care which the Government of Sindh will take in the development of Sindh's agriculture, industries and other natural resources will greatly increase Sindh revenue. Easy and accessible means of communications will greatly revive trade with consequent

general prosperity and rise in income. The development of Karachi as the first airport and the best sea-port of India will open new vistas of revenue.

Coordination of the work of Cooperative, Veterinary and Agricultural Departments, will add to the material happiness of the people and increase the taxable capacity. In a word Sindh can look forward with expectant joy to the enormous potentiality in the shape of increased revenue in the near future.

Karachi 18th August 1931.

HAJI SIR ABDOOLA HAROON
M.L.A.

APPENDIX VII

SIND ELECTION RESULTS, 1937

General Urban, Karachi City, South Constituency

	Votes
M.K. Sidhwa (Congress)	5200
Tikamdas Wadhurnal (No-Party)	2946
G. T. Hingorani (No-Party)	1725
Popat, Lal A. Bhoopatkar (Congress)	7248
Bulchand Bhojwani (No-Party)	3077
Votes rejected	201

Karachi District Rural

Nihchal Das Chatumal	864
Goverdhandas Tahilram	651
Chellaram Mulchand	87
R. B. Prihhdas Shewaram	39

Karachi Muslim North Rural

Muhammad Usman Soomro (United Party)	2506
Abdul Sattar Abbasi	1084

Karachi Muslim South Rural

Muhammad Yusuf Chandio	2979
Imam Bux Ali Bux Gaho (United Party)	1722

Karachi Muslim East Rural

Pir Ghulam Hyder Shah Sahibdino Shah	5219
Meher Ally Shah (United Party)	4707

Upper Sindh Frontier West Muslim Rural

Sardar Jaffar Khan Buledi	5162
Ghulam Kadir Allah Bux Baloch	1989

Hyderabad General Urban Constituency

Mukhi Gobindram Pritamdas (Hindu Sabha)	3256
Tahilram Basarnal Ajwani	1590

General Urban Constituency

Ganumal (independent)	2088
Parmanand Kundanmal	1604

Rohri General Urban Constituency.

Pamnani (Congress)	2685
Rai Sahib Chandiram	2085
Tulsidas	943

Mirpurkhas General Urban

Partabrai (Hindu Sabha)	3244
Thakurdas (with-drawn)	118

Dadu District Rural Constituency

Jamshcd N. R. Mehta (Independent)	1457
Manghirmal Jetomal Idnani	700
Mangatram Tilokchand Motwani	772
Assendas Chainrai Lalchandani	551
Shewaram Gehimal Thanwarani	482
Ramchand Assumal Ghenani	153

Nawabshah West

Rais Rasool Bux Unar (United Party)	5074
Imam Bux	3737
Bad Votes	307

Nawabshah North West

Syed Noor Mohammad Shah (United party)	4233
Pir Qurban Ali (President of Nawabshah District Local Board)	2762

Nawabshah East

Mohammad Salih (Independent)	4750
Ghulam Nabi	1543
Bad Votes	236

Nawabshah Muslim North

Syed Mohammad Ali Shah (United Party)	Elected
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Upper Sindh Frontier Muslim Rural Constituency

K.B. Sher Mohammad Bijarani (United Party)	Elected
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Sukkur North East Muslim Rural Constituency

Kesar Khan (independent)	4400
K.S. Dodan Khan	3700

Muhammadan Urban Karachi City South Constituency

M.H. Gazdar (United Party)	Elected
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Muhammadan Urban Karachi City North Constituency

Khan Sahib Gabole (No-Party)	3311
Haji Abdullah Haroon (United Party)	2599
Abdul Majid Lilaram Shaikh (Azad Party)	78
Adam Khan Mirza, G.M. (No-Party)	668
Rejected Votes	203

Karachi Muslim Women's Urban Constituency

Mrs. Allana	482
Mrs. Tayabji	339
Mrs. Sharif Hussain	28
Dr. Hemandas	830
Baluchand (Congress)	564
Dewan Bahadur Issarsingh	409
Seth Sugin Chand	372

APPENDIX VIII

THE OUTLINES OF A SCHEME OF INDIAN FEDERATION

PREPARED BY

SIKANDAR HAYAT KHAN

1939

It is hardly necessary for our present purpose to recapitulate the widely divergent reasons, which have actuated the various political parties and interests in British India, as also the Indian States, to enter a caveat against the Federal Scheme embodied in the Constitution Act of 1935. The grounds of criticism are well known and have been repeatedly ventilated by the leading spokesmen of the parties concerned. We need only take cognizance of the fact that the federal proposals embodied in the Government of India Act are unacceptable to a vast majority of the people in the country. At the same time, it is admitted by all concerned, and even those who are opposed to the present scheme, that a Federation of some kind is not only desirable but also indispensable for the ordered and peaceful progress of the country as a whole. In a sentence the problem resolves itself into this — whether it is possible to devise a Federal Scheme to replace the one envisaged by the framers of the Government of India Act, which would satisfy and compose the conflicting interests of the various communities and classes, or at least command a large measure of support than the present scheme. Any alternative scheme to be generally acceptable must, therefore be so devised as to allay the reasonable doubts and apprehensions of the Minorities and the Indian States, and at the same time meet the criticism leveled on the score of inadequacy of political power, which it is proposed to transfer to the representatives of the people under the present scheme. The problem is undoubtedly difficult and complex; but it should not be beyond the ingenuity of British statesmen to plan a revised Federal Scheme which, if not universally acceptable, would at least command a much larger measure of support and be free from some of the more serious defects which have been prominently brought into relief as a result of the working of the new Constitution in the provincial sphere. It is my fixed conviction that any scheme which does not rigidly and specifically circumscribe the authority of the Centre to matters of all-India concern (which are enumerated later in this note) is not likely to work. One of the main criticisms, on the part of the Minorities and the Indian States, against the present scheme is that it does not afford adequate protection to the British Indian Provinces and Indian States from interference by the Centre in the internal administration of the units. It is apprehended that a domineering Central Government might be tempted gradually to undermine the authority and the independence of the units and thus reduce Provincial Autonomy to a farce. It is further contended that the safeguards provided in the present scheme to curb such a tendency are likely to prove ineffective. The ineffectiveness of the safeguards in the provincial sphere is cogently cited in support of this contention. In my opinion,

any scheme of federation which seeks to cater for the peculiar condition of this vast subcontinent and which can reasonably be expected to work smoothly must take into account the legitimate desire of the Minorities to safeguard their religious, political, cultural and economic rights and interest, as also secure, to the satisfaction of the Princes, complete immunity to the Indian States from undue interference by the Centre or British Indian Provinces in their internal affairs.

Without these guarantees it would be unreasonable to expect willing cooperation, which is essential for the successful working of the Federal machine.

I venture to give below the outlines of an alternative federal scheme for consideration. Some of the salient features of the scheme are:

(1) Instead of bringing British Indian Provinces and Indian States into the Federation as two distinct components, it will provide for their entering it together on a regional basis, which will be conducive to the solidarity of the country and the stability of the Central Government.

(2) It will encourage collaboration between contiguous units, i.e. both between British Indian Provinces and Indian States whose geographical proximity, common language and affinity of economic and other interests from natural ties to bind them together. For instance:

(a) In administrative matters, and particularly in matters pertaining to law and order, this scheme will encourage the various units in a 'zone' to make reciprocal arrangements and, when necessary, to devise a common line of action.

(b) In the economic field it will enable the units to share in common arrangements for the establishment of institutes for industrial and agricultural research, for experimental and demonstration farms and other similar matters.

(3) By thus encouraging collaboration between British Indian Provinces and Indian States it will tend to reduce causes and occasions for friction, which would otherwise be constantly present if British Indian and Indian States Units are kept in two watertight compartments.

(4) By confining the jurisdiction of the Federal Executive and Legislature to a few specified subjects of common concern, it will enable both the British Indian Units and the Indian States to enter the Federation on a uniform basis. At the same time it will allay the doubts and misgivings of the units by eliminating the possibility of undue interference by the Centre in their internal affairs.

- (5) It will ensure the willing and loyal cooperation of the Units with the Federal Centre and thus avoid the growth of any fissiparous tendency among the Units.
- (6) It will effectively safeguard the integrity and autonomy of British Indian and Indian States Units; and
- 7) It will give the Minorities a greater sense of security.

The Scheme in General Outline

(1) For the purpose of establishing an All-Indian Federation on a regional basis the country shall be demarcated into seven 'zones' as under:

Zone 1: Assam + Bengal (minus one or two western Districts in order to reduce the size of the 'zone' with a view to approximate it to other zones) + Bengal States and Sikkim.

Zone 2: Bihar + Orissa (plus the area transferred from Bengal to Orissa). This would benefit Orissa, which is at present handicapped to some extent on account of its limited resources and area.

Zone 3: United Provinces and UP States.

Zone 4: Madras + Travancore + Madras States and Coorg.

Zone 5: Bombay + Hyderabad + Western India States + Bombay States + Mysore and CP States.

Zone 6: Rajputna States (minus Bikaner and Jaisalmer) + Gwalior + Central India States + Bihar and Orissa States + CP and Berar.

Zone 7: Punjab + Sindh + NWF Province + Kashmir + Punjab States + Baluchistan + Bikaner and Jaisalmer,

(NOTE: The proposed composition of these zones is only tentative and can be altered if necessary in consultation with the various interests concerned).

(2) There shall be a Regional Legislature for each zone consisting of representatives of both British and Indian States Units included in that zone. For the purpose of representation in the Regional Legislature every Unit will be entitled to send

representatives in accordance with the share allotted to it in the scheme embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, for representation in the Federal Assembly.

(3) The representatives in the various Regional Legislatures shall collectively constitute the Central Federal Assembly, which will consist of 375 members (250 from British India and 125 from the Indian States).

(4) One-third of the total number of representatives in the Federal Assembly shall be Muslims.

(5) The other minorities also shall be allotted the share apportioned to them in the Federal Assembly by the Government of India Act, 1935.

(6) The Regional Legislature shall deal only with subjects which are included in the regional list under this scheme, but may at the request of two or more units included in the zone, legislate with regard to subjects falling in the Provincial List in order to secure uniformity and facility of administration within the zone. Such enactments would for application in any unit within the region require confirmation by the Government of the unit concerned and shall therefore supersede any provincial (or State) legislation on the subject.

(7) In the Regional Legislature no Bill or other measure having the force of law, relating to a subject included in the Regional List shall be considered to have been passed unless two-thirds of the representative vote in favor of the measure. (This limitation is suggested in order to give additional security to the smaller Units).

(8) The Regional Legislatures may by a resolution authorize the Federal Legislature to undertake legislation with regard to subjects included in the Regional and Provincial Lists. But such authorization shall not be effective unless at least 4 out of the 7 zones ask for such action. And unless such authorization is endorsed by all the 7 Regional Legislatures the enactments so passed shall have force only in those zones, which ask for such legislation.

(9) Any law enacted by the Federal Legislature at the request of the zones and by the regional Legislatures at the request of the Units shall be repealed if in the case of the Federal Legislature at least 3 zones and in the case of the regional Legislatures at least half the number of units in that zone ask for its repeal.

(10) The Federal Executive shall consist of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General as representing His Majesty the King and a Council of Ministers, as far as possible, not less than 7 as and no more than 11 in number, including the Federal Prime Minister.

(11) The Federal Prime Minister shall be appointed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General from among the members of the Federal Legislature and the remaining Ministers also from among the members of the Legislature in consultation with the Federal Prime Minister. but subject to the following conditions and exceptions:

- (i) That each zone shall have at least one representative in the Cabinet;
- (ii) That at least one-third of the Ministers so appointed shall be Muslims;
- (iii) That at least 2, if the number of Ministers does not exceed 9, and at least 3, if the number is in excess of 9 shall be chosen from amongst the representatives of Indian States.

NOTE I: There will be no objection to (ii) and (iii) overlapping, i.e. if a Minister representing an Indian State happened to be a Muslim, he could also be counted towards the minimum stipulated under (ii) and vice versa;

NOTE 2: Every attempt will be made to provide adequate representation to other important Minorities also.

(iv) That during the first 20 (or 15) years from the date of the inauguration of the Federal Scheme His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General may nominate 2 of his Ministers either from among the members for the Federal Legislature or from outside and entrust to them the portfolios of Defence and External Affairs. Thereafter all the Ministers shall be selected from among the members of the Legislature.

NOTE 1: A tentative allocation of portfolio and designation of Ministers is suggested as under:

1. Federal Prime Minister;
2. Minister for Defence;
3. Minister for External Affairs;
4. Federal Finance Minister;
5. Minister of Interior (Home);
6. Minister of Communications;
7. Minister to look after Minority Interests;
8. Minister of Coordination (Civil);
9. Minister of Commerce and Industries.

NOTE 2: The Minister of External Affairs could also be entrusted with the work connected with the affairs of the Indian States.

(12)

(a) The normal term of office of the Ministers shall be the same as the life of the Federal Legislature (i.e. 5 years).

(b) The Ministers will retain office at the pleasure of His Majesty's representative, i.e. the Viceroy and Governor-General.

(c) A Minister representing a particular zone shall be removed if he loses the confidence of the majority of the representatives of his regional Legislature.

(d) The Ministry as a whole except the Ministers referred to in paragraph 11(iv) above shall resign if a vote of no confidence against the Ministry is carried in the Federal Legislature.

(13) The representatives for the regional Legislatures shall be chosen in the following manner;

(i) In the case of British Indian units by the Provincial Legislature in accordance with procedure laid down in the Government of India Act, 1935, for the election of representatives to the Federal Assembly.

(ii) In the case of Indian States, as nearly as may be possible in accordance with the procedure outlined hereunder:

(a) during the first 10 years from the date of the inauguration of the regional and Federal Legislatures three-fourths to be nominated by the Ruler and one-fourth to be selected by the Ruler out of a panel to be elected by the State Assembly or other similar institution which shall be set up for this purpose;

(b) during the next 5 years two-thirds to be nominated by the ruler and one third to be elected as in (a) above:

(c) After 15 years one-half to be nominated and one-half to be elected, as in (a) above.

(d) After 20 years and thereafter one-third to be nominated and two-thirds to be elected as in (a) above.

(NOTE: If the number of seats allotted to a State or group of States is less than 2, than the Ruler shall nominate for the first 15 years and thereafter the State's representative shall be elected as in (a) above by the State Assembly or such other institution as may be set up for the purpose).

(14) There shall be a Committee of Defence to advise in matters relating to defence. The Committee shall consist of:

- (i) H. E. the Viceroy and Governor-General – President;
- (ii) The Federal Prime Minister;
- (iii) The Minister for Defence;
- (iv) The Minister for External Affairs;
- (v) The Federal Finance Minister;
- (vi) The Minister for Communications;
- (vii) H. E. the Commander-in-Chief;
- (viii) The Chief of the General Staff;
- (ix) A Senior Naval Officer;
- (x) A Senior Air Force Officer;
- (xi) Seven Regional representatives, one from each zone;
- (xii) 5 official experts to be nominated by the President;
- (xiii) 2 non-officials to be nominated by H.E. the viceroy;
- (xiv) The Secretary to the Defence Department.

(15) A Committee shall also be constituted to advise on matters connected with External Affairs with:

- (i) H. E. the Viceroy as President; and
- (ii) The Federal Prime Minister;
- (iii) The Minister for External Affairs;
- (iv) 7 regional representatives (one from each zone) to be selected by the President from among the members of Regional Legislatures.

(v) 4 other members (2 officials and 2 non-officials) to be nominated by H.E. the Viceroy, and

(vi) The Secretary for External Affairs, as members.

(NOTE TO PARAS 14-15: If in any of these Committees the number of representatives from the States falls short of 3, the difference shall be made up by the appointment by the President of additional members selected from a panel proposed by the Chamber of Princes).

(16) The Federal Railway Authority shall be so constituted as to include at least one representative from each of the 7 regional zones.

(17) Effective safeguards shall be provided in the revised constitution;

(i) for the protection of the legitimate interests of the Minorities;

(ii) to prevent racial discrimination against British-born subjects;

(iii) against violation of treaty and other contractual rights of the Indian States;

(iv) to preserve the integrity and autonomy of both British Indian and Indian States Units against interference by the Federal Executive or Federal or regional Legislature;

(v) to ensure the safety of India against foreign aggression, and the peace and tranquility of the Units as also of the country as a whole;

(vi) to prevent subversive activities by the citizens of a unit or a zone against another unit or zone;

(vii) to protect the culture and religious rights of the Minorities.

(18) The composition of the Indian Army (as on the 1st day of January 1937) shall not be altered. In the event of a reduction or an increase in the peacetime strength of the Indian Army the proportion of the various communities as on the 1st of January 1937 shall not be disturbed. This condition may be relaxed in the event of a war or other grave emergency which may arise on account of a threat to the safety of the country.

(NOTE: As regards Indianization of the officers' ranks see my evidence before the Indianization Committee).

(19) Only those subjects the retention of which is essential in the interests of the country as a whole and for its proper administration shall be allocated to the Centre, e.g. Defence, External Affairs, Communications, Customs. Coinage and Currency, etc. The remaining subjects, at present included in the Federal List, shall be transferred to the Units or zones. Residuary powers in regard to subjects which are not specifically included in the Federal List shall vest in the Units, and, in the case of subjects allocated to zones, in the regional Legislatures. The Concurrent List in the Government of India Act. 1935, shall be revised and limited to Legislation only subject to the following conditions:

(a) that the Federal Legislature shall not undertake legislation on any matter within the Concurrent List unless at least 4 zones have applied for it; and

(b) that any legislation so enacted shall apply only to the zones which have applied for it.

(20) In the event of a doubt or difference of opinion as to whether a subject is Federal, Concurrent, Regional or provincial (or State), the decision of H. E. the Viceroy and Governor-General in his discretion shall be final.

(21) The Federal Legislature shall be unicameral.

(NOTE: If it is desired that the 'special interests' for whom representation in the Central Legislature had been specially provided in the Upper House (Council of State) under the Federal scheme embodied in the Government of India Act should also be given representation in the unicameral Legislature, then the number of seats in the re-constituted Federal Assembly might be increased to secure them adequate representation. If it is decided to provide additional seats for these 'special interests', then I would suggest that such additional seats should be distributed equally among the 7 zones, say, 14 for each unit or 98 in all. Of these 98 additional seats, 60 should be reserved for representatives of British Indian Units and 38 for the Indian States subject to the proviso that the distribution shall be so arranged as not to affect the representation of the Muslims and other Minorities in the Assembly as a whole as stipulated in paragraph (4) and 5) supra.)

(22) Adequate and effective machinery shall be set up both at the Centre and in the Provinces to look after and protect the interests of the Minorities.

(NOTE: One way of securing this would be to set up statutory committee consisting of representatives of the Minorities.

APPENDIX IX

SIR SIKANDAR HAYAT KHAN SCHEME

(1) For the purpose of establishing an All-India Federation on a regional basis the country shall be demarcated into seven 'Zones' as under:

Zone 1. Assam + Bengal (minus one or two western districts in order to reduce the size of the 'Zone' with a view to approximate it to other 'Zones') + Bengal States and Sikkim.

Zone 2. Bihar + Orissa (plus the area transferred from Bengal to Orissa) This would benefit Orissa which is at present handicapped to some extent on account of its limited resources and area.

Zone 3. United Provinces and U. P. States.

Zone 4. Madras + Travancore + Madras States and Coorg.

Zone 5. Bombay + Hyderabad + Western India States + Bombay States + Mysore and C. P. States.

Zone 6. Rajputana States (minus Bikaner and Jaisalmer) + Gwalior + Central India States + Bihar and Orissa States + C. P. and Berar.

Zone 7. Punjab + Sindh + N.W.F. Province + Kashmir + Punjab States + Baluchistan + Bikaner and Jaisalmer.

(2) There shall be a regional Legislature for each zone consisting of representatives from both British India and Indian States' Units included in that zone. For the purposes of representation in the regional Legislature, every Unit will be entitled to send representatives in accordance with the share allotted to it in the scheme embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935 for representation in the Federal Assembly.

(3) The representatives in the various regional Legislatures shall collectively constitute the Central Federal Assembly which will consist of 375 members, (250 from British India and 125 from the Indian States).

(4) One-third of the total number of representatives in the Federal Assembly shall be the Muslims.

(5) The other Minorities, also, shall be allotted the share apportioned to them in the Federal Assembly by the Government of India Act, 1935.

(6) The regional Legislature shall deal only with subjects which are included in the regional List under this scheme; but may at the request of two or more units included in the zone, legislate with regard to subjects falling in the Provincial List in order to secure uniformity and facility of administration within the zone. Such enactments would, for application in any unit within the region, require confirmation by the Government of the unit concerned and shall thereafter supersede any provincial (or State) legislation on the subject.

(7) In the regional Legislature, no Bill or other measure having the force of law, relating to a subject included in the Regional List, shall be considered to have been passed unless two-thirds of the representatives vote in favor of the measure. (This limitation is suggested in order to give additional security to the smaller units).

(8) The regional Legislatures may by a resolution authorize the Federal Legislature to undertake legislation with regard to subjects included in the Regional and Provincial Lists. But such authorization shall not be effective unless at least four out of the seven zones ask for such action. And unless such authorization is endorsed by all the seven regional Legislatures the enactments so passed shall have force only in those zones which ask for such legislation.

(9) Any law, enacted by the Federal Legislature at the request of the zones and by the regional Legislatures at the request of the units, shall be repealed if in the case of the Federal Legislature at least three zones and in the case of the regional Legislatures at least half the number of units in that zone ask for its repeal.

(10) The Federal Executive shall consist of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General as representing His Majesty the King and a Council of Ministers, as far as possible, not less than seven and not more than eleven in number, including the Federal Prime Minister.

(11) The Federal Prime Minister shall be appointed by His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General from among the members of the Federal Legislature and the remaining Ministers also from among the members of the Legislature in consultation with the Federal Prime Minister, but subject to the following conditions and exceptions:

- (i) That each zone shall have at least one representative in the Cabinet;
- (ii) That at least one-third of the Ministers so appointed shall be the Muslims;

(iii) That at least two, if the number of Ministers does not exceed nine, and at least three, if the number is in excess of nine, shall be chosen from amongst the representatives of the Indian States;

(iv) That during the first twenty (or fifteen) years from the date of the inauguration

of the Federal Scheme, His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General may nominate two of his Ministers either from among the members of the Federal Legislature or from outside and entrust to them the portfolios of Defence and External Affairs. Thereafter all the Ministers shall be selected from among the members of the Legislature.

(12)

(a) The normal term of office of the Ministers shall be the same as the life of the Federal Legislature (i.e. five years).

(b) The Ministers will retain office at the pleasure of His Majesty's representative, i.e. the Viceroy and Governor General.

(c) A Minister representing a particular zone shall be removed if he loses the confidence of the majority of the representatives of his regional Legislature.

(d) The Ministry as a whole except the Ministers referred to in paragraph 11 (iv) above, shall resign if a vote of no confidence against the Ministry is carried in the Federal Legislature.

(13) The representatives for the regional Legislatures shall be chosen in the following manner:

(i) In the case of the British Indian units by the Provincial Legislature in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Government of India Act, 1935, for the election of representatives to the Federal Assembly;

(ii) In the case of the Indian States, as nearly as may be possible, in accordance with the procedure outlined hereunder:

a. during the first ten years from the date of the inauguration of the regional and Federal Legislatures three-fourths to be nominated by the Ruler and one-fourth to be selected by the Ruler out of a panel to be elected by the State Assembly or other similar institution which shall be set up for this purpose;

- b. during the next five years two-thirds to be nominated by the Rulers and one-third to be elected as in (a) above;
- c. after fifteen years one-half to be nominated and one-half to be elected, as in (a) above;
- d. after twenty years and thereafter, one-third to be nominated and two-thirds to be elected as in (a) above.

(14) There shall be a Committee of Defence to advise in matters relating to Defence. The Committee shall consist of:

- (i). H.E. The Viceroy and Governor-General - President;
- (ii). The Federal Prime Minister;
- (iii). The Minister for Defence;
- (iv). The Minister for External Affairs;
- (v). The Federal Finance Minister;
- (vi). The Minister for Communications;
- (vii). H. E. the Commander-in-Chief;
- (viii). The Chief of the General Staff;
- (ix). A Senior Naval Officer;
- (x). A Senior Air Force Officer;
- (xi). Seven Regional representatives, one from each zone;
- (xii). Five official experts to be nominated by the President;
- (xiii). Two non-officials to be nominated by H. E. the Viceroy;
- (xiv). The Secretary to the Defence Department.

(15) A Committee shall also be constituted to advise in matters connected with the External Affairs with:

- (i) H. E. the Viceroy as President: and
- (ii) the Federal Prime Minister;
- (iii) the Minister for External Affairs;
- (iv) seven regional representatives (one from each zone) to be selected by the President from among the members of Regional Legislatures;
- (v) four other members (two officials and two non officials) to be nominated by H. E. the Viceroy; and
- (vi) the Secretary for External Affairs; as Members.

(16) The Federal Railway Authority shall be so constituted as to include at least one representative from each of the seven regional zones.

(17) Effective safeguards shall be provided in the revised constitution:

- (i) for the protection of the legitimate interests of the Minorities;
- (ii) to prevent racial discrimination against British-born subjects;
- (iii) against violation of treaty and other contractual rights of the Indian States;
- (iv) to preserve the integrity and autonomy of both the British India and the Indian States Units against interference by the Federal Executive or Federal or regional Legislature;
- (v) to ensure the safety of India against foreign aggression, and the peace and tranquility of the Units as also of the country as a whole;
- (vi) to prevent subversive activities by the citizens of a Unit or a zone against another Unit or zone;
- (vii) to protect the culture and religious rights of the Minorities.

(18) The composition of the Indian Army (as on the 1st day of January 1937) shall not be altered. In the event of a reduction or an increase in the peace-time strength of the Indian Army the proportion of the various communities as on the 1st January 1937, shall not be disturbed. This condition may be relaxed in the event of a war or other grave emergency, which may arise on account of a threat to the safety of the country.

(19) Only those subjects, the retention of which is essential in the interest of the country as a whole and for its proper administration, shall be allocated to the Centre, e.g. Defence, External Affairs, Communications, Customs, Coinage and Currency, etc. The remaining subjects, at present included in the Federal List, shall be transferred to the Units or zones. Residuary powers, in regard to subjects which are not specifically included in the Federal List, shall vest in the Units, and, in the case of subjects allocated to zones, in the regional Legislatures. The Concurrent List in the Government of India Act, 1935, shall be revised and limited to legislation only subject to the following conditions:

- (a) that the Federal Legislature shall not undertake legislation on any matter within the Concurrent List unless at least four zones have applied for it.
- (b) that any legislation so enacted shall apply only to the zones which have applied for it.

(20) In the event of a doubt or difference of opinion as to whether a subject is Federal, Concurrent, Regional or Provincial (or State), the decision of H.E. the Viceroy and Governor General, in his discretion, shall be final.

(21) The Federal Legislature shall be unicameral.

(22) Adequate and effective machinery shall be set up both the Centre and in the Provinces to look after and protect the interests of the Minorities."¹⁰⁴⁴

¹⁰⁴⁴ Outlines of a Scheme of Indian Federation (Nlutid-i-Am Press, Lahore) published in the press on 30th July, 1939.

APPENDIX X

THE ALIGARH SCHEME

"With a clear conception of the reality of our social and political problems and with unshakable faith and confidence in the future of Islam in India, we beg to offer in the following a scheme for the consideration of the Muslims of India and the rest of the world. But before coming to it we must state the principles on which it is based. We are convinced that we, the Muslims of India, must insist persistently and strenuously on them, namely:

1. That the Muslims of India are a nation by themselves ... they have a distinct national entity wholly different from the Hindus and other non Muslim groups; indeed they are more different from the Hindus than the Sudeten-Germans were from the Czechs;
2. That the Muslims of India have got a separate national future and their own contribution to make to the betterment of the world;
3. That the future of the Muslims of India lies in complete freedom from the domination of the Hindus, the British, or for the matter of that, any other people;
4. That the Muslim majority Provinces cannot be permitted to be enslaved into a single all-India Federation with an over whelming Hindu majority in the Centre; and
5. That the Muslims in the minority Provinces shall not be allowed to be deprived of their separate religious, cultural and politician identity, and that they shall be given full and effective support by the Muslim majority Provinces.

Now, in order to save the Muslim nation in India, we have to demand repartition of India on the only fundamental and valid principle of division, viz., nationality and to get India divided into Muslim India and Hindu India; further. we must do all we can to safeguard the interests of our nationals living in Hindu India. On this principle British India must be divided into three wholly independent and sovereign States;

- (1) North-West India, including the Punjab. the North-West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan;

(2) Bengal, including the adjacent district of Purnea (Bihar) and the Sylhet Division (Assam), but excluding the south-western districts of Howrah and Midnapore (Burdwan) and the north-western district of Darjiling; and

(3) Hindustan, comprehending the rest of British India. Inside Hindustan there must be formed two new autonomous provinces:

(a) Delhi Province, including Delhi, Meerut Division, Rohilkhand Division and the District of Aligarh (Agra Division), and

(b) Malabar Province, consisting of Malabar and adjoining areas on the Malabar Coast.

Further, all the towns of India with a population of 50,000 or more shall have the status of a borough or free city.

Also, in Hindustan, Muslims in villages shall have to live together in considerable numbers.

The Indian States: The Indian or Native States inside the boundaries of any of the above three proposed States or exclusively on the frontier of one of them, ought to be attached to that State.

Those bordering on more than one of the three States should have the option of joining any of the adjoining States.

Hyderabad with its old dominions Berar and Karnatik (Carnatic) to be a sovereign State.

North-western India will include small Native States, e.g., Qalat, Jammu and Kashmir, Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Patiala, Jhind, Nabha, Kapurthala, Malerkotla, Faridkot, and the Simla Hill States. With the inclusion of Kashmir it may well be called Pakistan as it has been for some years past.

The Pakistan Federation will be a Muslim State. It will include about 25 millions of Muslims, i.e. more than 60 percent of the total population. It is a self-sufficient unit on the basis of geographical, economical and political considerations. The realization of this federation will open a new and living future for the Muslims of India and will have a far-reaching effect on the whole of the Islamic world. Pakistan will form the north-western wing of Muslim India.

The Hindus and Sikhs are the two non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan. They will have the same cultural, religious and political safeguards granted to them, as the Muslims

will have in Hindustan. It will be of greater advantage for the Sikhs to be in this state than in an all-India Federation as envisaged by the Government of India Act of 1935, for they will be relatively in much larger proportion in their Province and in the Centre.

The new Bengal will again be a Muslim State. It will contain more than 30 million Muslims, i.e., 57 percent of the whole population. New Bengal can be entirely self-sufficient on account of its natural wealth and agricultural richness. It will be equal to France in area as well as in population. Because of having no component Provinces, it will be no Federation. However, it will be a sovereign State, having a status analogous to Burma, and will be the eastern wing of Muslim India.

Hindustan will be a Hindu State. It will have a population of 245 millions. It will include about 23 million Muslims, forming a minority of 10 percent. It is our duty to safeguard their interests politically as far as it is at present possible. We must consequently insist on the formation of two new Provinces inside Hindustan, one in the North and the other in the South. viz. Delhi and Malabar respectively.

In the newly-constituted Province of Delhi, there will be more than 3.5 millions of Muslims, forming about 28 percent of the total population. Indeed they will still be a minority. However, they will be such an important minority as cannot easily be swept aside by the Hindu majority. Being highly cultured and educated as the Muslims of these parts are, and having their boundaries close to the Muslim Federation of Pakistan, they will be in a much stronger position to guard their interests than otherwise. Aligarh, the centre of Muslim education, must be included in this Province, for we cannot afford to leave it unprotected inside the remaining portion of the United Provinces which will be overwhelmingly Hindu.

The Malabar Province will comprise the southern part of Madras Presidency especially that lying adjacent to Malabar Coast. This part is well populated by Muslims. There are about 1.4 million Muslims in it, forming 27 percent of the total population. They have large trading interests in this Province and possess an eminent cultural position. Moreover, they are a virile race and being such an important minority can look after their interests far better than they can at present.

In Hindustan the Muslims largely live in cities and in considerable numbers. We cannot afford to leave them entirely at the mercy of the Hindu Government. Therefore, it is necessary to protect their interests. Left to themselves they can fight their own battle in those towns. All that can be done for them at present is to eliminate the undue interference of the Provincial and Central Hindu Governments. This can well be done by giving the status of free cities or boroughs to large towns of a population of 50,000 and more. They shall have their own police and magistracy. and they may have powers to legislate and execute on local matters to a large extent. In this way the interests of about 1'25 millions of Muslims of Hindustan can be protected.

The Muslims in the rural area of Hindustan must be persuaded not to remain scattered in negligible minorities, as they do at present, in villages. They must be induced to aggregate in villages with a preponderant Muslim population. In this way alone can their cultural as well as economical interests be protected. A number of useful and constructive programmes for social, educational and economical improvement may at once be launched in rural areas of Hindustan for the sake of this object as well as for the immediate amelioration of the conditions of Muslims residing therein.

The aforementioned three States - Pakistan, Bengal and Hindustan - should enter into a defensive and offensive alliance on the following bases:

- (1) Mutual recognition and reciprocity.
- (2) That Pakistan and Bengal be recognized as the Homeland of Muslims and Hindustan as the homeland of Hindus, to which they can migrate respectively if and when they want to do so.
- (3) In Hindustan the Muslims are to be recognized as a nation in minority and part of a larger nation inhabiting Pakistan and Bengal.
- (4) The Muslim minority in Hindustan and non-Muslim minority in Pakistan and Bengal will have (i) representation according to population, and (ii) separate electorates and representations at every stage, together with effective religious, cultural and political safeguards guaranteed by all the three States.

Note:- Separate representation according to population may be granted to all considerable Minorities in the three States, e.g. Sikhs, non-caste Hindus, etc.

- (5) An accredited Muslim political organization will be the sole official representative body of the Muslims in Hindustan.

Each of these three independent States, Pakistan, Hindustan and Bengal, will have separate treaties of alliance with the Great Britain and separate Crown Representatives, if any. They will have a joint Court of Arbitration to settle any dispute that may arise between themselves or between them and the Crown.

Hyderabad commands a position which is exclusively its own amongst Indian States. It is even now recognized as an ally by the British Government, and its Ruler addressed by the distinctive title of His Exalted Highness. In truth it is a sovereign State by treaties. Berar and Karnatic (Carnatic) were taken from it by the British for administrative reasons. Now when the British are giving the control of India to its rightful owners, they must return to Hyderabad its territories, and recognize

Hyderabad expressly as a sovereign State, at least as sovereign as Nepal. Karnatik will restore a sea coast to Hyderabad and Hyderabad will naturally become the southern wing of Muslim India.¹⁰⁴⁵

It is interesting to note that the pamphlet bore the date 14th August, 1939. There is also an amusing incident pertaining to the pamphlet which must be recorded here. Dr. Muhammad Afzal Husain Qadri, the co-author, was a member of Choudhary Rahmat Ali's Pakistan National Movement. The publication of the pamphlet was considered by the Movement as an irregularity in the execution of an important task allotted to him in 1938. Dr. Qadri gave the following explanation to Choudhary Rahmat Ali, the founder of the Movement.

"In the Name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful" "Qaid-i-Millat"

"Assalam-o-Alaikum! Praise be to Allah that you have looked with approval upon the way I have endeavored to discharge the duties which you, as Founder-President of the Pakistan National Movement, had, in June, 1938, entrusted to me at the time of my departure from England for the Fatherland and in which the propagation of the ideals of the Movement pertaining to Pakistan, and to the Millat in India, occupied a prominent place.

Since, for the fulfillment of these duties in the changing conditions of the Sub-continent of India. I had to issue, from time to time, several statements in my own name, and also, conjointly with other friends, I think it essential that I should, in all fairness and frankness, acknowledge before the Millat, the world, and history, that in so far as those speeches and statements which I addressed to the Millat, were concerned, they were, in their conception and thought, as in their content and purpose, made by me as your interpreter. Further, they were entirely the creation of your profound mind which you have, from the very inception of the Movement, applied to the future of the Millat in the Sub-continent and from which I, along with brethren Abdussamad Khan, Mahboob Hyder Khan, Abdul Moeed Khan, Akhtar Hamid Khan, Mohd Mahmud Ahmed, and Mohd Zakiudin, had always benefited through our contact with you. Furthermore, you had not only informed me fully about them at the time of my departure but, also, appointed me to propound and publish proposals on which was based your book which, during my stay in England, you were busy writing and which, *Insha Allah*, would, on its early publication, give a memorable lead to the Millat.

And, I must, at the same time, ask your forgiveness for anything I might, in speech or in writing, have left to be desired in the execution and fulfillment of the duties with which

¹⁰⁴⁵ *The problem of Indian Muslims and its Solution* (Aligarh Muslim University Press, 1939), reproduced in Sir Gwyer, *Supra* Volume II, pp. 462-465.

I was charged; because, for such short-coming, the whole responsibility is mine and that of my collaborators.

You would probably consider this note un-called for, but it became absolutely essential especially after the publication of the Pamphlet, dated 14th August, 1939, entitled, The Problem of Indian Muslims and its Solution; for it might possibly cause some misunderstanding. Therefore, in the interests of truth and for welfare of "Iman", and with a view to removing any possibility of misapprehension I deemed it imperative to place these few lines before you in such a manner that nobody, either now or in the future, could think that the issuance or the publication of the pamphlet was, in any way, done by me in my personal capacity or that I was responsible for evolving its contents. That is all. 'Wassalam!'

Your Sincere Brother and Servant of the Pakistan

National Movement.

(Sd.) Muhammad Afzal Husain Qadri.¹⁰⁴⁶

¹⁰⁴⁶ *The Founder of Pakistan* by Khan A. Ahmad, pp, 22-23 (Urdu letter), p. 24 (English Translation).

APPENDIX XI

MAMDOT OR PUNJABI'S SCHEME

In the book a scheme was suggested for quinguepartite confederacy, according to which the sub-continent of India could be split up into various countries on the following lines and re-assembled in a Confederacy of India:

1. The Indus Region's Federation, with the Punjab (minus its Eastern Hindu tracts), the Sind, the N.W.F.P., Kashmir, Baluchistan, Bahawalpur, Amb, Dir, Swat, Chitral, Khairpur, Kalat, Las Bela, Kapurthala and Malirkotla as its federal units.
2. The Hindu India Federation with the United Provinces, Central Province, Bihar with some portions of Bengal, Orissa, Assam, Madras, Bombay and the Indian States other than the Rajistan and the Deccan States included in the States' Federations, as its federal units.
3. Rajistan Federation with the various states of Rajputana and Central India as its federal units.
4. The Deccan States' Federation comprising the Hyderabad, Mysore and Bastar States.
5. The Bengal Federation: The prominent Muslim tracts of the Eastern Bengal and Goalpara and Sylhet districts of Assam as its provincial unit and Tripura and other States lying within the provincial unit or cut off by its territories from the Hindu India, as its state units.

Reshaping the map of the Indian sub-continent in accordance with the above suggestion, would necessitate:

1. either creation of a new province consisting of the Ambala Division, Kangra district, Una and Garh Shankar tehsils of the Hoshiarpur district, and the Chief Commissioner's province of Delhi, etc., or inclusion of all these Hindu areas in the United Provinces;
2. inclusion of the prominently Hindu parts of the Western Bengal in Behar or Orissa;

3. inclusion of the districts of Goalpara and Sylhet of Assam in the Muslim Bengal;
4. leaving a corridor in the North of the present district of Goalpara of Assam in order to connect the Hindu province of Assam with the Hindu Federation of the Hindu provinces;
5. giving a similar corridor to the Deccan States' Federation through the Hindu Federation in order to link Hyderabad State with Mysore State; and
6. giving a corridor to the Rajistan Federation to connect with it its federal unit of the Patiala State.

Half of this corridor can be taken from Hindu India and the other half from Indusstan.

In a confederation of India on the lines chalked out above, each federation joining it can have a governor-general with the governors of its provincial units under him, responsible to the central confederal authority in relation to the confederal subjects and matters relating to the rights and obligations of the Crown in respect of the Indian States within the federation. The confederal authority can be vested in the Viceroy, assisted by a confederal assembly consisting of members drawn from the various Indian Federations. The number of such members to be drawn from a federation can be fixed according to its importance judged from the point of view of its significance to the confederacy as regards its geographical situation in the subcontinent, population, area and economic position, etc. Foreign relations, defence, and matters relating to water-supply from the common natural sources, and rights and obligations of the Crown in relation to the Indian States' (which may join any of the British provinces' Federations), can be entrusted to their governor generals, who will be responsible to the Viceroy. The various federations joining the confederacy can either directly contribute towards the revenues of the confederacy or assign some portions of their revenues from some specific heads towards its expenses.

We may also point out here that under no circumstances should the Muslim North-West consent to assign customs as a source of the confederal revenues. Such an assignment would mean no control over the tariff policy. In the case of the customs remaining a central subject, the Muslims of the North-West would permanently ruin all their future prospects of industrialization. It would also adversely affect interests ...¹⁰⁴⁷

The author gave peculiar reasons for the non-adoption of the name 'Pakistan':

¹⁰⁴⁷ "*Confederacy of India*" by 'A Punjabi' Published by Nawab Sir Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot, Lahore. 1939. pp. 10-12, 12-13.

"We should be separationists-cum-confederations, and if the Hindus disagree with the idea of a confederacy of Hindu India, and Muslim India, then we should be simply separationists, demanding secession of our regions from Hindu India without any link between them. We should desire separation simply because we want to evolve a happier and more contented India, whether it be by separation of the Hindu cultural zones and Muslim cultural zones to be linked together in a confederacy, quite independent of and separate from each other except for the confederal bond, or complete separation in order to constitute our regions into federated States independently and separately from Hindu India. The foreign element amongst us is quite negligible and we are as much sons of the soil as the Hindus are. Ultimately our destiny lies within India and not out of it. And it is for this reason that we have abstained from using the word "Pakistan" and have instead used the word "Indusstan" to denote the North-West Muslim Block. "Pakistan" is a term which has somehow or other, gathered round itself some unwholesome and alien associations which are far from our mind."¹⁰⁴⁸

The author also warned:

"Often the dispirited amongst us allege that separation will offend this party or that party. Are we to be afraid of opposition? We should demand separation as our right and not as a favor that may depend upon the good wishes of anybody.

We should be determined to fight for separation and not to beg for it as a special concession. As the position of the Muslims is strong both in the North-West and in Bengal, the questions of their separation from Hindu India, should be taken up simultaneously. In case Hindu India disagrees with the confederacy proposal, we should be prepared to separate our regions, without any link between them and Hindu India. Separation alone can save us and we should be prepared to get it at any cost. No doubt our struggle is difficult but our success is sure."¹⁰⁴⁹

¹⁰⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

¹⁰⁴⁹ "Confederacy of India" by 'A Punjabi' Published by Nawab Sir Muhammad Shah Nawaz Khan of Mamdot, Lahore, 1939, p. 20.

APPENDIX XII

FOREWORD OF SIR ABDULLAH HAROON ON THE SCHEME OF DR. SYED ABDUL LATIF

In this introductory note on the "Muslim Problem in India", He writes:-

Last year when the Cultural Future of India was issued by Dr Syed Abdul Latif suggesting the establishment of a federation of culturally homogenous states for India as a solution - possibly a lasting solution, to the age-long and vexed Hindu-Muslim problem, I was so much impressed with his outlook that I invited him to Lahore in order that he might discuss his views with the members of the Foreign Committee of the Muslim League which was to meet there on the 29th January 1939. As a result of his conversations with them, he was requested to prepare a scheme under which the goal suggested might be reached by successive stages. In response to this request, Dr. Latif has framed a constitution for India alternative to the one provided for the Government of India Act of 1935 and calculated to mark the first stage in the fulfillment of the object in view. His draft constitution is now receiving the consideration of Executive Council of the All-India Muslim League and to it at my special instance, he has now contributed a comprehensive introduction which is given in the following pages.

The Hindu-Muslim problem in India has grown so serious since the inauguration of provincial autonomy in the country that the Muslims see no other way of consolidating their future except carving out cultural zones or separate homelands for themselves. When the Act of 1935 was being shaped in the Houses of Parliament, the Muslim Leaders could not foresee that their Hindu brethren would exploit the new constitution so as to lay the foundation of a Hindu Raj, and swamp the country with their culture and reduce the Muslims to the position of a subject people. But the experiences of the last two years have opened their eyes, so much so, that they are now able to see the danger lying ahead of them. They have therefore, rallied round their great leader Mr. M. A. Jinnah, under the banner of the Muslim League, their sole representative, political organization, and have resolved to fight the Act of 1935 which reduces them to the position of a helpless minority and I fight it till it is replaced by a better one.

I may make it absolutely clear that the Muslims have no desire to dominate the Hindus or any other community in any part of the country and they refuse to be dominated by others. What they insist upon is equality of freedom for every community-freedom for all and not for the majority community only. And after all, it is but proper that the Muslims who number nearly 90 million and most of whom like myself descended from pure Indian stocks. should like to have their own motherland every right to equality of

opportunities with others for, free development on the noble cultural lines they have chosen to follow: and that right they fear, the Hindus are not prepared to allow them. Hence it is that the Muslims are anxious to have for themselves separate homelands where they might live a life of their own and from where they might be in a position to work with their Hindu brethren living in similar homelands of their own, for the common good of their country as a whole.

The idea is fully worked out in the scheme under reference. Dr Syed Abdul Latif, scholar and thinker as he is, has touched only the fundamentals of the problems leaving the details to be filled by practical politicians and constitutional lawyers. His thesis is divided broadly into two parts. In the one, he describes the ideal which he thinks the Muslims should place before themselves if they desire to preserve their the identity in this country and in the other he points out the stages whereby the ideal might be reached with the good will alike of their Hindu brethren and the British Parliament.

The transitional constitution which he has framed is such as should receive the immediate and earnest consideration of all the parties' concerned-Muslims, Hindus, the Princes, and the British Parliament. It is a sort of amendment to the Act of 1935. In the first place, it gives to every federal provincial unit as full an autonomy as is possible under the circumstances, and to every Indian State adequate security in its internal administration, by reducing federal list of subjects to a bare minimum. "As a corollary to this, it provides for zonal or regional Boards for contiguous federal units possessing common affinities to evolve common policies in respect of subjects of cultural and economic importance common to them; leaving the individual units to legislate in the light of the policies so evolved." In the second place, it suggests a composite stable executive of the American type (not a mere coalition) for every province and the centre, instead of a parliamentary executive in the English sense which will mean in practice the rule of a single majority community and not of the people as a whole. Lastly, it provides a machinery whereby during the transitional stage the necessary cultural and economic security might be afforded to the Muslims and the other minorities of the Centre as well as in the federal units. The Principle which underlies these provisions, to use the language of the author is, "to allow none to gain an upper hand over other. and yet afford them all every moral urge to care to each other and to work together for the lasting good of their common motherland."

Although I cannot say with certainty what exactly the Muslim League would finally decide upon I earnestly commend the scheme, in the meantime, to the careful consideration of those earnest minds, here and Britain. who are anxious to serve the highest interests of India at their critical stage in her history.

ABDOOLA HAROON
Napier Road, Karachi, July, 1939

APPENDIX XIII

LAHORE RESOLUTION, 23 MARCH 1940

"While approving and endorsing the action taken by the Council and the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, as indicated in their resolutions dated the 27th of August, 17th and 18th of September and 22nd of October 1939, and 3rd of February, 1940, on the constitutional issue, this Session of the All-India Muslim League emphatically reiterates that the scheme of federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, is totally unsuited to, and unworkable in, the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India.

It further records its emphatic view that while the declaration dated the 18th of October 1939, made by the Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty's Government is reassuring in so far as it declares that the policy and plan on which the Government of India Act 1935, is based will be reconsidered in consultation with the various parties, interests and communities in India, Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is reconsidered *de novo* and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims unless it is framed with their approval and consent.

Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India' should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.

That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them and in other parts of India where the Mussalmans are in minority adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and other rights and interests in consultation with them.

This session further authorizes the Working Committee to frame a scheme of constitution in accordance with these basic principles, providing for the assumption finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence, external affairs, communications, customs and such other matters as may be necessary".

APPENDIX XIV

TWENTY ONE DEMANDS OF HINDUS

The Agreement between the Hindu Independents and Muslim League members was as follows:

Demands for the safety of minority community and the measures to be adopted regarding Sukkur tragedy agreed upon by the Muslim League party and the Hindu Independent party which parties are now dissolved and have formed themselves into a Nationalist Party and which Party have approved and ratified the said demands,

- (1) Immediate appointment of impartial and independent tribunal to determine whether ally of the domed buildings in the Sukkur Manzilgah was originally a mosque or not. In case Tribunal holds that to be a mosque, then along that to be given with safeguards this will not lead to breach of peace.
- (2) Sufficient number of additional police to be employed for mofussil. As minority communities in police are few, recruitment should be made as to make up minority representation to 40 of the total strength in all cadres.
- (3) Compensation proceedings to be expedited and compensation to be ascertained as early as possible. Twenty percent of the compensation to be paid by the Government as advance which sum can be recouped from recoveries made towards compensation.
- (4) Orders regarding entertainment of punitive police in villages where dacoities, arson and murder have taken place during November disturbance to be passed immediately and sanction asked for in the current Assembly.
- (5) Court of Inquiry already decided to be appointed by Government should start their work immediately (looking) into all causes of riots, etc., including misbehavior of officers.
- (6) A Consultative Committee dealing with the situations like the one arising out of the Sukkur riots and dealing with questions relating to law and order should be formed with Premier as Chairman, one Hindu minister as a member and also Congress Party Leader as member.
- (7) Immediate firm action should be taken against those responsible directly or indirectly for the murder of Bhagat Kanwar Ram.

(8) Action should be taken against all those who were concerned in the Sukkur riots or who incited or abetted the same.

(9) No cases in connection with Sukkur riots to be withdrawn except those considered by the District Magistrate and Commissioner to be proper ones for reference to the *jirga*. Sindh Frontier Regulations should be extended to Sukkur district for disposal of such cases arising out of recent riots, which are referred to *jirgas*.

(10) Villages should be got rehabilitated and intensive propaganda to be carried on for communal harmony.

(11) Strong immediate action to be taken against all Police Officers and public servants who failed to discharge their duties properly during riots.

(12) Postings of officers in each district should be so made as to have proportionate assortment from all communities. The necessary changes to be effected at once.

(13) Officers of the minority communities already serving in Judicial, Police and Revenue should be posted in larger numbers in charge of executive posts in the mofussil, so as 40 of executive posts be held by them. Necessary changes should be effected at once.

(14) Riverine police which formerly existed should be re-employed as otherwise cattle lifters take shelter on the river and (in) forests.

(15) Government plots should be given either free or at nominal *malkano* to the villagers who want to shift to bigger towns.

(16) Gun licenses should be given to the following persons:

(1) Zamindars paying assessment Rs. 250.

(2) Lessees who pay Rs. 1,000 assessment.

(3) Income tax payers.

(4) Panchayats.

(5) All who need protection including working partners of big zamindars.

- (6) Applications for gun licenses should be disposed of within a month.
- (17) Parliamentary Secretary should not be allowed to represent accused in Crown cases.
- (18) All legitimate interests of minority communities should be safeguarded. Minority communities should get 40% ratio in public services.
- (19) Strict orders should be issued to all public servants not to indulge in any communalism and that any such tendency on their part shall be taken serious notice of.
- (20) No Bill should be brought by Government before the Assembly except with the previous consultation of the parties supporting the Government.
- (21) Introduction of Joint Electorates. Signed by:
- (1) Nichaldas Vazirani
 - (2) K. B. M. A. Khuhro
 - (3) G. M. Sayed
 - (4) Shaikh Abdul Majid.