Pakistan in crisis
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Ashok Kapur

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The history of Pakistan is a story of continuous power struggles involving competing elites. These struggles at the top of the political and policy pyramids have dominated Pakistan’s affairs since 1947; and they have provided little relief to the suffering Pakistani masses. All attempts to develop democracy in Pakistan, or to share power among the different ethnic groups and regions in a meaningful way have failed. Successive Pakistani governments have produced constitutional and political arrangements which reflect a pattern of uneasy political co-existence among competing elite groupings. Since the early 1950s, the Pakistani Army’s political influence and role in internal and external affairs has grown. Under Zia-ul-Haq, the Army acquired a constitutional basis to function as a legitimate political player and the power-broker in Pakistan. The use of national elections and the rise and fall of Benazir Bhutto as a civilian Prime Minister (December 1988–August 1990) should be studied in this context. With or without elections the power of the Army and the civil servants remains undiminished.

The book provides an integrated view of Pakistan’s political history since 1947. It reviews each period, by leadership, assessing its main features, the role of key players, the motives, ideas and power relations in play. The emphasis is on analysis of events and developments. My interpretations differ from the conventional US scholarship which does not stress the interests and the central position of the Army and civil bureaucracy in Pakistan’s internal and external affairs. Events are described briefly to give the reader the necessary background. Chronologies are provided of salient events when necessary. The style is punchy and direct, no holds barred. The approach is historical and comparative. The portraits of Pakistani leaders are not flattering. The conclusion is pessimistic: in feudalist, paternalistic and authoritarian Pakistan, democracy is a weak and cosmetic force, but it is not insignificant. The Army, as well as intelligence agencies, remains the dominant force in Pakistan’s affairs but it is obliged to keep up the appearance of acting in a constitutional manner, as it has done since 1988.

The manner in which Benazir Bhutto was dismissed in August 1990 is a clear sign of the strength of the Army-civil service oligarchy and its representative, President Ishaq Khan. The prognosis is that the dominance of this oligarchy is likely to endure and democracy is likely to remain a weak force in Pakistan’s affairs. But the democratic seed has sprung in Pakistan’s political ground. This is a result of US congressional concerns with elections and human rights, the presence of the Indian democratic model next to Pakistan, the global trend towards political pluralism and economic reform, the fascination of some prominent (e.g. Senate Foreign Relations Committee) Americans with Benazir Bhutto’s charisma and the association in their minds that the Bhutto cause is the cause of Pakistani democracy and, finally, because the thirst for political decentralization, provincial autonomy and free elections remains a dream of many Pakistanis. For these reasons the democratic idea lives in Pakistan, even as Benazir Bhutto and the People’s Party of Pakistan (PPP) were defeated at the polls in 1990. But it must continually struggle with entrenched bureaucratic interests. Here the distribution of
power is lopsided in favour of the Army and the bureaucracy. The prognosis is that Pakistan’s right-wing politicians are likely to remain co-opted with the bureaucratic interests, but the method of work of political players is likely to undergo change. The more secure the generals become with their ability to manage Pakistan’s affairs, the more marginalized the Bhuttos and the PPP become in Pakistan’s affairs, and the more comfortable will the generals and the civil servants be with democracy in Pakistan. Unlike Eastern Europe today, where democracy means an end of the dominant communist system of government, democracy in Pakistan does not imply the breakdown of the Army’s domination of affairs. It only means free elections, a continuous search for autonomy by the politicians, and the continuous demand of the Army that its autonomy should remain untouched by political interference in its internal affairs and in national security and foreign affairs.

The book was completed by June 1990. As a result of the Bhutto dismissal in August and the October elections, a postscript has been added. However, my earlier argument remains unchanged. The circumstances leading to the Bhutto dismissal validated my point about the nature of post-Zia Pakistan. In this sense it could be said that the argument has been tested by recent events in Pakistan!

This volume was inspired by a suggestion by Peter Sowden that I examine Pakistan’s internal affairs and speculate about post-Zia Pakistan. To develop this book I reviewed the literature and made two trips to Pakistan, in the summers of 1988 and 1990. I am grateful to the many Pakistani scholars, journalists, ex-Army officers and diplomats in Karachi, Islamabad and Lahore who kindly agreed to discuss Pakistan’s affairs with me and who shared their thoughts candidly. Unfortunately their wish for anonymity has deprived me of the pleasure of thanking them individually here and I must satisfy myself by dedicating this book to my Pakistani friends, who, for the moment, shall remain nameless.

My colleagues at the University of Waterloo encouraged my research work and I thank the University for providing me with a good intellectual home. As always my family, Deepika, Amit and Rishi, provided the comforts of a wonderful home and the opportunity to write. Maureen Rice worked extremely well as my research assistant, and Karen Murphy did a splendid job deciphering my drafts and in preparing the script for publication. My thanks also to Karen Peat at Routledge for editorial help.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BD</td>
<td>Basic Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMLA</td>
<td>Chief Martial Law Administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSF</td>
<td>Federal Security Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJI</td>
<td>Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad, better known as Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUP</td>
<td>Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ML</td>
<td>Muslim League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRD</td>
<td>Movement for the Restoration of Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>North-West Frontier Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNA</td>
<td>People’s National Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>People’s Party of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>South-East Asia Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>United Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

THE BURDEN OF THE PAST

Pakistan is an important state from the point of view of Pakistani, Western, Soviet, Chinese and Indian geopolitical interests but it has a troubled political history since it gained its independence. It faces an uncertain future. It had a strong raison d’être—its demand for a Muslim homeland which was separate from India. This makes the Pakistani state hang together. But at the same time its internal politics have been continually turbulent in the past 40 years of its existence. There are continuous tensions in elite-mass and intra-elite power relationships since 1947. There are many obvious signs of ongoing and seemingly intractable crises in Pakistan: revival of Bhuttoism, inner-Army debates, disputes over Islamization policy, ethnic and political riots in Karachi, controversy over Afghanistan policy, the Shia-Sunni divide, political murders, alleged involvement of state authorities in drug and arms trade, pressures of regional nationalisms, the growth of competing sub-cultures like the ‘Kalishnikov culture’, the failure of constitutional reform, political corruption of a feudal society, the dominance of the Pakistani Army over Pakistani politics and an enduring pattern of repeated military intervention in Pakistani politics.

Pakistan’s current difficulties flow from historical and perennial causes. The symptoms and the causes reflect the approach of Pakistani elites to politics. It reflects the way in which Pakistan was created. Mahatma Gandhi’s approach, and that of Indian Congress Party leaders to politics, was to emphasize the relationship between ends and means. Gandhi emphasized the need to think about the people as a collectivity and as an individual, to build people even more than to build political institutions, to build social relationships as the base of political relationships in a country, and to address the problem of poor and oppressed people. Gandhi felt also that suffering and sacrifice was essential to the quest for liberty. Personal suffering increased political consciousness. Personal sacrifice was required to achieve liberty. Indian freedom fighters made sacrifices to gain freedom from British rule. The Indian freedom movement was a mass movement. The current meaning of Indian freedom has been seriously tarnished by corruption, careerism and sycophancy among members of the Indian Congress Party and the Nehru dynasty, especially since the 1960s. Nevertheless the Gandhian focus on the poor masses and the importance of mass action has never been lost in Indian political thinking, in government policy, and in popular culture since the late 1800s.

Pakistan’s case history, unlike India’s, tells a different story. Pakistan received its freedom not through the crucible of Gandhian thought and action; or by adopting any particular brand of nationalism; or through mass movement; or through any particular advocacy or conception of liberty, representative government or majority rule; or by rejection of the concept of foreign rule; or through any particular positive (as opposed to a negative, anti-Hindu) sense of Pakistani nationality.1 Pakistan’s independence was the result of a combination of British India policy (1920s to 1940s) and the willingness of
Pakistan’s ‘leaders’ (with no mass following or ability to win elections or to form governments on their own, i.e. without British aid) to play the British India government’s game of ‘divide and rule’ and then ‘divide and quit’. Pakistan got its separate status as a gift for supporting the pet British theory that the brute majority of Hindus was not acceptable as the basis of government in India; that the Indian Muslims had to be supported; and that parity between Hindus and Muslims was needed in Government of India services and in the legislatures. The British India government was acting on anti-Congress, anti-Hindu and anti-majority rule premises.

The fact that Pakistan separated from India on the issue of religious politics reveals one of the effects of British rule that nationalism has not yet been able to submerge. Encouragement of political organization within the framework of religion had, after the First World War, become the principal British device for splitting the onslaught of a united nationalism. British official and semiofficial literature persisted in referring to a supposed Hindu Congress long after All-India Congress had made it a major policy to stress the union in nationalism of people of different religious faiths. Mohammed Ali Jinnah developed the momentum of his political career by turning this British policy to his own advantage.2

Indian constitutional developments of the 1920s and 1930s, the Minto-Morley reforms and the Montague-Chelmsford Act of 1935 were based on this approach. The British India policy made it profitable for the minority to claim that it was frightened of the majority; the rewards would follow. Pakistan was born in intrigue. It was a unique product of a calculated British India policy. A refusal to understand this feature in British-Pakistani political thinking and political strategy, and to emphasize the idea that Muslims were freedom fighters3 is to indicated that image makers are attracted to lies. Here ‘reasons of state’ justify a resort to misinformation, but this is not scholarship. The latter is served by recognizing that Pakistan came into being on an anti-majority platform. Significantly, Britain left the subcontinent in 1947, but the mentality of the Pakistani elites did not change. Pakistani fears of the majority not only shaped the Pakistan-India confrontation but have also shaped Pakistan’s internal political crises since 1947.

Given their success in achieving Pakistan without struggle and sacrifice (i.e. without a revolt against foreign power, with the active collaboration of a ruling foreign power, and without a politicized or radicalized mass base), after 1947 Pakistani elites continued to approach foreign and domestic affairs on the old basis. By building a policy on an anti-majority (stronger power) basis Pakistan developed an anti-India alignment and it mobilized India’s enemies on Pakistan’s side. But this attitude also created a perpetual, and a structural, dilemma in organizing internal power relationships and in finding a stable, legitimate basis for Pakistan’s political and constitutional arrangements. Consider this: the first Pakistani howl against brute Hindu majority (Jinnah dubbed the Indian Congress Party as a Hindu organization) resulted in the 1947 Partition. But the central element in Pakistani elite thinking was the fear of majorities, not only a Hindu majority. This was the fear of ‘enlightened’, ‘secular’ leaders like M.A.Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan as well as that of ‘ignorant’, sectarian, feudal, militaristic elites which came up
in Pakistan after 1947. They shared a common tradition in Pakistani thinking about politics: namely, rely on intrigue as well as on lies or half-truths and patron-client relations to organize power relationships within Pakistan and to advance the economic and political well-being of the dominant elite group. This tradition was formed in the days of the Mogul empire when personal aggrandizement justified autocratic rule, shifting patron-client ties, disloyalty and revolt even between father and son in search of the throne. Intrigue was a central feature of this tradition. The end—to gain and to maintain power—justified the means; and conceptions of morality, justice and truth mattered little.

The process of personal aggrandizement and autocratic rule and its implications for Pakistani politics is an enduring one. It is revealed by continuous infighting among members of Pakistani elites. Thus, in the 1947–8 period, the Jinnah-Liaquat Ali Khan relationship was contentious. In his last months, Jinnah realized that his prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan was weak and ambitious and he was not loyal to him in his dying days. (Jinnah suffered from lung cancer and tuberculosis.) When Jinnah came back to Karachi in 1948 from Ziarat (near Quetta) Liaquat Ali went to get some papers signed by Jinnah. According to an eye-witness account, Jinnah lost his temper and told his prime minister that he would not have asked for Pakistan had he known about Liaquat Ali Khan’s motives. Liaquat Ali Khan allegedly laughed at Jinnah and told him he was senile. When Jinnah died Pakistan’s Home Secretary allegedly said: ‘the bastard is dead’. Liaquat Ali Khan himself was assassinated in 1951, a murder which has not been solved. The speculation is that he died at the order of Ghulam Mohammed, a pro-US man.7 The man who shot Liaquat Ali Khan was himself shot dead by a police officer, and that policeman was shot dead by the Inspector General of Police. After the end of the Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan periods a transfer of power occurred within Pakistan from the Jinnah and the Indian Muslims to the pro-US, pro-military Ghulam Mohammed (1951–5). Thereafter, the triple processes of (a) personal aggrandizement and high level intrigue within Pakistan, (b) direction by a foreign patron (US government) of the dominant political coalition in Pakistan, and (c) an anti-majority attitude and policy among ruling elites in Pakistan continued to shape Pakistan’s internal affairs.

By the mid-1950s the Punjab and feudally dominated Pakistani civil and military elites looked around and feared the poorer but numerous Bengali majority. West Pakistani Punjabis started needling the Bengalis in East Pakistan by depriving them of their economic and political rights. The result was the 1971 war and the separation of the two wings of Pakistan. In West Pakistan itself, intrigues continued to dominate Pakistani politics. Pakistan’s governments rose and fell frequently. The Ghulam Mohammed and Iskander Mirza faction was active within Pakistan and had been in contact with the US government since Pakistan became independent. By 1949 their pleas to develop a Pakistan-US alignment against India and the USSR were successful (see Chapter 1). Thereafter the US government gradually became Pakistan’s main foreign patron. The decision to develop Pakistan’s ties and to contain India was taken in September 1949, a month before the Nehru visit to Washington, DC. The Ghulam Mohammed-Iskander Mirza coalition paved the way for General Ayub Khan’s military coup in 1958. After this coup Prime Minister Surhawardy fled to Beirut, where he was murdered under mysterious circumstances, allegedly by President Ayub Khan’s intelligence personnel. This murder too remained unsolved. Ayub Khan himself was brought down by intrigue in
the civil and military bureaucracy which crystallized after a leftist revolt in Pakistan in 1968. The 1968 student and urban revolt was the first major reaction by Pakistani masses which brought the government down. But this movement did not last long. It was a spontaneous and a popular revolt. Bhutto was not the father of this revolt but it helped Bhutto’s and Yahya Khan’s intrigue against President Ayub Khan. The student/urban revolt against Ayub Khan brought down the Ayub regime, and Bhutto’s rise was aided by his allies among Pakistan’s civil and military bureaucracies. Bhutto had inside help. Bhutto’s rise to power too was carried out on an anti-majority (anti-Bengali) platform. Bhutto, West Pakistani politicians, and the Pakistani military and civil bureaucracies refused to accept the verdict of the 1970 elections. This gave the Bengalis the majority and the right to form the government of Pakistan. Later, when the East Pakistan Bengalis left the Pakistan political picture in 1971, then Baluchis, Sindis, Pathans and Mohajirs began to highlight the problem of domination by Punjabis in Pakistan. Pakistani politics in the Z.A. Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq eras too were conducted on an anti-majority basis; and intra-elite politics were dominated by intrigue, personal aggrandizement and authoritarianism. Throughout Pakistan’s political history, its regional and ethnic groups have sought a better position for themselves on an anti-majority theme. The anti-majority theme is a British legacy which has dominated Pakistani elite thinking since 1947. It is a central feature of Pakistan’s political culture. It has its uses in Pakistan’s external relations but it also creates an internal attitudinal and policy dilemma. How can Pakistanis reject the majority principle in relation to India or the Hindus and accept it in relation to Pakistanis? Pakistan has had three national elections. In 1970, Bhutto and his West Pakistani allies refused to accept the popular verdict. In 1977 the Pakistani Army and its political allies refused to accept Bhutto’s political victory. In the 1988 national elections, Benazir Bhutto’s majority was accepted by the Pakistani Army, but as events in August 1990 showed, the political system continued to be dominated by the Army and it refused to share or transfer real power to the politicians in post-Zia and post-Benazir Bhutto Pakistan.

**TYPES OF PAKISTANI CRISES**

*Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State* is the provocative title and question of Tariq Ali’s book. This book is among the finest in Pakistani literature. However, it fails to distinguish between the issue of the survival of the state of Pakistan (i.e. its territorial unity) and the history of internal crises. The latter reflect the history and pattern of Pakistani politics. They have retarded the normal development of stable, continuous and organized power relations in Pakistan. They should be studied if Pakistani politics are to be explained and predicted.

My book distinguishes between three kinds of threats: threats to the territorial unity of the state, threats to Pakistan’s political system, and threats to Pakistanis’ images and identity.
Threats to the territorial unity of the state

Pakistan faced its biggest territorial crisis in 1971. Here the causes of the crisis were the cultural, economic and political strains in the relationship between West Pakistan (Punjab-dominated) and East Pakistan (with Bengali majority) from 1947 to 1971. But the strains had a territorial manifestation. It led to war involving Bangladeshi guerrillas, Indian and Pakistani armies and the separation of East Pakistan. This interface between internal power struggles and external intervention and pressures on Pakistan’s territorial borders may reappear in a number of ways:

1 If pressures from Baluchis, Sindis, Pathans and Mohajirs develop indigenously and/or in combination with external (Soviet, and/or Iranian, and/or Indian) covert or overt intervention.

2 If challenges to the political and military authority of the Pakistan government continue as a result of chronic ethnic conflict in the metropolitan Karachi region where Mohajirs (Indian Muslims), Afghan Pathans and Bihraris have participated in violent clashes for economic and ethnic reasons. Karachi is Pakistan’s sole access to the Indian Ocean/Arabian sea and its loss would turn Pakistan into a small landlocked state.

3 If India decides to use military force to settle its contention that all of Kashmir including ‘Azad Kashmir’ belongs to India; and if it adopts a strategy to fight fire with fire, i.e. if Pakistanis interfere with Punjabi and Kashmiri politics then it is appropriate for India to interfere in Sindi and Baluchi affairs.

This type of threat has several determinants:

Border disputes and border insecurity

Since 1947 Pakistan has been involved in a number of border disputes. Table I.1 provides the basic data.

**Table I.1 Pakistan’s disputed borders**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical location of disputed border</th>
<th>Duration of dispute</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Conflicting parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Durand Line</td>
<td>1948–</td>
<td>active</td>
<td>Pakistan-Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Ceasefire line/line of actual control in Kashmir</td>
<td>dormant up to 1989; active since 1989</td>
<td>Pakistan-India</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Rann of Kutch</td>
<td>1947–65</td>
<td>settled</td>
<td>Pakistan-India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Gwadar</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>settled</td>
<td>Pakistan-Oman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Kashmir</td>
<td>1984–</td>
<td>active</td>
<td>Pakistan-China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Siachan glacier</td>
<td>1947–71</td>
<td>settled</td>
<td>Pakistan-India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 East Pakistan</td>
<td>1947–71</td>
<td>settled</td>
<td>Pakistan-India-East</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ethnic disputes and territorial integrity

Border disputes are threats to Pakistan’s territorial and military security because they provide opportunities for external intervention against Pakistan. Opportunities exist because ethnic groups within Pakistan are located in close proximity to the disputed borders and they have persisting grievances against the dominant political elites of Pakistan. Competitive ethnically driven sub-national forces are active in the Pakistani political system. Since 1947 they have been a constant source of internal pressure on the political ‘centre’ of Pakistan. Ethnic (Bengali), economic and territorial nationalism in East Pakistan polarized West-East Pakistan relations between 1947–71 and led to the formation of an independent state. In Bangladesh’s formation, Bengali militant nationalism combined with Indian military intervention to change Pakistan’s borders. A precedent for such a combination thus exists in South Asian politics and international relations. If controversies between the ‘centre’ and the ‘peripheries’ in Pakistan are not managed or settled, and if pressures from the periphery combine with external power(s) who are hostile to Pakistan’s ruling elite, then contentious borders, irredentist regionalist claims of dissatisfied ethnic groups within Pakistan, and hostile external power could threaten Pakistan’s territorial unity again, as it did in 1971. Table I.2 provides the basic data about Pakistan’s ethnic composition. Figure I.1 shows the location of the major ethnic groups and their proximity to disputed borders. There is information about political contact between foreign
powers and Pakistan’s major ethnic groups\textsuperscript{15} but it is not complete.

Ethnic conflicts in Pakistani politics and society undermine the social base of Pakistan military and diplomatic strength. Figure I.1 reveals ethnic transnationalism because the territorial borders between Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and India reflected the
administrative interests/considerations of British India. These colonial borders do not make economic, political, military, or cultural sense. Pakistan lacks

Table I.2 Pakistan’s ethnic groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major ethnic groups</th>
<th>Proximity to borders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Bengalis</td>
<td>India-Pakistan border (up to 1971)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabis</td>
<td>Kashmir; India-Pakistan border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindis</td>
<td>India-Pakistan border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchis</td>
<td>Iran-Pakistan border; Afghanistan-Pakistan border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathans</td>
<td>Afghanistan-Pakistan border</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

social cohesion. These borders do not correspond to the region’s economic geography and ethnic groupings. There are transnational ethnic pulls between the Baluchis in Pakistan and Iran, between Pakistan’s and Afghanistan’s Pathans, between Pakistan’s Mohajirs and Indian Muslims, between Pakistani Sindis and Indian Sindis. In 40 years Pakistani territorial nationalism has not advanced to the stage that loyalty to Pakistan overrides ethnic and regional loyalties. Pakistan’s ethnic ‘frontiers’ do not coincide with its territorial ‘boundaries.’ The boundaries are porous because the ethnic frontiers cut across the boundaries, and these ethnic frontiers are politically active. Ethnic and regional politics are driven by beliefs and ambitions which differ from those of the ruling elite in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s ethnic cleavages may be divided into two categories of importance. The first is disputes among ethnic groups within Pakistan which disturb the local peace and are economically and politically motivated: for example, the ethnic violence between Pathans versus the Mohajirs and Biharis in Karachi. Table I.3 lists outbreak of ethnic violence in Pakistan in this category. Such disputes do not necessarily affect the territorial integrity or security of Pakistan but they weaken Pakistan’s internal social and political fabric.

The second category is disputes between particular ethnic groups and the central government in Pakistan. For example, the Baluchis and Sindis have frequently clashed with the central government which is dominated by Punjabis. These disputes have implications for Pakistani territorial security as well as for the integrity of the political system in the following cases: (1) because these groups exist in border areas, regional provincial autonomy is likely to weaken central authority in the border areas; (2) porous borders facilitate direct external military intervention, or indirect transnational and transactional linkages through gun-running, drug smuggling and political activity. In the latter instance, the preferred strategy of a hostile foreign power is not to openly attack the border by military means. Instead it is to erode the

Table I.3 Ethnic conflict in Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Major ethnic groups in conflict</th>
<th>Motive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr 1948</td>
<td>Kalat-Baluchis vs state</td>
<td>forced accession to Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 1958</td>
<td>Kalat-Baluchis vs state</td>
<td>opposition to one unit plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963–5</td>
<td>guerrilla</td>
<td>Baluchis vs state</td>
<td>opposition to military presence in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
power and authority of the Pakistani government by facilitating extensive transnational, boundary-crossing economic and cultural transactions which divide the loyalties of the Pakistani population. Here ethnic conflicts and demands for provincial autonomy in the Sind, Baluchistan and North-West Frontier areas could affect the future well-being of Pakistani land borders which face Afghanistan, Iran and India, and Pakistan’s sea frontier in Sind and Baluchistan. Thus far, all these areas have been the centres of political dissent, ethnic conflict, repeated suppression by military action by several Pakistani governments of regional and ethnic demands, and low level insurgency (especially in Baluchistan) as well as the development of the ‘Kalishnikov culture’ especially in the Karachi region. They deserve study because they threaten internal and external security as well as the character of Pakistan’s political system.

**Threats to Pakistan’s political system**

Whereas threats to Pakistan’s territorial unity lie in a combination of internal and/or external determinants, the threats to Pakistan’s political system are primarily internally driven.

They have been inherent in Pakistan’s constitutional and political history since 1947. Table I.4 sketches the political history of Pakistan from 1947 to 1990. It reveals the weakness of the democratic process and the emergence of the Pakistani Army as the strongest political organization in Pakistan. This was true even after the ascendancy of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto following free national and provincial elections in 1988.

The information shows that since the mid-1950s the Pakistani Army has functioned as a state within the state. The growth in the size, organization, capabilities, interests and ambitions of the Pakistani Army in the context of Pakistan’s political and constitutional history indicates a contradiction between its external and internal functions. Externally, it is not able now, and never has been able in the past, alone (unaided) and/or with US help, to balance Indian or any foreign military power. It revealed a capacity to intervene forcibly in Kashmir’s politics and in 1948 and 1965 Kashmir Wars and in East Pakistani politics (1954–71). It has been able to sell its services to Gulf and Middle East Arab regimes. But it has never been able to defeat Indian power or to balance it even with US help. On the other hand it has always, since the early 1950s, been too large an influence...
in Pakistani politics and society. From the point of view of those who favour democracy in Pakistan, the role of the Pakistani Army has been a negative one from 1954 to 1988.

The motives for the emergence of the Pakistani Army as a modern military organization are to be found in the interests and ambitions of the Pakistani military elite and the civil bureaucracy of Pakistan as well as in the interest and ambitions of the UK and USA concerning Pakistan’s role in the post-war world. The latter points to a convergence of interests of the Pakistani Army and Western powers since the early 1950s. At this time an internal elite-foreign power nexus emerged (see Chapter 1). The weapon of this coalition was a politically ambitious and modernized Pakistani Army. The opportunities were provided by the failure of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan from 1947 to 1958, by India’s refusal to join the Western alliance, and by Pakistan’s willingness to do so.

There are two main explanations in the literature about the ascendancy of the Pakistani Army as the dominant force in Pakistani politics.

1 Pakistani politicians and political parties failed to develop a viable constitutional framework for political actions to accommodate the competing demands of a

Table I.4 Overview of Pakistan’s political history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Constitutional framework</th>
<th>Martial law regulation in force</th>
<th>Nature of regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug 47–</td>
<td>Mohammed Ali</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>presidential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 48</td>
<td>Jinnah</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>imperial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 48–</td>
<td>Liaquat Ali Khan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 51–</td>
<td>Ghulam Mohammed</td>
<td>1956 Constitution</td>
<td></td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 55</td>
<td>Iskander Mirza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 69</td>
<td>Mohammed Ayub Khan</td>
<td>1962 Constitution</td>
<td></td>
<td>presidential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 69–</td>
<td>Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan</td>
<td>Constitution abrogated</td>
<td>Mar 69–Apr 72</td>
<td>military regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 77–</td>
<td>Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq</td>
<td>Constitution suspended</td>
<td>Jul 72–Dec 85</td>
<td>military regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 85</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 85–</td>
<td>Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq</td>
<td>1973 Constitution</td>
<td></td>
<td>presidential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>imperial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 88–</td>
<td>Benazir Bhutto</td>
<td>1973 Constitution</td>
<td>(amended)</td>
<td>parliamentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>regime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

heterogeneous society. This failure led to military intervention in Pakistani politics. Here, failure of Pakistan’s political parties and politicians explains the rise of the Pakistani Army as the dominant political organization. Here, the culprits are Pakistani politicians and the military is the saviour of Pakistan. This is the view of Pakistani establishment writers. This I challenge.

2 Once in power the Pakistani Army postponed and retarded the constitutional and political development (improvement) of Pakistan. It acted like a state within the state. Here the Pakistani Army accommodated the civil and military bureaucracies of Pakistan. It co-opted the business community, as well as some Baluchis and Pathans and some religious groups into the Army-dominated government. But it repressed the opposition and it stifled the prospects of democracy. Here the culprits are the civil and military intriguers in Pakistan. The victims are the people of Pakistan, i.e. the weaker sectors of Pakistani society and the political fringe. I will develop this view in this work.

Determinants of Pakistani politics
There are many determinants of political actions in Pakistan, and Pakistani crises are the result of tension between many such determinants. These determinants are deeply embedded in Pakistani political history, its constitutional history, its military-civil relations, its political culture, its elite structure, its external relations, and its internal social relations. The continuous strains in Pakistani politics since 1947 reflect the presence and interplay of these determinants. The thesis is that these determinants shape the ideas and actions of Pakistani politics. As long as each determinant exists the prognosis is that Pakistani politics will remain crisis-prone. The scene, the poses, the political cast may change periodically, but the driving elements will remain the same. I list below the driving elements in Pakistan.

1 Power structures are narrow. They are dominated by shifting military-civil bureaucratic coalitions and other changing partners, i.e. big business houses and Islamic groups. They lack an ability to organize mass movements. They lack constitutional legitimacy. They both rely on and are vulnerable to autocratic rule and intrigue.

2 Leaders are ambitious. Generals, politicians and civil servants who have participated in Pakistan’s political affairs have been motivated by personal ambition. They lost because of weakness in their character and their power base. They gained power through fortunate circumstances and intrigue. None of them have a long-term strategy to reform Pakistan’s political system along democratic lines.

3 Leaders are inexperienced, weak and lack a vision of the future. They are not able to develop ‘Pakistani nationalism’, or identity or status other than on a negative anti-Hindu (anti-India) and anti-Soviet basis. Pakistani ‘nationalist’ conceptions are stimulated by a sense of past Muslim glory and reactionary religious tradition. These are not forward-looking.

4 Pakistani sub-nationalism, i.e. its ethnic, regional and religious forces are competitive. Five nationalities, i.e. Punjabis, Sindis, Baluchis, Pathans and Mohajirs (Indian Muslims) exist in Pakistan. Their interests and images of the future are competitive. The Sunnis and Shias in Pakistan are also divided.
5 The Pakistani Army is dominant in Pakistan and it is dominated by the US. It is too big for Pakistan’s political development and it is too small to manage hostile neighbours. It has internal and external functions but the former are more important than the latter. It generally fails to win wars. It is the biggest and most organized political player in Pakistan, but it is not truly independent. Its military capability, political ideas and political interests depend on the US government’s ideas, interests and aid. The Pakistani Army is the client; the USA is the patron.

6 Political parties and public opinion are divided and disorganized. Ideology is fractured. There is ideological polarization, confusion and passion in Pakistan. This reveals an array of fascist, socialist and democratic tendencies in Pakistani thinking; there is no meeting ground between them. The Pakistani Left and political parties have been marginalized in Pakistan’s internal affairs but they continue to exist as social tendencies.

7 The retreat of the British Empire left behind a negative legacy and a power vacuum in Pakistan. It disrupted the system of colonial government in the Pakistan area of the British Indian empire. Ideas and methods to create a new, anti-colonial political order in Pakistan were not provided. Pakistani elites inherited and adopted the British colonial model of administration with a strong executive. This filled the power vacuum at the top but it failed to address the issues of democracy and meaningful political, economic and social change in Pakistan. Since 1947, Pakistanis have failed to develop an alternative model of government.

8 The Communist states play a role in Pakistan’s affairs. Their presence and interest in Pakistan helped the Pakistani elites to structure its external policy. Successive Pakistani governments saw the USSR as a threat to Pakistan’s external and internal security. The USA and China aided Pakistan’s internal development and external security. US and Chinese aid to Pakistani military regimes strengthened the hand of Pakistani militarism and weakened the causes of Pakistani socialism and democracy. China puts its state interests over its ideology and it helped marginalize the Pakistani leftists.

9 The UN system has helped Pakistan military—bureaucratic interests. By the political action of the UN Security Council on the Kashmir issue and support for the economic interests of the Pakistani elite through World Bank loans and grants, the UN system aided the diplomatic and political interests of a narrowly based power elite in Pakistan. By prolonging the hegemony of this narrowly based power elite the UN system weakened the cause of Pakistani constitutional and political development. This is ironic because the UN Charter believes in ploughshares, not swords.

10 The American connection is a major determinant. It has distorted Pakistan’s foreign and military policies and its internal political development by its support of a narrowly based power elite and military regimes in Pakistan.

System boundaries of Pakistan
These key determinants collectively create the ‘system boundaries’ of Pakistan. System boundaries differ from territorial boundaries. Territorial boundaries refer to the official and legal geographical sphere of Pakistani politics. ‘System boundaries’ refer to the limits of tolerance of public activity in Pakistani politics. The limits are set by dominant political coalitions (the governing elites—political personalities; institutions: especially...
military, civil bureaucracy and business groups), political parties, and political movements. Burke defines ‘system boundaries’ in the following terms: ‘even in those societies in which interaction between individuals and groups of individuals is not encouraged, the decision makers have only a limited range for manoeuvre; there are social, political and cultural boundaries that cannot easily be crossed’.20

The system boundaries of Pakistan have fluctuated in different periods of Pakistan’s history; they have been shaped by successive power structures in Pakistan; and conversely the political fortunes of individual Pakistani leaders have been shaped by successive system boundaries. The system boundaries of Pakistan serve two functions: they

Table I.5 Determinants in Pakistan’s political history

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period by leadership</th>
<th>Determinants in play</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug 47–Sep 48</td>
<td>Mohammed Ali Jinnah 1, 2, 4, 7, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 48–Oct 51</td>
<td>Liaquat Ali Khan 1, 2, 3, 4, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 51–Aug 55</td>
<td>Ghulam Mohammed 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 55–Oct 58</td>
<td>Iskander Mirza 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 58–Mar 69</td>
<td>Mohammed Ayub Khan 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar 69–Dec 71</td>
<td>Mohammed Yahya Khan 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 71–Jul 77</td>
<td>Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 1, 2, 5, 6, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 77–Aug 88</td>
<td>Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 88–Aug 90</td>
<td>Benazir Bhutto 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

constrain certain types of political activities; and secondly, they offer opportunities for certain types of political activities.

The system boundaries are located in our list of key determinants (on pp. 13–15) but all the determinants are not of equal importance to their formation. Table I.5 shows the key determinants in different periods.

My thesis is that Pakistan’s failure to develop (progress) internally is the result of defective system boundaries. Contradictory impulses impede progress: democracy versus the Pakistani Army’s dominance; centralized controls versus a decentralized federal system; oligarchic rule versus mass politics; marginalization of the Left versus Islamic socialism; a secular state versus a theocratic state. These impulses drive Pakistani politics and shape the system boundaries’ change. Pakistan’s system boundaries are fault lines or trip wires which have repeatedly short-circuited frequent attempts at Pakistan’s internal political and social development, (progress, improvement, stability). These defects continually fracture Pakistani nation-building. The system boundaries explain why Pakistan has been a politically divided nation. They show that its political culture remains divided by regional and ethnic competition; and that its mass level activities remain internally competitive. Unless the system boundaries change, the prognosis about Pakistan’s political future is pessimistic, i.e. there will be continued political instability and strains within Pakistan. The struggle for power among elites will persist and external powers will have opportunities to play a role in Pakistan’s internal affairs.
Pakistan is not a liberal democratic state, or an Islamic state, or a socialist state. But despite its structural defects there are successes in Pakistani political history. First, Pakistan has survived as a state since 1947. Secondly, its economic development is remarkable by Third World standards. Thirdly, it has a successful foreign policy system in the sense that it has formed advantageous external alignments. Fourth, Pakistan’s bureaucratic-military-business coalitions have successfully and repeatedly hijacked the state apparatus to serve their own ends.

The balance sheet of Pakistan can be illustrated as follows:

1 Successive ‘power structures’ or dominant political coalitions have arisen in Pakistan from 1947 to the 1980s. Their power base has usually been small in size. It has been narrow in the range of representation of competing interests. These power structures have temporarily managed Pakistan’s internal and external problems but they have failed to solve these problems.

2 Each such power structure or coalition had political ideas, an intervention strategy, and there was a pattern in the relations between or among the key political players (individuals and institutions). ‘Power relations’ must be organized and continuous. To meet the definitional test, they are not required to be stable and harmonious. Pakistan’s power relations have been and remain oligarchic and they meet the definitional test. However, taking a composite and historical view of the policy responses of different power structures or coalitions in different periods, there are major differences in the oligarchic responses to Pakistani problems. These depend on leadership styles and mental outlooks, leadership interests, their domestic and external compulsions and opportunities for action. But the results at the systemic level remain the same: the system is unstable, and when it appears to be stable, the stability depends on fortunate internal and external conditions.

3 None of the successive power structures and their policy responses have succeeded in creating political and military authority (legitimacy) within Pakistan. They have managed some immediate problems but they also failed to develop viable political institutions and processes which could secure domestic peace, internal political stability and psychological security. They have failed to form an acceptable federal system and to settle centre-province disputes; to curb ethnic conflict; to settle the relationship between religion and the state and between a military and a constitutional or democratic government. Over time these structural problems have grown in nature and scope. Pakistani government policies have exacerbated these problems rather than solved them (see also 5 below).

4 The power structures or dominant political coalitions were formed to accommodate the interests of the dominant institutional forces in Pakistan, namely the civil bureaucracy, the military bureaucracy, the powerful business houses, and the US government. Such coalitions succeeded temporarily in bringing up political leaders from time to time. But they also failed in the long term. As guardians of their own institutional and personal interests rather than of the Pakistani collectivity, these institutional forces in Pakistan have become a part of the problem.

5 By avoiding settlement of constitutional, political and social problems, by using unrepresentative and repressive means to manage political and social conflict in Pakistan, successive Pakistani power structures have retarded Pakistan’s constitutional, political, social and intellectual development: they divided Pakistani
public opinion. Pakistan’s balance sheet is mixed. ‘Retarded’ political and social development is mixed with ‘effective’ military and economic development.

Successive Pakistani political coalitions or power structures have gained power, used power to their own ends, and subsequently lost it to their competitors, but all of them failed to gain authority and stability at the systemic level in Pakistani politics. The making of Pakistan was the result of the work of Indian Muslims but it became the homeland of Punjabi Muslims; political and military power and privilege shifted to the latter by 1954.21 Power and privilege was not shared by all ethnic Muslim groups in Pakistan. The pre-partition Hindu-Muslim problem was a communal problem and a problem about sharing political power between two distinct communities. This became the India-Pakistan problem after 1947. It shaped Pakistan’s conflict relations with India. It shaped Pakistan’s quest for political and military parity with India. Religion became the factor in Pakistan’s foreign and military policy towards India (but not towards the USA, China, the USSR, moderate Arab states and smaller South Asian states). But Pakistani Islam or the two-nation theory failed to address Pakistan’s internal structural divisions. These existed at various levels: religious (Sunnis, Shias; Ahmediyas); ideological (the political left versus the political right); social (tradition versus modernity); economic (private enterprise for the rich versus national planning for the poor); political (secularism and pluralistic democracy versus a civil-military-bureaucratic power structure); and foreign policy (confront India versus accommodate India after partition). Hostility with India and the USSR and civil-military oligarchic rule in Pakistan was the answer to these divisions. But a policy of confrontation with India did not eliminate the internal dilemmas.

The militarization of Pakistan’s policies towards India since the early 1950s helped Pakistan manage its relationship with India. It helped shape Pakistan’s external alignments, but is also had domestic consequences. It militarized Pakistani politics and society. It reduced the incentive to find democratic solutions for a turbulent society. However, neither Islam nor military rule has helped settle the domestic controversies or to bridge the internal cleavages which fracture Pakistani state and society.

To put it another way, successive Pakistani civil-military bureaucratic coalitions were marginally successful in managing threats to its external security. Marginal—because they acquired a part of Kashmir and bits of Rann of Kutch, but lost East Pakistan, and failed or stalemate the 1965 war. Marginal—because Pakistani military activities helped Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan but the Durand Line remains controversial, the Iranians are suspicious, the Baluchis and Sindis are restless, and the Pathans from Afghanistan remain a lawless element in Pakistani ethnic, commercial, drug and arms activities. The marginal gains in external security were achieved by acquiring massive military power, by maintaining the dominance of the Pakistani Army over external and internal affairs, and by shaping a set of external alignments with the USA, China, and select Muslim and Asian states from the early/mid-1950s onwards. These coalitions were also successful in managing Pakistan’s aggregate economic performance.22 The coalitions were successful in retaining their dominant position in Pakistani politics as well as their ascendancy in the policy-making arena on a recurring (frequent) but not a continuous basis. But Pakistan’s political, constitutional, social and intellectual development has been retarded because the bureaucratic coalitions adopted an unrepresentative and repressive approach to domestic affairs. They relied primarily on the tools of external and
internal militarization because the other alternatives did not suit the attitudes and interests of the civil-military coalitions. One alternative required internal political, economic and social reform to bridge or accommodate the internal cleavages. The other alternative meant ‘do nothing’ attitude which was likely to lead to a civil war. Successive bureaucratic coalitions rejected the first and the second alternatives and relied instead on the third, namely to maintain a continuous preoccupation of the ‘state’ and its peoples with foreign threats and military balances. This approach had external and domestic uses.

Given this mixed balance sheet, what is the likely future of Pakistan’s political system?

1 Will the Pakistani military fade back to the barracks, out of sight but not out of mind? Will it allow representative democracy to take shape by reducing the authority of the Pakistani military in the political sphere and in the day-to-day governance of Pakistan? Does this imply a reduction in the size of the Pakistani military organization, its budget, and its dominant role in the making of Pakistan’s military and foreign policy or does it mean something quite modest, namely a change in the political style of the Pakistani Army?

2 Will Pakistani political forces revert to ethnic, linguistic and regional conflict or near-anarchism—as in metropolitan Karachi region today—and create conditions to balkanize Pakistan in the future, with or without direct or indirect foreign intervention by Shiite Iran, Hindu India or Marxist Russia?

3 Will Pakistani political forces seek a strengthened Pakistan federation via decentralization of power, a popular constitutional framework, and representative political institutions and processes?

4 Will the Pakistani military remain visibly in charge of Pakistani politics and will it maintain its repressive, manipulative and demogogic hold on Pakistani state and society through a military-Islamic-business bureaucratic coalition ‘a la Zia-ul-Haq’?

The premise behind such questions is that Pakistan is not likely to crumble under the weight of its problems and the burden of its past, but its problems should not be underestimated. The present ‘crisis’ is connected to the past history but it also contains the possibility of different futures in Pakistan’s case.

**Threats to Pakistani images and identity**

‘Images’ are sets of ideas, beliefs, myths, slogans, values, threat perceptions, perceptions of past glory and future destiny which enable governments or political coalitions to form ‘us versus them’ distinctions. Such ‘us-them’ distinctions are normally found in developed and developing societies. They are meant to create group or national cohesiveness (nationalism). They are meant to strengthen the emotional, social and intellectual bonds between the governmental ‘centre’ and the people, and to serve as a guide to policy and social action. It is by development of viable images and by their effective communication to all relevant players in a country’s political arena that political and moral authority (i.e. voluntary allegiance by the constituents to a state and its dominant coalition) are gained.

However, in Pakistan’s case, conflicting images function at two levels. In Pakistan’s relations with India, the Hindu-Muslim divide is portrayed as the basis of India-Pakistan
polarity. Secondly, within Pakistan, ethnic and regional political and social pressures have continually challenged the authority of the governing elite. The first level is interstate, and religion is the basis of the ‘us vs them’ divide. The second level is intra-state, intra-societal. Here the ‘us-them’ distinctions are motivated not by religion (because all major internal groupings are Muslims) but by ethnic, regional and personal (inter-elite) rivalries. Encounters at the second level produce social and armed conflict in Pakistani politics; they reveal the presence of a number of competitive Pakistani political subcultures.

In 1947, M.A.Jinnah recognized that regional and ethnic pulls were Pakistan’s primary problem but he chose instead to concentrate on external issues, namely the India and USSR threats. The militarization of Pakistan, the shift of internal political power from civil into military hands, the formation of a military-civil coalition (a service elite), the development of a US-Pakistan alliance, and the development of an anti-India and anti-USSR orientation in Pakistan’s external policy reflected a strategy to minimize internal political pressures by focussing Pakistani attention to foreign and military affairs.

However, the military option failed to defeat India. Instead Indian military action in 1971 made Pakistan’s military option an unattractive policy. Under these circumstances, the Pakistani Army appeared to Pakistanis as an agent of internal repression of competing political subcultures rather than as an agent of external defence against India.

Secondly, as a result of the proximity of India to Pakistan, India’s political system has continually functioned as a pole of attraction for Pakistani opinion that seeks a party based democracy. As long as Pakistan’s military option was viable against India, the intra-Pakistani competing political sub-cultures remained latent or subdued. But when the option failed (1971), and the Pakistani Army continued to arm itself and it refused to share power with other groups, the internal pressures started to bubble within Pakistan. The elimination of the safety value of fighting India increased the political pressures within Pakistan. Here Pakistani politics are affected by two Indian factors: asymmetry between Indian and Pakistani military power; and the continuous comparison between the vitality of Indian democracy and the retarded move towards democracy in Pakistan.

In studying internal affairs, Pakistani images may be sub-divided into two categories: of successive ‘in power’ dominant coalitions in Pakistan’s politics; and images of each ‘out of power’ ethnic, linguistic, regional, gender and religious group. Each dominant coalition has governed Pakistan according to its particular images. Comparisons between the mental outlooks of Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Z.A.Bhutto, Zia-ul-Haq and Benazir Bhutto reveal important differences. There are also differences between the images of the dominant coalition at a given time and those of other competing political groups at the time. This book stresses the first category because this is of immediate relevance, but the latter should be studied as well. They reflect societal tendencies.

The composite portrait of ‘Pakistani’ images over a 40-year span is one of a series of contradictory, self-serving and parochial images. They provide a picture of competitive sub-nationalisms or sub-cultures. The competition has been managed, and civil war on a large scale within West Pakistan (but not in East Pakistan) has been avoided. This was achieved by co-opting some of the ethnic, linguistic, regional and religious groups into the dominant political coalition from time to time (e.g. Pathans have been given high places in the Army). Pakistan’s conflict with India has moderated the internal
competition. The India factor is a buffer in Pakistani politics to the extent that it helps mobilize Islam against India. But on the other hand, when Islam fails to unify competing Pakistani groups, then the India factor reinforces the internal competition. A sub-culture of anti-Hindu (religious) and anti-India (territorial) nationalism has reduced the ill-effects of internal cleavages. But the India-Pakistan fight could not help Pakistani elites defeat Bangladeshi nationalism; nor could the power of the Pakistani Army. A stable India-Pakistan military imbalance makes war an unattractive option for the Pakistani military. Thus, Indian military behaviour has created a limit to the use of a negative anti-Indian nationalism in Pakistani politics. This limitation, in place since 1971, has sharpened internal fights among competitive political sub-cultures in Pakistan. This way, the Indian factor affects internal debates in Pakistan. As opportunities for India-baiting are reduced within Pakistan, Pakistanis have turned inwardly to the quality of their constitutional and political arrangements, and the need to further improve them.
Elements in the making of Pakistan’s political system, 1947–58

INTRODUCTION

This chapter sketches the formative phase of Pakistani politics. The contention is that despite the historic weaknesses of Pakistani political institutions a structure of power relations emerged during this period. The ‘system’ was governed by British and Pakistani political traditions. Its internal power relations had dual roots. Its Pakistani roots revealed the primacy of paternalistic and autocratic ways of Pakistani political and economic elites. The British roots of the post-1947 Pakistani system revealed the primacy of the British-trained Pakistani civil service. After 1947 it emerged as the steel frame of the Pakistani government administration, and it played a prominent role in Pakistani political life. In what became Pakistan after 1947, the British India government had relied on its civil servants and its military officers to administer the forward areas by administrative means. The civil service avoided mass politics and it divided mass movements by manipulating key political personalities or local notables. The local allies of British authority acted in a paternalistic and an autocratic manner. They had not been groomed in the nursery of democracy and in the ideals of individual freedom, liberty and nationalism. This tradition continued to dominate the Pakistani political system after 1947. Such a political system was not unified by high ideals or national, political or moral purposes which enjoyed widespread legitimacy. In these circumstances Pakistani political personalities acted with a view to aggrandize personal power. Factional fights were used to gain power with the aid of domestic and foreign alliances.1 The habit of relying on mass politics did not exist.2 Independent Pakistan’s main political party, the Muslim League, never led or participated in mass movements prior to 1947 as did the Indian National Congress Party. Instead, there were horizontal and vertical cleavages in Pakistani politics and society at the time of independence and these revealed the limits as well the opportunities. They revealed the system boundaries in which the political elites functioned to organize the power structure and political relations.

The contention is that a political system emerged in the first phase of independent Pakistan’s history, even though at the time its political life was unstable. The political infrastructure was weak and colonial in its organization and purpose. Pakistani legislative and judicial organs were weak compared to the strength of its civil and military bureaucracies at the time. The political life centred on personality and factional fights. The political system did not enjoy legitimacy within and outside Pakistan. Its political base was narrow and it was not popular. Moreover, the political base in this period was not strong. This is clear from the frequent changes in the leadership of successive Pakistani governments prior to the takeover by the Pakistani military in 1958. A sign of
the weakness and narrowness of Pakistan’s political infrastructure at the time was its vulnerability to intervention. The Pakistani Army, and the civil service continually acted against Pakistani politicians.

The political portrait of the time revealed a fluid centre of power that was populated with astute and ambitious leaders who sought power (strength) and authority (respect and legitimacy) in Pakistan and among Pakistan’s foreign friends. The arena of Pakistani politics at the time (1947–58) consisted of weak political institutions, disorganized peripheries, and multiple vetoes at the ‘centre’ and in the ‘peripheries’. At the time the structure of political power in Pakistan was not one of a strong alliance between the Pakistani civil service, the Pakistani Army, Pakistani business and Pakistan’s Islamic groups. Rather, temporary and unstable coalitions between civil servants and politicians marred and dominated the Pakistani political landscape. The civil service—Pakistani Army alliance started to take shape in 1951. It crystallized in 1954 when the Pakistani Army became a full partner in the ruling Pakistani oligarchy. I call this period the formative one because the civil service-Pakistani Army alliance which was to dominate Pakistani politics in subsequent eras (1958–69 under General, later Field Marshal, M.Ayub Khan; 1969–71 under General Yahya Khan; 1977–88 under M.Zia-ul-Haq) crystallized in this phase. This period reveals the origins of the Pakistani Army’s political role. Table 1.1 shows the interests and pattern of intervention by the Pakistani Army in the country’s politics in the early 1950s.

This period is important because Pakistan’s civil and military bureaucracies formed a political alliance, and power was forcibly transferred from the hands of Pakistani politicians to its administrators who emerged as the guardians of Pakistan’s external and internal security. This period is also important because political power was

**Table 1.1 The Pakistani Army (General Ayub Khan) as decision-maker**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Decision</th>
<th>Pakistani Army’s role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>‘Pakistan must have [a] strong/reliable friend to strengthen its defence’^a</td>
<td>Supported the civilian leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case was launched^b</td>
<td>The facts of this case are still unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953–4</td>
<td>US-Pakistan military ties are established^c</td>
<td>General Ayub Khan took the initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Pakistan must have an imperial, presidential type of political system</td>
<td>General Ayub Khan preferred such a system^d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Ghulam Mohammed dissolved first Constituent Assembly</td>
<td>Pakistan Army supported the dissolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954–5</td>
<td>Pakistan joined CENTO and SEATO military pacts</td>
<td>This was a joint decision of the Pakistani Army and Pakistan’s political leaders^e</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954–5</td>
<td>Pakistan’s government created one unit in Pakistan to centralize political powers and to weaken provincial autonomy demands</td>
<td>General Ayub Khan supported it</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


^Ibid., pp. 82–3.
transferred from the hands of Indian Muslims (Mohajirs who moved to Pakistan from India in 1947) represented by M.A.Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan into indigenous Pakistani (especially Punjabi) hands.4

Despite the difficulties in achieving a measure of stability in Pakistani political life during this period, the civil-military bureaucratic oligarchy was able to keep Pakistan together, to give Pakistani economic life some shape and hope, to give a systemic direction to Pakistani foreign relations, to curb the politicians, and above all to stay in power. In this period the military-bureaucratic coalition consolidated its power within Pakistan and shaped its alliance with the US government. The latter became the security partner of both the civil-military bureaucracy and Pakistan.

Such changes were short-term gains in terms of management of immediate problems. But at the same time, the outlook and the actions of the power groups in this period created the foundations of subsequent crisis in Pakistani political system. Thus it is important to address the following questions. Who were the key players and what were the internal power relations in Pakistan? What were the motives, interests and political ideas which informed the political actions of the key players? What were their methods of action or strategies of intervention in domestic and external affairs? What were the relevant domestic and external circumstances in which they acted? What kinds of immediate crises did they manage and what kinds of systemic and image crises did they create by their actions?

The successive crises in Pakistani politics had their origins in the mental outlook and approach to politics of Pakistan’s founder M.A. Jinnah. Jinnah is often portrayed as a secular man, a kindred spirit. This picture is misleading. He was the father of Pakistan as well as the father of Pakistani authoritarianism. Jinnah recognized from the beginning of Pakistani independence that Pakistan’s problem was internal, not external. As Jalal point out: ‘He knew better than anyone else that the greatest threat to Pakistan’s survival would be internal not external.’5 The internal problem lay in the demands of different regional and ethnic groups for political and economic power. Rather than address these fundamental issues (which have bedevilled Pakistani politics since 1947) and to find constitutional and political arrangements to accommodate these demands and to share power, Jinnah’s approach to politics evaded the issue. He embraced a system of centralized or authoritarian powers in his own hands; his framework was presidential or imperial.6 There was a touch of secularism in Jinnah’s speeches in 1947 but this gave way to a recognition of the utility of Islam in Pakistani politics as a cement against internal divisions.7 There were two Jinnah’s in play in Pakistani politics:

1 If you change your past and work together with a spirit that everyone of you, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second, and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make… We should begin to work in that spirit and in [the] course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community—because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis,
Shias, Sunnis, and so on, and among the Hindus you have Brahmins, Vaishnavas, Khatris, also Bengalees, Madrasis, and so on—will vanish... You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed—that has nothing to do with the business of the State.

(11 August 1947)

2 On the other hand, Jinnah took a dim view of political parties and politicians in Pakistan. He argued, along with Liaquat Ali Khan, that Pakistan could not afford the luxury of an opposition in politics. Jinnah rejected a political system that reflected the principles of constitutional checks and balances as a basis of political development. Instead, he recognized the central place of the bureaucracy in the administrative, political and economic life of Pakistan. And he recognized the utility of Islam. According to Venkataramani,

have you forgotten the lesson that was taught to us thirteen hundred years ago? Who were the original inhabitants of Bengal—not those who are now living. So what is the use of saying ‘we are Bengalis, Sindhis, or Pathans, or Punjabis’. No, we are Muslims. Islam has taught us this, and I think you will agree with me that whatever else you may be and whatever you are, you are a Muslim. If I may point out, you are all outsiders here.

(21 March 1948)

The final component in Jinnah’s thinking was the search for a dependable foreign patron with money who could assume the mantle of patronage of the Muslim League which the British had worn since the 1930s. According to Venkataramani,

on 1 May Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Leader of the Muslim League, received two American visitors at his Bombay residence. They were Raymond A.Hare, Head of the Division of South Asian Affairs, Department of State, and Thomas E.Weil, Second Secretary of the US Embassy in India. Jinnah asserted that under no circumstances would he accept the concept of an Indian Union since the Muslim League was determined to establish Pakistan. He sought to impress on his visitors that the emergence of an independent, sovereign Pakistan would be in consonance with American interests. Pakistan would be a Muslim country, Muslim countries would stand together against Russian aggression. In that endeavour they would look to the United States for assistance, he added. Jinnah coupled the danger of ‘Russian aggression’ with another menace that Muslim nations might confront. That was ‘Hindu imperialism’. The establishment of Pakistan was essential to prevent the expansion of Hindu imperialism into the Middle East, he emphasised.

In sum, Jinnah was ambivalent about the role of Islam in state affairs, but his conception of Pakistani politics centred on a political system that revolved around Jinnah and the Pakistani bureaucracy. During Jinnah’s lifetime a Jinnah-mullah’s alliance was not the centrepiece of Jinnah’s political model as it was to become under General M.Zia-ul-Haq.
Jinnah’s mental outlook recognized that internal ethnic and regional cleavages and divisive strains threatened Pakistan. Like many political practitioners his choices were: (1) do nothing and face the prospect of an internal civil war; (2) engage in domestic economic and political reform, and share power by broadening the political and social base of political participation so that competing domestic interests are accommodated; (3) or turn the population’s attention to foreign threats and to create a preoccupation with military balances. Jinnah chose the third option when the internal problems ideally required the second choice.

If the premise is sound that problems of internally divided societies require more democracy rather than less, then Jinnah’s approach was wrong-headed. This was so because Jinnah and the civil servants dominated the political process of Pakistan during 1947–8. Jinnah lived briefly after Pakistan became independent but he, the civil servants, and Liaquat Ali Khan (who was assassinated in 1951) established the Pakistani approach to politics. Between August 1947 and October 1951 the Pakistani Army was not the key player in the political process. At the time the combination of Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, and the civil service first discredited Pakistani politicians on the grounds that they were incompetent and corrupt. The Army critique of politicians came later.) The origins of this crisis in Pakistan was not the result of the ‘tradition versus modernity’ argument that divided Pakistani Islamic ideology. Rather the origins lay in Jinnah’s, and the civil services’ mental outlook, life experiences and personal interests which favoured elite rule with a narrow political base. This required an authoritarian approach. Here the emphasis was on charismatic political leadership, administrative rule, secretive actions, determination to control minority demands and the importance of ‘law and order’ rather than political development.

This was the outlook of the Jinnah-Liaquat Ali Khan-bureaucratic alliance that dominated Pakistan’s political affairs (1947–51). The internal strains in Pakistani politics and society could not be settled because there was no legitimate mechanism to articulate and accommodate internal pressures. Jinnah and his cohorts shifted the attention of Pakistani elites and masses to the external realm by making the India-Pakistan and Pakistan-USSR fights the centre-piece of Pakistani foreign and military affairs and its domestic politics. This strategy and ruse created a false expectation among Pakistanis about Pakistan’s military strength, its Islamic convictions and its moral superiority. It bought time for the dominant elements and enabled them to consolidate their hold over Pakistani political processes. When internal strains threatened the ‘integrity of Pakistan’ the psychological orientation of Pakistani politics under Jinnah and his cohorts was to express the problem differently: as one of Indian and Soviet threats to Pakistan’s territorial integrity. Here Jinnah’s mental outlook, the self-interest of the bureaucracy, and intrigue by key members of this bureaucracy (especially Ghulam Mohammed and Iskander Mirza) reinforced the Pakistani tradition of authoritarianism. The shift from authoritarianism by the Jinnah-Liaquat Ali Khan regime to authoritarianism under Ayub Khan (1958–69), Yahya Khan (1969–71) and Zia-ul-Haq (1977–88) is to be seen as a change of cast but not a change of basic approach of successive Pakistani elites. Even the elected government of Z.A.Bhutto (1972–7) matched Pakistani elites’ devotion to...
authoritarianism. Bhutto’s political style had a populist appeal but once in power he conducted Pakistan’s affairs in an imperialist manner.

TURNING POINTS IN THE FIRST PHASE

In the formative phase of Pakistan’s political history there are several watersheds. These occur between August 1947 (when Jinnah led Pakistan into independence) and October 1958 (when General Ayub Khan organized a peaceful military coup). A turning point is a major event with major consequences. It changes internal power relations and it reveals driving elements in a political system. It is a dividing line or milestone in a country’s development.

Jinnah’s takeover of power in Pakistan, 1947–8

The fourteenth of August 1947 represented the transfer of political, military and constitutional authority from British India government to two dominions, India and Pakistan. The period 14 August 1947 to 11 September 1948 (when Jinnah died) is important for a number of reasons. First, it saw the beginning of a viceregal regime in Pakistan. The foundation of a series of executive-dominated presidential systems of government in Pakistan was laid by Jinnah. Secondly, it marked the beginning of the internal, intra-elite intrigue and power struggle in Pakistan. The Jinnah-Liaquat Ali Khan (the Governor-General and the Prime Minister respectively) coalition was itself driven by intrigue. The foundation of intrigue in Pakistani politics was laid in the Jinnah era. Thirdly, it marked the beginning of the attempt by Jinnah and his lieutenants to develop a Pakistan-US/UK alignment against ‘Hindu imperialism’ and ‘Soviet expansionism’. Fourthly, it marked the beginning of Pakistan’s strategy to liberate Kashmir by force. Jinnah’s Kashmir strategy revealed Jinnah’s strategic ambition to kill two birds with one stone, namely to decapitate India by taking Kashmir, and to find a solution to domestic problems through foreign and military activities.

The fragmentation of political authority and fluidity in Pakistani politics and policy, 11 September 1948 to October 1951

Jinnah died of tuberculosis and lung cancer, in part because of neglect by his lieutenants. After his death, Liaquat Ali Khan, his chief lieutenant and Prime Minister, was not elevated to the Governor-General’s position; he remained the Prime Minister. Kwaja Nazimuddin from East Pakistan became the new Governor-General. Jinnah had held three major positions: Governor-General; President of the Muslim League and President of the Constituent Assembly as well as its legal adviser. Liaquat Ali Khan, like Jinnah, was a lawyer by training. But Liaquat Ali Khan lacked Jinnah’s political stature. Chaudhuri Khaliquzzam became President of the Muslim League. That is, Jinnah’s positions were divided three ways.

This period saw the fragmentation of political authority in Pakistan. It delayed the development of democracy in Pakistan. At the time Pakistani politics were driven by personal ambition, intrigue and substantive differences over policy objectives and
methods. A major difference was between Liaquat Ali Khan and a section of the Pakistani Army: the latter preferred a harder diplomatic and military stance against India; the former sought a dialogue with India. The existence of high level opposition to the Prime Minister from the Pakistani Army was revealed in the ‘Rawalpindi conspiracy’ case which involved the Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Army. The details of this case have not been made public.

The second major difference concerned Liaquat Ali Khan’s effort to make Pakistan into a parliamentary system. During his tenure as Prime Minister an Objectives Resolution (March 1949) was passed by the Constituent Assembly. It aimed at an Islamic, democratic and a federal constitution and government. Disagreements existed about the approach and methods to realize these aims.

The third major internal difference concerned the weakening of the position of the Muslim League. This party had a weak organization structure. Its activities revealed a high incidence of factionalism and a low commitment to pursuit of social and economic programmes. Its ideology was vague. Its political base was both weak and narrow. It could not compete in a country where traditionally landed families possessed enormous political power.

These sources of internal tension culminated in the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951, a murder which has not been solved.

This period is a turning point for two reasons: first, it marked the beginning of a move away from a commitment to develop a constitutional and parliamentary system in Pakistan and a move towards the development of a civil service and a military-dominated structure of political power in Pakistan. Secondly, starting in August 1949, the US government decided on a tilt towards Pakistan and against India. This was a turning point in American diplomacy and military policy. Its effect was revealed in Pakistani politics in the period following the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan.

October 1951 to August 1955, Ghulam Mohammed as Governor-General

This period was a watershed in Pakistan’s external relations as well as in its domestic politics. During 1947 and 1948 the US government was neutral in the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. It did not accept repeated pleas by Jinnah and his emissaries who sought a defence relationship between the USA and Pakistan. Jinnah and his emissaries tried to sell the idea to the US government that Pakistan was anti-Soviet and anti-India, and that its strategic location could help US strategic interests. From 1947 to 1949 the US government remained uninterested in Jinnah’s line. However, in 1949 the US government started to tilt towards Pakistan’s point of view. The following quotations from declassified US government documents reveal the motives and the methods in US policy towards Pakistan.

Pakistan’s endeavor to assume the leadership of a Middle East Muslim bloc is to create a counter-force to what it believes to be the ‘Hindu imperialism’ of the new Indian Republic. India has emerged from World War II as the strongest power in Asia. Its position of dominance will probably increase as its power potential is developed. We have no great
assurance that India in the future will ally itself with us and we have some reason to believe that it might not. Pakistan, if given reasonable encouragement, might prove the more reliable friend. In certain circumstances, therefore, a strong Muslim bloc under Pakistan’s leadership could provide a very desirable balance of power in Asia.\textsuperscript{18}

This line of thinking was confirmed in the Department of State’s policy statement on Pakistan (3 April 1950), to quote:

> the development of a Pakistan-India \textit{entente cordiale} appears remote. Moreover, the vigor and methods which have characterised India’s execution of its policy of consolidating the princely states, and its inflexible attitude with regard to Kashmir, may indicate national traits which in time, if not controlled, could make India Japan’s successor in Asiatic imperialism. In such a circumstance a strong Muslim bloc under the leadership of Pakistan and friendly to the US, might afford a desirable balance of power in South Asia.\textsuperscript{19}

The State Department view was pressed in US-UK informal discussions in 1950. George McGhee was the Senior State Department official at the meeting. The discussion indicated:

that the US was inclined to welcome Pakistani initiative in the Moslem world. We had no confidence in the effectiveness of Egypt’s influence and looking elsewhere for leadership, we were bound to think of Pakistan, which was the most progressive and capable of the Moslem countries and was in a good position to point out the inconsistency of backward economic and social conditions with Moslem principles. While the UK officials were skeptical that Pakistan would ever emerge as the head of an effective political association of Moslem countries, feeling that the language difficulties and its different historical associations largely ruled out such a prospect, they did agree that Pakistan might set an example and its leaders exercise a useful influence…. McGhee thought we should keep in mind the useful role Islam might be playing with respect to the Moslem minorities in [Soviet] Central Asia.\textsuperscript{20}

By 1951 the US tilt towards Pakistan also acquired an anti-India orientation. The conclusions of the South Asian regional conference of US officials held that ‘Pakistan is willing to make a significant contribution to the defence of the Middle East provided its fear of Indian attack can be removed’. It urged that the US and UK, ‘the two powers most immediately responsible for the defense of the Middle East, should discuss urgently the possibility of giving Pakistan assurances with respect to such attack by India’. Another major recommendation was to mount a campaign against Indian foreign policies. To quote:
We should suggest to Governments associated with us in the North Atlantic Pact and the Hemisphere Defence Pact that they instruct their diplomatic and consular representatives in South Asia and elsewhere, and their representatives to the United Nations, to point out on every appropriate occasion to the officials of the Governments of Middle Eastern and Asian countries the fallacious basis of the present foreign policies of India, and the dangers to Asia and to world peace inherent in those policies.21

The incremental development of a pro-Pakistani orientation in American foreign relations since 1949 paved the way for the establishment of formal military supply arrangements (1950 onwards) and a defence relationship (1954 onwards). Secondly, the development of a pro-Pakistani orientation in American foreign policy thinking (since 1949) converged with the pro-US orientation of Pakistani political elites from Jinnah onwards. The two strands of development, in Pakistani and American elite thinking, laid the foundation of a foreign-linked and foreign-managed Pakistani political system.

This period is important in a dual sense. First, it created a military partnership between the governments of the US and Pakistan in the context of American policies towards the USSR and the Middle East, and in the context of Pakistani rivalry with India; here the effects concerned the foreign relations of these countries. Secondly, the establishment of a US-Pakistani elite nexus affected the struggle for power within Pakistan. The US tilt towards Pakistan settled the internal Pakistani foreign policy debate in favour of a Western alignment and against Pakistani non-alignment. (For instance, on 8 March 1951, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan had spoken about Pakistan’s ‘independent course’ in foreign affairs.)22 By promoting Pakistani elites’ ambitions to lead a modern Muslim bloc, and to contain India and the USSR, the US security and foreign policy tilt reinforced hardliner Pakistanis who favoured a tough stance against India rather than a peaceful dialogue.

In the first sense US and Pakistani foreign policy actions affected Pakistan’s external relations with India and the superpowers; and it affected American foreign policy and relations with India and Pakistan. Here the turning point was located in the foreign policy and military spheres. In the second sense, US actions in foreign and military affairs decisively or permanently altered the character or the orientation of Pakistani politics after the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in October 1951. Here the US tilt towards Pakistan (from 1949 onwards) was actually a tilt towards those sectors of the Pakistan political (bureaucratic, military and economic) elites who favoured a Western orientation in Pakistani foreign and military affairs and in its internal politics. It was a tilt towards those constituencies in Pakistan who favoured the development of a foreign (US) linked and foreign-managed foreign policy, military policy, economic policy and domestic policy for Pakistan.

As a result of the incremental development of the US tilt the structure of domestic political power was consolidated in the hands of Pakistan’s pro-West, military-oriented constituents. US actions had transnational effects. Out of this tilt came the ascendency of the Pakistani civil service under Ghulam Mohammed (the Governor-General) and his two main advisers, Iskander Mirza (Defence Secretary) and Chaudhuri Mohammed Ali (Finance Minister).23 This was the pro-US group in Pakistan since 1947. Ghulam
Mohammed was the architect, along with Jinnah, of the Pakistan-US security connection. Iskander Mirza, with Jinnah’s support, was the senior military officer turned senior political officer who orchestrated the tribal insurrection in Kashmir in 1947–8. Iskander Mirza was the officer who did not take any major decision without consulting General M.Ayub Khan. The latter became the Defence Minister in 1954, the Chief Martial Law administrator in 1958, and the President of Pakistan in 1962. As a result of the mental outlook, career interests and institutional interests of this pro-US group, its ascendancy in Pakistani external affairs and domestic affairs meant also the beginning of the end of Liaquat Ali Khan’s dream to make Pakistan into a parliamentary democracy. The Pakistani civil service and Pakistani Army power coalition came into being in this period.

A study of the effects of activities of a major power on another country’s domestic power politics is not a novel approach but it is not often applied to studies on Pakistan. Western studies on Pakistan usually view its politics and policies in the context of the India-Pakistan fight. This evades a discussion of the relationship between US-Pakistan foreign policy and security alignment and its influence on Pakistan’s domestic power struggles. Selig Harrison is among the few who attempt to study this aspect of American relations with Pakistan. To discuss this relationship between foreign policy alignment and domestic power struggles and their outcomes I now turn to Harrison’s observations and the notion of a foreign-linked and foreign-managed Pakistani political system.

Selig Harrison’s observations point to a significant impact on Pakistani internal elite power struggles and the orientation of Pakistan’s political system as a result of US government actions. To quote:

> American military assistance has had a power impact on Pakistani domestic politics during the past three [four?] decades. The impact of US military aid grants on the interplay between Pakistan elite groups not only gave the military an edge over civil service and political factions, it also strengthened and hardened the dominant position of West Pakistan over the numerically superior eastern wing.24

Harrison correctly notes that US support for the Pakistani military affected internal constitutional and political arrangements in Pakistan. To quote:

> The struggle in the West [Pakistan] was closely divided in the fifties between advocates of a federal compromise and the ‘one-unit’ set up finally adopted. In the absence of US arms aid, some form of accommodation might well have evolved between a less intransigent military hierarchy and other West Pakistani elite groups.25

In Harrison’s view, the US-Pakistan military interaction started in 1949 and it crystallized by 1951. The centre of gravity of political action, political power and power struggle in the formative phase of Pakistani politics was Pakistan’s civil and military oligarchy. Here we need to assess the motives, actions and the resulting power alignments of the key players in the Pakistani political system. Within this oligarchic scheme there were four primary sets of interactions.
At this time there was a dominant power group in Pakistan. Its internal authority was not challenged by other elites but it was challenged by ethnic, regional-political and religious forces. The dominant power group led by Jinnah sought a foreign link with US power but the US government was not receptive at the time. But this power group laid down the policy line, namely, need for US-Pakistan collaboration to contain the twin threats of Soviet expansion and Hindu imperialism. It defined the cultural and the policy agenda that was to become the future basis of US-Pakistan cooperation. At this time, the Pakistani approach to the US government, and the US government’s indifference, suggests diplomatic contact between the two sides, but it was not a relationship of exchange. There was no coordination of policy between the two governments. Here the movers were Pakistani civil servants and military officers. At this time the power struggle within Pakistan was in a fluid form. It was between the oligarchic elite led by Jinnah and his advisers, and the regional and ethnic forces in Pakistan’s political system. There was also a secret power struggle between Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, but Liaquat could not challenge Jinnah, the Great Leader, and Liaquat remained Jinnah’s lieutenant, not his equal. There were two targets in the dominant Pakistani power group’s sights. The US government was the external target; the ethnic and regional pressure groups seeking internal political, economic and social reforms formed the internal target. The Jinnah-led dominant power group sought an external partner to manage the India and the USSR threats as well as to manage the internal opposition groups. Before 1947 the British India government was the external partner. After 1947 Jinnah recognized the UK’s economic limitation and sought to co-opt the USA as the external partner.

The second set of interactions September 1948 to October 1949 was a variation of the first one

The Pakistani cast of players was the same as before except for Jinnah. Without him it was different. The power group’s orientation in external and internal affairs was both weaker and less focused. It deserves separate study because several important differences and new circumstances entered Pakistan’s political picture after the death of Jinnah in September 1948. These were: (a) No one possessed Jinnah’s unquestioned political authority and charisma in Pakistan’s external and internal affairs. After Jinnah’s death the lid could not be kept on an internal power struggle within the oligarchy; personal ambitions of oligarchy members were radicalized and activated, (b) Jinnah had failed to win Kashmir through forced intervention and intrigue. Yet Pakistani public expectations had been raised and there was continuous internal pressure to settle this issue by diplomatic and military pressure, (c) The US-UK governments became receptive to Jinnah’s policy (after Jinnah’s death). They recognized the need to reinforce the pro-Western, pro-Middle Eastern, anti-Soviet and anti-Indian orientation of Pakistani foreign relations and politics. Following the failure of India Prime Minister Nehru’s visit to the USA in October 1949, Indian non-alignment, Indian diplomatic moves in Korea, and the development of a secret Nehru-Stalin relationship in 1950–52, the American government’s hostility to Nehru and the Indian government increased. Here external developments aided Pakistani diplomacy towards the USA. Even though US public
policy towards Pakistan did not change during 1949–51, its attitude or orientation started to change at the time.

In internal affairs Liaquat Ali Khan-Mirza-Ghulam Mohammed remained the dominant power group. The divide between internal ethnic and regional problems on the one hand, and the interests and perceptions of the key members of the oligarchy on the other hand, remained. But without Jinnah’s strategic conceptions and charisma to guide Pakistani politics and foreign affairs, a fluidity crept into Pakistani politics and policies. There were two signs of this: (a) There was a power struggle within the oligarchy that culminated in Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination in October 1951. (b) Liaquat Ali Khan flirted publicly with the idea of Pakistani non-alignment. He also sought a negotiated solution to India-Pakistan differences rather than a hard military and political line on the Kashmir issue.

Comparing the two sets of interactions we observe the origins of a US-Pakistan exchange relationship in this set of players and period—a coordination of attitude, a meeting of Pakistani and American minds without coercion. Here the centre of gravity of diplomatic and strategic action shifted to Washington from the latter half of 1949 onwards. That is, the size of the cast of decision-makers grew to include Pakistanis and Americans. In US thinking the need to build US-Pakistan ties and to develop a counter-force against India and the USSR became a strong imperative in US policy.


In the second set, Liaquat Ali Khan-Ghulam Mohammed-Iskander Mirza functioned as the dominant ruling group in Pakistan during 1949–51. They were the centre of constitutional and political authority in Pakistan. They were the centre of action in internal and external Pakistani affairs; they were the movers of policy and political action. The overlap with the third set started to take shape in the latter half of 1949 when a pro-Pakistan bureaucratic coalition emerged in Washington. Led by the State Department’s George McGhee and aided by the State Department’s Ambassador-at-large Phillip Jessup plus the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at State and US military planners, the group supported the policy line of Jinnah-Liaquat Ali Khan-Ghulam Mohammed-Iskander Mirza. Ayub Khan was co-opted into the dominant ruling group in Pakistan when he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army in January 1951. He was accepted by American representatives when he helped negotiate the US-Pakistan Mutual Defence Pact between September 1953 and February 1954. He became the Minister of Defence in 1954.

This coordination of the Pakistani and the American governments’ policy lines in 1949–54 was the first meeting of minds of the two policy establishments, the first ‘exchange’ relationship (i.e. of coordination without coercion) in diplomatic and military affairs between the US government and Pakistan. Here the US side (McGhee-Phillip Jessup-Near Eastern Affairs Bureau in the State Department-US military staff) favoured the policy line of the dominant ruling group in Pakistan. This was done at the expense of Pakistani ethnic and regional forces who sought to develop constitutional and political arrangements to settle internal problems by democratic means. The convergence and coordination of policy lines helped settle the internal power struggle within Pakistan in
favour of those who could get the arms, money and external diplomatic support. This group consisted of senior members of the Pakistani civil and military bureaucracy who stressed the importance of external and internal security in Pakistan’s affairs. The tilt by McGhee and company was not simply towards Pakistan in relation to India. The tilt was also to the anti-Soviet forces in Pakistan. It was a tilt against the Pakistani Left. It was a tilt towards those who wanted a harder military and diplomatic line against India on Kashmir. It was a tilt against those advocating a negotiated settlement by mutual compromise by India and Pakistan. Specifically it was a tilt in favour of the Pakistani Army which wanted to develop a military option against India and against the USSR in the Cold War. The Pakistani Army was the main advocate of the view that it had prime responsibility for external and internal security. The US tilt was implicitly also against Pakistani politicians including Liaquat Ali Khan who talked about democracy and social justice. The tilt by the US government occurred in 1949 and it crystallized by 1954. Here American policy was the brain child of a small oligarchic group in the US government. Its actions reinforced the oligarchic tendency of the key players of the Pakistani political establishment: namely, Civil Servants and military officers.

The development of a foreign-linked oligarchy

This pattern of interaction between the American and Pakistani oligarchies from 1949 onwards led to the development of a foreign-linked (US) domestic (Pakistani) dominant power coalition. This impacted on Pakistani diplomatic and military affairs and its internal power relationships. These aspects are discussed in the following pages. The foreign-linked domestic power structure in Pakistan is a constant determining element in Pakistan’s internal affairs and its external relations. It is therefore necessary to define the idea and its premises and to use it as a source of theoretical guidance in this book.

The idea of a foreign-linked faction is adapted from Dowty. In my usage it means

the presence within a state of a competing faction that seeks or accepts aid from other states (or from groups in that state in international organisations) in order to seize and wield power by means that are not publicly defensible. The premises of this model are as follows. (1) The oligarchic elite acts secretly. (2) The ‘national’ decision-making structure concerning internal, foreign and military affairs is small and not open to public scrutiny. Various domestic constituencies outside the oligarchic structure (such as political leaders, party members, parliamentarians, journalists, scholars and other members of the ‘informed public’) are at best kept informed on a selective basis about the inner working of the oligarchy. These ‘out-groups’ function as recipients and transmission belts of leaks about intra-oligarchy debates. But such leaks do not amount to consultation. Consultation of outsiders by oligarchy members is at best cosmetic, minimal and purposive. (3) The quality (action to noise ratio), the quantity, regularity and timeliness in the flow of information among the key members of the ‘foreign-linked domestic power structure’ is vastly superior compared to the information flow among the out-groups. Invariably the ratio of ‘noise to relevant information’ or the ratio of ‘information that points in the wrong direction to
information that reveals real intentions, actual dilemmas and actual options’ favours the in-groups. In the ‘foreign-linked domestic dominant ruling group’ model, the sovereignty of the state is continuously breached. Note the contrast here with the conventional model of bureaucratic politics in the Western literature. This assumes that bureaucratic and public controversies occur in the framework of an autonomous national political system. My foreign-linked domestic power structure requires a convergence in the mental outlooks, career interests, institutional links and policy aims between oligarchies located in two different countries. Through them an exchange relationship between the two states exists. The inner dynamics and scope of such exchange relations are usually not open to public scrutiny because official secret laws are used to hide such relations. Yet those exchange relations require political analysis as they determine the direction of affairs among states in the world today.  

The development of this foreign-linked Pakistani (bureaucratic) dominant power group produced a pro-US orientation in Pakistani domestic and external affairs. On the domestic side, it meant bureaucratic rule rather than rule by a parliamentary democracy or development of an Islamic, sectarian theocratic state. In external affairs, it meant an anti-India orientation in Pakistani policies, a rejection of non-alignment by Pakistan, an extension of the Cold War into India-Pakistan affairs, and reliance on the military option to settle the Kashmir issue.

The October 1951–August 1955 period under the Governor-Generalship of Ghulam Mohammed was an eventful period in Pakistan’s political history. A number of developments changed the character or nature of Pakistan’s political system. The major events are summarized below.

1952—The Security of Pakistan Act was passed. This strengthened the internal security function of the Pakistan government.

1953—Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed imposed martial law in the Punjab following attacks on the Ahmediyas, a minority Muslim sect. (It is allegedly a deviant sect according to Pakistani Sunnis and hence not entitled to call itself Muslim.) Governor’s rule was also imposed on East Bengal (East Pakistan).

1953—The Governor-General dismissed Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin when the latter tried to curb the Governor-General’s powers by seeking amendments to the Government of India Act of 1935 (Pakistan did not have its own Constitution until 1956).

May 1954—The first popularly elected [United Front] government in East Bengal (East Pakistan) was dismissed.

October 1954—The first Constituent Assembly was dissolved. The Pakistan Supreme Court called this an ‘illegal act’.

1954—The Governor-General created a ‘Cabinet of Talents’ after the dismissal of the Nazimuddin government. This consisted of Mohammed Ali Bogra as Prime Minister (a politician who had no popular base); Major-General Iskander Mirza as Interior Minister (a military officer who joined the British political service in the Indian North-west Frontier region and then aligned himself with Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan and Ghulam Mohammed); General M.Ayub Khan as Defence Minister (Ayub was close to Iskander Mirza. Mirza had close ties with the US government and he introduced Ayub Khan to the US establishment); and Chaudhuri Mohammed Ali, as Finance Minister (who was a former head of the civil service).

August 1955—Ghulam Mohammed died; Iskander Mirza took over as Governor-General.
October 1955—The four provinces of West Pakistan (Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan) were combined into a single unit despite serious opposition to this move by the regional constituents. ‘Parity’ between West and East Pakistan became the principle of political action in West-East Pakistan relations. This move put an end to the idea of provincial autonomy—where the ambition of the East Bengali Awami League and West Pakistan’s ethnic and regional parties and communities lay.

1955—A plan was underway to develop a new Constitution for Pakistan. (In 1954 the provincial assemblies chose a new Constituent Assembly, the second one, following the dissolution of the first one by Ghulam Mohammed).

1956—A new Constitution was adopted.

Governor-General Ghulam Mohammed’s activism reflected his political style, his strengthened political hand as a result of his alliance with the US government, and the development of a ‘winning power coalition’ which brought Pakistan’s civil servants and military officers together in a common cause against the Pakistani politicians. The events revealed the ascendancy of a new oligarchic power structure but it did not settle Pakistan’s internal political and social cleavages.

Rather, fears continued to grow within Pakistan.

1 The provinces feared Punjab domination and denial of their political, economic and linguistic rights.
2 There was a fear among Punjabis that democracy would give an edge to the populous East Bengalis; parity was seen as a way to blunt this edge.
3 There was a fear that the other provinces may combine politically against Punjab. Here the majority feared the minority; the majority had a minority complex.
4 Pakistan’s urban professionals, especially the lawyers and politicians who led the Pakistani movement, had grown up in an atmosphere of British ideals, intrigue and statecraft. They thought of Islam in terms of ‘ijma’ and ‘iftihad’, i.e. Islam as a set of norms formed by consensus and community standard which implied an evolving interpretation of the Koran. These professionals were seen as a threat to the political and economic authority of the landed interests, the ‘ulema’ and right-wing Islamic forces who had the support among lower middle-class Mohajirs, the rural population, and students.31

August 1955–October 1958

This was the fourth turning point in the early history of development of Pakistan’s political system. In August 1955 Ghulam Mohammed died and Iskander Mirza took over as Governor-General. In October 1955 the one-unit formula was adopted. This meant the incorporation of the four provinces of Pakistan (Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan) into a single West Pakistan province. This shattered the dream of provincial autonomy in Pakistan which had guided the aspirations of the ethnic and regional forces in the country since 1947. In March 1956 the new Constitution was established and Mirza became the first President of Pakistan, and Chaudhuri Mohammed Ali became the Prime Minister. This was a turning point because Pakistan went back to the model of an executive-dominated presidential system based on a civil service and military bureaucratic alliance. Effective power was with President Mirza and he consulted General Ayub Khan on important matters.32
Even though the presidency was the locus of political power, Pakistani politics remained unstable. From September 1956 to October 1957 H.S. Suhrawardy led a coalition government in Pakistan. Operating within the political framework of the ‘one-unit’ formula and the implied parity between West and East Pakistan, he ordered the allocation of foreign exchange to the two wings of Pakistan on the basis of parity. He wanted to promote coastal trade between the two wings; and he started to prepare for Pakistan’s first general elections in February 1958 (which were later scheduled for February 1959). It is widely believed that these preparations for general elections terrified Pakistani civil and military bureaucracies and Mirza pressed Ayub Khan to take ‘drastic action’. In October 1957 Suhrawardy resigned. A year later on 7 October 1958 Mirza abrogated the Constitution and declared martial law. On 27 October 1958 Ayub Khan took over as martial law administrator and as President. Thus began formal military rule in Pakistan.

**SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE TURNING POINTS**

These turning points had many consequences.

1. They subordinated the pressure of domestic ethnic and regionalist strains by diverting national attention to external threats. Here the need to contain external threats and to maintain national unity implied a subordination of domestic problems and delayed internal reforms.
2. They established the rise of the Pakistani civil service as the pre-eminent member of the ‘national’ oligarchic power structure and the key policy-making institution in Pakistan.
3. They revealed the autonomy and political nature of the Pakistani Army since the early 1950s. Its willingness and capability to take an active part in Pakistan’s political, economic and military affairs was revealed in this period.
4. They revealed a failure and retardation of democratic institutions. All the standard indicators of democracy (namely, a multi-party system, independent judiciary, constitutional government, checks and balances against authoritarianism, mass electoral politics, pluralism and consensus politics) were eroded by bureaucratic actions in this period.
5. They revealed a high degree of intra-oligarchic competition and coalition-building at the top of the political pyramid in Pakistan. The rise and fall of nine governments makes this point.
6. They revealed a pattern of a shift of effective political power from Jinnah, an Indian Muslim (1947–8), to Pakistani politicians (1948–51), to Pakistani civil servants (1951–3), and finally, to a Pakistani civil service and Pakistani Army coalition (1954–9). The shift was linear, not cyclical.
7. They revealed the development of a foreign-linked dominant power structure. This development eroded the autonomy of ‘foreign and military affairs’ and ‘domestic politics’ of Pakistan. The two spheres became fused in the attitudes and interests of the members of the ‘foreign-linked Pakistani oligarchy’. This coalition changed the nature of Pakistani external affairs. It also defined the structure of power within Pakistan. There is a connection between the development of the US-Pakistan security link and the failure of representative government in Pakistan. Another connection exists
between the development of the US-Pakistan security link and the rejection of non-alignment by the Pakistani oligarchy.

In studying Pakistani political crises, I stress the relationship between the steps which led to the development of the US-Pakistan security ties in the early 1950s and their effects on the democratic forces within Pakistan. The conventional Pakistani wisdom, which is widely accepted in American scholarship, is that the Pakistani Army took power because Pakistani politicians failed to develop stability in Pakistan. Instead, I argue that Pakistani politicians failed partly because they lacked an all-Pakistan vision; partly because their ambition led them to turn against each other and towards the bureaucracy for support; and partly because of the rise of the foreign-linked domestic power group. The US-Pakistan security link and the resulting bureaucratic network permanently shifted the internal balance of power within Pakistan against the forces of democracy and mass politics. It strengthened the authoritarian and paternalistic strain in Pakistani political culture. It played on the Pakistani/Indian Muslim’s minority complex and their need for an external patron. It played as well on US elite preference to create and manage clients in foreign states who would serve US interests.

The period 1947–58 was one of tremendous instability in Pakistan. Nine governments were formed and fell until General Ayub Khan’s military coup gave Pakistan a military regime that lasted till 1969. Despite the instability in the working of Pakistani governments during this period, political developments in Pakistan in this period were extremely important. They decisively shaped the political power structure and the political processes of Pakistan. During this period Pakistan’s internal political situation and its external relations underwent several significant shifts (see Table 1.2).

The importance of these shifts is assessed below.

1 From August 1947 to October 1951 Pakistani politics were driven by a combination of Jinnah’s personality, Pakistani authoritarianism, Islam, aggrandizement in Kashmir, ambivalent non-alignment, Pan-Islam, and search for a reliable foreign patron. The approach to domestic politics was unfocused. The ‘political system’ was unstable. The reason is that the system lacked a dominant ruling power coalition and a credible political culture; yet the system contained ambitious political personalities and bureaucratic institutions. The first imperative in these circumstances was to take care of the ambitions of the civil and military bureaucracy and to organize oligarchic interests and their competition. This was done by shaping the civil and military bureaucratic alliance versus Pakistani politicians, and by developing a political system with centralized powers rather than a system based on provincial and cultural autonomy. The system sought autonomy and security for the narrowly based power elite at the top of the Pakistani pyramid rather than a power-sharing arrangement which broadened the mass base of the political process. Hence articulation and accommodation of oligarchic interests and regulation of oligarchic competition were the driving elements of Pakistan’s political system in this period.

2 Inexperience about, fear of, and failure of mass party politics induced the search for a bureaucracy-centric ruling power coalition in Pakistan. To manage Pakistan’s internal and external problems, and to

Table 1.2 Foreign policy issues and changes in governments, 1947–69
Period  | Leadership              | Tendencies/orientations                                                  
---   |-------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aug 1947–Sept 1948 | Jinnah                   | • authoritarianism                                                      
       |                         | • Muslim League based party system                                     
       |                         | • constitutionalism                                                     
       |                         | • secularism                                                            
       |                         | • non-alignment                                                        
       |                         | • Islamism                                                             
       |                         | • India-Pakistan dialogue                                              
       |                         | • military option to acquire Kashmir by force                           
       |                         | • search for US government connection                                  
Sep 1948–Oct 1951 | K.Nazimuddin/Liaquat Ali Khan | same as above                                                           
Oct 1951–Aug 1955 | Ghulam Mohammad           | • authoritarianism is in the ascendant                                  
       |                         | • India-Pakistan dialogue is inactive                                   
       |                         | • search for US government connection is successful                     
       |                         | • military option to settle Kashmir issue is alive                     
Aug 1955–Oct 1958 | Iskander Mirza           | • authoritarianism is in the ascendant                                  
       |                         | • Muslim League based party system is in eclipse                        
       |                         | • constitutionalism is sporadic exercise                                
Oct 1958–Mar 1969 | M.Ayub Khan               | • authoritarianism is predominant                                       
       |                         | • constitutionalism is sporadic exercise                                
       |                         | • secularism is rejected                                                
       |                         | • non-alignment is rejected                                             
       |                         | • modern Islamism is sought                                            
       |                         | • India-Pakistan dialogue is sporadically pursued                        
       |                         | • military option to settle Kashmir issue is revived                    
       |                         | • the Pakistan-US government connection is entrenched
after October 1951 (after Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination). It culminated in the US-Pakistan alliance in December 1953/April 1954. Since 1947 the Pakistani oligarchy’s pattern of policy action was to stress the external threats (India and the USSR) and to ignore internal, regionalist problems. Figure 1.1 shows the options of the foreign-linked (post-1954) Pakistani oligarchy, and its actual choices.

3 The history of the making of Pakistan reveals a preoccupation about Muslim parity with the Hindus. This required a stress on Muslim separateness or nationhood, as well as state equality and military equality. Here a concern with the status and identity of the Muslims was the driving element. The history of the making of Pakistan was/is relevant to an understanding of Pakistani elite attitudes and the approach to its internal political arrangements and its foreign affairs after 1947. To maintain and to reinforce the claim that Pakistan was different from India, Pakistani elites developed paths to internal political, economic and social development that differed from Indian ways. Pakistanis also sought a pattern of alignment with the West in contrast with India’s non-alignment strategy. Here the India factor affected Pakistani thinking and policies about its internal and external affairs.

4 Pan-Islam (the search for a Middle East connection) and Pakistani non-alignment were tried as ways to address Pakistan’s internal and external problems. These approaches failed because most Middle East countries did not take Pakistani pleas to organize an Islamic bloc seriously. The Pakistani elites’ self-image of its leadership role in the Islamic world in the Middle East did not evoke a favourable response from the area. Neither did the notion of Pan-Islam. Pakistani non-alignment was of no use to
Pakistan's civil and military bureaucracy feared internal instability, mass party politics, and representative government. These were likely to diminish the authority and the interests of the unrepresentative bureaucracies. This fear induced the Jinnah and bureaucracy-centred oligarchy to shift national attention to foreign and military affairs. The oligarchy was successful in this approach. It bought time to establish its ascendancy within Pakistan’s political system; secondly, it provided a direction to Pakistani diplomacy and military policy. But this approach failed to manage or settle Pakistan’s internal problems. It eroded a search for indigenous political solutions by democratic means. The US-Pakistan oligarchic alliance relied on a narrow base of political power in Pakistan. Over time this increased internal alienation, polarization and instability. Pakistani oligarchies in power from 1947 to 1958 helped themselves but they did not stabilize Pakistani politics or address internal political problems. Nor did they stabilize Pakistan-India relations by diplomatic means or weaken Indian power and political will by military and subversive means. The ‘winning coalition’ drew its sustenance from a negative anti-Indian nationalism. Mobilization of support for the interests and policies of the Pakistani oligarchy by religious groups was driven by the anti-India factor. The line was that Hindu India was menacing Islamic Pakistan and hence Pakistanis should unify under the banner of the ruling power group. Likewise the territorial loyalties of competitive ethnic, regionalist/ provincial groups were put aside against the bigger ‘national’ challenge to ‘Pakistan’s territorial integrity’. But this negative anti-India nationalism could not feed Pakistan’s poor, or provide for their housing and their
economic, social-cultural and political well-being and participation in public life to decide their destiny for themselves.

The combination of the ‘foreign-linked Pakistani power grouping’ and negative anti-Indian nationalism in Pakistan affected different sides of Pakistani life in several ways. Of the issues noted in Figure 1.2 and Table 1.2 Pakistani oligarchies chose in the following manner. The search for (a) Pan-Islam with Middle Eastern countries (1947–54), (b) a non-aligned Pakistan, and (c) India-Pakistan diplomatic dialogue and friendship was downgraded during this period. Instead, the policy direction in internal and external diplomatic and military affairs reflected the emphasis on external and internal security and the country’s military development. Here a symbiotic relationship emerged between the popular culture of anti-Indianism and anti-Russianism. Under the circumstances, constitutional, political, economic and social reforms were rejected as urgent aims of public policy. In the short term, as a result of the popularity of the anti-India and the anti-Russia theme in Pakistani diplomacy, the popular base of support for the Pakistani oligarchy was broadened. The pernicious effect of foreign-linked

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Reason for downfall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M.A. Bogra</td>
<td>Apr 1953–Oct 1955</td>
<td>• promoted India-Pakistan dialogue on Kashmir issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>• relaxed anti-Sovietism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| H.S. Suhrawardy        | Sep 1956–Oct 1957 | • relaxed anti-Sovietism by promoting Soviet-Pakistan dialogue
|                       | 1957       | • continued dialogue with the USSR; Soviet economic aid was being planned |
| I.I. Chundrigar        | Oct 1957–Dec 1957 | • relaxed anti-Indianism by promoting the Nehru-Noon pact |
| Firoz Khan Noon        | Dec 1957–Oct 1958 | • relaxed anti-Indianism by promoting the Nehru-Noon pact |


Note: aT. Maniruzzaman suggests that the primary reasons for the downfall of the Suhrawardy government were related to domestic policy issues. See his The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath (Dacca: Bangladesh Books International, 1980), p. 9.

oligarchic rule on Pakistani politics was revealed during the 1950s. It led to the collapse of many governments in Pakistan during the 1947–58 period. Barring natural death and assassination, all governments fell because of foreign policy issues. Table 1.3 provides the general picture.

It indicates a relationship between Pakistani foreign affairs and its domestic power structure. Here the interests and the declared political culture of the Pakistani oligarchy differed from those of other Pakistani constituencies. The former sought participation and gain through association with a foreign-linked domestic oligarchic structure. The latter sought internal reforms, power-sharing and mass party politics. The Pakistani Army became an important member of the Pakistani oligarchy by 1951. By 1954 the Pakistani Army was a major player in the development of US-Pakistan military relations, in
Pakistan’s diplomatic and military affairs, and in the internal political arrangements of Pakistan. Through its emphasis on the primacy of external and internal security, the Pakistani Army became the heavyweight in the budgetary process and acted as the policeman in Pakistan. General Ayub Khan’s coup in 1958 was not the first time that the Pakistani Army entered Pakistani politics. The year 1958 was a turning point only in a formal sense. Myrdal makes the point as follows:

It was fashionable at first for the defenders of the army coup to put all the blame for the failure of parliamentary democracy on the professional politicians. But, as Ghulam Mohammed and General Mirza had openly demonstrated, the real levers of power had, in fact, already passed into the hands of those who still hold them under Ayub Khan.  

But 1958 is important because it meant a change in the nature of the political game and the relationship between the civil and military officials in Pakistan. Up to 1958 the civilians co-opted the military into the decision process. After 1958 the Pakistani Army co-opted the civilians into the decision process. The net result was the same: a civil-military power coalition gained public recognition in Pakistan and among the Western allies; and it continued to reinforce the streams of paternalism, authoritarianism and intrigue in Pakistani political culture.

SUMMING UP

During this period there were three main centres of gravity of political action in Pakistan and in world affairs concerning Pakistan: (1) The Pakistani oligarchy; (2) the US government; and (3) internal ethnic, regionalist/provincial and other political forces, especially the Bengali nationalists. The centres of gravity of political action (as defined by the presence of players, motives, and political ideas, actions and power alignments which shaped Pakistani domestic and foreign affairs during this period) were mainly oligarchic. They were located in Pakistan and in the USA. This period however, also saw the beginning of attempts to broaden the centres of gravity of political action by broadening the power struggle within Pakistan. The latter attempt did not radically affect the middle and the lower echelons of West Pakistani politics and society in the early 1950s. However, it reached, by 1954, the middle (the intellectuals, middle class) and the lower (workers, peasants, lower middle class) sections of East Pakistan. They were the economically, politically and culturally deprived Bengalis. They were the first and the most nationalistic of Pakistani ethnic and regional groups to seek a sharing of power with the West Pakistani oligarchy. The broadening of this power struggle in the first phase of Pakistani politics revealed the rise and eventual dominance of the ethnic and regional motives in Pakistani politics rather than the religious one. In the second phase of the Pakistan story (1958 to 1969) when General M.Ayub Khan held power, and in the third phase (1969 to 1971) when General Yahya Khan was in power, Pakistan acted according to the requirements of the interests and perceptions of the foreign-linked power coalition. During this period the time bomb of ethnic conflict and provincial autonomy (or meaningful internal power sharing) was ticking away but it was ignored by the power
coalition. General Ayub Khan’s coup stabilized the winning oligarchic power coalition and it seemingly saved the government from scheming and incompetent politicians. The next chapter shows how and why Pakistani internal and foreign affairs centred on India, US and Pakistani military-civil bureaucratic factors while elements that caused internal strains in Pakistan were ignored. In the long run this meant failures of crisis management and conflict resolution in Pakistan. I now turn to an assessment of the second phase of Pakistani politics.
INTRODUCTION

This was an era of paradoxes and missed opportunities. During the Ayub years the political, economic and social conflict between West Pakistan and East Pakistan crystallized. Its origins lay in developments in the first phase of Pakistani history. Yet it was during the Ayub era that the internal East-West relationship continued to polarize on economic, linguistic, political and military issues. Between 1954 and 1971 the Bengali demand for provincial autonomy was neglected by West Pakistani civilian and military authorities. As a result of the neglect of East Pakistani interests, a movement for autonomy was transformed into a movement for secession involving armed struggle and Indian intervention. The paradox is that General Ayub Khan stood tall in the international East-West conflict on America’s side and on the side of world freedom and democracy, but he failed to manage the East-West conflict within Pakistan. He failed to develop a regime that accommodated the internal pressures for provincial autonomy and democracy in Pakistan’s affairs. Instead he sought to develop a corporate model with centralized controls and power in the hands of civilian and Army bureaucracies and twenty-two economic families.¹ The Ayub era sought to develop a new political system called the ‘Basic Democrats’. Emphasis was placed on economic development that bred economic inequality.² In political affairs the quest was to develop an Ayub-centric political system instead of power sharing among diverse Pakistani constituencies. These new approaches, however, did not significantly change the elitist approach to politics in Pakistan; nor did it dilute the nature of the Pakistani oligarchy I have described in Chapter 1. Instead, the Ayub system refined the civil-military power coalition that shaped Pakistani political processes from the early 1950s. The ideas and actions of the Ayub era enabled Pakistani bureaucratic and economic elites to advance their interests. But by failing to address systemic problems of Pakistan, the Ayub era also delayed the search for a stable regime based on a democracy and provincial autonomy. This was the missed opportunity.

The Ayub era was one of outward stability and a slowly festering internal crisis. The latter reflected Pakistan’s structural problems. A major contradiction in Pakistan’s political history since 1947 lies between its vision of ‘Islamic unity’ and Muslim separateness, but on the other hand its ‘political realities’ have repeatedly fractured that vision. The role of Islam in state affairs has been a divisive issue in the power struggle between Pakistan’s modernizing and secular elites and leaders (Jinnah, civil and military bureaucratic elites, Z.A.Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto) and on the other hand, General M.Zia-ul-Haq and the Islamic fundamentalists. Despite Pakistan’s independence from ‘Hindu India’ on religious grounds, Islam was not powerful enough to give Pakistan an
Islamic Constitution. Up to 1956 Pakistan was governed under the Government of India Act, 1935. The first Pakistani Constitution was adopted in 1956. It made Pakistan in theory an Islamic state. This Constitution was abrogated in October 1958 by President Iskander Mirza. The 1962 Constitution was prepared and adopted under Ayub Khan’s direction. This Constitution had initially dropped the Islamic label, but the First Amendment Act 1963 restored the Islamic label and the Islamic features of the 1956 Constitution. This Constitution was scrapped by Yahya Khan in 1969. Then came the 1973 Constitution under Bhutto’s direction. Zia-ul-Haq amended this Constitution in 1985 and Benazir Bhutto planned to revise the amendments. A major difficulty in adopting a Constitution in Pakistan lies in the persistent power struggle and ideological disunity among Pakistani Muslims.3

Table 2.1 shows Pakistan’s constitutional shifts and the shifting Islamic content in its constitutional arrangements. The ‘political realities’ lie in the endemic internal ethnic and regional conflicts in addition to conflict about Islam in Pakistan. Ethnic conflicts lie in competing attitudes, power and interests and the absence of ‘integrative transactional links’4 between West and East Pakistanis, between Punjabis and Baluchis, between Punjabis and Sindis, between Punjabis and Pathans, and finally between Mohajirs (Indian Muslim refugees when migrated to Pakistan after partition) and Punjabis. Here the ‘Punjab factor’ and the unequal distribution of power and resources between the Punjabis and the non-Punjabis shaped the ethnic and regional pressures.

Despite its longevity and outward stability from 1958 to 1969 (compared to the frequent changes in governments from 1947 to 1958), the Ayub regime did not develop a viable political or a constitutional

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pakistan’s constitutional basis</th>
<th>Islamic content</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947– Government of India Nil Act was the constitutional basis of Pakistan</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 first Constitution was established</td>
<td>Pakistan was declared to be an Islamic state but political power was with a civil-military oligarchy. Mullahs were marginal in political affairs. Politicians tried to foster the Islamic dimension in internal and external affairs but did not succeed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958 Mirza abrogated the 1956 Constitution and formalized Army rule</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962 Ayub developed a new Constitution</td>
<td>Islamic content was cosmetic and vague</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969 Yahya abrogated the 1962 Ayub Constitution</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973 Bhutto developed a new Constitution. It had wide support within Pakistan</td>
<td>Islamic content was cosmetic and vague.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977– Zia-ul-Haq amended the Bhutto Constitution through a series of martial law orders. In 1985 the Junejo government validated the Zia</td>
<td>Zia-ul-Haq gave Pakistan politics and society an Islamic veneer but he faced continuous internal opposition from his bureaucracy and from social groups, e.g. lawyers, women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1 Relationship between Islamic content and constitutional basis in Pakistan
theory; it did not establish viable political institutions that were capable of settling internal conflicts.5 Between 1958–69 the Ayub regime had many opportunities to develop new policies. Until 1968–9 there were no significant internal challenges to Ayub’s authority.

Externally Pakistan had secured friendly relations with the USA and China since the mid-1950s. A secret Pakistan-China relationship emerged in the mid-1950s. Rushbrook Williams tells the story:

Following on the Bandung Conference, when the nations of Asia, under the lead of China, by whom India was momentarily over-shadowed, drew up a charter of peaceful co-existence amidst scenes of wild enthusiasm and speeches of brotherly amity, Karachi received—as I have been assured on unimpeachable authority—a private message from Peking. The Chinese People’s Government assured the Government of Pakistan that there was no conceivable clash of interests between the two countries which could imperil their friendly relations: but that this position did not apply to Indo-Chinese relations, in which a definite conflict of interests could be expected in the near future.6

The China-Pakistan strategic connection was strengthened by the China-Pakistan boundary settlement and by Pakistan’s diplomatic support for China in the China-India War. The Ayub government’s relations with Afghanistan and the USSR were normal, and they were friendly with Iran. With India, there was a diplomatic dialogue. Up to 1965 the region was free of war. The decision to go to war with India in 1965 was that of Ayub and his advisers.7 Ayub’s economic modernization programme had the endorsement of the US government and academic consultants (i.e. the Harvard advisory group in Pakistan).8

Still the Ayub regime failed because it lacked a vision and a political strategy to develop ideas and policies for internal conflict resolution. Despite its monopoly over the instruments of state coercion, the Ayub regime lacked the ability and the will to manage crises. This became apparent in the 1968–9 events which brought down the Ayub government. General Ayub Khan was also not able to develop a military strategy to defeat India on the battlefield. The 1965 India-Pakistan War in Kashmir is an important turning point because it led to loss of confidence in Ayub’s leadership among Pakistanis.

To understand the Ayub era it is important to understand its political ideas, its internal power arrangements and power relations, and the intervention strategies of Ayub Khan and his opponents. The Ayub era was eventful and it is a valuable micro-study of Pakistani politics.
The literature provides two models of political integration. The first concerns integration through the development of a consensus of political ideas. The second concerns integration that is achieved by the development of transactional linkages.

In relation to the Ayub era this chapter will show that the Ayub regime lacked stability because it lacked a consensus about political ideas and there was no stability or permanence in its internal power arrangements. That is, Ayub’s political system lacked integration in both senses of the term.

To appreciate the differences and similarities between the Ayub era and the preceding era let me recapitulate the features of Pakistani politics up to 1958.

1 Inter-elite linkages existed among key members of the Pakistani bureaucratic-military oligarchy. There was a consensus about political ideas and approach to govern Pakistan.

2 The strategic and foreign policy ideas of the US elite and the Pakistani elite were integrated after 1951. The consensus of political and strategic ideas between US-Pakistani elites produced a policy relationship. Exchanges between the USA and Pakistan in the economic and military spheres were signs of this type of transnational integration.

3 However, there was no elite-mass integration within Pakistan. At the level of political ideas there was no consensus in Pakistani politics and society concerning:

   (a) the place of Islam in Pakistan’s political (conventions; desirable modes of behaviour) and constitutional (laws) arrangements;
   (b) the place of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan’s political life; and
   (c) the place of provincial autonomy in Pakistani politics.

The inter-elite consensus (among Pakistani civil and military officials and among US officials who dealt with Pakistan) was against these ideas. However, the Pakistani body politic revealed sympathy for them. An elite-mass consensus existed only with respect to foreign and defence issues; India, and communists in Pakistan and abroad, were the common threats.

In sum, there was high integration concerning domestic and foreign affairs among Pakistan’s civil and military elites, but low integration among Pakistani elites and its masses. This was so at the level of political ideas and transactional links. The development of transactional linkages between US and Pakistani elites revealed high integration between US and Pakistani elites. The low integration led to elite-mass alienation and polarization. There were no important or enduring transactional links to accommodate the poorer, weaker and numerous people of Pakistan.

The Ayub era built on this pattern of inter-elite (within Pakistan) integration, Pakistan-US integration (in foreign, military and economic affairs) and elite-mass division (within Pakistan). The cast of actors and the setting changed, the coalition partners and the strategy of political intervention differed from the preceding era. But the Ayub era was a continuation of this pattern. I turn first to a brief discussion of this pattern and then to a discussion of the political ideas of the regime, its power relations, and the intervention strategies that maintained the regime from 1958 to 1969 and that brought it down. The process paved the way for another bout of military rule under General Yahya Khan, and the break-up of Pakistan in 1971.
THE SYSTEMIC CONTEXT OF THE AYUB KHAN ERA: AN OVERVIEW

The context is one of political instability. This is a result of a permanent strain between (a) enduring ethnic, religious and regional cleavages; and (b) political and constitutional arrangements that temporarily satisfy oligarchic interests.

The arrangements are temporary for a number of reasons. First, the political ideas of dominant Pakistani elites have often lacked societal consensus and legitimacy. Secondly, the internal power relationships and power struggles are driven by personal ambition, changing political circumstances, and intervention by external and internal opposition forces. They are frequently fragile. Thirdly, intervention strategies to organize and manage power relations in the ‘centre’ and at the ‘periphery’ have changed from time to time. As a result, the forms of government and the constitutional arrangements of Pakistan have changed continuously. There have been frequent changes as well in the composition of the dominant power coalition or the oligarchy as a result of frequent internal power struggles. There have been repeated military interventions in Pakistani politics. Military interventions have eroded the constitutional and the political arrangements of Pakistan.

To put the Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Z.A.Butto, Zia-ul-Haq and Benazir Bhutto eras in perspective, the following models are used to outline the structure of power and changing but temporary political arrangements in Pakistani political life from 1947 to 1969. (Subsequent chapters will build on the models illustrated in the figures that follow and explain the relevant period and government.) Figure 2.1 (1947–51) explains the Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan era. Figure 2.2 (1954–8)

![Figure 2.1 Structure of power in the Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan era, 1947–51](image-url)
explains the Ghulam Mohammed and Iskander Mirza era. Figure 2.3 (1958–69) explains the Ayub Khan era. Finally, Figure 2.4 (1969) explains the structure of power within Pakistan that led to Ayub Khan’s downfall.

The Ayub era’s power relationships are outlined in Figure 2.3. This was a build-up on the power relationships outlined in Figure 2.2. The Ayub regime had a power structure and an approach to Pakistan’s internal and foreign affairs but it did not create an authority structure that enjoyed legitimacy in Pakistan. Figure 2.4 shows the power structure in 1969. Comparing Figures 2.3 and 2.4 we see the direction of change in inter-elite and elite-mass relations. The constant element in Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 is the stability in the US-Pakistani Army connection.

There were a number of features in the internal setting in which the Ayub political system developed and collapsed. These reflected an ongoing power struggle at the inter-elite and the elite-mass levels of Pakistani politics and society. The features are summarized below:

1 Political action in Pakistan was/is continually dominated by a belief in a paternalistic and authoritarian tradition. This belief is widely shared by all major political groupings and political cultures in Pakistan.
Inter-elite competition and domestic alliance activities (i.e. in making, maintaining and breaking alliances) have occurred in the context of a permanent power struggle in Pakistan since 1947. There are two elements behind this struggle. First, it is embedded in a political system with a number of entrenched and competitive sub-national political cultures and associated competitive interests. Secondly, these competitions have staying power. They cannot, effectively and permanently, be mediated or settled; they can be managed or repressed on a temporary basis. In Pakistan there are no well-defined and widely accepted rules, norms or conventions of political behaviour that accommodate competing interests. Without widely accepted conceptions of ‘national’ interest, there is no alternative to a permanent power struggle in Pakistan. In these circumstances, inter-elite competition and alliance activity was/is driven by ambitions of key political personalities and institutional forces (the Pakistani Army and the Civil Service, and the US government). Their policies were/are rationalized by the requirements of external and internal security and law and order rather than by meaningful political, social and economic change in Pakistan.
3 Fears of sub-nationalist movements and majority rule (Bengali, Baluchi, Sindi, Pathan) have shaped the political ideas, alliance activity, and intervention strategies of the dominant elite groups in different periods in Pakistan’s history. The fear led members of dominant power coalitions to combine and to work against these national or sub-national movements. Pakistani Punjabis have dominated Pakistan’s politics and government; they fear majority rule and loss of political power. The key participants in inter-elite power struggles usually had a narrow political/societal base.

![Figure 2.4 1969: Structure of power that led to Ayub’s downfall](image)

Sometimes, as in the case of Z.A.Bhutto (1966–9; 1972–7), they could broaden their mass appeal by connecting themselves with a mass movement. They did not do so out of love of democracy. Rather they advocated democracy when they sensed that public opposition to the government of the day could help them gain power. However, once in power the tradition of paternalism and authoritarianism took over. The style of intervention by the group in power against others differed among different Pakistani political regimes. But paternalistic/authoritarian tradition was a constant. It shaped the inter-elite competition and alliance activity. It also required repression of Pakistani masses. In other words, the ‘mass level’ has usually functioned as an arena where inter-elite power struggles and alliance activities are carried out. Once a decision is made concerning the composition of
the dominant political coalition and the underlying interests of its members, then the mass arena is usually forgotten until the next round of the political battle. However, mass movements and urban violence, as in 1969 against the Ayub government and in 1970–1 in East Pakistan, have functioned as important catalysts in bringing Pakistani governments down. In Pakistani politics mass movements have important consequences. They radicalize inter-elite power struggles. They erode the staying power of dominant coalitions. They lead to the rise of new dominant coalitions. Mass protests and ‘nationalistic’ actions have occasionally forced or induced changed in the ‘centre’ where political power is located. But mass movements and public protest have not succeeded in eliminating the continuous power struggle at the top. Nor have they changed the structure of elite-mass relations. Thus far only one major mass movement has had a lasting impact. The Bangladeshi movement led to the separation of Bangladesh from West Pakistan. But mass movements and public protests have not usually generated political, economic, social or constitutional reform in Pakistan. At best, sub-nationalist movements and public protests have produced temporary changes in the political and constitutional arrangements in Pakistan.

The pattern and process described in this section so far was Ayub’s inheritance and his legacy. What were political ideas and internal political relations in Pakistan during the Ayub era compared to 1947–58? I distinguish between the political ideas of dominant Pakistani elites, of the US-Pakistani elites’ coalition, and those of non-governmental forces in Pakistani society. The main political ideas of the Ayub era were not novel but they were nicely packaged. A unified leadership structure and a polished Sandhurst political style, helped Ayub convey a coherence which did not exist in the 1947–58 period. Still Ayub’s regime failed. The main processes that shaped the Ayub era are summarized below.

1 Pakistani bureaucratic (civil and military) and economic elites came together during the Ayub era by forming transactional links among themselves. During the 1947–58 period the bureaucratic-military and economic elites had started to come together against ineffective politicians, against narrow-minded ethnic and religious groups, and against troublesome Bengali advocates of adult franchise and majority rule. The process of integration of political ideas among the bureaucratic, military, and economic elites started after Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination in 1951 in West Pakistan. It culminated in the Ayub era. Simultaneously the process of disintegration and polarization of political ideas between West Pakistani elites and East Pakistani masses commenced 1954 when the Muslim League lost the East Pakistan elections. It grew stronger during the Ayub era. It led to separation of East and West Pakistan shortly after Ayub lost power. The Ayub era is therefore important because it achieved political integration between Pakistan’s bureaucratic and economic elites, but it failed to do so between the elites and the masses and between West Pakistanis and East Pakistanis.

2 Transactional links between the US government and Pakistani government elites were established in the early 1950s. This was a result of the common attitudes and interests of General Ayub Khan and key elements in the US government. This combination was in place by 1954. The development of bilateral military and economic ties during the Ayub era consolidated this combination. However, the first major crack in the strategic thinking of the US and Pakistani governments also occurred in the Ayub era. The circumstances were as follows. President J.F.Kennedy sought to develop both Indian and
Pakistani military power in the aftermath of the India-China war of 1962. The Ayub government did not like the build up of Indian military power. It distanced itself from the Kennedy administration by restructuring Pakistani foreign policy towards China, the USSR and India. The public appearance of alliance—solidarity between the US government and the Ayub government—was maintained after 1962. Nevertheless, Ayub-Kennedy differences on the India and China questions had an impact on Ayub’s internal position. This crack became bigger when the US let Moscow pressure Pakistan (as well as India) into a ceasefire in the 1965 war. Ayub’s military performance in the 1965 India-Pakistan War, and his diplomatic performance concerning the Tashkent Agreement which ended this war, weakened Ayub’s internal political position. The withdrawal of US government and Pakistani Army support to Ayub Khan contributed to Ayub’s downfall in 1969.

This chapter maps this interesting pattern of disunity between Ayub Khan and the US government, and between Ayub Khan and his Pakistani associates in relation to the 1962 and 1965 crises. On the other hand, there is a parallel and continuous pattern of unity between the US government and the Pakistani Army. The disunity between Ayub and the USA set in after 1962. It contrasts with the unity between Ayub Khan and the US government from roughly 1953 to 1962. The links between the US government and Pakistani bureaucratic (civil and military) and economic elites started to take shape during the Korean war boom. Here Ayub Khan was a key player along with Ghulam Mohammed and Iskander Mirza. According to Gardezi and Rashid the October 1958 coup was instigated by Mirza and the United States was not involved. However, when Mirza was subsequently ousted the US supported his ouster and Ayub Khan’s elevation to the Presidency. Gardezi states that following the coup:

A fortnight passed before the US gained the initiative. On 24 October 1958, following a hectic four-day visit to Pakistan by US Defence Secretary McElroy, President Iskander Mirza was dismissed from office and General Ayub Khan was installed as President in his place. Ayub had never been capable of precipitating the coup on his own initiative in the first place, as subsequent myths sometimes suggest; he was Mirza’s creature. Now he became more directly a creature of his American masters. His American advisors and local officials soon went to work to devise civilian institutional foundations for his regime that took the form of the so-called ‘Basic Democracy’—the basis of the 1962 Constitution upon which the Ayub regime based itself.11

3 The pressure of non-governmental political ideas and political forces intensified during the last years of the Ayub era, especially after the India-Pakistan war (1965). This war undermined Ayub’s internal political base as well as Pakistan’s economic situation. Ayub was criticized by Bhutto, his generals, and public opinion for agreeing to the Tashkent agreement. It was widely (but erroneously) believed in Pakistan that the Army was better than India’s.12 My view is that the non-governmental ideas and forces were important but not decisive in bringing down the Ayub regime. The non-governmental actions intensified the inter-elite power struggle in the upper echelon of the Ayub government after 1962 and 1965. They intensified but they did not create the power struggle at the
The non-governmental ideas and activities were factors in, not the cause of, Ayub Khan’s political downfall. The inter-elite power struggle in the Ayub era was driven mainly by the concerns of the Pakistani Army and Z.A.Bhutto. For the former the concern was to maintain the US-Pakistan military alliance and the effectiveness of the Army in internal and external affairs. This required a sufficient level of US military aid. For Bhutto the concern was to unseat Ayub and to gain power for himself. But once the Ayub government fell and a new political power coalition emerged, the new power-players and power-brokers tried to disconnect themselves from mass politics and repress the non-governmental forces.13

The non-governmental ideas and political movements were useful in an opportunist and instrumental fashion for key participants in the inter-elite power struggle in the 1965–9 phase of the Ayub era. The motive was to organize a change in the ruling power coalition rather than to achieve meaningful domestic political, economic and social reform. Here I stress the development of a temporary political alliance between key opponents of Ayub Khan and the non-governmental forces. Secondly, I note the continuous working of a permanent political alliance between the US government and the Pakistan Army during the 1965–9 period in Pakistani elite politics. Finally, there was a third element (Z.A.Bhutto) in the inter-elite power struggle triangle. Bhutto’s role was to support Ayub during 1958–65, and then to support Ayub’s enemies during 1965–9. At the time he mobilized non-governmental agitation against Ayub, but not against the Army as an institution. From 1965 Bhutto became a collaborator of the Pakistan Army and both had a common enemy—Ayub. In this setting the non-governmental forces were used in the internal power struggle. The non-governmental forces lost their relevance after Ayub Khan was ousted from power.

The non-governmental political ideas and forces represented ethnic, regional, and ideological cleavages in Pakistani politics and society. But these forces by themselves were not able to change the structure of political, economic and military power in Pakistan during the Ayub era (or at other times). Their existence was nevertheless valuable for the opponents of the Ayub government. They were able to mobilize public opposition to the Ayub government for their own ends rather than for the good of the Pakistani public. Overall non-governmental ideas and activities in Pakistan have two possible functions: they could be a driving element behind internal reform; they are factors in regime-change but not reform. During the Ayub era the non-governmental forces fulfilled the latter function.

4 The pressure of inter-elite (Ayub, Army factions, Bhutto and politicians) competition and power struggle intensified during the last year of the Ayub era. This struggle led to Ayub’s ousting. The process leading to regime breakdown and Ayub’s ousting revealed a breakdown in the unity of Pakistan’s military high command: there was friction between President Ayub Khan and his Commander-in-Chief General Yahya Khan and between Yahya Khan and General Gul Hasan, the powerful corp commander in Multan who wanted the Commander-in-Chief post. Secondly, the process leading to regime breakdown revealed a great divide between the Pakistani Army and Bengali nationalism in East Pakistan. Z.A.Bhutto was a key contributor in the making of this great West Pakistan-East Pakistan divide because of his tactical alliance with key elements in the Pakistani Army. These elements used Bhutto and public dissent to force Ayub Khan out of power. In this inter-elite power struggle select Pakistani politicians...
were allies of military factions. It was not a ‘military’ versus ‘corrupt and ineffective politicians’ confrontation as is portrayed in the literature. The Pakistani military, and many West Pakistani politicians, shared a common fear of majority rule and free elections. This element explains the alliance between the two. As such, Ayub’s downfall and regime change did not alter the fundamental pattern of Pakistani authoritarianism and inter-elite struggle. To bring Ayub down, the intervention strategy of Ayub’s opposition (the Pakistani military and Z.A.Bhutto among others) was to play up the ‘democracy’ and ‘reforms’ cards and to radicalize politics at the mass level. But once Ayub fell and a new power structure emerged in Pakistan, then the intervention strategy of the new power grouping was to deradicalize the political processes and expectations and to revert to the traditional pattern of paternalism and authoritarianism.

THE LEGACY OF THE PAST AND THE BUILD-UP TO THE AYUB KHAN ERA

Ayub’s ideas were a build-up of the political ideas of preceding political elites in Pakistan. During 1947–58 successive Pakistani government heads—Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Ghulam Mohammed and Iskander Mirza relied on a viceregal and British colonial model of government whose main pillars were the bureaucracy, police and army. Ayub was a part of this approach. He belonged to Pakistan’s policy establishment since his emergence on the policy ladder as Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan’s armed forces (1951) and subsequently as Defence Minister (1954 onwards till he overthrew Iskander Mirza in October 1958). The period 1947–58 was formative in Pakistani political history as well as in the development of Ayub’s political approach. The Ayub coup in October 1958 was the result of the bureaucratic elite’s political thinking, oligarchic interests and transactional links (internal power relations) that started to percolate in the 1947–58 period. The Ayub coup did not mark a break with the past. It crystallized a trend from the past.

General Pakistani elite ideas

The Pakistani establishment’s political ideas concerning the 1947–58 period served as the intellectual foundation of the Ayub era as well.

These are summed up as follows:

1 Pakistan could not afford the luxury of an official opposition party or movement because of external and internal security threats to Pakistan.
2 The Western democratic model was not suitable for Pakistan, i.e. direct elections, adult franchise, and majority rule did not suit Pakistani requirements.
3 Pakistani politicians were corrupt, inefficient, ineffective and opportunistic. They preferred to align themselves with the bureaucracy rather than to seek free elections to test their power and their policies. Through political alignment with the bureaucracy the Pakistani politicians kept their power and their privileges.
4 Islam had a limited place in Pakistan’s constitutional arrangements and in the actual political norms, procedures and processes of the state.
5 Ethnicity and regionalism were Pakistan’s main internal problems, but power-sharing between centre and the provinces was not an acceptable political alternative.
6 Communism and socialism were bad for Pakistan.
7 Capitalism was good for Pakistan.
8 India and the USSR were the main threats to Pakistan’s security.
9 Paternalism and authoritarianism in Pakistani politics were consistent with Pakistani social traditions.

US influences

When the US government developed an alliance with Pakistan in the early 1950s it also developed an alliance with Pakistani civil and military bureaucratic elites. The US government did not explicitly endorse the entire cluster of political ideas noted above, but by publicly supporting ideas 6, 7 and 8 it influenced the internal political debate in Pakistan. By tilting towards Pakistan’s civil and military bureaucratic elites the US government interfered with the natural evolution of the internal power struggle in Pakistan and internal constitutional and political debates. Here the US government was not the cause of internal intellectual and political divisions in Pakistan. But it became a major factor that inhibited the intellectual and political advancement of Pakistan. Its tilt towards a particular power grouping and a particular approach to politics and foreign policy in Pakistan changed the internal balance of power at the critical juncture in Pakistan’s history. Here the US seduced the Pakistani bureaucracies into an alliance relationship. This combination of US-Pakistani elites hijacked the State of Pakistan to serve the respective interests of the alliance partners.

What were the ideas of the US government in the early 1950s which strengthened the internal power position of the Pakistani Army and the civil bureaucracy, and which also strengthened the hand of the West Pakistani elites in relation to East Pakistani non-governmental groups? These may be summed up as follows:

1. The US should try to remove the danger of an India-Pakistan war.
2. The US should try to obtain air bases in Pakistan which were near Soviet targets.
3. The US should provide military aid to Pakistan to reduce the disparity of strength between India and Pakistan and to reduce Pakistani concerns about Indian threat.
4. The US should equip and build Pakistani military forces to aid Western military effort in a war.
5. The US should encourage relations with Turkey and Iran to pave the way for Pakistani membership in a military pact with these countries.

This was the US government’s wish list in October 1951. There was also a belief in the Truman administration that the Liaquat Ali Khan government was not inclined or able to meet the US requirements. Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated on 18 October 1951. Pakistan’s tilt towards the US government was executed by the Ghulam Mohammed, Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan oligarchy, i.e. it was a post-Liaquat Ali Khan phenomenon. The US government’s tilt towards Pakistan was in favour of this group. Here the US government’s political ideas and policy emphasized military security. This aided the ascendancy and the political ideas of the bureaucratic oligarchy of Pakistan after Liaquat Ali Khan’s demise.
This initial set of US government ideas reflected the influence of Sir Olaf Caroe’s thinking on the US government as well as its cold war preoccupations. As well, it reflects an enduring political culture in the US that stresses the utility of local pawns in the great power game between the superpowers. This culture overestimates the USA’s ability to manipulate regional power relations and it underestimates the power of local/regional nationalism. The intellectual rationale of the USA’s and Caroe’s Pakistan policy is ably discussed by Selig Harrison and it may be summed up as follows:\textsuperscript{16}

1. India had been the strategic base in Allied movements in the Middle East during the Second World War.
2. After the withdrawal of British power from the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan had succeeded to British India’s strategic and oil security responsibility in the Gulf area.
3. Something had to be done to fill the power vacuum after the withdrawal of British power and to guard against the Soviet threat.
4. In relation to the above considerations India was on the periphery of Middle East defence but Pakistan was within it and hence it was the more important.
5. An accord between Gulf Muslim states and the Western powers was needed and in this context Pakistani bases were important for Western security.
6. Neutralism was bad for the West.
7. The US-Pakistan alliance was valuable as ‘counter-force’ against Nehru’s and Indian neutralism.
8. It was not in the best interest of the free world to have India as the only strong nation in the area.
9. Use of Pakistani military forces against Soviet and Chinese aggression would cost the American taxpayers less than the costs of sending in American troops.

These ideas provided the intellectual and policy context in which Pakistani diplomacy flourished. These ideas were consistent with Jinnah’s and Liaquat Ali Khan’s thinking, but the US government did not respond to Pakistani strategic ideas up to October 1951. The build up of the Pakistani-American connection under Caroe’s influence strengthened the place of the pro-US civil and military bureaucracy in Pakistan and of Pakistan in US Middle East and South Asia policy. Up to October 1951 there had been a power struggle between two tendencies in Pakistani social and political thinking. In the absence of a mediator or balancer this struggle remained inconclusive; and the internal political situation was unstable. The entry of the US government into the Pakistani scene was important because it enabled it to play the role of a balancer on the side of its Pakistani bureaucratic and Army clients and friends.

Non-governmental ideas

By tilting towards its bureaucratic and military clients/friends in Pakistan, the US settled the internal Pakistani debate. The politicians and the people advocating democracy and provincial autonomy lost the argument in the 1950s but their ideas remained a part of Pakistan’s political and social fabric. These ideas may be summarized as follows:

1. Pakistan needed political parties and politicians for its nation-building and political development.
2. Pakistan should have an Islamic political system as well as an Islamic society.
3 Provincial autonomy was desirable to accommodate competing ethnic and regional political and economic demands. The internal difficulties of Pakistan required more democracy and less internal repression by the Pakistani Army.

4 Pakistan requires some sort of socialism to address the problem of its poverty and to attract foreign aid from the Soviet Union for its public sector’s development.

5 Private capitalism in Pakistan should be curbed because it led to bureaucratic corruption and the neglect of Pakistan’s poor.

From October 1951, the non-governmental ideas were subordinated in Pakistani political affairs. In this framework Ayub built his political system. But the struggle between the bureaucratic elite’s political ideas and those of the non-governmental groups did not cease either in East or in West Pakistan. What were the competing political ideas in Ayub’s era? What were the competing intervention strategies of the key players of the Ayub era? What were the key power relationships of the Ayub era? To these questions I now turn.

THE AYUB KHAN ERA: EVENTS, IDEAS, INTERVENTION STRATEGY AND POWER RELATIONS OF DIFFERENT PLAYERS

The Ayub era started to emerge in the early 1950s. There was a pattern of involvement by the Pakistani Army and General Ayub Khan in key Pakistan government decisions since the early 1950s. Chapter 1 reveals the influence of the Army and Ayub in Pakistan’s political and military affairs before 1958. Building on this pattern Ayub acquired formal power in the 1958 military coup. Ayub Khan’s dream to have a presidential type of political system in Pakistan was outlined in his memorandum in 1954. This dream became reality in 1962 when a presidential type of government and Constitution was established in Pakistan. The Ayub era demonstrated that the Pakistani Army and civil service had no meaningful plan to address the economic and other issues of the Bengalis in East Pakistan. The latter problems emerged in 1954 and crystallized in 1966 when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman publicly outlined his six points demand for provincial autonomy.

Ayub Khan’s Western admirers regard his approach to politics and economics as pragmatic and modern. My contention is that what was the high point of the Ayub regime in Western eyes (with its political stability, its economic growth, and its attractive pro-Western foreign and military policy) was also the beginning of the end. The Ayub era makes an exciting case study where the twin processes of ‘regime-formation’ and ‘regime-decay’ are in simultaneous play.

The Pakistani Army-US government combination shaped the internal power struggle within the Pakistani oligarchy; it led to Ayub’s rise. This combination shaped the attitudes and policies of the civil and military oligarchy towards the Pakistani masses; it led to regime-making in Pakistan. On the other hand, military crises in the subcontinent in 1962 and 1965, and the reactions of the US government to Ayub Khan’s attitudes and policies concerning these crises, contributed to Ayub’s downfall. Here the US factor contributed to Ayub’s ascendancy in Pakistani politics as well as to his downfall.
During the Ayub era, the dominant political players were Ayub Khan, the Pakistani Army, the civil servants of Pakistan and of course, the US government. The subordinate players consisted of the political opposition in Pakistan and the disenfranchised and marginalized sectors of Pakistani politics. The former constituted the ‘centre’ of the political system; the latter constituted the periphery. Up to early 1969 the ‘centre’ controlled Pakistani political, economic and military affairs. After March 1969, however, the ‘periphery’ became ascendant in internal political affairs in Pakistan. As a result of deep divisions in the ‘centre’ as expressed by the Ayub-Bhutto, Ayub-US government, and Ayub-Yahya rivalries, the fortunes of Ayub Khan changed from success before March 1969 to failure after March 1969. At this critical juncture the internal weight in Pakistani politics of the Pakistani Army (other than Ayub) and of the US government remained unchanged. They were the permanently operating factors before and after March 1969.

The key variables that led to a shift in the process from regime-making to regime decay and eventually Ayub’s downfall were: the withdrawal of US government and Pakistani military high command support to Ayub; the radicalization of Pakistani politics at the mass level after 1965 by Bhutto; and a shift in the allegiance of Pakistani politicians from Ayub Khan to the Pakistani Army and to Bhutto. The last point reveals the enduring distinction between ‘service’ and ‘allegiance’ in traditional Muslim administration. In Muslim political thought, ‘service’ to the patron is more important than allegiance. When a power structure changes the importance of ‘service’ permits, indeed requires, a shift in allegiance to the new political master.

What were the political ideas that lay behind Ayub Khan’s approach to politics? These are summarized below:

1 ‘We cannot yet accept universal franchise but the people must be involved in state affairs.’
2 The people would choose an electoral college which would elect legislatures, local government and Pakistan’s president. This was known as the system of ‘basic democrats’ (BD). Here the BDs were meant to function as political buffers between the President and the people. They were to be the eyes and ears of the President as well as a transmission belt between the top and the bottom of the political system. The main idea was to build a democratic system from the top.
3 Because of ethnicity and parochialism in Pakistani society, a strong leader at the top was needed. A strong central government was a must. Such a government was the regulator and the pillar of the body politic. A parliamentary government was ‘out’ said Ayub ‘once and for all times’. The Pakistani president must have wide powers, more than the US president, including the power to appoint and to dismiss provincial governors. The Presidential writ ‘must prevail in the provinces’ said Ayub.
4 There was no need for provincial legislature but a national legislature (not based on adult franchise) and a Cabinet (but not drawn from the legislature) were acceptable to Ayub. (By 1962, because of internal pressures, provincial legislatures were accepted but they were not given any independent authority.)
5 Modern Islam as expressed by educated men—drawn from science, history, economics and foreign affairs—and nationalism ought to be the basis of Pakistan’s Islamic Constitution, said Ayub.
6 Political parties had no place in Pakistani political life in the 1962 (Ayub’s) Constitution. (However, in July 1962 in response to internal pressure the Political Parties Act legalized the formation of political parties and their participation in elections.)

7 In Ayub’s system, people had fundamental rights but these could not be challenged in a court. (In the First Amendment Act of 1963 however, fundamental rights were made enforceable by Pakistani courts.)

These ideas enjoyed a consensus in the Ayub government, but there were also important differences in establishment thinking. For instance, the Constitution Commission in May 1961 recommended that franchise should be restricted but that there should be direct elections for central and provincial legislatures and for election of the President by the electoral college.

More significant than the limited in-house differences was the competition between the Ayub approach to politics and the non-governmental/periphery’s political ideas. The latter had a triple thrust:

1 There should be direct elections for the Pakistani presidency. This was the view of Miss Fatima Jinnah (the sister of M.A.Jinnah) and the opposition parties.
2 The 1962 Constitution lacked popular consensus.
3 There was a need to recognize provincial autonomy to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the people. This was the demand of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of East Pakistan.

These ideas revealed the internal political tensions and competing interests of the bureaucratic/Ayub group (the ‘in-group’) and the non-governmental ‘out-groups.’ The ideas of the ‘in-group’ reflected the civil and military bureaucracy’s interest in maintaining its pre-eminent or hegemonic position in Pakistan’s political system. Secondly, they reflected the US government’s interest to maintain the Pakistani civil and military bureaucracy as a friendly ally and client in power so that US strategic interests in the region were served. Out of these ideas came Ayub’s intervention strategy in Pakistani affairs. The objectives were to preserve the interests of the ruling political oligarchy and to manage internal problems. By examining the main events and the intervention strategy we can get a sense of the dynamics of the Ayub era. During this era four such strategies were in play:

1 By Ayub government in Pakistan’s internal and external affairs (Table 2.2).
2 By the US government against Ayub in the 1960s (Table 2.3.)
3 By the Pakistani Army-Bhutto alliance against Ayub, 1965–9 (Table 2.4).
4 By Ayub against his internal opposition, February–March 1969 (Table 2.5).

In Pakistani politics there are few permanent legal, constitutional, institutional or societal restraints against elitist, authoritarian or paternalistic decision-making. This is for two reasons. On the one hand there are no major barriers to elitist actions and regime-making if the power structure at the top of the government is unified and if inner-elite power struggle is absent or minimal. On the other hand, if the inner-elite power struggle is active, and if street level politics are radicalized, then there are no self-correct mechanisms or buffers or shock absorbers in the Pakistani political system. The contrast is with India. There a free press and an active public opinion, continuous inner bureaucratic debates and power struggles among political leaders and political parties,
electoral politics and parliamentary debates, function as multiple centres of internal pressure against defective decision-making and personal aggrandizement. In India’s case mass politics provide a continuous feedback and insurance that political leaders do not suffer from the danger of a narrow power/political base. In Pakistan’s history there has been no such insurance. There is no systematic way in Pakistan to provide warning shots that help avoid regime breakdown.

Two political traditions are in play in Pakistan’s case: paternalism and authoritarianism, and service to the ruling authority. That is, allegiances are temporary in nature and patron-client relations change in response to changes in the power structure at the centre.

In the Ayub era two patterns of inter-elite and elite-mass behaviour were in play.

First, up to March 1969 there was unity in the power structure. The absence of internal restraints favoured regime-making. Here Pakistani society was vulnerable to the elites’ intervention strategies that transferred power resources and privilege to the top oligarchy and not to the regions and the masses. Here intervention of the oligarchic power structure was to exploit the rivalries among opposing forces and interests within Pakistan. The objectives were to neutralize them, disorient them, placate them, co-opt them, repress them or to leave them dormant. Here the entire power and force of the state apparatus was behind the oligarchic (unified) power structure. These intervention strategies were directed against the ‘out-groups’ within Pakistan. These strategies involve the use of information (propaganda), military action (internal security), defence preparation and war (external security), economic development/growth (rewarding the rich and exploiting the poor), political reform (to create rules and institutions that aided the interests of the oligarchic power structure), and so on. Here the ‘out-groups’ were the targets of the actions of the ‘in-group’.

Second, however, when a power struggle emerged within the oligarchic power structure in Pakistan in March 1969, then actions in the divided elite structure fanned societal tensions to their own ends. Bhutto’s activities, after he left the Ayub government in 1966, should be studied in this light. His motives were power aggrandizement and the desire to bring Ayub Khan down. His method was to publicly promote disaffection for Ayub Khan and to align with Pakistani Army officers who opposed Ayub’s foreign policy and internal politics. Such cracks in the power structure developed in 1966–9. Without an internal feedback mechanism to provide the warnings and without an internal constitutional mechanism to provide a legitimate avenue for political dissent, public discontent of Ayub’s foreign and economic policies was expressed by extra-constitutional means. The two combined to break the Ayub regime. Here one side in the inner-elite power struggle developed a strategy to radicalize Pakistani politics. But the aim was not to achieve meaningful domestic economic and social reform. Rather it was to restructure the oligarchic power structure, to bring down Ayub and to bring up another regime. The target of the intervention strategy was the ‘other side’ in the power struggle. The method was to mobilize public opinion. Here the latent societal tensions and demands in Pakistani society were radicalized by inner-elite factional activity. But once a new power structure was formed, the social demands were deradicalized by a combination of a repressive and a co-optive strategy.

In the Ayub era there were four sets of key political players. The first set consisted of Ayub, the Pakistani Army, Pakistan’s civil servants, and the US government. The second
set consisted of the US government. The third set consisted of Z.A.Bhutto, Pakistani Army generals and some civil servants of Pakistan. The fourth set consisted of Ayub alone. The relationship between key events and the activities (intervention strategies) of the players in each set are outlined in Tables 2.2 to 2.5.

In these tables lies a story of volatile power relations within Pakistan under Ayub. There is a story of continuous intra-state political intervention which was dominated by inter-elite power struggles involving individual and institutional forces in Pakistan as well as the US government. There is a story of elite-mass interaction in the form of street agitation, Bengali revolt, demands for democracy and so on. But it is not a story of the development of a positive, mutually beneficial transactional or exchange relationship without coercion between the elite and the masses. Rather the story indicates that the primary transactions within Pakistan during the Ayub era were horizontal rather than vertical. Figure 2.3 explains the pattern of distribution of political and economic power. It indicates indifference to power and resource-sharing between the elites and the masses; and there is intervention from the top to the bottom when the top of the policy and the power pyramid was united. However, Figure 2.4 shows the relevance of the societal base of Pakistan’s political system when the top of the policy and power pyramid is fractured or divided. The critical variable in the two figures is the level of unity/disunity in the elite power structure. The greater the unity, the less was the opportunity and the necessity for the elite to radicalize mass politics; conversely, the greater the elite disunity, the greater was the opportunity and the necessity for the dissatisfied segment of the elite to radicalize Pakistani mass politics. Figure 2.3 refers to Table 2.2. In my judgement Table 2.3 paved the way for Figure 2.4. Table 2.4 refers to Figure 2.4. Table 2.5 refers to Ayub’s attempt to save himself and his regime. Figure 2.3 continued to function as the framework for Pakistani politics under Yahya Khan (March 1969 to December 1971) and is discussed in the next chapter.

Table 2.2 Ayub regime’s intervention strategies, 1958–66

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Intervention strategy</th>
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<tr>
<td>June 1958</td>
<td>Martial law is declared in Pakistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 October 1958</td>
<td>Governor-General Mirza abrogated the Constitution and appointed Ayub as martial law administrator and supreme military commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1958</td>
<td>In late October 1958 Ayub overthrew Mirza and exiled him. In taking power Ayub banned political parties, outlawed politics, started action against corruption, smuggling, black marketeering and hoarding. He also appointed commissions to reform landholdings, education, health and legal affairs in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1959</td>
<td>Ayub publicized outline of Pakistan’s future constitutional and political arrangements. Its main principles were: (a) no universal franchise; (b) basic democrats were to be the link between the top whose writ would run throughout the country.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the President and the people to convey the government’s gospel to the people and to convey people’s feelings to the government, (c) basic democracy was to be the unit of local self-government and the pillar of democracy in Pakistan.

1958
Ayub publicized plans for Pakistan’s economic development

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Intervention strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960 Constitution Commission was appointed to debate the form of Pakistan’s political system</td>
<td>Ayub’s preference to have a presidential form of government with a style of benevolent paternalism was well known, dating back to his 1954 memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 Indus Waters treaty between India and Pakistan is signed</td>
<td>The strategy was to seek a negotiated settlement with India in an issue that affected Pakistan’s vital economic interests. The approach here stressed negotiation, bilateralism and third party participation not harmful intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 Ayub opened negotiations with China to settle its border question</td>
<td>The strategy was to seek a negotiated settlement with China, to unify the China-Pakistan diplomatic front, to put diplomatic pressure on India in the Kashmir issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1961 The Constitution Commission recommended restricted franchise for direct elections to central and provincial legislatures and Presidential elections through an electoral college</td>
<td>Ayub rejected all the recommendations. The strategy was to show his imperial conception of Pakistan’s presidency and his imperial style of work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1962 Ayub was elected as Pakistan’s President for three years. This election involved only the basic democrats functioning as the electoral college</td>
<td>This election was consistent with Ayub’s strategy to have an Ayub-centred political system and the strategy was also to have the fig leaf of an election</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| June 1962 Pakistan’s new Constitution was formed | The Constitution established a presidential system as per Ayub’s requirements. The President was independent of the judiciary. Political parties were not recognized. The President had total powers over the provinces. Unlike the 1956 Constitution (which referred to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan), the 1962
Constitution was simply the Republic of Pakistan. The strategy here was to diminish the place of Islam in Pakistani political and constitutional arrangements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Intervention strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1962</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student disturbances broke out in East Pakistan</td>
<td>Ayub’s strategy was to use force for internal pacification (internal security) rather than to have political negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>June 1962</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengali leaders criticized the new Pakistan Constitution because it lacked public support and consensus</td>
<td>Ayub’s strategy was to ignore the Bengali criticism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>July 1962</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayub allows the formation of political parties</td>
<td>The strategy was to build Ayub’s democratic credentials and to develop his own political party so as to direct his loyalists and to give himself a political platform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>October 1962</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-China war occurs</td>
<td>Ayub plays his China card by declaring India the aggressor and by not supporting President Kennedy’s desire to build up India and Pakistan militarily as a common front against China. Ayub also played his Kashmir card by insisting on Kashmir settlement as the basis of an India-Pakistan accord. The strategy was to put pressure on India and the US, to develop the China connection, and to distance Pakistan from the US in diplomatic and military affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>May 1963</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Muslim League was divided into the Ayub faction (Convention Muslim League) and the Council Muslim League (the old party)</td>
<td>The strategy was to enhance Ayub’s internal political profile and improve party work. This was in the framework of the basic democrats system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1963</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A constitutional amendment restored the name of the Islamic Republic and the Islamic features of the 1956</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Intervention strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1964</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayub prepared to have Presidential elections in 1965 by using the basic democrats as the electoral college</td>
<td>The strategy was to rely on political means rather than martial law to stay in power, but to rely on a narrow political base of the basic democrats rather than free, public and national elections with political parties and mass politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>January 1965</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayub contested the Presidential election against Fatima Jinnah, the sister of the founding father of Pakistan. Miss Jinnah wanted direct elections, as did the</td>
<td>Ayub’s strategy was to have a highly controlled election</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
opposition groups in Pakistan. Ayub won 65% of the BD votes; Miss Jinnah won 35%.

1965

India-Pakistan war occurs

Under the influence of his advisers, including Z.A. Bhutto, Ayub decided to play his military card in Kashmir. The strategy was to use the military option, as Kashmir’s liberation through US/UK/UN intervention was unlikely and Indian rearmament was reducing Pakistan’s margin of superiority in armour and aircraft.

January 1966

Tashkent mediation took place under USSR auspices

Having lost the war Ayub’s strategy was to recover his territorial losses through Soviet mediation and to re-establish his credentials as a statesman.

1966

Sheikh M. Rahman announced his six points for provincial autonomy

Ayub rejected this approach, seeking instead his preferred model of a strong centre. His strategy was not to open lines of communication with the provincial opposition groups.


Table 2.3 The US government’s intervention strategies, 1959–68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Intervention strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1959 US cut foreign aid to Pakistan</td>
<td>The US signalled its displeasure of Pakistan through its aid diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 Pakistan-China start to negotiate border agreement</td>
<td>The US reacted negatively to this and began to withdraw diplomatic support from Ayub regime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1962 India-China border war occurred. Ayub refused President Kennedy’s plea to cooperate with India against China. This created a strain in Ayub-Kennedy relations. Ayub refused to accept the Kennedy administration view that China was a threat to India. The US gave arms to India for use against China. This irritated Ayub and Pakistani elites. The apparent difference in approach between Ayub and Kennedy revealed a major fracture in the relationship. It undermined Ayub’s internal political prestige and gave an incentive to Ayub’s opposition to challenge Ayub’s political authority | Same as above  
The US build up Pakistan’s main enemy militarily and by revealing a different threat-perception than Ayub’s emphasis on the India threat, the US undermined Ayub’s authority in Pakistani politics and foreign affairs |
India-Pakistan war took place. The US embargoed arms supplies to Pakistan and India, hurting Pakistan more because of its greater dependence on US arms. US actions showed that the US government had distanced itself from the Ayub regime in the critical foreign affairs and military field. This signalled US displeasure with Ayub.

1966
Tashkent mediation took place under Soviet auspices and American support
This superpowers’ diplomatic intervention injured Ayub’s diplomatic strategy. Because Ayub returned territory to India (as India did to Pakistan) it unleashed Bhutto’s and the Pakistani Army’s opposition to Ayub’s ‘surrender’ at Tashkent of the sacrifices of Pakistani soldiers on the battlefield. Here Tashkent had domestic repercussions for Ayub.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Intervention strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1968</td>
<td>This event reinforced the US strategy to progressively write off Ayub as a force in Pakistani and South Asian affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayub had a heart attack. This created a power vacuum at the top. General Yahya Khan cordoned off Ayub’s house and set up his command post there. This was an unofficial coup d’état. It indicated that Ayub was not physically fit to stand the strain of the 1969–70 elections.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1968</td>
<td>Here Ayub distanced himself from the US government and revealed his anti-Americanism. The US strategy was to continue to distance itself from Ayub and to write him off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayub terminated the US lease on the Peshawar communications base. This decision surprised the US administration.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayub decided to build the Singkiang road. This annoyed the US government and Pakistani Army engineers. In his book <em>Friends Not Masters</em> (1968) Ayub declared that he wanted the US as friend, not as master. The implication annoyed the US.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The years 1959–62 were a turning point in Ayub-US government relations. The US government started to distance itself from Ayub in the foreign policy and military spheres. The Kennedy administration did not like Ayub’s semi-independent stance in his China policy. Ayub started China-Pakistan border talks and developed other links in bilateral relations. He opposed US arms to India against China and saw India, not China, as the threat. The Kennedy government did not appreciate Ayub’s general foreign policy orientation. Ayub wanted friends, not masters. He wanted to develop bilateral ties with the Communist states as well as with the West. US-Ayub foreign policy differences led to reduced US military and economic aid to Pakistan. This alienated or weakened the Pakistani Army’s support for Ayub because it was not getting the arms and benefits as a result of Ayub-US differences. The Kennedy administration’s displeasure with Ayub led to reduced aid.
Table 2.4 The intervention strategies of Z.A.Bhutto and the Pakistani Army, 1965–March 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Intervention strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1965                                                                  | Bhutto started a rumour that the Tashkent agreement had secret clauses and he would reveal the truth at the right time  

Bhutto and Pakistani Army generals started the rumour that Ayub did not stand up to Indian Prime Minister Shastri at Tashkent  
Pakistani Army generals started the rumour that the Army high command had a masterly plan for a long-term war with India but Ayub had lost his nerve  
Through these rumours the strategy was to disorient Pakistani public opinion, to fan nationalism and to foment disaffection for Ayub |
| 1966                                                                  | This plan put tremendous internal political pressure on the Ayub government and on West Pakistan’s polity. Here the strategy was to increase the West Pakistan-East Pakistan divide with the aim of shaping the bargaining situation between the two wings of Pakistan. At this point the strategy was not to secede from West Pakistan as that would mean a loss of opportunity for East Pakistani politicians to extract concessions from West Pakistan |
| 1967                                                                  | The strategy was to create a political opposition to the Ayub regime and to radicalize Pakistani public opinion. This alternative was meant to play on the Pakistani Army’s fear of a Bengali majority, and its fear of national and free elections |
| January 1968                                                          | The Bhutto-Pakistani Army strategy was to create an alternative to the Ayub regime and to build on the opportunity provided by Ayub’s health problems and the certainty that he could no longer manage the strain of a new election and another term for himself as President |
| November 1968                                                        | The strategy was to create conditions of public dissatisfaction with the Ayub regime and a breakdown in internal law and order or internal security. Here the aim was to radicalize the masses and create internal volatility so as to facilitate a return to martial law or a new political regime |
| January-February 1969                                                | Yahya Khan employed multiple strategies against Ayub.  

1 The Army was not ordered to stop the political agitation; it was allowed to become a festering sore.  
2 Yahya refused to put a few towns under martial law to diffuse the situation. He took a position against partial martial law. |
3 Yahya urged Ayub to go through the political process; this fanned the political opposition. 
4 Yahya persuaded Ayub’s ministers to take a position against partial martial law although there was a precedent to use partial martial law to dampen political agitation. The effect of these components in Yahya’s strategy was to isolate Ayub at this critical point in his career and to form a de facto coalition between Yahya and other army generals, Ayub’s ministers and Z.A. Bhutto against Ayub

1968

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested with junior army, airforce and naval officers for conspiracy to organize East Pakistani secession from Pakistan. This was known as the Agartala Conspiracy Case which was subsequently abandoned

Yahya insisted that Mujib should be shown as the main accused in this case. Ayub and his civil advisers did not like Yahya’s approach and deleted Mujib’s name from the list of main accused. Yahya restored the name. This radicalized Bengali

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Intervention strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>opposition to the Ayub regime and to West Pakistan and it contributed to popular opposition to Ayub. Here the Pakistani Army watched the show and did not aid civil authority to restore public order. Here Yahya’s strategy was to stoke the political fires and to watch an emerging drama. Here the Pakistani Army under Yahya (the Commander-in-Chief) sabotaged the Pakistani government of Ayub by encouraging political instability, by allowing it to continue and thereby encouraging the demoralization of the Ayub regime and an erosion of its public image. Here the Yahya group was distancing itself from the Ayub regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Here the Bhutto-Army strategy was to encourage the radicalization of mass politics and to use the maligned politicians for their own ends to bring down Ayub and to gain power for a new coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1969</td>
<td>Pakistani politicians declared themselves to favour direct elections, adult franchise, parliamentary government, the lifting of the state of emergency, the release of students, the lifting of restrictions on political activity, the release of Sheikh M. Rahman, and the dissolution of One Unit and provincial autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–21 March 1969</td>
<td>Yahya told Ayub that the Army was getting impatient and a delay in the imposition of a full martial law could lead to a military coup by a ‘madcap’. Yahya said that there was no law and order in East Pakistan and in Sind. Yahya told Ayub and his advisers that without immediate martial law the integrity of the armed forces was in danger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Here the Yahya strategy was to bring the Pakistani Army into the centre of the political process through the removal of Ayub and through the declaration of a full martial law. Another element in the strategy was to avoid a national election which would imply a return of the Army to the barracks and a loss of political power. Yahya’s thinking was apparently similar to that of Mirza in 1958 which led to the Ayub</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
coup in October 1958


### Table 2.5 Ayub’s intervention strategy against his opposition, February–March 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Intervention strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>January 1969</em></td>
<td>Political agitation against the Ayub regime was in full swing. (see Table 2.4 for details)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5–10 <em>February 1969</em></td>
<td>Ayub established the Round Table meeting with politicians to discuss issues of direct elections, adult franchise, parliamentary government, and to lift the state of emergency which had been in force since the 1965 India-Pakistan war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>12 February 1969</em></td>
<td>Ayub wanted partial military law which he thought would avoid civil war, avoid the abandonment of One Unit, avoid provincial autonomy and eventual provincial independence, and avoid a loose federation between West and East Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>21 February 1969</em></td>
<td>Ayub announced his withdrawal from politics and his decision not to seek re-election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>20 March 1969</em></td>
<td>Ayub asked Yahya Khan to establish full martial law in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>25 March 1969</em></td>
<td>Ayub resigned his office, handing power over to Yahya Khan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: A. Gauhar, ‘Pakistan: Ayub Khan’s Abdication’, *Third World Quarterly* 7:1, Jan. 1985

which in turn led to the erosion of Pakistani Army support for Ayub; and the Ayub regime depended primarily on Pakistani Army support. The cracks in the Ayub system surfaced in 1965. The 1965 war between India and Pakistan and the 1966 Tashkent agreement were the great divides in the Ayub-Army and Ayub-Bhutto power relations.
Power struggles are constants in Pakistani elite politics. In the ambitions of the key elite players, and in their competing political ideas and interests, lie the causes of internal power struggle. Yet the foreign policy dimension is crucial. The availability of external political support and foreign aid can temporarily bridge internal dissent through the development of temporary winning coalitions. But when the external support softens, it invariably loosens the cement which holds together the internal power coalition. The premise is that external intervention of this kind is able to temporarily adjust competing internal (Pakistani) interests. But when the external support is withdrawn, the holding cement begins to crumble and the bricks in the wall begin to dislocate. In this sense 1965–6 was the great divide in the internal politics of the Ayub era. Finally, 1968 was a turning point because Ayub’s heart attack sapped his health and his political will. Health problems of leaders are a critical variable in societies where politics are dominated by a single powerful personality and where political institutions and conventions are ad hoc and arbitrary.

ASSESSING THE AYUB KHAN ERA

A few observations will sum up the Ayub era. Ayub’s political experiment with Basic Democracy and the economic modernization programme was widely applauded in American circles, but as the tables show, it obscured a significant reality: Ayub’s high point was also the beginning of the end of the Ayub era. This means that the process of regime-making and regime-maintenance should be studied in the present case simultaneously with the process of regime decay. In studying regime development and regime decay I stress the central place of a surreptitious and a permanent patron-client link between the US government and the Pakistani Army. The vitality of this link is revealed by the size of the US aid package to Pakistan. This is the barometer. This link defines a critical system boundary of Pakistani politics and Pakistani foreign affairs. Ayub fell because he wanted the USA to be a friend and not a master.

Ayub’s vacillation between democracy and martial law led to his fall, according to A.Gauhar.22 I see Gauhar’s explanation as an immediate cause, but there was more to Ayub’s failure than Ayub’s vacillation. Ayub’s search for friends, not masters, showed him to be an unreliable ally to his US masters. A comparison between US-Ayub, US-Yahya, US-Bhutto relations is revealing. Yahya Khan respected the US-Pakistan ‘red lines’. He was a part of the ‘in group’. He failed because he did not have a strategy to manage the Indians and Bengalis. Yahya and his advisers did not fall foul of the US government. The USA did not fault Yahya because it also lacked a strategy to contain Indira Gandhi and the Bangladeshis. Yahya Khan failed but he followed the US-Pakistan rules. He failed because his rule book did not provide for a political method to manage the Indians and the Bengalis and the military method did not work. Yahya’s successor, Z.A.Bhutto on the other hand tried to change the rules to his own advantage but he too ran foul of the rules of the Pakistani Army-US government oligarchy. Bhutto used populist slogans and political causes to mobilize the masses. These masked his search for a Bhutto-centric power structure. Ayub and Bhutto, in different ways, tried to change the system boundaries by their political and foreign policy experiments. Both lost.
The discussion indicates a need to go beyond the standard justification of Pakistani scholars concerning military intervention in Pakistan’s politics.

According to Fazal Muqeem Khan the ‘failure’ of political leaders in the 1950s led to Pakistan’s military intervention in Pakistani politics. He maintains that the political situation ‘forced’ the Pakistani military into a position of (political) authority.\(^{23}\) I do not accept this premise for two reasons: First, the interests of the civil-military bureaucratic oligarchy that emerged in Pakistan by October 1951 dictated continuous bureaucratic-military intervention in constitutional and political arrangements in Pakistan. Pakistan has been mostly under Army rule for this reason.\(^{24}\) Secondly, in the 1951–3 period the Pakistani government was engaged in two major issues in Pakistan’s external affairs: India-Pakistan negotiations concerning the future of Kashmir, and US-Pakistan negotiations concerning a military security relationship. From 1953 to 1954 the Indian and Pakistani governments appeared to be on the verge of a Kashmir agreement.\(^{25}\) This would have eliminated the central cause of India-Pakistan tensions in Pakistani thinking. It would have made an external patron (US)-client (Pakistan) relationship unnecessary. Just as the probability of a Kashmir settlement crystallized, the interests of the foreign-linked domestic power group prevailed with a policy that gave prominence to US alliance ties rather than to a Kashmir settlement. Here the Pakistani military was tempted by the fruits of the military alliance with the USA. Here external affairs and external opportunities to act induced the Pakistani military and its civilian cohorts to act in a particular way. Here a volatile political situation was a secondary (but not unimportant) element.

The external setting was the arena of policy action. The driving element was the interest of the civil-military bureaucratic power structure to consolidate and expand its power. These were the driving forces behind military intervention in politics. Thus, I reject Fazal Muqeem Khan’s view that failure of Pakistani politicians was the cause; and that the cause produced the effect of military intervention in Pakistan’s politics. This is linear and simplistic. My discussion implies that Pakistani politicians are a much maligned factor in Pakistan’s political history. In any case they are a peripheral element in a scenario where Pakistani and US oligarchic interests combine in strategic affairs and continually affect Pakistan’s internal political arrangements.

Rizvi too asserts a relationship between the failure of democracy in Pakistan and the rise of the military as the (dominant) political organization in the state of Pakistan. If Rizvi is right the implication is that the Pakistani military intervened in politics after democracy failed in Pakistan. Yet there is an alternative explanation: democracy failed in Pakistan because the civil-military bureaucratic coalition had its own ambitions and strategic, economic and political agenda which had the support of its US patron.

Rizvi maintains that the Pakistani military ‘slowly’ became an important factor in Pakistani decision-making. This is true up to October 1958 when the pattern and process of Pakistani military involvement in Pakistan’s internal-political and external-diplomatic and military affairs was both secretive and incremental. But after Ayub’s coup in 1958 it became both public and quick. Rizvi maintains that the Ayub coup did not change any (policy or political) assumption or objective of pre-Ayub governments: modernization and democracy remained the objectives of the Ayub regime, but the approach changed.\(^{26}\) Rizvi is partially right: the declaratory aims of the Ayub regime coincided with those of the pre-Ayub oligarchy. However, it is a mistake to assume that the pre-Ayub aim was to
foster democracy in Pakistan. Rather, the oligarchic aims stressed international economic cooperation and military aid. This helped the prosperity of the oligarchy and its associates. It consolidated the power and authority of the bureaucracy and the military in Pakistan’s internal and external affairs. It avoided mass type democracy and economic policies that benefited the masses. Thus, military intervention in politics in Pakistan was the result of fear of losing power in free elections. This had nothing to do with the problem of corrupt and inept politicians. In other words, Ayub Khan’s main political themes (namely, that Pakistani politicians were selfish and opportunistic, that the 1956 Constitution was unworkable, and that the new Ayub regime would help the people’s lot) were not the driving elements.

The Ayub era had several qualities:

1. The Ayub model of political and economic development succeeded up to a point because Pakistan’s internal and external circumstances favoured the initiatives of Pakistan’s civil and military bureaucracy.

2. In the pre-Ayub era, Pakistani politics and society was concerned about representative government, mass party politics, provincial autonomy, non-alignment, Kashmir settlement and India-Pakistan normalization. As a result, up to 1958 the political system of Pakistan was volatile and nearly anarchic. Its internal constitutional and political arrangements reflected an internal debate among competing core values and interests. This is normal in developed and developing societies. In such circumstances the answer lies in more, not less, democracy so that competing internal demands can be asserted, argued, and developed into competing political and policy choices. Here consensus-building, democratic action, and pluralism are the core concepts. The Ayub regime cut the internal debate, drove it underground, and it polarized/marginalized internal opposition. The Ayub regime rested on an alliance of the Pakistani Army, Pakistan’s civil servants and the big business houses. The ruling coalition was clearly organized and orchestrated compared to the untidiness of politics in the pre-Ayub era. However, the political and societal base of power and legitimacy was also sectoral and narrower.

3. The Ayub era was rich in events and developments. The Ayub approach shaped the internal power structure in Pakistan. It triggered the break-up of Pakistan in 1971. It shaped the pattern of Pakistani Army repression of internal regional and ethnic opposition. It put the stamp of bureaucratic opposition on grass roots democracy and mass politics. It revealed the perennial lack of internal consensus in Pakistan’s constitutional arrangements. It revealed the place of private capitalism and personal aggrandizement in Pakistan’s economic, social and political life. Finally, it revealed the need of Pakistani Army and civil bureaucracies to use political institutions and politicians as buffers between the civil-military-economic oligarchy and the Pakistani masses. In foreign and military affairs it revealed the limits of the US-Pakistan diplomatic and military alliance. It revealed the limits of Pakistan’s ability to contain Indian power in war situations. It revealed the Pakistani interest in a China connection and the limitation of this link in a war situation as in 1965. None of the internal political and economic issues thrown up by the Ayub era have been satisfactorily settled by Ayub’s successors.

Finer notes four types of military intervention in politics as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Influence political system</td>
<td>use persuasion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finer notes four types of military intervention in politics as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Blackmail internal opposition</th>
<th>threaten sanctions if advice is not followed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Displace existing political leadership</td>
<td>change existing political regime for another, more cooperative, political regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplant existing political regime</td>
<td>change the regime by a military takeover of the political system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Pakistani Army’s involvement in internal and external affairs of Pakistan from the early 1950s to 1958 falls into category 1. The repeated fall of Pakistani governments on foreign policy issues suggests—but proof is unavailable—that the Pakistani Army, with the aid of the civil servants of Pakistan, was able to displace Pakistani political regimes. This kind of involvement falls into category 3. The coup by General Ayub Khan in October 1958 falls into category 4.

The functions of the Pakistani Army in independent Pakistan were derived from those of the Indian Army under the British India empire. The latter had three main functions. It was an agent of imperial defence and external security in the context of the fight between the Russian and the British empires in the nineteenth century. The cast of actors changed after 1947 but the nature of the play remained the same. In lieu of India, Pakistan emerged as the strategic base of Western defence against Russia in Middle Eastern affairs. In lieu of the UK, the USA emerged as the guardian of Western defence. From 1947 onwards, successive Pakistani leaders indicated the availability of their bases and their political commitment against Soviet expansion. In the second function, the military acts as an agent of internal pacification. The history of the East India Company and the British India empire (1600s–1947) is a fine example of the judicious use of the military to achieve a variety of imperial aims including internal pacification. Here political, military and economic strategies combined to pacify the natives and to establish the hegemony of the British authority in India. This was symbolized by an unchallenged possession of military, police and intelligence capabilities over Indians. The Pakistani Army played a similar role after 1947 in Pakistan. The quest for political power by the Pakistani Army started in the early 1950s. The Ayub coup in 1958 symbolized the emergence of the Pakistani military as the most powerful political organization in the state of Pakistan. The Pakistani ‘natives’ lived in a world of de facto paramountcy relations. A Governor-General or a self-appointed President gave the political centre an imperial veneer. This centre had a circle of political lieutenants (but not political equals). Native princes (provincial governors or chief ministers) served at the pleasure of the Governor-General or the President. Finally, just as the British India Army had managed inter-communal violence, it was/is the task of the Pakistani Army to manage ethnic riots in Pakistan and to keep the peace.

These colonial functions define the approach of the Pakistani Army to politics in Pakistan. Furthermore, these were the functions as well of Pakistani civilian leaders such as Z.A.Bhutto. The garb was civilian, the method to gain power was through an election (free, partially free, partially rigged, or wholly rigged) but the functions were similar to those of the military. (The Bhutto approach is discussed further in Chapter 4.) Out of these functions emerged the Ayub regime’s intervention strategies. And out of the regime’s intervention strategies emerged three counter-strategies: (1) by the US government against Ayub Khan’s foreign policy; (2) by Ayub’s in-house (establishment) opponents against Ayub in 1969; and (3) by Ayub against his internal opponents in 1969.
Each intervention strategy/counter-intervention strategy worked in a particular set of internal and external circumstances and took into account the competing mental outlooks of the key players. The Ayub era was followed by the Yahya era. To a discussion of its political ideas, internal power relations and the intervention strategies of its main players I now turn.
The Yahya Khan era, March 1969–December 1971
Dismantling the Ayub system and dismembering Pakistan

IMPORTANCE OF THE YAHYA ERA

The Yahya era was one of high drama and fast moving events that revealed the hollowness of Pakistani political life and the bankruptcy of its political and military establishments. Though short in duration, the Yahya era was a major turning point in Pakistani foreign and military affairs and in its internal affairs. The major event was the break-up of Pakistan and the separation of East Pakistan which became a newly independent state. This was the first time since 1945 that a new state had come into being as a result of internal revolt and external intervention. Secondly, this era saw the militarization on a national scale of the festering economic, political and cultural conflict between the Punjab-dominated West Pakistan and the poor but politically conscious and larger grouping of Bengalis in East Pakistan. Third, the era saw the emergence on a national scale of the Bhutto-PPP factor in West Pakistan-East Pakistan politics. This contrasted with the induction of Bhutto into the Ayub Cabinet when Bhutto lacked a mass following and his subsequent eclipse from the inner circle of power during 1966–71. The creation of political space or room for manoeuvre for Bhutto and Bhuttoism was a side effect of the Yahya era. Fourth, this period will be remembered because it showed to Pakistani public opinion and to the rest of the world that despite its modern arms and privileges and much advertised martial tradition, the Pakistani Army could not win a war in the subcontinent; instead, the Army was an agency of internal repression rather than of national security. Fifth, this era revealed the existence of a Bhutto-Yahya-Pakistani Army coalition at work. Here personal and institutional interests of Bhutto-PPP and Yahya-Army had priority over the national interest to keep the two wings of Pakistan together. Inter-elite coalition politics drove the Bhutto-Yahya-Army combination against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Bengalis; it led to reliance on military methods to solve a major political problem. The lesson is that whenever such a combination gains ground it is not likely to succeed. Sixth, this era revealed how in 1970, as in 1958, the fear of majority rule motivated the military and political elites in West Pakistan to avoid modern democracy. In one way the Yahya era was progressive. Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan pre-empted elections by their coup. In contrast Yahya Khan promised national elections; and he held them. But then, as a result of internal circumstances and the interests of the key players in West Pakistan, he avoided implementing the results of the elections. Seventh, the 1971 crisis in East Pakistan revealed the Pakistani Army’s willingness to...
engage in genocide against its own people; here racial motives\textsuperscript{1} were in play and the common bond of Muslim brotherhood seemed unimportant. The crisis revealed that ethnicity rather than religion was the driving element that had shaped the big divide between West and East Pakistanis since the mid-1950s. The 1971 events created a crisis in Pakistan’s dominant Islamic ideology which had originally stressed the central place of religion in political/state affairs. Eighth, the attitudes and actions of the Bhutto-Yahya-Army coalition revealed a contempt for the results of the 1970 elections which gave more seats in the National Assembly to the Awami League under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. This revealed a contempt for the principles of power-sharing, political compromise and compensation for the other side. Here separation of East Pakistan was preferable to power sharing. Ninth, this was the first time in Pakistan’s political history that mass politics had achieved momentous results. They shaped the nation’s destiny which the Pakistani Army could not control despite its full use of repressive means in East Pakistan. Urban militancy had been a factor in Ayub’s downfall (1969–70). But in Ayub’s case the Pakistani Army would not use force to control the opposition to Ayub. In the 1971 encounter between the Army and the Bengali mass movement, the Army failed despite its willingness and ability to use force on a large scale. It lacked a strategy to either divide and rule or to repress successfully. Tenth, the Yahya era demonstrated how three forces were at play. These were the armed forces, Bhutto and Mujibur Rahman. In this triangular contest there were two sets of winners. In East Pakistan affairs, Mujib and India made the winning coalition; in West Pakistan affairs, Bhutto was the winner. Finally, Yahya’s actions revealed ambivalence (like Ayub Khan’s in 1968–9). Yahya Khan rejected Ayub Khan’s ‘basic democrat’ approach and he sought instead national elections; here he appeared to want a political solution for a political problem. But then, as the events during March-December 1971 developed, he went for a military solution to a political problem. The implication is that generals are not necessarily clear-headed thinkers in political crises.

Tariq Ali calls the Yahya era an interlude.\textsuperscript{2} My view is that the Yahya period was a turning point in Pakistani political history. It was a stage in the development of the Pakistani political system. It paved the way to a shift from Ayub Khan’s benign corporate bureaucratic-military authoritarianism (to use Tariq Ali’s phrase), to Bhutto’s populist-authoritarianism. Yahya Khan unleashed a genocidal conflict in East Pakistan. This merits condemnation. Yet, it was to Yahya Khan’s credit that he advanced, inadvertently or by design, the cause of democracy in Pakistan. He ordered national elections on the basis of adult franchise. He allowed elections to take place. He allowed the election results to be announced. This was Pakistan’s first free and fair national election. Here Yahya Khan departed significantly from the Ayub model of political development of Pakistan. Furthermore, Yahya’s electoral action, inadvertently or by design, facilitated the rise of Bhutto.

However, it was to Yahya Khan’s utter discredit that he did not implement the results of the elections which gave Sheikh Mujibur Rahman a clear political victory and a right to form the national government. In East Pakistan Mujib won it all. In West Pakistan Z.A. Bhutto won a majority in the provinces of Punjab and Sind. The National Awami Party, a leftist party won the majority in Baluchistan and North-West Frontier Province. So Bhutto was not even the sole victor in West Pakistan. He held a majority in West Pakistan but not in the two wings. Partly as a result of his intransigence against Mujib,
and partly because of Yahya’s and the Army’s opposition to rule by politicians and a Bengali, Bhutto benefited from Yahya’s ambivalence in holding the elections but in not implementing the results.

In South Asian politics there are different kinds of elections: free and national elections, as in India; indirect elections as in the case of Ayub Khan’s ‘basic democrats’ who then went to elect Ayub Khan as the President; rigged elections, as in the case of Z.A.Bhutto in 1977 and President Ershad Hussain of Bangladesh in 1986; and finally, there is a new variant of elections, namely voterless elections as in Bangladesh in 1988 when results were announced but the voters were kept away from the polling booths. Yahya Khan held Indian-style free and fair elections but unlike India, where the winning party gets to run the government, Yahya chose not to implement the popular verdict. Here the Pakistani Army functioned as a power-broker, even after the popular verdict was in and it had been publicized. As I shall point out later, this is not an isolated incident in Pakistani politics. After Benazir Bhutto won the elections by a simple majority in 1988 there was a period of hesitation on the part of the Pakistan President (with strong Army ties) to call on the winner to form the government. This politics of hesitation in the case of Benazir Bhutto was an interlude which created opportunities for serious in-house, inter-elite bargaining and consensus formation (more on this in Chapter 6). In the Yahya era the post-election interlude was used to sabotage the election results by a Bhutto-Yahya-Army coalition against the Mujib victory. The adage that there is many a slip between the cup and the lip is relevant here. Yet, despite this hesitation to implement immediately the results of Mujib’s political victory, the Yahya era’s approach to politics and elections differed fundamentally from the inconclusiveness and ambivalence of the demand for representative government in the 1947–58 period. The Yahya commitment to democracy was a consequence of the failure of politics by charisma (Jinnah and Ayub). Furthermore, Yahya functioned in the context of an enduring bureaucratic-military-US government nexus that was, since 1954, the framework of Pakistani decision processes. This group did not expect a popular mandate for Mujib.

My analysis will proceed on the premise that the Yahya commitment to democracy was a tactical one. It was meant to buy time in the aftermath of the street violence that brought down the Ayub regime. As Tariq Ali points out

Yahya’s advisors believed that it was essential to concede on the electoral front in order to contain the upheaval. They were confident that the bureaucracy, from long experience in such matters, would be able to manipulate the results satisfactorily. The elections were postponed once, but finally took place in December 1970.³

It reflected the political tactics of the dominant bureaucratic and military coalition. The tactics misfired as the chronology of events and my analysis below shows.

There were three major consequences of the Yahya regime’s miscalculation.

1 The West Pakistani Army-bureaucratic elite and Bhutto’s refusal to share power with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman led to a political and a military crisis and later to the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan.

2 The Bangladesh crisis enabled the rise of Z.A.Bhutto in West Pakistani politics and the development of a populist authoritarian regime which may be called ‘Bhuttoism’.

3 The Yaha Khan era 75
Finally, creating a public identification with the principle of free and national elections, the Pakistani military and bureaucratic elites made a struggle between democratic rule and military-bureaucracy-economic elites’ rule inevitable. To this day this struggle endures in Pakistan. The Yahya era was responsible for unleashing this struggle.

The Yahya period did not settle the Pakistani debate between military rule or democracy but it tilted it towards the latter and it broadened the debate.

This way the Yahya era opened up Pakistan’s political system but this happened more by accident than by design. It turned its back to the Ayub approach to politics which was generally elitist and closed to mass politics. (In the Ayub presidency Pakistani politics opened up for a few months before Ayub’s downfall in March 1969. The opening up was the result of street violence in West Pakistan and the eruption of an inter-elite power struggle at the top of the political/policy pyramid in 1968 and 1969.)

The significance of the turmoil of the Yahya era is best understood by examining the pattern of change in internal political relations in Pakistan. During 1947–8, the Jinnah days, the Pakistani decision-making apparatus was small in size, elitist, and closed in nature. Following Jinnah’s death, Pakistani governments flirted with the idea of representative government. But as shown in Chapter 1, during 1948–1958 period, the trend was to develop a closed oligarchic political system based on a Pakistani military-bureaucratic and US government alliance. This skewed Pakistani foreign and military affairs towards US thinking thus tilting Pakistani political affairs against democracy. Here, the development of democratic political institutions and conventions in Pakistan was discouraged while development of an internal political alliance which favoured the dominance of the Pakistani Army in political and security affairs was encouraged.

After the Ayub coup in 1958 the political system remained generally closed to the masses. But it opened up in a limited way at the top. The economic elite, consisting of 22 economic families was co-opted into the inter-elite system at the top. Secondly, Ayub created a grouping of around 80,000 ‘basic democrats’ as a buffer between an imperial presidency and the masses. These basic democrats were supposed to be shock absorbers and transmission belts between the elite and the masses. In retrospect, however, such an opening up of the number of Pakistani political participants failed to either satisfy or repress popular pressures. Compared to the search for representative democracy during the 1948–58 and 1969–71 periods, Ayub Khan’s basic democrat system did not provide for mass popular politics.

The Yahya era was a turning point in Pakistan’s political history in a number of ways:

1 Yahya made a number of important decisions: (a) to have national elections based on adult franchise; (b) to scrap the unpopular 1962 Constitution; (c) to scrap the One Unit system of West Pakistan; and (d) to scrap parity between East and West Pakistan. These actions revealed a different elite approach to Pakistani political problems. The approach restored the democratic idea in Pakistani thinking. Yahya’s successors wrestled with the democratic idea but they could not put it aside.

2 During the last months of the Ayub era and for the entire duration of the Yahya era, two mass movements dominated Pakistani affairs, (a) In West Pakistan the students and trade unions combined, through street violence and inter-elite anti-Ayub intrigue, to bring down Ayub and his regime, (b) In East Pakistan Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League and Bengali society sought provincial autonomy. Through political
agitation, and later through guerilla warfare, they broke up Pakistan and brought down the Yahya regime. The growth of mass consciousness in West Pakistan led to the emergence of the Bhutto factor. This factor was driven by Bhutto’s personality, and by popular demand for internal economic and political reform. This led to the development of the People’s Party of Pakistan and a growing faith in mass politics. The emergence of mass politics and party politics was irreversible after 1969.

3 The West Pakistani Left had played an important role in mobilizing street level opposition. This led to the fall of the Ayub regime. However, in the Yahya era, the Left in East and West Pakistan was marginalized. Tariq Ali provides a useful account of the Peoples Republic of China-Yahya-Pakistan relations that led to the weakening and disorientation of the Maulana Bhashani led East Pakistani Left. The disorientation of the Pakistani Left was a result of the China-Soviet split; this controversy split the Left movement in South Asia. Since then the Pakistani Left has been a marginal element in Pakistani politics.

4 The Yahya era revealed an important truth about Pakistani politics: that masses and mass politics did not count once the transfer of power had been arranged from one political regime to another. Promises of political reform were forgotten once the political crisis had passed. This pattern of political behaviour by Pakistani political, bureaucratic and military elites was carried on by Yahya’s successors.

5 The decision-making of the Yahya era was dominated by military men and by military affairs. But the encounter with Bengali nationalism and the Indian Army in December 1971 destroyed the credibility of the Pakistani Army as a fighting force, and as the dominant political organization in Pakistan. The former, because it could not win the military encounter. The latter, because the Pakistani generals could not manage either the Bhutto-PPP phenomenon or the Mujib-Awami League phenomenon. The lesson of the Yahya era was that the Pakistani Army lacked a winning diplomatic strategy. It relied on brute force. It lacked a winning coercive strategy. Its problem was inherent in the traditional Pakistani habit of relying either on intrigue or on force to solve political problems. It became apparent in the 1971 crisis. Yahya did not create the problem; he was not the cause. But his actions threw it up and magnified it in 1970–1. The Yahya era was a turning point because it threw up the problem publicly and caused Pakistan to debate the desirability and feasibility of a non-military alternative to military rule in Pakistan. The Bhutto, Zia, and Benazir Bhutto experiments came in the aftermath of Yahya’s military and political failures.

6 The Yahya era was a turning point in another sense. Traditionally, Pakistani politics lacked a common national ideological denominator except for the fear of India and the Hindus. Until the downfall of Ayub, ethnicity was not a driving element in Pakistani politics. Pakistani leaders were no doubt aware of Pakistan as a multi-ethnic society. None the less ethnic strains were not allowed to percolate into Pakistani political processes; they were not given room for expression in Pakistan’s internal political and constitutional arrangements. Up to 1970–1, ‘politics’ comprised of inter-elite coalition building, regime-making and regime-changing activities.

From 1970–1 onwards, Pakistani politics revealed the assertion of, and polarization between, a number of ideological and power struggles. After 1971, the ideological agenda revealed a wide array of competing conceptions:

1 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s vision of provincial autonomy and Bengali nationalism.
2 Z.A.Bhutto’s vision of Islamic socialism.
3 Zia-ul-Haq’s vision of Islamic fundamentalism.
4 Benazir Bhutto’s vision of democratic nationalism.
5 The vision of Baluchi nationalism which troubled Z.A.Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto; the vision of Sindi nationalism which troubled Zia-ul-Haq; and the vision of Bengali nationalism which troubled Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan.

In all this the Yahya era was a turning point. His decision (1969) to scrap the One Unit formula and to hold national and free elections opened up the Pakistani political field to these diverse and competitive ideological forces. They revealed the deep fractures in Pakistani political life. Out of Bhutto’s personal ambition and opposition to Ayub (1966–71) came the ideology of Islamic socialism and a chauvinistic nationalism. Bhutto articulated his vision in his writings and political speeches of the 1966–71 period. Out of Ayub’s highly centralized presidential system came the Mujib cry for provincial autonomy for the Bengalis (1966–71). Out of Mujib’s victory in 1970–1, came the Bhutto-Army-bureaucracy opposition to provincial autonomy in East Pakistan. Out of Yahya’s defeat in 1971 came Bhutto’s tactical commitment to party based democracy and provincial autonomy in West Pakistan after 1971. Out of Bhutto’s populism and authoritarianism (1972–7) came the rise of Zia-ul-Haq’s drive to move Pakistan into a partyless and fundamentalist mode of political behaviour (1977–88). Finally, out of Zia-ul-Haq’s repressive regime came Benazir Bhutto’s quest for a modern democratic Pakistan (1988–90).

In each instance, the dominant power coalition continually faces ethnic dissent. Ayub faced the Baluchis and the Bengalis; Yahya faced the Bengalis; Z.A.Bhutto faced the Baluchis; Zia-ul-Haq faced the Sindis; Benazir Bhutto faced the Baluchis and the Pathans. Before 1970 the inter-elite power struggles were driven mainly by personal ambitions and narrowly based sectoral and institutional interests. After 1971 they were driven by personal ambitions, narrowly based sectoral institutional interests and broad-based ideological divisions among Pakistani elites and the masses. The Yahya era became a turning point inasmuch as it established the connection between ideological and power struggles. The connection has not been lost in Pakistani politics since that period. Moreover, since the Yahya era, Pakistani power struggles have been frequent, intense and public.

The Yahya era revealed a distinction between politics based on principles and politics based on tactics. Only Mujib seemed to practice the politics of convictions. He remained consistent in his demand for Bengali rights, provincial autonomy, and the importance of sharing political and economic power between West and East Pakistan. Yahya, Bhutto and their respective advisers spoke the language of democracy and elections but their moves represented tactics, not convictions. The chronology of events (see pp. 103–5) clarifies the point. Table 3.2 compares Bhutto’s and Mujib’s political attitudes. It shows the difference between Bhutto’s tactics and Mujib’s convictions.

The Yahya era was a turning point because Yahya’s approach destroyed the Ayub approach to politics. True, there were similarities between the two. Both Ayub and Yahya were driven by personal and opportunist considerations and by the need to maintain Army support for their policies. Both wanted a small internal decision-making power
### Table 3.1 Differences between Ayub’s and Yahya’s approach to politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ayub’s approach</th>
<th>Yahya’s approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic democrats had an important political role</td>
<td>Rejected Basic Democrats and relied on a small number of elitist politicians like Bhutto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had faith in politicians who accepted basic democracy and Ayub’s political pre-eminence</td>
<td>Had little faith in politicians and he kept them guessing about his political intentions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political system was centralized and the style of political management was presidential but open in appearance</td>
<td>The political system was centralized and the style of political management was secretive, manipulative and deceptive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani politics were demilitarized by the return of the Army to the barracks and by the reliance on a civilian administration</td>
<td>East Pakistani politics were militarized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayub politics were based on the principle of political parity between West and East Pakistan</td>
<td>Rejected parity and accepted the Bengali idea of population as the basis of political representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The civil service was a key player during the Ayub regime and especially after Ayub’s heart attack</td>
<td>The civil service became secondary and Pakistan became a semi-military state under Yahya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under Ayub, Bhutto was a marginal element in national decision-making (contrary to Bhutto’s claims) and after 1965 Bhutto was eclipsed</td>
<td>The Yahya era saw the resurgence of the Bhutto factor in Pakistani politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In 1968–9 Ayub accepted the principles of elections with adult franchise, political parties and parliamentary democracy in response to internal pressures</td>
<td>Yahya accepted these principles from the beginning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayub was a strong believer in central authority and opposed provincial authority</td>
<td>Yahya publicly acknowledged the provincial autonomy principle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

structure where the military and a co-opted bureaucracy were the primary voices. Both wanted stable, inter-elite alliance relations rather than radically new political and constitutional arrangements that depended on mass political action. Both wanted the political system of Pakistan to be personality-centric. Both leaders were vulnerable to in-house political intrigue by their advisers and by Z.A.Bhutto. Both used *ad hoc* reactive tactics to stay in power, to avoid power sharing with ethnic groups, and to avoid genuine internal political, economic and social reforms. Still, there were important differences between Ayub’s and Yahya’s approaches to politics. Table 3.1 sets out the differences. This indicates that Yahya had political ideas that permitted the opening up of Pakistani political processes. Yahya seemed to accept the democratic ideal as the way to ease Ayub out of power. Yahya appeared to respond to public opposition to Ayub’s closed and self-centred political system.

With hindsight this was a tactical pose by Yahya and his advisers. The Yahya aims were: (1) to transfer power from Ayub to Yahya; (2) to manipulate the elections so that the Army-bureaucracy coalition would remain the dominant force in Pakistan’s affairs. The December 1970 elections resulted in clear victories to Bhutto in West Pakistan and Mujib in East Pakistan. This upset the Yahya-bureaucracy calculations. The elections
polarized Pakistani politics into a three-way struggle between the Army, Bhutto and Mujib. The chronology of events shows how opportunism by Bhutto, and Yahya and his advisers led to the creation of Bangladesh and to the rise of Bhutto. Table 3.2 shows the differences in the political ideas of Bhutto and Mujib. These ideas made a Bhutto-Mujib clash inevitable and a Bhutto-Yahya alliance likely.

**Table 3.2 Differences between Bhutto’s and Mujib’s approach to politics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bhutto</th>
<th>Mujibur Rahman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wanted to restructure political economy of Pakistan.</td>
<td>Wanted to restructure political and economic relations between West and East Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanted to maintain West Pakistani hegemony over East Pakistan’s economic, political and military affairs</td>
<td>Wanted power for himself and the Bengalis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanted power for himself</td>
<td>Had a populist approach to politics but was inexperienced in foreign, military and economic affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanted to restore civil rule and to curb the Army’s internal political position</td>
<td>Had a populist approach to politics and was experienced in foreign, military and economic affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had a populist approach to politics and was experienced in foreign, military and economic affairs</td>
<td>Was aristocratic and feudal in his family background and upbringing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was aristocratic and feudal in his family background and upbringing</td>
<td>Family and social background was modest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Bhutto-Yahya alliance points to an important theme in Pakistan politics. The close ties between select elements in the Pakistani military command and the Bhutto family originated in the Ayub era. They crystallized forcefully in the Yahya era. They went into eclipse in the Zia era. They resurfaced as a political factor in the Benazir Bhutto era. But Bhutto-Army ties have never been lost; they constitute an important sub-culture in Pakistan’s affairs. Here too the Yahya era was a turning point because it solidified the Bhutto-Army alliance on an opportunistic basis.

**HISTORICAL SETTING AND EVENTS**

On taking over from Ayub, Yahya revealed an ambitious political strategy. Before discussing this, the historical setting may be briefly recalled. In the 1950s West Pakistan consisted of three provinces (NWFP, Punjab and Sind), several princely states (Bahwalpur, Kalat, Khairpur, and others) and one centrally administered territory (Baluchistan). In 1955 these were administratively integrated into one unit. In addition, on the western side of Pakistan lay Azad Kashmir, the tribal districts bordering Afghanistan and some northern districts (e.g. Balistan). East Pakistan constituted the eastern wing of Pakistan. In the 1956 Constitution, to avoid the danger of majority rule by the more populous East Pakistani (mostly Bengalis), Pakistan developed the idea of ‘parity’ between East and West Pakistan; this became the basis of political representation of the two wings of Pakistan. The Bengalis accepted this formula. But later on their grievances were that West Pakistani governments did not implement the 50–50 parity principle in their budgetary, developmental and administrative activities such as by
means of improved recruitment into the government services of Pakistan. They complained that East Pakistan was continually dominated by the central government of West Pakistan. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s six-point formula for provincial autonomy (1966) was meant to rectify the problem of non-implementation of the parity principle by West Pakistani governments.

After Ayub’s fall, Mujib insisted that population ought to be the basis of political representation; consequently parity between the two wings was not necessary. Mujib was playing on the point that neither the Bengalis nor the smaller provinces in West Pakistan (other than Punjab) were content with the parity principle. Yahya accepted the Bengali contention. He set up a One Unit Dissolution Committee. Its mandate was to establish a federation of Baluchistan, NWFP, Punjab, Sind and East Pakistan. Yahya’s political move was a turning point because, for the first time, the Army publicly accepted population rather than parity as the basis of Pakistan’s political and constitutional life.

Yahya’s strategy was revealed in his Legal Framework Order of 30 March 1970. This ordered national elections to elect a new National Assembly and to make a new Constitution. It provided for 300 assembly members through direct popular elections with 162 members from East Pakistan and 138 from West Pakistan. The National Assembly had 120 days to frame a new Constitution; if it failed the task, new elections were to be held. Yahya specified the principles of the new Pakistan as follows:

1 Pakistan was to be an Islamic state.
2 It was to be a democratic system with free and fair elections.
3 Its territorial integrity was to be preserved for all times.
4 Economic disparity between East and West Pakistan was to be eliminated.
5 There was to be maximum provincial autonomy without diluting federalism.7

On this basis national elections were held. The results were unexpected by the Yahya regime. The distribution of seats came to the following.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mujib</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutto</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Awami Party</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With these results Mujib would have been the Prime Minister of Pakistan. But this was not to be because of the fundamental differences in the personal ambitions and political philosophy of Mujib and Bhutto. Table 3.2 shows the differences. A triangular drama between Yahya, Bhutto and Mujib followed. The chronology of events is essential for an understanding of the players and their moves during 1970 and 1971.

1946 — Bengalis supported the All India Muslim League in its endeavours for the founding of Pakistan.9
1954 — Bengalis withdrew the support.
1958 — Ayub’s military coup; February 1959 elections were cancelled. Elections were held in East Pakistan on a non-party basis, under martial law,10 and under the framework of Ayub’s Electoral Bodies Disqualification Order which disqualified and punished corrupt politicians.

Jan — Ayub was re-elected as Pakistan’s President.
Bengalis did not play a role in Ayub’s elections or in his political and constitutional arrangements.

Mar 1970 — Yahya’s Legal Framework Order was issued.

Dec 1970 — Pakistan held its first general elections. Bhutto declared after the December 1970 election results that there were three forces in Pakistan: the Armed Forces; Awami League (Mujib); and PPP (Bhutto).

mid-Jan 1971 — Yahya visited Mujib in Dacca and reached a political understanding with him.

Jan 1971 — Yahya, Bhutto, and generals Hamid and Pirzada got together at Bhutto’s home in Larkana. They agreed to use force if Mujib did not change his attitude.

Feb 1971 — Indian plane was hijacked to Lahore. Bhutto met with the hijackers at the airport and it was blown up. India cut off airlink between West and East Pakistan.

28 Feb 1971 — Bhutto announced boycott of National Assembly which was to meet in Dacca on 3 March.

29 Feb 1971 — Yahya postponed National Assembly meeting.

6 Mar 1971 — Yahya called National Assembly meeting for 25 March. Ashghar Khan met Mujib. Mujib took the view that Yahya had decided not to share power with him and had decided to use force to crush the Bengalis.

7 Mar 1971 — Mujib made an important speech. He wanted (a) withdrawal of martial law, (b) immediate transfer of power before a constitutional settlement, and (c) immediate return of the Army to the barracks.

14 Mar 1971 — Bhutto said: ‘If power were to be transferred to the people before any constitutional settlement, as demanded by Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman, it should be transferred to the majority in East Pakistan and the majority party here [West Pakistan].’

15 Mar 1971 — Bhutto said. ‘In the situation faced by Pakistan, having a geographical distance between the two parts, the rule of the Majority did not apply.’

16 Mar 1971 — Yahya-Mujib negotiations about the latter’s six-point formula for provincial autonomy started. Yahya appeared willing to lift martial law and to transfer power to Mujib and to have special provisions in the Constitution for West and East Pakistan.

21 Mar 1971 — Bhutto said that martial law could not be lifted unless the National Assembly first met; otherwise there would be a ‘constitutional vacuum’.

22 Mar 1971 — Yahya, Bhutto and Mujib met. Mujib hardened his line and demanded transfer of power separately to West and East Pakistan.

23 Mar 1971 — Bangladeshi flags appeared in Dacca and Pakistani flags disappeared. Mujib proposed two separate constitutions for West and East Pakistan and a confederation plan with a common approach to defence, foreign affairs, currency and trade. This plan was rejected by Yahya’s advisers.

24 Mar 1971 — Planned meeting between Yahya and Mujib that day did not occur.


25/26 Mar 1971 — The Pakistani Army’s military campaign and slaughter of Bengalis started that night.

A few days later Bhutto returned to West Pakistan and said: ‘Thank God, Pakistan has been saved.’

April 1971 — India started to aid armed guerrillas in East Pakistan.
POWER COALITIONS IN THE YAHYA ERA

These events reveal three sets of power coalitions, political and military tactics, and enmities during the Yahya era. Table 3.3 outlines each set. The first set explains the promise and the holding of the December 1970 elections. The second set, and the third set, explain the military operation in East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. The third set also explains why the Mujib-Bhashani and moderate-militant divisions in

Table 3.3 Power coalitions in the Yahya era

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalitions</th>
<th>Tactics</th>
<th>Premise</th>
<th>Enmity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1Yahya-Army-bureaucracy in West Pakistan</td>
<td>elections and provincial autonomy was promised</td>
<td>elections could be rigged and time could be bought</td>
<td>anti-Ayub (1968–9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2Yahya-Mujib-Army and bureaucracy</td>
<td>same as above</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3Yahya-Bhutto-Army and bureaucracy in West Pakistan</td>
<td>refused to transfer power to Mujib and to allow Assembly to meet to develop a new Constitution as promised by Yahya</td>
<td>West Pakistani elites were opposed to Bengali majority rule and to power-sharing with East Pakistan</td>
<td>anti-Bengali, anti-Mujib and anti-provincial autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4Mujib-Mukhti Bahini-Indian Army and M. Bhashani</td>
<td>political agitation and guerrilla warfare</td>
<td>through pressure it was possible to restructure the West-East Pakistan relationship within a federal framework. Autonomy for East Pakistan could be achieved</td>
<td>anti-Pakistani Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5Mujib-India and same as above moderates in East Pakistan</td>
<td>same as above</td>
<td></td>
<td>anti-Bhashani and anti-militants who sought Bangladeshi independence rather than autonomy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1 and 2 refer to the December 1970 elections. 3 refers to the Pakistani Army’s military operation in East Pakistan between March–December 1971. 4 and 5 concern India’s involvement in the 1971 crisis.

East Pakistan (Bengali) politics (1970–1) led to Indian diplomatic and military intervention.

Several themes run through each set. First, the Left in West Pakistan and in East Pakistan failed to play a revolutionary role; the Left was disoriented by the activities of Bhashani vis-à-vis China and the Yahya regime. 25

Secondly, student power in West Pakistan contributed to the fall of the Ayub regime. Student power in East Pakistan (but with a different set of students) also contributed to the fall of West Pakistani political authority in East Pakistan during March-December 1971. However, West Pakistani students were not a factor in the defeat of the Pakistani Army in December 1971 and in the creation of Bangladesh. 26
Thirdly, China’s activities in connection with the Bangladesh crisis during March-December 1971 revealed a preference for its state interests in Pakistan. These required support for a military regime rather than for a revolutionary movement. By its actions China revealed its opportunism vis-à-vis its traditional posture which advocated self-determination and revolution. China’s opportunism in its policies vis-à-vis Ayub, Bhashani, and Yahya may be traced to the 1963–5 period onwards. It indicates the ascendancy of realpolitik rather than ideology in China’s South Asian thinking. It also reveals that China was consistent in its policy attitude, which was based on realpolitik calculations and interests rather than on its declared revolutionary ideology.

Fourthly, the various power coalitions in each set in Table 3.3 were driven by realpolitik concerns. None of them had a common ideological denominator. Convictions, values or moral concerns were not driving the decision processes.

Fifthly, the rise of Bhuttoism as a political force in Pakistani affairs may be traced to 1970–1 developments. Bhutto emerged as a key power-broker, catalyst and player in Pakistani affairs at the time. He revealed his capacity to understand and to exploit Pakistan’s difficulties to his personal advantage. His actions revealed that he practised the politics of opportunism rather than conviction although his speeches projected an image of convictions and concern with important political, economic and social issues. Bhutto was experienced in the art of manipulating the political processes and in taking advantage of political opportunities to gain power. Mujib, on the other hand, followed the politics of convictions. He believed in provincial autonomy and Bengali rights. He knew how to take advantage of political opportunities to gain power, but Mujib lacked the international experience of Bhutto. Bhutto came to power after the defeat of the Pakistani Army in December 1971. He won the December 1970 elections after the downfall of Ayub and on the back of Yahya’s promise to hold elections. Bhutto benefited from the mistakes of others. Mujib did not get many good chances. He gained power through convictions and despite adversity.

Finally, each set reveals the primacy of enmities in defining the power coalitions and then in defining the tactics of each such coalition. That is, to understand the membership in a power coalition and its tactics one must understand the enmity which brought the coalition together in the first place. Power coalitions are situational; they last as long as circumstances drive them. The political ideas and principles of power elites in Pakistan are less important than internal and external circumstances which throw up temporary/permanent enmities and temporary/ permanent friendships. Pakistan’s case history since 1947 shows a number of (1) permanent friendships (i.e. between the US government and the Pakistani Army, and between the Pakistani Army and the Pakistani bureaucracy); (2) temporary friendships (i.e. between Ayub-Bhutto; between Bhutto-Yahya; and between Mujib, Mukhti Bahini and the Indian Army) and (3) permanent enmities (i.e. between the Pakistani Army and Bengali nationalists and advocates of provincial autonomy; and between the principle of majority rule and the principle of Pakistani Army-bureaucracy dominance over Pakistani affairs.

The Yahya era produced two important power coalitions. It changed the structure of the Pakistani political system after 1971, and the structure of power relations in South Asia. The dominant members of the first coalition were Yahya Khan, Bhutto, the bureaucracy and the Army. The coalition’s formation and activity was driven by a desire to remove Ayub Khan from the Pakistani power centre. The key events connected with
the first coalition were: (1) the mass agitation in late 1968 which led to Ayub’s resignation in March 1969; (2) the assumption of power by Yahya Khan; (3) his promise of elections on the basis of adult franchise; (4) his promise to develop a new constitutional arrangement to share power between West and East Pakistan and (5) finally his recognition of the importance of provincial autonomy in Pakistan’s internal affairs.

The second coalition was anti-Mujib, anti-Bengali and anti-provincial autonomy. Its hidden agenda was to keep power in the hands of the Army-bureaucratic oligarchy. Another hidden agenda was Bhutto’s. His aim was to shine on the West Pakistani political stage, to develop his brand of populism and Pakistani chauvinism, and to gain power for himself. Bhutto was comfortable with select elements of the Pakistani Army who opposed India, who favoured the Pakistan-China connection, and who were against the sharing of powers with the Bengalis in East Pakistan. But, as post-1971 developments were to show, Bhutto and the Pakistani Army were using each other. Their coalition was a tactical one. It was not driven by convictions. It was not permanent in nature. Common enmities brought the two sides together, namely a belief that Ayub Khan’s regime had run its course (1968–9), a belief that Mujib had to be stopped (1970–1), and a belief that Bengali autonomy was not good for either the Punjab-dominated Pakistani Army and bureaucracy nor for Bhutto’s political future.

The dominant members of the second coalition were Yahya Khan, his US and military advisers, Bhutto, and the bureaucracy. The marginal players were the Pakistani masses who supported Bhutto’s populist slogans and political causes and who believed in the idea of democracy. Two external powers, the US and China, also played a role in this coalition’s activity. Their policies and postures reinforced the coalition members’ attitudes and tactics concerning the political situation in East Pakistan during 1970–1. But I do not consider them dominant members of this coalition. Their policies were driven by their foreign policy interests outside South Asia. At the time a US-China strategic alignment was emerging and Yahya was a conduit in this development. This, rather than internal developments in Pakistan, concerned the two. At the time the world community was concerned about Bengali self-determination, West-East Pakistan’s political and constitutional controversies, provincial autonomy, the moral and social issues connected with the flow of millions of refugees from East Pakistan into India, and the problem of genocide in East Pakistan as a result of the Pakistani Army’s brutalities. These issues were secondary in the thinking of the US and China. But these powers were not insignificant players. Their policy positions affected the perceptions of the key players in this coalition. Yahya and Bhutto thought China and the US government would come to Pakistan’s aid against ‘Indian aggression’. Kissinger’s menacing posture against India28 aided the Yahya-Bhutto-bureaucracy’s activities and attitudes.

The contrast here is with the policy of the US government vis-à-vis Ayub Khan personally. There were signs of US government displeasure against Ayub concerning a number of his policies and attitudes—principally his positions towards India in the China-India war (1962); his opposition to the development of Indian military power against China; his urge to link the Kashmir issue to US aid to India at a time of India’s troubles; his push for the China link when the US was not ready for it in the early 1960’s; his flirting with the theme of ‘friends but not masters’ (a clear dig at the US government); and his flirting with non-alignment and closer ties with Pakistan’s Communist neighbours.
By holding back US aid and total political support to the Ayub regime, the US government signalled its displeasure with Ayub Khan. In the murky world of Pakistani politics, this phenomenon, as well as Ayub’s tardy performance in the 1965 war, was enough to unravel his regime. Bhutto’s and the Army’s (including Yahya’s) opposition to Ayub was a sign that the rats were beginning to abandon the sinking ship. Here US actions aided the process of coalition-formation in the first coalition (i.e. Yahya-Army-Bhutto-bureaucracy against Ayub Khan). Here US actions were secretive, not public.

The high point of the second coalition was the night of 25/26 March 1971 when it decided to crush East Pakistan militarily. Its low point came with the surrender of the Pakistani Army to India’s Army in December 1971. By March 1971 the second coalition had emerged and its thinking was clear. Still, Bangladeshi independence was not inevitable because the political and military situation in East Pakistan was fluid. What were the circumstances and the key variables in West and East Pakistan that led to the 1971 crisis and war? What were the assessments and tactics of the Yahya-Bhutto-Army-bureaucracy coalition about the nature of the problem and the remedy? What were the effects of the 1971 crisis on the structure of Pakistan’s political system?

To these questions I now turn.

**CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 1971 WAR**

This war is recognized as a major event in South Asia because it established Indian military ascendancy in the subcontinent. It revealed that India could manage a hostile diplomatic and a military coalition that included two major powers: the USA and China. It was also an event because a new state was created by force. However, my interest in studying this war is not to demonstrate the Indian role and the implications of the India factor in subcontinental power relations since 1971. Rather the aims are, first to discuss the circumstances which led to intra-state and inter-state military conflict; and secondly, to assess the implications of this war for West Pakistani political affairs.

My theme is that the 1971 crisis revealed that two different sets of actors, core and peripheral, functioned in Pakistan in 1971. They had incompatible interests and different types of political behaviour. The 1971 outcome was the result of interactions between the two. The ‘core’ actors were Yahya Khan, the Army, Bhutto, the bureaucracy in West Pakistan; and Mujib, the students, the leftists and the masses in East Pakistan. Until the outbreak of military hostilities in December 1971 the peripheral actors were the external powers, i.e. the USA, the USSR, the People’s Republic of China and India. The ‘core’ actors were internal power players; the peripheral ones were the external power players. The core domestic actors had well-defined aims; these concerned their personal, institutional and philosophical interests. Gaining power was important to Bhutto after his years out of office since 1966. Maintaining the ascendancy of the Pakistani Army over East Pakistan was important for Yahya and his advisers. Seeking provincial autonomy and gaining political and economic benefits for the Bengalis were important for Mujib. For the peripheral external players the crisis created dilemmas and ambivalence about their interests. For China and the USA it was a dilemma between supporting a military regime in Pakistan, preventing Indian hegemony and promoting self-determination in East Pakistan. For India it was a dilemma between seeking East Pakistan’s autonomy or
Bangladeshi independence. For the USSR it was a choice between checking India’s hegemony and inducing West Pakistani restraint. For the core internal players, however, the crisis created opportunities for action. There was no ambivalence because their respective interests were well-defined and narrower compared to those of the external peripheral players. Table 3.4 offers a summary of the interests of the core and the peripheral actors.

In my scheme the core actors were the main participants in efforts to shape Pakistan’s internal political and constitutional arrangements; the peripheral ones were not. The core actors were responsible for the origins of the 1971 crisis. The external powers became factors in the 1971 war because their actions shaped the results of the West-East Pakistan crisis but they were not the causes of that crisis.

The causes lay in the internal political history and in the internal power relations of the two wings of Pakistan. When Pakistan was created in 1947 it consisted of two wings. Prior to August 1947 East Pakistan was dominated by Hindu capitalists. After Partition most of them left East Pakistan and there was a vacuum in political and economic power. The political vacuum was filled by the Awami League,

Table 3.4 Interests of the domestic players, 1971 crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core domestic actors</th>
<th>His core interests</th>
<th>Level of ambivalence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bhutto</td>
<td>gain power</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yahya</td>
<td>maintain his and Army’s pre-eminence in internal and external affairs</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujib</td>
<td>gain provincial autonomy and gain power for himself</td>
<td>high with respect to his goals and methods</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The causes lay in the internal political history and in the internal power relations of the two wings of Pakistan. When Pakistan was created in 1947 it consisted of two wings. Prior to August 1947 East Pakistan was dominated by Hindu capitalists. After Partition most of them left East Pakistan and there was a vacuum in political and economic power. The political vacuum was filled by the Awami League, a broad-based party. Since the mid-1950s it developed a strong political base in East Pakistan. It sought provincial autonomy and it opposed West Pakistan’s one-unit formula. West Pakistan, however, sought West-East Pakistani parity. Through parity it sought to neutralize the Bengali majority. Economically, East Pakistan became a captive market of West Pakistani businessmen and West Pakistani economic planning. East Pakistan’s main export commodity was jute. This valued source of foreign exchange was used and controlled by West Pakistanis. Consequently there was a widespread feeling of West Pakistani political, economic and cultural imperialism among the East Pakistanis. The Awami League’s political culture, however, was geared to the principles of compromise and power-sharing with West Pakistan rather than secession from it. It wanted to increase Bengali representation in the Pakistani Army and civil service. Through provincial autonomy it wanted to maintain a continuous political pressure on West Pakistani elites so as to induce them to participate in fair political, constitutional and economic arrangements between the two political wings. With secession this line of pressure was likely to be lost. Hence there was an element of political calculation in seeking autonomy, not secession, by the Awami League.

The Awami League’s six-point programme for power-sharing and provincial autonomy was governed by these concerns. Yet because the West-East Pakistan relationship was imperialistic, the West Pakistani reaction to the demand for provincial
autonomy was negative. There were reasons behind the reactions. First, since 1958 the Pakistani Army had been taking 60 per cent of the state budget. Diversion of jute export earnings from West to East Pakistan would seriously hurt the Pakistani Army’s budget. Secondly, West Pakistani elites thought of Bengalis in racial and stereotyped terms. Here a common religion was not strong enough to overcome the ethnic and racial divide. Thirdly, West Pakistani economic elites enjoyed the fruits of a captive and lucrative East Pakistani market. These concrete interests were constants in West Pakistani thinking about East Pakistan; they shaped the West-East Pakistani polarization.

On 25/26 March 1971 the Pakistani Army decided to use force to suppress Mujib and the Awami League. Here Pakistani military action escalated a social/political conflict into an intra-state military conflict. From April 1971 India started to arm the East Pakistani guerillas; and it increased its diplomatic and military pressure on the Pakistani Army. Armed conflict broke out between India and Pakistani armed forces in December 1971. Then the conflict became an inter-state military conflict.

The 1971 crisis revealed the competition between two political cultures: West Pakistani and East Pakistani. Since 1947 there was an evolving pattern of struggle and polarization between them. The Bangladesh war (1971) was the end point of this struggle. However, events during the 1970–1 period also indicated that the East-West struggle did not necessarily have to result in East Pakistani separation. Had political measures worked, the break up of Pakistan could have been avoided.

After Ayub’s fall many constructive political measures were in play on the Pakistani political stage. In 1969–70 Yahya accepted the need for general elections and provincial autonomy. Since 1966 Bhutto emphasized the virtues of democracy and elections. Mujib’s call for provincial autonomy and mass politics went back to the mid-1950s. Unfortunately this apparent convergence of political ideas was tactical and rhetorical because the motives of the core players varied, and their relations were driven by competition among them. Yahya Khan and his advisers accepted elections and provincial autonomy in response to popular demand and street violence during 1968–9. This was the way to distance the Pakistani Army from Ayub Khan and to bring him down. Furthermore, Yahya Khan and his advisers expected the bureaucracy to be able to rig the elections. Bhutto had his own agenda: he left the Ayub government in 1966 knowing that his advice to liberate Kashmir by force in the 1965 war was wrong and he was likely to be dismissed by Ayub. Bhutto had argued that: (a) Kashmiris were ready to rise against Indian imperialism; (b) India would not dare attack Pakistan by crossing the international border in response to infiltration of Pakistani fighters into ‘occupied Kashmir’; and (c) that Pakistan had China’s backing. Bhutto’s premises were completely wrong. Following the failure of the 1965 campaign, and after Ayub’s acceptance of the Tashkent accord, Bhutto and Pakistan generals started a rumour campaign that: (a) Ayub had betrayed Pakistani interests in Tashkent; (b) at the appropriate time Bhutto would reveal the secret clause(s) of the Tashkent agreement; and (c) the Pakistani Army had a secret plan to defeat India but Ayub had lost his nerve. There is no evidence to support the Bhutto-Army claims but that is not the point. Bhutto discovered that his anti-Ayub campaign was popular with Pakistani public opinion. This was the result of the Pakistani public’s identification with the Kashmir issue, with the Ayub regime’s corruption and with the need for internal reforms. In this setting Bhutto established his People’s Party of Pakistan (PPP) with the slogan of Islamic socialism. Bhutto’s motive in 1970–1 was to win
elections and to come to power. It was not to share power with the Bengalis in East Pakistan.

Table 3.4 indicates the three-way struggle during March-December 1971 between Bhutto-PPP, Yahya-Pakistani Army, and Mujib-Awami League. This struggle included a coalition of Yahya and Bhutto and their respective constituencies. This coalition was formed in the Ayub days. According to Asghar Khan:

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was…the only political leader to publicly welcome the imposition of martial law. For Bhutto, the end justified the means. The end being the capture of power, he was willing to use every stratagem to achieve this. He had maintained good personal relations with important Generals throughout his tenure as a minister in Ayub Khan’s cabinet and had done his utmost to retain these links even after his exit from the government. He was shrewd enough to know that Yahya Khan was the likely successor to Ayub Khan and had maintained good personal relations with him. His statement welcoming Yahya Khan’s martial law on his assumption of power as President and Chief Martial Law Administration was meant to start his dealings with him on the right note. All his subsequent moves were to follow this consistent approach and throughout the almost 3 years of Yahya Khan’s rule, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto maintained the closest links with him, largely through Major-General Pirzada, the Military Secretary to the President.32

The coalition was united by a common enemy, Mujib, after December 1970. The fear of provincial autonomy, majority rule and power-sharing motivated Yahya and Bhutto and their respective constituents. This coalition was locked in the East-West Pakistan fight (1954–71). Another element in this triangular struggle was the difference in approach to Pakistani politics: whereas the Army and the bureaucracy wanted to maintain its privileged position through an undemocratic and an anti-democratic political system, Bhutto and Mujib sought civil rule based on electoral legitimacy. The key players had different motivations, and contradictory impulses were at work during 1970–1. Bhutto wanted to gain power and to avoid power-sharing—first with Mujib and after December 1971 with the Army. Yahya wanted to keep his power, and his Army’s power, and to avoid power sharing with the Bengalis. The Army was not averse to sharing power with Bhutto, as it did in December 1971 and in 1988 with Benazir Bhutto in a limited way. There was no ambivalence in Bhutto’s and Yahya’s motives and threat perceptions. Bhutto and Yahya came together because they saw themselves as the winning coalition; a combination of the authoritarian but populist Bhutto and the repressive but national Army.

Among the core political players only Mujib was ambivalent in his aims and methods. His convictions led him to favour provincial autonomy and a federal Pakistan; his method was to secure compromise and a political solution. The circumstances during December 1970–March 1971, however, made him ambivalent. At this time he acted on the basis of internal compulsions rather than his convictions alone.

A number of internal compulsions produced ambivalence in Mujib’s political calculations. First, the Mukti Fauj (liberation army) emerged in Bangladesh. Several
reasons drove the *Mukti Fauj* towards armed struggle in East Pakistan: Bhutto and Yahya refused to respect the election results to make Mujib the Prime Minister; there was no sign that Pakistan’s political and constitutional arrangements would be changed in response to the election results of December 1970; finally the crackdown against the Bengalis by the Pakistani Army meant that the Army was determined to crush the Bengalis. But as Mujib and India saw it, the *Mukti Fauj* had high motivation but low capability in terms of military equipment and military organization. It was engaged against one of the best (US equipped) armies in the world. Mujib knew nothing about guerrilla warfare; he was a politician. Whereas Mujib’s preference was to negotiate a political solution, circumstances forced him to deal with the problems of armed struggle.

Secondly, Mujib was the symbol of the East Pakistani revolt against West Pakistani military repression and economic and cultural imperialism. But Bengalis lacked ideological unity. The East Pakistani Left responded to Maulana Bhashani. He had a rural power base and he was close to Beijing. On Chinese advice he had earlier supported the Ayub regime. After March 1971 Bhashani rallied on Mujib’s side but Mujib was considered pro-India and Bhashani was seen as pro-China. So the Mujib-Bhashani coalition was political and tactical rather than ideological. In a protracted war the ideological divisions among Bengalis were likely to surface. By siding with the Pakistani Army regime China had neutralized the Left in East Pakistani politics. However, in a protracted war China could have encouraged the development of a Vietnam-type war in East Pakistan. This could likely spill into India’s north-east; it could deny victory to Mujib’s forces and it could increase the internal ideological polarization in East Pakistani politics. Here protracted war was likely to exacerbate ideological differences and to complicate the ideological situation as well as the military one. Thirdly, protracted war was likely to bring many foreign influences into the East Pakistan military, diplomatic and ideological picture.

Table 3.4 indicates a convergence of interests between Yahya and Bhutto, and a disharmony of interests between Yahya and Mujib and between Bhutto and Mujib. The distribution of military power indicated asymmetry. According to the political rules of Yahya Khan, Mujib had the votes to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan but Yahya had the guns. Bhutto had most of the votes in West Pakistan but they were not enough to earn him the Prime Ministership. He aligned himself with the guns of the Pakistani Army as the way to deny Mujib the fruits of his political victory and to keep himself as a contender for power. Had Bhutto been sincere about democracy and socialism (his party’s platform), and had he been sincere in his criticism of Army rule, Bhutto’s convictions would have led him to take Mujib’s side and to share power with him rather than to join hands with the Army. By joining Yahya and by opposing Mujib, Bhutto strengthened the advocacy of the military option against Bengalis in March 1971. Hence Bhutto not only contributed to the political polarization of West-East Pakistan relations, but he also contributed to the militarization of the West-East Pakistan political, social and economic divide. In this sense Bhutto was a party to the slaughter of Bengalis which the Pakistani Army unleashed on the night of 25 March 1971. (As an aside it is worth mentioning that General Tikka Khan, allegedly the butcher of Bangladesh was appointed as the Governor of Punjab by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, thus perpetuating the love affair between the Pakistani Army generals and the Bhuttos.)
power was more important than Pakistani unity, power-sharing, democracy and socialism.

The polarization in West-East Pakistan relations and the military crackdown on 25/26 March 1971 led to an exodus of millions of East Pakistani refugees into India. This created a heavy strain on India’s social, economic and political fabric. In this setting India entered the East Pakistan picture. The introduction of the India factor in the West-East Pakistan divide decisively affected the outcome in the 1971 crisis. From March to December 1971 Indian diplomatic and military activities changed West Pakistan’s political and military position on the ground in East Pakistan.

Indian actions disoriented West Pakistani diplomatic and strategic thinking. As a result of Indian intervention West Pakistani elites focused on the issue of ‘Indian aggression’. However, the real issue concerned West Pakistani army brutality, and an unwillingness on the part of the military, bureaucratic and PPP elites to share power with the Bengalis. India externalized and internationalized the Bangladesh case. Pakistan did the same and by doing so it fell into the Indian trap.

Pakistan’s international howling about ‘Indian expansionism’ got it limited support and aid from its allies (the USA and China) but it did not help Pakistan retrieve its military and political position on the ground. The expectation of American and Chinese support for the Pakistani military regime against India increased West Pakistan’s intransigence in using the military option. It also delayed the reform of West Pakistani elite thinking about the necessity of power-sharing and democracy. Here foreign-linked elite behaviour in the 1971 crisis created a false sense of security in West Pakistan. It diverted the elite’s attention from the real domestic agenda that required fundamental internal reform of Pakistan’s political system.

West Pakistani elites learnt nothing about the importance of political accommodation and internal political reform during the 1971 crisis because the interests/values of the core domestic political players in West Pakistan were narrow, fixed, non-negotiable; and their foreign contacts reinforced these interests and perceptions. With the introduction of the India factor in Bangladesh affairs from April 1971 onwards, American and Chinese diplomatic activities in South Asia and at the UN were motivated by their parallel opposition to Indian power rather than the principle of self-determination, freedom, democracy and armed struggle for the Bengalis. The India factor changed the West-East Pakistan game; and it changed the game for the USA and China. For both countries, broader strategic factors took precedence over the need to reform West Pakistani internal political and constitutional arrangements. In the case of the US, Henry Kissinger states that the India-Pakistan War of 1971 was ‘perhaps the most complex issue of Nixon’s first term… What made the crisis so difficult was that the stakes were so much greater than the common perception of them.’

The American ‘tilt towards Pakistan’ was predicated primarily on three factors: the need to protect the Administration’s China initiative in which Pakistan played a pivotal role; the concern that inaction would send a ‘wrong signal’ to the Soviets and cause other US allies to question the strength of the American commitment; the belief held by Kissinger and Nixon that the Indian government intended to ‘use the opportunity to settle accounts with Pakistan once and for all and assert India’s pre-eminence on the subcontinent.’
The Chinese position was nuance-ridden. Their official stance, as documented in a letter from Chou En-Lai to Yahya Khan, was that:

Should the Indian expansionists dare to launch aggression against Pakistan, the Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly support the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to safeguard state sovereignty and national independence.\(^{38}\)

The Chinese firmly advocated a peaceful solution to the problems in East Pakistan. Although they were concerned that an Indian victory over Pakistan might lead to a Soviet-controlled subcontinent, they were reluctant to resort to military intervention in the light of the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. The Chinese feared that the Soviets would use an attack on India as an opportunity to confront the Chinese under circumstances favourable to a Soviet victory. Yaacov Vertzberger notes that:

China probably would have resorted to military intervention only in the most extreme circumstances—either those involving a high risk to China’s credibility as a world power and particularly as an Asian power or dismemberment of the heart of Pakistan, its western wing. East Pakistan itself was of little importance to China. It did not border on China, and its main value was the significance it had for Pakistan’s leadership. Once keeping East Pakistan became too expensive, China was unwilling to pay the price.\(^{39}\)

India’s military behaviour in the 1971 crisis has been widely studied, but Western commentaries rarely assess Indian behaviour as a product of compulsions and opportunities.\(^{40}\) A striking element was the prominence of ambivalence in the diplomatic and military activities of the external powers including India, in addition to Mujib’s ambivalence. Indian elites’ ambitions, Indian internal compulsions, the Indian government’s attentiveness to opportunities that existed because of ambivalence in the perceptions and policies of the US and Chinese governments, and the narrow-mindedness and incompetence of West Pakistani elites, contributed to the break-up of Pakistan. Fortunate circumstances and pressing compulsions, rather than an Indian master plan, led to the break-up of Pakistan. Table 3.5 outlines the ambivalent elements in the thinking of the great powers. India’s skill was to manoeuvre successfully through the maze of ambivalent interests in a crisis situation and to turn dangers into opportunities.

**EFFECTS OF THE 1971 CRISIS ON PAKISTANI POLITICS**

The defeat of the Pakistani Army on the battlefield and the break-up of Pakistan, opened up a number of possibilities about the next phase of Pakistan’s internal and external relations. These are summarized below.
1 The Bhutto-Army collusion in bringing down Ayub Khan, in opposing Mujib, in deciding on the use of the military option against Mujib and the Bengalis, opened up the prospect of the development of a Bhutto-Army-bureaucracy elite power coalition with a populist face.

Table 3.5 External players’ ambivalence, 1971 crisis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External actors</th>
<th>Elements of ambivalence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>It had to react to its realpolitik concern to maintain China-Pakistan-US links and its avowed commitment to humanitarian principles in world affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>It had to choose between its ties with India and its concern to curb the expansion of India’s power in South Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>It had to choose between its realpolitik concern to check the expansion of Indian power and to support its Pakistani ally and, on the other hand, its commitment to revolutionary principles which would have led to its support of the Bangladeshi revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>It had to choose between an autonomous East Pakistan which would have created a permanent line of pressure against West Pakistan, a prolonged civil/guerrilla war in India’s north-east which could have destabilized Indian provinces there or Indian military aid which led to an independent Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Mass uprisings in 1969–70 in West Pakistan, and in 1971 in East Pakistan, opened up the prospect of armed struggle as the basis of revolution in Pakistan so that power could be transferred from the bourgeois power elite to the people.

3 The failure of the two-nation theory in the 1971 crisis was revealed. The belief of Muslims separateness from the Hindus, and the belief in Muslim unity, could not keep the two wings of Pakistan together. This indicated that Pakistan’s future identity depended less on its religious distinctiveness and more on the viability of its internal political and constitutional arrangements which bridged inter-ethnic divisions. This opened up the prospect that Pakistani elites would re-think the need to develop viable internal arrangements to share powers and to recognize ethnicity as a political force in Pakistan.

4 The failure of the Pakistani Army to win against India, and the failure of Pakistan’s international allies to bail out Pakistan, meant that Pakistan could not successfully externalize its problems. This opened up the prospect that Pakistani elites might henceforth seek internal solution, for their internal problems and seek a political approach rather than a military approach to political problems.

5 Pakistan’s failure in a fight that was widely seen as an India-Pakistan fight opened up the prospect of stabilization and eventual normalization in India-Pakistan relations. India’s determination to maintain a military edge over Pakistan opened up the prospect that a territorially dissatisfied state (Pakistan) could lose its appetite for war. If Pakistan could not even save its own territory by satisfying the demands of its own Muslims, it was not realistic to expect it to liberate Kashmir by force. The 1971 crisis opened up the prospect of a fundamental shift in social and elite thinking about war and territorial irredentism in Pakistan.
These five possibilities established the setting of the agenda in Pakistan’s political affairs in the next phase: the Bhutto era. To this I now turn.
There are two ways to study the Bhutto era. First, it may be seen as an irrevocable break with the dominant pattern of military intervention in Pakistani politics since the early 1950s. Here Bhutto’s ascendancy to power in December 1971 is seen as a turning point in Pakistani political history. It is viewed as a new beginning which laid the foundation for a democratic and constitutional political system and a mixed economy to meet the popular aspirations of Pakistanis. The holding of national elections, the adoption of a new Constitution (1973), and efforts to curb corruption and to nationalize select sectors of the Pakistan economy, are signs of Bhutto’s attempt to restructure Pakistan’s political, military and economic affairs. The theme of a new beginning is also relevant in Pakistan’s foreign policy under Bhutto. After the break-up of Pakistan and the defeat of the Pakistani Army at Indian hands, Pakistanis went through an identity, and a psychological, crisis. The events of 1971 damaged the pet Pakistani theory that Muslims and Hindus were two separate nations. The year 1971 showed that there was unity between Indira Gandhi’s Hindus and the Bangladeshi Muslims and that there was total disunity between West Pakistani Muslims and the Bengali ones. The same year also showed that ethnicity rather than religion was the driving element in Pakistani politics. Furthermore, the Pakistani Army had projected itself as the guardian of Pakistan’s internal and external security. After the fall of Dacca the Army’s defeat undermined the Army’s guardianship role and image. As a result of these crises, Bhutto recognized the realities. He accepted a shift in the regional balance of power in India’s favour. He accepted that war was no longer a viable method with which to liberate Kashmir. The issue of Kashmiri liberation was put on the backburner by Bhutto. By accepting the Simla Agreement (1972), Bhutto acknowledged the principles of peaceful negotiation and bilateralism as the basis of India-Pakistan relations. This was a turning point in Bhutto’s and West Pakistani psychology. The change in Bhutto was striking since he, more than any other Pakistani leader, had continuously played up the theme of Kashmiri liberation in Pakistani politics since the 1960s. He had talked about fighting the Hindus for a thousand years. He had played up the notion that one Muslim equalled ten Hindus. So it was in this area that Bhutto’s foreign policy with India after 1971 was a major break with Bhutto’s pre-1971 personal attitudes and policy, which had stressed anti-Indianism and the primacy of the Kashmir dispute in Pakistani foreign and military affairs.

However the second approach sees the Bhutto era as a temporary interlude, a break from military-bureaucracy oligarchic rule, but the end result was a coup by Zia and a polarization between Islamic, democratic, ethnic and military-bureaucratic forces. Here Bhutto’s emergence was the result of fortunate circumstances. But as the Pakistani Army’s internal position changed from weakness (1971) to strength (mid-1970s) and the
internal balance of political power and perception about Bhutto’s future changed, Bhutto lost power. With his ousting and subsequent hanging the Bhutto factor in Pakistani politics was marginalized.

The premise in the second approach is that the Pakistani Army continued to retain a position of autonomy in the state of Pakistan and in society. This autonomy was temporarily put into cold storage by the Army because it knew it could not rule in a legitimate manner after the military débâcle in Bangladesh. It needed time to regain its lost position. It gained the time by having Bhutto as a civilian buffer between the Army, the public in Pakistan, and the world from 1972 to 1977. But after this, Bhutto was unnecessary, and given his personal ambitions and challenge to military authority, he was dangerous.

Two questions are inherent in this chapter. First, has the Pakistani Army always been autonomous (self-sufficient and not in need of domestic and external allies) and dominant in the Pakistan state as a state within a state, from the early 1950s? Secondly, did Bhutto, despite his numerous failures, nevertheless change the structure of Pakistani foreign policy, as well as its constitutional and political approach?1

This chapter adopts the latter view. It explores a perspective which builds on Pakistani studies on Bhutto but which differs in analysis and conclusion from the conventional wisdom.2 I see the Bhutto era as a major turning point in Pakistan’s political history but it was not a complete break with the past. Bhutto’s ideas were not original. His main ideas reflected internal political debates in Army circles, in the Foreign Office and in the Pakistani press. Bhutto was not an original thinker; but he was a synthesizer and a political animal who had a sense of politics and history in the making. He had a sense of public opinion. He could understand, and build on, opportunities. He was a political chameleon who could change colours when it suited his personal ambitions. He was not wedded to a particular ideology or philosophy other than his love for Bonaparte, a love of the presidency and glory. Bhutto was articulate but he was not consistent. He talked about democracy, but in power he functioned like an autocrat. He spoke of economic reform and yet he used violence against workers seeking better wages. He railed against feudal landowners, and yet he built political/electoral coalitions with them. He sought free elections and yet he rigged them. Bhutto was both egotistical and too clever by half, which is why he lost both power and his own life.

Bhutto’s strength lay in his tactics. These were driven by his personal ambition and had a political fall-out. The fall-out is Bhutto’s legacy and contribution to Pakistani affairs. Bhutto’s personal tragedy is not important in this study, but his tactics and their long-term consequences deserve attention.

The chapter argues that Bhutto built his political actions and speeches on ideas in circulation within the Pakistani policy establishment and public opinion. He was always an establishment man in search of opportunities to advance his power. His collusion with the Army and his articulation of Army interests during 1969–71 was a part of this pattern. These experiences and attitudes were Bhutto’s inheritance. Out of this inheritance came a strategy to develop Bhutto’s autonomy in Pakistani politics and to reduce the dominant position of the Pakistani Army in Pakistani affairs.

Bhutto was different from Ayub Khan or Yahya Khan. They wanted to establish their own, and the Pakistani Army’s, dominance over Pakistani affairs. Bhutto wanted to develop a Bhutto-centric system, with himself as the political director of the Pakistani
Army and other centres of power. These approaches were incompatible. The novelty of Bhutto is that he tried to transform Pakistan’s political system so as to increase his autonomy and to reduce the Army’s autonomy, a state within a state situation.\(^3\)

In his quest for total power he failed because of his personality, his policies and the circumstances. But his aim, to reduce the margin of political manoeuvrability and dominance of the Pakistani Army over Pakistan’s internal political, economic and civil-military arrangements, was a sound one. It found a home in Pakistani elite and public thinking. It had a social purpose. So even though Bhutto died, his ideas lived on. This, and the mythology about Bhutto which is being created by his family and admirers,\(^4\) became the basis of Bhuttoism and the push towards a post-Zia Pakistan.

The Bhutto relationship with the Army reveals on the one hand a ‘happy convergence’ between the two during 1965–71, and on the other hand a ‘deadly encounter’ between them during the period 1972–7. The convergence came about against common enmities (Ayub and Mujib). When these enmities were not in play, then the deadly encounter dominated the Bhutto-Army relationship because both sought autonomy and dominance.

Bhutto and the Army could have learnt important lessons from Pakistan’s internal developments in the 1960s and its performance in the 1965 and 1971 wars, but they did not. A correct evaluation could have indicated the following:

1 If the Army could not win wars against India, a large and an ambitious Army was likely to function in a parasitic way and in a political way in Pakistani affairs unless its motivations were changed to follow only military aims.

2 Neither the Army nor Bhutto nor the USA could pursue their respective interests in Pakistan unaided. The three parties needed to combine, to share power, to curb their respective ambitions. They needed to rethink their interests and their intervention strategies \(\text{vis-à-vis}\) each other.

Unfortunately, these lessons were not learnt by the Army and by Bhutto. This failure produced the turmoil in Pakistan during 1972–7. Nevertheless the Bhutto era was a turning point in two different ways. First, it revealed the inadequacy of military rule and military hegemony as a stable basis of Pakistani political life. Secondly, it revealed the inadequacy of Bhutto’s populist-authoritarianism as a stable basis on which to organize Pakistani affairs. The lesson about the utility of power-sharing was grasped by Pakistani elites in the post-Zia era, albeit in a limited and a tentative way. This occurred when Benazir Bhutto and the Army chief learnt the art of uneasy peaceful co-existence.

We need to assess the Z.A. Bhutto era because it provided the first irreversible step that started to restructure Pakistani political thinking and power relations. The recognition by the Pakistani Army that while it was the biggest and most autonomous organization in Pakistan it was not able to run Pakistan, led to the rise of Bhutto and Bhuttoism as a buffer between the Army and society in 1971. With this came the recognition that legitimacy required elections and pluralism in politics.

I turn now to explain the Bhutto approach to politics, the circumstances in which he functioned, the reasons for his failures, and finally his legacy.
After 1966 Bhutto sought power on a platform of democracy, socialism and an anti-Army stance. These thrusts were sharply presented in his writings and political speeches. He went to the gallows pleading his case along these lines. *If I am Assassinated*, his death cell memoirs, contain the views Bhutto would have us believe. They provide a strident critique of militarism in Pakistan and the need for reform and democracy under Bhutto’s guidance. My aims are to outline Bhutto’s political ideas, and to assess his political behaviour and the context within which he acted. The following sections will show that the Bhutto era was a turning point in Pakistan’s political and constitutional history but it was not a break with the past (in terms of Bhutto’s personality, his ties with the Pakistani Army, the internal political debate in Army circles, and the history of military rule in Pakistan). Bhutto and his family had close and enduring political ties within Pakistani Army circles. Through these links, they had first-hand knowledge about in-house political and military debates. It is appropriate to see Z.A. Bhutto as a Army insider but not necessarily as its sole spokesman or a spokesman at all times. As an insider he took advantage of his political connections and knowledge. He built his political position within Pakistan on the basis of changing internal political alignments within Pakistan and changing external strategic and diplomatic circumstances. Bhutto was not original in his thinking but he was original in developing a winning strategy which put him into power. In doing so he used his tactical alliances with elements in the Pakistani Army, and he took advantage of Pakistan’s internal and external compulsions. Bhutto never broke with his, and his country’s, pattern of political behaviour. He never abandoned his personal ambition to lead Pakistan. He did not abandon his contempt for Pakistani politicians. He shared the Pakistani Army’s view of politicians as inept, opportunistic and corrupt. Bhutto’s enthusiasm for democracy was tactical. Common enemies brought Bhutto and the Pakistani Army together in favour of the democratic case in Pakistan. In 1969–70 Bhutto and Yahya Khan favoured democracy because of their combined opposition to Ayub Khan and because of their belief that election results could be rigged by Pakistan’s powerful bureaucracy. In 1970–1 Bhutto and Yahya came together temporarily because of their common opposition to the political rise of Mujib and the Bengalis. For both Yahya and Bhutto free elections and democracy were meant to be used for their respective political purposes. In 1969–70 (vis-à-vis Ayub) and in 1970–1 vis-à-vis Mujib) Yahya and his advisers wanted power, not power-sharing. The case for Bhutto’s rise to power in December 1971 was settled by Yahya’s and the Pakistani Army’s defeat in the Bangladesh campaign. Bhutto favoured the Pakistani Army versus Mujib-Bengali confrontation. Out of the ashes of the 1971 débâcle came Bhutto’s rise. That is, favourable circumstances and Bhutto’s strategy brought about his rise. But the Yahya-Bhutto convergence during 1969–70 (against Ayub) and 1970–1 (against Mujib) was temporary. As other overriding interests came into play, the convergence of interests between Bhutto and the Pakistani Army evaporated, as in 1977.

Two views are examined in the following discussion. First, that the Bhutto era was a turning point in Pakistan’s political and constitutional history but it was not a break with the past (Bhutto’s and Pakistan’s). Secondly, the counter-point is that the Bhutto era was
not a turning point: it was an interesting experiment in Pakistani democracy and it
provided a temporary departure from the history of military rule. It was a passing phase
which was followed by the restoration of military rule in 1977.

The contention in the latter interpretation is that, given the history of formal military
rule in Pakistan since 1958, and of informal military rule since 1951, the military
organization has functioned as the dominant and autonomous entity in Pakistani political,
constitutional, military and external affairs. The nature of Army rule has undoubtedly
varied. Pakistani scholars point out that in November 1958 the Army returned to the
barracks after Ayub Khan assumed power through a military coup; the government’s
daily business remained in the hands of the Pakistani civil service. Under Yahya Khan,
there were parallel military and civil governments at all major levels of the governmental
hierarchy. The headquarters of the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) and of
provincial CMLAs ran the government directly and the civilian facade wore thin. Under
Ayub the Army ruled through a civil government, and Army personnel were kept out of
most government institutions. Under Yahya the Army presence in governmental affairs
was pervasive and direct.6

Both views have merit, but the former appears stronger on balance. In the 1951–71
period, the autonomy of the Army in Pakistan’s internal affairs increased, but its
authority in Pakistan’s internal and external affairs varied with circumstances. Its
authority was high in 1953–4 when the US-Pakistan security relationship crystallized. It
was high in 1958 at the time of the Ayub coup. It was low in 1965 when the Army failed
to wrest Kashmir by force from India; low in 1969–70 when the Ayub army failed to
keep the peace against mass urban violence and political protest in Pakistan. Finally, it
was low in 1971 when the Pakistani Army failed to subjugate the Bengalis and the
Indians even though the Pakistani Army was one of the best equipped and modern armies
in the world and the Pakistani soldiers prided themselves on their martial tradition and
military prowess against their non-martial Hindus and Bengalis.

When the Army lost its authority in the eyes of the Pakistani public and its US patron,
it recognized the need to develop civilian buffers. The aim was to secure breathing time
and to gain political space or room for manoeuvre in internal affairs. But even as it lost its
political authority in the eyes of its Pakistani and American constituents, the Pakistani
Army did not lose its autonomy in Pakistani affairs. It remained a disciplined and a self-
contained military organization. This point lies behind the second view mentioned earlier.

The only lawful foreign penetration of this organization was done by the US
government. This occurred as a result of its continuous involvement in the work of
Pakistan’s defence and intelligence establishments. This had the effect of solidifying the
US government-Pakistani Army alliance in Pakistani affairs and in Pakistan’s external
affairs. Even though the Pakistani Army lost its authority in 1971 in Pakistani affairs, this
institutional link with the US was never lost—a link which nourished the quest of both
the US government and the Pakistani Army to preserve the autonomy of the Pakistani
Army in political and military affairs. The historic problem for the US government was
that the Pakistani Army could not deliver by winning military battles against India (1965
and 1971) or by dislodging the Communist regime in the 1980s in Afghanistan. The US
government knew how to arm Pakistan against its enemies but it did not know how to
develop the authority/legitimacy of the Pakistani Army in Pakistani affairs and in
regional affairs. As a consequence it became necessary by 1971, for both the Pakistani
Army and its patron, the US government, to rely on civilian buffers such as Bhutto and other advocates of democracy in Pakistan. This approach was meant to preserve the autonomy of the Pakistani Army, to preserve the continuous intimacy of US government-Pakistani government institutional ties and the underlying common interests in a historic patron-client relationship, and to restore the authority of the Pakistani Army in political affairs. The civilian buffers were not meant to function as a substitute for the autonomy and authority of the Pakistani Army in internal and external affairs. The buffers were meant to be assistants in that process. As long as they played that role they could stay in power to manage the civil facade of Army rule.

According to this schema, the US-Pakistani Army alliance sought autonomy of political choice. This alliance revealed its effectiveness repeatedly at critical points in Pakistan’s political history. In 1958 this alliance brought Ayub into power and then destroyed him in 1969. It offered free elections in 1970 and then decided to fight Mujib and the Indians in 1971. It decided to bring Bhutto to power in December 1971 and then destroyed him in 1977–79. Here the recurring thread in Pakistani political history is the continuous and dominant presence in internal crises of the Pakistani Army-US government. This alliance has a hand in the making and in the temporary resolution of political crises in Pakistan.

Here two kinds of relations are at play. First, the Pakistani Army functioned, frequently but not continuously, as the dominant political force in Pakistani affairs; and it functioned continuously as an autonomous political player in Pakistan’s internal affairs. Secondly, the US government functioned continuously as the dominant political force in the Pakistani Army’s affairs. By defining the power structure of the Pakistani Army, the US government functioned as a key participant in Pakistan’s internal power struggles.

To develop its autonomy and authority in Pakistan’s affairs (with US government help) the Army relied on four assumptions at different times. Consider the following summaries of each premise.

**The first premise**
That Pakistani politicians were weak, corrupt and inept. That Pakistani political parties were divided and driven by personal ambitions and differences rather than convictions and issues. That Pakistan’s civil bureaucracy could manipulate elections. These views were dominant in the Ayub, Yahya and Zia eras.

**The second premise**
That the Pakistani Army and civil bureaucracy was the guardian of Pakistan’s internal and external security; and that the central aims of the state of Pakistan were to maintain internal and external security, as in the British colonial period. This premise was in full play in the Ayub, Yahya and Zia eras.

**The third premise**
That the Army could not rule by coercion alone; it required civilian buffers. This required civilian administrators who were administrative strategists, and civilian politicians as...
political front-men and political legitimizers in Pakistan. This premise was in play in the inner-Army debates during the Yahya and Zia eras. This premise was the basis of the Ayub era.

**The fourth premise**

That formal responsibilities of political office would undermine the Army’s prestige in the long run in the eyes of Pakistani public opinion. ‘Prestige’ was an important factor because of the charisma attached to the Pakistani Army as the guardian of internal and external security, as the defender of Pakistan’s Islamic faith, and as an anti-corrupt organization. This premise was a part of the controversy in internal Pakistani affairs in the Ayub era. As a result of the Ayub family’s business activities the smell of Army corruption entered Pakistani public consciousness. This premise also explains the widespread contempt for Yahya’s corruption, depravity and incompetence.

The first premise defined the Pakistani Army’s approach to Pakistani political affairs. The second premise defined the Pakistani Army’s approach towards its non-Punjabi nationalities, i.e. Baluch, NWFP, Sind and East Pakistan (Bengalis). The third and the fourth premises defined and explained the Pakistani Army’s approach to elections in Pakistan and its interest during the Ayub, the Yahya and the Zia eras in utilizing civil assistants and buffers in relations between the Pakistani Army, Pakistani society and the political system.

Unfortunately for the Army, successive internal and external crises eroded the first and the second premises of Pakistan’s Army-bureaucratic domination of Pakistani internal and external affairs and increased the utility of the third and fourth ones. Yahya’s débâcle in the Bangladesh crisis smashed the first premise. The erosion of the second premise set in during the 1965 war. In this war, Pakistani public opinion was divided in its judgement of the Army’s performance. Some thought that Pakistan had failed to gain Kashmir by force and it was unlikely to be able to do so in the future. Others thought that with better military leadership Pakistan would do better in the next war with India. It took the 1971 war to destroy this illusion in Pakistani public and elite opinion. This resulted in the Army’s crisis of authority. This crisis increased the usefulness of the third and the fourth premises. With the rise of Bhutto came one of the shifts in the Army’s thinking and behaviour.

Bhutto’s rise was the direct result of the Army’s authority crisis but in this crisis the Pakistani Army’s autonomy was never in doubt. Nor is the fact that Bhutto was a military collaborator; up to 1971 he was more militaristic and chauvinistic than the Pakistani generals. Interestingly, Bhutto articulated all the four premises listed above. But in Bhutto’s use of each premise there was a calculation to advance his career. He used the Army to weaken and to eliminate his opponents, i.e. Ayub Khan in 1969 and Mujib in 1970. Here Bhutto played up the value of the first and the second premises listed above. However, after 1971 Bhutto also saw the Army as a threat to this personal ambition to function as the umpire in Pakistan’s affairs. Here Bhutto was not interested in sharing power. He saw himself as Pakistan’s Napoleon.7 His writings and statements reveal a fascination with the French imperial figure. Bhutto’s declared vision of his own, and Pakistan’s future, and his method of political action fit the third and the fourth premises listed above. After 1971, the erosion of the first and the second premises set in. This led
to the advancement of Bhutto’s position under the third and the fourth premises. So the Pakistan story during the Bhutto era may be examined as an interaction between two linear curves. The first led to the rise and the fall of the Pakistani Army’s authority in Pakistan’s internal and external affairs. The second led to the rise and the fall of Bhutto’s authority and his dream for autonomy in Pakistan’s affairs. To the story of the two curves I now turn briefly.


Under Jinnah, Pakistan’s bureaucracy emerged as the directorate of Pakistani political affairs. Officials acted in Jinnah’s name as he was too sick to assume real control over state affairs. In this directorate the political weight of the Pakistani Army started to emerge in the early 1950s (Chapter 1). Since then a bureaucratic-military alliance gained ground and it continually shaped Pakistan’s internal political relations and constitutional arrangements. The growing weight of the Pakistani Army in Pakistani affairs was reflected in the increasing number of functions in state affairs which were discharged by the Pakistani Army (see Table 4.1). In most cases, the Army’s role was necessary and critical to the final outcome.

However, over time, the Army’s ability to discharge these functions declined but its military strength (measured by the size of its armed forces, its military expenditures and arms acquisitions) increased. Herein lies a paradox about the Pakistani Army: as its military capacities increased and its social purposes (military, political and ideological functions) weakened, its parasitic position increased. This is the historical record of Pakistani Army rule.

Table 4.1 Functions of the Pakistani Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideological</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>National security</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military strength is the basis of Pakistan’s survival as a Muslim state against Hindu and Soviet expansion. Here the ideological function combines with external security</td>
<td>When Pakistani politicians are weak, ineffective and corrupt, the Army is the political umpire in internal affairs</td>
<td>Pakistan has hostile neighbours and hostile borders: namely, facing India, the USSR, Iran, and Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Faced by internal ethnic and regionalist divisions, the Army is the guardian of internal security and order</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Successive crises in Pakistan led to an erosion of the Pakistani Army’s and the bureaucracy’s authority in Pakistan’s internal and external affairs. The Ayub era was tainted by corruption and by its inability to win a war. The smell of corruption in the Pakistani Army increased in the Yahya era, as did the widespread sense that the Pakistani Army could talk big but it could not defeat the Indians in the field. The taint of corruption undermined the political function and the political legitimacy of the Army as an anti-corrupt force. The failure to win in 1965 and 1971 undermined the Army’s military function.
The Pakistani Army was meant to ensure the survival of Pakistan as a separate nation and as a modern Muslim state. It had as well an ideological function in the promotion of the two nations theory. This was also Jinnah’s and the British Indian imperial government’s theory. The Pakistani Army’s military repression of a popularly elected Bengali Muslim government during 1970–1 smashed that theory to bits. The separation of East and West Pakistan destroyed the relevance of the two nations theory for West Pakistanis. The 1970–1 events revealed that ethnicity rather than religion was the elemental force in Pakistani politics. When the Pakistani Army set upon fellow Muslims in East Pakistan in March 1971 it revealed the coercive nature of the Army in relation to Pakistani nationalities. Army operations against Kalat and Baluchistan during the 1950s and 1960s carried the same lesson, but on a lesser and less visible scale than the Bangladesh campaign.

The increasing inability of the Army to fulfil its political, military and ideological functions eroded the authority of the Pakistani Army. But these losses were not enough to finish the Army as a political force in Pakistan. In my argument, by 1971, the Pakistani Army had lost its authority but not its autonomy in Pakistani affairs in comparison to other organized political groups in Pakistan. The Bhutto era was a turning point for the Army because Bhutto embarked on a political and constitutional course that was meant to end the Army’s function as a political umpire in Pakistan’s affairs. Bhutto did not succeed in becoming the political umpire himself. Nor could he prevent the re-emergence of the Army as a political force in 1977. Internal circumstances and Bhutto’s personality led to the events of 1977. These are discussed later in this chapter. But Bhutto succeeded in creating a few constitutional and political checks against unbridled Army domination of Pakistan. The Afghanistan issue helped Zia-ul-Haq extend his rule for eleven years. But even under favourable circumstances Zia-ul-Haq had to pay lip service to elections and laws. Furthermore, after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, it became necessary for Pakistanis to return to the Bhutto guidelines for civil-military relations in Pakistan. This way the Bhutto legacy endured.

The critical variable in my argument is not the size and strength of the Pakistani Army. This explains its autonomy. The critical variable is that the Army continuously lost its authority with respect to its political, military and ideological functions. Out of the misfortunes of the Pakistani Army came the opportunity for Bhutto to rise to power. Bhutto was the wild card in Pakistani politics. A part of him belonged to the establishment. He shared the first and the second premises of Army rule. The other part was anti-establishment. His personality and his actions put him on a collision course with Army-bureaucratic rule. The second part of Bhutto was consistent with the third and the fourth premises of Army rule. The Army wanted civil buffers and Bhutto was available for this role. However, the Army’s view of the third and the fourth premises did not suit Bhutto. The Army wanted a front-man, not a political umpire. Bhutto wanted autonomy. He wanted the power and the opportunity to function as a political umpire in Pakistani affairs.

The story of the loss of authority by Pakistan’s generals and the Army should be spelled out because it is relevant to my case that the Bhutto era was a turning point in Pakistan’s history and that it was not a passing fancy. To this I now turn.

The involvement of the Pakistani Army in internal affairs started in the early 1950s. At the time the Army influenced Pakistan’s diplomatic and military orientation. It became a
major factor in internal affairs but it was not a political umpire. Until 1958 Pakistan did not have long-lasting political umpires. Jinnah filled this role but his tenure as Governor-General was brief and he was mostly sick. Liaquat Ali Khan tried to fill this role but his tenure as Prime Minister was brief and his hold over government was tenuous. Ayub’s coup in 1958 along with his personality enabled him to function as a political umpire for the first time in a serious and a continuous way in Pakistani history (1958–69). He functioned above the ‘weak, corrupt and incompetent’ politicians. He controlled competing bureaucracies and rebellious provinces (Baluchistan and East Pakistan). Political power lay with Ayub Khan but the government was run by civilian officials and it was legitimized by Basic Democrats. The civil administration and the Basic Democrats were the buffers between Ayub and the Army on the one hand, and the Pakistani people on the other. Ayub had military and political authority within Pakistan and among Pakistan’s friends abroad. Within Pakistan this legitimacy came under attack with urban/student violence in 1969. These events (described in Chapter 2) finished Ayub’s authority but they did not affect the Army’s authority or its autonomy in Pakistani politics and its external relations. The Army’s autonomy and authority helped bring down Ayub. It led to the transfer of power peacefully from Ayub to Yahya in March 1969. During the Yahya era there was a change of cast but not a change in the attitudes of the Army, the bureaucracy and Bhutto about the Army’s dominant role in Pakistan’s affairs. Until December 1971 the autonomy of the Pakistani Army existed but from 1970 its authority in Pakistan’s affairs started to erode.

Military rule in Pakistan failed in its main function as a political legitimizer when the Ayub regime crumbled like a house of cards. It revealed its inability to develop nation-building policies. It failed to advance Pakistani interests in foreign affairs. The last months of the Ayub era showed the unravelling of the first and the second premises of the Pakistani Army’s approach to politics. Subsequently, as a result of events during 1970–1, the Pakistani Army lost both its legitimizing role in Pakistan’s affairs and its external and internal security functions. The Yahya regime’s assumption that weak and divided politicians could be manipulated, or that elections could be rigged, was invalidated by the 1970 elections. Here Yahya’s and the Army’s authority in both political and military affairs came into disrepute. With the emergence of Bhutto and Mujib on the West Pakistani and East Pakistani political stages respectively, the Army lost control over the political process. It lost its political umpire position. Instead, it became a party to the social and military conflict between the two Pakistani wings. In the end the Army lost its authority in both the political and external spheres although it remained an internally disciplined force, and it remained the strongest power in Pakistan. The Army’s invitation to Bhutto to take over power was not a political alliance between the two. Gardezi rightly points this out. Rather it was a sign of the Army’s political weakness. Bhutto took full advantage of this weakness.

The rise of Bhutto came in the context of a fierce polarization in Pakistani politics and a polarization in the thinking of Army circles as well. The internal Pakistani Army debate emerged in the Yahya era. This is discussed later in this chapter. Bhutto’s political ideas were expressed in the context of this debate. He benefited from the debate. His rise to political power came out of his position in this debate. In this way, the Bhutto era was to become a turning point because of the loss of authority of the Pakistani Army by December 1971. But it was not a break with the past. My view is that Bhutto was a
prisoner of the past in terms of his psychology and the pattern of Pakistani politics; both were continually driven by authoritarianism, paternalism, and intrigue (with an emphasis on service, not allegiance). Bhutto learnt from the inner-Army debate. After 1971 the inner-Army debate revealed a need to shift to the third and the fourth premises of Army thinking, that is, the Army needed to find civilian buffers and it could not rule by coercion alone. Bhutto was not an original thinker but he had enough sense to build a political strategy on the thinking of others. The framework of the inner-Army debate was crucial to Bhutto’s rise to power.

Bhutto’s rise to power was the result of Pakistan’s internal and external circumstances and Bhutto’s strategy to gain power.

There are two views to consider in assessing the Bhutto era. In the cyclical view of Pakistani political history, Pakistani politics move through cycles of civil-military interludes. In this view the Bhutto era was a passing interlude. The Army remained an autonomous and an authoritative force in Pakistani politics, waiting in the wings to return to power when Bhutto stumbled. That Zia-ul-Haq replaced Bhutto in July 1977 is seen as proof of this view. In the cyclical view, paternalism and authoritarianism (Jinnah era) was followed by a weak search for representative democracy (1948–58). This produced a number of unstable Pakistani governments. From the early 1950s the groundwork for de facto, and later, formal military rule was established as a result of the emergence of a bureaucracy-Army oligarchic alliance. This alliance started to dominate Pakistani politics from the early 1950s. Under the Ghulam Mohammed-Iskander Mirza oligarchic rule, the Pakistani Army had a big voice through the presence of Ayub Khan in the inner circle of government. Later, military rule by Ayub Khan (1958–69) was followed by Yahya Khan’s military rule (1969–71). Then came the rise of Bhutto as a civilian president (1971–7). The Bhutto civilian interlude (according to the cyclical view) was followed by Zia-ul-Haq’s military rule (1977–85), followed by an attempt to give this rule a civilian facade by having a civilian Prime Minister (M.A.Junejo) under Zia-ul-Haq (1985–88). This was followed by national and provincial elections and another

Table 4.2 Pattern of development of Pakistani politics, 1947–90

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947–58: Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan, Ghulam Mohammed, Iskander Mirza</td>
<td>This period saw the emergence of politics of charisma and intrigue. It saw the failure of representative government and the development of a foreign-linked Pakistani elite power structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958–69: Ayub era</td>
<td>This period saw the emergence of the military, bureaucratic and economic elites’ domination of Pakistani politics as well as politics of charisma (Ayub and Bhutto), intrigue, and mass politics (street agitation) in West Pakistan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969–1971: Yahya era</td>
<td>This period saw an intense polarization between West and East Pakistani political forces. This was a fight between two different models or approaches to political problems. (1) The oligarchy sought military-bureaucratic elite domination of Pakistani affairs. This was an anti-populist and an anti-Left position. It clashed with (2) populist, anti-rightist mass politics. The latter stressed the importance of street politics and ballot box politics. Bhutto was a part of the first model but he was not its leader; and Bhutto spoke the language of the second approach in public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972–79: Bhutto era</td>
<td>This was a period of populist-authoritarianism. Before his elections Bhutto projected a socialist</td>
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platform; after his accession to power he moved to the Right and he continually oscillated between the Left and the Right in his political actions.

1977–88: Zia-ul-Haq era
This period saw the development of military rule with an Islamic content. It was a form of right-wing government with an anti-democratic populism. This appealed to feudal and religious groups in Pakistani society.

1988–90: Benazir Bhutto
This period saw the development of an unsteady internal balance of power within Pakistan’s civil-military oligarchy and in the Pakistani political system. In inner circle struggles and debates personalities and policies were at issue. Here the US government played the key role of the ‘balancer’, the political umpire. Here two types of mass politics contended with each other—Bhutto’s PPP with a leftist, populist orientation versus the rightist, Islamic fundamentalist orientation. Here national and provincial politics also revealed inter-provincial divisions (e.g. Punjab versus Sind).


I reject the cyclical view. Instead I take the view that the Z.A.Bhutto era was a turning point in Pakistani politics.

Table 4.2 sketches the place of the Bhutto era in the overall picture and the overall pattern of development of Pakistani political affairs. It provides a linear view of change and improvement in the nature of Pakistan’s political system. The advance is incremental, but it is continuously vulnerable to internal vetoes and pressures. The advance lies in the gradual shift towards a Pakistani version of limited power-sharing between Bhutto-PPP, the Army, Punjab and the fundamentalists. The power-sharing is the result of circumstances. It does not express a natural orientation in Pakistani politics towards power-sharing. The natural orientation is to be paternalistic and authoritarian. The new element in Pakistani affairs after 1988 is that no single institutional force (e.g. the Army, bureaucracy, government departments) can dominate Pakistani politics today. The breakdown of Army authority and the growth of internal vetoes has created a climate of power-sharing. This power-sharing approach is a form of competitive coexistence, a way of accommodating diverse interests. The situation is one of unstable equilibrium or stalemate, i.e. there can be no meaningful internal reform because of the fairly even distribution of power in post-Zia Pakistan.

Although the last part of my narrative has gone beyond the Z.A. Bhutto era, it is necessary to have the perspective so as to show how the Z.A.Bhutto era may be studied as a turning point. Bhutto broke the authority of the Pakistani Army in internal Pakistani affairs by planting the seeds of constitutionalism, PPP, and national elections just as the Indian Army broke the authority of the Pakistani Army in external military affairs. Bhutto benefited from the internal and external misfortunes of the Pakistani Army. The irony is that he contributed to the Army’s misfortunes by constantly encouraging Pakistanis and Pakistani governments (under Ayub and Yahya) to rely on the military option to settle political problems. In this sense Bhutto was a big part of the problem. But on the other hand, by developing the PPP as an institutional force in Pakistani politics he created a new and powerful institutional participant in the search to redefine the basis of Pakistani politics. Bhutto’s motive was to create a Bhutto-centric political party to serve his personal quest for power. Its organization and decision-making was not democratic. However, despite such problems with internal party affairs in the PPP, Bhutto pushed the
notion of party-based mass politics in Pakistan. Though Bhutto abandoned the socialism after he came to power, though the PPP abandoned Bhutto when Zia-ul-Haq decided to hang Bhutto, still the idea of party politics survived despite Zia-ul-Haq’s repressive policies. This laid the foundation of ‘Bhuttoism’.

To understand the meaning and significance of the Bhutto era, it is important not to label Bhutto as either a liberal (progressive) or a leftist, or as a Fascist or a rightist. Bhutto’s ideological orientation does not help us assess his place in Pakistani history. Bhutto is on record telling an Italian journalist that it was inappropriate for a politician to reveal his operative policy concept.

The Bhutto record reveals that he had elements of Left and Right in his personality and in his political behaviour. In his election sloganeering and public speeches he was leftist. There are many examples of leftist orientation in his public positions. He cultivated China, opposed the Vietnam war, and he favoured internal populist reforms in Pakistan. But he also had significant rightist tendencies. His favourite leader was Napoleon. He encouraged and joined Yahya and the Army in a murderous campaign against the Bengalis. Against India on Kashmir in particular, and Hindus in general, he was rightist and chauvinist; he appealed to religious fundamentalists and anti-Hinduism in Pakistan even though he was not himself a devout Muslim. After 1971 he reorganized the Pakistani government machinery. A key change was to create a repressive Federal Security Force, a para-military organization. This agency was allegedly involved in political murders. Despite his publicized anti-Americanism in the Vietnam war, and his drive to develop ties with China and the USSR in the 1960s, Bhutto came to power in December 1971 with the blessings of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger.

From this evidence I judge Bhutto to have leftist and rightist characteristics. The weight of the one over the other depended on the circumstances and the imperatives in terms of Bhutto’s political and career interests. It is also relevant to note that the Left and the Right are not opposite poles in Pakistani politics. Excluding the hard core Pakistani communists and the ultra-Right Islamic fundamentalists, shades of leftists and rightists have coexisted in Pakistani politics. In Bhutto’s case, they functioned as two sides of the same political personality. As Bhutto’s career history shows, Pakistani political leaders were adept in changing colours to suit the circumstances. The Left-Right sides of Bhutto are best studied as two integral double tracks on which the Bhutto train moved.

THE SECOND CURVE: CIRCUMSTANCES BEHIND BHUTTO’S RISE

To make sense of the Bhutto phenomenon we need to understand Bhutto’s link with the Army, his attempt to carve out an autonomous political position for himself in Pakistan, his failure to do so because of his oscillating actions and the pressure of systemic constraints, his failed attempt to break the Army’s dominance over Pakistan’s political affairs and finally, his political legacy. Bhutto did not achieve a stable Pakistan but he developed inputs into Pakistani political life which have outlasted his period of ascendancy.

Bhutto’s rise to the pinnacle of political power was a result of the Army’s failure to stabilize the political system. Pakistan’s and the Army’s misfortunes during the 1965–71
period led to an inner-Army debate. The debate revealed a ‘Left-Right’ split in the Army. During this period, at the society level, the Pakistani Left had been marginalized; the ultra-Right was comparatively stronger and better organized. As noted earlier, Chinese Communists (e.g. Premier Chou-en-Lai) advised the Pakistani Left through Maulana Bhashani to cooperate with the Ayub regime. Bhashani and his party accepted this advice.

Bhutto built his career and his political tactics on the inner-Army debate. The following is the main background of this debate, and Bhutto’s relationship to it.

1950s

Mirza and Ghulam Mohammed emerged as the strongmen in Pakistan and the political umpires of Pakistani affairs. Here the civil-military bureaucratic coalition dominated Pakistan’s internal political and constitutional arrangements. The operative premises in the oligarchy’s thinking were that Pakistani politicians were weak, corrupt and inept, and secondly, that the civil-military bureaucracy was the guardian of Pakistan’s internal and external security. At this stage there was no inner-Army debate about Pakistan’s future and the nature of the Army’s role to assure its position in Pakistan’s politics.

1957–8

There was a political upsurge in Pakistan: there was pressure to have national elections and representative democracy. Elections had been promised for 1958/9. The Army and the civil bureaucracy, however, held an anti-democracy position. The oligarchy held to the premises of the Ghulam Mohammed-Mirza regime. The debate in the oligarchy (including the senior Army brass) resulted in the decision to remove the civil/parliamentary facade, to change constitutional arrangements and to formalize oligarchic rule under Mirza.

The Ayub coup eliminated Mirza as a political actor and established Ayub Khan as the pre-eminent political player in Pakistan. This event was not a seizure of power by the Army. As scholars point out, the Army already had the power since the early 1950s. Ayub shared the two premises of the Ghulam Mohammed-Mirza era. But, as Chapter 2 showed, Ayub was ambivalent about democracy in Pakistan. His actions revealed oscillation between (a) seeking an imperial presidency with Ayub as the political umpire and guardian; (b) seeking to establish ‘basic democrats’ as political buffers and seeking an indirect, local kind of grassroots democracy; and finally (c) accepting internal pressures for a party based electoral democracy but not a decentralized political system which was based on provincial autonomy. Bhutto entered the political picture as a young, ambitious and energetic and colourful cabinet minister in the Ayub era. Bhutto has been recommended to Ayub by Mirza. At this time Bhutto was openly a Ayub admirer. He stayed in the Ayub Cabinet from 1958 to 1966. There is no sign that Bhutto had any democratic inclinations at the time. His chauvinism against India and his faith in a military solution for the Kashmir issue revealed Bhutto’s faith in the second premise of Pakistan’s Army, i.e. the Army was the guardian of Pakistan’s internal and external security.

Prior to the India-Pakistan war (1965), Kennedy and Ayub disagreed on China and Kashmir affairs and US aid to Pakistan declined. This placed a shadow around the Ayub presidency. The Pakistani government’s decisions to (a) use military force to liberate
Kashmir in 1965, and (b) to accept the Tashkent settlement (1966) revealed a high level, in-house, divisive debate that pitted Ayub against Bhutto and the Army. In this debate Bhutto and the Army fanned Pakistani public opinion to go to war in Kashmir and to refuse to accept the Tashkent accord. According to Taseer

Although the international climate appeared generally favourable to the venture [war in Kashmir], it was Bhutto more than any other member of Ayub Khan’s cabinet who convinced him to act. He argued forcefully and strongly, gradually convincing Ayub Khan of the wisdom of taking action.

with regard to the Tashkent Agreement, Taseer states:

As a politician, Bhutto exploited Tashkent to its limit in his struggle against Ayub Khan during the 1970 election campaign, he was mercilessly and unscrupulously to play upon public disillusionment for his own ends.23

Here Bhutto was aligned with the generals on both decisions (to militarize the Kashmir dispute, and not to accept the Tashkent agreement); and he was aligned against his former political master and mentor, Ayub. This war cracked, but it did not destroy, the Army-Bhutto premise about the Army’s central role as the guardian of Pakistani security. The war, despite Bhutto’s bravado about fighting the Hindus for a thousand years24 nevertheless started the process of rethinking among Pakistani elites of the principles and premises of Pakistani policies. The debate concerned several key issues: (a) Ayub’s suitability as the leader; (b) nature and reliability of US aid to Pakistan; (c) the level of commitment of Pakistani public opinion against India; (d) the need to develop democratic processes in Pakistan; (e) the Army’s ability to win a war against India and its ability to discharge its primary mission as the guardian of Pakistani security. This war and the Tashkent settlement unleashed the Bhutto drive towards democracy and towards the Bhutto alternative to Ayub’s rule. Bhutto discovered that his stand against Tashkent and against Ayub was popular in Pakistan and in Army circles, and consequently there was room for him at the top. At this stage Bhutto was playing the politician by publicly raising issues he thought were popular so as to increase his visibility and manoeuvrability on the Pakistani stage.

Elections in West and East Pakistan were held under the auspices of Yahya Khan in 1970. Here the Army position was publicly prodemocracy, as was Bhutto’s position. In this period contradictory impulses led Yahya and Bhutto to turn to democracy. On the one hand Yahya and his bureaucratic advisers wanted to maintain their ascendant position in Pakistani politics by oligarchic means. On the other hand, the concession to national elections was important to bring Ayub’s regime down because a significant sector of Pakistani public opinion pressed for an end to military rule and for an elected government. For Bhutto, the national election was the way to gain political power. Bhutto too was ambivalent about democracy. Consider this. When he was in power in the Ayub Cabinet, he was pro-Ayub and anti-democracy. Out of power, he became anti-Ayub and pro-democracy. The critical variable concerned his power position. What Bhutto said about democracy depended on where he was in the power structure.
After Ayub’s fall four forces emerged on the Pakistani political scene. First, Pakistani public opinion was radicalized and it gravitated towards Bhutto and the PPP or towards the extreme Left. Secondly, the dominant power coalition consisted of the military and bureaucratic oligarchy under Yahya; it included US advisers. Its aim was to hold elections as promised by Yahya, but its operative premise was that the elections would result in a divided political house. Under these circumstances the military-bureaucracy coalition would continue to manipulate the political scene as before and to function as the guardian of the internal and external security of Pakistan. Here the first and the second premise of Army rule were in play.

Thirdly, the Left-Right polarization in Pakistani politics and society was prominent in Army thinking as well. Within the Army two contending socio-economic-political forces were at work: the Left reformers versus the Right conservatives. The Left was represented by Vice-Admiral Ahsan, the deputy CMLA who was in charge of the economic ministries under Yahya. The Right was represented by Air Marshal Nur Khan, also a deputy CMLA. He held charge of the non-economic ministries. The Left had the power to introduce reform but lacked a political strategy to do so; the Right had no scope for action since Air Marshal Khan held the non-economic portfolios, but it represented the vested economic interests and it had the power to veto. This internal power struggle in Army circles was settled by exiling Admiral Ahsan to East Pakistan as Governor, and by making Marshal Khan the Governor for West Pakistan where the political and economic power of Pakistan was located. By these actions the Left was neutralized and the Right was ascendant. Yahya and his advisers spoke the language of reform but their actions revealed a tilt towards the Right in West Pakistan before the start of the Bangladesh war. In this setting Bhutto moved to the Left in West Pakistani politics when Yahya and his advisers moved to the Right in West and East Pakistani politics. This was the context in which Bhutto projected himself as a democrat and a socialist in Pakistani affairs.

Fourthly, the extreme Left (the Communists and trade unionists for example) and the extreme Right (the Jamaat, for example) were the two extreme poles in the Pakistani political and ideological spectrum at this time. After Ayub’s fall these extremes were marginalized. The other forces noted above constituted the centres of gravity of political action. This was the setting which Bhutto exploited to his advantage.

This description outlines the immediate setting which helped Bhutto’s rise to power in December 1971. Bhutto’s manoeuvrability during the 1969–71 period reflected his political style and the pattern of his political behaviour throughout his career. The Bhutto pattern was to stay out of step—with one foot inside the establishment and one outside—with the pre-eminent leader at any given time in Pakistani politics. This was a deliberate ploy on his part to establish his personal reputation and public image in Pakistan as a patriotic, independent and intelligent political practitioner. Consider the following:

1 In 1958 he continued with Ayub after Ayub overthrew and exiled Mirza. At this time the Pakistan public wanted representative democracy and the Army feared national elections. Bhutto hitched his star to the anti-democracy platform of Ayub. This appeared to be Bhutto’s ticket to power. There is no sign of enthusiasm for democracy in the young Bhutto as he chose a career in Ayub’s cabinet.

2 From 1958 to 1965, Bhutto played up the Kashmir issue at a time when Ayub appeared to consider moving towards an Indian-Pakistan dialogue. Here Ayub was accommodating in foreign affairs; Bhutto was intransigent. Ayub and Bhutto seemed to
be out of step in their approach to India. This had implications for Pakistani diplomacy, military policy and public opinion.

3 In Pakistan’s decision to go to war in 1965 in Kashmir, Bhutto and his military collaborators convinced a reluctant Ayub to take up the military option in Kashmir. Ayub foolishly went along. Here Bhutto was the in-house and public militarist and chauvinist; Ayub was less so although the formal decision to launch the military campaign in Kashmir was Ayub’s. Here Bhutto was in tune with the dominant Pakistani Army thinking. He was out of step with Ayub’s thinking as well as Ayub’s and Pakistan’s interests.

4 In the 1966 Tashkent Agreement Bhutto opposed a diplomatic solution to the 1965 war which he had helped unleash. He fanned Pakistani chauvinism and militarism by his inflammatory speeches. Ayub, on the other hand, chose diplomatic accommodation to make the best of a bad military and political situation. Here Bhutto was in tune with Pakistani public opinion and the Army generals who opposed the Tashkent settlement but he was out of step with Ayub and those experts in the Pakistani Foreign Office who supported the Tashkent agreement.

5 Bhutto left Ayub’s Cabinet in 1966, fearing that he would be fired for his wrong advice which led to the Ayub decision to go to war, and because of his opposition to the Tashkent settlement. Then he established the PPP. This event marks the beginning of Bhutto’s commitment to democracy in Pakistan. Here Bhutto was in tune with Pakistani public opinion. From 1966 to the early 1970s was the honeymoon period between Bhutto and the Pakistani Left. This was a public romance. During this period there was also a secret honeymoon between Bhutto and select Army officers who sought a political alternative to Ayub’s Army rule and who wished to have a civil buffer between the Army’s dominant position in Pakistani decision-making and a radicalizing Pakistani public opinion.

6 In December 1970 elections were held in West and East Pakistan as per Yahya’s commitment to free elections and representative democracy. These elections brought Bhutto to national prominence because he secured the majority vote in West Pakistan. But Mujib obtained an overwhelming majority in East Pakistan. Bhutto’s political actions in the light of the election results revealed five faces of Bhutto. First, Mujib was entitled to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan as a result of the total number of seats his party held in the national elections. Bhutto refused to allow Mujib to become the Prime Minister. Here Bhutto was acting in an anti-democratic way. Secondly, Bhutto revealed his anti-Bengali bias and pro-West Pakistani chauvinism by his refusal to accept a Bengali leader of Pakistan. Thirdly, by his support of Army intervention and genocide against Mujib and the Bengalis, Bhutto showed himself to be a militarist and a military collaborator. Fourthly, by his willingness to take on India militarily in 1971, despite the Pakistani Army’s failure to take Kashmir by force in the 1965 war, Bhutto revealed his anti-India chauvinism and preference for military solutions to political problems. Finally, Bhutto projected publicly an expectation that China would intervene against India in the Bangladesh crisis. Whether this was naive utopianism and/or political manipulation on his part is unclear on the basis of available evidence. In expressing these five faces Bhutto was in tune with sections of Pakistani Army thinking and Pakistani public opinion.
My general assessment of Bhutto’s political behaviour in these instances is as follows. First, when Bhutto’s power was weak and his ambition was high, and Pakistan had a strong head (Ayub, from 1958 up the 1965 war), Bhutto functioned from within the government machinery but he stayed a step out of tune with his political master. Secondly, when Bhutto’s power base grew stronger and his ambition remained high, and the authority of Pakistan’s head weakened (Ayub, 1965–9, i.e. the post-1965 war period) then Bhutto publicly distanced himself from his political master. He publicly developed his democratic posture as well as his secret links with Army officers who were chauvinistic and militaristic. The duality of democracy and militarism in Bhutto’s political behaviour was internally contradictory. But with hindsight it may be explained as a ‘necessary contradiction’ given Bhutto’s ambition and the context within which he sought to develop his political career.

During 1969–71 Pakistan’s political situation was fluid and the political centre of Pakistan was weak. There was an oscillation between Yahya’s commitment to elections and representative government, between his refusal to accept the popular verdict and the use of force to subdue the Bengalis. In these circumstances, Bhutto could juggle the balls of democracy and militarism in his political manoeuvres. These circumstances enabled him to come to power. But once in power Bhutto was unable to juggle these balls. He had hoped to function as a political umpire between the Pakistani Left and Right, and between the military-bureaucratic oligarchy and Pakistani society. He failed because he lacked the vision to organize a broad-based Pakistani power coalition. The idea of power-sharing was alien to Bhutto’s personality and political experiences. His faith lay in a Bhutto-centric (a personality driven) charismatic political system in Pakistan. To a discussion of the circumstances leading to his fall I now turn.

THE SECOND CURVE: CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO BHUTTO’S FALL

The Bhutto era is a story of fundamental infrastructural changes in Pakistani politics as well as failures. The list of infrastructural changes is short but significant. First, the economy was restructured. The public sector was strengthened and the basis of Pakistan’s industrial development was laid. Secondly, in foreign affairs Bhutto realized that parity with India in diplomatic and military affairs was no longer a realistic goal. He committed Pakistan to the path of peaceful (non-military) or competitive coexistence and bilateralism. The Kashmir issue was put on the backburner and the Simla Accord was signed in 1972. Thirdly, Bhutto sought and gained a new consensus on constitutional issues. In 1973 a new Constitution was adopted. This emphasized the role of Islam in politics. The principle of power-sharing between the federal government and the provinces was recognized. There was to be a President and a Prime Minister in Pakistan and there was to be a division of responsibilities between the two. The need to develop brotherly relations with Muslim states was recognized. Finally, Bhutto set Pakistan on the nuclear path in 1972.

Still Bhutto failed. Why? Burki attributes this to flaws in Bhutto’s character. He sees flaws in the way in which he treated other political leaders, other political parties, and his
own PPP. Here Bhutto’s arrogance, vanity, and vindictiveness led to his failure. Gardezi has a similar view.  

I find this simplistic. Without denying the flaws in Bhutto’s character, I think it is important to examine another view. Until 1971 the focus of West Pakistani military and diplomatic affairs was against India, and the focus of West Pakistani political affairs was on the Bengalis. After 1971 the focus on East Pakistan was gone as a result of the creation of Bangladesh, and internal West Pakistani differences were radicalized, intensified and polarized. Burki recognizes this changed internal political setting. But Burki does not see this as a dilemma for Bhutto which he, with all his mental agility, could not overcome. My contention is that Bhutto failed in the sense that he lost power, and his head. He failed to carry out his declared electoral promises. He failed because he continuously oscillated between the Left and the Right. He failed in these areas because the structural constraints were severe, and his character was flawed.

What were the structural constraints? The following deserve particular attention.

**Internal**

1. A need to replenish a parasitic Army so as to escape the veto and intervention of the military-bureaucratic apparatus of Pakistan.  
2. Pakistani property relations were dominated by semi-feudal landowners who had leverage over political parties.  
3. Pakistan was economically bankrupt as a result of loss of jute export earnings and other earnings from East Pakistan.  
4. The balance of power within the PPP itself was volatile; Bhutto had to function as a balancer or a political umpire to maintain a Left-Right balance in his party.  
5. Bhutto had strong links with select members of civil-military elites. Gardezi maintains the contrary: that Bhutto’s links were initially weak. Bhutto had a militaristic stance in the 1965 and 1971 wars. Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan has revealed Bhutto’s close ties with the military. Tariq Ali describes Bhutto as a military collaborator. However, he needed to distance himself from his Army friends for fear of becoming their client or dependant. Here Bhutto’s compulsion to be the chief (a personality trait) interacted with the intrigue-ridden factionalism of Pakistani politics (an internal compulsion).  
6. Pakistani society, the Pakistani Army, and Bhutto himself, lacked ideological unity. There was a Left-Right split at each level.

Compared to this list of structural constraints, what were Bhutto’s opportunities? Below we find that the list is short compared to the problems.

1. Pakistan was ideologically bankrupt. The two-nation theory which had served as the ideological foundation of Pakistan since 1947 was discredited as a result of the fight between West and East Pakistanis: two Muslim communities. Here Bhutto could have provided ideological guidance to Pakistanis to fill the gap.  
2. Bhutto had increased mass consciousness in Pakistan. Large numbers of Pakistanis had rallied to his cause. His speeches raised popular issues such as the provision of bread, clothing and shelter to the masses. By tapping into the public consciousness, and by creating a public identification with his cause, Bhutto made mass politics a new
element in Pakistani affairs. He could have converted this mass energy to reform Pakistan.

3 As a result of the Army’s failure to carry on with Pakistan’s affairs after the defeat in Bangladesh in 1971, the Army itself saw no alternative to Bhutto. Furthermore, Bhutto had political legitimacy as a result of his election victory in December 1970. Both elements gave Bhutto and the PPP room to manoeuvre in Pakistani affairs.\textsuperscript{44}

4 Bhutto had the US government’s blessing in taking over the Pakistani government. President Nixon personally met Bhutto before he returned to power in December 1971. According to Taseer\textsuperscript{45} Nixon and the State Department cleared Bhutto for the task.

In this setting of structural constraints and opportunities what did Bhutto do? The following chronology tells a story of oscillation—first a turn from the Left to the Right by Bhutto, and then a turn from the Right to the Left. These turns revealed in part Bhutto’s response to the systemic constraints; in part they revealed his ambition to function as the political umpire in PPP affairs and in Pakistani affairs. Gardezi maintains that the PPP had an absolute majority in the national assembly (federal parliament) and the ruling military-civil oligarchy was in disarray. Hence the balance sheet showed a clear advantage in favour of Bhutto’s opportunities over dangers.\textsuperscript{46} My view is that given the flaws in Bhutto’s character, given Bhutto’s mistakes and given the structural constraints, the dangers exceeded the opportunities in Bhutto’s case.

The story is that Bhutto first turned against the Left, the constituency which brought him to power; here he joined hands with the rightists to manage the systemic constraints. Later, as he saw power slip out of his hands, he turned against the rightists. This way he lost the support of both the Left and the Right as well as his position and his life.

The sequence of Bhutto’s actions was as follows.

1 To get funds for his depleted treasury and to finance a parasitic Army he compromised with Western capitalism.\textsuperscript{47} This was a function of his systemic constraint.

2 To reduce his dependence on the Army, he purged it. But General Tikka Khan, the symbol of repression against the Bengalis and the Baluchis was not purged by Bhutto. This revealed his links with a select faction in the Army, and revealed his fascination with militarism. Among the purged were generals Rahim and Gul Hasan who had invited Bhutto to take over the government. Both were exiled as ambassadors. This was a function of Bhutto’s personal insecurity and desire to reduce his dependence on the Army kingmakers. Here his character was in play.

3 Bhutto set up a Federal Security Force, a para-military or a political police which answered only to Bhutto personally.\textsuperscript{48} This was Bhutto’s attempt to create a parallel organization to the Army. Two motives were in play in the action. It was, first, a quest for internal administrative reform, an admirable motive. But the action also revealed a character flaw—it revealed a desire to secure unlimited powers to control his enemies by coercive means and to establish his ascendancy in the political sphere.

4 Bhutto purged the civil service and allowed lateral entry of people from other branches into the hitherto exclusive central service of Pakistan. About 1,300 officials were purged on grounds of corruption. The newcomers were meant to create a new cadre which was loyal to Bhutto.\textsuperscript{49} This move had a reformist appearance but it also revealed Bhutto’s insecurity and desire to create a Bhutto-centric political system in Pakistan.
In October 1972 Pakistani political parties agreed to a constitutional accord. Bhutto approved the Constitution in April 1973. Bhutto had preferred a presidential type of system but the Constitution provided for a parliamentary type, with two chambers: a Senate based on equal provincial representation and an Assembly based on representation according to population. Bhutto promised that he would not interfere with provincial governments where PPP was not in power. Through elections non-PPP governments emerged in Baluchistan and NWFP. However, Bhutto did not keep his word. In February 1974 the Baluchi government was dismissed, and the NWFP government resigned in protest. The Baluchi leaders were criticized and imprisoned and about 100,000 Pakistani soldiers were used to fight the Baluchis. This operation revealed Bhutto’s militaristic tendency, his willingness to settle political problems by military means, and to forget his pledge not to interfere with non-PPP provincial governments. This operation was a function of Bhutto’s mental outlook and character. This operation revealed that Bhutto’s vanity and vindictiveness affected his political behaviour. The involvement of the Army in Baluchi affairs increased the Army’s manoeuvrability vis-à-vis Bhutto and in Pakistani affairs. It also revealed Bhutto’s dependence on the Army for internal affairs. This episode did not restore the Army’s authority to the extent that it could re-establish its earlier role as a political umpire in Pakistani affairs. But it gave the Army a much needed lift in morale after its defeat in 1971.

In May 1974 Bhutto secured a constitutional amendment whereby the executive (Bhutto) could declare illegal a political party which was seen as functioning against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan. Bhutto used this change to declare the National Awami party illegal. This party was the only opposition to Bhutto. His aim was to create a one-party state with himself at the top like a Napoleon.

These events showed the trend towards authoritarianism in Bhutto and the rejection of democratic norms which Bhutto had promoted in public. The trend in his actions reveals a shift away from democratic norms and towards Bhutto-centric authoritarian politics. Bhutto’s actions also reveal a tendency on Bhutto’s part to oscillate between the Left and the Right when he was confronted with pressures. To this I now turn.

The following chronology reveals Bhutto’s shift from the Left to the Right after 1971 and his oscillation between the Right and the Left when he started to lose power in 1977.

December 1971—Bhutto formed government with blessings of the Pakistani Army and the US government.

January 1972—Bhutto announced plans for nationalization. He had some Pakistan industrialists (a sign of vindictiveness) paraded in handcuffs before television cameras.

March 1972—Bhutto announced land reforms to liberate the Pakistani peasantry.

June 1972—The World Bank intervened and asked Bhutto to link foreign aid to control of Pakistani labour situation. Pakistani police shot 30 workers in Karachi and about 4,000 workers were driven underground.

1972–75—Pakistani workers turned against Bhutto. About 80,000 workers went on strike in the Karachi area. During 1974–5 the railway workers were on strike. Trade union actions occurred in Hyderabad in 1975. In addition there were fights in Baluchistan.

Bhutto had come to power on the strength of one new factor in Pakistan politics: he had aroused the political consciousness of the masses and he had created an atmosphere
for the masses to engage in mass politics. As a result of his massive and public turn against the Pakistani Left, Bhutto alienated his mass constituency. Furthermore, when Bhutto came to power in 1971 he brought with him three faces of power: (a) by personal background he was feudal and rightist; (b) his posture in world affairs was radical, pro-Chinese and anti-American; and in relation to domestic opinion he was an anti-Indian chauvinist, a freedom fighter for Kashmir, and a socialist; and finally, (c) in PPP both leftists and rightists, were present but the PPP manifesto was leftist. It projected an anti-imperialism, anti-feudal and anti-monopoly stance. But after his election victory Bhutto shifted towards the landlords. Many joined the PPP and thus shifted the balance of power in PPP affairs towards the Right. The leftist ideologues of the PPP were ousted and ill-treated by Bhutto. By October 1974 Bhutto lost his leftist credentials and this explains the silence of the masses when Zia-ul-Haq decided to hang him. In this instance, the Pakistani masses were deradicalized. They became silent spectators in the Bhutto-Zia drama.

The other new element in Pakistani politics emerged after Bhutto’s rise to power: he started to purge the bureaucracy and to bring his loyalists into it. This led to the politicization of the bureaucracy. Some swung towards the PPP; other swung towards the Jamaat, the ultra-Right section of Pakistani ideology and society. Here Bhutto’s administrative actions radicalized (politicized) and polarized the bureaucracy as well as the Army. The ultra-Right alliance between the ultra-Right in the Army (represented by General Zia-ul-Haq) and the Jamaat was in play when Bhutto was ousted from power in July 1977. This polarization of the Pakistan state and society occurred on a systemic scale in the Bhutto era, and it was carried through the Zia-ul-Haq and Benazir Bhutto eras.

Finally, Bhutto alienated the US government by his commitment to his nuclear bomb programme. This controversy brewed from 1974 to 1977. Bhutto came to power with US blessings but he lost it to Zia-ul-Haq with the consent of the US government. This happened before the April 1978 revolution in Afghanistan and before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 changed the US-Pakistan scenario and made the nuclear issue a secondary element in the bilateral relationship.

**SUMMING UP**

Bhutto tried to create a mediating, autonomous role for himself in PPP and in Pakistani affairs. To succeed, it was necessary for him to develop stable transactional linkages between the masses and the elites and between the elites themselves. He failed to do so. Surprisingly, when given an opportunity to use power, Bhutto demonstrated a capacity to alienate the Left, the Right, his PPP, the USA and vested economic interests in Pakistan. In this sense he was a total failure. His record during 1971–7 reflects his inability to manoeuvre through the minefield of radicalized and polarized Pakistani politics and society. The critique here is that Bhutto had the power and the opportunity to mobilize Pakistanis to his causes, but as a consequence of his policies and attitudes (character flaws) he reinforced the system constraints instead of reducing them by creative political action. Bhutto had limited manoeuvrability in 1971 and he sought more space for himself. His mistake was that he did not see the need to develop the PPP as a national, consensus-driven political organization. He did not develop space for the PPP in
Pakistani affairs. He ignored long-term restructuring of Pakistan’s political system for short-term gain. He failed to understand that in a society where political and economic power was divided, entrenched and polarized, it was necessary to develop political mechanisms to accommodate competing interests: by developing transactional (exchange) relations; by inducing a rethinking of competitive group interests; and generally by sharing power and by developing coalition politics. Bhutto failed to recognize that in the absence of mechanisms and attitudes to bring together diverse and competing societal interests by such measures, the political system would either get paralysed (on the brink of civil war), or it would be continuously vulnerable to an internal coup d’état. Bhutto did not create the system constraints in Pakistani politics and society. Their origins lie in the making of Pakistan and its history from 1947 to 1971. He should, however, be faulted because he radicalized the system constraints and created opportunities for the opposition to combine and eliminate him. Out of the Bhutto failure came the ultra-Right-Army coalition which threw up the Zia-ul-Haq regime.
TWO PATTERNS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR IN PAKISTAN

Thus far my study indicates the existence of two important patterns in Pakistan’s political affairs.

First, with a small and fragile state structure, successive Pakistani governments have sought to develop external opportunities to project a forceful military and diplomatic stance so as to avoid a preoccupation with internal problems, and to avoid a civil war. These external opportunities usually involved a focus on foreign aid, Kashmir’s and Afghanistan’s liberation, East Pakistani markets, and Middle Eastern monies. Having big ambitions and a narrow base of power and legitimacy in Pakistani politics and society, to survive and to expand their power position the Pakistani elites have inevitably had to develop external opportunities. Here external power projection and internal aggrandizement are linked in the attitudes and behaviour of Pakistani elites. The premise behind this view is that Pakistan is too small for the ambitions of its military and bureaucratic elites; hence they have continually sought external opportunities for their advancement. The search for foreign opportunities explains their preoccupation with externally oriented diplomatic, military and economic affairs. Whenever attractive foreign opportunities emerge, winning coalitions among Pakistani elites also emerge. They take over the pursuit of these opportunities. They circumvent the quest for internal reform. They structure internal political and constitutional arrangements to suit the interests of the ruling elite. In these circumstances the danger of civil war in Pakistan is managed. The winning coalitions result in an unstable balance of power in Pakistan, and a manageable level of instability. Here external opportunities are safety valves in Pakistani politics. They are buffers which divert and absorb Pakistani energies in the absence of orderly constitutional ways to transfer and to share political power.

The quest for external partners was started by Jinnah himself. By 1951 the Army joined this process and an Army-driven political process came to life in Pakistan. Since 1951 the Army-bureaucracy-US combination enabled ‘Pakistan’ to continually try to project a forceful stance in regional and international affairs. Its record of achievement in advancing Pakistan’s interests, both economic and in advancing the social well-being of the people, has been marginal. On the other hand, its record in dominating internal political and constitutional arrangements, and in repressing internal reform has been consistent and successful.

This pattern functioned well whenever Pakistani public opinion concentrated on external issues such as Kashmir, India, Soviet communism, Hindu expansion, Afghanistan, and Gulf security. For this to happen the external opportunities must be
there; further, there must be a clear public identification with the external issues. Both
requirements were there during the Ayub and Yahya periods. However, in both cases the
Army-driven political system of Pakistan was not able to convert external opportunities
to Pakistan’s long-term benefit, and at the same time Army rule damaged Pakistani
political institutions.

The second pattern emerges when external opportunities for military and diplomatic
action by the elites dry up. Here Pakistanis tend to turn inwards. From external
expansionism they turn to internal preoccupations and reflection about the utility of
national elections, party based politics and the return of the Army to the barracks and out
of the political arena. But without external opportunities to buy out or to pacify
competing domestic forces, without a willingness of Army and other groups to share
power, and without widely respected constitutional and political means to resolve
domestic controversies, domestic tensions rise and the Army finds it easy to step back
into the political arena. My premise is that genuine reform has not been seriously pursued
in Pakistan. Its politicians have been reluctant to test their position at the polls.
Consequently, the second pattern in effect may be described as a series of attempted but
failed reform moves. The alternative to reform is a mechanism to maintain a manageable
level of instability and an unstable balance of power in Pakistan. This is the first pattern
of Pakistani politics. This requires money (aid) and foreign collaboration (patron-client
relationships). But when external opportunities dry up this pattern fails. Then the country
moves into a near-civil war type of a political situation. In these circumstances, the Army
usually steps in to save Pakistan from civil war.

Until 1971, Pakistani politics moved according to the first or the second pattern. In the
1965 and 1971 wars Pakistani energies to conduct jihad against India were fractured by
Indian military power and political will. Then Pakistani social, economic and political
tensions started to flare up. The result was not anarchy or complete lawlessness: the result
was a condition of near-anarchy where law and order was kept by a large army. Figure
5.1 outlines the framework.

In the second pattern the Army usually manages internal dissent by force because (a) it
possesses massive force and intelligence capabilities to control the civil population; and
(b) it does not have the political skills to manage domestic issues by political measures.
The Army cannot eliminate the conditions of near-civil war in Pakistan because it lacks
the experience, the inclination, and the political strategy to bring competing forces
together in Pakistan. It lacks the skills necessary to practise the politics of persuasion.
Thus, despite many military takeovers of Pakistan since the 1950s, Pakistan’s political
system has continually hovered on
Figure 5.1 Two patterns of Pakistani politics

the brink of civil war. The alternative to civil war is either radical internal political, economic and social reform or foreign adventurism by the Pakistani Army.

The half-way house between civil war and radical reform is near-civil war in Pakistani society and power-sharing among key members of Pakistani elites. This way an unstable balance of power is developed. Figure 5.1 indicates this result in the first pattern; here power-sharing is facilitated by external opportunities and collaboration. But as Pakistan’s experience indicates, power-sharing arrangements at the top of the state apparatus are functional temporarily. Checks and balances exist until one or the other participant in an unstable balance of power situation tries to dominate the polity. The system is unstable because of the continuing jockeying for power. This power system is, however, functional in a way. The energies of the contenders for the dominant position are continually absorbed by ceaseless efforts to maintain the checks and balances (for fear that someone else may dominate and take it all). Here quest for dominance, suspicions and intrigue result in either an unstable balance of power in the domestic sphere, or a regime-breakdown and a repetition of the unstable cycle of checks and balances again. This unstable balance of power may have a long political life if the key players in the group share common core values and if they do not wish to allow one of the control
group to acquire an imperial or a domineering position. A common core value is that the key players do not seek genuine internal reform as this would downgrade their privileged position in Pakistani state and society.

In my view, the Pakistani Army (and bureaucracy) retreats from the political sphere when the opportunities which fuel the first pattern disappear. They reappear in the political sphere when opportunities for foreign adventurism re-emerge and if their privileged position in Pakistan is threatened by the danger of civil war or by other challengers. Jinnah, Ghulam Mohammed, Iskander Mirza, Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan jumped into the American lap to develop the external military, economic and diplomatic opportunities. These players, and their Army constituents, took the front seat in Pakistani political affairs when the opportunities for the development of external transactional linkages were prominent. Ayub lost power when he was not able to maintain the external transactional linkages in the form of US aid and President Kennedy’s support. But Ayub’s retreat was not the Pakistani Army’s retreat from politics. Yahya took over from Ayub and took the front seat in Pakistani politics. He restored the transactional linkages with the US government. Yahya was the conduit in the normalization of relations between the US and China. He had an important diplomatic role to play, for which there were rewards for services rendered. Yahya and the Army retreated from the political sphere when they lost East Pakistan. The Army was of no further use to the two foreign governments. The presence of external opportunities (foreign adventures; diplomatic assignments) and an ability to maintain a manageable level of instability in the domestic political sphere are the two essential requirements for the Pakistani Army and the bureaucracy to participate in the political sphere under the first pattern. Unless both conditions are met, the Pakistani Army-bureaucracy coalition is not able to maintain its effectiveness in the political sphere in Pakistan.

THE BHUTTO LEGACY AND ITS EFFECT ON ZIA-UL-HAQ

The Bhutto era does not fit either pattern of Pakistani politics. Bhutto came to power in December 1971 when the Army had retreated from the political sphere because of its failures to manage the civil war with East Pakistan and to control India militarily. As a result it had no external opportunities to develop. The Army left Bhutto in power, but with no foreign cards to play. He had limited internal resources, inadequate to meet his ambitious electoral promises concerning internal reforms and at the same time to keep the Pakistani Army happy.

Bhutto’s rise to power seemed fitting in view of his reputation as a giant in foreign affairs. Taseer notes that his [Bhutto’s] supporters called him ‘Fakhare Asia’ (The Pride of Asia). Anthony Howard, writing of him in the New Statesman, London, said ‘arguably the most intelligent and plausibly the best read of the world’s rulers’. Peter Hill wrote of him in the London Daily Telegraph: ‘At 47, he has become one of the Third World’s most accomplished rulers.’ Kissinger describes him as ‘undoubtedly the most brilliant man in Pakistani politics’. Fallaci describes him as ‘one of the most complex leaders of our time and the only interesting one his country has so far produced’. Bhutto saw himself as a master strategist, saviour of Pakistan and defender of national interests and honour.
Undoubtedly Bhutto’s mind was a subtle one. He had foreign policy experience and long-standing international contacts which spanned two decades. He knew how to tap the public consciousness and to whip up mass emotion: against India on the Kashmir question; against Ayub and military rule; and in favour of his demand for people’s power under Bhutto’s leadership, of course. But Bhutto’s foreign policy record does not justify the high praise. Bhutto was good for Bhutto but he was not good for Pakistan in the two major crises which faced Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. His political and military advice was fundamentally flawed. His advice to Ayub (to seek a military solution in the Kashmir question) and to Yahya (to oppose Mujib and the Bengalis by a bloody repression) did not serve Pakistan’s national interest. Because of his dashing personality Bhutto became the one-eyed king among the blind. In this context he was a giant.

Bhutto came to power after his actions in foreign and military affairs led Pakistan into a downward spiral; and the safety valve of external opportunities which is a requirement in the first pattern of Pakistani politics, was closed to Bhutto and to Pakistan. ‘Confrontation’ was Bhutto’s strategy with India. ‘Confrontation, confrontation, confrontation’, he claimed ‘is the key to the India-Pakistan dispute.’

Confrontation with Mujib and the Bengalis and confrontation with the Baluchis was also the Bhutto strategy. This strategy had the support of the Pakistani Army and public opinion until 1971. This way Bhutto was not out of step with the thinking of institutional and political forces in Pakistan but he did not, however, provide intelligent leadership. The results of the politics of confrontation were dramatic. They did not advance Pakistani national interests. As a result of Bhutto’s animus against the Hindus and India, Indian political will and military strength in Kashmir was radicalized in response to his provocation. Consequently the Indian military hold on Kashmir was reinforced along with the drive to integrate Kashmir into the Indian polity. The 1965 war was a stalemate but the war experience reinforced the Indian drive towards military victory in the next encounter and an Indian solution (rather than a foreign-imposed one) to regional crises. As a result of Soviet mediation at Tashkent the US took the back seat and it lost its enthusiasm for Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. The Kashmir issue was relegated to the backburner in India-Pakistan affairs, in international affairs and in UN affairs. By 1971, in the aftermath of the defeat of the Pakistani Army, the Kashmir issue lost its vitality in Pakistani politics. Finally, after Bangladeshi secession in 1971, East Pakistani markets and jute revenues were lost to West Pakistani military and economic elites. These were the results of the politics and policy of confrontation in Pakistan. Bhutto was the main architect of this approach.

Bhutto came to power in a defeated Pakistan but he reached the pinnacle of his power when external avenues to develop his, and Pakistan’s, presence were closed. He reached the high table but Fate had dealt him a very weak hand. Because of the asymmetry of power between India and Pakistan, Bhutto could not think of foreign adventures in Kashmir. At the same time a bankrupt treasury made costly internal reforms impossible. They were also politically dangerous because of the interests of entrenched bureaucratic, economic, and Army groups in Pakistan. Bhutto’s personality and ambition made power-sharing impossible in this period.

When Bhutto signed the Simla Agreement (1972) and committed himself and Pakistan to resolve issues by peaceful and bilateral means, was this a tactical (short-term) retreat, a strategic shift (long-term thinking and in Pakistan’s foreign policy orientation), or the
acknowledgement of a new principle (irrevocable attitude change) of Pakistani foreign affairs?

Bhutto’s shift away from confrontation with India and away from a policy of external adventurism was tactical; it was not based on principles. As a result of the severe internal and external constraints which accompanied Bhutto’s rise to the pinnacle of power in December 1971, the Bhutto wolf appeared in sheep’s clothing so that he could buy time to develop his options vis-à-vis his domestic and external enemies. There are concrete signs which support my contention. After December 1971 Bhutto put into motion a three-pronged strategy: (1) To develop a Bhutto-dominated PPP and to stress people’s power (dominated and manipulated by Bhutto) as the basis of Pakistani politics. (2) To cut the Army to size as an internal political force by the development of a paramilitary force which was accountable to Bhutto personally and which had internal security and intelligence functions. It became a parallel military organization and it sought to downgrade the exclusive role of the Army in security and intelligence affairs. (3) To develop a nuclear deterrent, again under Bhutto’s control. Had this come into being during Bhutto’s tenure in office it would have strengthened Bhutto’s hand vis-à-vis India, vis-à-vis his Army commanders and vis-à-vis the USA.

The nuclear drive was conducted in secrecy and it had elements of internal and external adventurism. Adventurism and secrecy were common denominators in Bhutto’s advice to Ayub to liberate Kashmir by force (1965), in Bhutto’s advice to Yahya to use bloody repression to stop Mujib and the Bengalis (1971), and in the nuclear project (1972–7). Another common denominator in these cases was the use of cunning and deceptive ploys in pursuit of these projects. The Kashmir and the nuclear projects could have changed the India-Pakistan strategic power equation. Pakistan’s liberation of Kashmir would have decapitated India both militarily and politically. Bhutto’s nuclear project is usually seen by Western experts as a response to overcome Pakistani fears of India. But there is another way to assess its role. Had it succeeded it could have diminished the domineering presence of the Army in Pakistan’s affairs. This way a new pattern of civil-military relations in Pakistan could have emerged with Bhutto as the political umpire or Napoleon; and the Army, the nuclear establishment, and the paramilitary/intelligence organizations as subordinate institutions that were accountable to Bhutto. Bhutto’s actions and pronouncements between 1972 and 1976 revealed an inclination to revise the Army’s political position by a new pattern of civil-military reactions in Pakistan. A US government study notes:

Bhutto purged the military ranks of about 1,400 officers. He [developed] also a paramilitary force called the Federal Security Force (FSF) to function as a personal bodyguard, a watchdog on the armed forces, and an internal security force to obviate the necessity of military intervention in cases of civil disorder. A White Paper on defense issued in 1976 firmly subordinated the armed forces to civilian control and gave Bhutto, as prime minister, the decisive voice in all matters relating to national security.5

In this gamble Bhutto appeared to be moving towards a new, third pattern in Pakistani politics. Because there were no opportunities for external manoeuvres, Bhutto tried to
fashion internal opportunities to create room or political space for himself, to create
autonomy and authority for Bhutto and Bhuttoism.

As Figure 5.1 shows, Pakistani politics move in two different ways. (1) There could be
a continuous or extended process that maintains an unstable balance of power among
internal contenders for power. This occurs when the key players are committed to power-
sharing among themselves and there are external opportunities to satisfy Pakistani elites’
interests. (2) But when external opportunities dry up, and power-sharing arrangements
among the key players break down, then conditions of near civil war emerge and they
dominate the political agenda. The Bhutto era ended in 1977 because Bhutto’s lack of
commitment to power-sharing produced a near civil war situation in 1977 and there were
no external opportunities for Bhutto.

Bhutto tried to create a Bhutto-centric civil-military, populist-authoritarian type of
political system in Pakistan. Had Bhutto succeeded he would have created a new pattern
in Pakistani politics. Bhutto failed in part because of the danger he posed to Army
authority. The Zia-ul-Haq coup in 1977 was triggered by Bhutto’s internal adventurism.
The liberation of Kashmir or Afghanistan, and achievement of military and diplomatic
parity with India were not on Zia-ul-Haq’s or the Army’s agenda when it moved against
Bhutto in 1977. To understand the meaning of the Zia-ul-Haq coup and it implications for
Pakistan’s political system it is essential to place it in the specific context of the Bhutto
era. The preceding discussion is intended to serve that purpose. Against this background I
now turn to a discussion of the developments and meanings of the Zia-ul-Haq era.

**MOTIVES AND PROCESS OF THE ZIA COUP, 1977–9**

A number of events, listed below, led to Zia-ul-Haq’s coup against Bhutto in July 1977.
The sequence of developments started in March 1977 and culminated in the coup in July.
The movement towards the coup was incremental. The involvement of the Army and its
motives for bringing down Bhutto were not revealed until July 1977. Three parties,
Bhutto, People’s National Alliance (PNA) and Zia-ul-Haq, were the key players during
this period. The process to bring Bhutto down and to establish the primacy of Zia-ul-Haq
and the Army in Pakistani politics was however, not triangular. Rather, the 1977–9 period
may be divided into two distinct (but related) struggles. The first struggle was between
Bhutto and the PNA; here the issue concerned the rigging of elections by Bhutto. Here
PNA was in the forefront of the struggle against Bhutto; the Army’s involvement was
secret. This struggle took place from January 1977—when Bhutto announced national
and provincial elections, to 5 July 1977—when Zia-ul-Haq took Bhutto into protective
custody and assumed power under a martial law regime. In this phase there was extensive
street violence as well as negotiations between Bhutto and the PNA to have new
elections. The events listed below outline the process. Initially, the process was
inconclusive; Bhutto seemed to bluff and to seek time. Later, the two sides seemed to
reach an agreement. But just as Bhutto and the PNA appeared to find an area of
agreement, the Pakistani Army under Zia-ul-Haq stepped in and changed the players and
the nature of the political game.

Under these circumstances, the second struggle was between Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq
from July 1977 to April 1979 when Bhutto was hanged. Zia-ul-Haq claimed that the
Army stepped into the political sphere because Pakistan was in a civil war situation. In the second struggle the PNA was sidelined by the Army, having served its purpose for Zia-ul-Haq and the Army.

The following chronology of events tells the story in detail.

**Late 1976**
Preparations for elections to the National Assembly started. Tehrik-i-Istqlal (led by retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan) wanted elections. The United Democratic Front (UDF) thought elections would be rigged and it was not keen to have elections.

**7 January 1977**
Bhutto dissolved the National Assembly and announced elections by 7 March 1977. An electoral alliance between the UDF and Tehrik-i-Istiqqlal was formed. This was called the People’s National Alliance (PNA). The electoral allies agreed on distribution of seats in the forthcoming elections. JUP and Tehrik-i-Istiqlal were allotted 36 per cent of the national assembly and provincial assembly seats; UDF parties received 64 per cent of the rest.

**8 March**
Election results were declared. They were as shown in Table 5.1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Punja (including federal area)</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Sind</th>
<th>Baluchistan</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNA</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ML</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Qayyum)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The opposition parties charged Bhutto with rigging the elections. They demanded fresh elections, removal of the Chief Election Commissioner and Bhutto's resignation. They decided to boycott provincial elections which were scheduled for 10 March. PNA decided not to take up its seats in the National Assembly, and it decided to organize a national strike and protest demonstration against Bhutto.

**12–15 March**
Bhutto tried to open dialogue with the PNA.

**16–20 March**
Bhutto arrested PNA leaders and tried to suppress the opposition by force and to conduct negotiations with the PNA as well. Public protest to Bhutto started to grow. During March to May 250–300 people died in the clashes and there was severe damage to property as well.
9 April
PNA-inspired agitation against Bhutto gained public support and Bhutto’s repression of the PNA increased.16

17 April
Bhutto banned drinking, night clubs and gambling in a move to placate religious sentiment in Pakistan. He offered to implement Shariat (Muslim) law even though this was not a PNA demand.17

21 April
Leftist labour unions and the PNA called for a national strike. Karachi, Pakistan’s main industrial city, was paralysed. Martial law was declared in Karachi, Hyderabad and Lahore.18

24 April
British press editorialized that Bhutto’s political career was finished and he should leave politics.19

27 April
Bhutto again tried to open a dialogue with the PNA while continuing to suppress the opposition by force. At this time Pakistani politics were internationalized. Saudi, United Arab Emirates and Libyan emissaries entered the political picture in an attempt to find a settlement between Bhutto and the opposition. Bhutto and the Libyan foreign minister said that there was a conspiracy against Bhutto involving the USA, the UK, West Germany and Egypt.20

May
Prospects of a political settlement between Bhutto and the PNA were dim.21

May
Air Marshal (retired) Asghar Khan wrote an open letter to Pakistan’s military chiefs and officers reminding them about their oath to obey lawful orders of their superiors. He suggested that the use of the Army to suppress internal dissent was not lawful.22

Bhutto-PNA negotiations continued. The PNA dropped its demand for Bhutto’s resignation but insisted on new elections in August or October 1977. Failing this the PNA wanted representation for itself in the Bhutto government.23

13 June
Bhutto rejected PNA demands and he started to consult the Pakistani Army about the political crisis. Thereafter he agreed to re-elections in October. He proposed a council to supervise the new elections.24

14 June
Bhutto announced that agreement with the PNA had been reached.
14–23 June
Bhutto went on a trip to Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Iran and Afghanistan.²⁵

23 June
The PNA announced its demand for a supervisory council with equal PNA and PPP representation and with a constitutional authority to supervise the fresh elections.²⁶

27 June
Bhutto’s negotiating team refused to receive the PNA’s draft proposal of a supervisory council.²⁷

28 June
Bhutto, in a complete volte-face, agreed to receive the PNA’s draft proposal.²⁸

29 June
The PNA’s draft proposal was submitted to Bhutto.²⁹

1 July
Bhutto and the PNA had their final meeting. Bhutto agreed to: (1) elections in October 1977; (2) establishment of an Implementation Committee with equal representation for the PNA but with Bhutto as the chairman, with a casting vote in case of a deadlock. However, this Committee was not to have a constitutional base. The PNA turned down this proposal.³⁰

3/4 July
Bhutto held a press conference. He announced the breakdown of the negotiations with the PNA. Bhutto said that he could not offer anything more to the PNA. Shortly thereafter Bhutto changed his mind and agreed to meet the PNA on 5 July.³¹

5 July
The Pakistani Army under Zia-ul-Haq stepped into the political process. It declared martial law in Pakistan and it took Bhutto and PNA leader Asghar Khan into protective custody. In his address on Pakistani radio and television Zia-ul-Haq declared:

I want to make it absolutely clear that neither I have [sic] any political ambitions nor does the army want to be taken away from its profession of soldiering… My sole aim is to organize free and fair elections which would be held in October this year.³²

15 July
Zia-ul-Haq explained that the Army decided to act to ‘save the country from civil war.’³³

In this phase, the key players had different strategies. The Pakistani Army’s strategy was to stay aloof from the PNA-Bhutto negotiations until the two sides appeared to reach an agreement. Here the prospect of new elections and a political settlement between Bhutto and the PNA triggered Army activism in the political process. As long as the
prospect of a political settlement appeared weak the Army was content to remain a neutral observer. Here the fear of elections seemed to be the common denominator in the Army’s behaviour in 1958 (Iskander Mirza and Ayub vis-à-vis politicians); in 1970–1 (Yahya Khan vis-à-vis Mujib); and in 1977 (Zia-ul-Haq vis-à-vis Bhutto). But there were stylistic differences in the Army generals’ behaviour towards politicians. Mirza and Ayub sought to avoid elections. Yahya and his advisors agreed to elections and went through the electoral process but then refused to accept the consequences. Zia-ul-Haq and his generals allowed the elections to take place in March 1977 but then refused to allow re-elections in October 1977. The PNA strategy on the other hand was to push for re-elections, and to find ways to clean up the electoral process and to strengthen the democratic process in Pakistan. If Asghar Khan’s book Generals in Politics is an accurate portrayal of the intentions of the retired Air Marshal (and there is no evidence to show that he did not mean what he said) then Zia-ul-Haq and the Army used the PNA in its secret fight to bring down Bhutto. The PNA neither intended nor succeeded in using the Army for its ends. That is, the PNA’s objective was to have real national and provincial elections and to create a framework for meaningful political and constitutional change in Pakistan by electoral means; but this was not the Army’s objective. Bhutto, in comparison, seemed to want neither Army rule nor a sharing of power with the PNA. This led to oscillation in his thinking and in his public actions. The result was a process where Bhutto seemed at times to bluff and buy time, and to generally combine negotiations with the PNA with repression of PNA cadres and leaders and Pakistani masses. By bringing in the Army to manage the Baluchi problem and to enforce martial law in Karachi and a few cities, and by consulting the Army in his negotiations with the PNA, Bhutto opened the door to the Army’s involvement in Pakistan’s political affairs. Give the camel an inch and it will take over the tent, goes an Oriental saying. Bhutto gave the Army the inch and it took over the tent.

Out of Bhutto’s mistakes (opportunities for the Army) and out of the Army’s complex motives and superior capabilities came the beginning of the Zia-ul-Haq era. With reference to the framework of this chapter (Figure 5.1), Zia-ul-Haq’s political actions and intervention strategy varied. The dividing lines in Zia-ul-Haq’s actions are March to July 1977, and December 1979. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gave Zia-ul-Haq a foreign policy opportunity which did not exist before. Zia-ul-Haq’s Pakistan after December 1979 fits into the first half of Figure 5.1. Here opportunities for external adventure and internal aggrandizement exist, and an uneasy internal balance of power became feasible. Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan opportunities for external adventure were not available to Zia-ul-Haq. The internal political system lacked opportunities for internal reform, and without power-sharing between Bhutto and the Army, or between Bhutto and the PNA, there was danger of a civil war. The Zia-ul-Haq coup in July 1977 was a reaction to the Army’s fear that Bhutto’s internal adventure against it—which would have clipped the Army’s internal authority and autonomy—would injure the Army’s institutional interests. Bhutto’s actions from 1972 to 1976, before the controversy in 1977 about the rigged elections, seem in retrospect to have been the trigger behind the Zia-ul-Haq coup.34

Let us now turn to an assessment of the Zia-ul-Haq era. What were the motives behind the Zia-ul-Haq coup in 1977? What were Zia-ul-Haq’s political ideas to reorganize
Pakistan’s political and constitutional arrangements? What was Zia’s method of action and political style? What were the power relationships in Zia-ul-Haq’s Pakistan?

**SETTING AND MOTIVES BEHIND ZIA-UL-HAQ’S COUP**

[W]hen the political leaders failed to steer the country out of a crisis, it is an inexcusable sin for the Armed forces to sit as silent spectators. It is, primarily, for this reason that the Army had to intervene to save the country…I would like to point out here that I saw no prospect of a compromise between the People’s Party and the PNA&…It was feared that the failure of the PNA and PPP to reach a compromise would throw the country into chaos…

Bhutto was later to claim that the army and General Zia-ul-Haq had ‘played a prominent part in encouraging, aiding and manipulating events to exacerbate civil strife in order to overthrow the legal government.’ Some of the evidence provided by Bhutto and confirmed by PNA leaders indicated that the army had decided to take over the country soon after the March 1977 elections.

The literature provides a number of motives which are listed below:

1. In December 1971 the Pakistani Army had encouraged and tolerated Bhutto’s rise to the highest position in the land because the Army lacked the political ability and the public legitimacy to rule, and Bhutto possessed both. As a result of his actions Bhutto’s populism failed, and Bhutto became expendable in Army eyes. This was the opportunity which led to Zia-ul-Haq’s coup.

2. The coup was not simply an indigenous fight between Bhutto and the PNA and between Bhutto and the Army. It was a fight between Bhutto and his domestic enemies (Army, religious groups, and politicians) and his external enemies (Shah of Iran, Saudi kingdom and the US government). The coup revealed the ascendancy of Bhutto’s enemies. This combined opposition brought the Bhutto regime down. This opposition was a marriage of convenience between the PNA and other Bhutto enemies; the interests of the anti-Bhutto grouping varied significantly.

The PNA wanted political reforms and a share of political power for itself. The Army possessed a hegemonic position (a pre-eminent position) in terms of budgetary support for itself in the Bhutto days but Bhutto had taken steps to deny the Army the political power it craved. Bhutto stood in the way of the Army’s political domination even as he appeased its demands for budgets and modern arms. The Army was hegemonic in comparison to other sectors in Pakistani state and society but it was not the dominant political player. So the Army wanted Bhutto out of power and out of the political game. It saw itself in a zero-sum game with Bhutto; the two could not coexist and one had to go. Naqvi describes the PNA as a front of the Pakistani Army. I do not agree with this view because the interests of the PNA and the Army differed sharply concerning Pakistan’s political future and the place of the Army in the country’s internal political and constitutional arrangements.

The Iranians opposed Bhutto because of his failure to control Baluchi nationalism which had a direct impact on nationalism among the Iranian Baluchis. The Baluchi
factor led to Bhutto’s decision to use the Army under General Tikka Khan (who had slaughtered Bengalis in 1971). During most of the Bhutto era there was a continuous pressure for provincial autonomy among the Baluchis. As a result the Shah of Iran’s displeasure with Bhutto entered the Pakistani political picture from 1972 onwards.

The USA opposed Bhutto because of his plans to make Pakistan into a nuclear power. In December 1971 Nixon and Kissinger had supported Bhutto’s return to power. According to Tariq Ali, the State Department ‘cleared’ Bhutto in 1971. Up to August 1976 Kissinger was willing to make a deal on the nuclear issue. The proposed deal was that Bhutto would receive modern conventional arms if he abandoned his nuclear plans.

The nature of the Saudi motive against Bhutto is unclear but the existence of active Saudi opposition to Bhutto is revealed by Saudi financial support for the PNA during the 1977 elections. Finally, the Pakistani Army opposed Bhutto because of his known desire to ‘get rid of the bastards’.

From this account it is clear that a foreign-linked coalition of enemies with tremendous diplomatic and financial clout was functioning against Bhutto before Bhutto ordered elections in January 1977. This coalition had the funds and an electoral strategy to make the 1977 elections into a plebiscite on Bhutto’s political record of broken promises. This strategy was articulated by the PNA during the elections in 1977, and later by the Zia-ul-Haq government when Bhutto’s misdeeds were publicized in volumes of White Papers. In this strategy the Army and Bhutto’s enemies had the support of Pakistani public opinion because of Bhutto’s alienation of the Left and the Right in Pakistan. After the elections, and before the July 1977 coup, the foreign-linked coalition activity involved contact between the Saudi ambassador and the Pakistani Army.

3 The coup was the result of the Army’s fear of another national election and of the US involvement with the Pakistani Army since the early 1950s. Table 5.2 shows that the Army has continually feared elections and political reforms in Pakistan and the loss of political power to civil control.

The American involvement in Pakistan’s military affairs was an important contributory factor in Zia-ul-Haq’s coup because the US government was historically ambivalent about the importance of democracy in Pakistan. In the 1950s Pakistan favoured stability over democracy during the Ayub days. The US political adviser to Pakistan,

Table 5.2 Domestic and external settings of Pakistani military coups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Coup leader</th>
<th>Domestic situation</th>
<th>External situation</th>
<th>US interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oct 58</td>
<td>Mirza</td>
<td>move towards national elections</td>
<td>there were no pressing problems between</td>
<td>US did not authorize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>seemed imminent</td>
<td>Pakistan and its neighbours</td>
<td>coup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 58</td>
<td>Ayub</td>
<td>Ayub wanted power and did not</td>
<td>same as above</td>
<td>US wanted stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>wish to share it with Mirza</td>
<td></td>
<td>more than democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Yahya</td>
<td>Ayub was unpopular with</td>
<td>same as above</td>
<td>US opposed Ayub’s policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistanis and Americans</td>
<td></td>
<td>on China and</td>
</tr>
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The 1977 elections were rigged and Bhutto was undermining Army’s internal political position.


Professor C.B. Marshall, summed up the American attitude.

> During residence in Pakistan I was often told by Pakistanis, from President Mirza down, of the prematurity and impracticability of democracy in Pakistan. I, in turn, never urged democracy as such. The essential things, I stressed, were consensus, authority, a sense of policy—the creation of institution to enable a state to amount to something. ⁴⁹

Under Yahya, American strategic concerns pertaining to China and India rather than democracy in East Pakistan dominated US policy. After Yahya’s fall the US favoured democracy in Pakistan but as a temporary expedient; the link with the Army was more important to advance US diplomatic and military interests in the south-west Asian region and to keep US influence in the Pakistani decision-making structure. When Bhutto fell foul of Kissinger on the nuclear issue, the US had no difficulty in supporting his fall even though he had been democratically elected.

According to Tariq Ali, the Army decided to take over power after the March elections. ⁵⁰ The pattern of Army intervention in politics in 1977 differed from earlier interventions. In 1970, elections were offered and held by Yahya and his advisers because the Army and the bureaucracy felt that they could rig them. But when this strategy failed and the 1970 elections resulted in big majorities for Mujib and Bhutto in East Pakistan and West Pakistan respectively, then Yahya refused to accept the consequences of these elections. In 1977, the Army and Zia-ul-Haq allowed elections to be held because Bhutto had not been discredited publicly, as he was in March 1977, by the charge of rigged elections. However, thereafter, the Army did not allow the PPP and the PNA to work out their difficulties by political means. According to Asghar Khan, Zia-ul-Haq decided to implement the coup plan on 4 July 1977 when Bhutto told a meeting where Zia-ul-Haq was present that he planned to reach a settlement with the PNA. ⁵¹ The reason for this attitude is that the Army was not confident that its allies would win the new, supervised, elections in October 1977. ⁵² Here Zia-ul-Haq and the generals learnt from Yahya’s mistakes. This indicated a political sophistication in the Army’s thinking about Bhutto’s election strategy. Given Bhutto’s unpopularity as a result of his policies during 1972–6, then he could have lost the elections to the rightist PNA grouping which included ultra-Right Army allies. On the other hand, if the elections were rigged then Bhutto was likely to be discredited by the rigging. The latter scenario became reality in March 1977. The idea that elections were likely to be rigged was planted in public opinion in January 1977⁵³ at the time of the Bhutto announcement regarding the elections. This suggests that someone in Pakistani politics was already, early on, thinking about rigged elections as the issue to discredit Bhutto.
Following the furore about rigged elections in March, negotiations for new elections ensued between the PPP and PNA. After considerable vacillation between 8 March and 5 July, Bhutto appeared willing to share power with the PNA by accepting their political demands. He agreed to new elections in October. He agreed to PNA representation on the Implementation Council to supervise the new elections. He appeared willing to pull back the Army from Baluchistan. But the Army was not willing to abandon its dominant position in Baluchi affairs, just as it had been unwilling to abandon its dominant position in East Pakistan in 1971. By its refusal to withdraw from Baluchistan, the Army revealed its autonomy vis-à-vis Bhutto and its refusal to accept Bhutto’s political authority. It revealed its contempt for the PPP-PNA approach to finding the middle ground to share political power and to finding political solutions for political problems in Pakistan.

4 This factor overlaps in part with the third one but here the coup is explained by a fundamental change in the Army officer corps’ sociology and psychology between the 1950s and the 1970s. Two dimensions are crucial in this analysis.

First, Zia-ul-Haq era politics—the approach to elections, and the approach to Bhutto’s political and personal future—reflected Zia-ul-Haq’s personal ideology and style but it represented also the interests and views of Pakistani generals (the Junta); it was a collegial decision-making system. In appearance this era’s politics was Zia-ul-Haq-centric. He was the most visible player on the domestic, regional and the international stage. None the less the system was actually Junta-specific. The Junta members were the decision-makers even though they were protected from public scrutiny.

Secondly, the generals feared mutiny by junior officers if political parties were allowed to take the political stage. A party based political system was likely had the PPP-PNA negotiations been allowed to take their course and had the October 1977 elections been allowed to take place. The critical fact here is that the junior officer corps of the Army had accepted the ideology of the rightist Jammat and it had increased its influence in Army circles during the Bhutto era. Here right-wing political ideology produced the danger of an ideological reaction in the Army officer corps which could have brought down the Junta of generals. Here generational politics and changes in Army sociology and psychology had implications for inner-Army power politics. During the Yahya era, the inner-Army debate revealed a radical-reformist versus conservative split in the upper reaches of Army politics; Yahya had failed to settle this debate. During the Zia-ul-Haq era, the split was vertical, not horizontal. It was about Islamic ideology, and its place in Army politics and in national politics. The change in Army sociology and psychology indicated that Bhutto’s links with the officer corps were limited to the ‘secular’ and the first generational generals like Tikka Khan. Even though Bhutto had expressed rabid anti-Hindu and anti-Indian sentiments in his views about diplomatic and foreign affairs, he was not prepared to deal with this fundamental shift in the ideological base of the Army.

5 Finally, the Army intervened to prevent civil war in Pakistan. This was Zia-ul-Haq’s public reason for the coup and at the time he declared his intention to hold fair elections within 90 days. Zia-ul-Haq said,

I want to make it absolutely clear that neither have I any political ambitions, [n]or does the Army want to be distracted from its profession of soldiering…My sole aim is to organize free and fair elections which
would be held in October this year…I give a solemn assurance that I will not deviate from this schedule.60

Although Zia-ul-Haq’s critics see this as a fig leaf to cover his and the Army’s political ambitions, there is truth in it. The Army has continually seen itself as the guardian of Pakistan’s internal security. In 1971 it had accepted Bhutto after Yahya’s defeat because the alternative then was either Bhutto or a civil war in West Pakistan. Here the reasons were that both Bhutto and Pakistani public opinion were dissatisfied with the Army’s military and political performance in the 1970–1 crisis and they demanded change. In March-July 1977 the alternatives were either a PPP-PNA negotiated political settlement, the return of the Army to political power, or a civil war if these two alternatives did not work out. In the 1977 scenario the critical variable was a politically active (in Baluchi and in PPP-PNA affairs), an ideologically energized (motivated by Jamaat) and a politically dissatisfied Army which was further motivated by external forces. This was in an environment where Bhutto had lost his control over political and foreign affairs. In these circumstances, even though civil war was not imminent or inevitable, there was danger of an internal political drift which was likely to create a political vacuum in the country. This the Army bridged by its July coup.

ZIA’S POLITICAL IDEAS AND MOVES AND THEIR BASIS: BHUTTO’S ACCOUNT

After November 1979, Zia-ul-Haq began to restructure Pakistan’s internal power arrangements. The restructuring process occurred in the context of attitudes and activities which drove Zia-ul-Haq, the Army Junta and Bhutto’s other enemies to the July coup and to Bhutto’s hanging. The restructuring was on a massive scale. It revealed Zia-ul-Haq’s approach to politics, his desires to stay in power, to fashion an Islamic Pakistan, to neutralize the Bhutto factor in Pakistani politics, to give the Army veto in Pakistan’s affairs a constitutional basis, and to create a partyless Pakistani political system.

By November 1979 Zia-ul-Haq had postponed national and provincial assembly elections; this, the second postponement, was indefinite. Zia-ul-Haq had said publicly that the reason for his coup was to organize fair elections and to avoid rigging. To rig means to act fraudulently or in a deceptive manner. Zia-ul-Haq’s entire political record consisted mainly of deceptive political actions. According to Bhutto (see discussion below) the web of intrigue and deception was laid out before the July coup.

To understand the scope and the process of restructuring under Zia-ul-Haq, it is important to study the make-up of this web which the Army and its collaborators had woven against Bhutto. Bhutto’s account of the elite structure which brought him down and which led to the Zia-ul-Haq political system deserves study. Bhutto’s statements are no doubt self-serving; they were written and published as he faced the death sentence. But they deserve study because they reveal the key players who orchestrated Bhutto’s downfall and Zia-ul-Haq’s rise. The evidence is circumstantial but it is compelling. Bhutto’s account is a curtain raiser. It reveals the cast of players, their interests and loyalties, and their role behind the scenes of internal political statecraft. This way the Zia-ul-Haq era may be examined at two levels. First, at the level of secret intrigue where
black may appear as white and white may appear as black. Secondly, at the level of public moves which represent the public record, the side which is before us in the scholarly and the press materials. To capture the flavour of the Zia-ul-Haq era’s policies and operating style, I will first sketch the Bhutto testimony as it reveals the web which trapped Bhutto and which gave rise to Zia-ul-Haq. Then I will outline the political events and developments in Pakistan after 1979.

Bhutto makes two major points in his memoirs. First, there was a secret understanding and strategy between the PNA, the Army and foreign power(s) against Bhutto.62 Says Bhutto, ‘hidden hands’ or ‘forces arrayed behind the opposition’ started to gather from mid-December 1976.63 The PNA had massive funds at its disposal.64 Second, there was intrigue in Bhutto’s inner office: Lieutenant-General Jilani, Bhutto’s chief of military intelligence was a key player. Jilani, says Bhutto, publicly praised him but he played a secret role against him.65 Jilani served as Bhutto’s military intelligence chief for five years. He knew Bhutto’s thinking intimately. This included Bhutto’s plan to undertake further major reforms. These would have further diminished the political power of the Army and they would have increased Bhutto’s powers. These plans were intended for action after the 1977 elections.66 Says Bhutto, Jilani also had a hand in proposing Zia-ul-Haq as the Army chief.67 Bhutto reveals that most members of the Bhutto official entourage were arrested by the Zia-ul-Haq regime but Jilani remained free and he was promoted to defence secretary in the Zia-ul-Haq government.

These details indicated that by the end of 1976 (if not earlier), Bhutto’s inner office had been penetrated and some of Bhutto’s principal advisers who were located in his inner circle, were effectively double agents. Bhutto’s disclosures reveal the primacy of intrigue in Pakistan’s political affairs. The suggestion is that intrigue was the main method used to orchestrate the transfer of power from Bhutto to the Army although the public political activity at the time stressed the importance of fair elections and national elections. That is, reliance on intrigue indicated the utility of extra-constitutional means to transfer power from one regime to another. This was the primary level of action while electoral activity was the secondary level of action.

If Bhutto is right, the web of extra-constitutional activity revealed the following structure of internal power relations, and these constitute the origins of the Zia-ul-Haq era (Figure 5.2).

The goal was to bring Bhutto down and to return the Army to power either indirectly behind the PNA front or directly if the PNA failed to win the 1977 elections. Here the premise was that the Army chief was the extra-constitutional centre of power in Pakistan as he frequently claimed.68 The declared public method behind this strategy was to hold elections and the hope was that the PNA would win. The undeclared secret method of action was to hold elections, declare that they were rigged if the PNA did not win and then use fraudulent, extra-constitutional means (including political interference with the judicial process such as adverse publicity and manipulation of a spineless Pakistani judiciary) to convict and execute Bhutto.

By July 1977 the Bhutto ‘centre’ in Figure 5.2 was neutralized and forces surrounding and attacking the ‘centre’ were in the ascendant. The restructuring of the Pakistani elite structure at this time was massive. It meant a victory for the Army (allied to the US and moderate Muslim states, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia), sectarian religious-political forces (PNA with a heavy ultra-Right component), and politicians who opposed Bhutto
but were willing collaborators of the Pakistani Army and bureaucracy. After Bhutto was politically neutralized (in July 1977) and physically neutralized (in April 1979), Zia-ul-Haq’s political moves were dominated by the military-right-wing orientation of the counter-revolution against the Bhutto populist-authoritarian ‘revolution’ of the early 1970s. Zia-ul-Haq’s political style was obsequious throughout his presidency. He did not reveal a grand plan in his policies and actions. Rather the style indicated the use of surprise attacks on his targets, repression against the population, deceptions, calculated ambiguity and even lies to keep the opposition off balance and to keep the Zia-ul-Haq regime in a dominant political position. After his indefinite postponement of the elections in November 1979, Zia-ul-Haq’s political actions revealed an orientation which was anti-democratic (by Western and Asian standards), reactionary and manipulative. To a discussion of the content of Zia-ul-Haq’s policies and his moves after 1979 I now turn.

Zia-ul-Haq did not destroy Pakistani political institutions as is sometimes alleged by students of the Pakistani scene. They were weak when he came to power as the Army chief under Bhutto. Historically speaking, Pakistani political affairs have been governed by a number of attitudes and practices. Their continuous use by a variety of political players in Pakistan has prevented the emergence of strong political institutions as we understand them in the context of modern industrial democratic states and societies. Pakistani traditions and practices have kept the country’s political institutions weak. As I will argue later, Zia-ul-Haq tried to build on the pattern of Pakistani politics of the past and to reorient Pakistan’s political and constitutional arrangements in a particular way so that the interests of Zia-ul-Haq, the Army and the political Right in Pakistan could be advanced and institutionalized. In this way, Zia-ul-Haq tried to destroy the Bhutto approach to civil-military and political relations in Pakistan. He tried to return to the Ayub approach of a partyless democracy and a government based on a strong executive presidency and local self-government. Zia-ul-Haq tried to create an Islamic order in Pakistan which none of his predecessors had tried

![Figure 5.2 The anti-Bhutto structure of power, January–July 1977](image-url)
and which Jinnah had rejected in his search for a Muslim homeland and in his early statements on the relationship between religion and the state in Pakistan. Zia-ul-Haq’s approach had the effect of polarizing Pakistani politics between the Bhuttoites and the Army and its collaborators. I will argue later that Zia-ul-Haq’s actions did not correspond to the standards of modern secularism and modern democracies with political parties and elections. However, one effect of his approach was to strengthen the constitutional basis of Army involvement in Pakistani politics. The opposition it generated within Pakistan led to the revival of party based electoral democracy. This way Zia-ul-Haq strengthened both the Army’s political position as well as, although this was not his intent, the political position of the Bhutto PPP and the democracy constituency in Pakistan. This may be studied as a process of institution development in Pakistan.

What were the political traditions which Zia-ul-Haq inherited and worked with?

1. A tradition of strong presidential-type government (a Governor-General or a President) where the presidency was dominated by military men. This tradition revealed an attraction to paternalism and authoritarianism as well as intrigue in the upper reaches of power and decision-making in Pakistan.

2. A tradition of a weak judiciary which was eager to ratify ‘extra-constitutional deviations’ of military rule. Pakistan has not been able to develop a strong and independent judicial tradition or a tradition which subordinates political activities to a rule of law. Rather, rule by leaders and organizations in Pakistan is generally outside the discipline of constitutional authority.

3. A tradition of weak and fragmented political parties. Pakistan has never enjoyed the use of a national political party. Since its inception Pakistan has had a number of political parties. Until 1970 none had a national base although several had a provincial or a regional power base. Since 1970, Bhutto’s PPP is the one party which has gained a national and a provincial orientation. However its fortunes reflect fortunate external and internal circumstances rather than strength in philosophy and political organization which is the hallmark of Western and Asian political parties.

4. A tradition derived from British colonial practices which produced tight-knit army and bureaucratic organizations. These had close and continuous links with the US government since the early 1950s. It was also a colonial tradition that local princes collaborated with foreign powers to establish their ascendancy in internal politics. In Pakistan’s context the civil and military bureaucratic organizations had the ambition and the capabilities to organize Pakistan’s political, military and economic affairs. The tradition here is to rely on the continuous functioning of the civil-military bureaucracy as the directorate of Pakistan in association with foreign power(s).

5. A tradition of a docile and servile press in Pakistan which is handicapped by censorship regulations and which is dependent on government patronage. This tradition emerged with Ayub’s press regulations which remained in use under the Yahya, Bhutto and Zia-ul-Haq regimes.

6. A tradition of relying on a narrowly based structure of political power in Pakistan. Since electoral politics have not existed for most of Pakistan’s history, and since they do not generally provide a legitimate avenue to express political grievances and to legitimize governmental activities, the tradition favours intrigue and inner-elite coalition-building activities to maintain and to change political regimes. Under Bhutto military and political intelligence services were used for domestic political work.
A tradition of secularism and suspicion among Pakistani masses of Islamic fundamentalists. This is why Pakistani political parties provide a variety of responses concerning the role of Islam in Pakistan’s political affairs, and why the range of political ideologies is vast in the party platforms.

A tradition of asserting Punjabi domination over Pakistan’s affairs. This is reinforced by Punjab’s position as the main recruiting ground for Pakistan’s soldiers’ and officers’ corps. This tradition led to another tradition: a refusal to acknowledge the need for provincial autonomy as an organizing principle of Pakistani politics.

Finally, a tradition opposing Communism and socialism as a political ideology and as an organizing principle of Pakistani political and economic life. Conversely the tradition was to strengthen private and state capitalism in Pakistan.

Zia-ul-Haq did not create these traditions or conventions of Pakistan’s political affairs. He used them, as his predecessors did not, to strengthen his position as well as that of certain institutional forces in Pakistan. He tried to project his visions of Pakistan’s future on the Pakistanis. To understand Zia-ul-Haq’s Pakistan it is necessary to understand the two levels of operation or the two worlds in which Zia-ul-Haq lived and functioned. The first was a continuation of the motives and the structure of power which emerged after the breakdown of the Bhutto power structure. This was the real or the primary arena of action for Zia-ul-Haq. Here he was the linchpin, the centre of gravity of action. This world had its origins in the developments and circumstances of Pakistan during the Bhutto era (especially from 1976 on) but its main development occurred after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. With Afghanistan on the US agenda, and with its dependence on Pakistan as the conduit of supplies to Afghanistan, Zia-ul-Haq’s Pakistan acquired the external opportunity. This energized the Zia-ul-Haq power structure which had brought Bhutto down; it returned Pakistan to the first pattern of Pakistani politics.

With Pakistan a frontline state after December 1971, the secretive and the real Zia world became a world of Zia-CIA links to funnel Afghan supplies. It was also a world of drug smuggling on a massive scale. This allegedly involved Zia-ul-Haq’s personal staff although Zia-ul-Haq was himself known to be a devout Muslim. Here trucks laden with arms for the mujahadeen returned with drugs which found markets within Pakistan and abroad. Drugs and arms trade developed an interface in the Zia-ul-Haq era. In Pakistani foreign and military affairs this was a high stake, ambitious world. Its aims were to push Pakistan’s strategic and ideological frontiers up to Afghanistan through a military victory of the Pakistan-supported Afghan mujahadeen in Afghanistan. The currencies of political action in this world were secrecy and intrigue which involved the Pakistani Army, the CIA, Afghan mujahadeen and other foreign supporters of the Afghan cause. Here Afghanistan became the arena and the land of opportunity because Kashmir and India were no longer available as arenas for Pakistani political and military action.

Zia-ul-Haq’s first world was his first love but he needed a second world as well. To maintain his participation in the first world, it was necessary for Zia-ul-Haq to stay ahead of his domestic political rivals and to stay in power. The game of survival concerned the Pakistan political front even though the opportunities for glory lay in the Afghan military and intelligence front. The second Zia-ul-Haq world reflected his ambitions to refashion Pakistani polity, society and economy in his image. The means were repressive. He was allowed a free hand in Pakistan’s affairs by his foreign mentors because of his usefulness to the Afghan cause. The internal development of Pakistani democracy and human rights
was secondary or marginal to the West as long as he was useful to them in Afghanistan. Democracy became important when Zia-ul-Haq was seen as needing a civil buffer to control domestic dissent (1985) and when Zia-ul-Haq was no longer useful to Western interests in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. Therefore, in assessing the pattern of Zia-ul-Haq’s political behaviour vis-à-vis Pakistani politics, it is important to bear in mind that his foreign opportunity in Afghanistan was the context of his freedom of action in the domestic sphere.

Zia-ul-Haq’s autonomy in the domestic sphere was a consequence of his faithfulness in serving the American cause in Afghanistan. But soon after the Soviet decision to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, the US lost interest in the area, and the divergence between American and Zia-ul-Haq interests in Afghanistan policy was revealed. The US was mainly concerned with the Soviet withdrawal; Zia-ul-Haq, on the other hand, wanted an Islamic Afghanistan. Because he pressed on with his drive towards an Islamic Afghanistan despite the changed context of US policy, Zia-ul-Haq paid the price with his life.

In this setting, while the US-sponsored Afghanistan operation to secure the Soviet withdrawal lasted, what were Zia-ul-Haq’s political actions in Pakistan? To address this question, the Zia-ul-Haq story may be divided into two parts. The first, 1977–9, concerned Zia-ul-Haq and Pakistan before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During this period Zia-ul-Haq’s approach to political affairs was cautious. There was oscillation in his attitudes and policies. Contradictory impulses appeared to be in play. The web of intrigue which I discussed earlier showed the external and the internal opposition to Bhutto and the consensus to bring Bhutto down. It was not yet a mandate for Zia-ul-Haq’s or the Army’s rule in Pakistan. There was a mandate at the time to bring the Army back into the political sphere either directly or indirectly as the power behind the PNA or the ultra-Right political forces of Pakistan; but there did not seem to be a clear consensus at the time about the nature and form of Army involvement in domestic political affairs. This is why after the July 1977 coup Zia-ul-Haq moved carefully and there was no sign of a grand design. Zia-ul-Haq seemed to vacillate between holding elections and avoiding them. The sequence of events between July 1977 and November 1979 indicates ambivalence on Zia-ul-Haq’s part. At this time Pakistani politics were in the second pattern, and Zia-ul-Haq’s autonomy was circumscribed by internal circumstance and pressures and by lack of foreign opportunities. The second, 1979–88, concerned Zia-ul-Haq’s Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Here Zia-ul-Haq had the international prestige and the power to pursue his ambitions. He was now in the first pattern (see Figure 5.1 ). Still his quest for autonomy was limited by his domestic pressures and international pressures required him to find a civilian and a democratic facade for Army rule. The story here is one of autonomy and constraint in Zia-ul-Haq’s approach to his political affairs in Pakistan.

According to Gardezi the Army returned to a position of ‘absolute dominance’ in July 1977. My view is different. At that time, and until his death in 1988, Zia-ul-Haq appeared to be dominant but in fact he was not. Throughout 1977–88 the Zia-ul-Haq regime lacked legitimacy. Furthermore, the regime had a narrow power base. The regime lasted because of several factors. First, the political opposition was fragmented and Zia-ul-Haq was skilled enough to use the principle of divide and rule to manage opposing forces. Secondly, the Army closed ranks behind Zia-ul-Haq because he effectively
represented their interests in the political system. Thirdly, as a result of the Afghan situation, US, Saudi, and other foreign aid came to Pakistan because of the Army’s and Pakistan’s utility to foreign powers. Finally, Zia-ul-Haq was able to mobilize Middle Eastern and other monies and this helped relieve a difficult economic situation. The flow of drugs from Afghanistan to Pakistan also helped the economic situation. Furthermore, remittances by expatriate Pakistanis to Pakistan, and good crops during Zia-ul-Haq’s era also helped the economic record of the regime. These were fortunate domestic and external circumstances which were skilfully exploited by Zia-ul-Haq and his advisers.

Regional security developments enhanced Pakistan’s position in international affairs as well as Zia-ul-Haq’s position within Pakistan. Because of Khomeini’s revolution and the fall of the Shah of Iran (1978–9) and Afghan developments (1978–9), US-Chinese-Saudi interests converged in supporting Zia-ul-Haq’s Pakistan. Bhutto’s downfall in 1977 was not the direct result of Afghan and Iranian developments as it preceded both. However the external constellation of powers in play against Bhutto in 1976–7 were also in play in orchestrating the international response to Afghan and Iran developments in 1978–9. Zia-ul-Haq benefited from this combination of powers. It helped him to neutralize Bhutto, and to restructure Pakistan’s political system.

Here fortunate external circumstances provided Zia-ul-Haq and his advisers with the opportunity to seek autonomy in internal Pakistani affairs. The theory is that a sub-imperial elite gains internal autonomy when it functions as a collaborator of foreign power in regional and international security affairs. But when it does not function in this manner, the external powers are likely to intervene in the country’s domestic power struggles. In the present case, as long as Zia-ul-Haq’s Pakistan remained committed to US policy aims in the region, it was left alone in domestic affairs.

The contrast is with Z.A.Bhutto. Because he refused to coordinate Pakistan’s foreign and nuclear policies with US interests, he was not left alone. The critical variable here is the willingness and ability of the Pakistan elite to coordinate policy with the external patron. Bhutto sought autonomy for himself and for Pakistanis without a willingness to cooperate with the US in external affairs. He lost his quest for autonomy as well as the benefit of gain from cooperation with the US in external affairs. Zia-ul-Haq, however, gained external approval to have a free hand in domestic politics. As well he benefited by cooperating with the US.

There is a caveat to this theory. External cooperation provides a promise of non-interference by the foreign power in internal affairs and a prospect of timely support for the regime’s (not necessarily national) interests. But the free hand still requires that the collaborating elite must develop indigenous legitimacy in the eyes of its own people. Zia-ul-Haq had autonomy compared to other players in Pakistan between 1977–88 but his autonomy was circumscribed by internal and external compulsions or pressures. The external pressures lay in the reality of asymmetry in military power between Pakistan and India and Pakistan and the USSR. Pakistan’s closest friends, the US and China, could not alter this factor. They could arm Pakistan with the latest military equipment but they could not balance India. The internal compulsions concerned Zia-ul-Haq’s inability to repress or coopt or marginalize all opposing forces. He tried but he failed in this respect. For this reason I maintain that despite the superficial appearance of Zia-ul-Haq’s and the Army’s dominance in Pakistan’s political affairs between 1977 and 1988, in reality there was a continuous interaction between constraints and opportunities for Zia-ul-Haq and
his advisers. Zia-ul-Haq had an area of choice or room in which to manoeuvre but it was limited. Zia-ul-Haq, like Bhutto, faced systemic constraints but the circumstances were sharply varied in the two regimes. There was a sharp difference in the political intelligence and political style of the two as well. Bhutto was the urbane, cosmopolitan statesman. Zia-ul-Haq was the peasant. But Zia-ul-Haq, unlike Bhutto, knew how to take advantage of opportunities in domestic and foreign affairs. Zia-ul-Haq was the better politician, the better political survivor, in part because he was a better listener and a better student of political affairs.

To create choices and room for manoeuvre, Zia-ul-Haq used an

Table 5.3 Zia-ul-Haq’s goals and complex alliances, 1977–88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Policy issue</th>
<th>Zia-ul-Haq’s partner(s)—the ‘in-group’</th>
<th>The ‘out-group’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>neutralize Bhutto</td>
<td>PNA and Jamaat-i-Islami</td>
<td>PPP and Bhutto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>elections without Bhutto and the PPP</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>PPP and Bhutto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>partyless democracy in Pakistan</td>
<td>nameless political leaders in Pakistan who begged Zia-ul-Haq not to hold elections</td>
<td>MRD, 1981–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Afghan liberation</td>
<td>Army, Pakistani intelligence, US government, and other Western powers</td>
<td>none in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Islamic Pakistan</td>
<td>lower middle class and Islamic fundamentalists</td>
<td>bureaucracy, lawyers,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>economic development</td>
<td>bureaucracy, economic elite, Pakistani middle class</td>
<td>women’s groups, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Army’s pre-eminent position in political and constitutional affairs of Pakistan</td>
<td>Army and bureaucracy</td>
<td>PPP, MRD and ethnic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and regionalist groupings in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nevertheless the system was orderly: it siphoned off internal pressures, marginalized them, neutralized them and created safety valves to let off steam. In this order Zia-ul-Haq was not accountable to Pakistani public opinion. Rather he functioned in response to what he saw were his divine responsibilities. Zia-ul-Haq had earlier insisted that Bhutto be held accountable for his actions. But he arranged the new political order in a way to immunize himself from public or constitutional accountability. This order was not harmonious. There were frequent and recurring political, constitutional, religious and sectarian, regionalist and ethnic controversies and tensions. Zia-ul-Haq responded to these internal dynamics; he was an active participant in the major controversies. In some instances systemic pressures constrained Zia-ul-Haq’s policies; in other instances, Zia-ul-Haq got his way and changed the system itself. On balance, Zia-ul-Haq changed irrevocably Bhutto’s political system; he left his imprint on Pakistani power relationships after his death. To make sense of post-Zia-ul-Haq Pakistan it is important to understand the character of Zia-ul-Haq’s Pakistan.

S.J.Burki, a senior World Bank official and a Zia-ul-Haq admirer, argues that Zia-ul-Haq changed Pakistan in three ways.

First, he depoliticized the Army and gave it a political say. To quote him,

> These two facts—the need to factor the armed forces into a political equation and the need for the armed forces to recognize that it would be exceedingly difficult for it to go alone into politics—can be counted as Zia-ul-Haq’s contributions to Pakistan’s political development.

The assumption of the Presidency by Ghulam Ishaq Khan (chairman of the Senate who moved up according to the rules of the 1973 Bhutto Constitution) without Army interference is, according to Burki, a sign of Army depoliticization. (Parenthetically it may be noted that Mr Khan is a civilian with close Army links and it made sense for the Army not to oppose the ascendancy of ‘their man’ in order to check Benazir Bhutto.)

Secondly, Zia-ul-Haq increased Pakistan’s geo-political importance. Says Burki,

> Zia-ul-Haq was able to move Pakistan’s foreign policy from a total obsession with India and reformulate it to provide the country with a role in a geopolitical area that is critical for all major global powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe, Japan, and China. It is unlikely that the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan will move Pakistan out of the niche it has carved for itself in world affairs, and the carving was done by Zia-ul-Haq.

Finally, Pakistan became a middle income nation under Zia-ul-Haq.

I disagree with these assessments. Zia-ul-Haq’s real achievement was that the Army’s political role was institutionalized and it was made permanent in a constitutional framework. The contrast here is with the Ayub, Yahya and Bhutto eras. The Ayub era was basically a civil administration where the Army returned to the barracks after Ayub’s coup in 1958. The Yahya administration was a military-civil bureaucratic administration but its declared political function was to pave the way for civil rule and representative democracy. The Bhutto administration was explicitly anti-military. It sought to create a
new civil-military relationship in the framework of the 1973 Constitution which had received broad support from a wide range of Pakistanis. This Constitution curbed the Army’s political role. It is treason, punishable by death under the 1973 Constitution for the Army, to remove an elected leader by a coup. By his July coup Zia-ul-Haq revised the civil-military relationship and he immunized the Army from political control by civilians. This to me is Zia-ul-Haq’s main contribution.

Burki may be right about Pakistan’s rise as a middle income nation under Zia-ul-Haq but here economists may disagree. If current estimates of Pakistan’s economy are credible as outlined by the prestigious Economists Intelligence Unit Pakistan’s economic performance had more to do with lucky harvests, healthy overseas remittances by Pakistanis and foreign aid packages rather than superior economic management.

Burki’s estimation of Zia-ul-Haq’s contribution to Pakistan’s geopolitical importance is overdone. Pakistan’s status as a frontline state did not survive the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. Since the early 1950s Pakistan has been important in American military and intelligence affairs. This importance was established in US policy before Zia-ul-Haq entered the political scene. But in another sense Pakistan’s geopolitical importance declined after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988 and after Pakistan’s military defeat in 1971. On the former, it was no longer required as a conduit of Western supplies to the mujahadeen; in the latter it was no longer useful as a line of pressure against India given India’s commitment to maintain a military and a nuclear edge against Pakistan. Furthermore, after the US-China détente relationship was established in 1972 Pakistan was of no further use to either power. Finally, after Khomeini’s death and the emergence of a more moderate Rafsanjhani leadership in Tehran, the American reliance on Pakistan as Iran’s flank also diminished. Zia-ul-Haq’s and Pakistan’s geopolitical prominence as a frontline state was, in my view, temporary during the Zia-ul-Haq era.

Zia-ul-Haq’s main contribution for the purpose of this study lay in domestic affairs. By 1979 Zia-ul-Haq had determined that he and the Army could stay in power because other constituencies in Pakistani politics were weak and divided. Between 1979 and 1985 Zia-ul-Haq was able to control the pace of political events in Pakistan; he never once lost the initiative and the determination to stay in charge. This was no small achievement for someone of peasant origin and without known political ambitions and with limited political experience before 1977. His political moves during this period revealed a commitment to a new political system as per Table 5.3. The orientation was explicitly anti-Bhutto, anti-PPP, anti-political parties, pro-Army, pro-Islamic, pro-capitalist, pro-US, anti-representative democracy, pro-local democracy, and it favoured the continuous co-opting of politicians in an advisory but not in a decision-making capacity. This system was driven by Zia-ul-Haq’s personality and ambition. It was also meant to be broad-based and institutionalized so as to enhance Zia-ul-Haq’s control over the political process and to give his rule the legitimacy of internal and foreign approval. The system was like an earthquake-proof Chinese house where a number of vertical and horizontal elements were loosely linked and these loose links functioned as shock absorbers. This way systemic shocks were expected to shake a part of the structure rather than to bring the entire house down.

As Pakistan’s political history is one of continuous internal vertical and horizontal cleavages, the system devised by Zia-ul-Haq was meant to manage internal systemic
tensions and power struggles by creating internal checks and balances. The idea was not to remove domestic tensions; these were enduring. Rather, the idea was to manage them by creating a system of countervailing tensions, and, in this way to creatively use internal political tensions to Zia-ul-Haq’s and the Army’s advantage. The idea was to form a system of countervailing pressures within Pakistani state and society so that these pressures would be concentrated among the domestic competitors (e.g. Pakistani political parties who mistrusted each other) rather than be unified and focused against Zia-ul-Haq and the Army. That Zia-ul-Haq succeeded in creating such a system of countervailing tensions, albeit in a deceptive and an arbitrary manner, testifies to his skills as a political manager.

In Zia-ul-Haq’s approach there were four policy constants or permanent core interests, and four peripheral elements as well. The core interests were as follows:

1 Need for continuous Pakistani military and intelligence involvement in Afghan affairs, so as to extend Pakistan’s ideological and strategic frontiers westwards.
2 Need for economic development of Pakistan.
3 Need for development of the Army as the centre of political power in Pakistan.
4 Need for Pakistan to jump into the US lap, to gain US diplomatic and financial patronage so as to develop the Army’s and Pakistan’s margin of manoeuvre in internal and external affairs; and conversely to avoid a flirtation with socialism at home, and non-alignment abroad.

The peripheral elements were as follows:

1 Need to appear to move towards elections in Pakistan.
2 Need to appear to move towards an Islamic Pakistan.
3 Need to appear to seek Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
4 Need to appear to seek normalization with India.

Zia-ul-Haq’s public relations posture was driven by the peripheral elements except that the election and Islamic issues were key parts of the strategy to countervail internal tensions and to manage competing constituencies. But they were not core interests; they were means to the ends represented by my list of core interests. The political system was driven by the need to satisfy the core interests. As long as the core interests were satisfied, Zia-ul-Haq’s political future seemed guaranteed.

This pattern of core/peripheral interests shaped Zia-ul-Haq’s political system. In the following pages I will show how the main lines of political developments in Pakistan under Zia-ul-Haq (December 1979 and 1988) can be understood by reference to these interests.

M. Lodhi writes that the ‘army has no solution to Pakistan’s deepseated problems’. 85 She is partly right. Ayub did not settle Pakistani economic, political and military problems. Ayub is fondly remembered by those who benefited from his policies, but his legacy was not positive. Yahya had a negative impact: his actions led to the break-up of Pakistan. He too did not solve Pakistan’s internal problems. However, the Yahya era was noteworthy in an important way. In his era Army officers started to rethink the Army’s role in internal political affairs. (See the reform versus conservative debate, Chapter 4.) The Yahya era is important because of the beginnings of the process of rethinking in the place which counts in Pakistan, i.e. the Army. Unfortunately this important in-house
debate was overtaken by the Bangladesh war, and by the rise of Bhutto. This rethinking process in Army circles was arrested in the Bhutto era because his populist authoritarianism forced the Army to close ranks against Bhutto. None the less it is important to recognize that the rethinking process begun in the Yahya era was resumed in the Zia-ul-Haq era in the early 1980s. Lodhi is right to the extent that the Army has not been able to solve Pakistan’s social, economic and political problems but on the other hand, given that the problems were/are deepseated, the rethinking process in the Army circles is a positive development. Rethinking the nature of the problem(s) and the solution(s) is the first step toward policy development and theory-building.

The Zia-ul-Haq era indicates that his political strategy did not solve Pakistan’s entrenched problems but by creating a system of countervailing forces within Pakistan, Zia-ul-Haq structured the internal competition. Structuring problems and political forces is not the same thing as solving problems, but it is the necessary first step in the processes of redefining core interests/values and core perceptions and adjusting competing and entrenched groups’ interests. The Zia-ul-Haq regime employed extra-constitutional means (a series of constitutional deviations) to bring order to Pakistan’s political affairs. Bhutto had rigged elections; Zia-ul-Haq rigged the entire political process. Bhutto gave Pakistan the 1973 Constitution; Zia-ul-Haq amended it so much that while he kept the outside shell of the Constitution he changed its nature. Zia-ul-Haq’s methods were often brutal. Human rights abuses, frequent use of official/state terror against Pakistanis in the name of Islamic punishments and law and order, were common in Zia-ul-Haq’s Pakistan. But if ends justify means (and this is open to debate) the measure of Zia-ul-Haq’s success lies in the ability to organize the domestic controversies and to create a political framework which enabled contending political forces to inch forward towards a minimum of ‘uneasy co-existence’ and the maximum of ‘power-sharing’ among powerful contenders. Success here means the avoidance of anarchy and a movement towards power-sharing.

The Zia-ul-Haq era was one of continuous military intervention in Pakistan’s affairs: in political and constitutional affairs by repeated martial law orders which changed the political conventions/institutions and the rules; in military affairs by immunizing the Army from civilian or political direction from outside the Army; in economic affairs by the continuous involvement of military personnel in the running of economic enterprises in Pakistan; and, finally, in social affairs by Zia-ul-Haq’s insistence on the use of Islamic principles in society. Here Zia-ul-Haq’s and the Army’s intervention in politics was driven by a number of elements: the ideology and sociology of the armed forces (especially the influence of the Jammat in the ranks); its self-image as the guardian of Pakistan’s internal and external security; the Junta’s interest to avoid internal dissent in Army ranks, and its interest to avoid subordination of the Army’s political and budgetary interests to a Bhutto-type civil administration; and, finally, its alliance with the US government. The effect of this continuous intervention was to radicalize contending forces who then sought to find ways to engage the military and Zia-ul-Haq in the political arena. This way Zia opened up the political system of Pakistan. Zia-ul-Haq was both referee and player in the political arena and he frequently changed the rules as he learnt from his political experiences in the minefield of Pakistani politics.

In other words, two processes were at work in the Zia-ul-Haq era:
1 The pattern of military intervention in political affairs was intensified and formalized by extra-constitutional means.

2 At the same time an internal political debate was organized in Pakistan. Zia-ul-Haq pushed the first process; and it was here he showed his initiative. He responded to the second: this was the Pakistan beyond his control but which he could not ignore. When he died a legitimate, harmonious basis to accommodate contending forces had not been found but the processes were entrenched.

Zia-ul-Haq’s interventions in Pakistan’s affairs did not solve the entrenched problems but they threw up on the political stage a pattern and distribution of Zia-ul-Haq’s and the Army’s core and peripheral interests. Table 5.4 shows how Zia-ul-Haq pursued these interests.

The core interests did not imply a transition to democracy or a system of pure civilian rule where the peoples’s representatives provide the political direction to a state’s political, economic and military affairs. These core interests did not imply a transfer of power from the Army to the people’s representatives; nor did they imply a sharing of power between the two. Power-sharing occurs when the political principals recognize a mutual vulnerability. Rais 87 sees the mutual vulnerability in the Zia-ul-Haq-Junejo relationship after 1985 as the basis of Zia-ul-Haq’s politics or as a basis for Pakistan’s political system. In reality the pattern of the relationship between the two showed Junejo either as a client (subordinate) of Zia-ul-Haq or at best a junior partner. Zia-ul-Haq’s unceremonious dismissal of Junejo in May 1988 suggests the former.

Table 5.4 Zia-ul-Haq’s core political interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Afghan liberation</th>
<th>Economic development</th>
<th>Zia-ul-Haq's personal power</th>
<th>The Army in politics</th>
<th>US link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Dec 1979 USSR invaded Afghanistan</td>
<td>Internal politics and foreign affairs were the priorities, not economic issues.</td>
<td>Zia’s personal ambitions were not revealed. His power was unchallenged but his legitimacy was questioned.</td>
<td>30 Aug 1979 amendment to 1962 Political Parties Act. This prohibited party activity which ridiculed judiciary or armed forces. Nov 1979, political parties were banned and Zia-ul-Haq declared that martial law will now be enforced as martial law.</td>
<td>Zia-US relations were bad. US embassy was burnt and Pakistan left CENTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Peshawar emerged as centre of Afghan resistance</td>
<td>Economic conditions were good because of good harvest, healthy overseas remittances</td>
<td>Changed Army command to avoid internal coup against Zia-ul-Haq</td>
<td>Army became the dominant force in politics.</td>
<td>1959 US-Pakistan executive agreement was reaffirmed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
to Pakistan was resumed. was effectively abrogated and military sales were revived

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period Afghan liberation</th>
<th>Economic development</th>
<th>Zia-ul-Haq’s personal power</th>
<th>The Army in politics</th>
<th>US link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>[as above]</td>
<td>[as above]</td>
<td>Zia-ul-Haq announced new constitutional arrangements which made the President stronger than the Prime Minister</td>
<td>[as above] [as above]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>[as above]</td>
<td>[as above]</td>
<td>Zia-ul-Haq announced changes in Army command to avoid internal coup. Zia-ul-Haq had a referendum which confirmed him in the presidency for five years</td>
<td>[as above] [as above]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>[as above]</td>
<td>[as above]</td>
<td>Mixed economic signals but US aid continued because of Afghan situation. Zia-ul-Haq chose Junejo as Prime Minister and issued Revival of Constitution Order which strengthened the powers of the President. Junejo government validated and Army rule during 1977–85. Martial law was lifted in Dec 1985</td>
<td>[as above] [as above]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>[as above]</td>
<td>[as above]</td>
<td>[as above] [as above]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period Afghan liberation</th>
<th>Economic development</th>
<th>Zia-ul-Haq’s personal power</th>
<th>The Army in politics</th>
<th>US link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>[as above]</td>
<td>[as above]</td>
<td>Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan from London exile and received big welcome from public</td>
<td>[as above] [as above]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>[as above]</td>
<td>[as above]</td>
<td>Junejo continued to try to develop his powers and authority vis-à-vis Zia-ul-Haq by developing party politics and constitutional government but the Army remained the invisible power in Pakistan’s affairs.</td>
<td>[as above] [as above]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>[as above]</td>
<td>[as above]</td>
<td>Zia-ul-Haq dismissed Junejo. Zia-ul-Haq died in a plane crash</td>
<td>[as above] [as above]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ZIA-UL-HAQ’S LEGACY

Zia-ul-Haq’s political activities, and the pattern of politics of the Zia era, indicate the primacy of the core interests. Secondly, they indicate that Zia-ul-Haq was very successful in making the Army the central player in Pakistan’s affairs. Still, peripheral interests were a part of the political picture even though their impact was secondary during 1979–88. To recapitulate, the four interests were: appearing to move towards elections; appearing to
secure an Islamic state; appearing to seek Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan; and appearing to seek India-Pakistan normalization.

On the peripherals Zia-ul-Haq’s accomplishments were mixed.

1 He repeatedly promised elections during 1977–9 but he failed to keep his promises. The Supreme Court of Pakistan had justified the 1977 coup as a necessary but temporary constitutional deviation provided elections were held as Zia-ul-Haq promised. Under Zia-ul-Haq the temporary constitutional deviation became permanent. By various martial law orders which were issued between October 1979 and 1981, the Courts were forbidden to challenge martial law activities. In December 1981 Zia-ul-Haq set up the Majlis-i-shoora, a nominated and an advisory body. This reflected Zia-ul-Haq’s mistrust of politicians and political parties and his desire to co-opt politicians into Army-bureaucracy rule. This way Zia-ul-Haq could marginalize the Bhuttos, the PPP and party politics of rightist, centrist and leftist ideological persuasion, and yet could stay in touch with politicians and the political undercurrents of Pakistan.

But Zia-ul-Haq’s moves did not dampen the internal political debate. Just as the Yahya era was notable for the early development of a debate about Pakistan’s political future in Army circles, the Zia-ul-Haq era was notable for the development of a debate about Pakistan’s political future at the mass level. This crucial point must be appreciated because the politics of post-Zia-ul-Haq Pakistan is really a continuation of this debate. The politics of Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan reflect the polarization of this debate.

By 1983 two lines of political thought emerged in Pakistan. Zia-ul-Haq’s appointees in the Majlis were nominees of the bureaucracy and they urged a reinstatement of political parties, the retention of the 1973 Constitution, human rights protection, independent judiciary, free press and a balance of power between the President and the Prime Minister. On the other hand Zia-ul-Haq’s Council of Islamic Ideology followed the Zia-ul-Haq line: it urged elections on a non-party basis.

The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) opposed Zia-ul-Haq’s politics and it pushed for the first line of thought.

The MRD opposed Zia-ul-Haq’s plan for an Islamic Pakistan on the grounds that the 1973 Constitution provided an adequate Islamic flavour for Pakistan. Instead, it urged a return to the 1973 Constitution and provincial autonomy. Beyond the MRD lay Pakistani leftists and their regionalist groups. Zia-ul-Haq’s answer to this debate came in 1983 when he announced himself in favour of local elections and martial law regulations over the 1973 Constitution.

Zia-ul-Haq’s legacy was mixed because the debate between the two lines of political thought remained unsettled during the Zia-ul-Haq era. In 1985 Zia-ul-Haq appointed Junejo as the Prime Minister. The latter moved to implement the first line of thought. Junejo’s agenda was to legalize political parties, to lift martial law and to restore a balance of power between President Zia-ul-Haq and himself. When Junejo appeared to threaten the Zia-ul-Haq approach he was summarily dismissed. This debate was partly settled after Zia-ul-Haq’s death when party based national elections were allowed by the post-Zia-ul-Haq (the Army and Ghulam Ishaq Khan) regime. This led to the rise of Benazir Bhutto. But on the other hand, the debate remained unsettled inasmuch as the 1973 Constitution was not restored to its original form; the Army remained immune to constitutional authority, and it remains the central player in Pakistan’s affairs, as Zia-ul-Haq had wanted.
2 Zia-ul-Haq, a devout Muslim, sought an Islamic Pakistan. This too was a peripheral issue in Pakistani politics (but not for Zia-ul-Haq). Peripheral, because it siphoned off a lot of public energy in Pakistan away from the main issues of civil-military relations in Pakistan and the need to develop stable political constitutional arrangements. Peripheral, because it produced a religious divide as a result of the establishment of Shariat courts and the institution of Zakat.97 Pakistani Shias clashed in riots with Pakistani Sunnis and the Ahmediyas remained marginalized. Despite Zia-ul-Haq’s high Islamic profile, the question of the role of Islam in Pakistan’s state affairs has never been settled since 1947. Under Zia-ul-Haq the opposition came from the Pakistani public as well as political parties and from within the bureaucracy.98 Finally, the Islamic issue was peripheral because it did not affect the shape of the Army-dominated power structure of Pakistan under Zia-ul-Haq. Thus, the issue was peripheral to the internal power arrangements of Pakistan. The issue was nevertheless important for Pakistan’s foreign affairs. The theme of Islamic Pakistan mobilized Pakistani public opinion to support the drive to develop as Islamic Afghanistan. This was important for Zia-ul-Haq and the Army because it would have extended Pakistan’s strategic and ideological frontiers to Afghanistan when Pakistan could not extend its frontiers into India’s Kashmir and India’s Punjab. Secondly, the Afghan issue was necessary to nourish Pakistan’s (Zia-ul-Haq’s and the Army’s) links with the USA. In other words, the Islamic issue was peripheral in relation to internal politics but it reinforced Pakistan’s core interests in relation to Afghanistan and the USA.

3 Zia-ul-Haq played up his desire to work towards the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan but this was contrary to his and the Army’s interests. Without the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s importance to the US was limited. To retain US aid and patronage and to maintain Pakistan’s frontline status, a ‘no win’ Soviet military presence in Afghanistan was to Zia-ul-Haq’s advantage. Here Zia-ul-Haq’s Afghan posture was in a deceptive mode.

4 Likewise, his search for India-Pakistan normalization was contrary to the Pakistani Army’s core interest which was to maintain its preeminent position as the guardian of Pakistan’s external and internal security. Normalization with India (and the USSR) would reduce the importance of the Army.

To sum up, Zia-ul-Haq’s motives and interests were complex but his legacy has been enduring. First, he restructured Pakistan’s constitutional and political processes by giving the Army a pre-eminent and a legal basis to define the political rules of the game. Through amendments to the 1973 Constitution, the balance of power between the Army and the politicians was shifted in the Army’s favour. This restructuring occurred because of Zia-ul-Haq’s political skills and because of the opportunity presented by Afghanistan to obtain US aid to Pakistan and the room to manoeuvre and to restructure political affairs. Here the US’s external compulsion or dependence on Pakistan relating to Afghanistan became Zia-ul-Haq’s opportunity to carve an area of autonomy. Secondly, Zia-ul-Haq moved Pakistan back to the first pattern of politics where external opportunities facilitate the development of an unstable balance of power within the country.

The contrast here is between Zia-ul-Haq and Z.A.Bhutto. Bhutto found himself and Pakistan locked into the second pattern because of the lack of external opportunities. As a result he faced the prospect of a near civil war at home following the results of the March
1977 elections. Compared to this, the Zia-ul-Haq era was a vast improvement but it was still not a solution to Pakistan’s entrenched problems.

Zia-ul-Haq died when the external context started to change and the Afghan campaign had begun to wind down. With that Pakistan’s front-line status had begun to erode and US Congressional forces had begun to question Zia-ul-Haq’s nuclear, human rights and democracy record. The Army and the bureaucracy under Zia-ul-Haq had controlled the political stage. They had managed and marginalized the processes concerning the Islamicization of Pakistan, its democraticization and the problem of its nationalities. Zia-ul-Haq’s death unleashed the pent-up demand for party politics and national elections which Junejo had tried to develop and harness for his and Pakistani ends. Out of this pent-up demand came the resurgence of Benazir Bhutto and the PPP, but out of Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamic campaign also emerged the Islamic Democratic alliance. Zia-ul-Haq had given the Army a secure political and a constitutional base by his martial law decrees. The Junejo government had given the Army amnesty against prosecution for eight years of martial law. Under these conditions the emergence of party politics led to a polarization of party politics. In this fight between a polarized political party system, the Army could sit on the sidelines and watch the unfolding political drama. To a review of this drama—its key players, its imperatives, its events and developments—I now turn.
Post-Zia Pakistan, 1988–90

The end of the Zia regime coincided with the process of Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan but the end of Zia-ul-Haq was not the end of the Zia political system. The only difference between the Zia-Junejo and the post-Zia Benazir Bhutto system lay in the emergence of the PPP and the IJI (where the Muslim league was prominently represented). There was a sharp and continuing polarization between the PPP and the IJI. In the post-Zia system there was considerable competition/conflict among Pakistan’s political parties, ethnic and regional nationalities and in the upper echelons of the power structure in Islamabad.

Post-Zia Pakistan could not properly be called Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan because she did not dominate Pakistani power relations even though she was the elected head of government. She shared power with a number of key players: (1) The President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who was pro-Zia and a pro-Army former civil servant. (2) Aslam Beg, who was the Army Chief, (the chief of Army staff has traditionally been the centre of power in Pakistan!) (3) The Chief Minister of the Punjab, who headed the most populous and the most prosperous province, Punjab, which is also the centre of recruitment to the officers’ corps and the ranks of the Army. The then Chief Minister was a political enemy of Benazir Bhutto. He was a Zia-ul-Haq man. (4) Regionalist forces in Sind and Baluchistan who sought provincial autonomy; they thought that Benazir Bhutto was weak. (5) ‘Criminal’ elements who were active in the drugs and arms trades. They allegedly enjoyed official patronage within Pakistan and possibly patronage from outside Pakistan’s borders. (6) Finally, the US government, which remained a continuing element in Pakistanian decision-making in salient internal and external issues. When power in Islamabad was deeply divided the US government was able to function as a balancer in the management of internal power relations in Pakistan.

In such a setting it was appropriate to call this Pakistan post-Zia Pakistan. It had a beautiful face in the form of Benazir. The framework of political and constitutional action was defined by the Pakistani Army. It was the master in the back seat of the car. Elections became a plaything of the Army. Mirza and Ayub rejected national elections because they did not suit them. Yahya agreed to elections because the military and civil services thought they could rig the results. Zia-ul-Haq rejected elections because they did not suit his requirements of Army rule. Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Aslam Beg allowed elections because they could not harm the Army’s pre-eminent position in Pakistan’s affairs. When elections are allowed by the Pakistani Army it means that either they can rig the election results or the election process, or elections are meant to function as a safety valve to let off steam.

Pakistan under the prime ministership of Benazir Bhutto may be studied as the culmination of three major restructuring processes in Pakistan’s political affairs.
The first restructuring occurred in the early 1950s. The civil-military bureaucracies under Ghulam Mohammed, Mirza and Ayub (with the aid of the US government), turned their backs against representative government in Pakistan, and rejected non-alignment in foreign affairs.

The second restructuring occurred in the late 1960s. A combination of Pakistani leftists (students, trade unionists, Bengali and other provincial autonomists, and the poor sectors in Pakistan), Bhutto, elements in the Pakistani Army and bureaucracy who were dissatisfied with Ayub’s policies, produced this change. Out of the inner-elite and mass revolt against Ayub came a revival of the notion of representative government. But the motives of the players varied. Some in the Army saw politicians as a necessary buffer between the Army and the population (where the Army was the real power). They saw in democracy the possibility for a civil government to share power with the Army. This restructuring led to the revival of political parties and mass politics in Pakistan. This restructuring process produced the PPP as the premier party in West Pakistan and the Awami League as the premier party in East Pakistan in the 1970 elections. With the break-up of Pakistan in 1971, the PPP became by default the national party of a truncated Pakistan.

Out of the rise of Bhutto came the 1973 Constitution. Bhutto moved to establish the primacy of civil authority in Pakistan and he radically sought to restructure civil-military relations in Pakistan. He sought to put an end to the repeated extra-constitutional interventions in the political processes of Pakistan since the 1950s. The Bhutto era produced two kinds of restructuring: (1) at the constitutional level the legal position of the elected leader was asserted; and (2) at the political level Bhutto developed paramilitary and intelligence agencies answerable to Bhutto personally. This way he developed parallel organizations to check the internal political position of the Army. At both levels the challenge to the Army’s position in internal and foreign affairs was severe, and Bhutto’s ambition to develop a Bhutto-centric political system was manifest.

The third restructuring occurred under Zia-ul-Haq. He did not abolish the 1973 Bhutto Constitution but he suspended and amended it severely. As a result the ‘dominant civil-subordinate Army’ paradigm of the Bhutto era was completely reversed under the Zia era. Zia-ul-Haq restructured Pakistani politics by constitutional and political means. The 1973 constitutional framework was revised by a series of provisional martial law orders which subsequently were ratified by the Junejo government in 1985 retroactively. At the political level the political parties and regionalist and ethnic nationalities were marginalized. As a result, for the first time in Pakistan’s history, Zia-ul-Haq legalized the Army’s political role in Pakistan’s affairs. Its veto power now had/has constitutional sanction and the constitutional set-up which Benazir Bhutto inherited in 1988–9 was not changed by constitutional amendment(s).

Keeping these restructuring processes in mind, I argue that Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto represented an uneasy co-existence between a part of the elder Bhutto’s scheme which provided a national party to mobilize the populace and to legitimize political decisions, and a part of the Zia scheme which assured the primacy of the Army in political affairs. The part from Zia-ul-Haq which did not work after his death concerned his mistrust of party politics. Under Zia-ul-Haq four elements distinguished the Army’s direction of Pakistan’s political affairs. First, there was centralization of political power in Army-bureaucratic hands. This directorate acted in concert on salient policy issues
with the US government. This was the ‘in-group’ in Pakistan. Secondly, the ethnic, regionalist, democratic and Islamic (ultra-Right) forces who opposed the policies of mainstream Army-bureaucracy-US government combination were marginalized. These opposing forces were the ‘out-groups’. Thirdly, there was a selective mobilization of important parts of the ‘out-groups’ such as key politicians who were co-opted in an advisory capacity. Finally, at the mass level, repression was used to terrorize the general population by public floggings and other types of Islamic punishments. In other words, centralization of political powers in Army-bureaucracy hands, marginalization of the ‘out-groups’, controlled mobilization of important members of the ‘out groups’ and systemic repression were the main control mechanisms of the Zia regime.

THEORY AND ARGUMENT

With major amendments the ideas of Paul Wallace help us understand the nature of post-Zia Pakistan. Wallace makes the following points:

1 Political elites in South Asia are confronted with a limited number of options in attempting to maintain political power. No longer do they have the age-old alternative of consolidating a few primarily urban centres of power and relating superficially to a large autonomous hinterland within a general status quo context. Substantial expansion of state activity accompanied by heightened levels of mobilization and politicization is a feature of at least thirty years’ duration in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.4

2 In ‘traditional’ politics, there was ‘minimal’ mobilization; rulersubjects relations were ‘limited and static’; intervention by central elites in the autonomous rural areas was ‘intermittent’.5

3 During colonial rule, the ruler-subjects relations started to change; ‘participant demands and/or mobilization needs’ emerged.6

4 In post-colonial states/societies there is a continuous tension between mobilization and politicization. ‘Politicization’ means the ‘actual sharing in decision-making and the structure of authority by a broad range of individuals and groups’.7 Mobilization and politicization do not occur simultaneously as is often erroneously assumed. Political elites try to ‘sever politicization from mobilization’. When they try to limit sharing of decision-making and limit the structure of political authority to a few, this is called ‘depoliticization’.8

5 In South Asian political systems there is oscillation between politicization and depoliticization. There is tension between those who seek to enlarge ‘politicization’ (i.e. increasing the numbers of participants in decision-making and power-sharing) and those who seek to limit this (i.e. the ‘depoliticizers’). ‘Who will participate and to what extent?’ are the questions in the domestic power struggles.9

6 Finally, there is a ‘centralizing trend at both federal and state levels’ in South Asia. Power is ‘increasingly concentrated’ at the centre at the expense of the states (provinces) and similarly in relations between the centre in the provinces and their sub-units. The military, bureaucracy, paramilitary, Fascist-party groups are engaged in this centralizing trend.10
Wallace’s theme ‘mobilize and de-politicize’ is a powerful way to explain the history of Pakistan’s power relationships within the centre, and in the relations between the centre and the periphery(ies). In Pakistan’s case the ‘centre’ means the Pakistani Army and not necessarily all the political players who are located in the national capital. The rural areas of the urban centres are not autonomous; they are vulnerable to intervention at will by the Army (centre). But conversely, the Army is immune to intervention by any single Pakistani group or a combination of groups within Pakistan; the Army is vulnerable to intervention from outside Pakistan. There are several instances of such intervention. In the latter half of the 1960s the Johnson administration withdrew its aid and diplomatic support to Ayub. This hastened Ayub’s downfall. In the mid-1970s Nixon and Kissinger, and subsequently the Carter administration, withdrew their support to Bhutto. This contributed to Bhutto’s downfall. The Army is also vulnerable to Indian intervention as in 1971 in East Pakistan. Finally, the Army is vulnerable to Soviet-Afghan intervention in Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier province. In Pakistan’s history, barring the Jinnah (1947–8), Liaquat Ali Khan (1948–51) and Bhutto (1972–7) eras, the political centre has been controlled by the Pakistani Army.

Wallace is right in indicating that political mobilization does not necessarily lead to politicization (power-sharing). In Pakistan’s history there are three periods of intense ‘national’ mobilization: during 1968–9 massive urban protest led to Ayub’s downfall; during 1970–1 massive protest in East Pakistan led to war, the break-up of Pakistan and the fall of the Yahya regime; and during 1977 charges of election rigging led to massive protests and these led to Bhutto’s downfall.

In each instance there was depoliticization once the regime change had been accomplished. After Ayub’s fall Pakistani leftists were marginalized in political affairs; and during the Ayub era the political parties and the politicians were marginalized (depoliticized). Every martial law regime in Pakistan has marginalized the political ideas and the political forces which sought representative government. The regionalist, ethnic groupings were marginalized from the early 1950s by the Army and the bureaucracy. The latter institutions insisted on a centralized, unitary type of a political system by their continuous rejection of provincial autonomy and a truly federal system. Because Pakistan came into being on a religious basis, it is surprising that even Islam has been marginalized in Pakistan’s political affairs. Initially Jinnah did this by insisting that religion was a private affair. The place of Islam in the political arrangements of Pakistan has been a recurring one of contention in Pakistani power struggles. In each attempt at constitutional development Islam’s place in the state has been a divisive issue. The elder Bhutto marginalized the poor and the regionalists. Note his use of the Army to attack the Baluchis, from 1973 onwards. He attacked the Right and the Army as well because he sought to centralize all powers in himself. Under Zia-ul-Haq too, power remained concentrated in Zia-ul-Haq’s and the Junta’s hands. In each major period of Pakistan’s history there were signs of political mobilization. These were either spontaneous and out of the control of the dominant power structure (as in the case of urban protest against Ayub in 1968 and in the 1970–1 East Pakistan revolt against Yahya’s government); or there was political mobilization which was orchestrated by the real centre (the Army and its allies) as in the March-July 1977 action against Bhutto. The evidence indicates that in Pakistan’s case, political mobilization (spontaneous or...
government-inspired) has not led to power-sharing at the top (politicization). This conclusion is consistent with Wallace’s framework.

However, contrary to Wallace’s thesis and prediction, the pattern is not one of ‘oscillation’ between politicization (sharing of power) and depoliticization (no sharing). Rather the pattern in the behaviour of military regimes in Pakistan indicates the following: (a) there was oscillation between politicization and depoliticization in the Ayub and in the Yahya regimes; (b) but there was depoliticization in the Bhutto and in the Zia regimes. This comparative assessment shows a trend away from oscillation between politicization and depoliticization and a trend towards a greater concentration of political powers in the hands of the Army (centralization) and their cohorts, and an increased depoliticization of other groups. The thesis is that the greater is the centralization of political powers by the Army-bureaucratic elites the greater is the pursuit of depoliticization strategies by these elites. The Zia era was the high point of centralization/depoliticization strategies of the Army-bureaucratic elites. Now the system is in place and it appears to be impregnable. The oscillation predicted by Wallace ceased during the Zia era. It has not appeared in the post-Zia era. My reading is that Zia-ul-Haq depoliticized the Bhuttos and the PPP. He killed the elder Bhutto and he dishonoured him as well. He ensured that Benazir Bhutto and the PPP could at best win elections but that she and the PPP could not control the levers of power and policy. Furthermore, during the Zia regime the pressures to restore the 1973 Constitution, to develop an Islamic state, to hold national elections and to create representative democracy and provincial autonomy, were marginalized. Through election promises Zia-ul-Haq elicited dissent. But he synthesized a political system which established the ascendancy, at the constitutional and the political levels, of the Army in Pakistan. All other political forces in Pakistan were marginalized by Zia-ul-Haq. Even as Islamic elements seek to Islamicize laws in Pakistan, they are not able to marginalize the Army.

Even after Zia-ul-Haq’s death the marginalization holds. Post-Zia Pakistan saw the revival of the PPP and Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister. Power appeared to be divided between a number of participants (the Army chief, the President of Pakistan, Punjab’s Chief Minister, and Benazir Bhutto and her party). This would indicate politicization, but the appearance was misleading. Behind the appearance lay a depoliticized Bhutto family. Major policy issues such as defence expenditures, Afghan policy, nuclear policy, constitutional amendments to diminish the powers of the Army and the President, and Kashmir policy, were outside the control of the Prime Minister. At the same time the political pressure on the Bhuttos and the PPP by the President, the Army chief and the Islamic-Punjabi forces remained intense. Her depoliticization was the price which she accepted in return for her nomination as Prime Minister.

Another weakness in the Wallace analysis lies in his view (which is implicit rather than explicit) that the federal authority in Pakistan is the political centre of Pakistan. His study relies on politicized/depoliticized and centre/periphery dichotomies. In Pakistan’s case the centre has rarely been unified. Jinnah shared power with no one; that indicated a unified centre. Political intrigue marked the Liaquat Ali Khan era. The contenders for decision-making power and political/military authority were Ghulam Mohammed, Iskander Mirza and Ayub Khan. Ayub was the decision-making centre from 1958 to 1965. But after the 1965 war and the 1966 Tashkent agreement his authority was under attack from inside the government by Army circles led by Yahya, and from outside the
government by his former foreign minister, the elder Bhutto. Yahya and his advisers were under attack by Mujib and the Bengalis and by the elder Bhutto for a share of power. Only under Zia-ul-Haq were powers centralized and tightly controlled by the Junta. To tap the empirical richness of the Pakistan case it is necessary to broaden Wallace’s centre/periphery distinction. The centre works at the federal level but the public face of federal authority is not necessarily the centre. In Pakistan’s case the Army is the true centre of decision-making power. The outer circle of power is represented by the bureaucracy (since Zia-ul-Haq’s time). The other faces of power are actually depoliticized legitimizers of the Army-driven political processes in Pakistan. The chauffeur is not to be confused with the master. Benazir Bhutto was the chauffeur until her dismissal.

To develop the analysis further Figure 6.1 may be employed to bring together the relationship between the Zia era and the post-Zia one.

My argument may be summed up in the following way. A combination of the Pakistani Army, bureaucracy and the US government has functioned since the early 1950s as the political centre of Pakistan. The

*Figure 6.1 Power relations in post-Zia Pakistan*

<table>
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<tr>
<th>POWER CENTRE</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Key coalition members</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghulam Ishaq Khan, President, Army chief and generals</td>
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<tr>
<td>US government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior civil servants</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Temporary coopted members</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Benazir Bhutto and Begum Nusrut Bhutto</td>
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<th>CONTROL MECHANISMS</th>
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<tr>
<td>A Centralization of decision-making powers among key coalition members</td>
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<tr>
<td>B Repression of the ‘out-groups’ viz political parties, ethnic and regionalist groups and nationalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Depoliticization of the ‘out-groups’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Controlled re-politicization via elections and political activity which is controlled by the key coalition members</td>
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<th>MASS LEVEL ACTIVITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>It is dominated by horizontal cleavages by ethnic and regionalist forces which are engaged in near civil war-like conflict, e.g. Sindhis versus Mohajirs</td>
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*Note: The Bhuttos were de-politicized in the sense that they did not enjoy decision-making powers concerning critical domestic and foreign affairs*

elder Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto have functioned on occasion as *temporarily co-opted members* of the inner power coalition or centre. The elder Bhutto played this role during December 1971–6. By 1976 Bhutto lost the confidence of the US government and the Pakistani military because of the nuclear controversy and because Bhutto’s policies threatened the Army’s political position. Benazir Bhutto played the role of a co-opted member from Zia’s death in 1988 to her fall in August 1990. Here the Army is to be studied as a politicized Army. Its political missions concern internal security, foreign
relations and alliance relations with the US government. They are more important and are continuously in play as compared to its military mission. (The latter concerns territorial defence and is relevant in war situations.) Its domestic aim has been to depoliticize the opposition—politicians, political parties, ultra-Right Islamic groups, regionalist movements, leftists, constitutional lawyers, women’s rights groups, trade unionists, and so on. On the whole, Pakistan’s political centre has succeeded in marginalizing Pakistan’s Islamic fundamentalist, democratic and ethnic/regionalist forces.

The only time when the centre failed in its depoliticization mission was in 1970–1 when Bangladesh came into being. In this instance the Pakistani Army-Pakistani bureaucracy-US government coalition failed to control the Bangladeshi rebellion and its Indian support. In this crisis the elder Bhutto joined hands with the Army in seeking to depoliticize Mujib and the Bangladeshis. During 1970–1 the West Pakistani Centre’s control mechanisms emphasized two elements: repression where the aim was depoliticization (no power-sharing); and partial repoliticization where Yahya and his advisers allowed, indeed encouraged, elections with a view to enabling the opposition to let off steam. Here the Yahya premise was that the electoral process during the 1970 elections could be rigged. Zia-ul-Haq too continually tried to rig the electoral process. Note here the similarity in the actual behaviour of the two generals although their public attitude towards party politics varied. Both intended to keep the Army in power. Both intended to depoliticize the opposition. But their methods to rig the electoral process varied. Yahya ordered elections but failed to implement the results. Zia-ul-Haq promised elections but repeatedly postponed them and subverted the democratic process by a series of martial law regulations which immunized the Army from political and judicial scrutiny.13

In the Bangladesh case, politicization in West and East Pakistan (1969, leading to Ayub’s fall) was followed by civil war and then a break-up; it was not followed only by depoliticization as Wallace predicts. The pattern of the Pakistani Army-bureaucracy-Bhutto behaviour was complex. Three political processes accompanied the transfer of power from Ayub to Yahya. First, Yahya depoliticized the leftists, students and the trade unionists—the main groups which shook Ayub’s authority in the urban centres. Since 1971 Pakistani leftists have not been able to play a role in changing Pakistan’s constitutional and political arrangements. Secondly, Yahya repoliticized Pakistani politics in general by promising national elections. Thirdly, after the 1970 election results were in, Yahya, his advisers, and the elder Bhutto, then tried to depoliticize Mujib. Only in the first of the three strategies of the Yahya regime is the Wallace theory of ‘politicization/depoliticization oscillation’ valid in the Pakistani case. In other words, the Wallace idea of oscillation between politicization and depoliticization is only partly true in Pakistan’s case. In my view this oscillation is random. It is not theoretically necessary in Pakistan’s case. It is not a structural characteristic in Pakistan’s political affairs.

After the break-up of Pakistan Bhutto emerged as the new leader in December 1971. His rise was supported by the Pakistani Army and the US government. It was meant to co-opt Bhutto into the power structure. Bhutto was useful as a civil buffer to the Army when it was in disrepute following its performance in the 1971 crisis in Bangladesh. Bhutto was popular. He also had close ties within Army circles. But Bhutto’s co-option was temporary. He worked and lived as long as he behaved according to Army-US government rules. Unfortunately Bhutto took himself too seriously. He tried to
depoliticize and marginalize the Army in internal political affairs. He sought to achieve this aim by the 1973 Constitution and by development of parallel organizations like the FSF. At the same time he tried to marginalize the US government in foreign affairs, especially in the nuclear field. As Chapter 4 indicates, Bhutto’s policies had marginalized the Pakistani Left as well as the Pakistani Right. Once in power he turned against Baluchistan (1973–7) and used the Army in a brutal campaign. By his nationalization policies he sought to depoliticize the rightist economic elite of Pakistan. When Zia-ul-Haq removed him in July 1977 Bhutto tried vainly to repoliticize Pakistani public opinion with his portrayal of people’s power and by his condemnation of ‘coup gemony’.14 But it was too late. Having tried to depoliticize all major constituencies who had a stake in Pakistan’s affairs, Bhutto had revealed his hand by his actions during his tenure in power. Under the circumstances it was not easy to repoliticize.

As I see it, the tactics of politicization and depoliticization have been in frequent play in Pakistani politics under different regimes but the process is not cyclical. The trend is not one of oscillation between the two as Wallace argues and predicts. Rather the main trend is one of continuous depoliticization of major political forces in Pakistan since 1947. A trend towards centralization of powers in Army hands is also indicated in Pakistani political history. Table 6.1 shows these trends.

In this trend of continuous depoliticization by the Army and bureaucracy, democracy has had a role to play but the function of the democracy argument by the oligarchy was/is not to replace the Army’s central position in Pakistan’s affairs. (The bureaucracy is a part of the political centre but the Army is the senior partner since Zia-ul-Haq’s

Table 6.1 Trends towards centralization and depoliticization in Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Centralization</th>
<th>Repoliticization</th>
<th>Depoliticization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947–</td>
<td>Jinnah</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948–</td>
<td>Liaquat Ali Khan</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951–</td>
<td>Ghulam</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high (politicians and provinces are marginalized)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958–</td>
<td>Mohammed/I.Mirza</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>medium through Basic Democrats supported by Ayub high as a result of mass public agitation in 1968–9 against Ayub which was supported by the Army and Bhutto</td>
<td>high (political parties and provinces are marginalized) low because of Yahya’s decision to hold elections and support provincial autonomy, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969–</td>
<td>Yahya Khan</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high (Yahya refused to share and transfer power after the December 1970 election results placed Mujib in the forefront)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971–</td>
<td>Z.A. Bhutto</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high with regard to</td>
<td>high (Bhutto turned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
having elections and securing a new Constitution against the masses after the elections. He tried to marginalize the Left and the Right in Pakistan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Centralization</th>
<th>Repoliticization</th>
<th>Depoliticization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977–85</td>
<td>Zia</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high in terms of tolerance of political activities by a variety of political and social forces in Pakistan</td>
<td>high because the decision-making powers were concentrated in Zia-ul-Haq and the Army junta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985–88</td>
<td>Zia-ul-Haq and Junejo</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high because Zia-ul-Haq’s firing of Junejo revealed that powers were concentrated in Zia-ul-Haq and the Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988–90</td>
<td>Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the Army and Benazir Bhutto</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high because of commitment to elections</td>
<td>high because ethnic and regionalist forces were still marginalized</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

presidency, and the bureaucracy is the junior partner.) The advocacy of democracy by the Pakistani oligarchy is not meant to pave the way for a sharing of powers between the Army and political parties or to organize a transfer of power from the Army to a civil leadership where the Army is meant to be depoliticized in political affairs. The function of the democracy advocacy in Pakistan by the oligarchy is to make the Army’s central position in political affairs palatable and legitimate.

My point is that the Army-bureaucracy-US government structure of power relations within Pakistan was secured completely under the Zia-ul-Haq presidency, and Benazir Bhutto’s electoral triumph and the re-emergence of democracy in Pakistan in 1988 may be studied in this context. Zia-ul-Haq’s approach followed in the footsteps of his military predecessors but with one important difference: Zia-ul-Haq succeeded but others failed to secure a fundamental change (restructuring) of the structure of power relations. Ghulam Mohammed and Iskander Mirza tried to develop a strong imperial presidency but failed because both lacked a constitutional basis to govern. (Ayub ousted Mirza because the latter had abrogated the Constitution of 1956.) In contrast, Zia-ul-Haq continually strived to give his actions a judicial and a constitutional veneer, however flimsy it might be. Jinnah and Ayub tried to function with a charismatic and imperial presidency. Jinnah died a natural death after a year in office and he was thus not fully tested in office. But Ayub was tested in office and he revealed himself to have feet of clay in his conduct of the 1965 war with India and in his approach to Pakistan’s political and constitutional arrangements. His structure of power collapsed like a house of cards when it faced street agitation and inner-Army and inner-bureaucracy intrigue. Yahya tried to develop mass politics under Army and bureaucratic direction but that did not work because the oligarchy lost control over the political processes. Zia-ul-Haq, the peasant, achieved what Sandhurst-trained Ayub and Yahya did not.

The central lesson of Zia-ul-Haq’s Army rule for eleven years was that it successfully prevented power-sharing between the Army and the politicians and it also prevented the transfer of power from the Army to civil hands. It repressed and scattered, perhaps irrevocably, the socialist-reformist, constitutional-democratic and Islamic fundamentalist
forces in such a way that each pole represented by these forces was radicalized and unleashed and yet neither of them could alone achieve a dominant political position in Pakistan affairs; therefore, no single force could upset the Army-bureaucracy-US government oligarchy. And yet, because the political interests and the political ideology of these poles of power were diametrically opposed, the chances of successful coalition activity on their part against the oligarchy were limited. Zia-ul-Haq’s strategy was to tap into the fundamental contradictions in Pakistan’s state and societal affairs; the Islamic, democratic and socialist tendencies are in a position of irreconcilable contradiction and polarization in relation to each other. By allowing and encouraging each such tendency to express itself and to be institutionalized during an eleven-year period, Zia-ul-Haq in effect created a permanent and a public conflict of interest between the three major tendencies in Pakistani political, social and economic activities. The Zia strategy was not to eliminate these tendencies but rather to bring them to the surface so as to intensify their mutual antagonism. The 1988 elections occurred in this context. (The 1988 election results are shown in Table 6.2.)

The results show the intense polarization between the constitutional-democratic forces (represented by Benazir Bhutto’s PPP) and the Islamic alliance led by the Punjab chief minister and the right-wing political parties. The socialist pole was marginalized in the 1988 elections. Benazir Bhutto’s political platform expressed the hope for the Pakistani poor but before the elections she made many concessions to the Pakistani Army and the US government. The following point reveals the fundamental changes in Benazir Bhutto’s political orientation.15

Whatever the case may be, Benazir Bhutto chose not to articulate the aspirations of the masses that turned out to receive her from exile and instead made Zia the sole target of her attack at her mammoth rallies,

### Table 6.2 Pakistan’s National Assembly elections, 16 November 1988—Results party position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
<th>Sind</th>
<th>NWFP</th>
<th>Baluchistan</th>
<th>FATA</th>
<th>Islamabad</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJI</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>–11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUI (FR)</td>
<td>– – – 1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>– – –</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUI (D)</td>
<td>– – – 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>– – –</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>– – –</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAI</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>– – –</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>– – – 1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPP (K)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>– – –</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MQM</td>
<td>– – 13 24</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNA</td>
<td>– – –</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (Seats only)</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1 = Number of seats; 2 = Percentage of votes;
hoping that she will produce cracks in the ranks of well-healed representatives of the propertied classes congregated in the General’s phony Parliament, many of them erstwhile psychopathic supporters of her own father. She eulogised the military and admonished her audiences not to burn the American flag. She said nothing about the oppression of Islamic fundamentalists and the tyranny of shariat laws against women, making instead protestations or personal conformity to Islamic codes and precepts. Her vague and non-committal pronouncements on Pakistan’s involvement in the Afghan civil war too did nothing to reassure men and women in the streets of personal security from daily shoot-outs with sophisticated weapons and bombings, not to speak of the worsening drug menace.

From this I estimate that Zia-ul-Haq’s strategy is working inasmuch as the changed structure of power relations in Pakistan survived Zia-ul-Haq’s death and it defined the context of the 1988 elections.

Zia-ul-Haq successfully restructured power relationships at the oligarchic and societal levels. He achieved what might be called ‘organized peacelessness’. This may be studied as a better condition compared to anarchy and civil war which menaces the political centre. (By ‘better’ I do not mean the most desirable.) His success was that he restored the political autonomy of the Pakistani Army in Pakistan’s political affairs. (This should be not confused with the lack of autonomy in regional military affairs where Pakistani decision-making is governed by its estimate of the balance/imbalance of power between Pakistan and India and Pakistan and the Afghan/Soviet front.)

Nevertheless there was a failure in Zia-ul-Haq’s strategy. Having restored the autonomy of the Army from the dangers of civil domination and from civil interference in its military and political position which the elder Bhutto posed, Zia-ul-Haq nevertheless failed to gain legitimacy or the consent of its people. He did not acquire the authority which comes from constitutional behaviour and genuinely broad political participation of diverse/pluralist political groupings. The point is that even tyrants find it necessary to achieve consent. For this reason Pakistani military dictators have found it necessary from time to time to experiment with some kind of democracy in Pakistan. Oddly enough, with the exception of the search for representative government by Pakistani politicians during 1948–58 (which ended in failure as a result of the threat which democracy posed to the Army-bureaucratic oligarchy) Pakistani military dictators

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FATA = Federally Administered Tribal Areas;
JUI (D) = Darkawasti;
PAI = Pakistan Awami Ittehad;
NPP (K) = Khar;
MQM = Mohajir Qaumi Movement;
BNA = Baluchistan National Alliance.

Election to Faisalabad VI and Swat I countermanded.
Minority seats = 10 (All over Pakistan); Women’s seats = 20 (Punjab = 12; Sind = 4; NWFP = 2; Baluchistan = 2).

have been the major proponents of democracy in Pakistan. Consider the democratic faces of Pakistani military and authoritarian regimes, as follows.

Ayub - he instituted the system of Basic Democrats and then under internal pressure he moved to establish party based politics and electoral politics.

Yahya - as he toppled Ayub he promised free and national elections and a new Constitution to be prepared by the elected assembly.

Bhutto - he came to power preaching the virtues of democracy, party politics, national and provincial elections but his ascendancy to power was facilitated by his old Army ties and by the Army’s dependence on Bhutto after the Bangladesh débâcle. Nominally a democrat, I judge the elder Bhutto as a populist-authoritarian type of leader and a cosmetic democrat. None the less he and Yahya deserve praise because they unleashed and publicized the democratic idea. They created a public identification with that idea even though their motives in advancing the idea were self-serving and opportunistic.

Zia-ul-Haq - while he rejected the utility of Western-style electoral democracy because it was not to his mind suitable for Pakistani conditions, he recognized the utility of local elections and the importance of national, partyless elections when the conditions were ripe.

Note here the continuous advocacy of democracy by Pakistan’s military and authoritarian rulers. I judge that the function of this advocacy was to use the fig leaf of democracy for their own ends. The advocacy was not intended to share powers with the out-groups beyond the oligarchy or to transfer power to the people and to broaden the political base of Pakistani decision-making. The aim was not to develop parliamentary traditions in Pakistan or to develop the organizational network of political parties. Bhutto was a major advocate of power to the PPP and yet the PPP was a one man (Bhutto oriented) affair without a tradition of inner party democracy that included regular elections. Nor was the aim to develop a tradition of human rights. Finally, even though Pakistan came into being on the premise that the Muslim minority deserved protection against the danger of a Hindu majority, successive Pakistani oligarchies saw no need to recognize the importance of minority rights for Pakistani nationalities.

Pakistan has seen a number of democratic experiments in its life history. Between 1948 and 1958 several Pakistani governments tried to develop representative government but the attempts failed (see Chapter 1).

Between 1958–68 Ayub developed the indirect form of democracy (basic democrats) but this also failed (see Chapter 2). Yahya’s flirtation with democracy led to the break-up of Pakistan. It led to the emergence of Bhutto to Pakistan’s centre stage. Politicization of Bhutto was the result. It simultaneously led to the campaign to depoliticize Mujib and the Awami League in Pakistan’s affairs as a result of the interests of the Bhutto-Army-bureaucracy oligarchy which dominated Pakistan’s affairs at the time. Bhutto’s experiment with democracy led to the development of the 1973 Constitution and the marginalization of the socialist forces in Pakistan (see Chapter 4); he also attempted to marginalize the Army, bureaucracy, and the right-wing economic and political and religious forces in Pakistan. Bhutto’s attempts led to the 1977 military coup which marginalized the Bhuttos, and it repoliticized the Army and the bureaucracy and the right-wing Islamic forces in Pakistan. This repoliticization led to the depoliticization/marginalization of the 1973 Constitution. In all these exercises the out-groups (especially the nationalities, the leftists and Islamic ideologues) remained marginalized. When societal forces were repoliticized (as in street violence against Ayub,
1968–9, and in East Pakistan, 1970–1, against Bhutto, 1977, and against Zia-ul-Haq, 1983–5) the change was temporary. It did not alter the method to change a regime. From the early 1950s onwards, the method continued to rely on inner oligarchic coalition building activities with temporary co-option of societal forces by the oligarchy. The pattern of political behaviour by Pakistani elites indicates the development of a tradition of Army and bureaucracy orchestrated democratic experiments after 1958; here elections are meant to legitimize oligarchic rule rather than to replace it. Benazir Bhutto’s emergence as the Prime Minister fitted into this tradition. The appointment of Junejo as Prime Minister by Zia-ul-Haq in 1985 was made in the context of this tradition as well. But when Junejo began to assert his independence and to take policy decisions which deviated from Zia-ul-Haq’s and the Army’s ideas and interests, Junejo was unceremoniously fired by Zia-ul-Haq. He was depoliticized when he tried to share power with Zia-ul-Haq and when he tried to politicize (in the Wallace sense) the prime ministership.

The trend in Pakistan’s affairs was that with each democratic experiment the power of the Pakistani Army-bureaucratic-US government combination increased. The centralization of the Army’s position in the inner circle of power increased over time. The coordination of decision-making activities under Army-bureaucracy-US government auspices increased over time. In the inner circle the Army and civil bureaucrats were continuously partners, but over time the relationship between the two changed. In the 1950s the bureaucracy was the senior partner and the mentor of the Army. Under Zia-ul-Haq the Army became the mentor and the decision-maker, and the bureaucracy became the assistant—albeit still a member of the inner core. In this case, there has been an incremental depoliticization of the bureaucracy as well. Still it retains its seat at the top of the policy and the political pyramid. Its marginalization is not as severe as that of the out-groups in Pakistan. Finally, over time the strategies to depoliticize the mass forces improved in effectiveness.

Outwardly Pakistan’s political history suggests mental shifts from a reliance on narrowly based elite politics to the development of mass politics. There are signs of an increasing use of mass politics as well as a shift from ‘illegal’ mass activity to legal mass activity. Finally, a shift from left-wing oriented mass action to right-wing oriented mass action is evident in Pakistan’s political history. Consider the following:

1 The 1968–9 street violence and protest which led to Ayub’s downfall was a sign of ‘illegal’ mass action. No legal avenues to express protest and to accomplish a change of government existed at the time. There were no constitutional arrangements or political conventions to orchestrate a transfer of power or a sharing of power between competing groups. The 1968–9 mass action was inspired by Pakistani leftists.

2 The holding of 1970 elections by Yahya was a sign that the Army recognized the utility and the legitimacy of electoral politics involving political parties and national elections. The election results demonstrated the victory of two left of centre political orientations: Bhutto’s PPP won in West Pakistan and its programme was socialism; and Mujib’s Awami League won in East Pakistan and its programme was concerned with the plight of the Bengalis and a decentralized political system. But given Bhutto’s long-established ties with select Army circles, behind the socialist and the democratic facade of Bhutto lay elements of militarism, authoritarianism and right-wing politics. None the less the 1970 elections revealed the attractions of mass politics by
legal/public means, even though, as Chapter 3 shows, in the Yahya era there was a continuous interface between inner elite debate and power struggle and struggle at the level of mass politics.

3 In March-July 1977 the rightists were behind the public agitation against Bhutto. This protest and violence too was extra-constitutional in nature because, with charges of rigged elections, there did not seem to be legal/legitimate channels to bring Bhutto down. Even though Bhutto was the author of the 1973 Constitution his actions and policies subscribed to the Pakistani traditions of authoritarianism and paternalism rather than the rule of law. During the Zia-ul-Haq presidency, electoral activity was conducted on a local and partyless basis but there was a recognition on Zia-ul-Haq’s part to utilize mass politics. For example, he used a referendum in 1985 to ratify the Islamic orientation of Pakistan and the Zia presidency for five years. The orientation of this kind of mass politics was right wing; and Pakistani leftists remained marginalized, as before.

4 Finally, after Zia-ul-Haq’s death, the 1988 national and provincial elections revealed the re-emergence of the Pakistani leftist constituency in the form of Benazir Bhutto’s PPP. But inasmuch as her party did not gain a clear majority, and the opposing Islamic democratic alliance with its right-wing orientation established its power base in the powerful and prosperous Punjab province, the result showed an ideological polarization in post-Zia Pakistan. But the polarization was channelled through constitutional means. Post-Zia Pakistan may therefore be called a victory for mass politics in contrast with the Zia-orchestrated indirect democracy.

These shifts in Pakistan’s political affairs pointed to an incremental opening up of the political system. However, too much should not be made of the changes in so far as the location and the nature of Pakistan’s political centre in post-Zia Pakistan is concerned. The signs of a shift towards mass politics do not tell the whole story. In the incremental development of mass politics in Pakistan a number of key elements may be noted. First, the advocates of Pakistani and Western democracy in Pakistan came from among elite circles (Ayub, Yahya, the elder Bhutto, Zia-ul-Haq and Benazir Bhutto) and from the grass roots (regionalist political parties and Pakistani politicians). However, as our study shows, the latter groups were marginalized by these elites. Given this, I judge the elite groups’ advocacy of democracy to be insincere inasmuch as their activities were meant to keep themselves in power and to organize a political coalition where power was concentrated in a few hands at the top. The intention was not to organize mass politics on a continuous basis. These elite members were good actors rather than good democrats. They were not interested in sharing power or transferring power to the elected representatives of the people.

Secondly, unless opposition groupings are given a stake in a political system, and unless they are offered legitimate channels of expression, a system cannot be deemed to be democratic. Military directed democratic activities in Pakistan fail to satisfy the standard test of democracy. Finally, Pakistan’s political party system presents a picture of proliferation of parties. There is a high degree of polarization among the parties, and within most parties. This is a result of personality conflicts, programmatic differences, opportunistic concerns and varying degrees of inner party democracy/authoritarianism and mass appeal. As a result of chronic weaknesses in Pakistan’s political parties’ system the parties are not able to provide a meaningful alternative to oligarchic rule.
Against this background what did Benazir Bhutto’s prime ministership mean? Was her ascendancy a victory for democracy in Pakistan? Was this the beginning of the end of Army rule in Pakistan? Or was this the sign that a bargain had been struck between the Bhuttos, the Army and the US government?

There were many signs which indicated that the latter perspective was relevant. Since Zia-ul-Haq’s death the key players in the ‘in-group’ were the following: Army chief Aslam Beg and the Army; President Ghulam Ishaq Khan; Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and her lieutenants in the PPP; Punjab’s chief minister Nawaz Sharif and the Islamic Democratic Alliance which he headed. Their relationship was like a stable cold war because there was mutual vulnerability; none could pursue their interests unaided. The new arrangement implied the existence of multiple vetoes in the inner circle of power in Pakistan. Inter-dependence among the key members of the inner circle was a consequence of mutual vulnerability and the vetoes. As a result the bargain which was struck by the principals in 1988 implied that Benazir Bhutto did not have the authority to initiate changes in the policy sphere. It further implied that as long as all the parties in the in-group behaved, the power coalition was likely to last. Another implication was that the players in the out-groups had been marginalized by the Zia regime and they were not to be accommodated by the in-group despite the PPP’s rhetoric about the importance of social and economic reform in Pakistan.

In the 1988 bargain, Prime Minister Bhutto gained the prime ministership but she lost autonomy in foreign affairs, in military policy and in the budgetary process. In a number of key policy areas she had to function within the parameters set by her coalition partners who were also her (and her father’s) political enemies.

The ruling establishment left behind by General Zia was quick to utilize to its maximum advantage this less than clear-cut electoral verdict in favour of Benazir Bhutto and her PPP. Zia’s successor in Presidency, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a shrewd superannuated bureaucrat, first marked time before calling upon Ms Bhutto to form a government at the Centre. This delaying tactic was clearly aimed at allowing political wheeling and dealing to take place, particularly by IJI’s Nawaz Sharif who was given audiences by the President, the military Joint Chiefs of Staff and the new US ambassador Robert Oakley. Thus left in suspense Ms Bhutto was compelled to make all the right moves. She met with the Chief of Army Staff General Aslam Beg, head of the ISI General Hamid Gul and President Ishaq Khan to allay their fears of government by a party once ousted from power by the military and its leader executed. Ten days after the election, Ms Bhutto was visited by the US ambassador Oakley, whose nod of approval finally produced the presidential invitation for her to form the elected government. Her stepping into the Prime Minister’s office was accompanied by several concrete moves to appease the military-bureaucratic establishment and its beneficiaries under Zia. These included the acceptance of the preceding Afghanist an policy and its control by the ISI. The PPP’s support for continuation of Ishaq Khan’s presidency. Retention of Yaqub Khan as Foreign Minister. And oddest of all, the
retention of Dr Mahbubul Haq, the architect of Pakistan’s economic disasters under two military dictatorships, as finance minister. 18

Mahnaz Ispahani noted that: The elections of 1988 did not signify a conclusive return to civilian control. It was by the generals’ decision that the return to civilian rule came about, and it is by their own choice that the soldiers remain overtly outside civil affairs. Benazir Bhutto inherited not only the broad legacy of army rule but also the specific constitutional and religious bequests of General Zia. In 1990 four centres of power existed in Pakistan: the PPP regime; the army; the President, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and the civilian opposition. 19 Beyond this inner circle bargain the out-groups remained marginalized as before. The out-groups are involved in ethnic fights as well as drugs trade and arms trade. 20

This scheme indicates two patterns. First, that in post-Zia Pakistan there was an unstable balance of power. Here, fortunate internal and external circumstances and mutual vulnerabilities kept the coalition together. But this coalition was context-specific and hence it was vulnerable to changing internal and external circumstances. Secondly, there were contradictions between the interests and policies of the in-group members and the out-group forces. The former were organized and experienced and they had international allies. The latter were larger in numbers but they were also inexperienced in the art of gaining and keeping power. They lacked international allies, and they were also disorganized.

As a result of these contradictions between the in-group and out-group forces my conclusion is that Pakistan is not a nation in the making, as is suggested in the subtitle of S.J.Burki’s book. 21 Rather, the evidence is strong that there is a hugh ethnic divide in Pakistan. 22 Under current conditions Pakistan can survive but the development of the Pakistani nation is unlikely because of the severe strains in Pakistan’s political and ethnic/regionalist fabric. Religion has failed to function as a unifying cement.

My prognosis of a year ago was that Benazir Bhutto, like Corazon Acquino, was going nowhere in the policy sphere and with regard to the demands of both her party and Pakistanis for political, economic and social reforms; but that she would stay in power as long as there was no alternative to her and as long as there was no urgent necessity for change. Post-Zia Pakistan is a fusion between the first and the second pattern of Pakistani politics which I outlined in Chapter 5. The first pattern (unstable balance of power) defines the relations among the power elites. The second pattern (civil war) defines the in-group/out-groups contradictions and tensions. In Pakistan today both patterns are in continuous play; both co-exist. The first one dominates Pakistan’s state relations; the second one defines the societal condition. The two worlds can function autonomously under particular conditions. As long as the Pakistani Army and its foreign patrons (the USA, China and Saudi Arabia among others) can maintain the flow of monies into the Pakistani treasury and as long as the Army can maintain a low risk strategy to push Pakistan’s strategic and ideological frontiers in Afghanistan, Indian Punjab and Indian Kashmir, Pakistani politics are likely to remain in the first pattern: a phase of unstable balance of power within Pakistan; a phase of uneasy co-existence among the elite contenders for power in Pakistan.
In the short-term (defined by years rather than months) Pakistan will continue to be strategically significant for the West. This will continually produce the required funds and diplomatic support for Pakistan. As long as the Army remains the biggest military and political organization in Pakistan civil war is likely to be avoided. However, Pakistan is likely to hover on the brink of civil war, as it has frequently in its history. But if and when Pakistan loses its strategic importance in Western thinking (as the Soviet threat to the Middle East and the Gulf oil fields diminishes and America makes its deals with the Iranians, the Afghans and the Indians) then the other opposing ethnic and regionalist forces within Pakistan are likely to be released and the existing contradictions between the in-groups and the out-groups will likely be sharpened, as in the case of Bangladesh in 1971. A repeat of 1971 in Baluchistan and Sind is not unlikely although it is not imminent either. But the impact as well of revolutionary changes in Pakistan’s neighbourhood—in Iran, Afghanistan, India and Soviet Central Asia—and the Western response to these changes will no doubt be of interest to Pakistani elites.

I have argued that the Army and the bureaucracy has centralized its powers and it has marginalized the other contending forces including the Bhuttos but it has used the Bhuttos and the PPP to the Army’s political advantage without sharing power. This reveals the Army’s political imagination and political consciousness. Yet it is premature to indicate that present day out-groups have lost their ambition and the means to challenge the Army. Recent developments in Eastern Europe show how quickly the out-groups can enter centre stage and how quickly the exit of the in-group players can be arranged.

There are many signs that the marginalized elements of the Zia system have a capacity to lead Pakistan towards civil war even though they lack the ability at present to replace an Army-driven political system. The marginalized elements are inspired by developments in the neighbourhood, and the example of the restructuring of Iranian and Afghan political, economic and social relations is before them. Indian politics have seen the beginning of the end of dynastic rule by the Nehrus. Since 1947 India has functioned as a model for Pakistanis in terms of the pattern of continued commitment and stability of democratic traditions and civilian authority over military institutions. In Pakistan on the other hand, there is a perennial structural dilemma. There is no way to achieve consent in Pakistan’s political affairs on a constitutional or an ideological basis. Without consent it is not easy to organize a stable and a public relationship between the in-group and the out-groups. Without consent, the relations are defined by oppressive power between the elite and the masses.

This review of Pakistan’s political history points to a central question. Will Pakistanis restructure their internal power relationships like neighbouring Iran and Afghanistan and will this occur by violent means? Or will Pakistanis embrace the Indian political model of largely peaceful development rather than hegemonic rule by the military as the basis of its internal political arrangements in the future? The neighbourhood reveals the theme of change but it also reveals two radically different methods to effect internal political, economic and social reform. The history of political and military behaviour of Pakistan’s elites indicates that it is not likely to change its ways. With continuing signs of nationalities’ problems in Pakistan, the likelihood of change effected by violent means cannot be excluded. When so much of the Eastern and the Third World is shifting
towards democratic pluralism and broad-based political activity, Pakistanis too may find inspiration in democracy and self-determination within Pakistan.
Postscript

On 6 August 1990 Pakistani President Ishaq Khan dismissed Benazir Bhutto’s government, dissolved the National and Provincial assemblies and charged the Bhutto government with corruption and incompetence. Bhutto called her dismissal a constitutional coup, and she blamed Pakistan’s military establishment for her downfall. The elections took place, as scheduled, in October 1990. Bhutto retained her seat in Larkana, her home base, but her party secured 45 seats, a drop from 93 in 1988. Bhutto alleged vote rigging, but international observers from the West were satisfied that the election was generally fair.

Was the Bhutto dismissal a sign of the end of Pakistan’s nascent democracy, and/or the end of the Bhuttos’ influence in Pakistan’s political affairs, or was it a part of an ongoing polarization and stalemate, or a restructuring of political forces in Pakistan with the Army, civil service, the US government and the World Bank as the stable cores of the power structure in Pakistan?

In my judgement, the significant event was not that Benazir Bhutto was dismissed. The dismissal decision crystallized in Army circles in July 1990. It revealed the dominant political position of the Army. It also revealed that the main issues concerned Benazir Bhutto’s inability to govern, to manage ethnic violence in Sind, and to retain the trust of the Army brass. This trust was tenuous in December 1988, but then negotiations between the Army, Bhutto, President Ishaq Khan, and the US Embassy led to a deal by which Bhutto was allowed to be the Prime Minister, provided she did not interfere with Afghan policy, nuclear policy, defence expenditures, and Army promotions and its internal affairs. From December 1988 to August 1990, Pakistan’s power structure consisted of the Pakistani Army, the US government, World Bank, civil bureaucracy, feudal lords and business groups, and Benazir Bhutto (last and least).

The key element which led to the Bhutto dismissal was that both the Pakistani Army and the US government were disappointed by Bhutto’s domestic performance, and they withdrew their support from her, while they kept their commitment to the democratic process in Pakistan. The attitude of the US government-Pakistani Army combination was critical to Bhutto’s political future. The US commitment to Pakistani democracy is real but it is moderated and modified by US strategic interests in the Gulf region and by the continued interest of the Pentagon and the CIA in strong ties with the Pakistani Army. When Benazir Bhutto would not agree to discuss criticism about her husband’s alleged corrupt financial activities, and when she failed to deliver anything but speeches on the policy front, the US government moved quietly towards the conservative elements in Pakistani affairs. US Ambassador in Pakistan, R.Oakley, has been associated with Pakistani hardliners on Afghanistan, and this group includes the Army, intelligence and select mujahadeens like G.Hikmatyar. Oakley lined up with the Pakistani Army’s decision to fire Bhutto. Oakley is more interested in Pakistan as a strategic ally; and Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait played up Pakistan’s strategic value. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the outward context of the dismissal of Bhutto; this explains
the timing but not the factors behind the decision. The factors were that Benazir Bhutto had wounded her credibility with her inept handling of rampant ethnic violence in Sind in April-May 1990 and corruption charges which involved her husband. Under Benazir Bhutto, the US government and the Pakistani Army became concerned that no one was in charge, and that there was no firm hand at the top. Under Bhutto no major legislation became law in Pakistan and Pakistan’s political problems became worse.

Recent events in Pakistan could mean the end of the Bhutto dynasty in Pakistani politics but it is not the end of Pakistani democracy. The election results point to the ascendency of the right-wing, Islamic fundamentalist groupings in Pakistani affairs. But here the Pakistani establishment must face a recurring dilemma. Given Pakistan’s identity crisis and the continual need to define its nationalism in anti-Indian terms, and given the bureaucratic interest which requires Army-civil service domination of Pakistani affairs, the establishment cannot entertain prospects of serious internal reforms or power-sharing with politicians or regionalist groups. The Islamic democratic alliance won a convincing victory in the 1990 national elections but this alliance was driven by hostility towards Bhutto and the PPP. With Bhutto and the PPP marginalized, the contradictions and ambitions of Pakistani politicians were likely to surface, as they have continually in Pakistani history. The Bhutto defeat was a victory for the MQM (the Mohajirs, or Indian Muslims, who came to Pakistan in 1947 and who are still dubbed as refugees) and it was a defeat for the Sindis. The MQM-Sindi fight was the heart of the 1990 Sind disturbances, and the new political grouping is not likely to be able to bridge this growing divide. The alienation of the Sindis is likely to increase and this will further polarize this strategically important province.

Another source of polarization concerns the demand to reform Pakistan along Islamic lines. Under Benazir Bhutto, the Islamic constituency had projected the demand for a Shariat Bill which would have replaced Pakistani laws by Islamic jurisprudence. Pakistanis, however, are ambivalent about Islam in state affairs, and there are several major political and religious divisions: between Shias and Sunnis, between easy-going Sindis and Punjabis and the strict regime of Saudi-and Iran-motivated fundamentalists. A Shariat law is likely to split Pakistani society; especially Pakistani women who would be required to adopt the purdah and return to traditional homely duties. The Shariat-related issues, rather than simply democratic elections, are likely to mar Pakistan’s future.

Finally, American thinking about Pakistan and India is currently going through slow but fundamental changes; and these changes are likely to affect the American inputs into Pakistan’s internal debates. The USA did not have a history of involvement in India—it left India alone. There were no US missionaries in India, as there were in China. The Cold War pushed India and the US apart, and each thought that the other was wrong. But as the Cold War waned, the USA realized that Indians were quite pragmatic and that they were not aggressive. The end of a bipolar world has changed the setting of US-India and US-Pakistan relations. Pakistan’s importance has declined as the Cold War has concluded and the Afghan issue no longer divides Washington and Moscow. In US thinking India is seen as a power and the need to work together with a common set of interests, controlling drugs and arms trade in South Asia, curbing terrorism and fundamentalism in the Gulf and South Asia, and promoting democracy is recognized. At present, US policies depend on the interactions among different policy communities in the USA. US congressional concerns focus on human rights, environment issues, and Indian military, especially naval
and nuclear, development. But human rights are less important for the State Department. The US approach to India began to change about five years ago. The big change is that the USA now looks at India and Pakistan as two different entities, playing different roles. It sees India as the regional dominant power. Sometimes it is not comfortable with this fact, but it is not concerned about it. India is seen as a great power in the twenty-first century, Pakistan is seen as a friend and an ally who is serving US interests. The main US concerns are to avoid an India-Pakistan war and a nuclear race, and to see the diplomatic dialogue continue. In general, US thinking about India and Pakistan is evolving at three levels in the US bureaucracy. The White House is the most progressive and forward looking. The State Department is the more conservative and the Cold War conditioning still affects its assessments of India and Pakistan. The Pentagon is the most conservative of the three. The differences are significant. For example, the State Department supports the Simla Agreement as the basis of conflict resolution between India and Pakistan; the Pentagon remains silent about this critical element. (The Simla Agreement requires bilateral and peaceful resolution of India-Pakistan differences.)

At the same time, several issues continue to complicate US-Pakistan relations, especially Pakistan’s nuclear activities, Afghan policy, and the future of democracy. In these circumstances, changes in US-India and US-USSR relations are likely to affect the pattern of US-Pakistan relations and to increase the pressures on the Pakistani oligarchy by competitive forces within Pakistan and by the trend towards political and economic reform in the international environment.
Notes

INTRODUCTION

1 M.Wight, distinguishes between three types of nationalism, as follows:

First, in its oldest sense, a nation means a people supposed to have a common descent and organized under a common government. Here the word nation is almost interchangeable with the words state or power…

Secondly, after the French Revolution, the word nation came to mean in Europe a nationality, a people with a consciousness of historic identity expressed in a distinct language.

Thirdly, in Asia and Africa, since the First World War, the word nation has come to mean a political unit asserting its right of independent statehood against European domination.


2 Owen Lattimore, The Situation in Asia (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1949), p. 184. Also see Wali Khan, Facts Are Facts: The Untold Story of India’s Partition, trans. Dr Syeda Saiyidain Hameed (New Delhi: Vikas, 1987). This book describes the British strategy. This work is based on a study of the confidential correspondence between the British secretaries of state for India and the Indian viceroys.


5 Interview, Islamabad, June 1988.

6 Ibid.


9 Leadership Changes In Central Government, 1947–48

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Gov.Gen./President*</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep 48–Oct 51</td>
<td>Khwaja Nazimuddin</td>
<td>Liaquat Ali Khan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Oct 51–Apr 53  Ghulam Mohammed  Khwaja Nazimuddin
Apr 53–Aug 55  Ghulam Mohammed  Mohammad Ali Borga
Aug 55–Sep 56  Iskander Mirza  Choudhry Mohammed Ali
Sep 56–Oct 57  Iskander Mirza  H.S. Suhrawardy
Oct 57–Dec 57  Iskander Mirza  Ismail Ibrahim Chundrigar
Dec 57–Oct 58  Iskander Mirza  Firoz Khan Noon


Note: The position of Governor-General was changed to President by the 1956 Constitution.

10 According to Sarvepalli Gopal Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Volume 2 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 321 and 324: Ghulam, Mohammed (1893–1956) was in official service from 1923 to 1947; Finance Minister of Pakistan from 1947 to 1951; and Governor-General of Pakistan from 1951 to 1955. Mirza, Iskander (1899–1969) joined the Indian army in 1921 and was selected for political service in 1926; was Defence Secretary in Pakistan in 1947; Minister for Home Affairs in 1954; Governor-General in 1955 and President of Pakistan from 1956 to 1958. According to Donald N. Wilber, Pakistan: Yesterday and Today (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964): Both Ghulam Mohammed and Iskander Mirza ‘were in close touch with commanders of the armed forces, and when they faced tests of strength with the politicians, believed that the army would intervene on their side to assure public order and stability’ (p. 126). They were ‘shocked by what they regarded as the corruption, selfishness, opportunism and disloyalty of the politicians in public office’ (p. 126). Mirza was ‘A skilled administrator, ready and willing to assume responsibility’; he ‘had always been skeptical about the value of parliamentary democracy. To establish personal control over the destiny of the country, he resorted to the same type of divisive maneuvers favored by the politicians whom he condemned, and he lacked the vision to channel power into constructive programs’ (p. 140–1).


Mirza was regarded as reliable and co-operative by US officials, (p. 144) While he projected himself as a ‘simple, unassuming and dedicated soldier with no interest in political intrigues’, he was actually ‘shrewd’ and crafty (p. 146). He was ‘known and feared for his Machiavellian skills honed to a high degree of finesse during long years of service to the British’ (p. 177). He ‘made no great effort to conceal his contempt for parliamentary democracy’ (p. 177).

Ghulam Mohammed was ‘the originator of the concept of massive dependence on the United States for meeting the “administrative expenses” of Pakistan, especially in the field of defence’ (p. 16). He did not believe that the parliamentary system was suitable for Pakistan. (p. 176). Among Ghulam Mohammed, Mirza and Ayub Khan, Ghulam was ‘the most forceful personality’ (p. 178).

11 See Chapter 1.

14 Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath (Dacca: Bangladesh Books International, 1980) is a reliable work.
16 Alistier Lamb, Asian Frontiers: Studies In a Continuing Problem (New York: Praeger, 1968), makes the boundary/frontier distinction.
24 Ayesha Jalal points out that Jinnah knew ‘that the greatest threat to Pakistan’s survival would be internal not external’. ‘Inheriting the Raj: Jinnah and the Governor-Generalship issue’, Modern Asian Studies 19:1 (February 1985), p. 50.

1 ELEMENTS IN THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN’S POLITICAL SYSTEM, 1947–58


2 M.S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly (eds), op. cit., p. 116.
6 Ibid.
7 M.S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly (eds), op. cit., p. 113.
10 M.S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly (eds), op. cit., p. 113.
11 Ibid., p. 114
12 Ibid., p. 116
16 Ibid., p. 38.
19 Ibid., p. 31, my emphasis.
22 Cited in K. Arif, ibid., p. 50.
25 Ibid., p. 136.
27 Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid (eds), op. cit., pp. 66, 68–9, and 153–8.
29 I have outlined these points in A. Kapur, op. cit., p. 213.
31 Ibid., p. 39.
32 Talukder Maniruzzaman, op. cit., p. 6.

Talukder Maniruzzaman op. cit., p. 9.

M.S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly (eds), op. cit., pp. 196–7; and Sisir Gupta, op. cit., p. 410.


See note 9.


James Manor defines ‘transactional linkages’ as ‘ties based upon mutal interest, between the elite(s) at or near the apex of the system, and sub-elites at various levels between the apex and the base’. James Manor, ‘The Dynamics of Political Integration and Disintegration’, *The States of South Asia: Problems of National Integration*, A.J. Wilson and Dennis Dalton (eds), (London: C. Hurst, 1982), p. 98.


L.F. Rushbrook Williams, *The State of Pakistan* (London: Faber and Faber, 1962), p. 120.


Myron Weiner identifies five types of political integration: national integration, territorial integration, elite-mass integration, value integration, and integrative behaviour. James Manor argues that Weiner’s view of political integration should be amended to distinguish between ‘integration at the level of ideas and integration at the level of interaction’. James Manor, op. cit., pp. 89–93.

Notes

18 The ‘Six Points Programme’ made the following demands:  

1 The establishment of parliamentary government based on universal adult franchise;  
2 A federal government with jurisdiction restricted to defence and foreign affairs, all residual powers to remain with the two states of East Bengal and West Pakistan;  
3 Separate currencies and banks in each state;  
4 Taxation to become a state responsibility;  
5 Independence of the state in international trade; and  
6 The development of an East Bengali militia or paramilitary force.  
19 Samuel Huntington stated that ‘more than any other political leader in a modernising country after World War II, Ayub Khan came closest to filling the role of a Solomon or Lycurgus, or “Great Legislator” on the Platonic or Rousseauion model’. Samuel P.Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 250–1.  
23 See the Foreword by Fazal Muqeeem Khan in H.A.Rizvi, op. cit., pp. xii-xvi.  
25 Escott Reid, the Canadian High Commissioner to India (1952–57), reported to Ottawa on 5 September 1953 that in his opinion ‘if the forces of moderation could secure control of the situation in Pakistan, there was a good possibility that within two years a settlement of the
26 Hasan Askari Rizvi, op. cit., p. 87.
27 Ibid., p. 107.
28 Ibid., p. 100.
29 Cited in H.A.Rizvi, ibid., p. 9.
30 Ibid., pp. 16–17.
31 For a recent example see: Lawrence Lifschultz, ‘From the U-2 to the P-3: The US Pakistan Relationship’, No. 159, (Sept./Oct. 1986).

3


1 Tariq Ali states that the West Pakistani soldiers ‘had been told that the Bengalis were an inferior race, short, dark, weak (unlike the martial races of the Punjab) and still infected with Hinduism’. Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), p. 91.
2 Ibid., p. 83.
3 Ibid., p. 83.
4 For a discussion of the impact of Chinese policy on the Pakistani Left see ibid., pp. 76–80.
7 Ibid., p. 64.
10 Ibid., p. 25.
11 Ibid., p. 26–7
12 Ibid., p. 28.
13 Ibid., p. 29.
14 Ibid., p. 30–1.
15 Ibid., p. 31.
16 Ibid., p. 31.
17 Ibid., p. 32–3.
18 Ibid., p. 33. Also see, G.W.Choudhury, op. cit., p. 169.
19 Mohammed Asghar Khan, op. cit., p. 33.
20 Ibid., p. 33.
21 Ibid., p. 33.
22 Ibid., p. 34.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., p. 35.
25 See note 4 above.
Notes

27 Ibid., pp. 75, 77.
28 In his memoirs, Kissinger states that during a meeting with Indian Ambassador L.K.Jha on 9 August 1971, Kissinger ‘could not [have been] more unequivocal in warning that a war between India and Pakistan would set back Indian-American relations for half a decade’. Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1979), p. 868.
32 Mohammed Asghar Khan, op. cit., pp. 15–16.
33 Sisir Gupta, op. cit., pp. 179–94.
34 Says Asghar Khan, ‘Tikka Khan was a hated name in East Pakistan and was associated with the killings that were taking place.’ Mohammed Asghar Khan, op. cit. p. 37.
35 Ibid., p. 41 describes Yahya’s expectations of the USA and China and their attitudes.
36 Henry Kissinger, op. cit., p. 913.
37 Ibid., p. 914.
40 For instance, see Robert Jackson, *South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh* (London: Chatto and Windus, for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1975) for a conventional view.
41 Tariq Ali states that ‘[t]he fact that Bhutto was colluding with the generals was clear to everyone’. Tariq Ali, (1983), op. cit., p. 88.

4

THE BHUTTO ERA, DECEMBER 1971–JULY 1977: A NEW BEGINNING OR A NEW POLARIZATION?

3 Bhutto’s obsession about this is revealed in his death cell memoirs, ibid.
6 Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, op. cit., pp. 70–1.
7 See note 14 below.
8 , p. 78.
9 , p. 72.
10 Talukder Maniruzzaman cites the following phases of military and civilian rule:

- 1947–58 civilian rule,
- 1958–69 military rule,
- 1969–71 military rule,
- 1971–77 civilian rule,
- 1977–88 military rule,


11 Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, op. cit., use these categories to study Bhutto (p. 96).


13 Oriana Fallaci says of Bhutto ‘you can define him in countless ways and all of them are true: liberal and authoritarian, fascist and communist, sincere and a liar. He is undoubtedly one of the most complex leaders of our time and the only interesting one his country has so far produced.’ Ibid., p. 183.

14 Bhutto states that ‘the only military coup d’état that brought glory to its people was that of Napoleon Bonaparte. But Napoleon was a giant. There was no man more complete than him. His military brilliancy was only one facet of his many-sided genius. His Napoleonic code remains the basic law of many countries. Napoleon was an outstanding administrator, a scholar and a romanticist. In my opinion, his prose was superior to that of Charles de Gaulle. However, even this military dictator with his undoubted genius, took France to the agony of Waterloo.’ Z.A.Bhutto, *If I am Assassinated*, pp. 102–3.

15 In his interview with Fallaci, Bhutto denied direct involvement in Yahya’s campaign against the Bengalis. However, while he expressed his contempt for the way in which the operation was carried out, he went on to state that ‘there are circumstances where a bloody suppression is justifiable and justified. In March the unity of Pakistan depended on the suppression of the secessionists. But to carry it out with such brutality on the people instead of those responsible wasn’t necessary.’ op. cit., pp. 188 and 205.

16 Salmaan Taseer, op. cit., pp. 133 and 150.

17 Ibid., p. 129


19 Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, op. cit., pp. 82–3.

20 Ibid., p. 83.

21 Mirza first met Bhutto during a partridge shooting trip to Larkana. They developed a personal relationship in which Mirza became Bhutto’s political patron. In 1957, Mirza appointed Bhutto, then thirty years old, to the position of Minister of Commerce and Industries. Salmaan Taseer, op. cit., pp. 38–40.

22 Taseer states that during the Ayub government’s early years, ‘Bhutto was carried away in his admiration of Ayub Khan, and determined to prove his loyalty. After barely a month in office, he enthused during a tour of Jacobabad: “In President Muhammad Ayub Khan we have a dauntless leader…I can assure the people that never has a cause had a man with greater purity of purpose.”’ Ibid., p. 41.

23 Ibid., pp. 60, 71.
24 In an emotional speech before the United Nations Security Council, Bhutto stated: ‘we will wage war for a thousand years; a war of defiance…we shall fight in self defence, we shall fight for honour. We want to live, we want our people to live…but we are resolved to fight for our honour, to fight for Pakistan.’


26 Ibid., p. 87.

27 Ibid., pp. 87–8.


29 Ibid., pp. 40–8.

30 Bhutto’s animosity toward the Tashkent Agreement and towards Ayub’s acceptance of the Agreement; Bhutto’s departure from the Ayub government because of the Tashkent Agreement, and Bhutto’s popularity with Pakistani public opinion on this issue are described in Salmaan Taseer, *op. cit.*, pp. 65–77. Also see, Z.A.Bhutto, *ibid.*, speeches 35–39, pp. 221–311.

31 After returning from Beijing where he was attempting to secure Chinese military support, Bhutto stated that his mission had achieved concrete results. ‘We are more than satisfied…we are now in full preparedness to maintain territorial integrity against foreign aggression.’ He also said that if a war broke out between India and Pakistan the latter would have certain friends who would fight shoulder to shoulder with it without entering into a formal pact, *Peking Review* 46:12 (Nov., 1971), pp. 5 and 23 as cited in S.R. Sharma, *Bangladesh Crisis and India Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Young Asia, 1978), p. 361.

However, Vertzberger notes ‘[t]hat no joint declaration was issued, together with hints transmitted by Bhutto upon his return, indicates that Bhutto failed to secure an explicit Chinese guarantee to use military force to help Pakistan in times of need’. *Sino-Pakistan Relations, 1960–1980* (Washington, DC: Praeger, 1982), p. 48.

32 This section draws on Shahid Javed Burki, *op. cit.*, pp. 69, 71.

33 For Pakistan’s tortured nuclear history see Ashok Kapur, *Pakistan’s Nuclear Development* (London: Croom Helm, 1987).


35 Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, *op. cit.*, p. 89.


38 Ibid., p. 99.

39 Ibid., p. 100.

40 Ibid., p. 99.

41 See note 32, ch. 3.


43 Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

44 Ibid., p. 100.

45 Salmaan Taseer, *op. cit.*, p. 129.


48 Ibid., p. 102.

49 Ibid., p. 102.


52 This chronology is based on Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, *op. cit.*, pp. 103–4.


54 Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, *op. cit.*, p. 129.
5
ZIA-UL-HAQ’S PAKISTAN: RESTRUCTURING INTERNAL POWER RELATIONS

4 As quoted in Salmaan Taseer, op. cit., p. 65.


7 Ibid., p. 129.
8 Ibid., p. 96.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., pp. 97–9.
11 Ibid., pp. 100, 102.
12 Ibid., p. 105.
13 Ibid., p. 106.
14 Ibid., p. 107.
15 Ibid., p. 122–3.
16 Ibid., p. 110.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., p. 111.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., pp. 112–13.
21 Ibid., p. 114.
22 Ibid., p. 116–18.
23 Ibid., p. 123.
24 Ibid., p. 124.
25 Ibid., p. 125.
26 Ibid., p. 125.
27 Ibid., p. 125.
28 Ibid., p. 125.
29 Ibid., p. 125.
30 Ibid., p. 126.
31 Ibid., p. 127.
32 Ibid., p. 128.
33 Ibid., p. 129.
34 See note 5 this chapter.
36 This is Tariq Ali’s view. Ibid., p. 134.
38 Ibid., pp. 126–7.
39 Naqui states that:
the people are not going to be duped by the Zia clique or by that tool of the Zia group that strutted under the mane of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) in 1977.


41 Ibid., pp. 115–24.
42 Ibid., p. 99.
43 Ibid., p. 127.
44 Ibid., p. 127.
48 Ibid., p. 134.
51 Mohammed Asghar Khan, op. cit., pp. 142–3.
52 Tariq Ali, op. cit., p. 135.
53 Mohammed Asghar Khan, op. cit., p. 102.
55 Ibid., p. 136.
56 The Junta members were Generals Chishti, Iqbal, Jehanzeb, Sarwar Khan, Ghulam Hassan, Zia-ul-Haq and Arif. Ibid., p. 136.
57 Ibid., pp. 131–7, 133.
58 Ibid., pp. 133, 140.
59 Ibid., pp. 140–2.
60 Ibid., p. 134.
61 Ibid, p. 142.
63 Ibid, p. 86.
64 Ibid., pp. 142–3.
65 Ibid., p. 49.
66 Ibid., p. 50.
68 Ibid., pp, xix, 12.
70 In November 1977, the Supreme Court, in its judgment of the Nusrat Bhutto Case, stated that:

While the Court does not consider it appropriate to issue any direction, as suggested by Mr Yahya Bakhtiar, as to a definite time
table, for the holding of elections, the Court would like to state in clear terms that it has been found possible to validate the extra- Constitutional actions of the Chief Martial Law Administrator for the reason that he stepped in to save the country at a time of great national crisis and constitutional breakdown, but also because of the solemn pledge given by him that the period of Constitutional deviation shall be as short a duration as possible and that during this period all his energies shall be directed towards creating conditions conducive to the holding of free and fair elections leading to restoration of democratic rule in accordance with the dictates of the Constitution.


71 Pakistani political parties have included: The Muslim League, National Awami Party; Pakistan People’s Party, Pakistan National Party, Quniat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam, Pakistan National Alliance, Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, National Democratic Party, Gamdat-ul-Ulema, Pakistan Democratic Party and the Mazdoor Kisan Party.

72 Richard Nyrop, op. cit., p. 204.


75 Press Trust of India, ‘Zia Ex-pilot is called Head of Drug Gang’, *India Abroad*, 21 April 1989, p. 4.

76 Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, op. cit., p. 132.


78 Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, op. cit., p. 137–9.


81 Ibid., pp. 1099–1100.

82 Ibid., p. 1100.

83 Cited in Mohammed Asghar Khan, op. cit., p. 130.

84 See their reports for 1988, 1989 and 1990.


86 Richard Nyrop, op. cit., pp. 219–231.


88 Mohammed Asghar Khan, op. cit., pp. 139–140.


90 Ibid., p. 219.

91 Ibid., p. 218.
6 POST-ZIA PAKISTAN

1 Bhutto quotes Zia as saying: ‘Whether it is or isn’t constitutional, power in Pakistan will always be wielded by the man who sits in the chair of the chief of the Army Staff.’


2 According to Martin Wight, ‘A power that is in a position to contribute decisive strength to one side or the other is said to “hold the balance”.’ Martin Wight, Power Politics, 2nd edn, Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (eds) (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986), p. 171.

3 The term ‘restructuring’ refers to the dramatic and wholesale alteration of a nation’s pattern of foreign relations. This definition is drawn from K.J. Holsti’s Why Nations Realign with one important difference. Holsti defines restructuring in terms of external relations while I am using the concept to study changes in domestic relations. See K.J.Holsti (ed.), Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. ix.


5 Ibid., p. 4.

6 Ibid., p. 4.

7 Ibid., p. 5.

8 Ibid., p. 8.

9 Ibid., p. 9.

10 Ibid., p. 9.

11 In a speech to the constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Jinnah stated:

You are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship. In this state of Pakistan you may belong to any religion or cast or creed—that has nothing to do with the fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.


12 Paul Wallace, op. cit., p. 11.

13 One such regulation stated that:
No judgement, decree, unit, order or process whatsoever shall be
made or issued by a court or tribunal against the Chief Martial Law
Administrator or any martial authority exercising powers or
jurisdiction under the authority of the Chief Martial Law
Administrator. The Laws (Continuance in Force) order, 1977 CMLA
order no. 1 of 1977. Other such orders that protected the Army from
political and judicial scrutiny include: The Laws (Continuance in
Force) (Second Amendment) order 1977, CMLA order No. 3. of 1977
the (Continuance in Force) order No. 1 of 1977 and Note on the
Provisional Constitution Order (CMLA order No. 1 of 1981) of 24
amended it so that it gave the President extraordinary powers. See:

14 See Bhutto, op. cit., p. xxiii. The term is Bhutto’s. He used it to refer to the hegemony of the
Pakistani Army (and through it of a foreign power), and the frequent use of military coups to
maintain it.

15 Hassan N.Gardezi, ‘Pakistan’s Second Passage to Democracy: The Legacy and Prospects’, in
Lois Valley-Fischer (ed.), Asian Perspectives: Bangladesh, India and Pakistan Facing the

16 The literature on Pakistani nationalities is extensive. Recommended articles include the
following: Nubar Housepian ‘Pakistan In Crisis: An Interview with Eqbal Ahmad’, Race and
Class XXII:2, 1980; Asaf Hussain and John P. Hutchinson, ‘The Impact of Religion and
Ethnicity on Political Conflicts in Pakistan’, Asian Profile 4:4 (Aug. 1976); Nazir A.Mughal
‘The Elite Groups and Aspects of Confrontation within Pakistan’, Asian Profile 5:3 (June,
1977). Also see the chapter by Selig S.Harrison in The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics:
Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, Ali Banuazizi and Myron Weiner (eds) (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 1986).

17 The results of the 1970 elections and the number of parties can be found in:
T.Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath (Dacca: Bangladesh Books
International, 1980), pp. 72–3. The results of the 1988 elections can be found in John

18 Hassan N.Gardezi, op. cit., p. 41.

of Strategic Studies, 1990), p. 11.

20 Further information on the out-groups can be found in M.Ispahani, Adelphi Papers 246, pp.
22–9.


22 See note 15 above.
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