A HISTORY
OF THE
SEPOY WAR IN INDIA.
1857-1858.

By
JOHN WILLIAM KAYE,
AUTHOR OF THE "HISTORY OF THE WAR
IN AFGHANISTAN."

IN THREE VOLUMES.

Volume II

(First Published in 1888)

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Sani H. Panhwar (2017)
I SHOULD HAVE DEDICATED

THESE VOLUMES

TO

LORD CANNING,

HAD HE LIVED;

I NOW INSCRIBE THEM REVERENTIALLY TO HIS MEMORY.
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WHEN the first volume of this book was published, I had little expectation that the second would be so long in course of completion, as the result has shown it to have been. In truth, I had not measured aright the extent of the work before me. But when I came to take account of the wealth of my materials, and to reflect upon the means of converting them into history, I saw clearly that the task I had undertaken was a more arduous and perplexing one than I had originally supposed.

It is not difficult to make the reader understand my perplexities; and I hope that, understanding, he will sympathize with them. The events to be narrated covered a large area of space, but were compressed within a small period of time. Chronologically they moved along parallel lines, but locally they were divergent and distracting. The question was how it was best to deal historically with all these synchronous incidents. To have written according to date, with some approach to fidelity of detail, a number of separate narratives, each illustrative of a particular day, or of a particular week, would have been easy to the writer, and would in some sort have represented the character of the crisis, one of the most distinguishing features of which was derived from the confusion and distraction engendered by the multiplicity of simultaneous outbursts in different parts of the country. This mode of treatment, how-ever, though it might accurately reflect the situation, was not likely to gratify the reader. The multiplicity of personal and local names rapidly succeeding each other would have bewildered him, and no distinct impression would have been left upon his mind. But though the nature of the subject utterly forbade all thought of unity of place and unity of action, with reference to the scope of the entire work, there was a certain unification of the several parts which was practicable, and which suggested what might be called an episodical treatment of the subject, with such connecting links, or such a general framework or setting, as historical truth might permit. And, in fact, different parts of the country were so cut off from each other when mutiny and rebellion were at their height, that each series of operations for the suppression of local revolt had a separate and distinct character. Certainly, in the earlier stages of the War, there was no general design—little co-operation or cohesion. Every man did what was best in his eyes to meet with vigor and sagacity an unexpected crisis. The cutting of our telegraph-wires and the interruption of our posts were among the first hostile efforts of the insurgents in all parts of the country. Joint action and a large scale was thus rendered impossible, and at the commencement of the War it would scarcely have been desirable. For our people had to deal promptly with urgent symptoms, and references and consultations would have been fatal to success.
Thus circumstanced with respect to the component parts of this History, I could not easily determine to what particular events it would be best to give priority of narration. One thing soon became unpleasantly apparent to me. I had made a mistake in forecasting the plan of the entire work, in an "Advertisement" prefixed to the First Volume: It was impossible to write adequately, in this installment of my book, of all the operations which I had originally intended to record. With materials of such great interest before me, it would have been unwise to starve the narrative; so I thought it best to make confession of error, and to expunge my too-hasty promises from subsequent editions of the work. In pursuance of this revised scheme, I was compelled to put aside much that I had written for this Second Volume, and though this has necessarily retarded its publication, it has placed me so much in advance with the work to be accomplished, that I hope to be able to produce the next volume after a much shorter interval of time.

The selection made for this volume from the chapters which I had written may not perhaps be the best, but it is at least sufficiently intelligible. After describing the earlier incidents of the mutiny, as at Meerut and Delhi, at Benares and Allahabad, and at different stations in the Punjab, I have narrated, up to a certain point, those two great series of operations—the one expedition starting from Bengal with troops drawn from the Littoral, the other from the North-Western Frontier, with forces derived from the Hill Stations and the Punjab—which were consummated in the capture of Delhi and the first relief of Lucknow In the one I have traced the movements of Neill and Havelock, under the direction of Lord Canning, and in the other of Anson, Barnard, Wilson, and Nicholson, with the aid and inspiration of Sir John Lawrence. It is by thus following the fortunes of individuals that we may best arrive at a just conception of the general action of the whole. For it was by the energies of individual men, acting mostly on their own responsibility, that little by little rebellion was trodden down, and the supremacy of the English firmly re-established. It will be seen that I have adhered very closely to pure narrative. The volume, indeed, is a volume of fact, not of controversy and speculation; and as it relates to the earlier scenes of the great struggle for Empire, it is mostly an account of military revolt and its suppression.

Dealing with the large mass of facts, which are reproduced in the chapters now published, and in those which, though written, I have been compelled to reserve for future publication, I have consulted and collated vast piles of contemporary correspondence, and entered largely into communication, by personal intercourse or by letter, with men who have been individually connected with the events described. For every page published in this volume some ten pages have been written and compiled in aid of the narrative; and if I have failed in the one great object of my ambition, to tell the truth, without exaggeration on the one hand or reservation on the other, it has not been for want of earnest and laborious inquiry or of conscientious endeavor to turn my opportunities to the best account, and to lay before the public an honest exposition of the historical facts as they have been unfolded before me.
Still it is probable that the accuracy of some of the details in this volume, especially those of personal incident, may be questioned, perhaps contradicted, notwithstanding, I was about to say, all the care that I have taken to investigate them, but I believe that I should rather say "by reason of that very care." Such questionings or contradictions should not be too readily accepted; for, although the authority of the questioner may be good, there may be still better authority on the other side. I have often had to choose between very conflicting statements; and I have sometimes found my informants to be wrong, though apparently with the best opportunities of being right, and have been compelled to reject, as convincing proof, even the overwhelming assertion, "But, I was there." Men who are personally engaged in stirring events are often too much occupied to know what is going on beyond the little spot of ground which holds them at the time, and often from this restricted stand-point they see through a glass darkly. It is hard to disbelieve a man of honor when he tells you what he himself did; but every writer, long engaged in historical inquiry, has had before him instances in which men, after even a brief lapse of time, have confounded in their minds the thought of doing, or the intent to do, a certain thing, with the fact of having actually done it. Indeed, in the commonest affairs of daily life, we often find the intent mistaken for the act in the retrospect.

The case of Captain Rosser's alleged offer to take a Squadron of Dragoons and a Troop of Horse Artillery to Delhi on the night of the 10th of May (illustrated in the Appendix) may be regarded as an instance of this confusion. I could cite other instances. One will suffice: — A military officer of high rank, of stainless honor, with a great historical reputation, invited me some years ago to meet him, for the express purpose of making to me a most important statement, with reference to one of the most interesting episodes of the Sepoy War. The statement was a very striking one; and I was referred, in confirmation of it, to another officer, who has since become illustrious in our national history. Immediately on leaving my informant, I wrote down as nearly as possible his very words. It was not until after his death that I was able orally to consult the friend to whom he had referred me, as being personally cognizant of the alleged fact—the only witness, indeed, of the scene described. The answer was that he had heard the story before, but that nothing of the kind had ever happened. The asserted incident was one, as I ventured to tell the man who had described it to me at the time, that did not cast additional lustre on his reputation; and it would have been obvious, even if he had rejoiced in a less unblemished reputation, that it was not for self-glorification, but in obedience to an irrepressible desire to declare the truth, that he told me what afterwards appeared to be not an accomplished fact, but an intention unfulfilled. Experiences of this kind render the historical inquirer very skeptical even of information supposed to be on "the best possible authority." Truly, it is very
disheartening to find that the nearer one approaches the fountain-head of truth, the further off we may find ourselves from it.¹

But, notwithstanding such discouraging instances of the difficulty of extracting the truth, even from the testimony of truthful men, who have been actors in the scenes to be described, I cannot but admit the general value of such testimony to the writer of contemporary history. And, indeed, there need be some advantages in writing of events still fresh in the memory of men to compensate for its manifest disadvantages. These disadvantages, however, ought always to be felt by the writer rather than by the reader. It has been often said to me, in reply to my inquiries, "Yes, it is perfectly true. But these men are still living, and the truth cannot be told." To this my answer has been: "To the Historian all men are dead." If a writer of contemporary history is not prepared to treat the living and the dead alike—to speak as freely and as truthfully of the former as of the latter, with no more reservation in the one case than in the other—he has altogether mistaken his vocation, and should look for a subject in prehistoric times. There are some actors in the scenes here described of whom I do not know whether they be living or whether they be dead. Some have passed away from the sphere of worldly exploits whilst this volume has been slowly taking shape beneath my pen. But if this has in any way influenced the character of my writing, it has only been by imparting increased tenderness to my judgment of men, who can no longer defend themselves or explain their conduct to the world. Even this offence, if it be one against historical truth, I am not conscious of having actually committed.

I have but a few more words to say, but because I say them last it must not be thought that I feel them least. I am painfully sensible that in this narrative Flume failed to do justice to the courage and constancy of many brave men, whose good deeds deserved special illustration in this narrative, and would have received it, but for the exigencies of time and space, which have forbidden an ampler record. This, perhaps, may be more apparent in other volumes than in this. But, whatever may be the omissions in this respect, I do not think that they will be attributed to any want of appreciation of the gallantry and fortitude of my countrymen in doing and in suffering. No one could rejoice more in the privilege of illustrating their heroic deeds than the author of these volumes. It is one of the best compensations of historical labor to be suffered to write of exploits reflecting so much honor upon the character of the nation.

J. W. K.
Penge -- Midsummer, 1870.

¹ It may be mentioned here (though not directly in confirmation of the above) as a curious illustration of the difficulty of discerning between truth and error, that the only statement seriously impugned in a former work of history by the author of this book, was the only one which he had made as the result of his own personal knowledge—the only fact which he had witnessed with his own eyes.
I INSCRIBE THIS VOLUME TO THE MEMORY OF

THE LATE

SIR HENRY MARION DURAND, K.C.S.I.

A MAN WHO COMBINED A RARE GREATNESS OF SOUL

AND A PERFECT GENIUS FOR AFFAIRS

WITH SIMPLICITY OF MANNERS, DIRECTNESS OF PURPOSE,

AND A DETESTATION OF ALL THAT IS MEAN AND FALSE.

AS WISE, AS HE WAS PROMPT AND DECIDED IN ACTION,

HE MET ALL THE STORMS OF LIFE WITH FORTITUDE,

RENDERING EVER, ALIKE BY HIS ACTION AND HIS EXAMPLE,

UNSURPASSED SERVICES TO HIS COUNTRY.

AFTER A SERVICE FULL OF HONOUR, EXTENDING OVER

FORTY-TWO YEARS,

HE DIED IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTY.

"HE LEFT A REPUTATION WITHOUT SPOT-THE BEST

INHERITANCE HE COULD BEQUEATH TO HIS CHILDREN."
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The civil districts of India—Bijnor - The effect produced by the mutiny at Bijnor - Mr. Shakespear takes measures to meet the difficulty - He secures, in an ingenious manner, the moneys of the State - Mahmad Khan, nawab of Najibabad, gives trouble - The mutiny at Bareli affects the situation for the worse - Lieutenant Gough, aided by a clever device of Shakespear's, escorts a portion of the money to Mirath - Shakespear, by tact and temper, controls the nawab - At length he decides to consign the district to that chief - And retires with the ladies and officials of the station to Rurki - He finds it impossible to return - The nawab installs himself as viceroy of the king of Dehli - He begins to persecute the Hindus - Shakespear transfers the charge of the district to two loyal Muhammads - But these are driven out and the nawab becomes supreme - They confirm their rule by a wanton massacre of Hindus, and then, settling their own disputes, carry their raids across the Ganges - Captain Boisragon marches from Rurki to repel them - Boisragon attacks and defeats the rebels at Khankal - The rebels retire crestfallen, and raise up a fresh tinsel fabric of authority - The British army, guided by Shakespear, enters the Bijnor district - Shakespear, by tact and conciliatory measures, speedily restores order - Dehra Dan - Mr. Keene and the European population - Keene organizes defensive measures - He receives bad news from outside - Marches against the rebels, who escape - How Keene surmounted difficulties regarding food and money - Dehra Don passes through the ordeal - Mr. Dunlop, magistrate of Mirath, hears of the mutiny when travelling in the Himalayas and at once hastens to Dehli - Thence, through a country in rebellion, to Mirath - He enlists Sikhs - To meet the exigencies of the time, Dunlop raises a body of volunteer horse known as the Khaki Meals - The Khaki Risala marches against and punishes the Gojars - It then proceeds to Barauth to check a notorious rebel, Sah Mall - After some early successes Dunlop conceives a daring plan to restore order - The plan is at first successful - Contest with Sill Mall and his followers - Dunlop meets his nephew in single combat - Eventually Sah Mall is defeated and killed and the district is cleared - Another rebel leader, Narpat Singh, is attacked and killed - Dunlop's appreciated justice - With the fall of Dehli the necessity for the labors of the Khaki Raga ceases - Estimate of Dunlop and his comrades - Civil aspect of Allahabad at the outset of the mutiny - Its aspect after Neill's arrival - Its three divisions - The lawlessness of amateur authority - The difficulties of the civil officers - Mr. Wynyard and Gorakhpur - The troops at that station - Wynyard receives extra powers from the commissioner of his division - The sepoy manifest discontent, and the prisoners make an abortive attempt to break out - Notwithstanding the mutinies in the district Wynyard adopts successful measures to hold his ground - Fugitives from Oudh reach Gorikhpur - The Governor-General writes an autograph letter of commendation to Wynyard - The Nipil troops reach Gorikhpur - In consequence of the mutiny of the
12th irregulars and of the necessity of marching on Azamgarh the commander of the Nipal troops resolves to evacuate Gorakhpur - All the officials, save one, accompany him after disarming the troops - The issue of Mr. Bird’s resolve to remain at Gorakhpur - Credit due to Mr. Wynyard and his companions - The civil servants of India.

CHAPTER II.

The officers of the Indian navy - Lewis and Mayo at Dhaka and the Abor hills - Carew and Batt in the Shahabad district - Chicken gains the Victoria Cross - Services of Duval, Wray, Scamp, Barron, Burbank, and Windus - Chitty and Sweny render excellent service on the western coast - Appreciation of the services of Griffith Jenkins - The cold shade of officialism - One last military episode - Tomkinson, on command at Orai, escorts treasure to Gwalior - Not permitted to enter Gwalior, nor to proceed to Agra, he is abandoned by his men, and sheltered by a poor Muhammadan - He endeavors to explode the ammunition of a body of rebels passing near his place of hiding, and, being discovered, is killed.

BOOK XVIII.

CONCLUDING CHAPTER.

The anxiety displayed, after the mutiny had been quelled, to discover its cause - Sir John Lawrence, after an elaborate argument, can discover no other cause but the greased cartridges - The fallacious character of this conclusion - The real cause of the mutiny — Bad Faith — and the attempt to force Western ideas on an Eastern people - Bad faith towards the sepoys illustrated by the action of Government on the batta question - The discipline of the army is undermined by the head-quarter staff in India - Renewal of had faith towards the sepoys - The untoward and disastrous result of that renewal - What Oudh was to the sepoys before annexation - Oudh was misgoverned according to Western, but not according to Eastern ideas - The manner in which the annexation of Oudh was regarded by the sepoys, illustrated by an incident 480 It deals the last blow to the confidence of the sepoy in his foreign master - How the same result was arrived at in the minds of the princes, chiefs, and landowners of India - The system examined of granting a life annuity in exchange for a kingdom and notes - Causes which increased the bad effect of the mere annexation of Oudh - The real authors of the mutiny — the Moulvi - The conspirators discover the cartridge and use it as their instrument to seduce the sepoys - Examination of the different modes in which the provinces which rose against us, and those which remained loyal, were administered - Lord Canning in 1857 - Influence upon him of Lord Dalhousie's prestige and Lord Dalhousie's councilors - Lord Canning, as he stood unshackled in 1858 - The real greatness of his character is then shown in all its different phases - Lord Elphinstone — his prescience, his decision, his high and lofty courage - His generous confidence towards his subordinates - The
foresight of which his correspondence - He is nominated by three successive secretaries of state to second Lord Canning in the event of a vacancy - Lord Harris—his energy, foresight, devotion - England has no reason to blush for the Englishmen and Englishwomen of the mutiny. 230
THE present volume concludes the history of the great Indian uprising of 1857. The question whether that uprising was simply a military mutiny or a revolt of which that military mutiny constituted the prominent feature, was debated keenly at the time, and is to this day as warmly contested. In the concluding chapter of this volume I have endeavored to throw some light on the dispute, by the simple process of tracing effect to its cause. There is not a line in that chapter which will not bear the most searching analysis. The conclusion I have arrived at is that the uprising of 1857 was not primarily caused by the greased cartridges; that it was neither conceived nor designed by the sepoys. The mutiny was in reality the offspring of the discontent roused by the high-handed measures inaugurated, or at least largely developed, by Lord Dalhousie, and brought to a climax by the annexation of Oudh. The greased cartridge was the opportune instrument skillfully used by a band of conspirators, for the most part men of Oudh, for the purpose of rousing to action the sepoys, already made disaffected by consecutive breaches of contract and of faith.

Of these acts, of the attempt, as I have termed it, to disregard the silent growth of ages and to force Western ideas upon an Eastern people, and in the course of that attempt to trample upon prejudices and to disregard obligations, the mutiny was the too certain consequence. It is remarkable that the decisive points of this great uprising were at two places, famous in Indian history, in both of which we had, by force or by the moral power engendered by the possession of force, displaced the former rulers. These places were Dehli and Lakhnao. At the one we were the besiegers, in the other we were besieged. Dehli and Lakhnao constituted, so to speak, the wings of the rebel army. Had the centre, represented by Gwiliar, gone with the wings, it had fared badly with us. But, for the reasons I have specially referred to in the concluding chapter, the centre remained sound long enough to enable us to concentrate the bulk of our forces on the two decisive points of the rebel line.

It was after Dehli had fallen and a severe blow had been dealt at Lakhnao that we had to deal with the centre—a centre formidable indeed, but which the loyalty of Sindia had deprived of much of its power and prestige. It is with the contest with that centre, carried on by Colonel Durand, Sir Hugh Rose, Sir Robert Napier, Generals Stuart, Roberts, Michel, and Whitlock, Brigadiers Smith, Honner, Parke, Somerset, Colonel Holmes, Becher, and many others, that the military portion of this volume mainly deals; and I venture to affirm that no part of this history is more remarkable for the display of capacity and daring by the generals, of courage and endurance by the men. It is a page of history which every Englishman will read with pride and satisfaction—with pride
because the deeds it records were heroic— with satisfaction because many of the actors
survive, ready, when they are called upon, to repeat their triumphs in other fields.

But important and full of interest as are the military records of this volume, the political
action it relates is certainly not less so. There was not a moment of more consequence to
India than that in which Lord Elphinstone had to decide whether he would content
himself with saving his own presidency, or, risking everything, would send every
available man to the decisive points in the endeavor to save India. Not for a second did
that illustrious man hesitate. It has been to me a task of no ordinary pleasure to
demonstrate how the daring and generous conduct of the Governor of Bombay vitally
affected the interests of England at the most critical period of the struggle.

Nor have I experienced less gratification in rendering justice to the character of Lord
Canning, as that character developed itself, when, in the early part of 1858, he stood
unshackled at Allahabad. I have entered in the concluding chapter so fully into this
point and into others affecting the judgment passed upon his action in the earlier part of
his Indian career, that it is unnecessary to allude to the matter further here.

I have devoted one chapter to five of the most important civil districts of the North-
West Provinces, but little referred to previously, and one to the more prominent of the
many gallant actions performed by the officers of the late Indian navy.

Although I have exerted myself to the utmost to ensure accuracy of detail in all the
military operations, I am conscious that there are many gallant deeds the details of
which have not reached me, arid which are therefore unnoticed. I have found it
impossible, even in a work so bulky as this, to mention every individual who deserved
well of his country. When a small body of men attack and defeat a large number of
enemies, every man of the attacking party is necessarily a hero. There may be degrees of
heroism, but it is difficult to distinguish them. Napoleon, feeling this difficulty,
announced to his army after one of his great campaigns that it would be sufficient for a
soldier to declare that he had belonged to the army which had fought in that campaign
for the world to recognize him as a brave man. That assurance is certainly not less
applicable to the soldiers whose gallant deeds are recorded in this volume, and on
whom the campaigns of Malwa, of central India, of the southern Maratha, country, and
again of Malwa and Rajpiltana, have fixed the stamp of heroes.

Attached to this volume will be found a few amplifications and corrections of details
given in the second volume. The services of the artillery during the street-fighting at
Delhi; the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Wilkin, 7th Hussars, at Lakhnao, and of
Captain Middleton, 29th foot, during the pursuit of Ktinwar Singh; and the additional
support of my statement regarding the part taken by Brigadier Napier in the plan for
the attack on Lakhnao, come under the former category. Under the latter will be found
the measures taken by Major, now General, Orfeur Cavenagh, to provide for the
equipment of the army before the arrival in Calcutta of Sir Colin Campbell; an accurate
version of the manner in which Adrian Hope met his death before Rilija; a corrected
account of the storming of the Mess-house at Lakhnao, rendering justice to Captain
Hopkins, 53rd foot; and an extract from a letter from General Cavenagh regarding the
cause of the panic in Calcutta on the 2nd of March 1858. I desire also to add that in my
account in the second volume of the defence of Lakhnao, after the first relief of that
place by Havelock and Outram, I have not given sufficient prominence to the services of
Major, now Major-General, Crommelin of the Engineers.

The last appendix gives the story of Tintia Topi’s career as related by Tantia Topi
himself.

I cannot conclude without expressing the deep obligations under which I lie to the
many gentlemen who have placed their journals and letters, all written at the time, at
my disposal. The value of the information I have thus been able to obtain is not to be
expressed in words. But especially do I desire to acknowledge the benefit I have
received from the services of the gifted friend who read this volume in proof-sheets,
and whose frank and judicious criticisms have greatly contributed to the clearness and
accuracy of the military narrative.

G. B. MALLESON.
27, WEST CROMWELL ROAD,
31st July, 1880.
HISTORY OF THE INDIAN MUTINY OF 1857.

BOOK XIII.

CHAPTER I.

THE western, or Bombay, Presidency of India comprises a long, narrow strip of country of varying breadth and irregular outline. Including the province of Sindh, the administration of which is subordinate to it, it occupies the western coast of the peninsula from the mouths of the Indus to the northernmost point of Goa, and from the south of that territory to the borders of Maisur. It is thus bounded on the west by Baluchistan and the Arabian Sea; on the south by Maisur; on the east by the Madras Presidency, Haidarabad, Barar, the central provinces, the states forming the central Indian agency, and Rajputana; on the north by Bhawalpur, the Panjab, and Baluchistan. The area of the British portions of the Presidency is one hundred and thirty-four thousand one hundred and thirty-five square miles, supporting fourteen millions of inhabitants; but in subordinate political relations to it, there are, or rather there were in native states comprising seventy-one thousand three hundred and twenty square miles with six millions of inhabitants. The principal of these were Barodah, Kathwar, Kachh, Kambhayat, Mahikanta, Rewakanta, Kohlapdr, Sawantwari, and Khairpur.

In 1857 Lord Elphinstone was Governor of Bombay. A man of culture and ability, Lord Elphinstone had enjoyed more experience of India than generally falls to the lot of governors unconnected with the civil or military services. He had been Governor of Madras from 1837 to 1842; and although the records of the Madras Presidency throughout his incumbency had marked no stirring events within its borders, yet the first Afghan war, with its early success and its later collapse, had excited the minds of the natives throughout the country, and had called for the exercise of tact and judgment on the part of the rulers. These qualities Lord Elphinstone was eminently qualified to display, and he had displayed them. He was called, however, to deal principally with administrative details. The manner in which he performed these duties gained for him the confidence of the natives. His measures for improving the resources of the country, and for establishing means of communication in all directions, are spoken of to this day. Lord Elphinstone revisited India at the time of the first Sikh war, 1845-6, and marched in company with the 14th Light Dragoons, then commanded by the late Colonel William Havelock, who had been his military secretary, from Bombay, through central India, to the head-quarters of the British army before Lahor. On the transfer of Kashmir to Galab Singh, a proceeding following the treaty of 1846 with the Sikhs, Lord Elphinstone formed one of the party which first visited that famous valley. After a residence in it of nearly three months, he set out for Ladak by the Husora valley, and
endeavored to proceed thence up the Gilghit valley—in those days an utterly unknown country. Forced, perhaps fortunately, by the objections of the authorities, to renounce this expedition, Lord Elphinstone crossed the Hurpo pass to Rondu on the Indus, being the first Englishman by whom that journey had been attempted.

It will be seen, then, that when in 1853 Lord Elphinstone was called to the post of Governor of Bombay, he brought to that office experience His such as few men, not trained in the Indian services, could command. His knowledge of men, his courtesy, his genial bearing, gave effect to that experience. Up to the outbreak of the mutiny in 1857 his conduct as Governor of Bombay was invariably marked by temper, judgment, and discretion. Calm and dignified in manner, courteous to his colleagues and to all with whom he was brought in contact, he evinced, on all occasions likely to test his action, the possession of a directing mind, of a will not to be shaken, a resolution that went direct to its aim. The crisis of 1857 was just one of those occurrences which Lord Elphinstone was constitutionally fitted to cope with. He at once realized its difficulty and its danger, and rose equal to encounter the one and to neutralize the other. In the words of a contemporary writer, generally unfavorable to him, he displayed "the courage of the soldier who knows his enemy."  

The truth of this judgment was proved by the action taken by Lord Elphinstone when the news reached him of the outbreak of the 10th of May at Mirath. Lord Elphinstone was at Bombay when he heard of that event. It happened that General Ashburnham, commanding the expeditionary corps on its way to China, was staying with him. So greatly did the importance of the intelligence impress the Governor, so certain did he feel that the Mirath revolt would spread, and that it should be met at once by bringing large reinforcements of European troops without delay into the country, that he urged General Ashburnham to proceed immediately to Calcutta, and to offer his services, and the services of the China expeditionary force, to the Governor-General.

It was a fortunate circumstance that the war with Persia had just been brought to a successful conclusion. Fortunate, likewise, that the disaffection had not spread to the native army of Bombay. Lord Elphinstone thus felt himself equal to the most decisive measures. He at once authorized the Commissioner of Sindh, Mr. Frere, to transfer the 1st Bombay Fusiliers from Karachi to the Punjab. He arranged that the 64th and 78th regiments, then on their way from Persia, should proceed forthwith, without landing at Bombay, to Calcutta. The more speedily to carry out this object, he caused vessels to be equipped and prepared for the reception of these regiments, so that on the arrival in the Bombay harbor of the transports which were conveying them from Bushir they might be transshipped without loss of time. This measure was duly and effectively carried out. The men moved from the one transport into the other, and reached Calcutta in time materially to influence the campaign. But Lord Elphinstone did more. He dispatched on

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1 *The Friend of India*
the instant to Calcutta a company of Madras artillery which happened to be on the spot, taking the duty of the Bombay artillery, then absent in Persia. He at the same time sent instructions to the officer commanding at Disa to hold the 83rd Regiment and the troop of horse artillery at that station in readiness to march on Ajmir, on the sole condition that, in the opinion of the local authorities, the departure of the only European troops in the vicinity of Ahmadabad and Gujarat might be hazarded without the absolute certainty of an outbreak. And, still penetrated by the necessity to concentrate on the scene of the mutiny as many European troops as could be collected, Lord Elphinstone chartered, on his own responsibility, two steamers belonging to the Peninsular and Oriental Company, the Pottinger and the Madras, provided them with all necessary stores, and dispatched them, under the command of Captain Griffith Jenkins of the Indian navy, to the Mauritius and the Cape, with letters to the Governors of those settlements, dwelling upon the importance of the crisis, and begging them to dispatch to India any troops they could spare.

I may here state that the result of these applications was such as might have been anticipated from the characters of the men to whom they were addressed. The Governor of the Mauritius, Sir James Higginson, embarked on board the Pottinger the head-quarters and as many men of the 33rd as that steamer could carry. Not contented with that, he took an early opportunity to charter and dispatch another transport to convey the remainder of that regiment, a battery of artillery, and as much money as could be spared from the treasury of the island.

Nor was the Governor of the Cape, Sir George Grey, animated by sentiments less patriotic. It fortunately happened that an unusually large force of British regiments was, at the moment, concentrated at Cape Town. Sir George dispatched, without delay, as many of them as he could spare. The 89th and 95th he sent to Bombay; the 6th, the 1st battalion 13th, the 2nd battalion 60th, the 73rd, 80th, and 31st to Calcutta. In subsequent vessels he dispatched horses in as large a quantity as he could conveniently procure.

The dispatch of Lord Elphinstone to Sir George Grey had painted the urgency of India's needs in terms so glowing that that able governor considered himself justified to stretch his powers. He did not hesitate to direct the commanders of the transports conveying the China expeditionary army so far to divert from their course as to call at Singapor for orders. The result of this patriotic action was most happy. The intelligence which met these transports at Singapor induced their commanders, in every case, to bear up for Calcutta.

To return to Bombay. So important did it appear to Lord Elphinstone, that reinforcements should promptly be sent from England by the overland route—a route till then untrodden by British troops—that, telegraphic communication being open with Calcutta, he suggested to the Governor-General the propriety of sending to England a special steamer, which he had ready, with dispatches, impressing upon the Home
Government the urgency of the need. There can be no doubt that the suggestion was a wise one. A fast lightly-laden steamer, travelling at her highest speed, would have anticipated the ordinary mail steamer by three or four days at the least. This, too, at a time when the most important events depended on prompt and decisive action. But Lord Canning did not view matters in the same light. He refused to interfere with the ordinary mail service. The steamer, therefore, was not sent.

Before I pass from the record of the precautionary measures taken in the early days of the revolt, to describe the actual occurrences in the various parts of the Bombay Presidency, I wish to advert for a moment to one material result which followed them. Those measures undoubtedly saved Bombay from serious outbreak. They did more. They secured an important base of operations against central India and Rajputana, and they preserved the line of communication between those provinces and the provinces beyond them and the seaboard. It is difficult to overestimate the importance thus gained, solely by the exercise of timely foresight.

A rather serious breach of the law at Baroch in the month of May, originating in a dispute between the Parsis and the Muhummadans, might have led to important consequences but for the firmness with which it was met, in the first instance, by the officer commanding on the spot, and, in the next, by the Governor. The spirit of Lord Elphinstone's action may be judged from the fact that, to prevent the spread of the riot, he dispatched two hundred men of the 86th to Sprat—a movement of troops which left only three hundred European troops of all arms in Bombay itself.

The riot at Baroch was, for a time, the only indication of ill-feeling manifested in the western Presidency, and it was entirely unconnected with the great revolt then raging in the north-west. Lord Elphinstone, whilst carefully repressing it, did not abate a single effort to carry out the policy which he was convinced was the only sound policy—the policy of offensive defence. Almost from the very first he had designed to form, at a convenient point within the Presidency, a column to secure and hold the great line of road between Bombay and Agra. Not only would the line thus secured form a base for ulterior operations, but a great moral advantage would be gained by its tenure. In the crisis which then afflicted India, it was not to be thought of that any portion of the empire would stand still. The attitude of folded arms was an attitude to invite danger. To check the approach of evil, the surest mode was to go forth and meet it. A column marching towards the north-west would encounter the elements which, having brewed there disturbance, were eager to spread it, and encountering, would annihilate them. The presence of such a column, marching confidently to the front, would, moreover, go far to check, perhaps even to suppress, any disloyal feelings which might have been engendered in the minds of the native princes whose states bordered on this line of communication. For these reasons, then, at a very early period of the crisis, Lord Elphinstone proposed in Council, and ordered the formation of a column, under the
command of Major-General Woodburn, to open out communications with central India and the North-West Provinces.

The column formed in consequence, under the command of Major-General Woodburn, was but small in numbers. It consisted only of five troops of the 14th Light Dragoons, the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, Captain Woolcombe's horse-battery of artillery, and a pontoon train. It set out from Puna on the 8th of June, under orders to march with all speed to Mau, with the view to save that place while there was yet time, and to prevent the spread of the insurrection in Malwa, and along the northern frontier of the Bombay Presidency.\(^2\)

The state of affairs at Mau and at Indur was such as to demand the most prompt action on the part of General Woodburn. It was just possible that, making forced marches, he might approach near to Indur as to baffle the plans of the discontented. The dread that he might do so for a long time paralyzed their action. Circumstances, however, occurred which baffled the hopes expressed by Lord Elphinstone, when, acting on his own unaided judgment, he pressed upon the military authorities the necessity for General Woodburn to advance.

The city of Aurangabad—once the capital of the kingdom of Ahmadnagar, and, at a later period, the favorite residence of the Emperor Aurangzeb—occupies a prominent and important position in the north-western corner of the dominions of the Nizam. The corner of which it was the capital, just like a promontory into British territory. To the east and north-east it touches western Berar and the central provinces; to the south, the west, and the north-west, the northern portions of the Bombay Presidency. Beyond the northernmost part of that Presidency, and within easy distance of Aurangabad, lies Malwa.

Disaffection was known to reign in Malwa, and it was of the highest consequence that that disaffection should not spread southward to Bombay. But at Aurangabad, the capital of the small promontory I have described, almost touching Malwa on one side and running into Bombay on the other three sides, were quartered the 1st and 3rd Cavalry, the 2nd Infantry, and a battery of artillery, of the Haidarabad Contingent. These regiments, commanded by British officers, were composed chiefly of Muhammadans, and one of them—the 1st Cavalry—had, in the early part of June, displayed symptoms of disaffection.

Aurangabad is distant from Puna a hundred and thirty-eight miles, from Ahmadnagar, about midway between the two, sixty-eight miles. In the ordinary course of events, General Woodburn, armed with positive instructions to push on with all speed to Mau, would not have entered the dominions of the Nizam. It happened,

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\(^2\) Lord Elphinstone's letter to General Woodburn.
however, that the disaffection I have spoken of as prevailing at Aurangabad proceeded on the 13th of June to more open demonstrations, and in consequence General Woodburn received, not from Lord Elphinstone, instructions to deviate from the line urged upon him by that nobleman, and to march upon Aurangabad.

In explanation of the open demonstrations at Aurangabad, I may state that a rumor had reached that place that the cavalry regiment stationed there would be required to join General Woodburn's column and march with him on Dehli. The rumor was founded upon truth, for it had been intended that the regiment in question should join General Woodburn's force. But to the minds of soldiers who were not British subjects, who lived under the rule of the descendant of a viceroy appointed by the Moghol, the idea of fighting against the King of Dehli was peculiarly distasteful. They showed their dislike on the moment. On the 13th of June the men of the 1st Cavalry openly expressed their dissatisfaction, and—it was stated at the time—swore to murder their officers if pressure to march against Dehli were put upon them. Fortunately, the commanding officer, Captain Abbott, was a sensible man. He summoned the native officers to his quarters, and discussed the question with them. The native officers declared that, for their own part, they were ready to obey any lawful order, but they admitted that their men would not fight against the mutineers. Captain Abbott then, after communicating with the Resident, resolved to adopt a conciliatory course. He gave the men assurances that they would not be required to march on Dehli. In this way order was restored. So little confidence, however, in the stability of the compromise was felt on both sides, that the officers proceeded to barricade themselves in their mess-house, whilst the mutinous cavalry boasted over their moral victory in every quarter of the city.

Matters were in this state when, on the morning of the 23rd of June, General Woodburn's column entered Aurangabad, marched at once to the ground occupied by the mutineers, and ordered the men to give up their arms. With the exception of one troop of the 1st Cavalry, all obeyed. The general gave the men of that troop six minutes to consider the course they would pursue. When the time elapsed, the men, instead of submitting, put on a bold front and attempted to ride away. In this attempt most of them succeeded. The next morning some three or four, convicted of attempts at assassination, were hanged, and order was restored.

General Woodburn was under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Henry Somerset. In the opinion of Lord Elphinstone, the danger at Aurangabad had not been so pressing as to necessitate the deviation of the field force from the direct road to Mau. He thought that in the presence of two dangers, that which would result from the mutiny coming down to Bombay from central India and Malwa was greater even than the disaffection of a portion of the troops of the Nizam. Forced, however, to accept

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3 The splendid manner in which the Haidarabad cavalry atoned for this momentary disaffection will be found recorded in subsequent pages.
General Woodburn's action at Aurangabad, he lost not a moment in urging him to press on towards Mau. "I am persuaded," he wrote to that officer on the 22nd of June, "that the local officers greatly exaggerate the danger of a rising in our own provinces. I have no fear of anything of the sort; and if it should happen, I trust that we should be able to put it down speedily. But I feel confident that it will not happen—at all events, for the present. If you allow the insurrection to come down to our borders without attempting to check it, we shall almost deserve our fate; but if by a rapid advance you are able to secure Mhow" (Mau), "you will also, in all probability, save Mehidpur, Sagar, Hoshangabad," &c. Lord Elphinstone followed up these noble words, displaying the true conception he had formed of the situation, by a letter addressed, the same day, to Sir Henry Somerset: "I am very much obliged to you," he wrote, "for the perusal of General Woodburn's letter. I conclude that since it was written he has received his orders to continue his march to Mhow " (Mau) "with all possible expedition."

But General Woodburn did not move forward. In reply to the letter I have just quoted, he wrote, on the 25th, to Lord Elphinstone, urging the various reasons which, he thought, would necessitate a long stay at Aurangabad. These reasons might, in the presence of the greater danger at Mau, be justly termed trivial. They consisted in the possibility of a fresh outbreak after his departure, and in the necessity of trying some sixty-four prisoners by court-martial.

Lord Elphinstone answered the objections to advance urged by the general, in a very decided manner. "I wish you to remember," he wrote to him on the 27th of June, "that it was for the object of relieving Mau, and not for the purpose of chastising a mutinous regiment at Aurangabad, that the field force was formed. The latter is an incidental duty, which it was hoped would not interfere with the main object. I am perfectly aware that, in these times, circumstances may occur to divert your force from its original destination, but I do not think they have yet occurred." He then proceeded in a few forcible words to urge the folly of wasting unnecessary time upon trials, and the necessity of disarming regiments which might show disaffection, instead of delaying a movement of the first importance from a fear that a revolt might take place after the departure of the British troops.

This letter, I have said, was dispatched to General Woodburn on the 27th of June. On the morning of the 28th Lord Elphinstone received a dispatch from Calcutta, instructing him to send to Calcutta by sea the wing of the 12th Lancers then stationed at Puna. This diminution of his available European strength, already extremely small, following immediately upon the departure from the Presidency of General Woodburn's force, and accompanied by reports received from many district officers to the effect that rebellion was only watching its opportunity, so affected Lord Elphinstone, that for the moment he felt inclined to authorize General Woodburn to halt at Aurangabad. Indeed, on the

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4 "To allow twenty days for the trial of sixty-four prisoners is out of the question in these times."
spur of the moment he wrote that officer a letter, expressive of his deep regret and
disappointment at having to request him to give up a measure which he believed to be
of great importance. But the night dissipated his anxiety. In the morning he had
resolved to dare all, to risk all, for the supreme advantage of saving central India. On
the 29th, then, he wrote again to General Woodburn, cancelling that portion of his
previous letter which had given him authority to defer the projected movement.

But, before this letter could reach General Woodburn that officer had become
incapacitated for command by ill-health. The Government promptly replaced him by
Colonel C. S. Stuart, of the Bombay Army, then commanding the 3rd Regiment Native
Infantry. Pending the arrival of that officer, the command of the field force devolved
upon Major Follett, 25th Regiment Native Infantry.

Major Follett had a grand opportunity before him. He had only to move forward.
Unfortunately, he wrote to the Commander-in-Chief a letter in which he dwelt upon the
impossibility of leaving Aurangabad in the then condition of the Nizam's regiments.
More unfortunately still, Major Follett's representations were strongly supported by the
head of the army.

Lord Elphinstone's reasons and instincts still told him that the further delay thus
proposed was the delay of red tape—the natural consequence of the absence of a clear
mind and a firm will. But he was in a very difficult position. He was not a soldier. And
although he would unhesitatingly have disregarded the scruples of Major Follett,
unsupported by higher authority, he could not treat with contempt the weighty support
given to those scruples by the officer who was Commander-in-Chief of the armies
serving in India. Unwillingly, then, and solely in deference to the strong opinion
expressed by Sir Henry Somerset, Lord Elphinstone consented to the delay.

A few days proved how true had been his judgment. On the 7th of July, Major Follett
convicted himself and the chief who supported him of a hasty and premature decision.
On the 7th of July that officer wrote to Lord Elphinstone,\(^5\) declared that it was perfectly
feasible to leave Aurangabad, and announced his intention to march for Mau on the
10th, leaving a troop of cavalry and two guns for the protection of the Aurangabad
cantonment.

Lord Elphinstone promptly requested Sir Henry Somerset to confirm this change of
feeling by cancelling his previous orders. This was, in effect, carried out.

The force, led by Colonel C. S. Stuart of the colonel Bombay army, who joined it on the
8th, quitted Aurangabad on the 12th, too late to prevent the mutinies at Mau and Inudr,

\(^5\) It is probable that Major Follett's change of opinion was due to the receipt of a dispatch from Colonel Durand
addressed to Mr. Plowden, and sent through the officer commanding at Aurangabad. This letter contained
convincing proofs of the necessity of promptly advancing.
but not too late, under the guidance of Colonel Durand, who joined it at Asirgarh, to restore British authority in central India. To the further movements of this column I shall return in a subsequent chapter. Its march beyond the Bombay frontier was due solely to Lord Elphinstone. Had he been unfettered, and had its first commander been a man after his own heart, it would have taken place in time to prevent much evil in central India.

But the dispatch of Colonel Stuart's column to central India was not the only aid proffered by the Bombay Presidency for the suppression of the mutiny. I have already alluded to the splendid self-abnegation by which the province of Sind was denuded for the benefit of the Punjab. Again, the western Presidency was prompt to comply with the indent made upon it by Colonel G. P. Lawrence, the Governor-General's agent in Rajputana. The greater part of the garrison of Dist, consisting of a troop of horse artillery, one regiment and one squadron of native light cavalry, a detachment (four hundred men) of the 83rd, and a detachment of the 12th Native Infantry, was formed into a movable column, and placed at the disposal of George Lawrence, just then nominated Brigadier-General in Rajputana. Lord Elphinstone was prompt to confirm this arrangement—an arrangement which gave General Lawrence a power, exercised with remarkable ability and judgment, to maintain order in a country ruled over by the great Rajput chiefs. Further, on the 23rd of July, four companies of the 86th Regiment were sent from Malligam to join Colonel Stuart's column on its way to Mau. Marching direct by the Bombay road, they did not join till after that column had arrived at Mau.

Whilst Lord Elphinstone was thus actively employing a policy of aggressive offence alike to keep the evil from his own borders and to crush it in the provinces beyond them, the spirit which had worked so much mischief in the north-west suddenly raised its head on his very hearth. The first symptoms of mutiny in the Bombay Presidency broke out shortly after the march of the columns whose movements I have just recorded.

—I quite agree with you," wrote Lord Elphinstone to Colonel Durand, the 27th of July, "in regretting the delay which took place in the advance of the force. You cannot have written more strongly than I have upon the subject, but there was a strong counter-prejudice on the part of the officers on the spot, everyone of whom declared that the departure of the column from Aurangabad would be the signal of a general rising. I from the first recommended that the mutinous troops should be disarmed and dismounted. But this was considered inexpedient. It was represented that it was not so much the troops but the whole population was against us. Mr.___, the Deputy Commissioner in North Berar, who is reckoned a very good officer, said that there were, I am afraid to say how many, armed Musulmans in his district, who would rise the moment the column was ordered to move. Colonel___, who commands the Madras cavalry regiment at ___, said it was utterly impossible to send half his regiment over to Aurangabad, as the people in that neighborhood would attack the station." It is immensely to the credit of Lord Elphinstone that, in spite of these and many similar reports from district officers, and of the opposition referred to in the text, he should have persevered in urging the forward movement. He was, in fact, one of the few men in high position in India who realized how the mutiny should be met.
The southern Marathi country comprises the territory between Satarah and the Madras Presidency to the north and south, and between the Nizam's dominions and the western ghats to the east and west. It has an area of fourteen thousand square miles and a population of about three millions, for the most part of pure Maratha blood. Within this country are the two collectorates, Balgaon and Dharwar, the native state Kolhapur, and numerous small semi-independent states, each with an annual revenue rising up to, but in no case exceeding, fifty thousand pounds. In 1857 the principal of these were Sangli, Miraj, Sivanur, Kurandwar, Jamkhandi, Nargund, and Mudhol.

Of this important country the Collector and Magistrate of Balgaon, Mr. George Berkeley Seton-Karr, had political charge. Mr. Seton-Karr possessed remarkable natural abilities, and these had been developed by an education which had continued up to the date of which I am writing. He was a firm advocate for the rights of native princes, for continuing to them the power to adopt, for interfering as little as possible with their customs which, however little understood by Europeans, were harmless in themselves, and which were hallowed by the practice of ages. He was one of those men who, whilst possessed of a firm and decided character, yet preferred to try to their fullest extent the arts of persuasion before having recourse to intimidation or violence.

The internal condition of the southern Maratha country when Mr. Seton-Karr assumed charge of it in May 1856, just twelve months prior to the revolt, was one of brooding discontent. The annexation by the Government of India of Berar of Oudh had been in the one case followed, in the other preceded, by an Act known as Act XI. of 1852, under the operation of which an Inam Commission was empowered to call upon all landed proprietors to produce the title-deeds of their estates. A new tribunal had, under this Act, been invested with arbitrary jurisdiction over this vast mass of property. The holders of estates, careless and improvident, unacquainted with law, and accustomed to consider that thirty years' possession conferred an irrefragable title, had failed in many instances to preserve the most valid muniments of their estates. In some cases, indeed, no muniments had ever existed. Chiefs who, in the anarchy which prevailed in India subsequent to the death of Aurangzib, had won their estates by the sword, had not been careful to fence them in with a paper barrier—in that age utterly valueless—but they had transmitted to their descendants the arms and the retainers who had constituted their right to possession, and The manner with whose aid they had learned to consider mere titles superfluous, as without it they were contemptible. In other cases, men who had acquired land in the general scramble which preceded the downfall of the Peshwa's Government, had transmitted their acquisitions to their children, fortified by no better titles than entries in the village account-books. To both these classes the main Commission had been a commission simply of confiscation. In the southern Maratha country the titles of thirty-five thousand estates, large and small, had been called for by the new tribunal. In twenty-one thousand cases that tribunal had pronounced sentences of confiscation. Thousands of other landowners, still unevicted, looked on in dismay, tremblingly awaiting the sentence which was to add their wail of distress and
resentment to that of their impoverished neighbors.\(^7\) Can it be wondered at, then, that Mr. Seton-Barr, when he assumed charge under these circumstances in May 1856, found the native landowners of the southern Maratha country in a state of moody discontent, which was prevented from bursting into open disaffection only by a sense of its utter hopelessness?

But another cause increased, even intensified, the discontent, and, by its connection with the religious feelings of all classes, added greatly to the danger of the situation. Of all the rights devolving upon a Hindu landowner, the right to adopt is at once the most cherished and the most sacred. It is an observance enjoined upon him by his religion. Should he fail to beget a child, he is bound to provide for himself an heir by adoption. On the child so adopted he bestows all the care and the affection ordinarily lavished on the offspring of love. Taught by his religion to believe that his own happiness in the other world depends upon the transmission to the adopted son of the inheritance of his fathers, he is ever careful to instill into his mind that he actually is of the family, and will be, after his death, the representative of its traditions and its honors. The idea that he might die heirless is to the Hindu landowner an ever-present canker-worm. It is sufficient to make him moody, despairing, miserable. The prohibition to find for himself such an heir might even make him reckless.

But the Anglo-Indian Government had, in many instances, pronounced such a prohibition. The policy of absorption adopted by Lord Dalhousie had shown no respect for the principle of adoption. Under its action large states had been absorbed, and the power to adopt had been denied to lesser landowners. This refusal had been extended to the landowners of the southern Maratha country—amongst others, to the important chief of Nargund. The prohibition produced consternation. The effeminate training of the Hindu upper classes often rendered it absolutely necessary to employ the rite of adoption to prevent the extinction of a family. The custom had been hallowed by time. The prohibition of it by a paramount power, alien in race and faith, could be attributed only to greed for the land. When, then, the prohibition was extended, and the landowners saw family after family disappear, a great fear fell upon them. They felt, one and all, that their turn would come; that their names, too, would perish; that none

\(^7\) In writing thus of the feelings of the actual landowners, I am far from desiring to say a single word against the inquiries instituted by the Inam Commission. I wish to record only the discontent of the men who actually possessed the land when the inquiry was ordered. I admit not only that the Government was perfectly justified in ordering that inquiry, but that it was demanded by thousands who had been violently and, in some cases, fraudulently dispossessed of their hereditary acres during the period antecedent to the fall of the Peshwa. The Inam Commission rendered substantial justice to these men. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that forty-years had elapsed since the dominions of the Peshwa had been brought under British sway, and that during those years, and, in many cases, during many antecedent years, the landowners who felt aggrieved by the action of the Inam Commission, had enjoyed and transmitted to their children the estates which their fathers had gained. The long possession gave them in their eyes a better right than any which could be urged by the descendants of the men who had been dispossessed. No wonder, then, from their point of view, the Inam Commission was an instrument of tyranny.
would succeed to commemorate their deeds and the deeds of their ancestors, and to appease their manes by yearly celebrations. In the common despair old feuds were laid aside, hereditary enmity was forgotten. A common dread produced a common sympathy, and the indignation or alarm of each was supported and increased by the sense that it was shared by all. For the moment, indeed, no one thought to combine against the British Government. But though tranquility prevailed, it was not the tranquility which is based upon contentment. The landowners were tranquil simply because successful revolt seemed impossible. The British authority seemed too firmly fixed to be easily shaken. But, were it to be shaken, it was always possible, considering the intense and widespread discontent of the landowners, that their hopeless apathy might become the audacity of despair.

Such was the state of the southern Marathi country when, in May 1856, Mr. Seton-Karr assumed charge of it. But a few weeks elapsed before his experienced mind had mastered the Causes of the discontent which he found everywhere prevailing. It was difficult, even for a man who condemned the policy of the Government and who sympathized with the native landowners, to allay it. He found, in fact, that in almost every instance the landowners had been grievously wronged. The influential chief of Nargund had been denied the rights of adoption in terms which—owing to the faultiness of the translation of the original English—added insult to injury. Other landowners of ancient lineage, and possessing weight in the country, were found by Mr. Seton-Karr estranged from their loyalty by the causes to which I have adverted—the Inam Commission and the withholding of the right of adoption—and plunged in moody mistrust of the Government. It was not in the power of Mr. Seton-Karr to carry out the only act which would have restored confidence—to moderate the action of the Inam Commission and to restore the right of adoption. Nor, conciliatory and sympathizing as he was, was he more able to reconcile the native chiefs and landowners to the new order which had to them all the effects of a revolution. But all that an earnest and high-minded man could do he did. He visited every landowner. Their individual characters he carefully studied. To their complaints he listened with patience. He met them generally with such explanations of the policy of the Government as might remove misapprehension as to its general intention; whilst, in cases of individual hardship—which he was powerless to remedy—he endeavored to soothe the sense of hardness and injustice by kindly expressions of sympathy. In this way he won their confidence. He made the landowners feel that in the highest official in the province they had a real friend. More it was impossible for him to effect. Regard for the individual in no way obliterated resentment at the action of the Government. A sense of deep injury still continued to rankle in each breast.

Such was the state of affairs when, on the 21st of May 1857, the news of the mutiny at Mirath and Dehli reached Belgian. The effect of this news, and of the worse tidings which continued to follow, upon the peoples of the southern Maratha country was electric. The Muhammadans were at once aroused to an intense pitch of excitement. The
Hindoos, on the other hand, were far more reticent, and for some time concealed their inner feelings by an impassive exterior. British authority seemed so firmly rooted in the country that they hesitated to believe that it could be suddenly destroyed.

Mr. Seton-Karr was fully alive to the dangers of the crisis. The force at Belgaon consisted of one regiment of native infantry, the 29th, a weak battery of European artillery, and the depot of the 64th Foot, composed of about thirty men fit for duty, guarding upwards of four hundred women and children belonging to that regiment. Exclusive of the artillery, not more than one hundred Europeans fit to carry arms could be mustered in the place; whilst between Belgaon and Puna and Sholapur there were more than two thousand native, and only one hundred and twenty European soldiers. The defenses of Belgaon consisted of a fort nearly a mile in circumference, the ramparts of which, unrepaired for years, presented breaches in several places. In a military point of view the place was, in fact, untenable, but it had nevertheless to be regarded as the sole refuge for the European non-combatants, consisting of some five hundred including children. Belgaon was the head-quarters of the southern division of the army, and Major-General Lester had arrived there on the 11th of May to assume that command. Mr. Seton-Karr at once placed himself in communication with that officer, and, under his direction, such improvements as in so brief a time where practicable, were made to the defenses.

During the week or two following, the unusual exaltation of the Muhammadans alone gave evidence of the effect produced by the bad news from the north-west. But in the early part of June Mr. Seton-Karr discovered that an emissary from that part of India had arrived some days before, and that he had been in daily communication with the Muhammadan leaders. Prompt to act in the presence of real danger, as he was slow to use violence when the end could be accomplished by peaceable means, Mr. Seton-Karr caused this intruder to be arrested and confined. He did not act one minute too soon. The sepoys, many of them natives of Oudh, had for some days previous displayed an unaccustomed insolence. It had become hourly more and more evident that they sympathized with the action of their brethren in the north, and that they would grasp at an opportunity to follow their example. In the proportion in which their insolence increased did the peril of Mr. Seton-Karr's position increase. It was still further augmented by the action of Nana Sahib at Kanhpur towards the end of June. To understand this it is requisite only to remember that Nana Sahib claimed to be, and in the eyes of his countrymen actually was, the adopted heir of the last of the Peshwas; and that some of the most important estates in the southern Maratha country—the estates of Sangli, of Jamkhandi, of Miraj, and of Kurandwar—were held by branches of the great Patwardhan family, the most illustrious of the dependants of the Peshwa. The fact that Nana Sahib was married to the first cousin of the chief of Sangli; that his most active lieutenant was that chief's uncle; and that the chief himself, on the verge of his majority, had evinced a taste for low and intriguing associates, did not certainly lesson the danger of the position.
There were other chiefs whose discontent was hardly less formidable. Prominent amongst these were the Desai of Nipani, a small fortress built on the model of Bharatpar, about forty miles from Belgaon—a chieftain who had lost a large portion of his estates under the operation of the Inam Commission, who was known to be disaffected, and whose disaffection would cut off communications with Bombay; the Desai of Jimboti—a chieftain whose family, settled for many generations amongst the forests which stretch onwards from the Ghats, had come to be regarded as the natural lords of the wild population of the jungles, and who, in his own person, had been reduced to penury by the action of the same arbitrary tribunal. The temper of this chieftain had been soured by his misfortunes. He had little to lose, everything to gain, by rebellion. It was in his power to draw after him a large portion of the jungle population, and by their means to sever the communications of the British with the sea. Not less dangerous was the adopted son of the late Dasai of Kittur. The retainers of this family, twenty-four years previously, had crowned a rash insurrection by a gallant defence of their fort, in the siege of which a political agent of that day had fallen. The last representative of the race was then living as a pensioner upon the bounty of his father-in-law, commanding in his fallen state the sympathies of the whole Lingayat population. He, too, had nothing to lose, everything to hope, from rebellion. His father-in-law, the Desai of Wantmuri, though a cautious and prudent man, did not possess the strength of character to resist extraordinary pressure placed upon him by his co-religionists. Add to these the chief of Nargund, connected with some of the most powerful families in the southern Maratha country, and known to be thoroughly disaffected; add, moreover, that the population, naturally turbulent and warlike, had retained the arms which had all but gained empire for the Marathas; and the reader may gather some idea of the position which, difficult in May, became dangerous in the early part of June, and threatening as every day witnessed a closer approach to the advent of July.

For long Mr. Seton-Karr met the increasing danger from the resources suggested to him by his long experience, and by his thorough acquaintance with native character. But as time went on, each post bringing with it intelligence of further outbreaks in the provinces of the northwest, that gentleman deemed it at last his duty to bring the situation of the provinces under the eyes of the Government of Bombay. He did this on the 20th of June. Cognizant, however, of the great difficulties which Lord Elphinstone had to encounter, of the unselfish foresight which had induced that heroic man to denude his own presidency that he might crush rebellion upon its borders, Mr. Seton-Karr did not ask for aid, material or other. He merely asked that his own powers might be extended. He asked, in fact, that the entire responsibility of meeting and encountering the crisis might be cast on him alone. It was a noble request; especially noble at that crisis; especially noble considering the resources at his disposal—a native regiment in a state of veiled rebellion, a weak battery of artillery, about one hundred
Europeans—to meet the rebellion which might occur at any moment. The request was
complied with.

Free now to act, Mr. Seton-Karr developed his plan. The use of force was out of the
question. The only possible policy was conciliation. In vantages carrying this out Mr.
Seton-Karr enjoyed advantages which would have been denied to many men. During
the year immediately preceding the mutiny he had carefully cultivated friendly
relations with the chiefs. Over the minds of many he had acquired an extraordinary
ascendancy. This ascendancy he now tested—and in the most cases with the happiest
results. Valuable information was placed at his disposal; the intercommunication of the
disaffect was prevented; a vigilant watch upon their movements was secured. In this
way, and by a show of confidence towards all, by impressing upon each chief the idea
that his neighbor was loyal, and by the expression of a confidence, really felt, that the
scare would soon pass away, leaving the British complete master of the situation, Mr.
Seton-Karr succeeded in staving off the fatal day and in averting the dreaded explosion.
Difficulties, however, continued to increase. On Mutiny at the 31st of July the 27th
Native Infantry mutinied at Kolhapur, plundered the treasury, and after murdering
such officers as fell in their way, set off for the Ghat. Kolhapur is sixty-five miles from
Belgian. Communications between the 27th Regiment and the 29th at the latter place
had been frequent. At Dharwar, forty-two miles from Belgian in a direction opposite to
that of Kolhapur, the 28th Regiment had been for some time on the very verge of revolt.
Mr. Seton-Karr was thus occupying a position between one station where the garrison
had just mutinied, and another the garrison of which was on the verge of mutiny—the
troops at the central point being also infected. It happened, however, that the native
officer of the 29th—the regiment stationed at Belgaon—who was the secret leader of the
disaffect, one Thakur Singh, was known to Mr. Seton-Karr. That gentleman at once,
and before the news of the mutiny at Kolhapur was generally known at Belgaon,
entered into communication regarding this native officer with General Lester. To arrest
him might have precipitated a calamity. It was more easy to devise a pretext to remove
him honorably from the station. Such a pretext was soon found. Two companies of the
29th, that of Thakur Singh being one of them, were ordered on command to Badami, a
small town some ninety miles distant near the south-western frontier of the Nizam's
dominions. The two companies set out on the morning of the 29th, still ignorant of the
mutiny at Kolhapur. When the tidings of that mutiny reached the sepoys left behind at
Belgaon they were too disinclined by the absence of their leader to act on the moment.
The opportune seizure and the condign punishment of an emissary from Jamkhandi
who had come to incite them to an immediate outbreak, awed them into still longer
inaction.

The danger, however, was by no means removed. Concurrently with the events I have
just related, Mr. Seton-Karr discovered a plot of the Muhammadan population of
Belgaon. He soon found that this conspiracy had its ramifications at Kolhapur, at
Haidarabad, and at Puna, and that its outbreak was to be signaled by the seizure of
Belgaon itself. The arrest of one of the chief conspirators at Puna seemed likely to precipitate the outbreak. Mr. Seton-Karr, therefore, no sooner received information of this event, than he secured the local leaders at Belgaon, all of whom he had carefully watched. The evidence regarding some of these proved defective, and they were discharged. But the principal conspirator was convicted on the clearest evidence, and he was blown from a gun in company with the emissary from Jamkhandi just spoken of.

Three days before this execution—the 10th of August—a small detachment of European troops arrived to reassure the authorities at Belgaon. Another detachment went on to produce a similar good effect in Dharwar. General Lester at once proceeded to repress the rising mutinous spirit of the 29th Native Infantry. Five men of that regiment were tried, one of them was condemned to death, the remainder were transported for life. Taking advantage of the good effect produced by these proceedings, Mr. Seton-Karr began the work of disarming the district, including the towns of Belgtion and Shahpur. On the 24th of August a further reinforcement arrived in the shape of a detachment of the 86th Foot. Their presence, combined with other precautionary measures taken by Mr. Seton-Karr, caused the great Muhammadan festival of the Muharram to pass off without disturbance—and, for a time, the Europeans in the southern country felt that they could breathe freely.

Mr. Seton-Karr had thus succeeded, by a combination of firmness and tact, the result of good judgment directing intimate acquaintance with the native character, in guiding the territories committed to his charge through the most dangerous crisis of the mutiny. Considering the previous discontent of the chiefs and landowners, the fact that he was supported by no force, that he had only his own energies upon which to rely, this result will ever be quoted as a marvelous instance of skilful management of men. It is not too much to say that a single false step would have produced the most fatal consequences. Not only would it have involved the southern Maratha, country in revolt, but it would have kindled a flame which would have spread throughout the dominions of the Nizam. Had Mr. Seton-Karr diverged, but for one day, from the line of vigilant forbearance which he had laid down as his policy; had he hurried the ill-disposed into open insurrection by any unguarded word of suspicion or slight; or had he encouraged their designs by supineness, a great calamity would have been inevitable. Unhappily, subsequent events proved only too truly the truth of this assertion. When in an evil moment, to be related hereafter, the charge of political affairs was removed from the hands of Mr. Seton-Karr to those of an officer distasteful, from his previous connection with the Inam Commission, to the chiefs and landowners, one month did not elapse before the rebellion, controlled by good management, began its course with murder. All honor, then, to the wise and farseeing officer who kept it within bounds when its outburst would have been far more dangerous.  

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8 The Government of Bombay was not insensible to Mr. Seton-Karr’s great merits. On the 14th of September 1857, he was informed that “the Right Honorable the Governor in Council considers that in a conjunction of great anxiety and danger you have displayed a calmness, an energy, and a foresight which entitle you to the thanks and
Before returning to Bombay, I must ask the reader to accompany me for a brief period to Kolhapur. The state of this name, ruled over by the descendants of Sivaji, had up to the year 1842 suffered from continuous disorder and misrule. To such an extent had the evil proceeded that in the year I have mentioned the British Government was forced to interfere and to nominate a minister to introduce order and good government. The efforts made in that direction by this enlightened man, a Brahman named Daji Khrisha Pandit, to deprive the corrupt party in the state of their illicit gains, provoked a rebellion. This rebellion having been suppressed, the British Government assumed the direct administration of the state during the minority of the Raja. Within this period, which did not expire till 1862, the forts of every description were dismantled, and the system of hereditary garrison was abolished; the native military force was disbanded, and a local corps, officered by three English officers, was substituted for it. These measures, especially those for the disarmament of their forts and the disbandment of their native force, though in view of the many previous rebellions absolutely necessary, had been regarded with great disfavor by the higher orders in Kolhapur, and had tended not a little to the unpopularity of the paramount power.

Such was the state of affairs in the province when the mutiny broke out at Mirath. Hopes and wishes similar to those which I have described as actuating the Muhammadan population of the Belgaon district, at once took possession of the minds of their neighbors in Kolhapur. To a people accustomed to revolt, living on the memories of plunder and corruption, and hating good government, the occasion seemed singularly favorable. The town of Kolhapur is distant only sixty-five miles from Belgaon. It was garrisoned by one native regiment, the 27th, and by the local corps raised on the disbandment of the native force. There were no European troops nearer than Belgaon, and it was impossible to spare any from that place. Satarah was eighty-one miles to the north, and Puna, whence European aid was alone possible, seventy-one miles further. The political superintendent of Kolhapur was Colonel Maughan. Major Rolland commanded the 27th Native Infantry, Captain Schneider the local corps.

I have already stated that communications between the 27th Native Infantry at Kolhapur, the 29th at Belgian, and the 28th at Dharwar, had been frequent during the commendations of Government." Again, "the judicious arrangements made by you have amply secured the future tranquility of the southern Maratha country." These and other commendations were repeated and confirmed by Lord Elphinstone in letters under his own hand, in which he alludes to "the marked ability and success" with which Mr. Seton-Karr had performed his duties. In his published minute on distinguished services rendered during the mutiny, Lord Elphinstone placed Mr. Seton-Karr's name third on the list of those who had deserved well of their country. The honor was the more marked, because, as Lord Canning observed, every recommendation from Lord Elphinstone carried double weight from the fact that out of the many who had rendered important services in western India, he selected only a few names for mention. Yet, strange as it may appear, when so many were decorated, Mr. Seton-Karr received neither honors nor reward. He returned to England towards the end of 1860, his proud nature suffering from the unmerited slight which had been cast upon him. In less than two years he died, conscious that he had performed a great service which his country had failed to recognize.
months of June and July. Supported, as they were, secretly, by discontented chiefs, almost openly by the disaffected Muhammadan populations, these three regiments had the game in their own hands. Concerted and simultaneous action was only necessary to their success. Happily on this, as on so many occasions at this eventful period, the conspirators failed in this essential particular. It would seem that they reckoned without the telegraph. Instead of deciding to rise on a settled date, they arranged that the example should be set by Kolhapur, and followed at once by Belgaon and Dharwar. The 27th Native Infantry accordingly rose on the 31st of July at Kolhapur. But for the telegraph the regiment at Belgaon would have received by express intelligence of the movement, and have followed the example. But the telegraph forestalled their express. And Mr. Seton-Karr, using his priority of news with judgment, averted, as we have seen, the calamity from that place.

But the mutiny at Kolhapur was a reality. During the night of the 31st of July the 27th rose in arms and detailed parties to attack their officers' bungalows. The native adjutant, a Jew, and a Hindu havaldar ran to give warning only just in time to permit the ladies to escape from their houses before the sepoys came up and poured volleys into them. Some of the officers nobly endeavored to bring back the rebels to their duty, but their efforts were vain. The treasury and the bazaar were plundered, and riot reigned supreme. Three officers who had escaped into the country were shot and thrown into the river. The remainder took refuge in the Residency, about a mile from the cantonment, but near the lines of the Kolhapur local regiment, which happily remained loyal.9

The news of this disaster reached Bombay by telegraph. Lord Elphinstone acted with promptitude and decision. It happened that Colonel G. Le Grand Jacob, a man of the old heroic type, ready in council, prompt and decisive in action, had but just returned to Bombay from a command in the Persian campaign. He was about to start for Puna under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, when the telegram from Kolhapur was placed in the hands of the Governor. Lord Elphinstone at once sent for Jacob. He told him all that had occurred at Kolhapur; that he would receive orders from the Commander-in-Chief to take command of the troops in that quarter. He added that he was well aware that there were no troops to be depended upon, except perhaps the local regiments; but that he would receive special powers, and was to do the best he could.10

9 Western India before and during the Mutinies, by Major-General Sir George Le Grand Jacob, K.C.S.I., C.B.

10 The final orders to Colonel Jacob were not issued till the following day, as Lord Elphinstone wished, before their issue, to receive a reply to a telegram he had sent to Kolhapur. As no reply came, the orders were at once issued. "They were," writes Sir G. Le G. Jacob, "brief and satisfactory. I am aware," said Lord Elphinstone, "that in a crisis like this, a person on the spot ought to be the best judge of any action that might be at once necessary; to wait for orders may allow events to become too strong to master. I have confidence in your judgment; do your best to meet the present emergency, and rely on my full support." —Western India, by Sir G. Le G. Jacob.
Colonel Jacob set out at once, saw the Commander-in-Chief at Puna, pushed on, then, to Satarah, and found there a troop of horse artillery and dragoons. The rainy season was at its height, the track between Satarah and Kolhapur was composed of the black soil in which, during the monsoon, horses not infrequently sank up to their girths, and wheels to their axles; there were several rivers and streams un-bridged and un-fordable. Still, time was everything. Colonel Jacob then pushed on two guns with double allowance of men and horses, and riding forward himself with a few men of the Southern Maratha Horse, a loyal and capable regiment, reached Kolhapur on the 14th of August, just before midnight.

How, meanwhile, had matters been progressing in Kolhapur? There, according to all probabilities, there would have been little to check the victorious progress of the rebels. Thanks to their delays and to the prompt action of Colonel Maughan, it had happened otherwise. The sepoys, greedy of plunder, went first to pillage the treasury and sack the station. Then, and then only, did they make their way to the town, fully expecting to find its gates open. But Colonel Maughan had closed those gates. The sepoys, not caring to attempt to force them, took up a rather formidable position outside, close to the gates, in a small outwork where the Raja's horses and menagerie were kept. Here they maintained their position all night, repulsing Colonel Maughan in an attempt made by him to dislodge them.

It would seem that from this time the greater part of the regiment returned to its allegiance. This movement was probably hastened by the knowledge, brought to the sepoys by some of their still recalcitrant comrades, that the passes to the coast had been occupied by Europeans landed on the coast by the splendid exertions of the Indian Navy. This is certain, that the recalcitrant sepoys were checked in this way; that the greater number betook themselves to the jungles; whilst the minority, about forty in number, returning to Kolhapur, reoccupied the outwork close to the town. But the garrison of the town had in the meantime been reinforced. Lieutenant Kerr, of the Southern Marathi Horse, had marched a detachment of that regiment from Satarah—a distance of eighty-one miles—without a halt. The rebels were at once attacked, on the 10th of August, in their outwork, some of their own comrades joining in the attack. They made a desperate defence—but a secret entrance to the outwork having been pointed out to Lieutenant Kerr, that gallant officer dashed in, followed by horsemen whom he had caused to dismount, and fought his way to the interior of the building. At the same time, Lieutenant Innes, with a party of the 27th, took the rebels in the rear. These two attacks decided the affair; but so desperate had been the defence, that of the forty rebels three only escaped wounds or death.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11} \textit{Jacob's Western India}. Lieutenant Kerr received the Victoria Cross for his conduct on this occasion.
When, then, Colonel Le G. Jacob reached Kolhapur, he found that the mutiny had been quelled. Some forty of the most rebellious men of the 27th Native Infantry had been killed in fair fight; a larger number was in the jungles; but still the great bulk of the regiment was doing its duty, and there was no evidence against any man of it.

Three days after his arrival, Colonel Jacob was reinforced by the two horse-artillery guns he had sent on from Satgrah, and about a hundred men of the 2nd Europeans from the coast—the same who had so opportunely occupied the passes. With so small a force at his disposal, he felt it would be impossible to act against the insurgents unless he should decide, before acting, to disarm the regiment whose conduct had been so suspicious. On the one hand was the danger of his being attacked before his force should gather further strength, or of the mutineers marching away with their arms; on the other, the chance of the men who were still loyal, those of the local corps especially, yielding to the temptation to join their countrymen. It was a balance of risks and probabilities. Many men would have preferred to wait. But Jacob was, as I have said, a man of the old heroic type, and, feeling the importance of striking the first blow, he determined to disarm the men of the 27th Native Infantry.

He disarmed them on the morning of the 18th of August. Under his orders were twenty-five European gunners, with two guns and two howitzers; ninety men of the 2nd Europeans; one hundred and eighty men of the Southern Marathi, Horse; and three hundred and fifty men of the local corps. These were drawn up in a manner to command any movement tending to resistance on the part of the rebels.

But they made no resistance. They piled their arms in silence. The investigation which followed brought to light many hidden springs of the movement. It had been intended, it was discovered, to delay the mutiny till the 10th of August; but the action of the Jew native adjutant on the 31st of July, in sending away his family, aroused suspicion, and prompted a sudden and ill matured rising. This premature movement ruined the plot. Acting hurriedly and without concert with their brethren at Belgaon and Dharwar, the mutineers acted without plan or settled purpose. It required, then, only energy to baffle them, and that energy was conspicuous in the conduct of all the European officers concerned, in the conduct alike of Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, of Maughan, of Kerr, of Innes, in defence and attack, and of Colonel Jacob in striking the decisive blow.

I ask the reader to return with me now to Bombay. Until the approach of the great Muhammadan festival of the Muharram there had been no apprehensions of an outbreak in that city. The Superintendent of Police, Mr. Forjett, a gentleman who, born and bred in India, knew the natives thoroughly, had deemed it sufficient, when the news of the massacre of Kanpur reached Bombay, to obtain permission to incorporate into body of fifty mounted Europeans. He reasoned justly that as the Muhammadan population of the city exceeded a hundred and fifty thousand, it would be folly to trust implicitly to the fidelity of the native police.
It may be fitting to describe here the officers to whom was entrusted the direction of the civil and military forces, upon whose conduct depended the safety of the important town of Bombay at this critical juncture.

The commander of the military forces was Brigadier-General Shortt of the Bombay army. General Shortt was an officer of capacity and intelligence. He thoroughly understood the native soldier. He was quick to decide on an emergency and prompt to carry his decision into execution. In a word, he was an officer thoroughly to be depended upon in danger, a tower of strength to the Government in the crisis which was then impending.

The Superintendent of Police, Mr. C. Forjett, was one of the most remarkable men brought to the front by the events of 1857. I have already stated that he was born and bred in India. When the mutiny broke out, he was in the very prime of manhood. He was so thoroughly acquainted with all the dialects of all the languages of western and southern India, that it was easy for him to pass himself off as a native upon the most astute of natives. Mr. Forjett gave an extraordinary proof of this talent immediately prior to his nomination to the office of Superintendent of Police. He had gained so great a reputation for ability, tact, and judgment in the performance of his duties in the southern Maratha country, that in 1855 Lord Elphinstone sent for him to offer him the chief superintendence of police in Bombay. Mr. Forjett came to the presidency, saw Lord Elphinstone, and received the offer. He at once expressed his willingness to accept it, but requested that Lord Elphinstone would defer the nomination for a fortnight, so as to give him time to find out for himself the true character of the men he had been summoned to command. The request was at once granted. Mr. Forjett then disguised himself as a native and went to places haunted by the police, passing himself off as the son of a subadar in search of a girl whom he loved. He so completely deceived the natives that men of the highest caste invited him to eat with them. He found out the character, the secret longings, of the natives, who, in a few days, would be his instruments. Nor did he neglect the European police. His experience with them was remarkable. He tried them all, and not a single man amongst them refused the bribe he offered. At the end of the fortnight he presented himself to Lord Elphinstone, and took up the office. I leave the reader to imagine the consternation of his native subordinates when they learned whom it was whom they had now to serve.

But quickness, cleverness at disguise, readiness of resource, represented but a small part of Mr. Forjett's qualities. Small in person, endowed, His according to all appearance, with no great strength, he united the cool courage of a practiced warrior to remarkable powers of endurance. The courage was not merely the physical courage which despises

\[12\] I am happy to add that imperfect tense is used only historically. Mr. Forjett still lives in the vigor of the healthy life.
danger; it was that, and much more. It was a courage set into action by a brain cool and clear—so cool and so clear that there never was a crisis which could blind it, never a danger which it was unable to parry. I venture to describe it as the highest form of intellectual courage.

I have spoken of his powers of endurance. These were often tested in the southern Maratha country prior to 1855. If to ride a hundred miles a day, on dismounting to partake of a rude meal of the natural products of the country, and then to lie on the ground, with a bundle of grass for a pillow, in the morning to wash in the stream or in the water drawn from the well, and pursue a similar journey in a similar manner, if this be a test of endurance, then Mr. Forjett may claim to be a passed master in the art. If, to the qualities I have recorded, I add an upright mind, a lofty sense of honour, a devotion to duty, I present to the reader an accurate portrait of the Superintendent of Police of Bombay.

During the two years which had elapsed between his assumption of that office and the outbreak of the mutiny, Mr. Forjett had gained the complete confidence and esteem of Lord Elphinstone. Those who knew that high-minded noble are aware that he never bestowed his trust until he had assured himself by experience that the recipient was fully worthy of it.

There being thus two men so capable and in all respects so well qualified at the head of the departments regulating order, it would seem that the reprisal of disturbance in Bombay would be easy. But there were two causes which militated against such a conclusion. The first was the great disparity between the numbers of European and native troops. Whilst there were three native regiments, the 10th and 11th Native Infantry and the Marine Battalion, of the former there were but four hundred men. The other cause affected the concert between the heads of the two departments. General Shortt believed in the loyalty of his sepoys but mistrusted the native police. Mr. Forjett was confident that he could do what he would with the police, but mistrusted the sepoys. To use his own words, Mr. Forjett regarded the sepoys as "the only source of danger."

The festival of the Muharram was a festival of a character the most dangerous of all. It was a religious festival, lasting many days, the excitement of which increased with each day. Lord Elphinstone had confided to General Shortt the arrangements for preventing disturbance during the whole of the time it lasted. Granted one premiss—that the sepoys were absolutely loyal—those arrangements were perfect. Mr. Forjett, when informed of them, declined, without pledging himself to the contrary, to admit this premiss, and he informed Lord Elphinstone of his doubts. Lord Elphinstone replied that he was sorry he had not known of his objections before, but that it was now too late to alter them. I may here state that the arrangements made by General Shortt involved the division into very small bodies of the European force under the orders of Mr. Forjett.
The reply made by that gentleman to Lord Elphinstone's remark just referred to, is eminently characteristic. He intimated that he should, at all events, be obliged to disobey the orders of Government with respect to the police arrangements, because it was necessary for him to have them in hand in the event of a sepoy outbreak. "It is a very risky thing," replied Lord Elphinstone, "to disobey orders, but I am sure you will do nothing rash." Mr. Forjett construed this tacit permission in the sense in which it was doubtless intended.  

Five days of the festival passed without disorder. The next night would see its conclusion. On the eve of that night an incident, accidental in its cause, almost produced an outbreak. A Christian drummer belonging to the 10th Regiment Native Infantry, whilst in a state of intoxication, insulted the carriers of a Hindoo god which was being carried in procession by some townspeople, and knocked over the god. Two policemen, who witnessed the outrage, took the drummer into custody. It happened that the sepoys of the native regiments were possessed by an inner conviction that their loyalty was doubted by Forjett, and they replied to the feeling they thus imputed to him with one of hatred to himself and his subordinates. When, then, the men of the 10th heard that one of their comrades, albeit a Christian, caught in the act of offering an insult to a Hindu god, had been taken into custody by the police, some twenty of them turned out, broke into the lockup, rescued the drummer, assaulted the policemen, and marched them off as prisoners to their lines. The European constable of the section at once proceeded with four native policemen to the lines, and demanded the liberation of their comrades. The demand was not only refused, but the new-comers were assaulted by the sepoys, and, after a conflict, in which two of the assailants were left for dead, and others were wounded, they were forced to retire. The excitement in the sepoy lines, increasing every moment, received a further impetus from this retirement, and the sepoys began to turn out in such numbers that a messenger was sent at full speed to Mr. Forjett, with the information that the native regiments had broken out.

This was the one danger which Mr. Forjett had all along dreaded, and against which he had taken every precaution possible under the circumstances, already noted, of his limited sphere of action. He had, that is to say, disobeyed orders, and massed his European policemen. On receiving the news that the sepoys had broken out, Mr. Forjett ordered the European police to follow him as soon as possible, and galloped down to their lines at so great a speed as to outstrip rives alone. all his attendants. He found the sepoys in a state of tumult, endeavoring to force their way out of the lines, their European officers, with drawn swords, keeping them back. The sight of Mr. Forjett inflamed the sepoys still more. Fury of the They called out loudly that this was the man who had wished them all to be killed, while the European officers, seeing how the presence of Mr. Forjett excited their men, begged him in earnest language to go away.

13 "Happy was it for Bombay, happy for western India, and happy probably for India itself," wrote Mr. Forjett, reviewing at a later period these events, "that one so noble and clear headed as Lord Elphinstone was Governor of Bombay during the period of the mutiny."
The fate of Bombay at that moment hung upon the conduct, at this critical conjuncture, of Mr. Forjett. Such are Asiatics, that had that gentleman obeyed the calls of the officers, the sepoys would have burst the bonds of discipline and dashed forward to pursue him. He was there, alone, seated on his horse, calmly daring them. His knowledge of natives made him feel that so long as he should remain there, facing and defying them, they would not move; but that a retrograde movement on his part would be the signal for a real outbreak. In reply, then, to the shouts of the officers and men of the native regiments, Mr. Forjett called out to the former, "If your men are bent on mischief, the sooner it is over the better," and remained facing them. Two minutes later his assistant, Mr. Edington, galloped up, followed very shortly by fifty-five European policemen—the men he had kept massed in case of a disturbance. Then Mr. Forjett acted. Forming up and halting his men, he called out, "Throw open the gates; I am ready for the sepoys." Again was displayed that complete acquaintance with the Asiatic character which was one of the secrets of Mr. Forjett's power. The excitement of the sepoys subsided as if by magic, and they fell back within their lines. Never had a nobler deed been more nobly done!

The tide now turned. The evil-disposed amongst the sepoys—and that many were evil-disposed subsequent revelations fully proved—were completely cowed. Nevertheless, Mr. Forjett relaxed not one of his exertions. The Muharram was not yet a thing of the past, and it was clear that an accident might yet kindle the mine. One night still remained, and Mr. Forjett, far from relaxing his precautions, bent himself to increase them. He so posted his police that the smallest movement upon the part of the sepoys would at once become known to the main body of his Europeans, forty-eight in number, located at a decisive point. His precautions were not only successful, they were the cause of success. To borrow the language, subsequently revealed, of the baffled conspirators, "it was the vigilance maintained that prevented the outbreak." The vigilance was the vigilance of the police personally directed by Mr. Forjett.14

14 Mr. Forjett's great services were not left unacknowledged. On the 19th of June 1858, Lord Elphinstone thus recorded his sense of their value:—The Right Honorable the Governor in Council cannot too highly praise the devoted zeal of this excellent public servant, upon whom such grave responsibilities were imposed during last year. Referring to Mr. Forjett's very valuable services in the detection of the plot in Bombay in 1857, the same high authority thus wrote: "His duties demanded great courage, great acuteness, and great judgment, all of which qualities were conspicuously displayed by Mr. Forjett at that trying period." All classes combined to testify to the great services rendered on this occasion by Mr. Forjett. Couchèd in varying phraseology, every letter received from the members of the European community indicates that, in the opinion of the several writers, it was the vigilance of Mr. Forjett which saved Bombay. I may add here that, for his services in the mutiny, the European and Native communities in Bombay presented Mr. Forjett with addresses, and, with the sanction of the Government, with testimonials and purses to the value of three thousand eight hundred and fifty pounds. It was still more gratifying to him that, after he had left the service and quitted India, the native cotton merchants sent him a handsome address and a purse of one thousand five hundred pounds, in token of strong gratitude for one whose almost despotic powers and zealous energy had so quelled the explosive forces of native society, that they seem to have become permanently subdued. In addition, and likewise after he left India, the shareholders of a company, mainly composed of natives, presented Mr. Forjett with shares, which they subsequently sold on his account, for thirteen thousand five hundred and eighty pounds.
I have already stated that, thanks to the precautions taken and to Mr. Forjett's energetic action, the festival of the Muharram had passed off quietly. The discontented men amongst the sepoys still, however, cherished the hope that another opportunity more favorable to the execution of their projects would soon arise. The Hindu festival of the occurring towards the end of October, seemed to them to offer such an opportunity. During this festival the Hindus of the upper and wealthier classes are accustomed to collect all their wealth in one room of their dwelling, and assembling, to worship it. The discontented sepoys resolved, in many a secret council, to break out during the Diwali, to pillage Bombay, killing all who should oppose them, and then to march out of the island. Had this plan been carried out, it is nearly certain that the contagion would have spread all over the presidency, and have even reached Madras.

But again had the mutineers to reckon with Mr. Forjett. That gentleman was informed by detective that suspicious meetings were being held by disaffected sepoys at the house of one Ganga Parshad. Attempts to introduce a confidential agent of the police into those meetings having been baffled by the precautions of the sepoys, Mr. Forjett had Ganga Parshad conveyed to the police-office during the night, and obtained from him a complete revelation. Fertile in disguises, Mr. Forjett subsequently became an eyewitness—by means of holes made in the wall which separated the chamber where the conspirators assembled from the ante-room—of the proceedings of the sepoys, a listener to their conversation. More than that, aware of the feeling prevailing amongst the officers regarding himself, he induced Major Barrow, the officer commanding the Marine battalion, to accompany him, on four different occasions, to the meetings. The information there obtained was duly reported to General Shortt by Major Barrow, and to Lord Elphinstone, through his private secretary, by Mr. Forjett. Courts-martial were in due course convened. The proceedings resulted in sentences of death being passed and executed on two, of transportation for life on six, native soldiers of various ranks. But the projected mutiny was nipped in the bud.

With the story of the measures taken for the safety of Bombay closes the general sketch of events in the western Presidency up to the close of 1857. We have seen how, displaying at once a rare foresight and a remarkable self-reliance, Lord Elphinstone had denuded his own Presidency of European troops in order to crush the mutiny beyond its borders. No man in high position recognized more truly, and acted more conscientiously, on the maxim that the art of war consists in concentrating the greatest number of troops on the decisive point of the action. Now, the decisive point of the action in the early days of the revolt of 1857 was not in Bombay. To Lord Elphinstone it

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15 Major Barrow's astonishment when he saw some of his own men in Ganga Parshad's house was remarkable. He exclaimed, My God, my own men! Is it possible! And his memorable words to me at the court-martial were: "It is well I was present and saw and heard them myself, but for which I should have been here, not as a witness for the prosecution, but as one for the defence; such was my confidence in these men."—Forjett's Our Real Danger in India.
was clear that Dehli could only be reached from Bengal, and that it was just possible he might save central India and Rajputana. Whilst, then, he sent every available European soldier to Calcutta, he formed, from the small remnant which was left, a number in reality not sufficient for his own needs—one column which should march on Mau, another which should restore order in Rajputana. Feeling that amidst the many dangers which threatened him the most fatal was that which would come from without, he sent to meet and to crush it before it should penetrate within. His defence of Bombay was an aggressive defence. It was a policy requiring rare courage, immense confidence in his own judgment, and great resolution. In carrying it out he exposed himself to the danger, only one degree less, of a rising within the Presidency. How nearly that was occurring I have shown in these pages. The southern Maratha country was saved, in 1857, partly by the prudence and the judgment displayed by Mr. G. B. Seton-Karr, aided by the energy of General Lester, partly by the bungling and want of concert of the conspirators. How Bombay was saved I have just told. The reader will have seen that the danger was real, the peril imminent, that but for the unlimited confidence placed by Lord Elphinstone in Mr. Forjett—a man of his own selection—it might have culminated in disaster. That he dared that risk to avert a greater danger is one of the many proofs of Lord Elphinstone's capacity. Sufficient credit has never been given to him for his noble, his far-seeing, his self-denying policy. In the presence of the massacres of Keinhpur and of Jhansi, of the defence of Lakhnao, and of the siege of Dehli, the attitude of Lord Elphinstone, less sensational though not less heroic, has been overlooked. Had there been an uprising attended with slaughter in Bombay, the story of its repression and the deeds of velour attending that repression would have circulated throughout the land. Instead of that, we see only calm judgment and self-reliance meeting one danger and defying another, carefully selecting the most experienced instruments, and by their aid preventing a calamity so threatening that, if it had been met by men less tried and less worthy of confidence, it must have culminated in disaster. It is an attitude which gains from being contemplated, which impresses the student of history, in an ever-increasing degree, with admiration of the noble character of the man whose calm trust in himself made possible the success of the policy he alone inaugurated.
ASIRGARH is a very famous fort, lying two hundred and ninety miles to the north-east of Bombay, one hundred and fifty miles from Maligam, and ninety-nine miles to the south-east of Mau. It is built on an isolated hill, detached from the Satpura range dividing the valley of the Tapti from that of the Narbada. It has a history which has sent its name through the length and breadth of India. Alike in the times of the Hindoo, of the Muhammadan, and of the British over lordship, it has been considered a place worth fighting for. After many changes of masters, it surrendered, on the 9th of April 1819, after a vigorous resistance, to a British force commanded by Brigadier-General Doveton, and it has, ever since; remained in the occupation of a British garrison.

In 1857 that garrison consisted of a wing of the 6th Regiment Gwaliar Contingent, lent by the Bengal Presidency to replace the 19th Bombay Native Infantry ordered on service to Persia, but which never embarked for that country. The commanding officer of the garrison was Colonel Le Mesurier, and the Fort Adjutant was Lieutenant John Gordon of the 19th Bombay Native Infantry.

The hill on the summit of which Asirgarh is perched rises abruptly to about five hundred feet above the jungle. Below it is a town of no real importance, inhabited by villagers mainly engaged in tending their flocks.

The men who formed the garrison of Asirgarh belonged to a contingent which speedily asserted its right to a prominent place amongst the mutineers. The events at Nimach and at Gwaliar seedily convinced the European residents at Asirgarh that their guardians were not to be trusted. Even before this discovery had been made, the fort adjutant, distrust ing their demeanor, had enlisted some ninety men from the villagers of the town, and had charged them with the task of watching the behavior of the sepoys. These men were known as Gordon's Volunteers.

On the 19th of June the Europeans of the garrison heard of the mutinies at Nimach and Nasirabad. From that day almost every post brought them distressful tidings. Every precaution was taken by Lieutenant Gordon. To relieve the fort, by fair means, of a portion of its real enemies, one company of the regiment was detached to Burhanpur, twelve miles distant. The anxieties of the ladies of the garrison were lessened about the same time by the intelligence, verified by a personal visit made by Lieutenant Gordon,
that Captain Keatinge, the political agent for that part of the country, had fortified a position fourteen miles distant from Asirgarh.

From this time till the end of July good and bad news succeeded each other with strange rapidity. At times the Europeans were in great danger. The company sent to Burhanpur mutinied, marched on Asirgarh, and was only prevented from entering it by the havildar-major of the regiment, whose loyalty had been appealed to, not in vain, by Lieutenant Gordon.

The following morning the four remaining companies obeyed, not without murmuring, the order given to them to march out and encamp below the fort, their places within being taken by Gordon's Volunteers. The next day a party of Bhil infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Birch, surprised and disarmed the Burhanpur mutineers, and carried their arms into Asirgarh. A few hours later that place was reinforced by two companies of the 19th Native Infantry under Captain Blair. The disarming of the Gwari men outside the fort—a work performed admirably and without bloodshed by Captain Blair and Lieutenant Gordon—completed the necessary measures to ensure the safety of the fortress pending the arrival of Colonel Stuart's column.

That column, the earlier movements of which I have recorded in the preceding chapter, quitted Aurangabad for Asirgarh on the 12th of July. Marching rapidly, it reached Burhanpur on the 21st and Asirgarh on the 22nd idem. Here it was joined by Colonel Durand, who had reached Asirgarh some days previously.

In another part of this history I have shown how Durand, after the catastrophe of Mau, had fallen back on Sihor; how, staying there only one day, he had set out for Hoshangabad on the southern bank of the Narbada, in the hope of being able to communicate there with General Woodburn; how, hearing at Hoshangabad of the safety of Mau, he heard also of the attempts made to change the direction of Woodburn's force from the line of the Narbada to Nagpar; how, not content with simply protesting against such a line of conduct, he had set off for Aurangabad with the intention of enforcing his arguments there, and, if necessary, of pressing on to Bombay; how, on his road, he received the gratifying intelligence that Woodburn's column, now commanded by Stuart, was advancing towards Asirgarh; how he had at once hurried to that place. He had the gratification of meeting that force on the 22nd of July. From the moment of his joining it, he assumed his position as the Governor-General's representative, and became likewise, in everything but in name, the real leader of the column.

The column pushed on for Mau on the 24th with all practicable expedition. On the 28th it joined by the 3rd Regiment Cavalry, Haidarabad Contingent, under the command of Captain S. Orr. On the 31st it ascended the Simrol pass, is halted on its summit to allow

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16 Now Colonel Keatinge, V.C.
the artillery to close up, and the following morning marched into Mau. The weather for the time of the year, the height of the monsoon, had been exceptionally fine; no rain had fallen to hinder the march of the guns over the sticky black soil. On the night of the 1st of August, however, the weather changed. Heavy rains set in and continued throughout August and September. But Durand was now at Mau, within thirteen and a half miles of the capital whence the mutinous conduct of Holkar's troops had forced him to retire just one month before. He had returned to vindicate British authority, to punish the guilty, to give an example which should not be forgotten.

Even before he had marched into Mau, whilst Durand was yet halted on the top of the Simrol pass, Durand had received a message from the Indian Darbar. Maharaja Holkar and his minister sent to inform him that they were still in a state of alarm as to the conduct of their own troops, and to inquire whether aid could not be afforded to them. Durand replied that he was ready, if the Maharaja wished it, to march with the entire force into Indur instead of into Mau. Apparently, this was not the end desired by the Darbar, for the messengers at once withdrew their requisition.

In deciding to march on Mau instead of Indur, Durand was mainly influenced by the fact that at the latter place there was no accommodation for European troops. He had with him, indeed, no European infantry, but four companies of the 86th were marching up by the Bombay road, and would join in a few days. It was desirable also, after the events which had occurred, that the Indur rabble should see in the British force the white faces of the unvanquished foot soldiers of England. Durand marched then on Mau.

The four companies of the 86th having joined a few days later, the propriety of marching on Indur to punish Holkar's guilty troops and the townspeople who had abetted the revolt again became a question for Durand's consideration. It was a very difficult question. That Holkar's troops had attacked the Residency on the 1st of July was a fact admitted by everyone. But Holkar had asserted that this act had been committed without his sanction or authority. Durand himself never believed this; but officers who had occupied the Mau fort in July, notably Captain Hungerford, had been penetrated with the conviction that Holkar was innocent, and, in his letters to Durand, Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, had insisted on the same view. Under these circumstances Durand, duly weighing the difficulties presented by the case, deemed it advisable to defer all action, so far as Holkar was personally concerned, until he should become acquainted with the views of the Governor-General regarding him. He accordingly made a complete reference on the subject to Lord Canning.

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17 The force consisted of five troops 14th Light Dragoons, 3rd Cavalry Haidarabad Contingent, one horse battery of European artillery, the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, and a pontoon train.
Holkar, on his part, was naturally anxious to delay Durand's action as long as he could. He knew that, in his heart, Durand had condemned him. And, although it was well known that, in the excited state of native feeling throughout the country, he could not depend on the conduct of his own troops, and would have been glad to see them coerced by the British, yet, when he thought of the possible results of such action, he inclined to prefer the uncertainty of his actual condition. Could he, he felt, but stave off the critical moment for a few months, Durand would be relieved by Sir Robert Hamilton, and Sir Robert Hamilton, an old and much-regarded friend, would, he felt confident, accept explanations regarding the events of the 1st of July which Durand would utterly contemn.

The question of disarming Holkar's revolted troops, whilst the personal case regarding Holkar was still pending, opened out difficulties of another description. The force at the disposal of Durand was small, and, though sufficient to dispose of the revolted troops of Indur, could these be encountered en masse, it was scarcely large enough to attack its several component parts in detail, holding the bulk in check whilst portion after portion should be destroyed. It must always be remembered, writing of this period, that the revolt had at that time nowhere received a serious check. The force before Dehli was almost as much besieged as besieging. Lakhnao was supposed to be at its last gasp; Havelock had made no impression upon Oudh; Bihar was surging with mutineers. The disaffected in central India might, then, well be excused if, regarding all these points, they were not only hopeful, but confident that resolute resistance on their part would serve the cause which they now regarded as the common cause of their co-religionists throughout India. Under these circumstances, it was to be apprehended that Holkar's troops, the three arms of which, each superior in numbers to the entire British force, were located in separate cantonments, might evince a strong disinclination to be disarmed; and that, morally supported as they were by a large party in the city of Indur, and, as I shall presently show, by a strongly aggressive party in the districts lying between Indur and Nimach, they might offer a resistance certain to entail great loss on the attacking party, and to cripple its future movements. This will be clear to the reader when, recalling the composition of the force at the disposal of Durand, extremely weak in infantry, he calls to mind that a rainy season of unusual force was at its height, that the roads could be traversed by guns only with the greatest difficulty, that the bridges in many places had been carried away, and that any military operation against the several cantonments occupied by Holkar's troops would have to be carried out on a swampy plain, on which, at that season of the year, it would be impossible for the three arms to work together.

But there were other reasons which impressed Durand with the necessity of dealing in the first instance with those rebels in the districts, of whose aggressive tendencies I have just spoken.
Mandisur is a large and important town on a tributary of the river Chambal, about one hundred and twenty miles from Indur. In the month of July this place had been occupied by some of Sindia's revolted troops, and these had been joined, and were being constantly further strengthened, by Afghan, Mekrani, and Mewati levies. In August the insurrection at Mandisur threatened not only to embrace all western Malwa, but Nimach as well. Impressed with a confidence in themselves, justified only by the prolonged immunity which had been allowed them, the rebels at this place began, in the month of August, to display an aggressive temper far more dangerous than the sullen disaffection of the compromised troops of Holkar. The more active and daring of the mutineers of Holkar's army had proceeded to Gwaliar after the insurrection of the 1st of July; the less energetic mass remained, sullen, dangerous, watching events, but to a certain extent paralyzed, though not controlled, by the English party in power at Holkar's court. The progress of the Mandisur insurrection was, however, so rapid that to uphold British supremacy in Rajputana and Maawa, and to maintain the line of the Narbada, it became absolutely necessary to check its growth with the utmost promptitude. In the presence of this new danger, the disarming of Holkar's troops became, in every sense, a matter of secondary importance. An attempt to subdue the lesser evil might have augmented the greater, whilst a decisive blow struck at the greater could not fail to be fatal to the lesser.

Action in any shape was impossible so long as the heavy rains continued. But when, in the beginning of October, the monsoon passed away, and the country began to dry up, the Mandisur rebels began to give proof of the possession of the aggressive nature with which I have credited them.

The leader of the Mandisur insurgents was Firoz Shah, a Shahzada or prince connected with the imperial family of Dehli. It was estimated in September that some fifteen thousand men with sixteen or eighteen guns, had rallied round his standard, and this estimate was subsequently found to have been below the actual number. To meet these, Durand, after deducting the sick and wounded, and a sufficient number of men to guard Mau, could not bring into the field more than one thousand five hundred men and nine guns.

Under these circumstances it was perhaps fortunate that the aggressive movement was made by the rebels. Durand expected it. Towards the very end of September he had intercepted letters from Haidarabad, from Nagpur, from Surat, from Ujjren, from Gwaliar, and from Mandisur, all telling the same tale. The tale was to the effect that,

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18 Thus composed: Artillery, one hundred and seventy; Dragoons, two hundred; 86th, two hundred and thirty; 25th Bombay Native Infantry, three hundred and fifty; 3rd Nizam's Cavalry, three hundred and fifty.
after the conclusion of the Dasahra festival, a general rising would take place in Malwa, and that influential personages were coming from Nagpur and Haidarabad for the purpose of giving life and strength to the insurrection. The close of the Dasahra corresponded with the setting in of the dry season. The result corresponded with the information Durand had thus obtained. Early in October the Shahzada's troops, who had previously occupied Dhar and Amjhera, advanced to the Bombay road and threatened to interrupt Durand's communications with Bombay, to command the line of the Narbada along the Bombay frontier, and to attack Nimach. They sent also a pressing invitation to Holkar's troops to join them.

Everything depended upon the rapidity with which Durand would be able to strike a blow at this enemy. Failing it, it was quite possible that Nana Sahib, who at that time was hovering in the vicinity of Kalpi, might transfer the whole of his troops to central India, and that the Maratha, war-cry might raise the whole of the country formerly acknowledging the supremacy of the Peshwa. Seeing the necessity, Durand struck. On the 12th of October he detached one body of Haidarabad cavalry to defend Mandisur, threatened by the rebels, and another to the village of Grajrl to intercept them on their way. On the 14th he sent three companies of the 25th Native Infantry and some dragoons to support this last-named party, and on the 19th, with all the men who could be spared from forming the garrison of Mau, he marched for Dhar.

Anand Rao Puar, a lad of thirteen years, had succeeded to the chiefship of Dhar on the death of his brother, cut off by cholera on the 23rd of May 1857. His minister, Ramchandar Bapoji, a shrewd and intelligent man, who, from his thorough knowledge of the English and from his large acquaintance with British officers, was supposed to be devoted to British interests, began, almost immediately after his assumption of office, to pursue a line of policy the very reverse of that which had been hoped from him. In direct opposition to the policy pursued by the Government of India ever since the settlement of Malwa, to prevent the employment of mercenary troops in native states, this man began to enlist large numbers of Arabs, Afghans, and Mekranis. As soon as the news of the Indur rising of the 1st of July reached Dhar, a party of these mercenaries, four hundred in number, joined with the mercenaries of the raja of Amjhera, and plundered the stations of Bhopaor and Sirdarpur, burning the hospitals over the heads of the sick and wounded. Returning to Dhar with their plunder, they were met and honorably received by Bhim Rao Bhonsla, the young raja's uncle, and three of the guns which they had captured were placed in the raja's palace. On the 31st of August they were in possession of the fort of Dhar, with or without the consent of the Darbar was

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19 A festival of ten days' duration, nine of which are spent in worship and religious ceremonies. The tenth day is the birthday of Ganga (the Ganges). Whoever bathes in the Ganges on that day is purified from ten sorts of sins. The festival occurs in September or October, the date varying with each year.

20 The formal recognition by the British Government only reached the young chief on the 28th of September, but he was acknowledged and treated as Raja from the date stated.
not certainly known. But on the 15th of October Captain Hutchinson, the political agent, reported that there was strong reason to believe that the raja's mother and uncle and the members of the Darbar were the instigators of the rebellion of the Dhar troops, that the conduct of the Darbar was suspicious, that its agent had purposely deceived him regarding the negotiations entered into by its members with the mutinous mercenaries and the number of men they had enlisted, and that it had received with attention and civility emissaries from Mandisur, the centre of the Muhammadan rising. It was this intelligence which decided Durand to dismiss the Dhar agent in attendance on him, with a message to the Darbar that its members would be held strictly responsible for all that had happened or that might happen, and to dispatch all his available troops to attack Dhar.

On the 22nd of October the British force arrived before Dhar. The Arab and Mekrani levies who garrisoned that fort gave a signal instance of the confidence engendered by the long compulsory inaction of the British by quitting the protection of their lines of defence and coming to attack them in the open. Planting three brass guns on a hill south of the fort, they extended from that point along its eastern face in skirmishing order, and advanced boldly against the British.

But their confidence soon vanished. The 25th Bombay Native Infantry, a splendid regiment, often to be mentioned, and always with honor, in these pages, led by their most capable commandant, Major Robertson, charged the three guns, captured them, and turned the guns on the rebels. Almost simultaneously, the four companies of the 86th and the sappers, flanked by Woolcombe's (Bombay) and Hungerford's (Bengal) batteries, advanced against the centre, whilst the cavalry threatened both flanks, the dragoons, under Captain Gall, the left, the Nizam's cavalry, under Major Orr, the right. Baffled in their advance by the action of the 25th, and the play of the British guns on their centre, the enemy made a rapid movement to their left, and attempted to turn the British right. The dragoons, led by Gall, and the Nizam's cavalry, led by Orr and Macdonald, Deputy Quartermaster-General of the force, charged them so vigorously that they retired into the fort, leaving forty bodies of their companions on the field. On the British side three dragoons and one native trooper were wounded, a jemadar and native trooper were killed.

The fort was now invested, but the British force had to wait for the siege guns, expected on the 24th. They arrived on the evening of that day; the next morning they were placed in position.

The fort of Dhar is entirely detached from the town of the same name. Its southern angle rests on the suburbs, the road running between. It is situated on an eminence of thirty feet above the surrounding plain, and is built of red granite, in an oblong shape,

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21 Durand repeated this warning to the Raja in person during the siege of the fort.
conforming itself to the hill on which it stands. The walls are about thirty feet in height, and have at intervals fourteen circular and two square towers.

On the 25th a sandbag battery, two thousand yards south of the fort, armed with one 8-inch howitzer and one 8-inch mortar, began to shell the fort. Under cover of this fire the infantry pushed on to a low ridge, about two hundred and fifty yards from the southern angle of the fort, forming a natural parallel, and took possession of it. On this the breaching battery was at once constructed. Simultaneously, strong cavalry and infantry pickets were thrown out on the north and east faces of the fort, whilst the west face was covered by an extensive tank or lake which could not be forded. Durand was in hopes that the rebels, seeing themselves thus surrounded, would spontaneously surrender. But although, during the six days the siege lasted, they made many efforts to obtain aid from outside, acting and writing in the name of the Darbar, under whose orders they professed to be defending the fort, they waited until, on the night of the 29th, the breach had been made so large that its practicability was only a question of a day or two, ere they sent a white flag to inquire the terms which would be granted. "An unconditional surrender," was the reply, upon which the firing continued.

At sunset on the 31st the breach was reported practicable, and that night a storming party was detailed to assault the place. Never was a task easier. The breach was easily ascended. Almost immediately afterwards firing was heard on the plain. Whilst dragoons and irregulars were dispatched in that direction, the storming party entered the fort. It was empty.

In fact the rebels, foreseeing the assault, had quitted the fort by the main gate between 9 and 11 o'clock, and escaped in the direction of the north-west. The firing heard on the plain at the moment the breach was entered was only a skirmish with the rear-guard of the retreating enemy and an outlying picket of the 3rd Nizam's cavalry. The main body had passed by them and the dragoons wholly unobserved, and were well away before the alarm could be of any avail. Pursuit, though it could scarcely avail much, was attempted. It resulted, however, only in the capture of a few wretched stragglers.

Durand ordered the fort of Dhar to be demolished, the state to be attached, pending the final orders of Government, and charges to be prepared against the leaders and instigators of the rebellion. The force then continued its march through western

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23 It had unfortunately happened that the European pickets, which had be, a there for some days and which knew the ground well, had been changed that very day. The trooper, sent by the jemadar of the native picket, fell with his horse on the way, and was disabled. — Lewe.

24 Ultimately, owing to circumstances upon which it is unnecessary for me to enter here, they all escaped punishment. To the young Raja himself, merciful consideration was shown, and he was restored to his title and position.
Malwa towards Mandisur, pursuit of the rebels. These latter, however, had by no means renounced their aggressive tendencies. On the 8th of November they attacked the cantonment of Mahidsur, garrisoned by a native contingent of the three arms, officered by English officers. Major Timmins, who commanded the contingent, imprudently permitted the rebels, without offering opposition, to take up a strong position close round his guns and infantry. The men of the contingent, on their side, displayed mingled cowardice and treachery, the majority eventually going over to the rebels. Half a troop of the cavalry behaved, however, extremely well, and, after making a gallant but ineffective charge, in which their leader, Captain Mills, was shot dead, and their native officer severely wounded, escorted the remainder of their European officers to Durand's camp, where they arrived on the 9th.

Two other affairs, which occurred during the pursuit of the rebels to Mandisur deserve here to be recorded. The first was the capture and destruction of the fort of Amjhera by a small party of Haidarabad cavalry and infantry under Lieutenant Hutchinson. There was, indeed, no opposition, but the fact of the occupation was satisfactory, as it proved that Durand's rapid action had saved the line of the Narbada, and had maintained that barrier between the blazing north and the shouldering south.

The other action was one in which Major Orr and the Haidarabad Contingent was prominently engaged.

I have already stated how one regiment of the Haidarabad Contingent had joined Brigadier Stuart's force on its march from Aurangabad. The remaining cavalry of the contingent and a large force of its infantry and artillery, had, about the same time, been formed at Edlabad, one of the chief outlets of the Dekhan, on the high road to central India. Here they remained until the monsoon had ceased and the roads had begun to dry up. They then marched with all speed into Malwri, and coercing on their way the refractory zamindars of Pipliah and Rigugarh, reached Durand's force before Dhar.

Upon the news reaching camp of the successful action of the rebels at Mahidpur, Major Orr, with a small force, consisting of three hundred and thirty-seven sabres drawn from the 1st, 3rd, and 4th regiments Nizam's cavalry, was sent to follow on their track. The second morning after he had left camp, Orr, having marched some sixty miles, arrived before Mahidpur. There he learned that the rebels had left the place the same morning, carrying with them all the guns, stores, and ammunition upon which they could lay hand. Orr stopped to water and feed his horses, and whilst thus halting had the gratification to receive Mrs. Timmins, the wife of the commandant already mentioned, who had been unable to effect her escape with her husband. Having dispatched that lady under a sufficient escort to rejoin her husband, Orr followed the rebels, and after a

25 This lady had been concealed by a faithful tailor, who frustrated all the efforts of the rebels to discover her hiding-place.
pursuit of twelve miles came up with their rear-guard, about four hundred and fifty men with two guns, about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, at the village of Rawal. They were prepared to receive him. They had taken up a very formidable position, especially calculated to resist cavalry, their right resting on the village, and their front covered by a muddy nullah or rivulet. Occupying this position they hoped effectually to cover the retreat of their main body, conveying their stores, their ammunition, and the spoils of Mahidpur. But they had not counted on the gallant spirit of their enemy. Orr and his officers, Abbott, Johnstone, Clark, Murray, and Samwell, led their men forward, crossed the nullah, charged the guns, and then fought hand to hand with the enemy. The contest was desperate and continued till the sun went down. Then the rebels gave way, and all their guns, eight in number, and stores, fell into the hands of the victors. The nature of the engagement may be gathered from the fact that the British lost nearly one hundred men killed and wounded. Amongst the latter was Lieutenant Samwell, shot through the abdomen. The rebels lost one hundred and seventy-five killed, and some seventy taken prisoners.

When the dispatch containing the account of this affair reached Durand, he handed it over to Major Gall to read to the 14th Dragoons and 86th Foot. By these men it was heard with more than satisfaction, for it dissipated any doubt which might have been caused by the escape of the garrison of Dhar.

Durand now pushed on as fast as the baggage-carts and the roads would permit him, and on the 19th of November reached Hernia on the banks of the river Chambal. The crossing of this river, unopposed as it was, presented no inconsiderable difficulties. Its banks are rugged and almost perpendicular, its stream is deep and rapid, and its bed is broken by enormous boulders of basalt. The baggage of the force was carried almost entirely on carts drawn by bullocks, a few camels only having been obtainable, and to convey these carts and the artillery guns across a river presenting the difficulties I have described would, under no circumstances, have been an easy task. That the rebels, hitherto so aggressive, should have neglected the opportunity thus offered to them adds another to the many proofs in which this history abounds, that brave as they were in fight, they understood little of the art of war. As it was, nearly two days were spent in effecting the passage, nor was this possible until the sappers had cut a road down the bank for the artillery and carts, and another up the opposite bank.²⁶

²⁶ "I never saw a more animated and beautiful picture in my life than when our brigade crossed this river. The steep, verdant, shrubby banks, covered with our varied forces, elephants, camels, horses, and bullocks; the deep flowing clear river, reaching on and on to the tar east, to the soft deep-blue tufted horizon; the babble and yelling of men, the lowing of the cattle, the grunting screams of the camels, and the trumpeting of the wary, heavily-laden elephant; the rattle of our artillery down the bank, through the river, and up the opposite side; the splashing and plunging of our cavalry through the stream—neighing and eager for the green encamping ground before them; and everybody so busy and jovial, streaming up from the deep water to their respective grounds; and all this in the face, almost, of an enemy, formed a tableau vivant never to be forgotten." — Lowe's Campaign in Central India.
The column halted the afternoon of the 20th on the east bank of the Chambal, and marching early the following morning, encamped four miles south of Mandisur, in a position covered to the front by some rising ground, flanked on the left by a little village and gardens, beyond which again were several large topes, some cultivated ground, and another village surrounded by gardens and trees. On the right of the British position were hills and villages, and between these and the rising ground in front already referred to was an extensive plateau, covered here and there with acres of uncut grain. Beyond it, again, the city of Mandistir. A reconnaissance having indicated that all was quiet in front, the camp was pitched, and the men went to their breakfasts.

But the rebels were again in an aggressive humor. Rumours had been industriously spread in their ranks that the British force had been repulsed from Dhar and, in sheer desperation, was now meditating an attack on Mandisur. The leaders knew better, but they used all their efforts to give currency to the story. Consequently, about midday on the 22nd, the rebels, confident that they had before them only a dispirited and beaten column, sallied forth from Mandisur, and, marching gaily, took possession of the village surrounded by trees and gardens beyond the extreme left of the British line, and making that village their extreme right, occupied, with two considerable masses, the plateau connecting it with Mandisur.

The men in the British camp were at their breakfasts when the news of the rebel movement reached them. Instantly they fell in, and the line formed; the dragoons on the extreme right, the Nizam's horse on the extreme left, Hungerford's and Woolicome's batteries forming the right-centre, the bullock battery of the Haidarabad the left centre, the 86th and 25th Bombay Native Infantry the centre, and the Haidarabad infantry with the Madras Sappers on the left of the Haidarabad guns, opposite the village occupied by the rebels. The British guns at once opened fire; and Woolcombe's guns, pointed by Lieutenant Strutt, to be again mentioned in these pages, firing very true, the rebels wavered. An advance of the Haidarabad troops converted their wavering into flight. The cavalry then pursued and cut up a number of them. The remainder escaped into the city.

The next day, the 22nd, Durand crossed to the right bank of the Mandistir river and encamped to the west of the town within two thousand yards of the suburbs. His object was to gain a position whence he could threaten Mandisur with one hand, and the rebel force, which had occupied Nimach, and which, he had learned from spies, was now

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27 Lowe.

28 "Lieutenant Strutt's shooting was very true. All the while this firing was going on at the village, a fine fellow, dressed in white, with a green flag, coolly walked out from the cover, and sauntered leisurely along the whole line of our guns, while round shot and shell were whizzing about him in awful proximity. He occasionally stooped down but never attempted to run; he then quietly retraced his steps, when a shot from Lieutenant Strutt struck him just before he regained the village."—Lowe’s Central India.
hastening to the aid of their comrades, on the other. A cavalry reconnaissance showed the Nimach rebels to be in considerable force in the village of Goraria, on the high road to that place.

In that direction, then, Durand moved on the 24th. After a march of three miles, he espied the rebels about a mile distant, their right resting on the village, their centre on a long hill, and their left well covered by fields of uncut grain, with broken ground and nullahs in their front, full of water and mud.

The British guns, opening out on the rebels, soon overcame the fire of their five field-pieces, and forced their line to fall back. They clung, however, with great pertinacity to the village of Goraria, and on this, retiring from the centre and left, they fell back very slowly. Whilst the British were endeavoring to drive them from this position, a strong party sallied from Mandisur and attacked the rear. They were driven back after a very sharp contest by the Nizam's horse and the dragoons. In front, however, the British could make no impression on the village. The brigadier detailed the 86th and 25th Bombay Native Infantry to carry it with the bayonet, but the fire from it was so fierce that he countermanded the order, preferring to reduce it with his guns. When night fell the rebels still occupied Goraria. The British loss had been considerable, amounting to upwards of sixty officers and men killed and wounded.

At 10 o'clock next morning the 18-pounders and the 24-pounder howitzer were brought to within two hundred and fifty yards of the village, and the firing recommenced. The place was shelled till it became a mere wreck; everything that could be burned in it was consumed. Still the rebels held out. At last, about midday, some two hundred and twenty came out and surrendered. Those that remained were Rohillas, and they stuck to the last brick in the place. About 4 o'clock firing ceased, and the 86th and 25th Bombay Native Infantry stormed it.

The stern defence of the Rohillas did service to their cause. Whilst the British force was dealing with them the Shahzadah and his two thousand Afghans and Mekranis evacuated Mandisur and retreated on Nangarh. The cavalry, worn out by four days of unremitting exertion, was unable to pursue them.

Pursuit, however, was scarcely necessary. The blow struck at Goraria was a blow from which there was no rallying. The Afghans and Mekranis, as panic-stricken as they had been bold, fled through the country, avoiding towns and villages, and endeavoring to seek refuge in the jungles. One party of them, more daring than their fellows, suddenly appeared at Partabgarh. The loyal chief of that state, summoning his Thakurs, attacked them, killed eighty of them, and drove the rest into flight. The others seemed, above all, anxious to place the Chambal between themselves and their conqueror.
The objects which Durand had in his mind when he set out from Mau on the 14th of October had now been accomplished. With a force extremely weak in infantry, he had crushed the rebellion on the plateau of Malwa, thus saving the line of the Narbada, and cutting off the disaffected troops of Holkar from the supports on which they had rested. The campaign, brief as it was, had proved decisive, and had vindicated to the letter the prescience of Durand when, resisting every temptation to act otherwise, he resolved to allow Holkar's troops to rest in quiet until he should have disposed of the Dhar rebels and the mutineers of Mandisur and Nimach.

He was now at liberty to turn his arms against Holkar's troops. This he did. Returning by Mahidpur and Ujjen, he reached the vicinity of Indur on the 14th of December, fully prepared to encounter the troops of the Maharaja should they offer opposition to his entrance into the city. But the spirit which had prompted the treacherous attack of the 1st of July quailed before the sight of a British force returning from victory over traitors. The Indur troops, held in check during Durand's campaign by the Mau garrison, had been utterly disheartened by the defeat of their sympathizers at Mandisur, and were as humble as some few weeks previously they had been boastful and defiant.

Near the ground on which Durand encamped on the 14th of December he met and disarmed Holkar's regular cavalry, and placed the men under the care of the Sikh cavalry of the late Bhopal Contingent. He sent likewise to Holkar's chief minister a letter, in which he insisted that the remainder of the troops should be promptly disarmed. Should this demand not be complied with immediately, he expressed his firm resolution to disarm them himself.

The reply came that afternoon. The agent who brought it expressed the intention of the Darbar to disarm the infantry at once, and the request that whilst the operation was being carried into effect Durand would halt at a point one mile from the cavalry lines. Durand complied, and Holkar's infantry, one thousand six hundred in number, were quietly disarmed that same evening.

After the disarming had been completed, Durand, accompanied by a large body of the officers of the Mau column, called upon the Maharaja in his palace in the city of Indur. It was the first time since the month of June that Durand had seen Holkar. Regarding him in his own mind as an accessory to the attack made upon the Residency on the 1st of July, Durand had sent a report of all the circumstances of the case to Lord Canning, and pending a reply, had declined to renew personal relations with a prince who might possibly be adjudged by the English authority in India to be a rebel. But when, after the Malwa campaign, Holkar had acquiesced in the disarming of his cavalry and infantry, and his minister had promised that a suitable punishment should be meted out to the guilty, Durand, on the eve of being relieved by Sir Robert Hamilton, felt that the circumstances were not such as to warrant the omission of the ordinary courtesy required to be displayed on such an occasion. Holkar himself was anxious for the visit,
and that it should be conducted with a ceremony and an ostentatious display of friendly intercourse such as would produce an impression on his people. Durand acceded. The visit went off well. Holkar was in good spirits, expressed himself delighted at the disarming of his troops, and a hope that the act would be regarded by the British Government as a proof of his loyalty. Durand quietly, but firmly, impressed upon him that something further was yet required—the punishment of the guilty, whether soldiers or citizens—and stated his confident belief that the British Government and the British people would expect that this remaining duty would be properly carried out. Holkar gave an assurance that a Commission, which he had previously appointed, would make full inquiries into the matter. The interview then terminated. The next day Durand was relieved by Sir Robert Hamilton.

He had completed a noble task. His personal character had been the mainstay of British authority in central India. Had Durand not been there, the result had not been accomplished. This little sentence conveys to the reader more clearly than a multitude of words the vast value of his services. He was the representative of political power and, virtually, the general; the brain and the hand, in a most important part of India. He foresaw everything, and he provided for everything. He foresaw even—his own dispatches and memoirs written at the time show it most clearly—all that was to happen in the few months that were to follow: how the pacification of the North-West Provinces would increase the pressure west of the Jamna; the action of Nana Sahib and his nephews; the incursion of Tantia Topi. He saw equally clearly the line that should be, and that was, followed. "If affairs at Indur are successfully arranged," he wrote on the 12th of December, "I shall lose no time in marching the bulk of the Mau column to Sihor with the view of concentrating Sir H. Rose's command, and enabling him to relieve Sagar, clear Bandalkhand, and advance on Jhansi and Gwalior." In these lines Durand foreshadowed the course which he would himself have pursued, and which Sir Hugh Rose did pursue. But it is his actual achievements which call for special commendation. In spite of his earnest entreaties, in spite of the pressure exercised by Lord Elphinstone, Woodburn had in June chosen to waste most precious moments at Aurangabad. Had that general not delayed at that Capua, it is more than probable that the insurrection of the 1st of July would never have been attempted at Indur. But mark the conduct of Durand after that misfortune had happened. He hastens to meet Woodburn's column, now commanded by another officer; he meets it, quickens its movements, and brings it to Mau. He finds western Mimi in a state of aggressive insurrection, and the only line which had remained a barrier between the Central Provinces and Bombay—the line of the Narbada—sorely threatened. Of all the political officers in central India he alone understands the enormous importance of that line. He finds Mr. Plowden from Nagpar, Major Erskine from the Sagar and Narbada territories, urging measures which would have lost it. Though pressed by many considerations to disarm Holkar's troops, he, receiving from no quarter a word of encouragement or support, risks everything to save that important line. Then what do we see? With a
weak column of five hundred Europeans of all arms and eight hundred natives,\textsuperscript{29} he sets out from Mau, and in five weeks takes a strong fort, fights several cavalry combats, gains three actions in the open field, takes more than forty guns, crushes the Mandisur insurrection, saves the line of the Narbada, and, marching back to Indur, causes the disarming of the disaffected troops of Holkar. In four months he more than counteracts the evil effected by an army of conspirators.

It was, I repeat, a noble work, nobly performed, and, like many noble works, left unrewarded. No man has been more calumniated than its author. No one more bravely fought the battle of life in face of calumny. I may add that of no man that ever lived will the career bear more acute and critical examination. Should the life of Henry Marion Durand be written with the fearlessness the occasion demands, his countrymen will realize alike the worth of the man who, at a most critical period, secured a line the loss of which would have produced incalculable evils. They will learn, too, something of the nature of the smaller beings who aided in the attempt to calumniate, to insult, and to depreciate him. They will learn that it is not always the truly great who occupy the most conspicuous position in the eyes of their contemporaries!

Many officers distinguished themselves in campaign. One of these, who for his daring, his gallantry, and his brain power was specially noticed by Colonel Durand, requires mention here. "Much of the success in quelling this insurrection," wrote Durand to Lord Canning at the end of November 1857, "is due to the judicious daring, the thorough gallantry with which, whenever opportunity offered, Major Gall, his officers and men, sought close conflict with the enemy—a bold one, who often fought most desperately. I feel it a duty to Major Gall and H.M.'s 14th Light Dragoons, men and officers, thus especially to beg your Lordship's influence in favor of officers and men, who have merited, by conspicuous velour, everything that Her Majesty's Government may be pleased to confer. They deserve most highly." Durand also noticed with marked commendation the splendid services of Major Orr, Captain Abbott, and the officers and men of the Haidarabad Contingent and of the 25th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry. This regiment boasted a commanding officer, Major, afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel, Robertson, than whom no one rendered better service to the State. Captain Woollcombe, Lieutenants Strutt and Christie, of the Bombay Artillery, the last-named of whom was shot through the heart, also greatly distinguished themselves. But there were many others in the same category. The list is too long.

\textsuperscript{29} Reinforced at Dhar by the Haidarabad troops.
BOOK XIII.

CHAPTER III.

THE territories known as the Sagar and Narbada territories formed an extensive tract, bounded on the north by the British districts of Banda, Allahabad, and Mirzapur; on the south by Nagpur and the dominions of the Nizam; on the west by Gwalior and Bhopal. Within these boundaries is comprehended the state of Rewi, whose Raja recognized the over lordship of the British. The other native feudatories, the feudatories of Koti, Maihir, Uchera, and Solawal, held their lands under grants from the East India Company. Within the limits of those lands, however, they exercised a ruling authority, subject to the interference, when necessary, of the paramount power — The larger portion of the Sagar and Narbada territories were directly British. This portion comprised the districts of Sagar, Jabalpur, Hoshangabad, Sioni, Damoh, Narsingpar, Jhansi, Chandairi, Nagod, and Mandlah.

When, in 1843, the Gwalior Darbar commenced those hostilities against the British which culminated in the battle of Maharajpur, the chiefs and people of the Sagar and Narbada, territories, then ruled by Mr. Fraser, C.B., as Agent to the Governor-General, broke out into open rebellion. This rebellion was due partly to the great dislike felt by the people to the civil courts, and more particularly to the mode in which they were administered, and partly to the propaganda of the Gwalior Darbar. When, however, the pride of that Darbar had been lowered by the battle of Maharajpur, peace was restored to the Sagar and Narbada territories. Lord Ellenborough, who, throughout his Indian career, always displayed a marked detestation of proved abuses, inaugurated the newly-gained peace by making a clean sweep of the British officials serving in the territories, and by sending one of the ablest officers in the Indian services, the late Colonel Sleeman, to administer them on a new basis. Colonel Sleeman succeeded in pacifying the chiefs and in contenting the people. When, after a rule of two or three years, he was promoted to be Resident at Lakhnao, he handed over the territories to his successor, Mr. Bushby, in perfect order. Mr. Bushby's administration of five or six years was characterized by ability and good judgment; but when, at the close of that period, he was promoted to the Residency of Haidarabad, the Sagar and Narbada territories were joined to the North-West Provinces, then ruled by Mr. Colvin, Major Erskine receiving the appointment of Commissioner of Jabalpur and becoming Mr. Colvin's representative in the territories. Subordinate to Major Erskine, were, amongst others, Captain Skene, Commissioner of Jhansi, and Captain Ternan, Deputy Commissioner of Narsingpur.

30 Afterwards Earl of Kellie.
With their transfer to the North-West Provinces, the Sugar and Narbada territories came under the Sudder Board of Revenue. In accordance with its traditions, that venerable Board at once proposed changes in the administration so startling that, if carried out, they would inevitably have caused a violent rebellion. Before finally deciding in favor of the proposed changes, Mr. Colvin had the good sense to ask the opinion of the officer who had served longest in the territories, a man of remarkable sense and strength of character, Captain A. H. Ternan. Captain Ternan replied by pointing out the inapplicability of the rules of the Sudder Board of Revenue to the needs of the province, and the certain consequences which would follow any attempt to enforce them. Mr. Colvin, struck by Captain Ternan's representations, withdrew nearly the whole of the proposed changes. It is a pity that he did not withdraw the whole, for the few that be allowed, relating chiefly to the subdivision of properties, roused a very bad feeling, and led to many agrarian outrages.

Such was the state of the territories in 1855. The temper of the people, kindled by the cause I have mentioned, had not wholly subsided into its normal condition of contentment. The outbreak in the North-West Provinces came inopportune to inflame it still more.

The small station of Narsingpur on the Narbada, sixty miles to the west of Sagar, was garrisoned at the outbreak of the mutiny by four companies of the 28th Madras Native Infantry, under the command of Captain Woolley, an excellent officer. The Deputy Commissioner of the district, Captain Ternan, to whose calm and cool judgment I have already referred, had his headquarters also at Narsingpur. The district of which this town was the capital was largely inhabited by petty chiefs, who had gone into rebellion in 1843, and who had never submitted willingly to British jurisdiction. So early as December 1856 there were not wanting indications that some great event was looming before the eyes of these men, but no European could venture an opinion as to the form that event would take. It happened, however, that one evening in January 1857, Captain Ternan was sitting outside his tent, smoking a cigar, when the Kotwal31 of the village came running to him, bearing in his hand some small chapatties or cakes of unleavened bread. On reaching Ternan, the Kotwal, out of breath and panting, stated that the cakes were the remnant of a large quantity he had received that morning, with instructions to leave them with the watchman of every village, to be kept till called for; that he had so distributed them in the neighboring villages, and that those which he held in his hand constituted the surplus. "What," he asked Ternan, "was be to do with them?"

Ternan, naturally shrewd, and that natural shrewdness sharpened by the experience of the rebellion of 1842-43, at once divined the truth. In those small unleavened cakes he saw the fiery cross sent through the land to unsettle the minds of the great mass of the people; that, distributed broadcast as the Kotwal had distributed them in his district,

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31 A Kotwal is generally a chief officer of police.
they would indicate a sudden danger that might come at any moment upon the people, threatening their caste and undermining their religion. He at once embodied these ideas in a report, which he transmitted forthwith to his official superior, Major Erskine.

Major Erskine was an officer who had written a book of "Forms and Tables for the Use of the Bengal Native Infantry." That book was a reflex of his mind. His mind was a mind "of forms and tables." His mental vision commanded the line of strict and formal routine. Out of that line he saw nothing, he was incapable of seeing anything. When, therefore, he received Ternan's report and read the conclusions drawn by that officer regarding the unleavened cakes, he ridiculed them; he considered the idea far-fetched, absurd, impossible. He wrote back to Ternan to that effect, adding that it was simply a case of "a dyer's vat having gone wrong," and that the owner of the vat was propitiating the gods by the distribution of cakes!

Subsequent events made it abundantly evident that Erskine was wrong and Ternan was right. Distributed broadly over the North-West Provinces and in Oudh, in the earlier months of 1857, these cakes were the harbingers of the coming storm. It is certain now that they originated in the brain of the Oudh conspirators, of the men made conspirators by the annexation of their country, and they were sent to every village for the very object divined by Ternan—the object of unsettling men's minds, of preparing them for the unforeseen, of making them impressionable, easy to receive the ideas the conspirators wished to promulgate.

I may record here a decision of the Government promulgated in the same district a year or two prior to 1857, and of the remarkable consequence it produced after the mutiny had broken out, as illustrative of the influence which an able and conscientious English officer can almost always bring to bear upon native chiefs. One of the most influential chieftains in the territories under Captain Ternan's supervision was the raja, of Dilheri, the feudal lord of all the Gond clans. This chief had ever been loyal. For his fidelity and good conduct in the trying times of 1842-43, the Government had presented him with a gold medal. Like many of the Gond tribe, he had been somewhat too profuse in his expenditure, and had incurred debts. But by exercising a strict economy he had paid off those debts.

Such was his condition in 1855, shortly after the Sagar and Narbada territories had been brought under the government of the North-West Provinces. It had been a principle of that government, since the time when it was administered by Mr. Thomason, to discourage large landowners. One morning in that year Captain Ternan received instructions, emanating from Agra, desiring him to inform the raja of Dilheri that, inasmuch as he was unfit to hold the title of raja and had proved himself incapable of managing his estates, he was deprived of both; that his title of raja was abolished, and that his property would be distributed among his tenants, he receiving a percentage from the rents! When this decision was most unwillingly announced to the raja, by
Captain Ternan, the old man drew his medal from the belt in which it was habitually carried, and requested the English officer to return it to those who had bestowed it, as they were now about to disgrace him before his clan and before the whole district. With great difficulty Ternan pacified him. It was generally expected that he would break out into rebellion. He might well have done so, for every member of the clan felt insulted in his person. Ternan, fearing an outbreak, pressed on the Government the mistake they had committed, and urged them to rectify it. But the Government would not listen. The order was carried out. Ternan did all in his power to save the family from ruin; but even he could do little.

Before the mutiny broke out in May 1857, the old man had died; his son, too, had died. The next heir took the title—for, however the Government might order, the representative of the family was always raja to the people. Then came the mutiny of May 1857. The Narsingpur district felt its shock. Muhammadans from across the border invaded the district and pillaged the villages. The outlook became every day more gloomy. "Save yourselves while yet there is time," said the loyal officials to Ternan. But Ternan stayed. One morning, however, early in June, his house was surrounded by a considerable body of armed men, with lighted matchlocks. Ternan saw at a glance that they all belonged to the Dilheri clan. He at once summoned the chief and asked him what had brought him and his clansmen in such numbers and in so warlike a garb. The chief replied that he would answer if he and the other chiefs were allowed a private audience with their interlocutor. Ternan admitted them into his drawing-room. The chief replied: "You behaved kindly to us and fought our battle when the title and estate were confiscated, and you were abused for so doing. Now we hear disturbances are rife, and we come to offer you our services. We will stick by you as you stuck by us. What do you wish us to do?" Ternan thanked them, accepted their offer, assured them they should be no losers by their conduct, and promised to do his utmost to see justice done them. The members of the clan remained loyal throughout the trying events of 1857-58, resisted the urgent solicitations made to them to join the rebels, and, what was of equal importance, they induced other clans to join them in rendering most valuable service to the British cause.

I turn now to the part of the territories the chief centres in which were more purely military stations.

There were three military stations in the Sagar and Narbada territories—the stations of Sagar, Jabalpur, and Hoshangabad. Sagar was garrisoned by the 31st and 47th Bengal Native Infantry, the 3rd Regiment Irregular Cavalry, and sixty-eight European gunners; Jabalpur by the 52nd Bengal Native Infantry, and Hoshangabad by the 28th Madras Native Infantry. The commandant of the Sagar district force was Brigadier Sage, who had his head-quarters at Sagar.
Neither the news of the mutiny at Mirath nor the tidings of the nearer and more horrible events at Jhansi, affected, according to all appearance, the demeanor of the native troops at Sagan. Indeed, so conspicuous was their good conduct, that, early in June, Brigadier Sage, not trusting them, yet unwilling openly to display an opposite feeling, did not hesitate to send a detachment, consisting of five hundred infantry, one hundred and twenty-five cavalry, and two 9-pounders, against a raja who had rebelled, promising them a reward of six thousand rupees for the capture of the said raja, dead or alive. A few days later, however, the brigadier had reason to feel that the policy of concealing distrust was not likely to answer better in Sagar than in the places where it had been already tried and had failed. The station of Sagar was laid out in a manner which rendered it difficult for a commander with only sixty-eight European soldiers at his disposal, to exercise a general supervision over the whole. At one end of it were the fort, the magazine, and the battering train. At the other end, distant from it three miles and a quarter, was a commanding position known as the artillery hill. Both these points could not be retained. The artillery hill, though in many respects important as a position, wanted water and storing-room for provisions. There was no question, then, in the brigadier's mind, as to the position which should be abandoned. Yet he labored under this great difficulty, that the sepoys possessed the fort and the treasury, and they took care to let it be surmised that they would yield neither the one nor the other. In a word, the station was at their mercy.

Affairs were in this position when, on the 13th of June, Brigadier Sage received an application for assistance in guns from Lallatpur, a station in the Jhansi district, garrisoned by three hundred men of the 6th Infantry, Gwalior Contingent. The brigadier promptly dispatched two 9-pounders, escorted by one company of the 31st Native Infantry, one of the 42nd, and seventy-five troopers of the 3rd Irregulars. The detachment never reached Lallatpur. The very evening before it left Sagar, the three companies of the Gwalior regiment at that station had broken out into mutiny, had plundered the treasury, and had driven the European officers to flee for protection to the raja, of Banpur, who, under the pretence of being a friend, had been for some days in the vicinity of Lallatpur, exciting the sepoys to mutiny.

For a moment I follow the action of this raja. Finding that the rebel sepoys had taken possession of the Lallatpur treasury, and were marching off with its contents, he attacked them, and was repulsed. Thus baffled, he sent off his European guests to the fort of Tehri, there to be confined, and then marched in haste to meet the detachment coming from Sagar, with the view of inducing the sepoys composing it to join him.

Major Gaussen, commanding that detachment, had reached Malthoni, thirty-seven miles from Sagar, when he heard of the mutiny at Lallatpar and of the movement of the

32 Captain Sale, commanding; Lieutenant Irwin, second in command, his wife and two children; Dr. O'Brien, and Lieutenant Gordon, Deputy Commissioner of Chandairi. They were made over to the raja of Shahgarb, by whom they were kindly treated. Ultimately they were all released.
Blinpur raja. He at once halted and wrote for reinforcements. Sage replied promptly by sending four hundred infantry and one hundred cavalry. The night previous to the day on which those men were ordered to set out, great commotion reigned in Sagar, and it seemed as though mutiny might break out at any moment. The danger passed, however. Brigadier Sage, though urged by many of those about him to put an end to the terrible suspense by striking a blow with the few Europeans under his orders, remained impassive. He had resolved to act only when the sepoys should commit themselves unmistakably to revolt.

The detachment marched the following morning, the 19th of June, and joined Major Gaussen on the 23rd. Gaussen then marched with his whole force against the fort of Balabet, held by the rebels, stormed it, and took sixteen of the garrison prisoners. The sepoys stormers promised these men their lives, and two days later, on the return of the detachment to Malthoni, they insisted on their release. Major Gaussen being powerless to refuse the demand, they released the prisoners, and made them over to the Banpur raja. No sooner had this act been accomplished than that raja entered the British camp, and openly offered the sepoys a monthly pay of twelve rupees if they would leave their officers and go over to him with their arms and ammunition! The sepoys complied, dismissed their officers, and joined the raja.

The information brought by the returning officers to Sagar decided Sage to act promptly. He saw that if he were to wait till the rebel raja should march on Saga; he and his sixty-eight men would be surrounded and lost. According he at once, and in the most judicious manner, began his operations. He first moved the contents of the treasury to the fort; to the same place he next conveyed the contents of the expense magazine and the artillery magazine; and last of all, he removed thither the women, children, and baggage of the European artillery. As soon as this had been accomplished, he took a guard of Europeans and relieved the sepoy guard at the fort gate. He then marched into it the ladies and children. Thus, by a few decisive strokes, the one following the other with rapidity, Sage gained a place of refuge, secured the contents of the magazine, and saved the treasure.

The second day after, the morning of the 30th of June, whilst the ordinary grand guard-mounting was progressing, Sage marched the Europeans and sixty cavalry, who remained loyal, into the fort. He then sent for all the native officers, and frankly telling them the reason of his action, added that they had suffered acts of mutiny to take place without opposing them, and had forfeited their character; that there was yet one method open to them of regaining it, and that was to have the leading mutineers seized and delivered up to justice. The native officers of the three regiments, apparently very much affected, promised everything. The next morning, however, the 3rd Irregulars

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33 In blowing open the gate, - Ensign Spens of the 31st was accidentally killed. Lieutenant Willoughby of the artillery was wounded.
and the 42nd Native Infantry broke into open mutiny and plundered the bazars and the bungalows of the officers. The 31st held aloof, professing loyalty; and on the 7th of July, one of their men having killed a trooper who had fired at him, a desperate fight ensued between the two native infantry regiments. The 31st being unable to make much impression on the 42nd, who had two guns, sent into the fort imploring assistance. Sage sent them the sixty loyal troopers. A good deal of fighting then ensued, but, in the midst of it, forty of the 31st deserted to the 42nd. Still the bulk of the loyal regiment persevered and when evening fell, sent again to the fort to implore assistance in guns. Sage replied that it was too late to send them that night, but in the morning he would bring them victory. Information to this effect reaching the two belligerent parties fixed the 31st in their loyal resolves, whilst it so dispirited their opponents that during the night they fled, pursued for some miles by the loyal sepoys and troopers, who captured one of the guns. When the victors returned, it was ascertained that whilst the entire 31st, the forty above alluded to excepted, had remained loyal, fifty of the 42nd had followed their example, and the sixty loyal troopers had been joined by at least an equal number of the same temper from out-stations.

The brigadier now devoted himself to strengthening the mud fort. He had supplies and medical stores for six months, and a sufficiency of guns and ammunition. The able-bodied men of the Christian community were gradually drilled, and as they numbered about sixty, Sage soon had at his disposal a force of one hundred and twenty-three fighting men. The number was not at all too large, for the duties were heavy; there were one hundred and ninety women and children to be guarded, and occasionally parties of Bandila rebels, into whose hands the surrounding country had fallen, made known their presence by a sudden volley. They fired, however, only to disappear in the jungles on the first appearance of pursuit.

The districts in close vicinity to each other—of Jabalpur, of Sagar, of Chandairi, of Jhansi, and Jalaun, continued, from this time until the arrival of the relieving force under Sir Hugh Rose, to be overrun by rebels, sepoy and other. These harried the country, captured forts, plundered villages, for a long time with impunity. Before I narrate the manner in which they were ultimately dealt with, it will, I think, be advisable to clear the ground by recording the events passing at the other stations in this part of India.

Of Lallatpur I have spoken. Jabalpur, one hundred and eleven miles south-east from Sagar, has next to be noticed. This station was, in 1857, garrisoned by the 52nd Native Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Jamieson. It was the head-quarters likewise of Major Erskine, the chief political officer in the Sagar and Narbada territories. For a few weeks after the news of the mutiny at Mirath had reached Jabalpur the men of the 52nd showed no sign of disaffection, but it soon became clear that they, too, were only watching their opportunity. On the 16th of June one of the men attempted to murder the adjutant; and though the man in question was subsequently
released on the ground of insanity, the conduct of his comrades a little later proved that there had been method in his madness. They assumed the usual airs of authority, treated their officers with patronizing familiarity, and declared that they would only mutiny if a European regiment were sent to disarm them. One consequence of this conduct was that all the ladies and children were promptly dispatched to Seoni and Narsingpur.

The news that a native brigade was advancing on Jabalpur from Kampti would appear to have produced a good effect on the men of the 52nd, for in the interval between the period I have referred to and the arrival of the brigade, 2nd of August, they were usefully employed by Major Erskine in repressing disturbances in the district. The Kampti movable column— for it was no more— consisted of the 4th Madras Light Cavalry under Captain Tottenham, the 33rd Madras Native Infantry under Colonel Millar commanding the column, a battery of Field Artillery under Captain Jones, and one company Rifles, Nagpur Irregular Force, under Lieutenant Pereira. This column marched into Jabalpur on the 2nd of August. After a halt there of a few days, the larger portion of it was sent into the neighboring districts to restore order. During its absence an old raja of the Gond dynasty, Shankar Shah, his son, and some adherents of his house were convicted, on the clearest evidence, of plotting the destruction of the English at Jabalpur, and the plunder of the station. On the 18th of September the father and son were blown away from guns, the adherents being reserved for the following day. But little doubt was entertained that the criminal raja and his criminal son had made many efforts to seduce the men of the 52nd from their allegiance. To allay, then, the excitement which, it was apprehended, their execution might create in the minds of the rank and file, Colonel Jamieson and other officers of the regiment proceeded almost immediately to the lines, and explained to the men that the raja and his son had merely paid the penalty for proved misconduct. They judged, from the manner of the men, that they had removed all apprehensions from their minds. At 9 o’clock that night, however, the entire 52nd regiment marched quietly out of the station, without noise or alarm, and proceeded some twenty miles without a halt to the Tahsildiri of Patan. At that place was stationed a company of their own regiment commanded by Lieutenant MacGregor. MacGregor, who naturally had had no intimation of the proceedings of the regiment, was surprised, and at once placed in confinement under sentries. The sepoys then sent in to their colonel a letter, most respectfully worded, in which they announced their intention of marching to Dehli, and offered to release MacGregor in exchange for ten sepoys left behind in Jabalpur. This offer not having been complied with, the rebels kept their prisoner till they were attacked, and then shot him.34

But long before the commission of this atrocity information of the high-handed action of the 52nd Native Infantry, and orders to return to Jabalpur, had been conveyed to the

34 MacGregor’s body was found by the officers of the Madras column with one ball through the neck, both arms broken, and his body perforated with thirty or forty bayonet wounds. Major Erskine had previously offered eight thousand rupees for his release.
Madras column in the district. That column, consisting of four hundred men of the 33rd Madras Native Infantry, A Madras the rifle company of the 1st Madras Native Infantry, one troop of the 4th Madras Light Cavalry, and four guns, manned by European gunners, happened to be at Damoh, sixty-five miles to the north-west of Jabalpur. It started at once, on the 21st of September. On the night of the 25th it encamped at Sangrampur, about twenty-five miles from its destination. Between this place and Jabalpur, close to a village called Katanji, flows a navigable river, the Hiran, the passage across which, it was thought possible, might be disputed by the 52nd. To secure the means of crossing it, a party, consisting of the grenadier company 33rd Madras Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Watson, and a few troopers of the 4th, under Major Jenkins, left the camp at 2 o'clock in the morning of the 26th. At daybreak, as they were nearing Katanji, Jenkins and Watson, who were riding in front of their column, were suddenly fired at, and almost immediately surrounded. How they escaped it is difficult to imagine. But, notwithstanding all the efforts made by the sepoys, they fought their way through them and reached their men. These were not numerous enough to take the aggressive. Jenkins, therefore, drew them up on a hill difficult to escalade, and there awaited the arrival of the main column.

To this column, on the point of starting about 6 o'clock in the morning, information arrived, in an exaggerated form, of the events at Katanji. The two European officers were reported killed, and the rebels were said to be pressing on in force. Eager to avenge their officers and relieve their comrades, the gallant native soldiers of the coast army hurried forward. On reaching the mouth of the gorge leading to Katanji, they found the 52nd had taken up a very strong position, both flanks covered by thick jungle. Without hesitating, they opened fire from the guns, and then attacked the rebels with the bayonet and drove them before them. On reaching Katanji, they were joined by Jenkins and Watson. The pursuit was continued beyond that place. In Katanji the body of MacGregor, murdered that morning, was found. The rebels suffered severely. A hundred and twenty-five dead were actually counted on the field, and it is certain that many more were wounded. On the side of the victors one man was killed and fifty were wounded. The column then returned to Jabalpur.

This was not by any means the only skirmish which took place in the Sagar and Narbada territories during the autumn of 1857. In my story of the transactions at Sagar, I have alluded to the conduct of the Banpur

This rebel chief, still hoping to gain greatly by the downfall of the British, had, after a great deal of promiscuous plundering, taken up a position at Niraoli, about nine miles from Sugar, and had strongly entrenched it. Against this position a force was sent from the Sagar fort on the 15th of September, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Dalyell, 42nd Native Infantry.
The expedition was not successful; for though the rebels suffered severely from the fire of the British guns, Colonel Dalyell was killed and the loss of the attacking party in killed and wounded was very severe. The entrenchment was not stormed.

This affair did not increase the chances of the restoration of order. The remnant of the 52nd native infantry, numbering some five hundred and thirty men, continued, after its defeat at Katanji, to ravage the country. Joining the adherents of rebel rajas, these men took advantage of the withdrawal of the Madras column from Damoh to plunder that place and to release the prisoners. They then took possession of a strong fort, about thirty miles from Sagar, called Garhakot, and from this they constantly sallied forth to plunder and destroy. In fact, as the year drew to a close, in spite of the fall of Dehli, the daring of the rebels increased, whilst the handful of British, shut up in the stations at long distances from each other, and powerless to interfere effectually, could do little more than hold their own. Several skirmishes, indeed, occurred, but with no decisive result. In one of these, early in November, near Jabalpur, the Madras troops defeated the enemy, but their commander, Captain Tottenham, was killed. In others, the defeat of the rebels merely signified a disappearance from one jungle to appear immediately in another.

In the preceding pages of this chapter I have alluded to the conduct of Captain Ternan in the Narsingpur district. I must devote a few lines to the military operations in that quarter. The garrison of Narsingpur consisted of four companies of the 28th Madras Native Infantry under Captain Woolley. These sepoys, unlike the bulk of their brethren in Bengal, continued throughout the period of 1857-58 loyal and true. In November 1857, led by Woolley and accompanied by Ternan, they restored order in the disturbed parts of the district, cooperating for that purpose with a detachment sent from Sugar under Captain Roberts of the 31st Bengal N.I. and Captain Mayne of the 3rd irregular cavalry. Its action was most successful. The districts north of the Narbada were cleared of rebels; and in a hand-to-hand encounter with the largest body of them, the rebel leader, Ganjan Singh, a landowner of considerable consequence, was slain, and nearly all his followers were destroyed. Ternan, who had his horse shot under him in this encounter, then urged a rapid march upon Singpur, a place held by a noted rebel called Dalganjan. His advice was followed, and Dalganjan was taken and hanged. The following month another fatal blow was dealt to the insurgents near Chirapur. When Woolley reached this place it was found evacuated. Ternan, however, pushing on with a small party in search of the rebels, succeeded in surprising them, and capturing their tents, one 4-pounder gun, and many native weapons. This enterprising officer followed up the blow in January 1858 by completely defeating the invading rebels from Ratgarh and Bhopal at Maddanpur. By this vigorous stroke the Narsingpur district was finally cleared of all rebels of consequence.

Before describing the measures ultimately taken to reassert British authority throughout this part of India, it is necessary that I should take the reader for a moment to Nagod.
Nagod is a military station, in the Uchera district, distant forty-eight miles from Rewah, one hundred and eighty from Allahabad, and forty-three miles from Sagan. The garrison in 1857 consisted of the 50th Bengal N.I., commanded by Major Hampton. Up to the month of September this regiment had displayed no mutinous symptoms, and the men were regarded by their officers as staunch and loyal. It happened, however, that at the time that the 52nd native infantry decamped from Jabalpur in the manner already described, a rumor reached Nagod that Kunwar Singh was marching on that place. The men of the 50th were accordingly ordered to prepare to march against that warrior. They appeared delighted at the order, made all the necessary preparations with alacrity, and marched. The regiment had not, however, reached the second milestone from Nagod when a voice from the ranks gave the order to halt. The regiment halted. Some of the men then told the officers that their services were no longer required, and that they had better go. Opposition was useless. A few faithful men escorted the officers and their families to Mirzapur, whilst the remainder, returning to Nagod, plundered and burned the place, and then inaugurated in the district a career similar to that of their brethren of the 52nd.

Rewah, I have already stated, is a small native state, ruled by a quasi-independent raja, recognizing the suzerainty of the British, bound to them by treaties, and having a British resident at his court. In 1857 the resident political agent was Lieutenant Willoughby Osborne, an officer of the Madras army, possessing great strength of will, a courage that never faltered, and resolute to do his duty to the utmost. Left unfettered, Willoughby Osborne almost always did the right thing; but, like many other men conscious of their powers, he writhed under the sway of self-appreciative mediocrity. Happily, at Rewah, he was unfettered.

The town of Rewah lies little more than midway between Allahabad and Sagar, being one hundred and thirty-one miles south-west of the former, and one hundred and eighty-two miles north-east of the latter. It is built on the banks of a small river, the Bihar, a tributary of the Tons. Around it runs a high and thick rampart, still nearly entire, flanked by towers, many of which have fallen into decay. Within this outer defence a similar rampart immediately environs the town; and still further inward a third surrounds the residence of the raja. It is a decaying place, and the population in 1837 scarcely exceeded six thousand.

The residence of a raja whose ancestors had been proud of their independence, surrounded by districts in which mutiny was rampant, lying many miles from the route of the British armies between Calcutta and the north-west, Rewah, in June and July of 1857, seemed utterly lost. Not, however, to Willoughby Osborne. The first point to which that able officer directed his efforts was to win the raja. His character had, indeed, already gained the respect and admiration of the prince, but in such times as were then upon it became necessary that the princes of India, especially the small
rajas, should feel that they had everything to lose, nothing to gain, by the success of the mutineers. Osborne succeeded in instilling that feeling into the mind of the raja. On the 8th of June he was able to announce that the raja of Rewah had placed his troops at the disposal of the Government of India; that the offer had been accepted; and that eight hundred of those troops, with two guns, had been sent to Ammapatan—a place commanding the roads to Jabalpur, Nagod, and Sagar—ready to oppose insurgents from any of those stations, and to intercept communications with the rebellious villages on the Jumna. He dispatched, about the same time, eleven hundred of the raja's troops and five guns to the Kattrra pass, about midway to Mirzapur, and whence a rapid advance could be made on that important commercial city, on Banaras, or on Chunar, as might be deemed advisable. A week later he obtained the raja's sanction to send seven hundred troops to Banda, and he induced him to issue a proclamation promising rewards to any of his soldiers who should distinguish themselves by their gallantry and loyalty.

The measures taken by Willoughby Osborne had a very marked influence on affairs in Bandalkhand. There, as in the adjacent territories, the smaller chieftains, mostly men of impoverished fortunes, thought the opportunity too favorable to be lost. They, too, rose in revolt. But Osborne was incessantly on the watch. By the skilful disposition of the raja's troops, and by the display of an energy which never tired, he baffled all the earlier efforts of the rebels. By the exercise of similar qualities he kept open the important line of road between Mirzapur and Jabalpur, a necessary part of the available postal route between Calcutta and Bombay. In a few weeks he was able to take an active offensive against the insurgents. He defeated them at Kanchanpur and Zorah, then advancing on their stronghold—Maihir—he stormed that city on the 29th of December, pushed on to Jakhani, captured that place, thus opening thirty-six miles of road in the direction of Jabalpur. At a date considerably later he, in the most gallant manner, captured the important fort of Bijrajugarh. Owing solely to the indefatigable exertions of this gallant Englishman, the rebel cause not only found no footing in Bandalkhand, but it lost way in the adjacent territories.

Nagpur, till 1853 the capital of the Bhonsla dynasty, and since that period the chief town in the Central Provinces and the head-quarters of the Chief Commissioner, is a large straggling city, about seven miles in circumference, having in 1857 a population somewhat exceeding a hundred thousand. Close to the city, on its western side, is a hilly ridge running north and south, known as the Sitabaldi, possessing two summits, one at each extremity, the northern being the higher, the southern the larger, but both commanding the city. Outside of but near the city were the arsenal—containing guns, arms, ammunition, and military stores of every description—and the treasury of the province, containing a large amount of cash. To protect these and the city, the Commissioner, Mr. George Plowden, had, of European troops, one company of Madras artillery, whose headquarters were at Katmpti, eleven miles distant. The local native troops at his disposal were thus stationed: at Kampti or in Nagpur itself, the head-
quarters of the 1st Infantry, the 1st Cavalry, and the artillery of the Nagpur irregular force; at Chanda, eighty-five miles south of Nagpur, were the 2nd Infantry, and a detachment of the 1st, of the same force; at Bhandira, forty miles to the east, was another detachment of the 1st Regiment; the head-quarters and greater part of the 3rd Regiment were at Raipur, one hundred and thirty-seven miles still further in the same direction; the remainder of that regiment was at Bilaspur. These, I have said, were local troops. Kampti was likewise the head-quarters of a brigade of the Madras army. The troops stationed there in 1857 were the 4th Madras Light Cavalry, the 17th, 26th, 32nd, and 33rd Native Infantry, and the European artillery already alluded to. Brigadier H. Prior commanded the Nagpur subsidiary force.

Very soon after the events of May 1857 at Mirath became known to the troops located in the Central Provinces, symptoms of disloyalty began to be manifested by the troops, especially by the cavalry portion, of the local force. In the position he occupied, ruling a large city, dependent for physical aid upon a few European gunners and five native regiments, Mr. Plowden could not afford even the symptoms of mutiny to pass unnoticed. Still less could he afford it when all the circumstances of the intended rising, to the extent even of the signal which was to set it in action, were revealed to him. Mr. Plowden resolved to act, and to act promptly. He arranged with Colonel Cumberlege, who entirely trusted the men of his own regiment—the 4th Light Cavalry—that the troopers of the local regiment should be disarmed on the 17th of June. Colonel Cumberlege performed the task with skill and tact, and without bloodshed. Mr. Plowden followed up this blow by strengthening the two peaks on the Sitabaldi hill, that they might serve as a refuge for the residents of Nagpur in the event of a mutiny. The residency was at the same time converted into a barrack, in which the civil and military officers should congregate during the night.

These precautions were effective. Notwithstanding serious alarms, no outbreak actually occurred. The Madras soldiers not only remained faithful, but when a column of them was dispatched to Jabalpur, the departing men were replaced by others of the same army not less loyal and true. The position at Nagpur was the more difficult in that the province of which it was the capital was isolated. No part of it was used as a high road for troops. No Europeans could be spared for it from their more pressing duties of crushing the revolt in Oudh and in the North-West Provinces. Its safety was in the hands of the Commissioner. For it he was responsible. It was his duty, with most inadequate means, to assure it. Fortunately, Mr. George Plowden, who represented the Government at Nagpur, was a gentleman of lofty courage and imperturbable nerve. Without appliances, he acted as though he possessed them. Left without external resources, he regulated his conduct as though they were abundantly at his command. And he succeeded. Eventually, when the first fever-heat of mutiny had subsided, he

35 The mutiny was to have broken out on the 13th of June; the signal to have been the ascent of three fire-balloons from the city. One of the ringleaders, caught in the act of seducing the men of the 1st local infantry, gave the first intimation of the plot.
restored their arms to the local troops. There is no truer test of a man than this capacity to meet dangers and difficulties when he is unarmed, to look them calmly in the face, to remain cool and imperturbable in their presence. If to do this thoroughly, to cause disaffection to quail before the glance — if this be a proof of greatness, then most assuredly Mr. George Plowden deserves to be classed amongst the great men brought to the front by the mutiny.
BOOK XIII.

CHAPTER IV.

It will clear the ground if, before I record the action of the British generals which restored order throughout central India, I deal with the events in a part of the country already slightly touched upon in the first chapter of this book, and upon the issue of which depended, to a very considerable extent, whether the rebellion would or would not extend throughout the length and breadth of southern and western India. I refer to the dominions of the Nizam.

Those dominions — called after the capital Haidarabad, the abode of Haidar — occupy a portion of India south of the Vindhya range, and enclose about ninety-five thousand three hundred and thirty-seven square miles. Measuring from their extreme point in the north-east, they extend four hundred and seventy-five miles to the south-west, and in their widest part they produce almost a similar result. On the north-east they are bounded by the central provinces, of which Nagpur is the capital; on the southwest by portions of the Madras Presidency; on the west by the Bombay Presidency; and on the north-west by a portion of the same presidency, by the dominions of Sindia, and by the Sagar and Narbada territories. A consideration of this proximity to so many inflammable points will convince the reader how dangerous would have proved a Haidarabad in arms; how essential it was that tranquility should be maintained within her borders.

When the year 1857 dawned, the Nizam was Nasir-ud-daolah. This prince died, however, on the 18th of May, and was succeeded by his son Afzul-ud-daolah. The minister, Salar Jang, nephew of his predecessor, Suraj-ul-Mulk, had held the highest office in the state since the year 1853. He was a man of great ability, great intelligence, devoted to the interests of his country and his master. It was his pride to prove that the natives of India can be governed by natives, not only with justice, but with a regard to their habits and modes of thought, such as, he considered, was impossible under alien rule. But, holding these opinions, he was, nevertheless, a sincere admirer of the British character, and sensible of the absolute necessity of an overlord-ship, which, while interfering as little as possible with the internal affairs of a native state, should take from each the power to draw the sword against a neighbor. The British Resident at the Court of the Nizam in the early part of 1857 was Mr. Bushby. This able officer, however, died in February of that year. He was succeeded by Major Cuthbert Davidson, an officer of the Madras army, who had at a previous period held the office temporarily, and who had then shown that he possessed all the qualifications necessary for discharging its duties in quiet times. Major Davidson took charge of the office of Resident on the 16th of April. In a very short time an opportunity offered for him to show the stuff he was
made of. I have already stated that on the 18th of May the Nizam, Nasir-ud-diolah, died. His son, Afzul-ud-diolah, was installed after the necessary ceremonies. But to the disaffected in Haidarabad the death of one ruler and the succession of another seemed to offer a mine of promise. The late Nizam had trusted Salar Jang. It was quite possible that his successor might refuse his confidence to that powerful minister. At all events an attempt might be made to discover the actual lay of the situation. Accordingly, when the men of the city of Haidarabad rose on the morning of the 12th of June, they found the walls of the city covered with placards, signed or purporting to be signed by orthodox maulvis, calling upon the faithful to enroll themselves and murder the Europeans. Major Davidson was not the last to receive the intelligence. He acted promptly and with vigor. He requested the general to parade his entire force in full marching order, with forty rounds of ammunition per man. This parade impressed the disaffected immensely. On the morning of the 15th a second parade, not less imposing, was ordered. At this the resident was present, and addressed the troops. By that time it had become known that the influence of Salar Jang was not less weighty with the new, than it had been with the late ruler. That loyal minister, on learning that a large mob had assembled near the mosque known as the Mekka mosque, and had hoisted there a green flag, sent down a corps of Arab mercenaries upon whom he could rely to disperse them. Subsequently he arrested the principal leaders of the movement, and for the moment the plague was stayed.

Only, however, for the moment. The information which poured daily from the outer world into the city, often in an exaggerated form, made every day a deeper impression upon the minds of the more bigoted of the population. They argued that whilst their co-religionists had risen for the faith in the north-west, it was not becoming in them to sit idle in the south. They recalled to the minds of listeners, likewise impressionable and fanatic, that little more than half a century had elapsed since Dehli, the capital of the Muhammadan world of India, had fallen into the hands of the infidel; that a supreme effort had now recovered it, and that if that effort were supported by the entire Muhammadan community of Hindustan, the recovery would be made complete, the gain would become permanent. These were no idle words. They sank deep into the minds of the people of Haidarabad—a people that had never known European rule, and that had never welcomed its approach to their borders. In a few weeks they produced corresponding acts.

A little before 5 o'clock on the evening of the 17th of July, five hundred of the Rohilla troops in the service of the Nizam, supported by some four thousand of the mob of Haidarabad, rose in insurrection and marched on the residency, demanding the release of thirteen mutineers and deserters, who, caught red-handed in revolt, had been made over by Major Davidson to Salar Jang. That minister, who was not very well served by

36 The garrison at or near Haidarabad consisted of a battalion of artillery, the 7th Madras Light Cavalry; the 3rd Madras Europeans; the 1st, 22nd, 24th, 34th, 41st, 42nd, and 49th Native Infantry. The force was commanded by Brigadier, now Sir William, Hill.
his agents, only heard of the outbreak just on the eve of its occurrence. He at once sent a
special messenger to warn the resident. Major Davidson, however, in anticipation of
some such movement, had improvised defenses all round the residency, had mounted
guns on the newly-erected bastions, and had warned his military secretary, Major
Briggs, to arrange the troops at his disposal in the manner best calculated to meet a
sudden attack. Seven minutes then sufficed to send every man in the residency to his
post. The insurgents came on, in the manner of undisciplined fanatics, drunk with
excitement, without order, and without leading, properly so called. A fire of grape from
the ramparts sent them reeling back. They came on again, only similarly to be received,
and similarly to retire. Staggered by this reception, they were beginning to recover
from their intoxication, when a charge of the Nizam's troops decided them to flee in
confusion. Many of them then took refuge in a two-storied house, at the end of a
narrow street. In this place it was resolved to allow them to stay till the morning. They
did not, however, avail themselves of the permission. Mining under the floor, they
escaped during the night. In their attack on the residency, several of the rebels were
killed; in their flight from the Nizam's troops more were taken prisoners. Amongst the
latter were the two ringleaders, Torabaz Khan and Maulvi Allah-uddin. The former,
attempting to escape, was shot dead; the latter was tried, convicted, and transported to
the Andaman islands.

The manner in which this wanton attack terminated produced a very salutary effect on
the minds of the Haidarabad population. It showed them very clearly that their own
rulers, men of their own faith, sided with the British. It needed but one word from Salar
Jang to rouse the entire country. Not only was that word not spoken, but the fanatical
Muhammadans were made clearly to understand that, in the event of their rising, they
would have to deal, not with the British only, but with their own Government as well.

Still the situation grew daily more critical. The city of Haidarabad had ever been filled
with military adventurers. The custom of importing Arabs from beyond the sea, and of
forming of them regiments of peculiar trust, had long prevailed. But in addition to the
Arab, there used to come from every part of India those adventurous spirits to whom
the sober administration of the British gave no avocation. From Rohilkhand, from the
Panjab, from Sindh, from Dehli, and from the border-land beyond the Indus, men of
this stamp had never been wanting. To them were added, in the autumn of 1857,
adventurers more dangerous still. The mutinied and disbanded sepoys who had been
unable to reach Dehli, or whose offers had been rejected by Sindia, poured in shoals
into Haidarabad. Combining with the other classes I have mentioned, and who gave
them a cordial welcome, they helped to swell the ranks of the disaffected, and to impart
to them a discipline in which the others were lacking.

The presence of these men added not a little to the difficulties of Salar Jang and the
Nizam. Every rumor which reached the city of misfortunes befalling the British arms
roused feelings which might at any moment prelude an outbreak. If we think of all that
was happening in those provinces—of the massacre of Kanhpur, of the long siege of Dehli, of the leaguer of Lakhano, of Havelock's three retirements, of the events at Agra, at Indio, at Jhansi, at Banda—we shall cease to be surprised that this was so. It must be remembered, too, that every skirmish was magnified into a battle, every repulse into a catastrophe, that victories gained by the British were studiously concealed. When we think of the news of these disasters coming upon an inflammable people, hating the English, armed to the teeth, and chafing under their forced inaction, we may well wonder that peace was, on any terms, preserved.

But peace was preserved—mainly owing to the excellent understanding between the Government of the Nizam and the British resident. Whilst the former used all those arts which a powerful native government has so well at command, to check the fanatical ardor of the disaffected, the resident, acting in concert with the Nizam, applied for a larger force of European troops to overawe the same class. In consequence of these representations Davidson received later in the year a reinforcement of a regiment of cavalry, a regiment of infantry, and some artillery.

Whilst thus securing his base, Major Davidson was not unmindful of another means for employing the trained soldiers of the Nizam—the soldiers of the Haidarabad contingent, led by English officers—in a manner which might transfer the sympathies of the great bulk of the people, from whose ranks those soldiers were drawn, to the British cause. Acting in concurrence, then, with the Nizam and Salar Jang, and with the full approval of the Government of India, he formed towards the beginning of 1858 a brigade from the regiments of the contingent, and sent it to act in central India. This brigade was composed of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th regiments of cavalry, of the 3rd and 5th regiments of infantry, and of three field-batteries of artillery. The splendid deeds of these troops will be recorded in their proper place. But I will not wait to record that the other purpose which had suggested this action to Major Davidson was entirely accomplished. The successes obtained by these soldiers elated the relations they had left behind them, and these came, in a very brief period, to regard as their own the cause for which their kinsmen were fighting. From that time forward all anxiety ceased in Haidarabad itself. In some parts of the district's the disturbances which arose were eagerly quelled, and with one exception, no chieftain of rank showed the smallest inclination to question the wisdom of the policy adopted by the Nizam and his minister. That exception was the raja of Shorapur.37 Shorapur is a small territory situated in the south-west angle of the Nizam's dominions. The Hindu chief who had ruled it, had, fifteen years prior to 1857, fallen into pecuniary difficulties so great that he found himself unable to fulfill his obligations to his suzerain, the Nizam. Certain arrangements, unnecessary here to detail, followed, which ended, after the death of the raja, in the administration of the country falling for a time into the hands of the British.

37 For a most interesting account of the raja of Shorapur and the causes which led him to revolt, I refer the reader to the Story of My Life, by the late Colonel Meadows Taylor, one of the most charming of autobiographies.
This arrangement lasted till 1853, when the country was handed over to the native ruler in a very flourishing condition. The young raja, however, soon dissipated his resources; he became so embarrassed as to be utterly reckless. He was in this state of mind when the events of 1857 occurred. With the record of the disasters attending the British came whispers of the advantages which must accrue to him from a successful rebellion. The raja had not the strength of mind to resist the temptation. Intoxicated by the promises made him, he called together the men of his own clan, and began to levy Rohilla and Arab mercenaries.

Full intelligence of the doings of the raja was quickly conveyed to Major Davidson. Well aware that to prevent an outbreak even by an extravagant display of force was far wiser and far cheaper than to allow it to come to a head, Davidson at once took decisive measures. Acting in concert with Lord Elphinstone, who displayed on this occasion, as on every other, a farsighted policy and a rare unselfishness, he called up from the Bombay Presidency a force under Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm, consisting of a detachment of European troops, the Maratha Horse, the 15th Bombay Native Infantry, and a battery of artillery. This force he located at a point equidistant between the Shorapur and the southern Maratha country. At the same time he arranged that a force from the Madras Presidency, under Major Hughes, should watch the eastern frontier of Shorapur, whilst he detached four hundred men and two guns of the Haidarabad contingent, commanded by Captain Wyndham, to occupy Linsugur, ready to act in concert with either of the other forces, as necessity might require.

Before these preparations had been completed Cuthbert Davidson, hoping to save the raja from his own folly, dispatched to his court, early in January 1858, one of his own most trusted assistants, Captain Rose Campbell. Campbell, however, only wasted his efforts. The raja had given himself to the fanatical party. Not only did he continue deaf to all entreaties, but he was, it is believed, prepared to connive at the murder of his guest. This, at least, is certain, that Captain Campbell received an intimation from the raja's own relatives and servants that his life was in imminent danger.

It would have been fruitless to temporize further. Captain Campbell proceeded to Linsugur and ordered Wyndham to march on Shorapur. Wyndham started at once and reached Shorapur on the 7th of February. As he approached, the raja, as is customary in such cases, sent his own servants to indicate a proper encamping-ground. The servants led Wyndham to the place selected — a narrow valley, surrounded by lofty hills and rocks. But Wyndham, though but a captain, was too old a soldier to fall into the trap. He moved on to an open plain, where he was comparatively safe from danger of surprise.

That night Wyndham was attacked by a force composed of the clansmen of the raja, of Arabs and Rohillas, estimated at from five thousand to seven thousand strong. The attack continued all night, but its result was never doubtful. Wyndham, aided by Rose
Campbell and the medical officer, Dr. Williamson, barricaded the position, and with the guns kept up a continuous fire. At 1 o'clock in the morning he was reinforced by one hundred cavalry of the Haidarabad contingent. The rebels then ceased their attack, and occupied the heights near the town.

Meanwhile, expresses had been sent to Major Hughes and Colonel Malcolm. Major Hughes, with two companies 74th Highlanders and some Madras cavalry, arrived first, early on the morning of the 8th. Joining his troops to those of Wyndham, Hughes at once attacked the rebels. A squadron of the 8th Madras cavalry, commanded by Captain Newberry, led the attack, and charged a body of Rohillas. Unfortunately, Newberry and his subaltern, Lieutenant Stewart, better mounted than their men, dashed into the middle of the rebels before their men could follow them. Newberry was killed and Stewart was severely wounded. The enemy, however, were driven from the heights above the town. The city being very strong, the approaches to it difficult of access, and the walls and bastions crowded with defenders, Hughes thought it advisable to wait for Colonel Malcolm's force, which was expected that night, before attempting anything further.

But the raja did not wait for Malcolm. Dispirited by the failure of his attack on Wyndham, and aware that reinforcements were approaching, he gave up the game as precipitately as he had entered upon it, and, accompanied by a few horsemen, fled that night towards Haidarabad. Arriving there, with but two followers in his train, he made a fruitless attempt to gain the protection of the Arabs. Found, then, wandering in the bazar, he was apprehended and taken to Mar Jang, who made him over to the Resident. The departure of the raja led to the immediate evacuation of Shorapur by the hostile bands. Colonel Malcolm, who arrived on the evening of the 8th, entered the town the following morning and found it almost deserted. Captain Rose Campbell assumed charge of the administration of the country.

So ended the only serious attempt made to disturb the tranquility of the Dekhan. The preservation of that tranquility was essential to the maintenance of the British power in India. There can be no question but that the rising of Haidarabad, headed by the Nizam, would have been a blow struck at the heart. The whole of western and southern India would have followed. Central India, the dominions of Holkar, and Rajpatting could not have escaped; and it is more than probable that the communications between Calcutta and the north-west would have been severed. That this calamity did not occur is due to many causes. The far-sighted policy of Lord Elphinstone did much; the Governor of Madras, Lord Harris, contributed all that was possible for a man in his high position to contribute.

38 The story of the raja's end is tragical. He was sentenced to death, but the Governor-General commuted the punishment to four years' imprisonment for life, after which he might be restored to his territory. The very day the raja received this news he shot himself, Colonel Meadows Taylor thinks accidentally.—Vide Story of My Life, vol. ii.
Major Cuthbert Davidson displayed a skill, a tact, and an energy far above the average; he was well served by his subordinates: Colonel Malcolm, Major Hughes, Captain Wyndham, and their comrades executed with marked ability the tasks entrusted to them. But the efforts of these men, great and valuable as they were, would have been utterly unavailing had the Nizam and his minister not seconded them. For three months the fate of India was in the hands of Afzul-ud-diolah and Salar Jang. Their wise policy proved that they preferred the certain position of a protected state to the doubtful chances of a resuscitation of the Dehli monarchy under the auspices of revolted sepoys.
BOOK XIV.

CHAPTER I.

IN a previous chapter of this history I stated that Colonel Durand had been appointed to act as agent for the Governor-General at Indur in consequence of the departure of the agent, Sir Robert Hamilton, to Europe on leave. Sir Robert Hamilton on hearing of the mutiny at Mirath, at once asked permission, though he had been but six weeks in England, to return and join his appointment. The application was granted, and Sir Robert arrived in Calcutta in August 1857.

Very soon after he had reached Calcutta, Sir Robert Hamilton was called upon by the Government to state the measures which he considered necessary for the restoration of tranquility in central India. There were very many reasons why it was natural that the Government should be anxious to have his views on this important subject. Sir Robert Hamilton was a very eminent public servant. He had passed the greater part of his career in high official positions in central India. Not only had he traversed every inch of that territory, but he knew the exact distances between village and village throughout it, the lay of the ground, the disposition of the people, the peculiarities which constituted either a bond or a division between the several districts. Sir Robert had trained from his early youth the boy who, in 1857, ruled the possessions of his ancestors as Tilkaji Rao Holkar. The training and the connection—that between a guardian and a ward—had inspired both with similar feelings, feelings of the warmest regard. More than that—each thoroughly believed in the other. Each would have waged the possession he most valued on the question of the loyalty of the other. Sir Robert Hamilton was not less acquainted with all the courtiers of his charge, with their character, their dispositions, the influences they exercised. He knew to a scarcely less degree every man of note in the country.

When, then, the Government of India applied to Sir Robert Hamilton to state the measures which he considered necessary for the restoration of order in central India, they did that which it would have been in the highest degree unwise to omit. Sir Robert Hamilton responded to the call. He drew up a memorandum, which he submitted to the Governor-General. Lord Canning passed it on to Sir Colin Campbell, who was still in Calcutta.

Sir Robert Hamilton's plan was as follows. He proposed that whilst one column, coming from the Bombay Presidency, should make Mau its base of operations, and sweep thence the country between that point and Kalpi on the Jamna, re-conquering Jhansi in its course; another, coming from Madras, should form its base at Jabalpur, clear the line of communication with Allahabad and Mirzapur, and cross Bandalkhand to Banda.
Thus Kalpi and Banda would constitute the points towards which the two columns would separately be directed.

This plan was fully discussed between Sir Robert Hamilton, Sir Colin Campbell, and the Chief of the Staff—General Mansfield—and, in the end, was, with one slight modification in one of its details, adopted. Sir Robert Hamilton calculated that if no delay were to occur in the formation of the several columns, the points indicated would be reached by the 1st of May 1858.

This plan approved, Sir Robert Hamilton proceeded to Indur, and arrived there on the 16th of December 1857, and not only resumed the appointment of Governor-General's Agent for central India, but took up likewise the political functions in respect of all the chiefs in the Sagar and Narbada, territories, which, till then, had been exercised by the Commissioner of those territories.

The day that witnessed the return of Sir Robert Hamilton greeted likewise the arrival of the officer who had been nominated by Lord Canning to command the force which, having its base at Mau, was to work up to the southern bank of the Jamna. That officer was Major-General Sir Hugh Rose, K.C.B. Sir Hugh Rose bore, even then, a high character for ability, decision, and firmness. Entering the army in 1820, he had early given proof of those qualities, and when, in 1840, the Government of the Queen decided to detach several British officers to serve in Syria with the view of checking the progress of the rebellious Pasha of Egypt, Lieutenant-Colonel Rose proceeded thither in the capacity of Deputy Adjutant-General. Here he distinguished himself no less by his judgment than by his daring courage. In a hand-to-hand encounter with the Egyptian cavalry, in which he was wounded, Colonel Rose captured with his own hand the leader of the enemy, an exploit which procured for him a sabre of honor from the Sultan and the Order of the Nishan Iftihar set in diamonds. For his conduct in Syria, too, he was decorated with the companionship of the Bath. A little later he was nominated by Lord Palmerston Consul-General of Syria.

When, a few years subsequently, Russia was preparing to make her bid for the inheritance of the "sick man," Colonel Rose was nominated secretary to the embassy at Constantinople.

Later on, just before the storm broke, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe proceeded to England, and Colonel Rose succeeded him as chargé d'affaires. Holding that office, he not only penetrated the designs of Russia, but detected that the one means by which only

39 The modification was immaterial. Sir R. Hamilton had suggested that the two brigades of which the Mau column would be composed should, prior to their advance on Jhinsi, effect a junction at Sipri. Sir Colin Campbell substituted Gimah for Sipri. Gimah is nearer to Jhansi by seventy miles.

England could foil them was to put her foot down, and say, "One step further constitutes war." Impressed with this idea, when Prince Menschikoff endeavored to impose upon the Sultan terms which would have annihilated the independence of Turkey, and the Sultan, turning to the British chargé d'affaires, implored him to give a material pledge of the support of England by bringing the British fleet into Turkish waters, Colonel Rose took the responsibility upon himself, and ordered the fleet to Besika Bay. The fact that such an order had been sent answered for the moment the purposes of the Sultan. Russia was checked; and, if she renewed her attack, it was because the same firmness and the same clear-sightedness were not apparent in the conduct of the British ministers who approved the admiral for refusing to comply with Colonel Rose's requisition.

Subsequently Colonel Rose served in the Crimean war. He was recommended for the Cross of the Legion of Honor for his conduct at Alma, was repeatedly mentioned for distinguished conduct in the trenches before Sebastopol, and had two horses shot under him at Inkerman. I cannot omit to add that Marshal Canrobert, then commanding the French army in the Crimea, recommended General Rose for the Victoria Cross for his gallant conduct on three different occasions, and that the claim was not preferred solely because general officers were expressly excluded from the decoration. For his services in this war General Rose received the Turkish order of the Medjidie, was nominated a Knight Commander of the Bath, and received a step in rank "for distinguished conduct in the field."

When the mutiny broke out in India, Sir Hugh Rose proceeded at once to that country. He landed in Bombay on the 19th of September, was brought on the general staff of the army from that date, and was shortly appointed to the command of the force acting in Malwa, the operations of which I have recorded in this volume. He proceeded accordingly to Indur in company with Sir Robert Hamilton, who had taken the only route then open, that via Bombay.

Simultaneously, almost, with the appointment of Sir Hugh Rose to command one of the columns indicated, Brigadier General Whitlock of the Madras army was nominated to direct the other. The proceedings of this officer will be related in the next chapter. This will be devoted to the operations of the Mau column.

The force, now called the Central India Field Force, of which Sir Hugh Rose took command on the 17th of December, consisted of two brigades—the first being at Mau; the second at Sihor. The brigades were thus formed. The first, under the command of Brigadier C. S. Stuart of the Bombay army, was composed of a squadron 14th Light Dragoons, a troop of the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, two regiments of cavalry Haidarabad contingent, the 86th Regiment, the 25th Regiment Bombay Native Infantry, one regiment infantry Haidarabad contingent, one troop of horse artillery, one light field battery, two field batteries Haidarabad contingent, and some sappers; the second,
commanded by Brigadier Steuart, 14th Light Dragoons, of the head-quarters of the 14th Light Dragoons, head-quarters of the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, one regiment of cavalry Haidarabad contingent, the 3rd Bombay European Regiment, the 24th Bombay Native Infantry, one regiment of infantry Haidarabad contingent, a battery of Bombay Horse Artillery, one field battery of artillery Haidarabad contingent, one company Madras sappers, a detachment of Bombay sappers, and a siege-train.

From the second chapter of the last book the reader will have gathered some idea of the hard work which had already devolved upon this force; he will have seen how they had triumphed over obstacles, had beaten every enemy, had proved incontestably that they were made of the stuff which required only leading to conquer. They had now once more a leader. Personally, indeed, that leader was a stranger to them, but his reputation had gone before him, and that reputation was of a nature to make the men grudge even the short period of repose which it was necessary to give them.

That repose was necessary for the perfect carrying out of the plan devised by Sir R. Hamilton with Sir Cohn Campbell in Calcutta by virtue of which a second force, that to be commanded by Whitlock, should start from Jabalpur. Until tidings of Whitlock's movements should be received, Sir Hugh was forced to halt at Mau.

The time was not thrown away. The two brigades were organized; the country was pacified; the line of advance was marked out; the men had time to recruit themselves. The country about Mau and Indur is peculiarly suited to be a resting-place. It abounds with the necessaries of life; there is plenty of water and of fodder; the climate at that season is most enjoyable; the country, hilly and diversified, is pleasant to the eye. The halt there was but short; it scarcely exceeded three weeks—not too long to satiate the men with their rest, yet long enough to make them glad to be once more on the move.

On the 6th of January Sir Hugh Rose, accompanied by Sir R. Hamilton, started from Mau to join the 2nd brigade at Sihor. On the 8th the siege-train was dispatched to join him there. It arrived on the 15th. On the following morning Sir Hugh, reinforced by about eight hundred Bhopal levies contributed by the loyal Begun of that principality, started for Rathgarh, a strong fort held by the rebels. The 1st brigade left Mau on the 10th, and then marched in a line parallel with the 2nd brigade upon Chandairi, a very famous fortress in the territories of Sindia. I propose first to follow the fortunes of the 2nd brigade.

Rathgarh, distant only thirty miles from Sagar, Rathgarh is situated on the spur of a long high hill, and commands the country surrounding it. The eastern and southern faces of the fortress are almost perpendicular—the rock being scarped. Round their base runs a deep and rapid river—the Bina—answering the purpose of a wet ditch. The

\[41 \text{Now the 109th Regiment.}\]
north face is covered by a strong wall, facing a very thick jungle, between which and the
wall is a deep ditch twenty feet wide. The western face overlooks the town and the road
to Sagar, and its gateway is flanked by several bastions, round and square. Along each
face and in the four angles were bastions commanding the only possible approaches.
Altogether it was a most formidable position.

Sir Hugh Rose arrived before this place the morning of the 24th of January. He at once,
with small loss, drove the enemy from the outside positions they had occupied in the
towns and on the banks of the river, and then completely invested the place. Fronting
the eastern face he posted the Bhopal troops; facing the northern the 3rd Bombay light
cavalry and the cavalry of the Haidarabad contingent. With the remainder of the force
he occupied the plain across which runs the road to Sagar. He then reconnoitered the
ground preparatory to selecting sites for his breaching batteries.

The enemy had reoccupied the town. Issuing from its walls into the thick jungle already
spoken of, they made thence, during the 25th, several raids on the camp-followers and
baggage-animals of the force, and at night even attacked the position held by the
Bhopal troops. They were, however, repulsed with slight loss.

Early the following morning Sir Hugh Rose made a move forward. Crossing the Sagar
road with the 3rd Europeans, followed by the 18-pounders, howitzers, and mortars, and
the guns of the Haidarabad Contingent, he entered the jungle. He had no sooner
reached a point well within its thick covering, than the enemy, who had been lurking
near, fired the jungle grass on all sides. For a few moments the position was perilous,
but Sir Hugh, turning back beyond the range of the flames, sent his sappers to cut a
road up the height to the north of the town for the guns. This, and the getting up of the
guns, occupied the greater part of the day.

Meanwhile the remainder of the force had occupied the town, and driven the enemy
within the fort.

At 3 o'clock the summit of the hill fronting the northern face of the fort was gained. Sir
Hugh at once selected sites for his breaching batteries, and set the sappers to work. By 8
P.M. the mortar battery was ready. Whilst it was being thrown up the 6-pounders of the
Haidarabad contingent kept up a constant fire of shot and shell on the fort, whilst the
3rd Europeans employed their Enfield rifles to keep down the matchlock fire of the
enemy. At 11 P.M. the mortar battery opened fire, and continued it all night. The
breaching batteries were completed by daybreak.

These opened fire early on the morning of the 27th, and continued it all that day and the
day following. At 10 P.M. on the 28th a large breach had been made, and two men went
forward to examine it. They had just returned when a sudden rush of camp-followers
and cattle-drivers from the rear gave intimation that something startling had happened. It transpired immediately that a rebel force was advancing to the relief of the place.

It was so indeed. The raja of Banpur, whose doings in the vicinity of Sagar I have already recorded, was advancing on the rear of the besieging force with a considerable body of revolted sepoys and other levies. He came on with great boldness, his standards flying, and his men singing their national hymns. But if his appearance at this critical juncture was a surprise to Sir Hugh Rose, it was a surprise that did not embarrass him. Instead of ceasing his fire against the fort he redoubled it. As for the raja of Banpur, Sir Hugh detached a small force, consisting of a detachment of the 14th Light Dragoons, the 3rd Bombay cavalry, the horse artillery, and the 5th Haidarabad infantry, to deal with him. It did not require extraordinary exertion to effect this object. The confidence of the raja and his followers vanished as they heard the tramping of the horses of the British and Indian cavalry. They did not wait to be charged, but throwing away their arms and ammunition, made off with such celerity, that, though hotly pursued, a few only were cut up.

The attempt at relief, apparently so formidable, was really a stroke of fortune for Sir Hugh. It had been made, evidently, in concert with the rebels within the fort, and its failure so disheartened them, that they silently evacuated Rathgarh during the night, escaping by a path the precipitous nature of which would seem to preclude the possibility of its being used by man.42 Their flight was not on the whole to be lamented, for Rathgarh was found to be so strong as to make it tenable by a few resolute defenders against numbers greatly superior.

The rebels were pursued, but without, much effect; they had gone too far before the evacuation of the place had been discovered. A little before noon on the 30th Sir Hugh received information that the raja of Banpur, reinforced by the garrison, had taken up a position near the village of Barodia, about fifteen miles distant. He at once ordered out the horse artillery, two 51-inch mortars, two guns of the reserve battery, the 3rd Europeans, the majority of the cavalry, and a section of the Madras sappers, and went in pursuit. About 4 o'clock he came upon them posted on the banks of the Bina, and prepared to dispute his passage. Sir Hugh at once attacked, and though the rebels fought well, he forced the passage of the river. The country on the other side was thick and bushy, and the rebels took every advantage of it. From the river to Barodia Sir Hugh had to fight his way step by step. He did not do this without loss. Two officers43

42 "The most amazing thing was to see the place from whence they had escaped. To look down the precipitous path made one giddy—and yet down this place, where no possible footing could be seen, they had all gone—men and women—in the dead of night! One or two mangled bodies lay at the bottom, attesting the difficulty of the descent. Nothing but despair could have tempted them to have chosen such a way."—Dr. Lowe's Central India during the Rebellion of 1857-58 — a book to which I am much indebted.

43 One of these was Captain Neville, R.E. He had joined the force only the day before. Captain Neville had served throughout the Crimean war, in which he had greatly distinguished himself.
were killed and six were wounded. The casualties among the men were likewise severe. In the end, however, the rebels were completely defeated, and though the rebel raja, was not captured, he owed his safety only to his acquaintance with the intricacies of the jungle. The force returned to Rathgarh about 2 o'clock in the morning. It found there a supply of provisions sent from Sagar escorted by a detachment of the 31st Regiment Native Infantry.

The fall of Rathgarh had effected two most important objects. It had cleared the country south of Sagar of rebels, had reopened the road to Indur, and had made it possible for the general to march to the relief of Sagar, now beleaguered for nearly eight months.

The state of Sagar has been recorded in a preceding chapter. Although during that period the garrison had made occasional sallies, more or less successful, it may, be stated generally that the rebels had retained possession of the strongholds all over the district, and that, by means of these, they had possessed likewise the country. The manner in which they had used their usurped power had made the peasantry look earnestly to the time when the law-loving rule of the British should be restored.

That time had now arrived. Sir Hugh Rose marched from Rathgarh direct on Sagan He entered that place on the morning of the 3rd of February, escorted by the Europeans, officers and others, who had held the fort, and who had gone forth to welcome their deliverers. The 31st Native Infantry was one of the very few regiments of the Bengal army which, retaining its arms, had remained faithful throughout that trying period. The greater honor to the 31st, for its companion infantry regiment had revolted, and it had been tempted on all sides.

Some of those companions had now to be dealt with. Twenty-five miles to the east of Sagar stands, on an elevated angle of ground, the strong fort of Garhakat. The eastern face of this fort is washed by the wide river Sonar; the western and northern faces by the nullah with precipitous banks; the south possesses a strong gateway flanked by bastions, and a ditch twenty feet in depth by thirty in width. So strong are the parapets of this fort, that when, in 1818, it was attacked by Brigadier Watson with a force of eleven thousand men, he was unable, in three weeks, to effect a breach in them, and was glad to allow the garrison to evacuate the place with all the honors of war! In February 1858 it was held by the revolted sepoys of the 51st and 52nd Native Infantry, and other rebels, well supplied with ammunition and provisions.

Sir Hugh Rose sent a small force to destroy the fort of Sanoda on the 8th, and on the 9th of February marched towards Garhakat. He arrived within sight of it and encamped at half-past 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 11th. He at once made a reconnaissance, which was not concluded till 8 P.M. Sir Hugh found that the rebels had thrown up earthworks on the road to the south, by which they had expected him to arrive, and that they were occupying a position close to the village of Bassari, near the fort, in some
force. Notwithstanding the lateness of the hour, he at once drove them from the
positions they held, and occupied Bassari; nor, though during the night the rebels made
repeated efforts, could they regain the posts they had lost.

The next day Sir Hugh commenced his attack. He first caused a breaching battery to be
thrown up opposite the western face. A 24-pounder howitzer working all day from this
battery soon silenced the enemy's guns. Lieutenant Strutt of the Bombay artillery,
already referred to in these pages, succeeded in dismounting one of the enemy's guns
which had been worked very successfully against the assailants. It was this shot, "one of
the many good shots made under fire by Lieutenant Strutt," which, in Sir Hugh's
opinion, made the sepoys reflect on the casualties which might befall them. Certainly
after that they lost heart. In the night they consulted, and determined to escape if they
could. Unfortunately Sir Hugh Rose's force was so small, a great part having been left at
Sagar, that he had been unable to place a portion of it in a position which would guard
the gateway. By this gateway the sepoys made their way into the country during the
night of the 12th. They were, however, pursued early the following morning for twenty-
five miles by Captain Hare, with his Haidarabad cavalry, a troop of the 14th Light
Dragoons under Lieutenant Reed, and half a troop of horse artillery. Hare came up with
them at the Bias river, near the village of Nan The river not being practicable for guns,
he led the cavalry across, fell upon the rebels, and cut up about a hundred of them.

Garhakot was found full of supplies. Sir Hugh had its western face destroyed, and
returned to Sagar on the 17th.

Jhansi, one hundred and twenty-five miles to the north, was the next point to be aimed
at. But between Sagar and Jhansi lay the passes of Maltun and Maddanpur, the forts of
Sorai and of Mariora, the towns of Shahgarh and Banpar. After overcoming the certain
obstacles which would be offered by these places, Sir Hugh would have, before
marching on Jhansi, to effect a junction with his 1st brigade under Brigadier Stuart.

Before setting out on this expedition, there were other considerations demanding
attention. Sir Hugh could scarcely move from Sagar until he should receive certain
information that Brigadier Whitlock's column had started from Jabalpur for that place.
Meanwhile he would have time to repair damages and to store supplies. The necessity
for this was the more pressing inasmuch as it had been ascertained that the districts
through which the force would have to march, still occupied by rebel sepoys or
disaffected chiefs, would supply little or nothing in the way of commissariat. The hot
season, too, was setting in, and it was certain that not a blade of grass would survive a
few weeks of its duration. Sir Hugh foresaw all this, and employed the enforced delay
in laying up supplies. He caused to be collected sheep, goats, oxen, grain, flour, and
large supplies of tea and soda-water. Much of the grain was sent by the loyal Begam of
Bhopal. The sick and wounded men he transferred to the Sugar field hospital, to be sent
away or to rejoin as opportunity might offer. He resupplied the siege-train with
ammunition, and strengthened it by the addition of heavy guns, howitzers, and large mortars from the Sagar arsenal. He obtained likewise an additional supply of elephants, and, what was of great consequence, he secured summer clothing for his European soldiers.

At length news came that Whitlock had left Jabalpur. Sir Hugh's preparations were now as complete as they could be made. Accordingly a start was determined upon. On the evening of the 26th of February Sir Hugh detached Major Orr's column of the Haidarabad contingent to march on a route parallel with his own, and at 2 o'clock he set out with the remainder of the troops. The following day he took, after some shelling, the fort of Barodia. Pressing forward, he found himself, on the 3rd of March, in front of the pass of Maltun. This pass, of great natural strength, had been fortified, and was now held in force by a mixed army of sepoys and local levies. A reconnaissance having convinced Sir Hugh of the great loss of life which would inevitably attend a direct attack upon it, he determined then only to feign an attack in front, whilst, with the bulk of his force, he should gain the table-land above the hills by a flank movement through the pass of Madanpur. With this view, early on the morning of the 4th of March, he detailed a force, under Major Scudamore, to menace the pass, whilst with the remainder, now strengthened by the junction of the Haidarabad troops, he moved on Madanpur.

The pass leading to this town forms a narrow gorge between two ranges of hills, thickly covered with jungle and brushwood, and capable of offering a solid defence. The rebels had not only crowned the heights on both sides of the gorge, and planted guns in the gorge itself, but they had sent, to a considerable distance in advance, skirmishers, who, concealed in the jungle, would be able to harass an advancing enemy. The British troops, in making the turning movement contemplated, marched for about six miles along the foot of the hills, which they then began to ascend. Almost immediately the enemy opened fire. The crests seemed alive with their infantry, whilst their guns from the gorge opened a continuous fire. Sir Hugh sent the 3rd Europeans and the Haidarabad infantry to storm the heights, brought his guns to the front, and returned the enemy's fire.

The British skirmishers drove back the rebel footmen, but as these retired another artillery-fire opened from a commanding position at the further end of the pass. So galling and so heavy was this fire that for a short time the British advance was checked. Sir Hugh even ordered the guns to retire some yards. Before this could be done Sir Hugh's horse was shot under him, and the artillerymen were forced to take refuge behind the guns. Bullets fell like hailstones, and the number of killed and wounded increased every moment.

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44 Consisting of the 24th Bombay N.I., three guns Bhopal artillery, one howitzer, a detachment 14th light dragoons, and the 3rd Bombay cavalry.
The halt, however, was only temporary. The guns of the Haidarabad contingent coming up at this conjuncture opened with shell on the enemy's masses to the left of the pass in support of the guns in action. Under cover of this combined shower, the 3rd Europeans and the Haidarabad infantry charged. Asiatics can stand anything but a charge of infantry. They had here a splendid position, and a large force of the three arms to hold it; but the sight of the charging infantry struck awe into them. Far from awaiting, with their superior numbers, the hand-to-hand encounter offered, they fled in disorder and dismay. They were followed through the pass by their enemy, and only halted to take breath when they found themselves within the town of Madanpar.

That town, however, was to be no secure refuge to them. Sir Hugh Rose brought his howitzers to the front and opened fire upon it. For a few minutes the rebels replied, and then fled to the jungles behind. The cavalry, sent in pursuit, followed them to the walls of the fort of Sorai.

The effect of this victory was very great. It so daunted the rebels that they evacuated, without a blow, the formidable pass of Maltun, the fort of Narut to the rear of it, the little fort of Sorai, the strong fort of Maraora, the fortified castle of Banpur—the residence of the rebel raja called after it—the almost impregnable fortress of Tal-Bahat on the heights above the lake of that name. They abandoned also the line of the Bina and the Bitwa, with the exception of the fortress of Chandairi, on the left bank of the latter river.

Leaving Sir Hugh Rose to reap the consequences of his victory at Madanpur, I propose to return for a moment to the 1st brigade, under the command of Brigadier C. S. Stuart of the Bombay army, which, in pursuance of the instructions of Sir Hugh Rose, had left Mau on the 10th of January, and marched upon Gunah, meeting on its route no serious opposition. About seventy miles to the east of Gunah lies the important post of Chandairi. Chandairi is a very famous town. Its splendor in the prosperous times of the Moghol empire had made it notorious. "If you want to see a town whose houses are palaces, visit Chandairi," was a proverb in the time of Akbar. In the reign of that illustrious prince it was described as a city possessing fourteen thousand houses built of stone, three hundred and eighty-four markets, three hundred and sixty caravanserais, and twelve thousand mosques. Since that period, it is true, the rule of the Marithas had worked a great change in its prosperity. In later years, too, its manufactures had suffered from competition with Manchester. But its fort still remained—strong, menacing, defiant, with a long history, testifying alike to its prestige and to the velour of its defenders. Situated on the summit of a high hill, defended by a rampart of sandstone, flanked by circular towers, the fort of Chandairi, seen by an approaching enemy, looked worthy of its reputation. To this place, in February 1858, flocked the sepoys beaten in the actions already detailed by Sir Hugh Rose, to join there the men who had sworn to defend it successfully or to perish.
Against it Brigadier C. S. Stuart marched from Gunah. On the 5th of March he reached a place, Khukwasas, six miles from Chandairi. Between Khukwasas and Chandairi the road lay through a dense jungle. Stuart, therefore, sent the 86th Foot and the 25th Bombay Native Infantry to the front in skirmishing order. After marching three miles, he arrived at a narrow pass between two high hills—a place offering splendid capabilities for defence. To the surprise of Stuart, none was offered. Two miles further, however, the road was found barricaded. The engineers began to clear away the barricades; but they had not worked long before the enemy were seen to climb the hill to the left. On reaching it they opened out a musketry-fire. From this point of vantage they were soon dislodged by a small party of the 86th, and the barricades having been removed, the artillery advanced, covered by the 86th on the right, and the 25th Native Infantry on the left. They had not gone far, however, before a very heavy fire opened upon them from the wall of an enclosure about one mile distant from the fort. The 86th dashed forward to gain this enclosure. One officer of the regiment, Lieutenant Lewis, and the political agent with the force, Captain Keatinge, outrunning the men, gained first the top of its wall, and jumping down, followed by a few men, drove out the enemy. Stuart pursued his advantage, and did not halt till he had occupied the hills to the west of the fort.

The next few days were spent by Stuart in clearing the neighboring villages, in reconnoitering, and in planting his guns in a commanding position. On the 13th the breaching-batteries effected a breach which was reported practicable.

On the morning of the 17th Stuart sent his stormers, men of the 86th and 25th Native Infantry, to the attack. Their impetuous rush himself carried all before them. Captain Keatinge, who accompanied the party, and who led it into the breach, was struck down severely wounded. But his fall did not stop the stormers. The rebels hurled themselves over the parapets to avoid the rush they could not withstand, and most of them escaped. A letter which the brigadier had sent the previous day to Captain Abbott commanding a party of cavalry, and requesting him to invest the north side of the fort, reached that officer too late. But the place was taken with all its guns.

Sir Hugh Rose heard of the storming of Chandairi on the 18th. Hearing that the garrison had escaped northwards, he sent a detachment of the Haidarabad contingent to intercept them. This force came up with a few stragglers only, but captured some camels and ponies. On the 19th he marched to Chanchanpur, one march, fourteen miles, from Jhansi. After a rest here of about two hours, he dispatched the cavalry, horse artillery, and light field-guns of the 2nd brigade to reconnoiter and invest that place.

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45 Now Colonel Keatinge, V.C.

46 The casualties in the capture were twenty-nine, including two officers.
To the fall of Jhansi Lord Canning and Lord Elphinstone attached the greatest importance. They regarded that fortress as the stronghold of rebel power in central India, the main strength of the formidable rebel force on the Jamul. It was a place, moreover, in which the slaughter of English men and women had been accompanied by circumstances of peculiar atrocity, and where hatred to the English name had been illustrated by acts of the most wanton barbarity. Nevertheless, anxious as was Lord Canning, anxious as was Sir Colin Campbell himself, that the blow, the most effective of all to the rebel cause in central India, should be struck, they were both so little appreciative of the enormous value of delivering that blow at once, whilst the success of Sir Hugh Rose's brigades was yet fresh in the minds of the rebels, that, on the very eve of the crisis, they both sent orders to defer the attack on Jhansi, to divert the force elsewhere. From the dangerous consequences of their own orders they were saved by the firmness and decision of Sir Robert Hamilton.

I have already stated that Sir Hugh had sent the cavalry and horse artillery of his 2nd brigade, on the afternoon of the 20th, to reconnoiter and invest Jhansi. He was about, a few hours later, to follow with his infantry, when an express arrived in camp bearing two dispatches. One of these was from the Governor-General to Sir Robert Hamilton, the other from the Commander-in-Chief to Sir Hugh Rose.

The purport of these two dispatches was identical. They represented that the raja of Chirkari, a man who, throughout the trying period of 1857-58, had shown unwavering fidelity to his British overlord, was being besieged in his fort by Tantia Topi and the Gwiliar contingent, and they ordered Hamilton and Rose to march at once to his relief, Whitlock's force not being near enough to do so.

Chirkari was about eighty miles from the ground on which Sir Hugh's force was encamped, on the direct road to Banda. Jhansi was within fourteen miles. To the mind of a soldier the idea would naturally present itself that the surest mode of saving the lesser and more distant place was to attack at once the more important and nearer fortress; that to act on the principle indicated in the dispatches would be to act in defiance alike of the rules of war and of common sense. So it appeared to both Hamilton and Rose. But Sir Hugh was a soldier. He had received a positive order. Foolish though he knew that order to be, he was bound to obey it. He would be forced to obey it unless the means could be devised of superseding it by higher and more potential authority.

Sir Robert Hamilton devised those means. How, I will relate in his own simple words. "Sir Hugh Rose considered the order of the Commander-in-Chief imperative: there was not anything left to my discretion in my letter from the Governor-General; it was clear to me it would be a great political mistake to draw off from Jhansi, which our cavalry were investing, and our force within fourteen miles; moreover, supposing the force moved on Chirkari, it was not possible to march the eighty miles before the rebels had carried the fort, the raja having no provisions, and having lost the outworks according
to my intelligence. I, therefore, took on myself the responsibility of proceeding with our operations against Jhansi, trusting to that course as the most effective to draw the enemy from Chirkari, and so I wrote to the Governor-General.\footnote{Memorandum submitted by Sir Robert Hamilton to Lord Palmerston, - dated the 20th of March 1862.}

It was a responsibility which only a strong man would take, thus to act in direct opposition to the orders of the two highest officials in the country, but, under the circumstances, it was a responsibility which it was necessary to assume. It gave a decided character to the campaign, and enabled Sir Hugh Rose to carry to a glorious conclusion the task which he had taken in hand at Mau.

Freed by Sir Robert Hamilton from the necessity of pursuing the vicious course indicated by the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Rose set out at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 21st for Jhansi. He arrived before that city at 9 o'clock, and halting his troops in the open about a mile and a half from the fort, proceeded with his staff to reconnoiter. He did the work completely, for it had struck 6 P.M. before he returned.

Between the open ground on which Sir Hugh had halted and the town and fortress of Jhansi, were the ruined bungalows occupied nine months before by Europeans, the jail, the "Star" fort, and the sepoy lines. Near the town were several large temples and topes of tamarind trees. On the right of the halting-ground, stretching to the north and east of the city, was a long belt of hills, through which ran the Kalpi and Urchah roads; to the left were other hills and the Datiah road; due north was the fortress on a high granite rock, overlooking, to the north, the walled-in city.\footnote{Lowe's \textit{Central India}.}

The great strength of the fort of Jhansi, natural as well as artificial, and its extent, entitle it to a place among fortresses. It stands on an elevated rock, rising out of a plain, and commands the city and surrounding country. It is built of excellent and most massive masonry. The fort is difficult to breach, because composed of granite; its walls vary in thickness from sixteen to twenty feet. It has extensive and elaborate outworks of the same solid construction, with front and flanking embrasures for artillery-fire, and loopholes, of which in some places there were five tiers, for musketry. Guns placed on the high towers of the fort commanded the country all around. On one tower, called the "white turret," recently raised in height, waved in proud defiance the standard of the high-spirited rani.

The fortress is surrounded on all sides by the city of Jhansi, the west and part of the south face excepted.

The steepness of the rock protects the west; the fortified city wall springs from the centre of its south face, running south-east, and ends in a high mound or mamelon,
which protects by a flanking fire its south face. The mound was fortified by a strong circular bastion for five guns, round part of which was drawn a ditch, twelve feet deep and fifteen broad, of solid masonry.

The city of Jhansi is about four miles and a half in circumference, and is surrounded by a fortified and massive wall, from six to twelve feet thick, and varying in height from eighteen to thirty feet, with numerous flanking bastions armed as batteries, with ordnance, and loop-holes, with a banquette for infantry.\(^49\)

The town and fortress were garrisoned by eleven thousand men, composed of rebel sepoys, foreign mercenaries, and local levies, and they were led by a woman who believed her cause to be just, and who, classified according to Channing's definition of greatness, was a heroine, though of the third order.

In his long reconnaissance of the 21st of March, Sir Hugh Rose had noted all the strong points of the defence, and had examined the lay of the ground. He noted the many difficulties presented to the attack, by the fort perched on a lofty granite rock, with its three lines of works, its flanking fire, its thick and solid walls. He had discovered that it would be necessary to take the city prior to assailing the fortress, a work involving double labor and double danger. In this reconnaissance, however, he had decided on his plan of attack. That night he was joined by the cavalry of the 1st brigade. The next day he completely invested the city and fortress with his cavalry. In this investment the defenders read the determination of the English general to capture not only the place but its garrison.

One of the measures taken by the rani might, under other circumstances, have caused considerable embarrassment to the besiegers. She had made the country all about bare. Not a blade of grass was to be seen. Thanks, however, to the loyalty of Sindia and of the rani of Theri, the force was throughout the operations abundantly supplied with grass, firewood, and vegetables.

The cavalry having invested the city on the 22nd, the siege began on the night of that day. At 9 o'clock a detachment of Madras and Bombay sappers, was sent with two 18-pounders, and a company 24th Bombay Native Infantry, to throw up a battery near the Urcha road on the east side of the town wall; other parties were detached at the same time to positions which the general had selected. Working hard that night, the next day, and the night and day which followed, four batteries, constituting the right attack, were ready on the evening of the 24th. On the morning of the 25th they opened fire. That day, too, the bulk of the let brigade came up, and was at once posted south of the fort, constituting there the left attack.

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\(^49\) Sir Hugh Rose's dispatch, dated the 30th of April 1858, from which this description is taken almost textually. Sir Hugh adds, further on, A remarkable feature in the defence was that the enemy had no works or forts outside the city."
The siege now progressed in real earnest. For seventeen days the fire from the besieging batteries and from the walls of the city and fort was incessant. Shot and shell were poured into the city, and the enemy's guns never ceased to reply. The labor entailed upon the small force of the besiegers was tremendous. During the period of which I have spoken the men never took off their clothes, nor were the horses unbridled except to water. Nor were the exertions of the besieged less determined. Women and children were seen assisting in repairing the defenses of the walls, and in carrying water and food to the troops on duty, whilst the rani constantly visited the troops and animated them to enthusiasm by her presence and her words.

For breaching purposes Sir Hugh had been able to employ only two 18-pounders, the remainder of the guns being laid so as to employ the enemy incessantly, and to damage the buildings inside the city. The progress made by these 18-pounders was, owing to the great strength of the walls, extremely slow. But on the 29th the parapets of the mamelon bastion were leveled by the fire from the left attack, and the enemy's guns there rendered useless. The two following days the cannonading continued with great spirit. A breach had been effected, but it was barely practicable; the courage of the enemy continued unabated; danger seemed only to increase their resolution. Such was the state of affairs when a new danger arose for the besiegers. On the evening of the 31st of March intelligence reached Sir Hugh Rose that an army was advancing from the north for the relief of the fortress. This was the army of Tantia Topi. The career of this able Maratha leader will be told at fuller detail in a subsequent chapter. Suffice it to say that after his victory over Windham and his subsequent defeat by Sir Colin Campbell, Tantia had crossed the Ganges, and subsequently, in obedience to orders from Rao Sahib, the nephew of Nana Sahib, had proceeded to Kalpi. Thence, complying with orders from the same quarter, he had, with a small force of nine hundred sepoys and four guns, moved on Chirkari, and, on the eleventh day, had taken it, capturing twenty-four guns and three lakhs of rupees. Just at this time he received a letter from the rani of Jhansi, begging him to come to her help. Again he asked for orders, and again received the full approval of his superior. His and force, by this time, had been increased by the junction of five or six regiments of the Gwaliar contingent and the levies of rebel rajas to twenty-two thousand men and twenty-eight guns. Leading it himself, he marched on the English camp before Jhansi.

The position of Sir Hugh Rose was full of peril. Before him was an unconquered fortress, garrisoned by eleven thousand warriors, full of the ardor of battle; advancing against and close to him, an army of more than twenty thousand men led by a chief who hated the English, and who had twice reveled in their defeat at Kanhpur. It was a position which required in a special degree great daring, a resolute will, the power to take responsibility. A single false step, a solitary error in judgment, might have been fatal. But Sir Hugh Rose was equal to the occasion. Rightly believing that to withdraw the troops then investing the fortress, for the purpose of meeting the new enemy, would
give the besieged all the moral advantages of victory as well as the material advantages
which they would derive from a virtual raising of the siege, the English general
resolved still to press the siege with vigor, whilst at the head of all the troops not
engaged in actual duty he should march against the new enemy. The extreme daring of
this plan will be realized when the reader reflects that Sir Hugh was unable to assemble
more than one thousand five hundred men of all arms for this purpose, that of these
only five hundred were British, and that the enemy numbered, according to Tantia
Topi's own admission, twenty-two thousand men. Sir Hugh's preparations§ for the
engagement were made on the evening of the 31st. He resolved to attack early the
following morning.

Sir Hugh had drawn his covering force from both brigades, the detachment from the 1st
being led by Brigadier C. S. Stuart, that from the 2nd by himself in person. The men
slept in their clothes ready for immediate action. The precaution was necessary. At 4
o'clock in the morning of the An 1st, Tantia Topi advanced towards the British
encampment. Half an hour later, the falling back of his pickets warned the English
general of his approach. In a few minutes the British guns opened fire, and almost
immediately those of the enemy answered. But the fire of a few guns was powerless to
check the onward march of an enemy whose line overlapped that of the British on both
flanks. Tantia had but to move straight on to reach with his overlapping wings the
troops besieging the fortress, who would thus, literally, be placed between two fires. Sir
Hugh comprehended the position in an instant, and took measures to meet it. Massing
his horse artillery on his left, and attaching to it a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons,
under Captain Prettijohn, he ordered them to attack the enemy's right, whilst he
himself, on the other flank, should direct another squadron against their left. The plan
succeeded admirably. The rebels were so surprised and intimidated by this double
attack, that their centre, which up to that time had been advancing steadily, first halted,
and then, as the men composing it discerned a movement on the part of the British
infantry, broke up into disordered masses. The movement of the British infantry is
easily accounted for. Sir Hugh Rose, in the moment of charging, had sent orders to his
infantry to advance as soon as the cavalry attack should be well pronounced. This order
was now obeyed. The infantry sprang to their feet, advanced a few yards, then poured
in a volley and charged. The result was magical. The first line of the enemy at once
broke, and fled in complete disorder towards the second line, abandoning several of
their guns.

The second line, commanded by Tantia in person, was occupying a position upon rising
ground, its front covered by jungle, about two miles in rear of the first line. Tantia
beheld in dismay the latter rushing helter skelter towards him, followed by the three
arms of the British in hot pursuit; but he had scarcely realized the fact when another

§ The preparations were witnessed with delight by the defenders of Jhansi, who thought the English were
marching to certain destruction. They shouted all night in a frenzy of joy.
vision on his right flank came to add to his anguish. Whilst Sir Hugh Rose had been engaged in the manner I have described, Brigadier C. S. Stuart, with the detachment of the 1st brigade, had moved round the hill into the plain on the right of the enemy, in order to check a large body of them, who were taking advantage of the battle raging in front of the line to move off towards Jhansi. Stuart attacked, defeated them, and drove them back, hotly following them. So close, indeed, was the pursuit, that they had no time to reform, but fled in confusion, leaving gun after gun in the hands of the victors, and leaving numbers of their own men dead or dying on the field. This was the vision that came to add to the dismay of Tantia Topi.

It had the effect of forcing upon him a prompt decision. The day, he saw, was lost, but there was yet time to save the second line and his remaining guns. I have said that the ground upon which he rested was covered to the front by jungle. This jungle was dry and easily kindled. He at once set fire to it, and under cover of the smoke and flames, commenced a retreat across the Betwah, hoping to place that river between himself and the pursuers. His infantry and horsemen led the retreat, his guns covered it. Right gallantly and skillfully they did it, and he did succeed in crossing the Betwah with his reserve and guns and some of the fugitives of the first line. But he was not the safer for the passage. The British horse artillery and cavalry had dashed at a gallop through the burning jungle, and they were resolved not to cease the pursuit till they had captured every gun that had opened against them. They carried out their programme to the letter. The pursuit did not cease till every gun had been taken. Fifteen hundred rebels were killed or wounded on this day. The remainder, with Tantia Topi at their head, fled towards Kalpi.51

Whilst this battle had been raging, the besieged had redoubled their fire. Mounting the bastions and the wall, they had shouted and yelled, and poured down volleys of musketry, seemingly threatening a sortie. Never, however, did the besiegers' batteries ply with more vigor or with greater effect. The sight from the wall, moreover, did not long continue to inspire.

Suddenly the yells and the shouts ceased—a sure sign that the garrison had recognized that the hour of deliverance had not arrived for them.

The victorious army, returning from the pursuit, its morale strengthened as much as that of the enemy had deteriorated, resumed its former positions the same evening. Sir Hugh Rose determined then to take the promptest advantage of the discouragement which, he was well aware, the defeat of Tantia Topi could not fail to produce in the minds of the garrison. He poured in, then, a heavy fire all that night and the day following. On the 2nd the breach in the city wall having been reported practicable,

51 Tantia states that four or five guns were saved, but these must have been additional to the twenty-eight field-pieces accounted for. He adds that he was followed in his flight by only two hundred sepoys.
though only just practicable, Sir Hugh determined to storm the place the following
morning. He made his preparations accordingly. His plan was to make a false attack on
the west wall with a small detachment under Major Gall, 14th Light Dragoons; as soon
as the sound of his guns should be heard, the main storming party was to debouch from
cover, and enter the breach, whilst on the right of it attempts should be made to
escalade the wall. The right attack, composed of the Madras and Bombay sappers, the
3rd Bombay Europeans, and the infantry of the Haidarabad contingent, was divided
into two columns and a reserve. The right column was commanded by Lieutenant-
Colonel Liddell, the left by Captain Robinson—both of the 3rd Europeans—the reserve
by Brigadier Steuart, 14th Light Dragoons. This attack was to attempt to gain the town
by escalade. The left attack, composed of the Royal Engineers, the 86th Foot, and the
25th Bombay Native Infantry, was similarly divided. Its left column, commanded by
Lieutenant-Colonel Lowth, 86th Regiment, was to storm the breach; the right led by
Major Stuart, 86th Regiment, to escalade the rocket-tower and the low curtain
immediately to the right of it. The reserve was commanded by Brigadier C. S. Stuart.

At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 3rd of April the storming parties marched to the
positions assigned to them, to await there the signal from Major Gall's party. No sooner
was it given than the stormers dashed to the front. On the left, Captain Darby, 86th, led
the stormers of Colonel Lowth's column up the breach in the most gallant manner,
driving the enemy before him. At the same time Major Stuart attacked the rocket-tower,
and though met by a strong opposition, forced his way by it into the town. Lowth then
collected his men, and detached a portion of them against that section of the rebel forces
which were engaged in opposing the right attack. Taking these in flank and rear, this
detachment forced them to let go their hold on the defenses, thus greatly facilitating the
difficult task of the right attack. With the remainder of his troops, Lowth prepared to
march on the rani's palace.

The right attack, on hearing the signal, had marched silently from their cover in three
bodies. No sooner, however, had the troops composing it turned into the road leading
towards the gate which was the object of their assault than the enemy's bugles sounded,
and a very heavy fire opened upon them.\(^{52}\) Through this fire the stormers had to march
upwards of two hundred yards. Steadily they pushed on, and planted the ladders in
three places against the wall. For the moment, however, it was impossible for the
stormers to ascend. "The fire of the enemy waxed stronger, and amid the chaos of
sounds of volleys of musketry and roaring of cannon, and hissing and bursting of
rockets, stink-pots, infernal machines, huge stones, blocks of wood, and trees—all
hurled upon their devoted heads—the men wavered for a moment, and sheltered
themselves behind stones."\(^{53}\)

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\(^{52}\) "For a time it appeared like a sheet of fire, out of which burst a storm of bullets, round shot, and rockets,
destined for our annihilation."—Lowe's *Central India.*

\(^{53}\) Lowe, *ibid.*
Notwithstanding this momentary check, the sappers, animated by their officers, kept firm hold of their ladders, and in spite of the superhuman efforts of the enemy, maintained them in their position against the wall. How long this lasted it is difficult to state. Minutes seemed hours, when, happily, Major Boileau, Madras Engineers, who had gone back to report the state of affairs to the brigadier, brought up a reinforcement of a hundred men of the 3rd Europeans. The stormers then rushed to the ladders led by their engineer officers. Some were found too short, others, from weakness, broke down under the men; but Lieutenant Dick, Bombay Engineers, gained, by means of one of them, the summit of the wall, and fighting against enormous odds, called upon the men to follow him. Lieutenant Meiklejohn of the same noble regiment mounted by another, and then boldly jumped down into the seething mass below. Lieutenant Bonus, also of the Bombay Engineers, reached the wall by a third. The men pressed on from behind; but before they could, in any number, join their officers, Dick had fallen from the wall, dying, pierced with shot and bayonets; Bonus had been hurled down, struck in his face by a log or stone; Fox of the Madras sappers, who had also reached the wall, had been shot in the neck; Meiklejohn had been cut to pieces. But the stormers pushed on, and in streams from some eight ladders, at length gained a footing on the rampart, dealing and receiving death from the enemy, who still continued fiercely to contest every point of the attack.

It was at this crisis that the stormers of the left attack made the charge upon the flank and rear of the defenders, of which I have spoken. Its effect was marvelous. The defenders relaxed their hold, the opposition ceased, and the stormers of the right attack jumped down and mingled with their comrades.

The defence having thus given way, the stormers made their way through the city to the palace, Lowth leading the way. The palace had been prepared by the rebels for a resistance in the last resort. The conflict, as the stormers forced their way through the streets, was severe. At the palace it was desperate. The houses on both sides of the street leading to it had been set on fire, and the heat was fearful. When even the courtyard of the palace was reached, it became apparent that the resistance had only begun. Every room was savagely contested. Fruitlessly, however. From chamber to chamber the enemy were driven at the point of the bayonet. At length the palace itself was gained. The opposition, however, had not even then entirely ceased. Two hours later it was discovered that fifty men of the rani’s bodyguard still held the stables attached to the building. These men defended themselves to the last before, after a desperate encounter, they were disposed of. But the men who accomplished this task, the 86th and the 3rd Europeans, were compensated for their toil and danger by recapturing a British flag.54

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54 This was a Union Jack of silk, which Lord William Bentinck had given to the grandfather of the rani’s husband, with the permission to have it carried before him, as a reward for his fidelity.”—Sir H. Rose’s dispatch.
This occurrence had but just happened when Sir Hugh, who had been present throughout with the left attack, received information that a body of the rebels, numbering about four hundred, driven from the town, after having vainly tried to force the pickets of one of the cavalry camps, had taken up a position on a hill to the west of the fortress, where they had been surrounded by the cavalry. Sir Hugh instantly sent against the hill the available troops of all arms under Major Gall. This gallant officer sent to storm the hill a detachment of the 24th Bombay Native Infantry. The 24th went at the rebels with a will, and killed all but about twenty, who retreated to the summit and there blew themselves up. The 24th lost an officer and several men in this attack. Another body of about one thousand five hundred who had collected in one of the suburbs of the town, declaring they would defend it to the last, were driven out, about the same time, with a loss of three hundred of their number.

All that night, and throughout the following day, desultory fighting continued, the enemy being either slaughtered or driven under the shelter of the fort guns. Sir Hugh was meanwhile engaged in organizing measures for an attack on the fortress. But the rani saved him further trouble on that score. On the night of the 4th, despairing of a successful defence of the fortress, and hoping that her presence at Kalpi might induce Tantia Topi once more to aid her, that princess evacuated the fortress with all her remaining followers. She rode straight for Kalpi, and arrived there the very evening on which Tantia, who had travelled more leisurely, reached that place. Sir Hugh sent a cavalry force in pursuit of her, but the start had been too great. A few of the fugitives were, however, cut up.

The fortress of Jhansi was occupied by Sir Hugh Rose on the morning of the 5th of April. The loss sustained by him during the operations against it, including the action on the Betwah, amounted to three hundred and forty-three killed and wounded, of whom thirty-six were officers. The enemy's loss was computed at five thousand. One thousand dead bodies were actually burned or buried in Jhansi itself.

The mode by which Jhansi was captured attests the merits of the noble soldier who planned and carried out the attack. Never was there a more complete combination of daring and skill, of foresight and resolution. The result was worthy of the plan, and of the genius which formed the plan.55

Sir Hugh's object now was to march on Kalpi, to drive the rebels from that stronghold on the Jamna whence they had so constantly menaced the communications of the

55 The following extracts from Sir Hugh Rose's dispatch attest the great strength of the town and fortress: "It was not till Jhansi was taken that its great strength was known. There was only one part of the fortress, the south curtain, which was considered practicable for breaching. But, when inside, we saw this was a mistake, there being at some distance in rear of the curtain a massive wall fifteen or twenty feet thick, and immediately in rear of this a deep tank cut out of the live rock."
British. Kalpi was the arsenal of the rebels, the head-quarters of the nephew of Nana Sahib, and was extremely well provided with artillery and warlike stores. It lies on the Jamna, one hundred and two miles to the north-east of Jhansi, and only forty-six to the south-west of Kanhpur. The occupation of this place would enable Sir Hugh to touch the left rear of Sir Colin Campbell's army, and, in cooperation with him, to clear the triangle the angles of which were Jhansi, Kalpi, and Agra—Gwaliar being nearly midway in the line uniting Jhansi and Agra.

For seventeen days Sir Hugh's little army had known no repose. The halt at Jhansi of nearly nineteen days which followed the capture of the place was, however, in no sense devoted to repose. Much had to be done in Jhansi itself: the arrangements for a fresh campaign had to be organized, provisions had to be laid in, the magazines to be replenished. At length all was ready. Leaving at Jhansi a small garrison consisting of the head-quarter wing of the 3rd Bombay Europeans, four companies 24th Bombay Native Infantry, left wing 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, one hundred troopers Haidarabad contingent, half a company Bombay sappers, and three guns Bhopal contingent—the whole under the command of Colonel Liddell, 3rd Europeans—Sir Hugh detached, on the night of the 22nd of April, a detachment under Major Gall to watch the rebel garrison of Kota., reported to be at a place called Mau in the neighborhood, and set out himself with the 1st brigade at midnight on the 25th, leaving directions for the 2nd brigade to follow two days later. Major Orr had been previously detached with the bulk of the Haidarabad force to prevent the rajas of Banpur and Shahgarh and any other rebels from crossing the Betwah and doubling back southwards.

Leaving for a moment these several officers engaged in carrying out the orders entrusted to them, I propose to return for a moment to the rani of Jhansi and Tantia Topi.

These two important personages had arrived, as I have said, at Kalpi the same day. The first act of the rani had been to implore the nephew of Nana Sahib, known as Rao Sahib, "to give her an army that she might go and fight." The following morning Rio Sahib ordered a parade of all the troops at his disposal. These consisted of some regiments of the Gwiliar contingent, several regiments of the regular native army recruited to nearly full strength, the contingents of various rebel rajas, and the remnant of the Jhansi garrison. Rio Sahib reviewed these troops, addressed them, and then directed Tantia to lead them against the English. Tantia obeyed, and hoping to meet them when possibly all their forces were not reunited, marched to Kunch, a town forty miles from Kalpi on the Jhansi road, and there took up a strong position, covered by woods and gardens, with temples at intervals between each of them, surrounded by a strong wall, and there threw up entrenchments.

Meanwhile the English force was advancing on Kunch. Major Gall, harassed by the enemy on his march, had reached the town of Putch, sixteen miles from Kunch, on the
1st of May. Here he was joined the same day by Sir Hugh Rose and the 1st brigade. Major Orr, on his side, had crossed the Betwah, attacked the rajas of Banpur and Shahgarh at Kotra, and had taken one of their guns. He had, however, found it impossible to cut them off, and they had succeeded, for the time, in escaping southwards, supplies and carriage being furnished them by the treacherous raja of Jigni. By Sir Hugh's direction, Major Orr then marched on Kunch.

The country between Pitch and Minch was studded with little forts, which, up to the time of which I am writing, had been occupied by the enemy. From these they could undoubtedly cause considerable annoyance to small detachments; but, in the presence of the large force now collecting at the former place, they deemed it advisable to abandon them and concentrate at Minch.

Sir Hugh was joined by his 2nd brigade, strengthened by the 71st Highlanders, on the 5th of May. He at once marched on Lohari, ten miles nearer Minch, thence to put into action the plan of attack which he had matured. Before this, however, hearing on his arrival at Lohari that the rebels were in possession of the fort of the same name close to it, he detached Major Gall, with a wing of the 3rd Europeans, some artillery and dragoons, to attack it. Gall took the fort, losing two of his officers and some men; but of the garrison not one escaped. Sir Hugh meanwhile had matured his plans.

An Asiatic army, Sir Hugh was well aware, always expects a front attack. He had also noticed that nothing disturbs such an army as a turning movement. Instead, therefore, of sending his troops against a position which the rebels had carefully prepared, Sir Hugh resolved to make a flank march with his whole force on the 6th to a position at once facing the unfortified side of the town of Minch, and threatening seriously the enemy's line of retreat from that place to make a flank march with his whole force on the 6th to a position at once facing the unfortified side of the town of Kunch and threatening seriously the enemy's line of retreat from that place to Kalpi.

With this view Sir Hugh broke up from his encamping-ground early on the morning of the 6th, and making a flank march of fourteen miles, brought his force into the position contemplated. His 1st brigade, forming his left, rested its extreme left on the village of Nagupura; his 2nd brigade, forming the centre, occupied the village of Chomair; Major Orr's Haidarabad force, forming the right, occupied the village of Umri. This position was two miles from Kunch.

The sun was high in the heavens before the troops had taken up the posts assigned to them. Sir Hugh, who had marched with the 1st brigade, ordered them to eat their dinners, whilst he galloped to inspect the arrangements made in the centre and on the right. In an hour he returned, and ordered Major Gall, with a detachment of cavalry, to reconnoitre the wood, garden, and temples which lay between him and Kunch,
covering that advance by a fire of shot and shell. At the same time he directed the siege-
guns to take up a position whence they could play upon the town.

Gall soon returned with a report that the enemy had retreated through the wood to the
part of it near the town, having in their rear a body of cavalry; that the siege-guns had
had the effect of driving the rebels on the right of the wood into the town, but that some
outworks were still occupied by them.

Sir Hugh determined at once to clear the wood and the outworks with his infantry, and
then to storm the town. Covering his left wing with a wing of the 86th, and the whole of
the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, in skirmishing order, and supporting their flanks
with cavalry and horse artillery, he sent them into the wood. Advancing in perfect
order, the gallant sepoys of the 25th Native Infantry cleared the wood, temples, and
walled gardens in front of them, whilst the 86th, making a circuit to their left, carried all
the obstacles in their front, and then, bringing their left shoulders forward, advanced,
despite a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, through the north part of the town and
took the fort. This operation, performed by the 1st brigade, drove the enemy's right on
their centre.

Meanwhile, Brigadier Steuart, commanding the 2nd brigade, having observed a body of
rebel infantry strongly posted in cultivated ground threatening the line of attack of his
brigade, marched to dislodge them. The rebels contested their position with great
velour, and it was not until the 1st brigade, establishing itself in the manner already
described, threatened their flank, that they gave way. It had been intended that
Brigadier Steuart should then march straight into the town, but, with the view of
cutting off the rebels, he moved to the south of it and missed them.

Major Orr's force had, whilst this was going on, advanced through the wood, round the
town, to the plains traversed by the road to Kalpi.

Although the operations of which I have given an outline had taken only an hour, and
the rebels in that short period had been completely defeated, they managed,
nevertheless, to gain with the bulk of their forces the Kalpi road in advance of their
pursuers, and on both sides of this road they were now endeavoring to restore some
sort of order in their masses, so as to check by every means in their power the ardor of
the pursuit. When Sir Hugh Rose, then, emerging from the narrow streets of the town,
formed up his brigades for a renewed attack, he beheld the enemy retreating in a long
irregular line, covered by skirmishers at close distances, the skirmishers supported by
groups who acted to them as a sort of bastions.
The terrific heat of the day, and the power of the sun, which had made itself felt with fatal effect on many of his European soldiers,\textsuperscript{56} forbade him further to risk the soldiers of that arm in a pursuit which could not fail to entail a sacrifice of many valuable lives. He, therefore, halted them, whilst he launched in pursuit the cavalry, of both brigades and of Major Orr's force,\textsuperscript{57} and the horse artillery and field guns.

Then was witnessed action on the part of the rebels which impelled admiration from their enemies. The manner in which they conducted their retreat could not be surpassed. There was no hurry, no disorder, no rushing to the rear. All was orderly as on a field-day. Though their line of skirmishers was two miles in length it never wavered in a single point. The men fired, then ran behind the relieving men, and loaded. The relieving men then fired, and ran back in their turn. They even attempted, when they thought the pursuit was too rash, to take up a position, so as to bring on it an enfilading fire. Their movement was so threatening that Sir Hugh ordered Prettijohn, 14th Light Dragoons, to charge the enfilading party, an order carried out by that most daring officer with great gallantry and success. Still, however, the rebels maintained the order of their retreat, nor was it until many of them had been killed, and all their guns had been captured, that the survivors were driven in on the main body. Then, for the first time, they lost their nerve; then they crowded into the Kalpi road, a long and helpless column of runaways. But the pursuers were completely tired; they were unable to move faster than at a walk; the cavalry horses were knocked up; and whilst the guns could not approach near enough to fire grape, the cavalry could only pick up an occasional straggler. When, then, a few hundred yards further, broken ground, over which the rebels scattered, supervened, the pursuit came to an end. It had produced great results. The rebels lost nine guns, a quantity of ammunition and stores, and five or six hundred men in killed and wounded. The mutinous 52nd Bengal Native Infantry, which covered the retreat, was almost Annihilated. The English loss was three officers and fifty-nine men killed and wounded, in addition to many struck down by the sun.

The defeat at Kunch sowed great mistrust among the rebels. The infantry sepoys taunted the cavalry troopers with having abandoned them, and the men of all three arms brought the same accusation against Tantia Topi, who had disappeared at Kunch even more rapidly than he had galloped away on the Betwah. The Jhansi horse-men, too, came in for their share of abuse, and when they excused themselves on the plea that they had felt bound to escort their rani\textsuperscript{58} to a place of safety, they were only vilified the more. To such an extent did the animosities among the several parties who constituted the rebel force proceed, that on the morrow of their reaching Kalpi, the rumor that Sir Hugh was advancing by forced marches against that place, sufficed to induce them to

\textsuperscript{56} Many of the sepoys were also struck down by the sun.

\textsuperscript{57} Except a party left to watch the Jalaon road and the rear.

\textsuperscript{58} The rani fled to Kalpi after the defeat: Tantia Topi to Chirki, near Jalaor, the residence of his parents.
disperse. It is believed that shortly after that rumor arrived there were only eleven sepoys left in the town and fort of Kalpi. This dispersion was, however, soon remedied in a manner to be hereafter described.

The report which had so disquieted the rebels at Kalpi was not baseless. Despite the fact that his ammunition was well-nigh exhausted, Sir Hugh, determined to give the enemy no breathing-time, had pushed on with all practicable speed from Kunch. On the 15th he established himself at Golaoli, on the Jamna, six miles from Golaoli is not on the direct road between Kunch and Kalpi, but two reasons had prompted Sir Hugh to march on it in preference to taking the direct route. In the first place, he had heard from the Commander-in-Chief that Colonel G. V. Maxwell had been detached with the 88th Foot, some Sikhs, and the Camel corps, to cooperate with him; and Maxwell having reached the left bank of the Jamna opposite Golaoli, Sir Hugh was able to hold out his hand to him at that place. In the second, by marching on Golaoli, Sir Hugh turned the fortifications which had been thrown up to impede his advance, and threatened Kalpi from an unexpected quarter.

Sir Hugh's march from Kunch to Golaoli, though unopposed by the enemy, was in all respects most trying. The terrible heat, and the rays of the sun told upon his men with deadly effect, and admissions to the hospitals and deaths increased at an alarming rate. This fact was well known to the rebels, and they did their utmost to reap full advantage from it. An intercepted general order by their general-in-chief, issued about this time, directed that no attack should be made upon the European infidels before 10 o'clock in the day, as fighting in the sun either killed them or sent them to their hospitals. But in spite of the heat Golaoli was reached on the 15th, communications were opened with Maxwell, and Sir Hugh, in accordance with his invariable custom, made prompt arrangements for engaging the enemy.

Who now constituted the enemy? I have related how, in the panic caused by the rumor of Sir Hugh's onward march, only eleven rebel sepoys had been left in the town and fort. A few days later, however, the unexpected arrival of the nawab of Banda with two thousand horse, some guns, and many followers—the remnant of the force defeated by General Whitlock at Banda, in the manner to be told in the next chapter—and his energetic exertions, backed by those of the rani of Jhansi, produced one of those changes from despair to confidence which mark the Indian character. The sepoys who had left returned, and, exhorted by their leaders to hold to the last Kalpi, their only arsenal, and to win their right to paradise by exterminating the infidel English, declared their resolution to defend it to the last.

59 Sir Hugh Rose's dispatch, the 24th of May 1858.

60 Intercepted letter, idem.
Although as a fortification Kalpi had but little to boast of, its position was unusually strong. It was protected on all sides by ravines, to its front by five lines of defence, and to its rear by the Jamna, from which rises the precipitous rock on which stands the fort.

Between the British camp and Kalpi, indeed, existed a most extraordinary labyrinth of ravines, over which artillery and cavalry could make no progress, but which furnished an interminable cover of the most formidable description for infantry. On the, so to speak, tongues of land formed by the prolongation of the ravines, the rebels had rapidly thrown up entrenchments, and had cut trenches near to these in a manner rendering it impossible that they should be turned. Even if driven out of the entrenchments, it was within the power of the rebels to fall back on eighty-four temples, built, as well as the walls round them, of the most solid masonry. These temples constituted a second line of defence; the outwork of ravines a third; the town of Kepi a fourth; another chain of ravines a fifth; and the fort the last.

On the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th, constant skirmishes occurred between the two armies, the enemy being the attacking party. On all these occasions they were repulsed, but the British suffered much from the sun, as well as from the incessant toil, anxiety, and heat. On the 19th a mortar battery, established on the right front of the British position, opened on the town. On the 20th a detachment from Colonel Maxwell's brigade, consisting of two companies of the 88th, one hundred and twenty Sikhs, and the Camel corps, crossed the river, and joined Sir Hugh Rose. On the 21st the batteries from Maxwell's camp opened on the fort and town. On the 22nd Sir Hugh determined to deliver his long-meditated blow.

Sir Hugh had, from the first, determined that whilst Maxwell's batteries should shell Kalpi, he would clear the ravines and the other obstacles and attack the left face of the fort. Resolved to keep his men for this great blow, he had contented himself with simply repulsing the attacks I have mentioned. But when he received information that the rebels were meditating an attack on the 22nd, which should be fatal to one of the contending parties, he, now ready for them, resolved to second their views.

The rebels had prepared a plan so skilful, that, if carried out with courage and resolution, it seemed to offer several chances in its favor. Whilst making, with great demonstrations, a false attack on the British left, they were to steal up the ravines with their main body, and try and overwhelm the right, weakened, they hoped, by detachments sent to support the left.

It must be understood that the British force occupied the ground situated between the river Jamna and the road running from Kalpi to Banda, that its right rested on the ravines near the river, whilst its left nearly touched that road.
In pursuance of their plan, the rebels marched out in masses at 10 o'clock on the 22nd along the Banda road, and threatened the British left, opening fire, simultaneously with their guns on its centre. This attack, headed by the nawab of Banda and by Rao Sahib, nephew of Nana Sahib, though intended only as a feint, soon made itself felt, and the British left became heavily engaged.

Still Sir Hugh, confident as to the real object of the enemy, did not move a man from his right. He contented himself with replying to their guns with his guns in a style which soon forced the rebels to limber up and fall back. The attack on his left not only continued, but became very real indeed, but still Sir Hugh did not move a man from his right. It was well he did not. Suddenly, as if by magic, the whole line of ravines became a mass of fire; the enemy's left batteries opened, and their infantry, climbing from below, poured in an overwhelming musketry-fire on the right of the British line. The suddenness of the attack, their superior numbers, and the terrible heat of the day gave the rebels a great advantage. Another point, too, was in their favor. Many of the Enfield rifles had become clogged by constant use in all weathers, and the men, after a few discharges, had found it very difficult to load them. The sun, too, had struck down an unusual number of the Europeans. When, then, the rebels, starting up in great numbers from the ravines, poured in volleys which the British reply to only feebly, when they saw that each discharge from the thin red line became weaker than that preceding it, they began to gain a confidence they had never felt before. They pressed on with loud yells, the British falling back, until they approached the British light field-guns and mortar-battery. Then it was that Brigadier C. S. Stuart, dismounting, placed himself by the guns, and bade the gunners defend them with their lives. The 86th and 25th Native Infantry,, in thin extended line, disputed step by step. Still the rebels pressed on, and it seemed as though from their very numbers they must prevail, when Sir Hugh, to whom news of the attack had been conveyed, brought up the Camel corps at their best pace; then, dismounting the men, and leading them forward himself at the double, charged the advancing foe, then within a few yards of the British guns. For a moment the enemy stood, but only for a moment. A shout, a dash forward from the whole line, and they went headlong into the ravines below. Not only was the attack on the right repulsed, but the victory was gained! The attack on the left collapsed when that on the right failed, and the guns, gaining the rebels' flank, inflicted great loss on them as they fled. Sir Hugh followed them up so closely, that he cut off a number of them from Kailpi. The fire from Maxwell's batteries made those who reached that fort feel that it was no secure place of refuge. They evacuated it accordingly during the night. The rest of their force, pursued by the horse artillery and cavalry, lost their formation and dispersed, losing all their guns and baggage. Even the rani of Jhansi, who fled with them, was compelled to sleep under a tree!

The position of the troops, their sufferings, the feelings that animated them, are thus graphically described by an eyewitness who, throughout its duration, took part in the campaign, and who subsequently gave to the world an eloquent record of the
achievements of his comrades. "This was," writes Dr. Lowe, 61 "a hard day's work, and a
glorious victory won over ten times our numbers under most trying circumstances. The
position of Kalpi; the numbers of the enemy, who came on with a resolution and a
display of tactics we had never before witnessed; the exhausted, weakened state of the
general's force; the awful suffocating hot winds and burning sun, which the men had to
dure all day, without time to take food or water, combined to render the achievement
one of unsurpassed difficulty. Every soul engaged in this important action suffered
more or less. Officers and men fainted away, or dropped down as though struck by
lightning in the delirium of a sun-stroke; yet all this was endured without a murmur,
and in the cool of the evening we were speculating upon the capture of Kalpi on the
morrow." 61

Before daybreak the following morning, Sir Hugh marched on that place. His 1st
brigade, under Brigadier C. S. Stuart, he sent through the ravines, following the course
of the Jamni, whilst he led the 2nd himself, 62 along the Kalpi road.

Colonel Maxwell's batteries still continued to shell the fort and the villages in front of it.
As the two brigades advanced, however, these villages were abandoned by the rebels,
and it soon became apparent that no serious resistance was contemplated. When the
two brigades, having overcome all obstacles in their path, united near the town, and
advanced into it, they were not opposed; the rebels had fled, quitting forever the arsenal
which had served them so long and so well. 63

The capture of Kalpi completed the plan of the campaign for the column having its base
at Mau, which Sir Robert Hamilton had submitted to the Governor-General and the
Commander-in-Chief towards the close of the preceding year. In all respects that plan
had been carried out. Marching from Mau in November Sir Hugh Rose had, in five
months, traversed central India, crossing its numerous rivers, storming strong forts,
taking many towns, defeating armies vastly superior in numbers, led by men and by a
woman whose hatred to the British name incited them to efforts not to be surpassed in
the annals of the mutiny. He and his gallant comrades had accomplished these great
deeds during a season the terrible heat of which far surpassed the heat of the

61 Lowe's *Central India during the Rebellion of 1857-58*.

62 Brigadier C. Steuart, C.B., commanding the 2nd brigade, had reported sick after the battle of Minch, and the
command had devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, 71st Highlanders.

63 The following description, given by an eyewitness, proves how the rebels had used the position of Kalpi, and
the good stead in which it had stood them. After enumerating the quantities of ammunition, lead, iron, brass, gun-
carriages, gun-moulds, &c., found in the fort, Dr. Lowe adds:—"The enemy had erected houses and tents in the
fort, had their smiths' shops, their carpenters' shops. Their foundries for casting shot and shell were in perfect
order, clean and well constructed; the specimens of brass shell cast by them were faultless .... In the arsenal were
about sixty thousand pounds of gunpowder, outside it were large heaps of shot and shell ranged after the fashion
of our own .... It would appear .... that the enemy had prepared for a long stand here."—Lowe's *Central India.*
corresponding season of previous years, and under a sun which proved scarcely less deadly than the enemy. Yet moving steadily onwards, regarding difficulties as only obstacles to be overcome, keeping in view the goal at which he aimed, Sir Hugh had marched from victory to victory. It may be said of him that it was his character which created his success. Careless of himself, he conducted every reconnaissance, he planned every action, he was foremost in every attack, he courted danger and exposure. At the same time, no leader ever paid greater attention to the soldiers. To look after their comforts, to see, after a hard-fought action, that the wounded were attended to, and, after a long and tedious march, that provisions were abundant, was with him a sacred duty. It was this which endeared him to the troops; this that made them fight cheerily against numbers, endure the killing rays of the fierce sun. If he demanded all their energies on the battle-field, they saw that their wants were attended to when the battle was over; that he never spared himself; that with all the cares of command upon him, he managed to find time to attend to them. It was that sympathy which evoked the enthusiasm which enabled the soldiers of Sir Hugh Rose to equal the achievements of any warriors of whom history makes record.

The campaign now appeared over. Its every object had been accomplished. Sir Colin Campbell, sharing that opinion, wrote to Sir Robert Hamilton a letter explaining the mode in which the several corps of the Central India Field Force were to be cantoned, and adding, with regard to Whitlock's force, that "it would be otherwise employed as a movable division." The general who had conducted the campaign was about to dissolve the force and to proceed to a cooler climate for the recovery of his health. How all these arrangements were suddenly altered I shall tell in another chapter. Meanwhile it is my duty to record the operations of the other column, which, with Jabalpur as its base, had been directed to move on Banda, subduing the rebel rajas on its route.

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64 Dr. Lowe thus describes the condition of officers and men from the effects of the sun, when they entered Kalpi. "Most of the officers and men were sick, and the whole force needed rest. The general himself was very ill; his chief of the staff, Colonel Wetherall, C.B., was in a raving fever; his quartermaster-general, Captain Macdonald, was worn out, and among the list of those going away ; the chaplain of the force, the Rev Mr. Schwabbe, had lost his reason and was apparently sinking fast; and other officers, wounded or exhausted by their long and arduous duties and disease, brought on by these and the terrible sun, had been ordered to England."
BOOK XIV.

CHAPTER II.

ON the 16th of November 1857 Brigadier-General Whitlock of the Madras army was appointed to the command of a division for service in the Nagpur, Sagar, and Narbada territories. His force was to consist of an artillery brigade composed of two troops of horse artillery and three companies of foot artillery, with two light field-batteries attached, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Miller; of a cavalry brigade composed of the 12th Lancers and the 6th and 7th Madras Light Cavalry, commanded by Colonel A. W. Lawrence; of one brigade of infantry composed of the 3rd Madras Europeans and the 1st and 5th Madras Native Infantry, commanded by Colonel Carpenter, M.A.; of a second infantry brigade composed of the 43rd Light Infantry and the 19th and left wing of the 50th Madras Native Infantry, commanded by Colonel McDuff, 74th Highlanders. There were also details of sappers and miners. The force was to be massed at Jabalpur, and to march thence towards Banda.

A small force, previously detached from the Madras Presidency or serving in the central Provinces, was already at Jabalpur. This force consisted of six hundred and fifty men of the 33rd Madras Native Infantry under Colonel Miller; one hundred and twenty men 28th Madras Native Infantry, under Lieutenant Standen; one hundred and twenty men of the 1st Nagpur Rifles; three hundred men 4th Madras Light Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Cumberlege; three hundred men 6th Madras Light Cavalry under Lieutenant-Colonel Byng; one hundred and fifty men 2nd Nizam's Cavalry under Captain Macintire; a total of eight hundred and ninety infantry and seven hundred and fifty cavalry. This small column had orders to halt at Jabalpur pending the arrival of General Whitlock and his force.

General Whitlock reached Kampti on the 10th of January. He was unable, from various causes, to leave that place till the 23rd of the same month. Setting out on that date, he arrived at Jabalpur on the 6th of February. Part of his 1st brigade reached on the 6th, the remainder a few days later.

On the 17th of February General Whitlock, leaving a small garrison in Jabalpur, soon to be increased by the arrival of Brigadier McDuff's brigade to a tolerable strength, set out

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65 The Nagpur local force had been rearmed by Mr. Plowden.

66 The distance is one hundred and forty-eight miles.
for Sagan He moved in the direction of Jakhani with the object of overawing the mutinous landowners in the Rawah district. He reached that place, previously captured by Willoughby Osborne, on the 24th, and was there met by the loyal raja, of Urchah. Halting here one day, he set out on the 26th for Damoh, and arrived there on the 4th of March. It is worthy of remark that during this march of fifteen days General Whitlock, though strongly urged by Major Erskine, the political officer accompanying his force, to drive the rebels from the strong places they occupied, and from which they still continued to harass the districts between Jabalpur and Damoh, refused to send a single detachment for that purpose from his force. He preferred, he said, to keep it massed in his hand. The result was that, although Whitlock's column secured the ground on which it encamped, scared into submission the villages through which it marched, and even recovered Damoh, it left the population of the districts still occupied by rebels astonished at the regard paid to the latter.

On the 5th Whitlock rode into Sagar accompanied by some horse artillery and cavalry. Sagar had previously been relieved by Sir Hugh Rose, but on reaching it Whitlock at once sent an express to Damoh for two hundred European and seventy native infantry to come in by forced marches; he also detached a small body of Europeans to escort treasure from Jabalpur, whilst the remainder of the force he kept halted at Damoh under the command of Brigadier Carpenter. He, however, returned and resumed command on the 12th.

On the 17th Whitlock, still halted at Damoh, received the Governor-General's orders to march on Nagod and Pannah by way of Hattah, and to afford aid to the loyal rajahs of Bandalkhand, notably to the raja of Chirkari. Lord Canning's dispatch further directed Whitlock to communicate his movement to Sir Hugh Rose so as to enable that officer to work in concert with him.

In compliance with this order, Whitlock left Damoh on the 22nd of March, and entering Bandalkhand, arrived at Pannah without molestation on the 29th. Evidently a man of extreme caution, Whitlock halted here to obtain information regarding the position of the enemy and the practicability of the roads. The reader, if he refer to the preceding chapter, will see that this was the precise period when the Government would have diverted Sir Hugh Rose from his attack on Jhansi in order to succor Chirkari, then besieged by Tantia Topi; and that activity on the part of General Whitlock was specially desirable. But none was displayed. The force remained halted at Pannah till the 2nd of April. Whitlock, having by that time come to a resolution, marched it by Marwa Ghat, a road almost impossible for guns and vehicles. So difficult was the road that on reaching Mandela, at the foot of the pass, Whitlock had to halt for three days to repair damages. Whilst thus halted he received (3rd of April) a dispatch from Sir Hugh Rose directing him to move with all expedition upon Jhansi. The very day on which this dispatch reached Whitlock, Rose stormed Jhansi. Whitlock was unable to leave Mandate, till the 6th of April. He then marched, by way of Chattarpur, on Banda, reached Chattarpur on
the 9th, surprised the rebels the following night whilst evacuating the fort of Jhigan, then marched on Mahoba, and thence on Banda.

The rebel nawab of Banda was playing the part of an independent prince in the district which took its name from the chief town. The nawab had been well supplied with information regarding Whitlock's movements, and judging him to be a man of a cautious and anxious temperament, determined to attempt to lead him into a trap. No sooner, then, had he been certified of the advance of the English general than he directed the troops he had stationed at Mahoba, and which consisted of eight hundred and fifty men of the mutinied 50th Bengal Native Infantry, two hundred men of the 23rd Native Infantry, the 2nd Regiment Irregular Cavalry Gwaliar contingent, and half a battery of guns, to evacuate that place and take up a position in ambush at Kabrai, whence they should fall upon English troops as they would pass it before dawn. At the same time the nawab took care that Whitlock should be informed that he would encounter no enemy south of Banda.

Had the courage of his troops equaled the cleverness of the nawab, the plan would have succeeded. Whitlock so far fell into the trap that he believed there were no rebels before him. His troops were actually marching through Kabrai an hour before daybreak when the enemy opened upon them a heavy fire. The surprise was but for a moment. The Horse Artillery, the Lancers, and the Haidarabad Irregulars galloped forward, and soon compelled the rebels to retreat. Unfortunately, in the pursuit which followed, the principal body of the British force took, in the dark, a wrong direction, so that but few of the enemy were cut up. The attempt, however, clearly indicated to Whitlock what was in store for him at Bands. He pushed on, however, and on the early morning of the 19th found the rebel forces, headed by the nawab, occupying the plain south of the town, and barring his entrance into it. The nawab's forces consisted of seven thousand men, of whom rather more than one-third were regular troops. The position he had taken up was strong. The ground was very much intersected by ravines and watercourses, and of these the rebels had taken skilful advantage.

Whitlock had broken up his camp at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 19th. At 5 o'clock his advance guard, commanded by Colonel Apthorp, and consisting of three companies 3rd Madras Europeans, two guns Mein's troop Horse Artillery, some Haidarabad Irregulars under Macintyre, a few of the 12th Lancers, and a detachment 1st Madras Native Infantry, came upon the enemy. Apthorp was at once directed to turn the right of the rebel position, whilst the main body should threaten it in front. These orders were carried out to the letter. Apthorp's men had, however, no easy task. It was difficult to get at the rebels. One ravine carried, they were found in force in the next. There must have been much in the nature of the ground to screen human life, for though the fight lasted six hours, from 5 o'clock till noon, the casualties on the British side amounted only to thirty-nine, of whom four were officers. Several deeds of heroism were performed. The coolness of Apthorp was the admiration of everyone. Young Colbeck of
the 3rd Europeans met a glorious death leading his men to the charge of the first nullah. Captain Macintire of the Haidarabad cavalry—which lost twenty killed and wounded—greatly distinguished himself, as did likewise Brigadier Miller, M.A., Sergeant-Major Alford of the same regiment, and Captain Clifton, 12th Lancers. At length the position was forced, and the nawab fled, with two thousand followers, to Kalpi, leaving behind him seventeen guns, the town of Banda, and a palace filled with property of great value. The rebel loss in the battle was variously estimated at from four to six hundred men. General Whitlock established his head-quarters in Banda, to wait there till the remainder of his force should join him.

The second brigade, under Brigadier McDuff, reached Jabalpur on the 18th of March, and set out for Sagar on the 24th. In order, however, to prevent the mutineers from heading backwards into the Mirzapur district, Whitlock sent instructions to this brigade to change its course and to proceed to Nagod. McDuff, therefore, only reached Banda on the 27th of May. He found Whitlock still halted there.

Whitlock, on being joined by McDuff's brigade, resolved to march to the assistance of Sir Hugh Rose at Kalpi, and had indicated the 29th as the day of departure on that errand. But Sir Hugh Rose, as we have seen, had completely defeated the rebels before Kalpi on the 23rd, and had entered that place on the 24th of May. Information of this reached Whitlock in time to change his plans regarding Kalpi.

The reader who has followed me through this and the preceding chapter will not have failed to see how, in every particular, the action of Sir Hugh Rose had cleared the way for the action of General Whitlock. It was Sir Hugh who at Garhakot and on the Betwah, had disposed of the enemies with whom, but for that, Whitlock would have had to deal. The defeat of Tantia Topi on the Batwah alone made it possible for Whitlock to march on Banda. Yet—extraordinary perversity of Fortune!—whilst Sir Hugh and his force endured all the hardships of the campaign and did by far the most important part of the fighting, Whitlock and his little army, up to the time of the capture of Banda, gained all of the substantial advantages. The spoils of Banda, which would not have been gained but for the action of Sir Hugh Rose, were allotted to Whitlock's force alone!

The same blind goddess, not content with one perverse distribution of her favors, now set about to perpetrate another. Whitlock had but just renounced his intention to march to the assistance of Sir Hugh Rose at Kepi, when he received orders from Lord Canning to march against the Rios of Kirwi.

Kirwi, formerly better known as Tirahan, is forty-five miles from Banda and seventy from Allahabad. The two rao's, who lived there—Narain Rao and Madho Rao—were descendants by adoption of the Peshwa Ragonath Rao. On the fall of the Peshwa's dynasty in 1818, Amrat Rao of Tirohan, a son of the Peshwa Ragonath, had entered into an agreement with the British, under which a provision of seven lakhs a year was
guaranteed to himself and his son. He selected Tirahan (Kirwi) for his residence, and there an estate (jaghir) of four thousand six hundred and ninety-one rupees was conferred upon him. On the death of Amrat Rao's son, Banaik Rao, the pension of seven lakhs per annum ceased. Banaik Rao left no natural heirs, but in accordance with the obligations imposed upon him by his religion, he had adopted two boys, Nartan Rio and Madho Rao. Though these lads succeeded to considerable accumulations of wealth, they regarded as a grievance the cessation of the pension, authorized though that cessation was by treaty, and these feelings were fostered by the courtiers who fattened upon them, especially by their dewan, Radho Govind, a man of considerable ability and utter want of scruple. It is scarcely to be wondered at, under these circumstances, that when the earlier occurrences of the mutiny in the vicinity of Bandalkhand seemed to presage the fall of the British and the resuscitation of the dynasty of the Peshwa, these young Maratha nobles should have thrown themselves heart and soul into the cause of their relative, Nana Sahib, and have joined him in his revolt against the British.

Up to the third week of May 1858, the two young raos had enjoyed blissful visions of a fortunate future. Kirwi was for a long time covered from attack by the nawab of Banda, and although Banda fell on the 19th of April, the two raos saw Whitlock halting at that place, they knew that Tantia Topi was at large, and they believed that Kalpi was impregnable, and would baffle even Sir Hugh Rose. It is true that they wrote to Sir Robert Hamilton, professing loyalty to the British and offering to surrender. But they did not surrender, and the intelligence which reached them shortly afterwards from Banda, that Whitlock was about to march to join Sir Hugh, confirmed them in their disinclination to take that step.

But when the raos heard that Sir Hugh, unaided by Whitlock, had taken Kalpi, and that a second brigade had joined Whitlock, they began to tremble. They trembled still more when they learned that, on the 2nd of June, Whitlock had left Bandit to march on their palace. At once their resolution was taken. Resistance they knew to be impossible. On learning, then, that Whitlock had reached Bharatkdp, ten miles from Kirwi, they rode out and surrendered.

Whitlock's march on Kirwi had been made possible by the annihilation of the forces of the nawab of Bandit at Kalpi. That chieftain fled from Bandalkhand, never again, during the war, to reappear within its borders. In him the two raos lost their only protector, the more important as under his orders had been serving many of their own retainers. Thus it was that once more Fortune had given to Sir Hugh Rose the toil, the exposure, the danger; to General Whitlock the bloodless conquest and the spoils of war!

For Whitlock, moving from Banda on the 2nd June, entered Kirwi without opposition on the 6th, and found there alike proofs of the complicity of the rim in the rebellion, and

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67 The very day on which, it will be seen, one of Sir Hugh's columns started to encounter more dangers at Gwalior.
enormous treasure. In the palace-yard were more than forty pieces of cannon, of calibers between 18 and 3-pounders; an immense quantity of shot, shell, and powder; two thousand stand of arms with accoutrements complete; muskets and belts belonging to several regiments which had mutinied. The gun-foundries and powder-manufactories had been, up to two days prior to the surrender, working full tides. But in the palace itself was stored the wherewithal to compensate soldiers for many a hard fight and many a broiling sun, but in this case gained without a shot. In its vaults and strong-rooms were specie, jewels, and diamonds of priceless value! The question of the proprietary right in this booty, declared to be prize-money, was ultimately argued before the High Court of Admiralty. By this court the claim of Sir Hugh Rose's force to share in the prize, which had come into British possession mainly in consequence of his action, was rejected; the claims of the commanders of other cooperating but independent divisions and columns were rejected; the claims of the Commander-in-Chief in India and of his staff, who were hundreds of miles from the spot, and whose action did not influence the capture, and the claims of the officers and men of General Whitlock's force, were admitted to an exclusive right in the prize of Banda, and Kirwi.

After the capture of Kirwi, Whitlock's force was distributed so as to maintain order in the Bandalkhand and Jamna, districts. A portion was sent to Kalpi on the requisition of Sir H. Rose; one was left at Kirwi, other portions were sent to Mohaba, Jaltion, Banda, Kirka, Sagar, Damoh, and Hamirpur. The general's headquarters were fixed at Mahaba. Here we must leave him, to return to Tantia Topi and Sir Hugh Rose.
CHAPTER III.

IT has already been related that Tantia Topi, after his defeat at Kunch, had fled to Chirki—about four miles from Jalaor—where his parents resided. He remained there during Sir Hugh Rose's march to Kalpi, and the events which led to the capture of that place. Learning that Rao Sahib and the rani of Jhansi had fled, after their defeat at Galaoli, towards Gopalpur, forty-six miles south-west of Gwaliar, Tantia girded up his loins and joined them at that place.

Their affairs seemed desperate. Not only had they lost their hold on central India, on the Sagar and Narbada territories and on Bandalkhand, but their enemies were closing in on every side; Roberts had already detached from Rajputana a brigade under Colonel Smith to cooperate with Sir Hugh Rose; the force under that officer was at Kalpi, about to be distributed in the territories west of the Jamna; Whitlock, having conquered Banda, had Kirwi at his mercy. On three sides, then, on the south, the east, and the west, they were encompassed by foes. Nor towards the north did the prospect look brighter. There lay the capital of Maharaja Sindia, overlooked by a wall-girt and almost inaccessible rock. Sindia was not less their enemy than were the British. In the darkest hour of their fortunes, at a time when hostility seemed to promise him empire, Sindia had remained faithful to his suzerain. It was not to be thought of, nor was it thought possible, that in the midday of their triumph he would turn against them.

The situation then seemed desperate to the rebel chieftains. But desperate situations suggest desperate remedies; and a remedy which, on first inspection, might well seem desperate, did occur to the fertile brain of one of the confederates. To which one it is not certainly known. But, judging the leading group of conspirators by their antecedents—Rao Sahib, the nawab of Banda, Tantia Topi, and the rani of Jhansi—we may at once dismiss the two first from consideration. They possessed neither the character nor the genius to conceive a plan so vast and so daring. Of the two who remain, we may dismiss Tantia Topi. Not that he was incapable of forming the design, but—we have his memoirs—and in those he takes to himself no credit for the most successful act with which his career is associated. The fourth conspirator possessed the genius, the daring, the despair necessary for the conception of great deeds. She was urged on by hatred, by desire of vengeance, by a blood-stained conscience, by a determination to strike hard whilst there was yet a chance. She could recognize the possibilities before her, she could hope even that if the first blow were successful the fortunes of the campaign might be changed; she possessed and exercised unbounded influence over one, at least, of her companions—the Rao Sahib. The conjecture, then, almost amounts to certainty that the desperate remedy which the confederates decided to execute at Gopalpur was suggested and pressed upon her comrades by the daring rani of Jhansi.
The plan was this. To march on Gwalior by forced marches, appeal to the religious and national feeling of Sindia's troops, take possession of his capital, by force if it were necessary, and, gaining over his army, bid defiance to the British from the precipitous rock of the Gwalior fortress!

The scheme was no sooner accepted than acted upon. Emissaries proceeded in advance of the column to tamper with and, if possible, to gain over Sindia's troops; the column followed more leisurely, yet with a celerity adapted to the occasion, and reached the Morar cantonment, formerly occupied by the contingent, in close vicinity to Gwalior, during the night of the 30th of May.

Maharaja Sindia was informed that night of the arrival of his dangerous visitors. Probably no prince had ever been placed in circumstances of stronger temptation than was Jaiaji Rao Sindia during 1857-58. The descendant by adoption and the representative of the family of the famous Madhaji Rao Sindia, of the Diolat Rao Sindia who had fought for the possession of India with the two Wellesleys, he was still the most considerable chief of the Maratha race; and his word, if spoken for religion and race, would have found a response all over central and western India. For four months he had probably the fate of India in his hands. Had he revolted in June, the siege of Dehli must have been raised, Agra and Lakhnao would have fallen; it is more than probable that the Panjab would have risen. That, under such circumstances, possessing strong military instincts and chafing under a great ambition, Sindia should have remained loyal, is most weighty testimony to the character of the English overlord-ship, and to its appreciation by the princes of India. That Sindia was greatly influenced in the course he followed by his shrewd minister, raja Dinkar Rao, and by the appeals from the fort of Agra of the able British representative at his court, Major Charters Macpherson, may be admitted. But neither Sindia nor Dinkar Rao liked the English personally. Both the one and the other would have preferred an independent Gwalior. But though they did not like the English personally, they had great respect for the English character. Recollecting the state of north-western and central and western India prior to the rule of Marquess Wellesley, they could feel, under the English overlordship, a sense of security such as their fathers and their fathers' fathers had never possessed. They had, at least, secure possession of their holdings. No one from outside would venture to molest them as their ancestors had been molested. The question, then, would rise—and it was in answering this that the influence of Major Charters Macpherson came most beneficially into play—"Granting that, by joining the mutineers, we could confine the English to Bengal, would Gwalior gain by their expulsion? It is doubtful: there would be many competitors for supremacy, and—who knows? The King of Dehli might, with the aid of the sepoys, become supreme, or the Sikhs of the Panjab, or Nana Sahib, or perhaps even Holkar! The risk is too great, for, adhering to the English, we shall be safe in the end."
In some such manner reasoned Sindia and Dinkar Rio. They argued the question in the light of the interests of Sindia, and in that light, held ever before them by the steady hand of Charters Macpherson, they cast in their lot with the British.

But not in this manner reasoned many of the great families of Gwaliar, the bulk of the army and of the people. These men could recognize only what was passing before their eyes. They never attempted even to open the book of the future. They could only see, in 1857, the British power struck down, and an opportunity offering itself to their master such as the great Madhaji would have given half his years to have had a glimpse of. They could not understand Sindia's inaction, his attempts to befriend the British in the hour of their adversity. They sympathized with the men of his contingent when they revolted and murdered their officers. The higher and more influential amongst them assailed Sindia with persuasions and entreaties; and when they found these fail, they began even to talk of dethroning him and setting up another maharaja in his place.

The fall of Dehli, the British successes in Lakhnao and in north-western and central India, had by no means changed these sentiments. The irritation caused by lost opportunities had produced a state of mind eager to grasp at any chance to mend the situation or to be rid of it.

Such was the state of general feeling in Gwaliar when, on the night of the 30th of May, information was brought to the maharaja that Tantia Topi, the rani of Jhansi, and other chieftains, with a force estimated at seven thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and twelve guns, had reached Moran. No one knew better the general state of feeling about him than the maharaja. But he never wavered. The conviction of the ultimate triumph of the English was never stronger within him than at this apparently inauspicious moment, and, notwithstanding the ill-concealed hostility of many of his adherents, he determined to seize the offered opportunity and do battle with the rebels. Accordingly, at daybreak on the 1st of June, he marched out and took up a position about two miles to the eastward of Moral. He had with him six thousand infantry, about one thousand five hundred cavalry, his own bodyguard six hundred strong, and eight guns. These he ranged in three divisions, his guns in the centre, and waited for the attack. About 7 o'clock in the morning the rebels advanced, covered by mounted skirmishers, with camels carrying guns of small caliber. As they approached, Sindia's eight guns opened on them. But the smoke of the discharge had scarcely disappeared when the rebel skirmishers closed to their flanks, and two thousand horsemen, charging at a gallop, carried the guns. Simultaneously with their charge, Sindia's infantry and cavalry, his bodyguard alone excepted, either joined the rebels or took up a position indicative of their intention not to fight. The rebel cavalry, pushing their advantage, then attacked the bodyguard, with which was Sindia himself. A portion of the guardsmen defended themselves with great gallantry, and did not cease to fight till many of their number had fallen. It becoming more and more apparent that it was
useless to continue the unequal contest, Sindia turned and fled, accompanied by a very few of the survivors. He did not draw rein till he reached Agra.

The first part of the rani's bold plan had thus succeeded. She and her confederates delayed not a moment to carry it out to its legitimate consequences. They entered Gwalior, took possession of the fortress, the treasury, the arsenal, and the town, and began at once to form a regular government. Nana Sahib was proclaimed as Peshwa, and Rito Sahib as governor of Gwalior. Plentiful largesses were distributed to the army, alike to the Gwalior troops as to those who had come from Kalpi. Ram Rio Govind, one of Sindia's disgraced courtiers, was appointed prime minister. The royal property was declared confiscated. Four Maratha chiefs, who had been imprisoned by Sindia for rebellion, were released, clothed with dresses of honor, and sent into the districts to raise troops to oppose the British in any attempts they might make to cross the Chambal. The command of the bulk of the troops, encamped outside the city, was entrusted to the rani of Jhansi. Those within the town obeyed the orders of Tantia Topi. Letters were at once dispatched to the rebel rajas still in the district, notably to the rajas of Banpur and Shahgarh, to join at Gwalior.

The intelligence of the success of this audacious enterprise reached Kalpi on the 3rd of June. Before I refer to the action taken by Sir Hugh Rose, it is necessary that I should state the exact positions of the various portions of the force with which he had conquered Kalpi on the 24th of May.

As soon as, by the occupation of Kalpi on the 24th of May, Sir Hugh Rose had discovered the flight of the rebels, he sent out parties to discover the line they had taken. Information was soon brought to him that whilst a few had crossed the Jamna into the Doab, whilst a few more had been checked in attempting the same course by Colonel Riddell, the main body had bent their steps in almost a south-westerly direction to Gopalpur. To pursue these latter he at once organized a column composed of the 25th Bombay native infantry, the 3rd Bombay light cavalry, and one hundred and fifty Haidarabad cavalry, and dispatched it, under the command of Colonel Robertson, on the track of the rebels.

Robertson set out from Kilpi on the 25th of May, the rain falling heavily. This rain, which continued throughout that day and the day following, much impeded his progress. He pushed on, however, as fast as possible, and traversing Mahona and

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68 Colonel Riddell, who was moving down the north bank of the Jamna with the 3rd Bengal Europeans, Alexander's horse, and two guns, caught sight of a body of the rebels escaping from Kalpi, a few miles above that place, on the south bank of the river, on the 25th of May. He instantly sent the 3rd Europeans across, who captured their camp equipage, the enemy not waiting to receive them. Colonel Riddell's force had previously had several skirmishes with detached parties of insurgents. A small party of his troops had proceeded to Kalpi in boats, joining there Sir Hugh Rose. On their way they were threatened by a numerous body of rebels near Bhijalpur. Lieutenant Sherriff, who commanded the party, had at once landed 150 men, defeated the rebels, and captured four guns.
Indurki, found that the rebels were but little in advance of him. At Irawan, reached on the 29th, supplies ran short, and as none were procurable in the district, the column had to wait till they could be sent up from On the 2nd of June, Robertson received these and was joined by two squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, a wing of the 86th foot, and four 9-pounders. The following day he reached Moharar, fifty-five miles from Gwaliar. Here he was startled by information of the attack made by the rebels on Gwaliar and of its result.

An express from Robertson, sent from Irawan, and which reached Kalpi on the 1st of June, gave Sir Hugh the first information that the rebels had taken the road to Gwaliar. Instantly Sir Hugh dispatched General Stuart with the remainder of his brigade, consisting of the other wing of the 86th foot, a wing of the 71st Highlanders, four companies of the 25th Bengal native infantry, one squadron 14th light dragoons, No. 4 light field battery, two 18-pounders, one 8-inch howitzer, and some sappers, to join Robertson, and to march on Gwaliar. Stuart reached Attakona on the 3rd—the day on which Robertson had reached Moharar—and there he too received the first information of the startling occurrences at Gwaliar.

The order which had sent Stuart to Gwaliar was dictated by a sound military instinct. But no one, not even Sir Hugh Rose, had imagined the height of daring to which the rani of Jhansi would carry her audacious plans. The rebels might march on Gwaliar, but no one believed they would carry it by a coup-de-main. It seemed more likely that they were marching into a trap, to be kept their till Stuart's force should fall on their rear.

How the impossible happened has been told. The information of it reached Sir Hugh on the 4th of June, after he had resigned his command and applied for leave on medical certificate. In a moment he realized the full danger of the situation. Gwaliar had fallen into the hands of the rebels at the time of year most unfavorable for military operations. Another week, and the monsoon rains would render the black soil untraversable by guns, and would swell the rivers. Under those circumstances, the transport of siege-guns, in the absence of pontoons, which Sir Hugh did not possess, would be most difficult if not impossible. He realized, moreover, the great danger which would inevitably be caused by delay. No one could foresee the extent of evil possible if Gwiliar were not promptly wrested from rebel hands. Grant them delay, and Tantia Topi, with the immense acquisition of political and military strength secured by the possession of Gwiliar, and with all its resources in men, money, and material at his disposal, would be able to form a new army on the ruins of that beaten at Kalpi, and to provoke a Marithg rising throughout India. It might be possible for him, using the dexterity of which he was a master, to unfurl the Peshwa's banner in the southern Marathi districts. Those districts were denuded of troops, and a striking success in central India would probably decide their inhabitants to pronounce in favor of the cause for which their fathers had fought and bled.
Thus reasoning, Sir Hugh considered, and rightly considered, that the time for ceremony had passed. He at once resumed the command which he had laid down,\textsuperscript{69} and leaving a small garrison at Kalpi, set out on the 5th of June with a small force\textsuperscript{70} to overtake Stuart's column.

With a view to aid Sir Hugh in his operations against Gwaliar, the Commander-in-Chief placed at his disposal, by telegraph, Colonel Riddell's column previously referred to, and Brigadier Smith's brigade of the Rajputana field force. The only other troops of which it was possible for Sir Hugh to avail himself, were those composing the small garrison of Jhansi, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hicks of the artillery; and the Haidarabad contingent, commanded by Major Orr.

The Haidarabad contingent, after their hard and splendid service, had received orders to return home. They had already started; many of them, indeed, were far advanced on their road. But the moment the intelligence of the events passing at Gwaliar reached them, they one and all expressed their earnest desire to take part in the operations of their old commander.

 Whilst Sir Hugh Rose himself proceeded by forced marches to join Stuart, he directed Major Orr to move to Paniar, on the road between Sipri and Gwalair, to cut off the retreat of the rebels to the south; and Brigadier Smith, who was near Chandairi, to march with his brigade direct to Kotah-ki-serai, about five miles to the south-east of Gwaliar. To Colonel Riddell, escorting a large supply of siege-guns, he sent instructions to move with his column by the Agra and Gwiliar road. He hoped that all the column of operations would be at their posts by the 19th of June.

 Setting out, as I have said, on the 6th of June, and making forced marches in spite of a heat which occasionally rose to one hundred and thirty degrees in the shade, Sir Hugh overtook Stuart at Indurki on the 12th, and still pushing on, reached Bahadurpur, five miles to the east of the Morar cantonments on the 16th. There he was joined by Brigadier-General Robert Napier, whom we last heard of at the storm of Lakhnao, and who at once assumed command of the 2nd brigade.\textsuperscript{71}

 Sir Hugh had reached Bahadurpur at 6 o'clock in the morning of the 16th of June. He at once directed Captain Abbott with his Haidarabad cavalry to reconnoiter Morar. On receiving Abbott's report that the rebels were in force in front of it, Sir Hugh galloped

\textsuperscript{69} It is said that for this breach of red tape rules Sir Hugh was severely reprimanded by Sir C. Campbell. Undoubtedly strict routine required the previous sanction of the Commander-in-Chief. But there are circumstances which require that strict routine must be laid aside; and this was one of them.

\textsuperscript{70} 1st troop Bombay horse artillery; one squadron 14th light dragoons; one squadron 3rd Bombay light cavalry; Madras sappers and miners.

\textsuperscript{71} Only a small portion of this brigade was present; the bulk of it having been left at Kalpi.
forward himself to examine the position. He noticed that the side of the cantonments
fronting the British position was occupied by strong bodies of cavalry, flanked to the
right by guns, supported by infantry in considerable numbers.

The position offered strong temptations to a commander who knew the value of time
and promptitude in war, and who considered that minor difficulties must give way
when a chance should present itself of overcoming a great obstacle. The effect produced
on Sir Hugh Rose by his examination of the position of the rebels before Morar, I shall
tell in his own words.

"My force had had a long and fatiguing march, and the sun had been up for some time.
Four or five miles' more march in the sun, and a combat afterwards, would be a great
trial for the men's strength. On the other hand, Morar looked inviting with several good
buildings not yet burnt; they would be good quarters for a portion of the force; if I
delayed the attack until the next day, the enemy were sure to burn them. A prompt
attack has always more effect on the rebels than a procrastinated one. I therefore
countermanded the order for encamping and made the following arrangements to
attack the enemy." 72

He attacked them accordingly. Placing his cavalry and guns on his flanks, and the
infantry in the centre, he took ground to the right, the 86th leading the way, with the
view of coming upon the road leading to cantonments, and the occupation of which
would have turned the left of the rebels. Sindia's agent, however, who had promised to
lead the troops to this road, lost his way, and Rose found himself in front of a masked
battery in the enemy's centre. This at once opened upon the assailants, and its fire was
rapidly followed by a musketry and artillery fire from both sides of it. Sir Hugh
answered with his guns, at the same time pushing forward his infantry to gain the
required turning position on the right. This once gained, he formed to the front, and,
reinforcing his left, which bore for a moment the whole weight of the enemy, pushed
forward. The advance was decisive. The enemy limbered up and gave way on all sides.
The gallant Abbott with his Haidarabad men had, meanwhile, galloped across the
nullahs, further to the right, and dashing through the cantonments at a more northerly
point, endeavored to cut off the retreat of the rebels. But the broken ground he had had
to traverse had enabled these to take their guns across the stone bridge which spans the
river at the back of the cantonment on the road to the city. The main body of the enemy,
driven through the cantonments, fell back on a dry nullah with high banks, running
round a village, which they had also occupied. Here they maintained a desperate hand-
to-hand struggle with the British. The 71st Highlanders suffered severely, Lieutenant
Neave, whilst leading them, falling mortally wounded; nor was it till the nullah was
nearly choked with dead that the village was carried. On this occasion Lieutenant Rose
of the 25th Bombay native infantry greatly distinguished himself. The victory was

72 Dispatch of Sir Hugh Rose dated the 13th of October 1858.
completed by a successful pursuit of the rebels by Captain Thompson, 14th light dragoons, with a wing of his regiment. The wing of the rebel force which he destroyed had been turned by Abbott's advance already spoken of; Thompson, following them up, caught them in the plains and made a great slaughter of them. The guns were splendidly commanded during the day by Strutt, always to the front, and by Lightfoot. The result, then, had justified Sir Hugh's daring. Not only had he dealt a heavy blow to the rebels, but he had gained a most important strategical point.

Sir Hugh Rose's success was speedily followed by an exploit on the part of Brigadier Smith, fruitful in important consequences. That gallant soldier, coming up from the south-east, had to make his way through the difficult and hilly ground on that side of Gwalior before he could reach Kotah-ki-serai. Picking up on his way the small field-force from Jhansi, he reached Antri, with his brigade, on the 14th of June, and was joined there the following day by Major Orr and his Haidarabad men. Under orders from Sir Hugh Rose, Smith marched from Antri early on the morning of the 17th of June, and reached Kotah-ki-serai, five miles to the south-east of Gwalior, at half-past 7 o'clock that morning.

Smith had, met no opposition in marching into Kotah-ki-serai, but on reaching that place he observed masses of the enemy's horse and foot occupying the hilly ground between himself and Gwalior. As these masses showed a strong disposition to attack him, and as, hampered with a large quantity of baggage, Smith did not regard his position as a very secure one, he determined to take the initiative. Reconnoitering the ground in front of him, he found it very difficult, intersected with nullahs and impracticable for cavalry. He discovered, moreover, that the enemy's guns were in position about one thousand five hundred yards from Kotah-ki-serai, and that their line lay under the hills, crossing the road to Gwalior. Notwithstanding this, Smith determined to attack. First, he sent his horse artillery to the front, and silenced the enemy's guns, which limbered up and retired. This accomplished, Smith sent his infantry across the broken ground, led by Raines of the 95th. Raines led his men, covered by skirmishers, to a point about fifty yards from the enemy's works, when the skirmishers made a rush—the rebels falling back as they did so. Raines then found himself stopped by a deep ditch with four feet of water, and having banks so steep that it was with difficulty the men could cross in single file. The rebels took advantage of the delay thus caused to move off with their guns and to retire up the ravines and across the hills. Raines found them so retiring when, after surmounting the difficulty I have recorded, he gained the abandoned entrenchment. Whilst he was continuing his advance across the broken and hilly ground, Smith moved his cavalry across the river Umrah, close to Kotah-ki-serai. They had hardly crossed when they came under fire of a battery which till then had escaped notice. At the same time a body of the enemy

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73 The brigade was thus composed: a wing 8th hussars, a wing Bombay lancers, H. M.'s 95th foot, the 10th Bombay native infantry, and a troop of Bombay horse artillery.
threatened the baggage at Kotah-ki-serai. Matters now became serious. But Smith sent back detachments to defend the baggage and rear, and pushed forward. The road, before debouching from the hills between his position and Gwaliar, ran for several hundred yards through a defile along which a canal had been excavated. It was while his troops were marching through this defile that the principal fighting took place. Having gained the further end of the defile, where he joined Raines, Smith halted the infantry to guard it, and ordered a cavalry charge. This was most gallantly executed by a squadron of the 8th hussars, led by Colonel Hicks and Captain Heneage. The rebels, horse and foot, gave way before them. The hussars captured two guns, and continuing the pursuit through Sindia's cantonment, had for a moment the rebel camp in their possession.

Amongst the fugitives in the rebel ranks was the resolute woman who, alike in council and on the field, was the soul of the conspirators. Clad in the attire of a man and mounted on horseback, the rani of Jhansi might have been seen animating her troops throughout the day. When inch by inch the British troops pressed through the pass, and when reaching its summit Smith ordered the hussars to charge, the rani of Jhansi boldly fronted the British horsemen.

When her comrades failed her, her horse, in spite of her efforts, carried her along with the others. With them she might have escaped but that her horse, crossing the canal near the cantonment, stumbled and fell. A hussar, close upon her track, ignorant of her sex and her rank, cut her down. She fell to rise no more. That night her devoted followers, determined that the English should not boast that they had captured her even dead, burned the body.

Thus died the rani of Jhansi. My opinion of her has been recorded in a preceding page. Whatever her faults in British eyes may have been, her countrymen will ever remember that she was driven by ill-treatment into rebellion, and that she lived and died for her country.

The charge of the 8th hussars was the last effort of Smith's force. "Upon the return of the squadron, the officers and men were so completely exhausted and prostrated from heat, fatigue, and great exertion, that they could scarcely sit in their saddles, and were, for the moment, incapable of further exertion." But the enemy, recovering, were again threatening. Smith then determined to content himself with holding the defile, the road, and adjoining hills for the night. He drew back his cavalry accordingly, and brought up his baggage. The enemy held their ground on the heights on the other side of the canal.

The position taken up by Brigadier Smith was still far from satisfactory. It left his left and rear threatened, his baggage within range of the enemy's guns, and his whole force

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74 Brigadier Smith's report.
cramped. Sir Hugh, on receiving an account of the action, with characteristic promptitude, dispatched Colonel Robertson, with the 25th Bombay native infantry, three troops 14th light dragoons, and four guns, to reinforce him.

The next day Sir Hugh was reinforced and his 2nd brigade brought to its full strength by the arrival of the Kalpi garrison. This arrival left him free to act.

Leaving Napier in Morar with the troops he could spare, he marched in the afternoon with the rest of the force to join Smith. The distance was long, the heat terrible, the march harassing in the extreme. No less than a hundred men of the 86th were struck down by the sun. Nevertheless, Sir Hugh pushed on, and bivouacked for the night on the rocky ground between the river and Smith's position.

The first thing that struck Sir Hugh on reconnoitering the following morning was the possibility of cutting off the main body of the enemy from Gwaliar by forcing their left; the next, the extremely cramped and dangerous nature of his own position. The rebels, too, showed every indication that they intended an attack, for with the early dawn they began a heavy fire from their guns, whilst masses of their infantry were seen moving to positions from which they could maneuver with advantage against the British position. On the principle, then, that an attack is the best defence, Sir Hugh resolved to become the assailant.

The rebels, as we have seen, were occupying the heights separated by the canal from those gained by Brigadier Smith. That they meant to attack was evident. They spent the early hours of the morning in strengthening their right with the view of attacking the weakest point of the British line, the left. Soon an express arrived from Sir Robert Hamilton to say that he had received certain information that an attack was intended that day. There was no time for further consideration. Sir Hugh then directed Brigadier Stuart to move with the 86th regiment, supported by the 25th Bombay native infantry, across the canal, to crown the heights on the other side of it, and to attack the left flank of the rebels. As a diversion in favor of this attack he sent Colonel Raines with the 95th regiment from his right front, across the canal in skirmishing order over the shoulder of the hill on which the rebels had intrenched some guns. This movement was supported by the 10th Bombay native infantry. Sir Hugh at the same time ordered up the 3rd troop Bombay horse artillery, supported by a squadron of the 8th hussars, to the entrance of

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75 These were — One troop Bombay horse artillery, three troops 14th light dragoons, three troops 3rd Bombay light cavalry, fifty men 1st Haidarabad cavalry, 3rd Haidarabad cavalry, two squadrons Meade’s horse, 21st company Royal Engineers, wing 3rd Bombay Europeans, four companies 24th Bombay native infantry, three guns Haidarabad artillery.

76 Of these men, Sir Hugh reports that they "were compelled by sun-sickness to fall out and go into dhoolies. These same men, the next day, unmindful of their illness, fell in with their companies, and took part in the assault of Gwaliar." These men, be it remembered, formed part of the unreformed British army, an army never equaled by any other in the world.
the pass towards Gwaliar. The remainder of the force he disposed in support of the attacking columns and for the defence of the camp from the rear.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lowth led the 86th, in accordance with the orders he received, against the left of the rebels. These fell back rapidly on the battery; while the 86th pressed them so hard that they made no stand even under their guns. The 86th gave them no time to rally, but dashing with a cheer at the parapet, crossed it, and took the guns which defended the ridge, three excellent English 9-pounders. Leaving a party with these guns, they pushed on after the fleeing enemy.

Almost immediately afterwards Raines, advancing with the 95th, came upon the captured guns. Noticing the enemy's cavalry and infantry in detached parties in the plain below at a distance of about a thousand yards, he turned the guns on them and made excellent practice. Meanwhile the 10th Bombay native infantry, led by Lieutenant Roome, moving up in support of the 95th, and protecting the right of the assailing force, found itself exposed to a fire of musketry and artillery from the heights on the enemy's extreme left. Roome was equal to the occasion.

Wheeling to the right, he advanced with half his regiment in skirmishing order, the other half in support, cleared the two nearest heights of rebel infantry, and captured two brass field-pieces and three mortars which were in the plain below.

The day was now won, the heights were gained; Gwaliar lay, as it were, at the feet of the British. "The sight," writes Sir Hugh, "was interesting. To our right was the handsome palace of the Phul Bagh with its gardens, and the old city, surmounted by the fort, remarkable for its ancient architecture, with lines of extensive fortifications round the high and precipitous rock of Gwaliar. To our left lay the Lashkar or new city, with its spacious houses half hidden by trees." In the plain between the heights and the city was a great portion of the rebel forces, just driven from the heights, and now, under the influence of panic, endeavoring to seek a refuge in one or other of the walled enclosures or fortified places towards which they were moving.

The sight of these men at once suggested to Sir Hugh that it would be possible to complete his work that day. "I felt convinced," he wrote in his dispatch, "that I could take Gwaliar before sunset."

He at once, then, ordered a general advance. Covering his extreme right with the 3rd troop Bombay horse artillery and a troop of the 8th hussars, he ordered Colonel Owen, with the 1st Bombay lancers, to descend the heights to the rear, make his way into the road which led through the hills to the south, and thence attack the grand parade and the new city. Covering his advance, then, with No. 4 light field-battery, and two troops 14th light dragoons, he moved forward his infantry from the left, the 86th leading from that flank, the 95th forming the right.
This prompt advance completely paralyzed the rebels. Their guns, indeed, opened fire, but the main object of their infantry seemed to be to escape. The British infantry were approaching the plain, when Owen's lancers, who had gained the point indicated, charged across the grand parade, and, carried away by their ardor, followed the rebels into the Lashkar. In this charge a gallant officer, Lieutenant Mills, was shot through the heart. Raines followed up this charge with a dash on to the parade-ground with two companies of the 95th, and took two 18-pounders and two small pieces. The British line pushing on, the rebels retreated through the Oown. Before sunset, as Sir Hugh had divined, the Lashkar or new city was completely in his possession. That night, too, Sir Hugh rested in the regained palace of Sindia.

Meanwhile Brigadier Smith had taken the garden palace, the Phul Bagh, killing great numbers of the rebels. He then, in pursuance of orders, followed up the retreating enemy, and continued the pursuit long after dark, inflicting great loss on them, and capturing most of their guns.

As soon as it was clear the day was won, Sir Hugh sent an express to General Robert Napier, directing him to pursue the rebels as far and as closely as he could. How this order was carried out I shall have to relate presently.

The Lashkar and palace occupied, Sir Hugh, ever careful even of the vanquished, made arrangements for the security of the city. This task he found comparatively easy, for the shop keeping class has always been on the side of its best paymaster, the British.

Thus, on the night of the 19th of June, Sir Hugh had, with a loss of eighty-seven men killed and wounded, regained all Gwaliar, the formidable fortress alone excepted. But the exception was a grave one. The rock fortress, completely isolated, having a length of a mile and a half, and a breadth at its broadest part of three hundred yards, its face presenting a perpendicular precipice, might, if well defended, still give some trouble. The guns from its ramparts had maintained, during the operations of the 19th, a continuous, though not very effective, fire on the British troops. The fire recommenced on the morning of the 20th. It was then, early on that morning, that two officers of the Indian army and their Bombay sepoys performed a deed of unsurpassed daring.

On the morning of the 20th Lieutenant Rose, 25th Bombay native infantry, was in command with a detachment of his regiment of the kotwali, or police-station, not far from the main gateway of the rock fort. As the guns from its ramparts continued to fire, Rose proposed to a brother officer, Lieutenant Waller, who commanded a small party of the same regiment near him, that they should attempt to capture the fortress with their joint parties, urging that if the risk was great, the honor would be still greater. Waller cheerfully assented, and the two officers set off with their men and a blacksmith, whom, not unwilling, they had engaged for the service. They crept up to the first gateway
unseen. Then the blacksmith, a powerful man, forced it open; and so with the other five gates that opposed their progress. By the time the sixth gate had been forced the alarm was given, and when the assailants reached the archway beyond the last gate, they were met by the fire of a gun which had been brought to bear on them. Dashing onwards, unscathed by the fire, they were speedily engaged in a hand-to-hand contest with the garrison. The fight was desperate, and many men fell on both sides. The gallantry of Rose and Waller and their men carried all before them. Rose especially distinguished himself. Just in the hour of victory, however, as he was inciting his men to make the final charge, which proved successful, a musket was fired at him from behind the wall. The man who had fired the shot, a mutineer from Bareli, then rushed out and cut him across the knee and wrist with a sword. Waller came up, and dispatched the rebel; too late, however, to save his friend. But the rock fortress was gained.

I have said that when Sir Hugh saw that success was certain, he sent a dispatch to Brigadier-General Robert Napier requesting him to pursue the rebels as far and as closely as he could.

Napier started on this service at half-past 5 o'clock on the morning of the 20th, with about five hundred and sixty cavalry, of whom sixty were dragoons, and Lightfoot's battery of artillery, and pursuing the rebels rapidly, came up with them, at least four thousand strong, at Jaora-Alipur, on the 22nd. Napier, reconnoitering, found them strongly posted, their right resting on guns and infantry in the centre, and cavalry on both flanks; but he resolved to attack them.

Finding the ground to his right open, Napier directed Captain Lightfoot to take up a position on the left flank of the enemy, about six hundred yards from them, and to enfilade them. He then ranged his cavalry behind a rising ground, which afforded partial concealment, ready to act as soon as the fire from Lightfoot's guns should be felt. This soon happened. After a few discharges, a rapid thinning and wavering of the rebels' ranks took place. Lightfoot then limbered up and advanced at a gallop, whilst the 14th dragoons, led by Prettijohn, and the Haidarabad cavalry, by Abbott, dashed into their ranks.

The result was decisive. Prettijohn's distinguished velour and Abbott's gallant leading were especially conspicuous. The dash of Lightfoot's horse artillery was superb to look

77 Sir Hugh Rose, in his dispatch, thus alludes to this officer: "But the gallant leader, Lieutenant Rose, who has been twice specially mentioned by me for good and gallant conduct, fell in the fort, mortally wounded, closing his early career by taking the fort of Gwaliar by force of arms."

His brigadier, Brigadier C. S. Stuart, thus referred to him in his brigade orders: "Brigadier Stuart has received with the deepest regret, a report of the death of Lieutenant Rose, 25th Bombay native infantry, who was mortally wounded yesterday, on entering the fort of Gwaliar, on duty with his men. The brigadier feels assured that the whole brigade unite with him in deploring the early death of this gallant officer, whose many sterling qualities none who knew him could fail to appreciate."
"You cannot imagine," writes an eyewitness, a cavalry officer, "the dash of the artillery: it was wonderful. We could scarcely keep up with them." But, in fact, every man behaved like a hero: each vied with his comrade. After a brief resistance the rebels broke and fled, hotly pursued. They lost twenty-five guns, all their ammunition, elephants, tents, carts, and baggage, and had three to four hundred men killed. Never was a rout more complete.\(^78\)

The capture of Gwaliar and the dispersion of the rebel army closed the campaign which will forever be associated with the name of Sir Hugh Rose. In a previous chapter I have ended to the personal character, strong and firm as iron and yet singularly sympathetic, which had chained success to all the incidents of that most eventful campaign. I may be pardoned if I briefly recapitulate here all that had been accomplished in a period falling somewhat short of six months. On the 6th of January 1858 Sir Hugh Rose had left Indur; on the 24th he laid siege to Rathgarh; on the 28th he defeated in the field the raja of Bampur; on the 29th he took Rathgarh; on the 3rd of February he relieved Sagar; on the 13th he took the strong fort of Garhakot; on the 4th of March he forced the pass of Maddanpur; on the 17th his 1st brigade stormed the fort of Chandairi; on the 22nd he invested Jhansi; on the 31st he defeated Tantia Topi on the Betwah; on the 3rd of April he stormed Jhansi; on the 6th of May he defeated Tantia Topi and the rani of Jhansi at Kunch; on the 23rd he beat the rebels at Galioli near Kalpi, and occupied that fort the following day. In this chapter I have told how, roused from a bed of sickness by the news of the capture of Gwaliar by the rebels, he pursued them with unremitting vigor, and stayed not his hand till he had recovered all that they had temporarily gained. In every undertaking he was successful, and he was successful because, careless of himself, he thought of the great end he had in view, and spared no means to attain it.

After the victory at Gwaliar, Sir Hugh Rose proceeded to Bombay to assume command of the army of that Presidency.\(^79\) The force with which he had won so many victories

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\(^78\) Tantia, Topi, who was present on this occasion, thus describes the affair: "We reached Joara Alipur and remained there during the night. The next morning we were attacked and fought for an hour and a half. We fired five shots and the English army fired four shots, and we then ran off, leaving all our guns."

\(^79\) The following farewell general order was issued on this occasion by Sir Hugh Rose:—"The Major-General commanding, being on the point of resigning the command of the Punk division of the Bombay army, bids farewell to the Central India Field Force; and at the same time expresses the pleasure he feels that he commanded them when they gained one more laurel at Gwaliar. The Major-General witnessed with satisfaction how the troops and their gallant comrades in arms—the Rajputana brigade under General Smith — stormed height after height, and gun after gun, under the fire of a numerous field and siege artillery, taking finally by assault two 18-pounders at Gwaliar. Not a man in these forces enjoyed his natural health or strength; an Indian sun and months of marching and broken rest had told on the strongest; but the moment they were told to take Gwaliar for their Queen and country they thought of no thing but victory. They gained it, restoring England's true and brave ally to his throne, putting to rout the rebel army, killing many of them, and taking from them in the field, exclusive of those in the fort, fifty-two pieces of artillery, all their stores and ammunition, and capturing the city and fort of Gwaliar, reckoned the strongest in India. The Major. General thanks sincerely Brigadier-General Napier, C.B., Brigadier Stuart, C.B., and Brigadier Smith, commanding brigades in the field, for the very efficient and able assistance which
was, to a great extent, broken up. The 95th regiment was ordered to occupy the rock fortress. The 71st Highlanders, the 86th regiment, and the 25th Bombay native infantry, with detachments of cavalry and artillery, remained at Morin. The 3rd Bombay Europeans, the 24th Bombay native infantry, with cavalry and artillery, were sent to Jhansi. Of these troops the command devolved upon Brigadier-General Robert Napier. Brigadier Smith's brigade was distributed in three portions, respectively at Gwaliar, at Sipri, and at Gunah. It seemed as though they were about to enjoy the rest they had so gloriously earned. But appearances were deceitful. Though one bitter enemy, the rani of Jhansi, had disappeared, there had escaped another, not less implacable, perhaps even more fertile in resources than that resolute lady. Though beaten at all points, that other adversary had never despaired. Not many weeks elapsed before the cities, the villages, and the jungles of central India once more resounded with the name of Tantia Topi.
BOOK XIV.

CHAPTER IV.

IN the first chapter of this volume I have brought the record of affairs in the southern Maratha country up to the spring of 1858. In Belgion and the neighboring districts the crisis had passed away. It needed only the continuance of the same firm and conciliatory rule to ensure that it should never return.

It happened, however, at this period (March and April 1858) that Mr. G. B. Seton-Karr, exhausted by the double labors which had devolved upon him, applied to the Government of Bombay to be relieved of portion of his overwhelming duties. Mr. Seton-Karr had, unquestionably, reason to believe that the Government, should it accede to his request, would grant him an option in the matter, or, at all events, would relieve him of the less important routine duties appertaining to the administration. But he was mistaken. The Government, in sanctioning Mr. Seton-Karr's request, desired him to retain in his own hands the civil administration of the territory, and to transfer the charge of the political agency to his assistant, Mr. Charles Manson.

Than Mr. Manson there was not a more high-minded, a more generous, or a more earnest officer in the Bombay Civil Service. He was devoted to his profession, he gave to it his whole soul and his undivided energies. He was in the prime of life, intelligent, energetic, decided. But—he had been employed on the detested Inam Commission—and he belonged to a school of politics differing in one essential point from that of which Mr. Seton-Karr was a leader. The reader will have already discovered the title of that school. Mr. Seton-Karr was strongly in favor of the maintenance of the native aristocracy, an upholder of the rights and customs held and enjoyed by native land-owners at the time that they came under British rule. He believed that so long as the British respected those rights and customs, it would never be necessary to employ force; that persuasion and management would affect the required end. How he had tried, and tried successfully, that policy, I have already shown. The success had proved to him its efficacy. Mr. Manson belonged to a more modern school. In one of the letters which Mr. Seton-Karr addressed to him before the transfer of the political duties, he is jestingly referred to as "an admirer of Lord Dalhousie." This, at least, is certain, that in a crisis such as that which was then prevailing, he gave his preference to measures stronger than those which Mr. Seton-Karr deemed suited to the occasion.

Mr. Seton-Karr was greatly disappointed by the decision of the Government, but the reason adduced by that Government was one to which he could take no exception. Lord Elphinstone desired that the whole of the southern Maratha country should be placed
under the control of one officer as commissioner, and, in the circumstances of the time, he deemed it further advisable that that officer should be a soldier. Now Colonel Le Grand Jacob already exercised political authority in one part of the territory. On the 6th of December he had suppressed a mutiny in Kolhapur, and had, by his firmness and strength of character, impressed the Bombay Government with the conviction that he was peculiarly qualified to wield political power in troublous times. Lord Elphinstone, then, transferred to him in the new arrangement a similar authority in the other part, with Mr. Manson as political agent under him. If, however, the reason for the transfer was sufficient in that it cast no slur upon Mr. Seton-Karr, it did not the less cause considerable misgivings to that gentleman, for, knowing as he did the native chieftains, he felt that a change would create suspicion in their minds, a change more especially which transferred political action from himself to an officer who had been engaged in the Inam Commission, and that if that change were followed by a tension of the tie which bound them to the suzerain power, it might even produce a catastrophe.

Previous to the assumption of the charge of the political duties of the Belgaon districts, Mr. Seton-Karr had been gradually engaged in disarming the country—a work in which he had been most ably assisted by Colonel George Malcolm, commanding the Southern Maratha horse, and holding military charge of the southern Maratha territory. It would be difficult to overestimate the services rendered by this able and gallant officer. His regiment mainly preserved order in that excitable country. In a previous chapter I have referred to his services at Shorapar. Prior to that event, on the 29th of November 1857, he had led his cavalry, supported by one company 28th native infantry, against the fortified village of Halgalli, which had become the head-quarters of the disaffected. For some days previously these men had been held in check by detachments of the horse, first under Kerr, subsequently reinforced by La Touche, of the same regiment. These officers had, by spirited charges, driven the enemy into the town, and were struggling with them desperately in the streets when Malcolm, with a fresh party, arrived. His men at once dismounted, and, assisted by the sepoys of the 28th native infantry, scrambled over the flat-roofed houses of the village, dashed upon the rebels, and decided the victory. The country, however, was still uneasy. Both above and below the ghat British authority had met with resistance, but, except that in some cases the guns and the arms had not entirely been delivered up, the danger from such disturbances was considered to have passed away when Colonel Jacob took charge. Within a very short time of that event, however, a new peril appeared in another quarter.

Of the chief of Nargund I have spoken in the first chapter of this volume. That this chief was thoroughly disaffected there can be no doubt. Mr. Seton-Karr had even suspected him of treasonable correspondence with the chief of Shorapur But up to May 1858 he had been managed. He had even, under the gentle pressure exercised by Mr. Seton-Karr, sent in a correct list of the guns and ammunition he possessed, and very recently, urged by Mr. Manson, had even begun to dispatch them to Dharwar. Those who are aware of the reverence and affection with which a native chief regards his guns, will
realize the sacrifice which the raja made to meet the expressed wishes of the Government.

Matters were thus progressing, the chief doubtless secretly disaffected, yet complying under gentle pressure with the orders of the Bombay Government, when, about the 25th of May, intelligence reached him that Mr. Seton-Karr had been removed from the political charge of his country, and that Mr. Manson had been gazetted his successor.

This intelligence changed all the good dispositions of the chief of Nargund. Although he did not personally dislike Mr. Manson, he regarded him as the living representative of the hated system of ham examination—a system which, as have said, had worked with most disastrous effects on the chiefs of the southern Maratha country. At that moment, too, Mr. Manson was specially obnoxious to him, for, only few a week's previously, whilst still serving under Mr. Seton-Karr, he had arrested and carried off as a prisoner his own dearest friend, the chief of Jamkhandi. The conviction at once took possession of him that the change was aimed against himself, that he was to be arrested, as his friend had been arrested, and thrown into a dungeon. In his fear and trepidation, the chief sent a confidential agent to Dharwar to inquire of the magistrate the meaning of the portentous change.

But before he could receive an answer, those about him had begun to work on a nature constitutionally timid and nervous. His habitual advisers and companions had not even then despaired of receiving a summons to join the victorious standard of the heir of Peshwa. All seemed yet possible. Tantia Topi was confronting the British in Bandalkhand, Kalpi was yet held, and one good victory might give them all they desired. These men took advantage of the consternation caused in the chief's mind by Mr. Manson's appointment to inspire to resist, to cast defiance in the teeth of the foreigners who had persecuted themselves and their brethren.

These men were not alone in their endeavors. The chief's wife, a lady of great personal attractions, and twenty years younger than he was, had renounced all hopes of a natural heir. She loved power, and the chance of her possessing power after her husband's death rested on the prospect of her becoming the adoptive mother of a reigning boy. And the British Government having refused to the chief the right to adopt, this prospect was possible only in the event of the British rule being supplanted by that of the Maratha. This favored counselor added, then, her entreaties to those of the chief's companions.

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80 Only a short time previously the raja of Nargund had met Mr. Manson at the chief of Jamkhandi's house, visiting him apparently on friendly terms.

81 So penetrated was he with this idea, that he dispatched that day a letter to his brother at Ramdrag, in which occurs the passage: "I had rather die than be arrested as Jamkhandi was."
The chief of Nargund gave way. That day he recalled the guns which had progressed only a few miles on the road to Dharwar, began to store provisions, and on the 27th of May, possessing only three obsolete rusty cannon and a swivel gun, declared war, with all the formalities used by the Marathis, against the British Government.

Mr. Manson had taken up his duties as political agent on the 16th of May. From that date till the 26th he had remained with Colonel Jacob at Kohlapur, transacting business with him. On the 26th he set out for the northern states of the territory, with the view of judging for himself of the state of the country and of using his influence with the chiefs. Four hours after he had set out, Jacob received a telegram from General Lester, commanding at Belgaon, stating that an insurrection had broken out near to Dharwar, and that the Nargund chief was believed to be supporting it as he had recalled some of his guns on their way to be given up. Jacob at once sent a horseman with this news to Manson, informing him also that he had telegraphed to the general to send, if the report were true, a sufficient force to Nargund, and recommending him to return to Kohlapur. Jacob's messenger reached Manson at Kurandwar. Englishmen in India are so accustomed to authority and to all the incense which waits on authority, that, except in rare cases, they judge men and affairs not as they are, but as to their complacent minds they seem to be. Now Manson had always been on the most friendly terms with the chief of Nargund. He had no adequate conception of the depth of bitterness and the dread his connection with the Inam Commission had roused in the mind of that Maratha. noble. It was not possible, then, that he should imagine for a moment that his nomination to the control of political affairs in place of Mr. Seton-Karr would rouse the chief to madness. Still believing, then, in the friendly professions of that chief and in the persuasive powers of his influence over him, he sent back word to Jacob that from Kurandwar he could reach Nargund by a cross road; that he would arrive there in time to prevent, probably, the development of the intended mischief; but that if too late to prevent such development, he was confident of being able to prevent the chief's half-brother, the lord of Ramdrug, from joining the rebellion. Having dispatched this reply, Manson posted horses along the road to Ramdrug, and sent off by a horseman a letter to Colonel George Malcolm, commanding at Kaladji, requesting him to join at Ramdrug with a body of his regiment, the Southern Maratha horse.

But before this missive reached Malcolm, that able and daring officer had taken the field with two hundred and fifty horsemen to attack the insurgents, who had already plundered the treasury of one of the district stations of Dharwar. Mr. Manson, then, though he rode hard, reached Ramdrug to find it unoccupied. He had with him the twelve troopers who had accompanied him from Kohlapur, and these were as fatigued as he himself was. There he learned from the chief the treason of his half-brother; he read the compromising letters from the latter, urging the Ramdrug chief to follow his example; and, entreated by that chief not to pursue his journey to Nargund, he resolved to join the force in the field under Malcolm.
Tired as he was, Manson set out in a palanquin, escorted by his troopers, that evening. Better had he taken his rest at Ramdrug and made the journey to Malcolm in one day, for, exhausted by the long day's work, he and his followers stopped about 10 o'clock at a temple near a little village on the way and slept.

A report of all Manson's movements had been duly carried to the chief of Nargund. When the news reached him of the halt at the temple, he reasoned as a Maratha will always reason. His enemy was in his power; he would slay him. He conceived that, having declared war against the British, he had a perfect right to destroy the members of that nation wherever he might find them. Accordingly, about midnight, he sallied forth with some hundreds of followers, and approaching the spot, poured in a volley, which killed the sentry, and then sent in his men to finish the work with the sword. Manson, roused from his sleep, fired his revolver at his assailants, but he was immediately overpowered, his head was cut off, and his body thrown in the fire, still burning, which had been kindled by his followers. Having killed as many of these as he could find, the chief returned with Manson's head to Nargund, and suspended the bloody trophy over a gateway.

Meanwhile, the insurgents who had plundered the treasury, had marched southwards and joined Bhim Rio, the chief of Kopaldrug. There they were attacked by a Madras force from Bellari, under Colonel Hughes, already mentioned for his soldier-like conduct at Shorapur, and who, in daring and manly qualities, in the capacity to manage men and to direct operations, yielded to none who came to the front in the mutiny. This gallant soldier pushed forward with an energy surpassing that of the rebels, caught them, as I have said, at Kopaldrug, and stormed the place, killing Bhim Rao, the chief of Hembaji, and many of the defenders.

Malcolm, on his side, had no sooner heard that Nargund was in revolt than he felt that a moment's delay would provoke the rising of the entire Maratha country. With only two hundred and fifty cavalry at his disposal he marched, then, immediately against the place, assisted by the wily Brahman officials, who believed he was marching on destruction.

At the same time he wrote to Belgaon asking for some infantry and some guns. The authorities there sent him two companies of Europeans, one of native infantry, and two guns under Captain Paget. Riding on with these, only five days after the insensate declaration of war, he appeared before Nargund. He had scarcely dismounted before news reached him that the rebels were marching to attack him. His heart bounded with

82 It was the reasoning of Jael, wife of Hebor the Kenite, whose conduct was infinitely more treacherous.

83 Read also Sir George Le Grand Jacob's *Western India* before and during the mutinies. The account of the suspension of the head over a gateway rests entirely on native testimony. When the place was taken it was found floating in a well.
joy. "I have them now," he said. Mounting his troopers as quickly as possible, he went to the front. It was true, they were advancing. But when they saw Malcolm and his horsemen they hesitated, then halted, and, in the manner of natives, began to close in on their centre. Then, wavering, they fell back. By this time Malcolm had collected his men. Riding at their head, he charged, overthrew the rebels—who, however, fought well in groups—drove them back, followed them up into the town, and forced the surviving combatants to take refuge in the fort.

There remained now only the fort, a very strong one, so strong, that if defended, it would have defied the efforts of the small assailing force. But Malcolm knew the natives well. "Give them a quiet night," he said, "and they will save us the trouble." He was right. On the morning of the 2nd of June the strongest fort in the southern Maratha country was found deserted.

The chief, accompanied by six of his principal advisers, attempted, in the guise of a pilgrim, to escape the fate he had provoked. Every possible ruse was had recourse to by the fugitives to baffle the pursuit which, they soon learned, had been instituted after them. The man who had been deputed for that task, Mr. Frank Souter, possessed qualities which did not permit him to be easily baffled. He met ruse with ruse, and after a hot pursuit, captured the chief on the night of the 3rd.

On learning of Mr. Manson's death, Colonel Jacob had taken the promptest measures to control the northern states of the territory. He forced the chief of Miraj, the best fortified town in the country, to give a pledge of his fidelity by surrendering his ammunition. Shortly afterwards, the death of General Lester led to the nomination of Colonel Jacob as Brigadier-General in military command in the southern Maratha country.

Under General Jacob's firm rule the country above the ghats soon subsided into quiescence, but below the mountains, along the Goa frontier, the Sawant rebels still continued to keep a large number of Madras, Bombay, and Portuguese troops, regular and irregular, in the field. Want of concert, however, naturally resulted from the action of troops serving under commanders independent one of the other. Eventually, in November, the Portuguese Viceroy, at a conference with General Jacob, consented to place the whole of his field detachments under the command of the officer who should unite that of the Bombay troops. Under this agreement Brigadier-General Fitzgerald of the Madras army took command of the united forces, and an organized plan was

84 Now Sir Frank Souter, Superintendent of Police in Bombay.

85 The chief of Nargund was tried at Belgaon on the 11th of June. He pleaded guilty, and in his plea stated that it was the fear of arrest that had caused him to commit the bloody deed. He was executed, in the presence of all the troops and of a large number of natives, on the 12th. It remains only to add that the bodies of the wife of whom I have spoken and the chief's mother were found in the Malparba river on the night of the 3rd. Sir G. Le Grand Jacob states, in the work already referred to, that they drowned themselves, unable to bear up against the disgrace.
arranged. This was to hem in the track occupied by the rebels, and to inform them that unless they surrendered by the 20th of November, they would be hunted down without mercy. On that date the band had dwindled to the number of eighty persons. These surrendered to the Portuguese commander on the night of that day, and their ringleaders were subsequently transported to the Portuguese possessions in Taimor.

Thenceforward the peace of the southern Maratha country was assured.
BOOK XV.

CHAPTER I.

IN the preceding volume I referred to the proclamation issued by Lord Canning regarding the talukdars of Oudh, and of its reception in the victorious camp of Sir Colin Campbell; and I promised to deal with the subject more fully later on. I proceed now to redeem that promise.

The Oudh proclamation, dispatched by Lord Canning to Sir James Outram in his capacity of Chief Commissioner of Oudh, with a letter bearing date the 3rd of March 1858, directing that it should not be published until Lakhnao had fallen, or at least lay at the mercy of the British commander, was at once a sentence, a warning, and a threat addressed to the inhabitants of the rebellious province. That proclamation announced that Lakhnao, after defying and resisting the power of the British for nine months, now lay at the mercy of the conqueror; that in that defiance and resistance the mutinous soldiery who had begun the revolt had been greatly aided by the inhabitants of the city and the province, even by those who owed their prosperity to the British Government; but that the hour of retribution had now arrived. Acting on the principle that before pronouncing sentence on the guilty, it was just and proper to reward the innocent, the proclamation proceeded to name six men—three of whom were rajahs, two zamindars, and one a talukdar—who had remained faithful amid great temptations, and who were not only declared "the sole hereditary proprietors of the lands which they held when Oudh came under British rule," but were promised additional rewards. Rewards and honors in proportionate measure were likewise promised to others in whose favor similar claims should be established to the satisfaction of the Government. But, with these exceptions, the proprietary right in the soil of the province was confiscated to the British Government, which would dispose of that right in such manner as might seem fitting. To the chiefs, talukdars, and landowners, however, who should make immediate submission, surrendering their arms and obeying the orders of the Chief Commissioner, the proclamation promised the safety of their lives and of their honor, provided that their hands were "unstained with English blood murderously shed." For any further indulgence, the proclamation added, and with regard to the condition in which such men might thereafter be placed, "they must throw themselves upon the justice and mercy of the British Government." The proclamation promised, in conclusion, that to those amongst the classes referred to who should come forward promptly and give the Chief Commissioner their support in the restoration of peace and order, the indulgence would be large, and that the Governor-General would be ready to view liberally the claims which they might thus acquire to the restoration of their former rights. Further, that whilst participation in the murder of Englishmen and Englishwomen would
exclude those who had participated in it from all mercy, those, on the other hand, who had protected English lives would be specially entitled to consideration and leniency.

In the letter to which I have referred as accompanying the proclamation the Foreign Secretary, Mr. G. F. Edmonstone, was, as I have already stated, careful to lay down that it should not be published until Lakhnao had either been conquered or lay at the mercy of the conqueror. It further prescribed that, when published, the proclamation was to be addressed only to the non-military inhabitants of the province, and in no sense to the mutinous sepoys. It expressed likewise the conviction of Lord Canning that the tone of apparent severity which characterized the proclamation was necessary, inasmuch as the announcement in such a state paper of a liberal and forgiving spirit would be open to misconstruction; and it added that, in reality, the spirit of the proclamation was merciful and even lenient, in that it promised exemption, almost general, from the penalties of death and imprisonment to rajas, talukdars, and zamindars who had conspired and fought against the Government; that even the confiscation of estates was rather a merciful commutation of a severe punishment than a harsh measure of justice. The letter concluded with suggestions to Sir James Outram regarding the manner in which it might be requisite for him to deal with mutineers of varying grades of guilt.

Sir James Outram received the letter and the proclamation on the 5th of March. Reading the latter by the light of its actual contents, apart from the commentary furnished by the letter, he arrived at a conclusion regarding it the very reverse of that which Lord Canning had endeavored to impress upon him. Lord Canning, when sending him the proclamation, had said in so many words, by the mouth of his Foreign Secretary, "Do not judge the proclamation simply by itself, as a paper dealing out stern justice to conquered revolters. Rather, looking at the measure of punishment which those revolters have brought upon themselves, see whether the proclamation does not in every case, except the case of atrocious murder, pronounce a mitigation of punishment, capable of still further mitigation." But Outram, disregarding this exhortation, looked at the proclamation without sufficient reference to the circumstances which had made it necessary, and condemned it. In a letter to the Foreign Secretary, dated the 8th of March, he declared his belief that there were not a dozen landowners in Oudh who had not, in some way or other, assisted the rebels, and that, therefore, there would be but few exceptions to the sweeping confiscations proposed by the Governor-General; he expressed his conviction that as soon as the proclamation should be made public nearly all the chiefs and talukdars would retire to their domains and prepare for a desperate resistance. He proceeded even to urge extenuating circumstances for those of them who had revolted, by declaring his opinion—which, it must be admitted, was founded on fact—that the landowners had been very unjustly treated in the land-settlement after the annexation; that, apart from this, their sympathy with the rebels had been, in the actual circumstances, only natural; that it was not until the British rule in Oudh had been brought to a virtual end by the mutineers that they had sided against the Government; that they ought to be treated rather as honorable enemies than as rebels;
that they would be converted into relentless enemies if their lands were confiscated, maintaining a guerilla war which would "involve the loss of thousands of Europeans by battle, disease, and exposure"; but that if their lands were insured to them they would at once aid in restoring order, and would so cooperate with the paramount power as, before long, to render unnecessary the further presence of the enormous army then occupying Oudh.

To this letter Lord Canning replied, on the 10th, in a brief dispatch, the nature of which renders still clearer the really merciful intentions of his proclamation. Referring to the promise of safety of life and honor to the talukdars, chiefs, and landholders, unstained with English blood murderously shed, who should surrender at once and obey the orders of the Chief Commissioner, Lord Canning authorized Sir James to amplify it by an addition which, if not very wide in itself, intimated as clearly as possible the merciful intentions of the Governor-General. "To those amongst them," ran this addition, "who shall promptly come forward, and give to the Chief Commissioner their support in the restoration of peace and order, this indulgence will be large, and the Governor-General will be willing to view liberally the claims which they may thus acquire to a restitution of their former rights."

Three weeks later Lord Canning replied at greater length to Outram's remarks. In Mr. Edmonstone's dispatch, dated the 31st of March, Lord Canning admitted that the people of Oudh occupied a different position, with respect to their allegiance to the British Government, to that of the inhabitants of the provinces which had been longer under British rule. But, in the Governor-General's opinion, that difference constituted no valid ground for treating the chiefs and talukdars in the lenient manner suggested by Outram. Arguing in the spirit of the letter of the 3rd of March, he again insisted that, in the presence of a great crime, exemption from death, transportation, and imprisonment were great boons, and that to have offered more lenient terms would have been to treat the rebels—not, as Outram contended, as honorable enemies—but as enemies who had won the day. With respect to Outram's contention that the injustice of the land-settlement after the annexation had impelled the landowners to rebel, Lord Canning simply declined to recognize the hypothesis. Admitting that the policy of introducing into Oudh a system of village settlement in place of the old settlement under talukdars might not have been altogether wise, Lord Canning declined to believe that the conduct of the landowners was in any respect the consequence of that policy. He attributed that conduct rather to the repugnance they had felt to suffer any restraint of the arbitrary powers they had till then exercised; to a diminution of their importance by being brought under equal laws; and to the obligation of disbanding their armed followers and of living a peaceful and orderly life. For these reasons, Lord Canning adhered to his proclamation.

That Sir James Outram did not at once realize the statesman-like nature and the really merciful tendencies of Lord Canning's proclamation may at once be admitted. The end
of the two men was really the same; the difference was in the manner by which that end should be attained. Sir James would have carried leniency to a point at which leniency would have missed its aim. Lord Canning, maintaining the right to be severe, was prepared to be as merciful as Outram whenever the exercise of mercy was politically desirable.

The real character of Lord Canning's statesmanship at this period might have remained long generally unknown but for the action taken with respect to the proclamation by the then President of the Board of Control, the Earl of Ellenborough. That nobleman had but recently taken over the seals of that office from his predecessor, a member of the Whig Cabinet, Mr. Vernon Smith. In due course he received, about the 20th of March, a copy of Lord Canning's proclamation, unaccompanied by any explanatory document. In point of fact, Lord Canning, in transmitting the proclamation, had written to Mr. Vernon Smith, a member of his own party, and who, in his belief, still held the office of President of the Board of Control, a letter in which he stated that the proclamation required an explanatory dispatch which he had not had time to prepare. Unfortunately Mr. Vernon Smith neglected to pass on that letter to his successor. He thus allowed Lord Ellenborough to believe that the proclamation stood alone, that it required no interpretation, and was to be judged on its merits as an act of policy.

It is not surprising that, reading the proclamation in this way, Lord Ellenborough arrived at a conclusion not very dissimilar to that with which Sir James Outram, possessing all the advantages of proximity to, and personal communication with, Lord Canning, had been impressed. He condemned it as likely to raise such a ferment in Oudh as would make pacification almost impossible. In accord with Outram, of whose views, however, he was ignorant, Lord Ellenborough believed that the mode of settling the land tenure when the British took possession of Oudh had been in many ways unjust, and had been the chief cause of the general and national character of the disaffection in that province. He concluded—agreeing in this also with Outram—that the people of Oudh would view with dismay a proclamation which cut them off, as a nation, from the ownership of land so long cherished by them, and would deem it righteous to battle still more energetically than before against a government which could adopt such a course of policy. Lord Ellenborough embodied these views in a dispatch to be transmitted to Lord Canning in the name of the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, added to them an argument—also an argument of Sir James Outram—to the effect that the people of Oudh ought to be regarded as legitimate enemies than as rebels, and concluded it with these stinging words: "Other conquerors, when they have succeeded in overcoming resistance, have excepted a few persons as still deserving of punishment, but have, with a generous policy, extended their clemency to the great body of the people. You have acted on a different principle. You have reserved a few as deserving of special favor, and you have struck with what they will feel as the severest of punishment the mass of the inhabitants of the country."
"We cannot but think that the precedents from which you have departed will appear to have been conceived in a spirit of wisdom superior to that which appears in the precedent you have made. We desire, therefore, that you will mitigate in practice the stringent severity of the decree of confiscation you have issued against the landowners of Oudh. We desire to see British authority in India rest upon the willing obedience of a contented people; there cannot be contentment where there is general confiscation.

"Government cannot long be maintained by any force in a country where the whole people is rendered hostile by a sense of wrong; and if it were possible so to maintain it, it would not be a consummation to be desired."

Lord Ellenborough was not content with penning these severe and galling strictures. Without submitting the dispatch for the approval of the Queen, without even showing it to his colleagues, he transmitted it direct to Lord Canning. Nor was he content even with that. Three weeks later he allowed it to be presented to the House of Commons!

So far as Lord Ellenborough was concerned, the three mistakes he committed—the penning of an acrimonious dispatch without waiting for an explanation, the transmission of that dispatch before it had been submitted to the Queen or had received the approval of his colleagues, the disclosure of its contents to Mr. Bright with a view to its being presented to the House of Commons—were fatal to his tenure of office. The matter having come under the cognizance of the House of Commons, Lord Ellenborough taking upon himself the sole responsibility of the dispatch, resigned his office.

Far different was the effect produced by the receipt of the dispatch upon Lord Canning. He received it at Allahabad on the 13th of June. Before its contents became known, rumors circulated that the Government of Lord Derby had written a disagreeable letter to the Governor-General. "I asked him," wrote, at the time, one deeply in his confidence, "if it was true that he had received something disagreeable. He said, almost indifferently, that it was impertinent; but he did not care much; he would answer what they wrote." He then entered into a conversation regarding his Oudh policy. The next day, when the dispatch had been read by others, the prevailing feeling regarding it was that it was offensively impertinent, with a look of epigrammatic point in the concluding sentences—those which I have quoted—of which the writer was evidently proud. But, above all, there arose a feeling of indignation that a dispatch so insulting should have been published for the benefit of the natives, many of them still in revolt, as well as of the Anglo-Indians.

But Lord Canning had, at this crisis, a support not less grateful than the confidence of the friends about him. The same mail brought him a copy of a resolution of the Court of Directors expressing continued confidence in their Governor-General. Letters were received from Mr. Sidney Herbert, from Lord Granville, from Lord Aberdeen, and from
many other leading men, expressing sympathy and regard. In almost all these Lord Canning was urged not to resign, but to carry on his own policy calmly, and to leave to the Government the odium of recalling him. Lord Canning never thought of resigning. He regarded Lord Ellenborough's dispatch as Achilles would have regarded a javelin "hurled by the feeble hand of Priam," and far from allowing it to disturb his equanimity, he sat down coolly and calmly to pen a vindication of his policy.

Curiously enough, ten days after that vindication was drafted and dispatched—on the 27th of June—Lord Canning received a long private letter from Lord Derby himself on the subject of the point of difference. In this letter Lord Derby expressed a general confidence in Lord Canning's policy: he attributed Lord Ellenborough's dispatch to the conduct of Mr. Vernon Smith in withholding the covering private letter which accompanied the Oudh proclamation, and which gave the only intimation that further explanations would be forwarded. Lord Derby concluded by virtually asking, almost pressing, Lord Canning to stay on, and spoke of the probability of Lord Stanley going to the Board of Control. To one in Lord Canning's position such a letter from the chief of the cabinet of which Lord Ellenborough had been a member was most satisfactory. It might almost be said that his policy was vindicated by his enemies.

Lord Canning's own vindication was dated the 18th of June. It began by alluding in a dignified manner to the fact that the dispatch censuring himself had been made public in England three weeks before it reached his hands, and that in a few days it would be read in every station in Hindustan. Dwelling then upon the pain which the censure of his conduct by the Court of Directors would cause him, and upon the manner in which the publication of it would increase his difficulties, he declared that no taunts or sarcasms, come from what quarter they might, would turn him from the path which he believed to be that of public duty. Expressing, then, his conviction that a change in the government of India at that time, taking place under circumstances which would indicate a repudiation of the policy pursued towards the Oudh rebels, would seriously retard the pacification of the country, he proceeded to declare his belief that that policy had been from the first merciful without weakness, and indulgent without compromise of the dignity of the Government; that it had made manifest to the people of reconquered districts all over India, including Oudh, that the indulgence to those who should submit, and who should be free from atrocious crime, would be large; and that the Oudh proclamation, thoroughly consistent with that policy, offered the best and earliest prospect of restoring peace to that province on a stable footing.

Stating then, in dignified language, that although in a time of unexampled difficulty, danger, and toil, he would not lay down of his own act the high trust which he had the honor to hold, yet that if, after reading the vindication of his policy, the Court of Directors should see fit to withhold their confidence from him, he then preferred his respectful yet urgent request that he might be relieved from the office of Governor-
General, Lord Canning proceeded to reply to Lord Ellenborough's strictures, and to assert the grounds upon which his convictions of the soundness of his policy rested.

With respect to the former, Lord Canning referred to the extraordinary manner in which Lord Ellenborough's dispatch had almost justified the people of Oudh, as if they were fighting in a righteous cause—a manner quite legitimate in a member of the legislature, but quite unjustifiable in a minister of the Queen of England, who herself was actually Queen of Oudh also. He declined to discuss the policy which, in 1855-56, had dictated the annexation; it was not his act, nor had he ever been empowered to undo it. But he felt it incumbent upon him to point out the disastrous results which might follow, should the people of Oudh be encouraged, by such reasoning as that contained in the dispatch, to continue their resistance. At the actual moment, the chiefs of the various sections of rebels in Oudh were united neither by a common plan nor by a common sympathy, but, he added, if it should become manifest that the British Government shrank from a declaration of its right to possess Oudh, the Begam, as the representative in the field of the late reigning family, would draw to herself all the sympathies of the country, and all the other factions would merge in hers.

Lord Canning prefaced the defence of his proclamation by stating that he had early in the year proceeded to Allahabad chiefly that he might be able to investigate the state of Oudh; that he soon determined to make a difference, in the measures to be adopted for the pacification of the country, between the mutinied sepoys and the Oudh rebels; that the latter should not be put to death for appearing in arms against the authorities, unless they had committed actual murder; that the general punishment for rebellion in Oudh should be confiscation of estates, a punishment recognized by native states as the fitting consequence of the offence, and one which in no way affected caste nor the honor of the most sensitive Brahman or Rajput; a punishment which admitted of every gradation according to the severity or lightness of the offence, which would enable the Government to reward friendly talukdars and zamindars, and which, in point of fact, would, in many cases, constitute a kind of retributive justice—many of talukdars having acquired their estates by spoliation of the village communities; that, as a matter of abstract justice, it would only be right to restore those estates to the village communities; but that as there would be insuperable difficulties to such a course, it would be better to take the forfeited estates of the rebellious talukdars as Government property, out of which faithful villages and individuals might be rewarded.

With this vindication ended practically the crisis caused by Lord Ellenborough's hasty act. The result was to seat Lord Canning, in the presence of a ministry of an opposite party, more firmly in the saddle, and to give him greater strength to carry out the policy which he believed to be adapted to the circumstances. In another way his hands had been strengthened at this crisis.
The nomination of Sir James Outram to the Supreme Council enabled Lord Canning to place at the head of the Oudh province a man who, imbued with his own views, was certain to carry out his policy with the vigor arising from conviction.

The new Chief Commissioner of Oudh was Mr. Robert Montgomery. Mr. Montgomery was a man who, with a thorough acquaintance with administrative duties, combined great decision of character, a sound judgment, and a rare knowledge of native character. He had been the right hand of Sir John Lawrence in the Panjab, had been the firm advocate of those resolute measures which made the fall of Dehli possible, and, in the earlier stages of the mutiny, when Sir John Lawrence was absent from Labor, had himself directed the measures for disarming the native troops, which, carried out in time, had unquestionably saved the province. In questions of administrative policy, Mr. Montgomery, as I have said, agreed in principle with Lord Canning.

Such was the man to whom, in the month of May 1858, Lord Canning entrusted the carrying out of the policy towards Oudh embodied in his famous proclamation. Mr. Montgomery, without ignoring the proclamation, did not put it into rough action. He used it rather as a lever, by the judicious employment of which he could bring about the results at which the Governor-General professedly aimed. The situation was, for the first three months of his tenure of office, in many respects remarkable. The larger number of the relations, adherents, and dependants of the deposed royal family had their dwellings in, or belonged, by family association extending over many years, to the city of Lakhnao. Considering, moreover, the part which that city, and more especially the classes of its inhabitants to which I have referred, had played in the rebellion, it was especially necessary to exercise over it a strict supervision. In the provinces an entirely different feeling prevailed. There the rule of the king of Oudh had planted no seeds of loyalty or devotion. Alien in religion and in race to the great bulk of the people of Oudh, the king and his courtiers had been tolerated, first, because they were there, and, secondly, because they had exercised no strict supervising power, but had been content to be the nominal rulers of the great landowners, permitted to carry on, very much in accordance with their own wishes, their feudal rule. The central power, as exercised by the kings of Oudh, had interfered to put a stop to rapine and oppression only when that rapine and oppression had attained a magnitude so great that to ignore them would have produced a national rising. The sentiment felt, then, by the great body of landowners towards the royal family of Oudh was not loyalty; it was not affection; it was not sympathy; it was scarcely contentment. Perhaps the term that best describes it is the term toleration. They had been content to tolerate that family as exercising a kind of nominal suzerainty which permitted them to do just as they liked.

Towards the British rule, exercised as it had been by the civilians who had immediately preceded Sir Henry Lawrence, they entertained a different feeling. In strong contrast

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86 Now Sir Robert Montgomery, K.C.S.I., a member of the Council of India.
with the selfish sway of the Muhammadan kings of Oudh, the British rule had made itself felt in every corner of the province. The reforms it had introduced, the inquiries which it made, had been so sweeping, that an almost universal feeling had risen amongst the landowners that it was not to be endured. If the king of Oudh had been king Log, the British rule was the rule of king Stork. The landowners of Oudh, then, had hailed the mutiny, not from affection towards the deposed dynasty, but from hatred of its successor. Indifferent as they were to the persons and the race of their Muhammadan kings, they would have gladly ejected the British to restore them.

When, then, Lakhnao had fallen, the talukdars and the landowners generally were as far as they had ever been from submission to the British authority. Could the Begam show a strong front, they might yet combine with her for the restoration of the ancient dynasty in the person of one of its members. But as there did not appear in the field any force sufficiently strong to rally round, the landowners and other rebel leaders fought each for himself, each hoping that some great benefit would accrue to him out of the general turmoil.

This disunion greatly diminished the difficulties which Montgomery might otherwise have had to encounter had there been unity of purpose or concentration of action among the malcontents. But still the task before him was no light one. He met it with all the skill, the temper, and the judgment which might have been expected from so experienced a ruler of men. He exhaustcd every means of persuasion at the same time that he brought clearly to the view of the landowners the fixed determination of the British Government. He was thus able to restore in some few districts the lapsed British authority. To reorganize that authority in those deaf to his persuasions, he was content to wait until the forcible measures inaugurated by his military coadjutor, Sir Hope Grant, should produce their natural results.

What those measures were I shall relate in the next chapter.
BOOK XV.

CHAPTER II.

WHEN I last referred to General Hope Grant, he was marching to the fort of Jallalabad near Lakhnao. The date was the 16th of May. Leaving his force to enter that place, the general, just then nominated a Knight Commander of the Bath for his services in the field, rode into Lakhnao to consult with Mr. Montgomery, just then appointed Chief Commissioner. Montgomery informed him that the Kanhpur road was again endangered by Beni Madho, an influential talukdar, who had likewise caused proclamations to be distributed in Lakhnao, warning the inhabitants to quit that city, as it was to be attacked. On receiving this information, Hope Grant, taking with him the 53rd foot instead of the 38th, and substituting Mackinnon's battery for Olpherts's, returned to Jallalabad, and started thence in pursuit of Beni Madho on the 25th of May.

For some time Beni Madho was invisible. Hope Grant followed him to Jassanda, eight miles from Bani, where he had been reported to be "with a force of eighty-five thousand men"; but the talukdar and his men had vanished. On the 4th of June the Sikh raja of Kappartola joined Sir Hope with nine hundred Sikhs and three brass 6-pounders.

Hope Grant posted this reinforcement at the Banni bridge, and leaving the pursuit of Beni Madho, marched against a body of rebels, less fabulously numerous, but more really formidable—being fifteen thousand strong—who had taken up a strong position at Nawabganj, on the Faizabad road, eighteen miles from Lakhnao. Grant's division was tolerably strong.\textsuperscript{87} Leaving, then, a small force at the other Nawabganj (on the Kanhpur road), he marched on Chinhat. There he found another column, one thousand two hundred strong, under Colonel Purnell. Leaving his baggage under charge of that officer, he left Chinhat at 11 o'clock on the night of the 12th of June to march against the rebels.

These latter had taken up a position exceptionally strong. They occupied a large plateau, surrounded on three sides by a stream, crossed by a bridge at a little distance from the town. On the fourth side was jungle.

\textsuperscript{87} It consisted of the 1st and 2nd battalions Rifle Brigade, the 5th Panjab infantry, five hundred Hodson's horse, under Lieutenant-Colonel Daly; one hundred and fifty Wales's horse, under Prendergast; two hundred and fifty Bruce's horse police, under Hill; the 7th hussars, under Colonel Sir William Russell; two squadrons Queen's Bays; Mackinnon's horse artillery; and Gibbon's and Carleton's batteries. The whole of the cavalry was commanded by Colonel Hagart.
Hope Grant's force, led by a trustworthy guide, crossed the complicated country between Chinhat and the plateau during the night, and reached the bridge mentioned about half an hour before day-break. He halted his column to allow his men to rest and get their breakfast, and then marched on the rebels. His plan was to turn their right and interpose between them and the jungle. His men would do the rest.

At daylight Hope Grant crossed the bridge and fell on the rebels. He took them completely by surprise. Their forces, divided into four parts, each commanded by a separate leader, had no time then either to concentrate or to act with unanimity. Hope Grant had struck at their centre, and this move had greatly contributed to their confusion. Still, they fought very gallantly. "A large body of fine daring zamindari men," wrote Sir Hope in his journal, "brought two guns into the open and attacked us in rear. I have seen many battles in India, and many brave fellows fighting with a determination to conquer or die, but I never witnessed anything more magnificent than the conduct of these zamindaris." They attacked Hodson's horse, who could not face them, and by their unsteadiness imperiled the two guns attached to their regiment. Grant at once ordered up the 7th hussars, and directed one of the batteries to open on the zamindaris. The fire from four guns of this battery mowed them down with terrible effect, but did not force them to retire. After they had played upon them some time, the 7th hussars came up, and charging through them twice, forced them to give way. The fact that round the two guns of Hodson's horse there lay, after the combat was over, a hundred and twenty-five rebel corpses, testifies to the velour of these gallant zamindaris. After three hours' fighting, the rebels fell back, leaving on the field six guns and about six hundred dead. The British lost sixty-seven in killed and wounded. In addition, thirty-three men died from sunstroke, and two hundred and fifty were taken into hospital.

This victory had very important results. The and disperse. rebels had from all sides been flocking to Nawabganj to swell the formidable column already there. But Hope Grant struck dismay all around. The defeat was so crushing, that the fugitives left the vicinity of Lakhnao, each of the four parties taking a different direction. The concentrating movement was also efficiently stopped.

Sir Hope left his force at Nawabganj and returned to Lakhnao to consult with Montgomery, whom this victory had allowed for the first time to breathe freely. From Lakhnao he was ordered by Sir Colin Campbell, in the third week of July, to march to the relief of Man Sing, a famous raja, who, having at one time taken part with the rebels, had listened to the advice of Mr. Montgomery, and returned to his allegiance. For this he had been denounced by his former associates, and at the moment was attacked in his fort by a body of them twenty thousand strong with twenty guns.

88 Incidents of the Sepoy War, by Sir Hope Grant and Captain Knollys.
It being of great importance to retain the adherence of so powerful a chieftain, Hope Grant at once dispatched the 90th regiment, the 1st Bengal fusiliers, Brasyer's Sikhs, Mackinnon's troop of horse artillery, and four hundred cavalry to Nawabganj to supply the place of the troops he should take on thence, and with these latter \^89 he set out on the 22nd of July.

Before starting with Sir Hope on this expedition it may be convenient to the reader to realize the exact position at the moment of the several rebel parties in Oudh. Of these, counting as one the forces of the Begam and her alleged paramour, Mammu Khan, there were nine of great, besides many of smaller dimensions. These nine disposed at the time of sixty or seventy thousand armed men, with forty or fifty guns. More than half of these were said to have their head-quarters under the command of the Begam and Mammu Khan at Chaokti, ghat, on the Gaghra, not far from Faizabad; but a considerable body of them were besieging Man Singh. The remainder—led by such men as Rimbakkas, Behunath Singh, Chandabaksh, Gholab Singh, Narpat Singh of Ruiya notoriety, Bhopal Singh, and Firoz Shih—were scattered all over the province, never long at the same place, hoping that a chance blow might give them victory or plunder.

Hope Grant, urged by letters from Man Singh to the effect that unless speedily relieved he could not answer for the consequences, pushed on rapidly, so rapidly, indeed, that the rumor of his advance had all, or almost all, the effect of the advance itself. When within a day's journey of Man Singh's stronghold of Shihganj he learned that the besieging force had melted away!

It was perfectly true. On hearing that the English army was advancing by rapid marches the besiegers took fright, and broke up into three and break divisions. One of these fled towards Gonda, a second to Sultanpur on the Gumti; a third to Tanda on the Ghagra.

Hope Grant moved then, not the less rapidly, Hope Grant on Faizabid; thence he proceeded to the ghat of Ajudha, and found a considerable body of rebels pushing forth in boats to the opposite side of the river. He opened on these and sank all but one. The crews for the most part escaped. The next day he had an interview with raja Man Singh.

But he did not rest idle at Faizabid. Sultanpur having been indicated to him as the next to point of attack, Hope Grant detached thither a column composed of the 1st Madras fusiliers, the 5th Panjab rifles, a detachment of 7th hussars, three hundred Hodson's horse, and a troop of horse artillery under the command of Brigadier Horsford. Horsford was delayed by heavy rain, but at last, on the 7th of August, he set out, and on the 12th arrived within four miles of the town, separated from it by the river Sai.

\^89 The 1st Madras Europeans, the 2nd battalion Rifle Brigade, the 1st Panjab infantry, the 7th hussars, five hundred Hodson's horse, twelve light guns, and a train of heavy guns.
Horsford having ascertained by means of a reconnaissance that the enemy were in force, that the river was peculiarly favorable for defence, and that his passage would be disputed, reported that state of affairs to Hope Grant. Almost simultaneously with the arrival of that report, Hope Grant received a telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, informing him that the Sultanpur rebels numbered fourteen thousand men, that they had fifteen guns, and that it was advisable that he should reinforce Horsford with the Rifle Brigade.

Nothing loth, Hope Grant ordered up the 53rd from Dariabad, and taking the rifles with him pressed forward to reinforce Horsford. He reached that officer on the 24th of August, and at once changing the position of the British camp, resolved to cross the following morning. The remainder of that day he employed in making rafts. On these, early on the morning of the 25th, he sent over the 1st Madras fusiliers, and the 5th Panjub infantry. Then, though with great difficulty and after one or two mishaps, he landed on the opposite bank two 9-pounder guns. This force, commanded by Colonel Galwey, then gallantly attacked and carried two villages in his front, at a point where the river forms a bend and where the rebels had a picket. The rifles were sent over in support of this advanced party.

It was not till the 27th of August that the main body had completed the passage of the river, and even then the heavy guns, artillery park, hospital, and a wing of the 53rd were left on the further bank. Nor did the British force even then attack. On the evening of the 28th, however, the rebels assailed that force, and after a sharp fight were repulsed. They then fled and abandoned Sultanpur to the conqueror.

It is difficult to follow the Oudh rebels in their continuous marches and countermarches. But few of the old sepoys, the men who had been the backbone of the mutiny, were now among them. Their fluctuating numbers were composed almost entirely of the adherents and vassals of the Wilkdars and landowners of the province, aided by the scum of the population, the refuse of the jails. Their movements were extremely irregular. One day they appeared to retire into Amethi, a fort twenty-five miles from Sultanpur, seven miles in circumference, composed of mud walls and surrounded by a jungle, the residence of Lal Madho Singh, a young chief determined in his hostility to the British; then they were heard of near Mozaffarnaggar, then at Rampur Kassia. It became evident to Sir Hope that nothing would drive them to submission but force, and he had full instructions to use it. The season, however, was unhealthy, and, having gained Sultanpur, he resolved, with the concurrence of Sir Colin Campbell, to postpone further operations till the middle of October.

Whilst the gallant soldiers of Sir Hope Grant's force are waiting, with anxious hearts, for the period of renewed action, it may not be inopportune to take a rapid glance at the
events which had been occurring in the meanwhile in other parts of the disturbed province.

In the last volume I recorded the close of the Rohilkhand campaign and the death of the Moulvi, the daring Ahmad Ulla of Faizabad. But although the campaign was terminated, some time elapsed before the border-lands of Oudh and of Rohilkhand were completely pacified. Many landowners on both sides of the border resented the conduct of the raja of Powain, and took up arms to punish, if they could, an act which they regarded as treachery in its basest form. It soon appeared, however, that the rebels could not agree amongst themselves, and they soon began to act independently of each other. One leader, named Nizam Ali Khan, with a considerable following, threatened the station of Philibit. Then there appeared in the field the whilom pseudo-viceroy of the province, the treacherous pensioner Khan Bahadur Khan, with about four thousand followers; the nawab of Farakhabad with five thousand; and a third under Wilayat Shah with three thousand. The authorities, however, were on their guard. They sent a small force, including the cavalry commanded by the gallant de Kantzow, to protect Powain, and they stimulated the corpulent raja of that place to keep his levies, two thousand strong, in constant training. This measure saved Powain; but in other parts of Rohilkhand it was found difficult to put down disorder. Towards the end of August, indeed, Ali Khan Mewati, acting in concert with the Nizam Ali Khan above alluded to, approached so near Philibit as to menace Nuriah, a large village ten miles only from that British military post.

The force at Philibit was commanded by Captain Robert Larkins, 17th Panjab infantry. It consisted of the 2nd Panjab cavalry under Captain Sam Browne, the 17th Panjab infantry under Captain Larkins, the 24th Panjab pioneers under Ensign Chalmers, and a detachment of Kemaon levies under Lieutenant Cunliffe. Both Captain Larkins and the chief civil officer, Mr. Malcolm Low, considered that the occupation of Nuriah by the rebels was at all hazards to be prevented. Larkins accordingly detached one hundred men of the 24th pioneers and one hundred 2nd Panjab cavalry, under Lieutenant Craigie, to hold that village, Mr. Low accompanying the party.

Craigie—who, as senior officer commanded—reached Nariah on the 28th of August. On the following morning the rebel chiefs I have named came down with three guns, three hundred infantry, and one hundred cavalry to attack the place. Craigie made excellent dispositions to meet them outside the town, and checked their advance. So well did the rebels fight, however, that when nineteen of their cavalry met in a hand-to-hand encounter a party of the 2nd Panjab cavalry, under Rassaidar Hakdad Khan, fourteen of

90 Now Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Browne, V.C., K.C.B.

91 Now the 25th native infantry.

92 Now the 32nd native infantry.
the nineteen were killed fighting. This occurred on the left flank. On the right flank Craigie repulsed them in person. They then fell back on Sirpurah, three miles distant.

Larkins, hearing at Philibit the enemy's fire, thought it advisable to reinforce Craigie. Accordingly he directed one hundred and fifty 2nd Panjab cavalry, one hundred and seventy-five 17th Panjab infantry, and one hundred Kamion levies to proceed at once, under the orders of Captain Sam Browne, to Mriah. Browne set off at once, and reached Nuriah at 4 o'clock that evening.

He at once reconnoitered the rebel position. It was on a rising ground or mound, amid the debris of the ruined village of Sirpurah, separated from Nuriah by an inundated tract of country nearly a mile in width, the inundating water varying from one to two feet. From that side Browne saw that it was impossible to attack. It was possible, however, to assail the position from the other side. The energetic magistrate, Mr. Malcolm Low, having procured him guides in the persons of an old woman and a boy, Browne started at midnight to make the detour necessary for the success of his plan.

Taking with him two hundred and thirty Panjab cavalry, one hundred and fifty 17th native infantry, one hundred 24th pioneers, and one hundred Keration levies, Browne worked round the enemy's right flank, and by daybreak reached a position on his left rear admirably adapted for his purpose. The fatigue had been great, and Browne halted for a few minutes to refresh men and horses. Whilst so halting the rebels discovered him, and at once made preparations to resist him, bringing three 9-pounders to bear on his advance, and having one on their proper right flank. There was no time for further rest, so Browne at once moved forward.

Covering his front with skirmishers, and giving them strict orders not to fire, but to use the bayonet only, Browne pushed his infantry forward through some grass jungle which served to screen their movements. Very soon, however, the enemy's guns began to play on his cavalry on the left, which were marching on the open road. Browne, who was with that cavalry, seeing the effect which one of them, fired with grape at eighty yards, was producing, galloped up to it, accompanied only by an orderly, and at once engaged in a desperate hand-to-hand encounter with the gunners, hoping to prevent them working their piece till the skirmishers should come up. Surrounded by the enemy, who attacked him with great fierceness, Browne attained his object. He did prevent the working of the gun until the skirmishers came up and relieved him. In the fight, however, he was first wounded on the knee; immediately afterwards his left arm was severed at the shoulder. As he received this terrible wound, his horse, struck in the face, reared up and fell back on him. Just then the major of his regiment, followed by two or three others, rushed in, and, though the former was severely wounded, these men kept the rebels at bay, and saved their commanding officer. Immediately
afterwards the infantry came up, bayoneted the gunners, and secured the gun which
Browne had captured.93

To go back for a moment. Whilst Browne was thus engaging the gunners, the
skirmishers had advanced steadily without firing a shot until close to the position,
when a body of the enemy's infantry lying in the grass jumped up and fired. On this the
skirmishers, firing a volley, dashed on, secured the gun, and, aided by the supports and
reserve, carried the position.

The cavalry on the right, meanwhile, had on and, simultaneously with their comrades
on the left, attacked the enemy's flank and captured one gun. This completed their
discomfiture. They broke and fled into the jungle, followed, as far as it was possible to
follow them, by the victorious horsemen. Their loss had been heavy, amounting to three
hundred men killed, their four guns, their ammunition, and their stores. The two rebel
leaders escaped, though one of them, Nizam Ali Khan, had been wounded.

In eastern Oudh, near Allahabad, there were about this time many bold and daring
talukdars, the men who had already caused trouble to Longden at Azamgarh, and who
were at this time exerting themselves to the utmost to stimulate opposition to the
British. They went so far, indeed, as to threaten with condign punishment any member
of their class who should submit to or accept the friendship of the common enemy. On
these threats they acted. Baba Ramparshad Singh, a talukdar of Soraon who had
displayed British sympathies, was attacked by some of these confederated rebels, who
burned his house, sacked the town, and took himself and his family prisoners. On the
intelligence of this outrage reaching Allahabad Lord Canning hastily organized a small
force, to be designated the Soraon field force, composed of two hundred and sixty of the
32nd foot, eighty of the 54th foot, the 7th Panjab infantry, seventy men Brasyer's Sikhs,
fifty-two troopers 6th Madras light cavalry, sixty sabres Labor light horse, detachments
of horse and foot artillery, and nine guns and mortars, and placed them under the
command of Brigadier Berkeley, C.B., with directions to reassert British authority in that
part of the country.

Berkeley crossed the Ganges on the 12th of July, and on the 14th came in sight of a body
of rebels at Dahain. Dahain was not properly a fort. It was rather a large area of jungle
surrounded by a dilapidated earthen wall and ditch, and fenced with a thorny abattis.
In the centre of the enclosure was a square brick-house. On Berkeley's approach the

93 Few more gallant deeds than this were performed during the war. Mr. Malcolm Law, who was near Browne at
the time, considered the daring act of prowess to have been the means of preventing the rebel gunners reloading
and firing upon the infantry at the most critical period of the whole action. Sir William Mansfield stated that in his
opinion and in that of Sir Colin, the affair was "very brilliant," and as "quite one of the best things we have seen of
the sort, the attack of you having been made in a most soldierly manner and secundum artem." Captain Browne
received the Victoria Cross for his daring. The reputation of this gallant officer as a man of great ability and conduct
had already been made, and he has subsequently shown himself as qualified to conduct large operations in the
field as he was willing to risk his life in the cause of duty.
rebels retired within the enclosure, allowing the British to occupy the village and the jungle outside without opposition. Berkeley waited for the arrival of his heavy guns, and then opened fire; but the result, owing to the dense nature of the jungle, not being satisfactory, he sent on his infantry to storm. The result was entirely successful. About two hundred and fifty rebels were killed in the ditch alone; as many more, chased through the jungle, were cut down by the cavalry and the horse artillery.

Resting on the 15th, Berkeley proceeded on the 16th to the fort of Tirul, seven miles north of Soraon. He found this fort in the middle of an impenetrable thorny jungle, through which a few paths were cut in directions only known to the natives of the place; and it had walls, bastions, ditches, escarps, like a miniature fortress, with a stronghold in the centre, into which the garrison could retire on being closely pressed. There were only three guns on the bastions, but the walls were loop-holed for musketry. So thick was the jungle around, that Berkeley could scarcely gain a view of the fort; he therefore deemed it prudent to employ his mortars and a 24-pounder before sending in his infantry. This plan succeeded. The enemy evacuated the place during the night, leaving behind them their three guns and their gun-ammunition. The fort was then destroyed.

By a somewhat similar train of operations, Berkeley captured and destroyed a fort at Bhairpar. Having thus completed the work entrusted to him, he returned with his field force to Allahabad. After a brief interval, he was again sent Berkeley out to demolish other forts in Oudh at distances from Allahabad. In this manner he extended his force as far as Partabgarh. Pushing on, then, to Sultanpur, he touched Hope Grant's force, and they united the line of posts direct from Allahabad to Lakhnao.

The force under Rowcroft, and the Pearl brigade acting with it under Captain Sotheby, whom we left at A'morha at the end of April, had fallen back on Captainganj. In the interval there was occasional sharp fighting. On the 9th of June a detachment of both services, led by Major Cox, the sailors commanded by Lieutenant Tumour, and some twenty marines by Lieutenant Pym, marched on A'morha, where, it had been ascertained, Muhammad Husen had arrived in force. Cox divided his detachments into two parts; one led by himself, the other—to which were attached the sailors and marines—by Major J. F. Richardson. Setting out at 2 o'clock in the morning, and arriving at daybreak within a mile of A'morha, they were suddenly met by a heavy fire from skirmishers thrown out by the rebels. Pym and the marines drove these in: Cox then opened fire with his guns. Then foiling an attempt made to outflank him, he drove the rebels out of the place.

Nine days later a larger detachment of Rowcroft's force again attacked the same rebel leader at the head of four thousand men at Harriah, and inflicted on him a defeat so crushing that he fled from that part of the country. A little later Rowcroft moved with
Isolated actions in the more western part of the province produced results not less beneficial. It happened that on the 7th of August a rebel band, the advance of the force of the rebel Firoz Shah, attacked the station of Mohan, on the river Sai, seventeen miles from Lakhnao on the road to Fathgarh. Mohan was one of the places in which British rule had been reestablished, and was at the time the head-quarters of the Deputy Commissioner of the district, Mr. Pat Carnegy, already mentioned in these pages. At Mr. Carnegy's disposal was a native police battalion. The river Sai, close to Mohan, was traversed by a bridge. On the evening of the 7th of August the rebel band referred to, numbering two hundred infantry and one hundred and fifty cavalry—the advance guard of a larger force—drove in the police pickets, crossed the bridge, and made every preparation to attack the town the following morning.

Information of this attack reached Colonel Evelegh, C.B., commanding at Nawabganj, at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 8th. An hour later Evelegh set off with three hundred Sikh cavalry under Godby, two horse-artillery guns, twenty-five gunners mounted, to support the guns, and twelve rank and file of the 20th foot, mounted on limbers, and reached a point three miles from Mohan. Conceiving that were he to continue his direct advance the rebels would acquire information of his approach, Evelegh turned off from that point to the village of Husenganj—a village between Mohan and Rassulabad, the general headquarters of Firoz and the occupation of which would cut the rebels' line of retreat. His foresight was justified; for on coming within a mile of Husenganj, he perceived the rebels falling back on that place from Mohan. He immediately pursued them with his small force, but finding that his guns could not travel fast enough to overtake them, he pushed forward his cavalry under Godby. The result was satisfactory. Godby laid low forty-five of the rebels and captured their only gun, a brass 3-pounder, together with one elephant and two camels.\textsuperscript{94}

Nearer to Lakhnao, between the Rohilkhand frontier and that city, a gallant deed performed by the Kavanagh whose immortal heroism was recorded in the last volume, tended greatly to the pacification of the district in which it occurred.

Of the district of Malhiabad, twelve miles northwest of the capital, Mr. Kavanagh was Assistant Commissioner. Eighteen miles further to the north-west, lay the town of Sandhia, occupied chiefly by Pathans, possessing many brick-built houses and a small mud fort, and situated in a level plain. The Pathans of this place had displayed a determined hostility to the British, and had lost no opportunity to threaten their posts and to intercept their communications. It occurred to Kavanagh, a daring man, fertile in resources and full of the love of adventure, that it would be possible to put an end to

\textsuperscript{94} This action had the effect of clearing the rebels from many of the districts of Unao and Mallaon.
these excesses by the capture of the town. He proposed, therefore, to Captain Dawson, commanding one of the new police levies, to attack Sandela. Dawson agreed. The place was stormed on the 30th of July, the rebels were driven out, and the town remained in the occupation of the British. Kavanagh displayed great daring on this occasion. Nor was his tact inferior to his courage. By a ready display of that quality, he won over several zamindars to the British cause, and even engaged them to maintain a number of matchlock men at their own expense for its support.

The banks of the Ganges in Oudh, even so far down as Allahabad, required during these three months of July, August, and September, very close watching. They were infested by bands of rebels, some of whom pillaged the villages in Oudh; others, crossing the river, attacked and plundered those in British territory. To remedy this evil, river steamers were employed during the rainy season, when the river was navigable. On one occasion, information having reached the authorities, towards the end of July, that the rebels had collected many boats, ready, whenever a favorable opportunity should offer, to cross into British territory, a force of one hundred and twenty Sikhs and two guns was dispatched in a steamer to destroy the boats. They did destroy some twenty boats, but the forts which the rebels occupied were too well armed and too strong to be attacked. The expedition against these was deferred, but on several occasions in August and September small detachments were sent up the river to check the predatory instincts of the rebels, and in most cases this object was accomplished.

At the period at which we have arrived, the end of September 1858, the position occupied by the British in Oudh was very peculiar. They held a belt of country right across the centre of the province, from east to west; whilst the districts north and south of that belt were either held by the rebels or were greatly troubled by them. North of the belt were the Begam, Mammu Khan, Firoz Shah, Hardat Singh, and leaders less notorious, with their followers; south of it were Beni Madhu, Hanmant Singh, Harichand, and others. Besides these, in the north-eastern corner of the province, near the Nepal frontier, Nana Sahib and his adherents were believed to rest.

In October the cessation of the rains made the movement of troops again possible. The rebels were the first to take advantage of the change of season. On the 3rd of October Harichand with six thousand men and eight guns, crossed the Gumti ten miles north of Sandela. His force, increased by the junction of several zamindars and their following to twelve thousand men and twelve guns, arrived within three miles of that post on the morning of the 4th. Sandela was occupied by the Captain Dawson already spoken of with his newly raised police battalions and other infantry levies, one thousand four hundred strong, and five hundred irregular cavalry levies. On the approach of the rebels in such overwhelming force, Dawson placed his infantry in the small mud fort and sent his cavalry to Nalliabad. He kept the rebels at bay till the 6th, when Major Maynard, with a detachment of the 88th foot, two 9-pounder guns, two 2½ inch mortars, two hundred and fifty police cavalry, and six hundred police foot, joined him,
taking up the five hundred cavalry on the way. Maynard at once attacked the rebels and drove them to Pannu, about four miles distant, where they took up a very strong position. On the evening of the 7th, Brigadier Barker reached Sandela with a strong column, attacked the rebels on the morning of the 8th, and, after a desperate battle, completely defeated them. His loss, however, was severe, being eighty-two of all ranks killed and wounded. Major Seymour, Queen's Bays, Major Maynard, whose charger was hacked to death with *tulwars* when in the thick of the fight, and Lieutenant Green, of the Rifle Brigade, who received thirteen wounds, including the loss of his left arm and the thumb of his right hand, greatly distinguished themselves on this occasion. The rebels lost a large number, especially in the pursuit, which promptly followed on the victory. A few days later, after a hard day's fight, accompanied by many casualties, the fort of Birwah fell into the hands of the victors.

About the same time, the 5th of October, Brigadier Evelegh defeated the rebels at Mignanj, between Lakhnao and Kinhpur, took two guns, and put about two hundred of them *hors de combat*; and on the 8th Sir Thomas Seaton added to his former laurels by intercepting a large body of the rebels on the frontier near Shahjahanpur, killing three hundred of them, and taking three guns. The same day an attack upon Powain was repulsed by the raja of that place, though with trifling loss.

These were the small actions which indicated the reopening of the campaign. The comprehensive plan which the Commander-in-Chief, now become Lord Clyde, had drawn up during his stay at Allahabad, came into operation only on the 15th of October. This plan was devised on the principle of acting by columns in all the districts simultaneously, so that, driven out of one district, the rebels might not be able, as they had previously, to take refuge in another. Thus, by Lord Clyde's plan, one column was drawn from Rohilkhand for operations in the north-west of Oudh, clearing Mohamdi, Naorangabad, and similar places of importance, and proceeding then to establish itself at Sitapur. For operations in the Baiswara country four brigades were detailed. Another column was posted to guard the Deb; another to guard the Kinhpur road; whilst other smaller columns starting from Lakhnao, Nawabganj, Dariabad, and Faizabad were ordered to be kept movable.

The reader will at once conceive the general purport of the plan. The brigades detailed for duty in the Baiswara country would occupy the whole of the Faizabad district between the Ganges and the Ghaghra. Pushing then northward they would re-conquer the country between the Ghaghra and the Rapti, holding out a hand to Rowcroft's force, on their right, in the Gorakhpur district. Simultaneously the Rohilkhand force would re-conquer Sitapur and the places in the Khairabad division. Then, with his right firmly fixed, as a pivot, at Balrampur and a point beyond the Rapti, Lord Clyde would wheel

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95 Two field batteries, two squadrons Queen's Bays, six hundred and seventy native cavalry sabres, two hundred and fifty 88th foot, one hundred 3rd battalion Rifle Brigade, 900 police battalion.
his main force round to the right till its left point should touch the Rohilkhand column,
when the whole, sweeping onwards, would clear the northernmost parts of the
province, and drive the surviving rebels, who should refuse to surrender, into the
jungles of the kingdom of Nipal.

On the 23rd of October Lord Clyde dispatched instructions in the same spirit to Sir
Hope Grant. That officer was directed, in cooperation with Brigadiers Pinickney and
Wetherall, to make a circuit, moving up the Gumti as far as Jagdispur, then turning
sharp to his left and moving southward by Jais, place himself between Parsidapur and
A'methi, dispersing any rebels on his way. The brigadiers mentioned received at the
same time detailed instructions as to their action so as to make it co-operate with Sir
Hope's movement and to ensure the success of the general plan.

Hope Grant, in obedience to these instructions, started immediately, arranging with
Brigadier Wetherall, who was marching up from Sariam to join him on the 4th of
November, and attack the fort of Rampur Kussia, held by an active partisan named
Ram Ghualam Singh. But Wetherall, reaching the vicinity of Rampur Kussia on the
morning of the 3rd, resolved, despite of the orders he had received to wait for Sir Hope,
to assail the place at once. Fortune greatly favored him. Rampur Kussia was in very
deed a stronghold.

Its outer fortification, formed of mud ramparts, was three miles in circumference.
Within this, surrounded up to the outer works by a dense jungle, was another fort, and
within this again a stone building. So much for the interior. But beyond, and
surrounding the outer ramparts, there was again a dense jungle in every direction save
in that of the north-west; and beyond the ramparts was a formidable abattis. The ditch
was deep but narrow, and there were rifle-pits in the part which, in fortification, would
correspond to the berm.\textsuperscript{96} It happened, however, that on one side the ditch and
ramparts had not, for a very small space, been completed, and it fortunately happened
that Wetherall lighted on this particular spot. At any other point he would certainly
have been repulsed, but at this he effected an entrance, and carried the place and its
twenty-three guns, with a loss of seventy-eight men killed and wounded. The rebels lost
about three hundred.

Hope Grant first heard of Wetherall's success on the afternoon of the 3rd. He at once
joined him at Rampur Kussia. Thence, in pursuance of instructions, he proceeded to
A'methi. This fort likewise was almost covered by jungle. It was garrisoned by four
thousand men, one thousand five hundred of them sepoys, and thirty guns. Grant
arrived within two miles of its north-eastern face at 2 o'clock on the afternoon of the 7th
of November. A reconnaissance promptly made, assured him that the rebels were bent
on resistance. On returning from this reconnaissance he found a messenger from Lord

\textsuperscript{96} Sir Hope Grant's \textit{Incidents in the Sepoy War}. 
Clyde, stating that he was encamped three miles to the east of the fort. The Commander-in-Chief, in effect, having failed to induce the raja of A'methi to come to terms, had marched from Pertabgarh on the 6th, to bring him to reason. This active measure succeeded. The raja, rode into camp on the morning of the 8th, and tendered his submission, yielding his stronghold.

A'methi taken, Grant, carrying out the orders of Lord Clyde, proceeded to Shankarpur to attack it from the north, whilst Wetherall and Pinckney should invest it on the east and south, and Eveleigh on the west. In performing his part of the combined movement Evelegh was delayed by the bad roads and the opposition of the rebels. He defeated these on the 8th at Morar Mau, and on the 9th he took the fort of Simri, but these operations so delayed him that he was unable to arrive in time to take up a position to cut off the retreat of the chief of Shankarpur and his followers.

This chief was no other than Beni Madho, and he had with him a following estimated at fifteen thousand men. The Commander-in-Chief, anxious to avoid bloodshed, had offered him very favorable terms if he would surrender. Beni Madho had returned the proud reply that he would yield his fort as he could not defend it, but that he would not yield himself as he belonged to his king! That night he and his followers evacuated the fort by its un-invested face. Not, however, with the freedom from molestation they had hoped for. Fleeing hastily to Dundia Khera they were encountered on the way by Eveleigh and defeated, with the loss of three of their guns.

Shankarpur was at once occupied by Grant, who then marched on the Ghaghra, which he crossed in face of the rebels, led by the raja of Gonda and Mehndi Husen, on the 27th of November, pursued the enemy twenty-four miles, and captured four guns. Marching thence towards Rai Bareli, he beat the rebels again at Machligtion on the 4th of December, taking two guns, reached the fort of Banhassia, whence he extracted five guns, on the 5th, Gonda on the 9th, and Balrampur on the 16th. Lord Clyde, meanwhile, having learned the direction taken by Beni Madho, took Evelegh's brigade with him, and marched on Dl ndia Khera, and attacked the chief on the 24th of November and completely defeated him, taking all his guns. Beni Madho, however, escaped. The other columns had by this time formed a complete cordon round the circumference of eastern Oudh. They now closed in, and marching from their different points of departure, and on a common centre, traversed the whole territory, demolishing forts and strongholds, and reestablishing the civil power as they advanced.

Whilst the east was being thus pacified, the Bareli column, commanded by Colin Troup, employed all its efforts to bring about a similar result on the western side. Crossing the Rohilkhand frontier in the end of October, Troup advanced on Sitapur, dispersed the talukdars who attempted to oppose him in the vicinity of that place, captured Mithaoli on the 8th, and gave a final defeat to the rebels at Mehndi on the 18th of November. Columns, meanwhile, under Gordon, Carmichael, and Horsford, were engaged in
clearing the country south of the Ghaghra, and before these the irreconcilable chiefs, men of the stamp of Beni Madho, and Beni Madho himself, fell back.

Hope Grant, I have said, had reached Balarampar on the 16th of December. There he learned that Bala Rao, brother of Nana Sahib, had taken refuge in the fort of Tulsipar, twelve miles distant, with a number of followers and eight guns, and that he had been joined there by Muhammad Hesen, and his adherents. Grant at once directed Rowcroft to move from his position at Hir, and, reinforcing him with the 53rd, directed him to attack Tulsipur. Rowcroft obeyed orders, found the enemy drawn up to receive him, beat them after a feeble resistance, but could not pursue them for want of cavalry. Hope Grant, fearing lest the rebels should escape into the Gorakhpur country, then took up the pursuit himself, and cutting off Bala Rao from Gorakhpur, ascertained that he had retreated with six thousand men and fifteen guns along the margins of the jungle to a place near Kandakot, where there was a half-ruined fort at the confluence of two rivers. Maneuvering with great skill, and placing his columns in a position so that escape to any other quarter but Nipal was impossible, Grant moved against them on the 4th of January 1859, and drove them across the border, taking all their guns.

Whilst Grant was thus engaged, Lord Clyde, sending Evelegh to the west to join Troup, was engaged in sweeping the country from the points occupied by his troops towards the Nipal frontier. Moving on to Sikrora, with Grant's force forming his right, touching, as we have seen, Rowcroft's force on the extreme right, and which formed, as it were, the pivot, Lord Clyde drove the Begam and Nana Sahib before him from Bondi and Baraich; then advancing on Nanpara, cleared the country between it and the Ghaghra; then marching on Banki, close to the Nipal frontier, he surprised the camp of the rebels, defeated them with great slaughter, and drove them into Nipal. This action and that of Hope Grant at Tulsipur, referred to in the preceding paragraph, cleared of Oudh the last remnants of the rebels. Sir William Mansfield wrote that he considered the mutiny crushed out; and Lord Clyde, sharing that opinion, left the province under the military care of Sir Hope Grant, instructing him to keep the frontier of the border of Nipal closely shut up, so as to prevent, if possible, the escape of any rebels into the lower country.

The spirit, however, which had animated the rebel chieftains to sustain against the British a struggle which, during six months at least, had offered not a single ray of success, was not entirely extinguished.

Sir Hope Grant, taking leave of the Commander-in-Chief, proceeded to join Brigadier Horsford's force on the Rapti. An incident had occurred just before his arrival, which showed the great care required in attempting to ford Indian rivers. Horsford had driven a strong rebel force across that river, and in fording it in pursuit of them, many men of the 7th hussars and the 1st Panjab cavalry had been swept away by the force of the current and were lost. Amongst these was Major Home of the 7th hussars. After some
search his body was drawn out of a deep hole, his hands having a fast grip of two of the rebels, whilst the bodies of two troopers who perished with him were found, each with his hands clutching a rebel sowar!  

From one side only, from the side of Nipal, was further danger to be apprehended. On this side the frontier had a length of about a hundred miles, and a hundred miles of mixed hill and jungle; and with such a frontier it was always possible that, despite the best dispositions on both sides, the strictest precautions would be evaded.

At this crisis the real ruler of Nipal, the Maharaja Jang Bahadur, behaved with the loyalty that had throughout characterized his dealings with the British. Not only did he inform the armed rebels who had crossed the border that he would afford them no protection, but he allowed British troops to cross the border to disarm any considerable body there assembled. Under this permission, Brigadier Horsford, early in the year, entered the Sonar valley, and crossing the Rapti at Sidonia ghat, came upon a body of rebels and captured fourteen guns; and, later on, Colonel Kelly, of the 34th, caused the surrender of six guns, after having chased the rebels with great loss under the hills. Under the pressure thus exercised, a moiety of the fifty thousand who had crossed into Nipal, one by one threw away their arms, and returned to their homes, trusting they would be allowed to settle down unmolested.

A few, more hardened in crime and therefore more hopeless of mercy, still continued to hold out, and some of these—the regiments which had perpetrated the Kanhpur massacre, the 1st, the 53rd, and the 56th native infantry, led by Gujadar Singh, a rebel whose hate to the British had not been lessened by the loss of an arm when fighting against them—succeeded in crossing the border, in marching on Sikrora, and filching thence two elephants, and finally, when pursued from that place by Colonel Walker and the Queen's Bays, with two guns, in taking up a position at Bangaon, a small dilapidated fort on the river Naddi, at the entrance of the Ghungle jungles. There, at the end of April 1859, Colonel Walker, reinforced by four hundred men of the 53rd, and sixty of the 1st Sikh cavalry, attacked and completely defeated them.

Notwithstanding that the hot weather had set in, Sir Hope Grant deemed it of pressing importance to drive the remainder of the rebels from the jungles. Learning that the last remnant of their disorganized forces was at the Serwa pass, Grant moved against them in person, dislodged them by a turning movement and then pursued them across the hills. The pursuit gave ample evidence of the state of exhaustion to which the enemy had been reduced. Without food and without arms and without money—for they lost here their last two guns—they were thenceforth powerless. Pursuit ceased, and Grant contented himself with posting troops at different points along the frontier as a precautionary measure. His only regret now was that Nana Sahib and his brother Bala...
Rao had found refuge in Nipal. To the last the former had been defiant and daring as became his assumed position. Bala Rao, on the other hand, had expressed penitence and denied participation in the Kanhpur massacre.

At last, then, Oudh was at peace. The province Oudh had become British by a right far more solid and defensible than the pretext under which it had been seized in 1856. Then, the country of the ruler who had ever been true to his British over-lord, was, in disregard of treaty, seized in the dead of the night, against the wishes alike of the sovereign and the people. Fifteen months experience of British rule, administered by doctrinaires who preferred the enforcement of their own theories to considerations of justice and policy, far from reconciling the people to their new master, had caused them to regret the sovereigns whom the British had expelled because of their misgovernment of that very people. They hailed, then, the opportunity, ingeniously fomented by the more influential of their countrymen, which seemed to promise them a relief from regulations which perplexed and from changes which irritated them. They joined in the revolt inaugurated by their brethren the sepoys—the majority of them Oudh men—and fought for independence. How pertinaciously they waged the contest has been told in these pages. No other part of India gave an example of a resistance so determined, so prolonged, as did Oudh. Throughout the struggle, the sense of the injustice perpetrated in 1856 steeled the hearts of its people and strengthened their resolution. If on some occasions they too precipitately fled, it was in the hope of renewing the struggle another day. When, finally, the sweep made over Oudh by Lord Clyde forced the remnant of the fighting class to take refuge in the jungles of Nipal, the survivors preferred starvation to surrender. The agricultural population, the talukdars, the landowners, the traders, accepted the defeat when, after that long struggle, they felt that it was final. Thenceforward Great Britain possessed Oudh by a title far sounder than that which she had set up in 1856, the title of conquest. She holds it now on a basis even stronger, on the basis of the affections of a people whom she has con-ciliated and of a territorial aristocracy whose rights, whilst defining, and, in some instances, curtailing, she has made inalienable.

98 "Further on," wrote Sir Hope Grant, describing his last pursuit, "we discovered two of the rebels in a state of helpless exhaustion, dying from their wounds and from starvation. It will sad to see many of the poor wives of the sepoys, who had accompanied their husbands, deserted and left to die on the bare ground," and more to the same effect.
BEFORE proceeding to recount the other great military measure with which the story of the mutiny fitly closes, it is necessary that I should ask the reader to accompany me to the Panjab to see how the fall of Dehli, made possible by the noble self-denial of Sir John Lawrence, affected that border province. From the Panjab the reader will return through the pacified provinces of the north-west to A'gra, in close vicinity to that Gwaliar but just re-conquered by Sir Hugh Rose. In the succeeding book I shall record the most romantic episode in the history—the pursuit, from many starting points and by many independent columns, of the famous Tantia Topi.

The decision at which Sir John Lawrence had arrived at the end of July 1857, to denude the Panjab of troops in order to reinforce General Wilson's army before Dehli, had not been arrived at without most serious and anxious consideration. On the one side he had had before him General Wilson's letter announcing that unless he were reinforced from the Panjab he would not be able to maintain his position, still less to assault the city; and the inner certainty that if General Wilson were to raise the siege of Dehli the Panjab would rise in insurrection. On the other he had the knowledge that the effective force of Europeans at his disposal, including the sick and convalescent, but not including the force under Nicholson, did not exceed four thousand men, and that these were not more than sufficient to maintain order in the Panjab, even whilst the general feeling of the Panjabis should remain loyal; most insufficient should a striking reverse of fortune, such as the raising of the siege of Dehli, turn the Panjabis against him. He had before him, in fact, a choice of two risks—the risk of a general rising in the Panjab, caused by the effect which would certainly be produced in the minds of the Panjabis by a retreat from Dehli; and the risk of rebellion induced by the knowledge that the Panjab had been denuded of British.

Of the two risks, the second was undoubtedly really the lesser. To a nervous man, to a man fearing responsibility, however, the second risk would present dangers affecting to such a degree his position, that he would certainly shrink from incurring them. A man of that stamp would have argued that his primary duty was to protect the Panjab, and that he dare not, for the sake of the uncertain chance of conquering Dehli, risk the safety of that province. "True," he would have said, "true it is that if the march of Nicholson's column enable Wilson to take Dehli our situation will be ameliorated. But, Wilson might be repulsed; Wilson himself thinks it is quite a toss-up whether he will succeed or whether he will fail. And if he fail, the situation of the Panjab without Nicholson's column will be a thousand times worse than if I were to retain it. Everything, then,
depends upon a very doubtful if; and, responsible for the Panjab as I am, I dare not incur the risk." But Sir John was not a nervous man, and he had no fear of responsibility. He saw clearly that the one chance of preventing the further spread of the mutiny was to strike a blow at its heart. That heart palpitated at Dehli. Every risk, then, which strengthened the blow to be struck at Dehli was a prelude to safety.

How Nicholson's column successfully worked out the great result aimed at has been already recorded in these pages. Dehli fell. But in the interval Sir John Lawrence had to meet the other risk of which I have spoken. He at once made preparations to face it. Nicholson's departure at the end of July had left in the Panjab about four thousand European troops, including those sick and convalescent. Of these, three regiments were in the Peshawar valley, but so reduced by sickness, that for the active work of a campaign they could not muster more than a thousand bayonets; one regiment, the 24th, held Lahor; one, sent from Sindh, held Multan and Firozpur; another furnished detachments to hold Rawal Pindi, Amritsar, and Jalandhar. Sir John first formed a movable column. For this purpose he drew from the 24th foot two to three hundred men, and joined with them four hundred Panjab infantry and a few horsemen. The other troops alluded to being required for the purpose of watching, as at Peshawar, the frontier, and elsewhere, the disarmed native troops, eighteen thousand strong, this column really constituted the only force which could be used in the event of an insurrection provoked by the hopes which the march of Nicholson's column might inspire in the minds of the disaffected.

The doubts which Sir John Lawrence had entertained regarding a prolonged continuation of the loyalty of the Panjabis were quickly justified. Nicholson had crossed the Satlaj on the 30th of July. Early in September it was discovered that the inhabitants of the lower Hazara country had conspired to revolt. Mostly Muhammadans, the people of that tract and of the adjoining hills had been tempted by the long successful resistance of Dehli to plot the downfall of their English masters. They had evidently been close observers of the state of affairs, for they had arranged that their continued loyalty should depend on the turn affairs should take at Dehli. If that royal city should not fall before the 10th of September, on that day they would revolt.

In this case to be forewarned was sufficient. Lady Lawrence, who was then at Marri, received the first intimation of the intended revolt. She quickly entered into communication with Mr. Edward Thornton, Commissioner of Rawal Pindi. That gentleman concerted at once with the other officials to baffle the conspirators. In a few hours their leaders were arrested, and the plot was thus nipped in the bud.

A few weeks later, a conspiracy of a similar nature actually came to a head in the country between Lahor and Multan. On the evening of the 14th of December, the very day on which the assault on Dehli was delivered, a Muhammadan official of the postal department arrived at Lahor from Goghaira, and making his way to Sir John Lawrence,
reported "with somewhat of a malicious twinkle of the eye,"99 that all the wild tribes as inhabiting the jungle country between Lahor and Malian had risen. Questioned further, he declared that the insurgents numbered one hundred and twenty-five thousand. Though he knew this number to be greatly exaggerated, Sir John, well aware of the wild and reckless character of the tribes to whom the tale referred, felt certain that a rising of a formidable character had taken place, and that it was a case to meet which it was necessary to take prompt and decided action. Within three hours, then, of the receipt of the message, one company of European infantry, two hundred Sikh cavalry, and three guns were on their way to the headquarters of the insurgents. Small though the force was, totally inadequate to deal with any large body of rebels, the celerity with which it was dispatched compensated for every disadvantage. The very rumor of their advance struck terror into the insurgents. They at once took refuge in the almost impenetrable jungles which formed their normal habitation. Their retreat did not in the least relax Sir John's endeavors to crush them. He sent reinforcement after reinforcement to his small column, and very speedily ensured the submission of the disaffected tribes.

This was the last attempt made by any portion of the population of the Panjab to rise in revolt. The fall of Dehli occurred about the same time to convince even the most disaffected that the star of England was still in the ascendant. The occurrences that followed seemed to add daily confirmation to this opinion. The relief of Lakhnao, the capture of that place, followed by the re-conquest of Rohilkhand, and accompanied, almost, by Sir Hugh Rose's splendid campaign in central India, came as proof upon proof that the power which had won India was resolved to maintain it. In the latter half of the year 1858 one or two disturbances occurred which, by their exception to the general rule and by their easy suppression, served to prove the real tranquility of the province.

In July 1858 a portion of the 18th Panjab infantry, stationed at Dera Ishmail Khan on the Indus, planned a mutiny. The portion referred to was composed of Sikhs, known as the Malwai Sikhs, and numbered about a hundred. For some cause unknown, they proposed, it was said, to murder their officers, to seize the magazine and the fort, and to rearm the 39th regiment native infantry, which had been disarmed some time previously. Fortunately, on the 20th of July, the plot was discovered. Major Gardiner of the 10th Panjab native infantry, and Captain Smith of the artillery, proceeded, at 10 o'clock in the evening of that day, to the lines of the regiment and summoned two of the Malwais. One, a sepoy, came out at once, when Major Gardiner ordered him to be confined. On hearing the order he ran off, at once pursued by the guard. Just as the foremost men of the guard had reached him a Malwai jemadar rushed out, cut down one man and wounded another, and fled with the sepoy. A few days later they were captured, and the revolt, of which they had been the ringleaders, was suppressed.

At Multan an attempt made, the following month, to dispose quietly and peaceably of some of the disbanded regiments, terminated in bloodshed. At that station there were the 62nd and 69th native infantry and a native troop of horse artillery. These men were a source of great embarrassment to the authorities, for it was considered unsafe to rearm them; whilst, disarmed, they required European troops to guard them. It was resolved, as a middle course, to disband them by fractions, and allow them to depart quietly to their homes. The sepoys acquiesced in the decision when the decision was made known to them. Subsequently, however, they conceived the impression that it was intended to attack and destroy them piecemeal on their way home. Imbued with this idea, they rose in revolt. When the midday gun fired on the 31st of August, they seized clubs and whatever else they could find in the shape of weapons, and rushed to attack the European and Sikh troops. Those troops consisted of one hundred and seventy artillerymen, a wing of the 1st Bombay fusiliers, the 11th Panjab infantry, and the 1st irregular cavalry. These men were taken by surprise, and five of their number were beaten to death with clubs. Lieutenant Miles, Adjutant of the Bombay fusiliers, was dragged from his horse and killed in the same manner. As soon, however, as the Europeans and Panjabis realized the state of affairs, they came up in strength, and showed no mercy to the assailants. The 11th Panjabis were especially furious at the unprovoked attack. Of the thirteen hundred men who made it, few lived to return to their native land.

Passing downwards through the territories of the loyal chieftains of the Cis-Satlaj states—of the raja of Patiala, who, at the very outset, cast in his lot with the British, protected the stations of Ambala and Karnal when the British army marched on Dehli, guarded the grand trunk road from Katmai to Philor, cooperated with Van Cortlandt in Hissar, and maintained a contingent of five thousand troops for service with the British; of the raja of Jhind, who, emulating his brother raja in loyalty, left his own country undefended to march against Dehli, and in many other ways rendered assistance to the good cause; and of the raja of Nabha, who aided in holding Lodiana, supplied an escort for the siege-train, gallantly opposed the Jalandhar mutineers, and performed various other excellent services—the reader will traverse the pacified Dehli territory till he reaches the district of Itawah. Here he will make a short sojourn before proceeding to A'gra.

The Itawah district had, in common with other districts in the Jamna Doab, been included in the brigade command assigned to Sir Thomas Seaton. The attention of that gallant soldier was, however, more constantly directed to the side of Rohilkhand than to the more peaceful districts to the south of him. In those districts order had been restored, and the civil administration generally reintroduced. The only chance of a renewal of disturbance in them arose from the possibility of some fugitive rebel from the country west of the Jamna endeavoring to restore the fortunes of his followers by a raid into a settled but little-guarded country. It was this possibility which occurred in the Itawah district.
The defeat of Sindia's rebellious troops at Gwalior by Sir Hugh Rose had let loose on the country a number of turbulent partisans, who, escaping from the battle, had sought refuge in the ravines of the Jamna. Prominent among these was an adventurer named Rap Singh. This man, followed by a few soldiers of the regular Gwilliar contingent, a certain number of the fugitives of Sindia's army, and other rabble, crossed the Jamna, and made his appearance at A'jitmal, twenty-five miles from Itawah, in the month of July. Though he was routed by a force sent from Itiwah and forced to flee, he did not abandon the district. And, what was of more consequence, other adventurers, animated by similar aims, sprang up about the same time, and rivaled him in his endeavors to harass and plunder the newly pacified districts. Amongst all these marauders, however, Rup Singh maintained the preeminence. Often beaten, he always managed to elude his pursuers. During long periods he was not heard of in the districts. But whenever that occurred, daily accounts of robberies and stoppage of traffic on the Jamna reached the authorities. It was then discovered that Rup Singh had taken possession of a fort at Barhi, near the junction of the Chambal with the Jamna, and that from this place he levied contributions on travelers by land and water.

The exactions of this adventurer and of others like him reached at last so great a height that, in the month of August, a small force was despatched from Itawah to destroy or disperse them. This force, commanded by Captain Gordon and accompanied by Mr. Lance, the able and energetic magistrate of the district, embarked in boats, and proceeded down the river towards Barhi. It had reached Garha Kliddr, a fortified village three miles from that place, and was still in the boats, when Rup Singh attacked it. Gordon's men at once disembarked, in spite of opposition, drove away the rebels, re-embarked, dropped down to Barhi, and took the place. After destroying three of the bastions of the fort and rendering it generally indefensible, Lance pushed on to Chakarnaggar, the resort of another rebel chief, completely defeated the rebels there, and fixed that place as the head-quarters of a small detachment to control the country. This prompt action for a time pacified the districts. But in October Rup Singh reappeared on the Kuari with a following of four hundred men, and attacked a British picket on the Itawah side of that river. Mr. Allan, in command of a few levies — one hundred and forty infantry and twenty-five sowars—happened to be at the moment at Sahson, not very far from the point of Rup Singh's action. He at once went in pursuit of him, caught him near the village of Kuari, completely defeated him, and captured all his camels and pack-cattle. The band of the rebel leader then dispersed, and from that time the Itawah district was undisturbed.

In A'gra, since the relief of that place by Greathed, matters had remained fairly tranquil. In the early part of 1858 Brigadier Showers had been sent to command the district and to perform in its vicinity the work which he had so successfully accomplished in the Dehli districts after the capture of the imperial city. One of Showers's first acts was to work vengeance on some local rebels who had plundered the town of Bah and.
murdered the authorities. This was done on the 20th of March. Showers, making a long night-march, surprised the rebels at Kachru and captured the ringleaders. But the task allotted to him and to the civil authorities in the fort was long and difficult. Not only were the districts swarming with small bands of insurgents, but the whole of the country west of the Jamma, was in a state of complete insurrection. Gwalior lies but sixty-five miles from A'gra, and it is no exaggeration to state that until the capture of Gwalior by Sir Hugh Rose in June 1858, the influence of Maharaja Sindia over his own people was not to be counted upon, and that A'gra was at any moment liable to an attack in force from any number of rebels.

This situation was entirely appreciated in A'gra. The guns of the fort remained pointed at the native town—the focus of a rebellion which might at any moment break out. Every precaution was, indeed, taken to prevent, or rather to ward off, such an event; but the fact that no European living beyond the range of the guns of the fort felt his life secure for a moment, shows how deep was the impression that a revolt was a mere question of opportunity. The slightest event might bring it on. The news of a disaster in the Doab or in central India, the appearance on the Jamna, of any one of the mutinied contingents or of Tantia Topi—any one of these eventualities would most certainly precipitate a catastrophe.

Throughout this crisis the civil authorities at A'gra—Colonel Fraser, Mr. E. A. Reade, and their colleagues—displayed a coolness of judgment and a readiness of resource which left nothing to be desired. The self denying energy with which they devoted themselves to the task of reorganizing where reorganization was possible, of meeting great and pressing wants from exhausted resources, of providing all the military and civil requirements day by day, and of infusing their own brave spirit into those whose fortunes were at the lowest, deserve a far longer and a fuller notice than I am able to give them in these pages. The history of the occupants of A'gra is the history of men who, deprived of the stimulus of action, of the excitement of the camp, of the joyous sound of the clash of arms, devoted all their energies to their country, and deserved fully the credit and the glory always assigned to deeds more showy but not more meritorious.

Amongst the useful measures carried out during the period of which I am writing was the raising of a corps of cavalry, subsequently known as Meade's horse. At the end of the year 1857 the want of native troopers and mounted orderlies at A'gra had been greatly felt, and as there were in the fort officers whom the mutiny had deprived of their employment, it was considered advisable to raise a regiment on a military footing. The task of raising it was, in December 1857, committed to Captain R. J. Meade.

This officer, who will occupy a conspicuous figure towards the close of the next chapter, had been for some years brigade-major of the Gwalior contingent, and in that office had won the confidence of the officers under whom he had served. He possessed a thorough
acquaintance with the language of the people, and he invariably gave all his energies to the duties confided to him. It would have been impossible for a general in command to have had under his orders an officer who would more resolutely carry into execution the orders he received.

A body of a hundred Sikhs and Panjabi Muhammadans formed the nucleus of this new regiment. To them Meade added some forty odd Eurasians and native Christians, chiefly drummers and bandsmen, taken from the disbanded native regiments. These were ultimately increased to eighty-five, and were formed into a Christian troop. As none of these men had ever previously crossed a horse, some of Meade's difficulties may be imagined.

At the end of January 1858 Meade obtained an accession of forty-five mounted Jats, sent from Rohtak under a jemadar of good family by Mr. J. Campbell, collector of that district; and a little later the new commandant induced Baldeo Singh Thakur of Jharra to raise, from men of his class in the neighborhood of the Chambal, a troop of seventy horsemen. In this manner the regiment was formed, and Meade was, in a short time, able to form it into six class troops. The labor of drilling the men and teaching many of them to ride may be imagined when it is considered that none of the men had served in the cavalry or as soldiers at all. Working incessantly himself, and aided by such men as Sergeant Hartigan, V.C., of the 9th Lancers, and who subsequently gained a commission in the 16th, by Cockburn, whose gallantry has been referred to in a previous volume, and by others, Meade was able, by the beginning of March, to show a fair proportion of his regiment fit for service. Brigadier Showers, who inspected them during that month, expressed himself well satisfied alike with men and horses.

From this time up to the beginning of June Meade's horse were constantly employed in maintaining order in the neighborhood of A'gra, and it would be difficult to exaggerate the services they rendered in this respect to the administrative and military authorities in the place.

But in June the aspect of A'gra suddenly changed. How on the 1st of that month Maharaja Sindia was attacked and driven to flight by the rebels under Tantia Topi, I have recorded in a previous chapter. The maharaja, abandoned by all but a few faithful men, fled to Dholpur, intending to push on to A'gra. The news of his misfortune had, however, preceded him. Showers instantly dispatched a squadron of Meade's horse to escort the fleeing sovereign with all honor into the capital of the north-west provinces. The maharaja, who reached A'gra on the 2nd of June, remained there till the 14th and left it that day, escorted by two squadrons of Meade's horse to Dholpar, thence to proceed to join Sir Hugh Rose, expected to reach Morar on the 16th. News of Sir Hugh's arrival on that day having reached the maharaja, he set out on the morning of the 17th,

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still escorted by the two squadrons and made the march, fully sixty-five miles, within twenty-four hours. The events which followed have been recorded in the preceding book.

Returning to A'gra, I have only to record the fact that on the defeat of Tantia Topi on the 17th and 19th of June at Mortir and at Gwiliar Brigadier Showers sent out a detachment consisting of the 3rd Europeans and a battery of guns, to cover Bharatpur, upon which place he believed the rebels to be marching. The demonstration was successful, inasmuch as the presence of the detachment induced Tantia Topi to bend his steps southwards. As soon as his march in that direction was definitively known, the detachment returned by way of Fathpur Sikri to A'gra. Thenceforward that city and the districts east of the Jamna experienced the full relief caused by the crushing defeat, at a point so close to the British districts, of the one chieftain whose name up to that time had been a beacon of hope to the marauder.

Tantia Topi had fled from Gwiliar; had fled from Napier at Jaora Alipur; but whither? All that was known was that when he had fled from the battle field he had taken a southerly direction. Who could say how long he would maintain that direction? It is time now that we should follow him, and recount in some detail the measures adopted by his pursuers to overtake him.
BOOK XVI.

CHAPTER I.

TANTIA TOPI, accompanied by Rao Sahib and the nawab of Banda, had fled from the field of Jaora Alipar on the 22nd of June. The information which had induced Brigadier Showers to send a detachment to cover Bharatpar was perfectly correct, for Tantia, as soon as he had ascertained he was no longer pursued, had turned his steps north-westwards. On reaching Sarmathura, however, he learned the dispositions made by Showers. Foiled on one side, he pushed on directly westwards, hoping to gain Jaipur, in which place he believed a strong party was prepared to rise in his favor.

On this route I propose to leave him, whilst I trace the positions taken up by the several British columns upon whom his pursuit was to devolve.

I have already shown how on the 29th of June Sir Hugh Rose made over the command of his force to Brigadier-General Robert Napier, and proceeded to Bombay to assume command of the army of that presidency. The season for active military operations on the black and spongy soil of central India had now passed away, and Napier hoped before the country should harden he would be able to afford some rest to his overworked soldiers. With this object he made arrangements for comfortably housing a portion of them at Gwalior itself. Here he quartered three squadrons of the 14th light dragoons, Meade's horse, a wing of the 71st Highlanders, the 86th foot, the 25th Bombay native infantry, a company of Bombay artillery, a company of Royal Engineers, and a light field battery. To rest at and to hold Jhansi he detached a squadron of the 14th light dragoons, a wing of the 3rd Bombay cavalry, the 3rd Bombay Europeans, the 24th Bombay native infantry, a company of Bombay sappers, and three guns of the late Bhopal contingent. Brigadier Smith's brigade—which, it will be remembered, took an active part in the operations against Gwalior—consisting of two squadrons of the 8th hussars, two of the 1st Bombay lancers, the 95th foot, the 10th Bombay native infantry, and a troop of Bombay horse artillery, marched to occupy Sipri, whilst Mayne's irregular cavalry took up their position at Gunah.

But these were not the only troops which, in the month of July 1858, occupied positions overlooking the area on which only it was likely Tantia Topi would act. In a previous page I have recorded how General Roberts, commanding the Rajputana field force, had detached a column under Brigadier Smith to cover and to aid in the operations of Sir Hugh Rose. Roberts's force, diminished by the departure of that column, consisted of the 83rd foot, a wing of the 72nd Highlanders, wings of the 12th and 13th Bombay
native infantry, two squadrons 8th hussars, two of the 1st Bombay lancers, three hundred Biluchi horse, a light field battery, and a siege-train of six pieces. At the end of June Roberts lay with this force at Nasirabad.

Upon him it fell to strike the first blow against the fugitive leader. On the 27th of June Roberts learned from Captain Eden, the political agent, that Tantia Topi had sent emissaries to the disaffected party in Jaipur assuring them that he was marching on that place, and begging them to be in readiness to join him. Roberts took his measures accordingly. On the 28th of June he set out from Nasirabad, and marching rapidly, reached Jaipur before Tantia.

Tantia, again foiled, turned southwards, and made a raid on Tonk, followed by a light column under Colonel Holmes. The nawab of this place, Vizir Muhammad Khan, was by no means disposed to submit to the dictation of a Maratha fugitive with an English army at his heels. He, therefore, shut himself in his citadel with the men he could depend upon. The remainder of his force, with four guns, he left outside with orders to face the rebels. Instead of facing them this force received them as brethren, and made over to them the four guns. With this addition to his army Tantia started off southwards to Madhopur and Indragarh, still pursued by Holmes, and at a longer interval by Roberts.

The flight and the pursuit were alike retarded by the rains, which fell during this month with remarkable force, so much so that the river Chambal, swollen to a torrent, barred Tintia's passage from Indragarh to the eastward. Changing his course, then, he took a south-westerly course to Bundi, capital of the native state of the same name. The maharao of Bundi, Ram Singh, had more than once displayed a disposition to strike for independence, but even he was not prepared to link his fortunes with those of Tantia Topi. He shut, therefore, the gates of Bandi in the face of the fugitive. Tantia, pursued, as he thought, by Holmes, had no time to stop to use force, but marched a few miles south-ward, then making a sudden tour westward, crossed the Bundi hills by the Kina pass, and made for the fertile country between Nasirabad and Nimach, a country which had already been the scene of warlike operations, and the larger towns in which had more than once shown a disposition to favor the rebellion. Tantia was able to change his course without fear of being disturbed by Holmes, for on leaving Bundi he had loudly asserted his intention to continue his course due south, and he counted that information thus disseminated would deceive his pursuers.

Tantia, pushing on, took up a position between the towns of Sanganir and Bhilwara on the Nasirabad and Nimach road. Roberts, meanwhile, had been obliged, in consequence of the continuance of the heavy rain, to halt at Sarwar, an elevated plateau about thirty miles from Ajmir. On the 5th of August, however, the roads having been reported

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101 Consisting of the cavalry and horse artillery, some native infantry, and two hundred 72nd Highlanders.
passable, Roberts broke up and marched towards Nimach. On the 7th, when at Dabla,
ten miles from Sanganir, he received information regarding the position taken up by
Tantia close to that place.

The town of Sanganir is on the left bank of the little river Kotaria. On the other side, and
more than a mile up the stream, is the town of Bhilwara, in the front of which Tantia lay
camped. Roberts was well aware that all his cavalry and a portion of his infantry
under Holmes were following on the track of the rebels. He himself was in front of
them. The opportunity was too good to be thrown away. He resolved, though he had no
cavalry, to attack.

The rebel infantry and guns had taken up a position in front of Bhilwara. Their horse,
however, were thrown forward on the left, across the Kotaria up to Sanganir, and on
the right to the other side of that town, the whole forming a horse-shoe figure of about a
mile and a half, connected by skirmishers. Their elephants and baggage were in the rear
on the line by which they would retire if beaten.

Roberts advanced his infantry, covered by skirmishers a short distance in front, cleared
Sanganir of the few rebels who had penetrated within it. He forced the rebel horse across
the river, and bringing his guns to the river-bank, opened on the enemy's right. Under
this fire his infantry, played upon by the rebel batteries, crossed the river, and took up a
position on a rising ground, their right on a village, their left on a small tank. The guns
then also crossed the river. Seeing this, Tantia attempted no further resistance; he
withdrew his guns and infantry, massing his cavalry on the intervening plain to cover
the retreat. He retired unscathed, except by the guns, for Roberts had no cavalry to send
after him, and proceeded to a village called Kotra in the Udaipar country.

The next day Roberts was joined by his much-required cavalry, who had made a march
of thirty miles. He then set out in pursuit of the rebels, doing twenty miles daily till, on
the afternoon of the 13th, he came up with their advanced guard at Kankraoli, a town

102 Blackwood's Magazine, August 1860. This number contains an admirably written account of the operations of
Generals Roberts and Michel against Tantia Topi. It is difficult to exaggerate the obligations under which the
author lies to the writer of this article, himself an actor in the scene.

103 Tantia merely records of this action: "We were there" (Bhilwara) "attacked by the English force, and I fled
during the night accompanied by my army and guns."

104 The excellent information obtained by General Roberts enabled him, in more than one instance, to traverse
the chord of a circle whilst the rebels had gone round by the arc. The method employed by Roberts to obtain this
accurate information is thus succinctly described by the author of the article in Blackwood, already referred to.
"The method which General Roberts adopted for obtaining information was to have about twenty cavalry in
advance, close to the rebels. They left connecting links of two or three men every few miles, so as to keep up the
chain of communication. The advance party was composed, half of Biluch horse, who had no sympathy with the
rebels, but could not communicate very well with the villagers, and half of horsemen belonging to the raja of
Jaipar, who were supposed, as Rajputs, to be on good terms and able easily to communicate with the villagers, but
situated on a lake not far from the A'rvavalli hills. On driving in the rebel outposts, Roberts learned from prisoners and villagers that their main force was occupying a position on the Bangs river, seven miles distant.

Tantia Topi, who was, according to his lights, religious man, had devoted that 13th of August to a visit to the shrine of Nethdwara, reputed one of the most sacred in India. On his return at midnight he heard for the first time of the close vicinity of the English. Dreading an attack, he determined to decamp at once. But his infantry refused to move. They said that they were worn out by the long marches, and must rest; that they would march in the morning, and the guns should march with them; that the cavalry might act as they pleased. Under these circumstances, Tantia had no other alternative but that of fighting.

At daybreak, then, he ranged his men as skillfully as the nature of the ground would allow. His position was strong. In front of him flowed the Banas, which, covering his centre, then made a bend which protected his right; his left rested on some steep hills. The ground he occupied was a low, steep ridge, which formed the bank of the river. Before him, on the opposite bank, was an open plain, eight hundred yards wide, across which his enemy must march.

At 7 o'clock on the morning of the 14th Roberts marched across it. In vain did Tantia's four guns, well protected by a natural parapet, sweep that plain. In spite of the effect they produced—and it was considerable—the British and native infantry reached the left bank, forded the river, and scaled the heights on the enemy's left and centre. The right, where the guns were posted, being thus left unsupported, abandoned the pieces under a volley from the 13th Bombay native infantry. The cavalry, led by Colonel Naylor, then dashed across the stream, and came upon the rebels scattered over the plain. Naylor pursued them for two miles, his men dealing and receiving death. He then collected his men, and, under orders from the general, kept up a steady pursuit for fifteen miles, killing numbers of stragglers, and capturing three elephants and a quantity of baggage. Two miles further on the rebels, having reached a village surrounded by jungle, determined to make a stand. Naylor, finding that the number of men whom he could then muster amounted only to a hundred and fifty, and that the country was quite unfit for cavalry, upon this abandoned the pursuit.¹⁰⁵

Tantia Topi, having shaken off his pursuers, pressed, now without guns, eastward, hoping to find the Chambal fordable, and to place that river between himself and the

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¹⁰⁵ *Blackwood's Magazine*, August 1860. Tantia Topi writes thus of this action: "The next morning we moved towards Patun, and after proceeding about one mile, the English army arrived and an action took place. We left our four guns and fled."
English. Roberts, divining his intention, followed in that direction, and the fourth day after the action reached Punah, a town north of Chitor, not far from the high road between Nimach and Nasirabad. Here he met Brigadier Parke, commandant of the Nimach brigade, who, some days before, had started from that place in anticipation of orders to cut off Tantia from the south. Roberts now made over to him the 8th hussars and the Biluchis, and begged him to continue the pursuit.

Parke set out at once, but some of the horses of the 8th hussars being knocked up, he deviated from the exact course followed by Tantia to proceed to Nimach, where he knew he could obtain about fifty fresh horses. Here he was met by conflicting news regarding the fugitives. On the one side he was assured by experts that it was absolutely impossible that Tantia could cross the Chambal at that season of the year, and that he was bent on pushing southwards; on the other, Captain Showers, the political agent at Udaipur, who was then at Nimach, had received information from the spot that Tantia was determined to cross the river. Unfortunately, Parke believed the experts. Proceeding to Morassa, fifteen miles from Nimach and thirty from the Chambal, he halted there a few hours to obtain more exact information. When it came it told him that the informant of Captain Showers was right, and that Tantia was attempting the Chambal. Parke hurried after him, reached the river after a hard march, only to find it just fordable, but rising rapidly; to see "a few disabled ponies standing on the left bank, and the rebels disappearing among some mango-trees in the west horizon." Tantia had escaped. Parke returned to Nimach to refit.

Tantia, meanwhile, having crossed the Chambal, pushed for Jhalra Patan, thirty miles distant. Jhalra Patan is a handsome town in the Jhalawar state built on the model of Jaipur. The rana of that state, Prithi Singh, great grandson of the famous Zalim Singh, the founder of the principality, was loyal to his British overlord. He had no idea of yielding without a struggle. But his troops, when drawn up to repel the Maratha invader, behaved precisely as Sindia's troops had behaved at Gwalior on a similar occasion. They at once fraternized with the rebels. Tantia at once took possession of the rana's guns, more than thirty in number, his ammunition, bullocks, and horses, and surrounded the palace. The next morning he visited the rana, and demanded a contribution in money. The ranas offered five lakhs; but this sum not being deemed sufficient, Rao Sahib, acting as representative of the Peshwa, sent for him and demanded twenty-five. Ultimately the rana agreed to give fifteen. Of these he actually paid five, but having been insulted and ill-treated, he escaped that same night and fled to Mau, leaving some barrels of powder handy for his wife and family to blow themselves up if threatened with insult.107

106 Blackwood's Magazine, August 1860.

107 This account is taken mainly from Tantia's memoirs. The writer in Blackwood states that the war contribution amounted to sixty thousand pounds, whilst forty thousand pounds more was collected from Government property. As Jhalra Patan was a very rich town, this was very likely the case.
Tantia, freed by the rising of the Chambal from all chance of pursuit, halted five days at Jhalra Patan. He states that he employed the money taken to issue three months' pay to his troops, at the monthly rate of thirty rupees to each trooper, and twelve rupees to each foot soldier. Whilst so halting, he and his comrades, Rao Sahib and the nawab of Banda, conceived a very bold idea. This was no less than to march on Indur, and summon Holkar's troops to join the representative of the liege lord of the Marathas. Could he succeed in reaching the capital of Holkar before the small body of troops which the news of his approach would probably bring to the same spot from Mau, the fraternization would be certain, and the result would spread to all Holkar's subjects. Impressed with this idea, he marched with his army, now reinforced by the Jhalawar levies and all the rana's guns, nearly direct south to Rajgarh.

But, whilst Tantia had been resting at Jhalra Patan, the officer commanding in Malwa, Major-General Michel, had, as if reading his thoughts, dispatched from that place a force under Colonel Lockhart, to cover Ujjen, due north of Indur. Lockhart proceeding further northwards, reached Susner, a place about seventeen miles to the west of Rajgarh. Not believing himself strong enough to attack Tantia, he entrenched himself, to await the arrival of a small reinforcement under Colonel Hope coming from Mau. He met this reinforcement at Nalkera, about three miles to the south of Susner. At the very time of this junction Tantia was marching on Rajgarh, within a few miles of him.

At this period, the end of August 1858, a change took place in the personnel of the British command. Major-General Roberts, who had up to that time commanded in Rajputanta, was transferred to the military and political control of the Gujrat division. His place was taken by Major-General Michel of the Royal army, commanding in Malwa, a command which he was now to hold in conjunction with that in Rajptitana. Michel was a zealous, active, resolute, and capable officer, thoroughly impressed with the necessity of pursuing the fugitive chieftain without cessation.

Michel joined the united columns of Lockhart and Hope at Nalkora. He had no information regarding Tantia Topi, but a vague rumor prevailed that he was moving in a north-easterly direction. Marching was, in every sense of the word, difficult. Although the month of September had arrived, heavy rain, the precursor of the break-up of the monsoon, was falling, and the saturated cotton soil of Malwa resembled a sea of black mud. Still it was necessary to move, and Michel moved in the right direction. With great difficulty he transported his little army to Chapera, about midway to Rajgarh. The

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108 Tantia says eighteen, but as three were abandoned and twenty-seven captured a few days later at Rajgarh, he must have taken all.

109 Three hundred and fifty 92nd Highlanders, four hundred and fifty 19th Bombay native infantry, one squadron Bombay 3rd light cavalry, and two guns Le Marchand's battery Bengal artillery.
following day, the rain having ceased, Michel pursued his march towards that place. The heat was so great and the sun's rays were so terrible, that some of the artillery-horses dropped dead in the traces. Still Michel pushed on, and about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, halting on a rising ground, he had the gratification of beholding Tantia Topi's army encamped near the walled town of Rajgarh.

To traverse three miles of black soil and then, at the approach of night, to attack with a tired army a fresh body of men in the position they had chosen, was not for a moment to be thought of. Michel, then, waited for the morning. But when morning dawned, Tantia and his men, had disappeared. Michel at once sent his cavalry on their track. This track was distinguished, first, by the marks of the gun-wheels and the elephants, then, more decidedly, by three guns lying abandoned on the road. A little further on the rebel force was descried, drawn up in two lines, the second on higher ground than the first, and the guns on ground above both. The cavalry then halted to await the approach of the infantry and guns.

The infantry and guns did not let them wait long. As soon as they came up the action began with an artillery fire from both sides. Then the English infantry, deploying, went at the rebels. The latter did not wait the conflict, but gave way and fled. Getting entangled in intersecting roads, they fell into inextricable confusion. The British horse artillery, galloping forward in alternate divisions of two guns, kept up a fire on the retreating masses, whilst the cavalry, threatening their left flank, forced them to incline towards the north. In the pursuit, twenty-seven guns were taken.

Tantia, driven towards the north, wandered about for some time in the jungly country on both sides of the B4twah, and eventually made for Sironj—in an easterly direction. But whilst thus seeking a place of security, new enemies were gathering round him. To Brigadier Parke, who had left Nimach on the 5th of September, was entrusted the duty of covering Indur and Bhopal, thus leaving Michel's force to follow Tantia from the west, whilst Smith's brigade should advance from the north, and the Jhansi column under Colonel Liddell from the north-east.

With this disposition opens a new phase of the pursuit. The defeat of Tantia Topi at Rajgarh almost coincided in time with the conclusion of the rainy season; for, although rain continued for some days to fall, further operations had become impossible. We are now entering upon the cold-weather campaign. In this new actors appear upon the

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110 Of this action, Militia writes: "On reaching Rajgarh the English army came up and attacked us. We left our guns and fled." It would be incredible, were it not true, that a force so large, numbering at least eight thousand, with thirty guns, should allow itself to be defeated by less than one-sixth of its number in men and guns, without drawing a drop of blood. Yet, so it was. It is the more strange, as about half the rebels had been trained and disciplined by Europeans; their guns were effective pieces of larger caliber than the English 9-pounders, their muskets bore the Tower mark, and their swords were excellent, yet not one man of the British force was killed or wounded!
scene. The Central India field force once more invites the attention of the public. It seems fitting, then, that before describing the events of that cold-weather campaign, I should trace the operations of General Napier and of Brigadier Smith from the period when we left them up to the middle of September. Meanwhile we must suppose Tantia Topi making the best of his way, by circuitous paths, from Rajgarh to Sironj.

We left General Napier's division at Gwaliar and Jhansi at the beginning of July, Brigadier Smith's brigade at Sipri, and Mayne's irregulars at Gunah, all resting after the extraordinary fatigues and exposure of the central India campaign. To the superficial glance, order had been restored in Sindia's dominions. The maharaja, grateful to the English, more fervent than at any previous period in his desire for their success, was doing his utmost to forward the views of the army administrators for the success of the troops. Sir Robert Hamilton, located in Gwaliar, was engaged in reestablishing political relations with the petty states around. The situation was full of promise; and yet, all the time, it was hollow and unsound.

During the whole of July the European troops had rest. The comparatively trifling matters which required attention in the districts were easily disposed of by the employment on detached duty of the men of Meade's horse, a regiment daily rising in estimation. But on the 3rd of August an incident occurred which led to very serious complications. A chief of Sindia's territory, named Man Singh, raja, of Narwar, had quarreled with his liege lord. To avenge the wrong which, he conceived, had been inflicted upon him by Sindia, and which will presently be related, and encouraged possibly by Tantia's action in the south, this chieftain, summoning his followers, twelve thousand strong, surprised on the 2nd of August the strong fort of Paori, eighty-three miles by the Sipri road southwest of Gwaliar, and eighteen to the north-west of Sipri, but recently supplied with six months' provisions and ammunition. Now, Smith's brigade was at Sipri. On the 4th he learned of the act of rebellion perpetrated by Man Singh. On the 5th he started from Sipri with a force composed of two squadrons of the 8th hussars, two of the 1st Bombay lancers, a wing of the 95th, and three field-guns, and, marching as rapidly as the roads would permit, reached the vicinity of Paori early on the morning of the 7th. On approaching the place, Man Singh sent a messenger with a flag of truce to the brigadier, to assure him that he had no quarrel with the English; that his contention was with the maharaja alone, and to supplicate earnestly for an interview. Smith granted the request and saw the chief that day. In an earnest manner, totally devoid of pretension, Man Singh told his story to the brigadier. He and his family, he said, had ever been loyal servants to the maharaja. During the lifetime of his father, nothing had occurred to mar the good feeling which had previously existed. But on his father's death, the maharaja had insulted and robbed him by refusing to recognize his right to succeed to the principality of Narwar, and the estates adjacent.

111 Narwar is a very important place, with an interesting history. It lies forty-four miles south of Gwalior. In 1844, Narwar, with the lands pertaining to it, was assessed by the Gwalior Government at 2,25,000 rupees annually. Little wonder, then, that the despotic ruler of the native state in which it lay should covet it.
It was to recover these, or, at all events, to avenge himself on the maharaja, that he had drawn the sword and seized Paoli, which formed a part of his ancestral possessions, but, he added earnestly, "I have no connection with the rebels and no quarrel with the English." The plea, though true, and convincing the listener of its truth, was not of a nature which, in those times, could be accepted by an English commander. Smith was responsible for the peace of the country near Sipri; that peace had been violated by Man Singh, and Smith and prepares are. had but one plain duty, to see that the violators were punished and that peace was maintained. He informed Man Singh of this necessity.

Man Singh prepared, then, to take the consequences. Paori was strong, well supplied with provisions and ammunition, and its garrison, originally only two thousand, had been increased during the few days since the capture to nearly double that number. Amongst the new-comers was a chief, A'jhit Singh by name, uncle of Man Singh. Smith's force amounted only to eleven hundred men of all arms, and his three pieces were field-pieces. He was thus far too weak to undertake a siege; and the place was too strong to be carried by a coup-de-main. Under these circumstances he deemed it prudent to maintain his position near the place, while he sent to Gwiliar an earnest request for reinforcements. On receiving this requisition Napier felt the enormous importance of settling the matter with as little delay as possible. Examples of that sort in a country long under Maratha. rule are apt to be contagious, and there was every probability that if Man Singh were allowed for any length of time to parade his defiance of the British, chieftains more powerful than he might follow his example. Napier, then, determined to take the matter into his own hands. He started accordingly on the 11th with five guns and four mortars, escorted by six hundred horse and foot, reached Sipri on the 17th, and joined Smith on the 19th of August. He began operations the next day. For twenty-four hours he poured a vertical fire into the fort from his mortars, and then began to use his breaching batteries. This demonstration quite satisfied Man Singh. On the night of the 23rd he, A'jhit Singh, and their followers evacuated Paori, and made their way southwards through the jungles. Napier entered Paori the following morning, then equipped a light column, under Robertson, 25th Bombay native infantry—an officer whose gallantry and soldier-like conduct have often been mentioned in these pages—and sent him in pursuit of the rebels. Napier himself having destroyed the fortifications of Pion and burst the guns, retired to Sipri to make arrangements for the further pursuit of Man Singh should Robertson fail to capture him.

That zealous officer left Paori on the 26th of August, on the track of Man Singh. He had with him a squadron 8th hussars, a squadron Meade's horse, two 9-pounders, one 6-pounder, one 5½ inch howitzer, one hundred men of the 86th, one hundred and twenty of the 95th, two hundred 10th Bombay native infantry, and two hundred 25th Bombay native infantry. Pushing on by forced marches through the jungles, crossing difficult rivers, and conquering every obstacle, Robertson on the 3rd of September ascertained that the rebels were at Bijapur, near Gunah, twenty-three miles distant. His
determination was instantly taken. Leaving the remainder to guard the camp and baggage, he mounted on elephants and camels seventy-five men of the 86th, ninety of the 95th, and one hundred each of the 10th and 25th native infantry, and with these and fifty men of the 8th hussars and one hundred and fifty of Meade's horse, he set out that night. At daybreak the following morning he came in sight of the rebels occupying a rising ground on the opposite bank of the Parbati river. They had no scouts, and, the light being still grey, Robertson was able to cross the river unperceived and to send his cavalry round to take up a position in rear of the rebel camp. These movements were executed with so much care and precision, that, when the cavalry were taking up the position indicated, the rebels were actually preparing to bathe in the river, preparatory to their morning meal. The surprise was complete. Of organized resistance there was none; but the casualty list showed that the rebels, though taken unawares, defended themselves bravely. Lieutenant Fawcett, 95th, was killed; Captain Poore and Lieutenant Hanbury, 18th hussars, and Lieutenants Stewart and Page, of Meade's horse, were wounded. The remaining casualties in killed and wounded amounted to eighteen.

It was discovered after the action that it was not Man Singh's but A'jhit Singh's band which had been routed. The astute Man Singh, on learning that he was pursued, had divided his partisans into three divisions, with instructions to traverse a separate road and to combine at an appointed place. It was one of these divisions, six hundred strong, and composed, as was ascertained after the action, of men from the maharaj's bodyguard, from the Gwaliar contingent, and from the 3rd, 40th, 47th, and 50th regiments native infantry. They were all dressed in red, and had percussion firelocks. About three-fourths of them were killed, but A'jhit Singh escaped.

Robertson marched from the scene of action to Gunah, where he arrived the middle of September. With this march may be said to terminate the campaign of the rainy season in the districts to the west and south-west of Gwaliar bordering on Rajputana. It is now fit that we should follow the various columns in the cold-weather campaign against Tantia Topi and his allies. Of these, that against Tantia Topi demands precedence.

I left that chieftain making his way about the jungly country on both sides of the Betwa towards Sironj. He duly reached that place about the middle of September, he and his men utterly exhausted. A rest of eight days, made sweeter by the absence of all fear—for the heavy rain that was falling would, they well knew, make the roads impassable to their enemy—set them on their legs again, and even restored to them their former audacity. On the conclusion of that period, the rains having ceased, Tantia led his men, with the four guns he had taken at Sironj, against Isaogarh, a town with a fort, belonging to Sindia, in the hilly and difficult country south of Sipri. Here he demanded supplies; but the townspeople refusing them, Tantia stormed and plundered the place.

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112 The number of killed is and five hundred dead bodies often exaggerated, but on were actually counted on this occasion between four both sides of the river.
and took seven guns. He and his associates halted there for a day to consider their further plans. Their deliberations then culminated in a determination to divide their forces, Tantia proceeding with the bulk of them and five guns to Chandairi, the Rao Sahib with six guns and fewer followers making his way to Tal Bihat by Lalatpur: this plan was carried out.

What Chandairi was, the reader will recollect who has followed the history of Sir Hugh Rose's central Indian campaign. It was now held for Sindia by a loyal soldier, a man who had no sympathy with rebels. He repulsed, then, Tantia Topi's appeals, and when the Maratha chief attempted to storm the place he repulsed his attacks. Tantia wasted three days in an attempt to gain a place the possession of which would have been of incalculable use to him, and then, baffled though not dispirited, made for Mangrioli, about twenty miles south of Chandairi. He was marching, though he knew it not, on defeat, for the English were to meet him there!

I must now return to his pursuers. I have already stated the position of the several English columns; how Brigadier Parke was covering Indur and Bhopal; how Colonel Liddell with the Jhansi force was covering the country to the north-east. I have now only to add that Brigadier Smith, released by the capture of Paori, had taken up a position north of Sironj. In the inner part of the circle, the outer rim of which was occupied by these columns, General Michel was acting.

Enabled at last, towards the end of September, by the cessation of the heavy rains, to act freely, Michel, believing he should find Tantia in the Betwah valley, went in pursuit of him in a north-easterly direction. As he marched, he heard of the various depredations committed by the fugitives, and he felt sure he should find him. On the 9th of October, marching towards Mangraoli, information reached him that Tantia had occupied the high ground near the place, and was waiting for him.

Tantia had arrived there that very morning. He had not sought a battle, but as the ground was favorable he resolved to risk one. His position was strong, and the five guns he had placed in front of his line commanded the ground along which the English must advance. When, then, Michel sent his men forward, Tantia's guns opened a destructive fire. Grown bolder by despair, Tantia at the same time sent his cavalry to menace both flanks of the few assailants. For a moment the position of these seemed critical, the more so as some of the outflanking horsemen penetrated between the main body and the rear-guard. But whilst they still hesitated to come on, to risk a hand-to-hand encounter, the British troops advanced steadily, and gaining the crest, charged the guns. Then all was over. Tantia and his men abandoned their guns and fled. The want of sufficient cavalry did not allow Michel to pursue them.

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113 Of this action Tantia writes: "On our march to Mangraoli we met the English army. Shots were fired for a short time, when we left all our guns and fled."
Tantia crossed the Betwah and fled first to Jaklom, and then, next day, to Lalatpur, where he rejoined Rao Sahib, who, it will be remembered, had six guns. Tantia remained here, but Rao Sahib, with the bulk of the troops and the guns, set off the following day, and marched in a southeasterly direction. Michel, meanwhile, ordering Smith to watch the left bank of the Betwah, followed Rao Sahib, and making his way with great difficulty through the dense Jaklon jungle, came suddenly upon him at Sindwaho, about thirty miles east of the Betwah. Warned by the inopportune sound of a bugle in the British camp, Rao Sahib had time to draw up his men on a rising ground, with the guns in front. Then followed a scene almost similar to that at Mangraoli. The English, threatened on both flanks, advance and capture the guns, when the rebels flee. In their flight, however, they were, on this occasion, less fortunate than at Mangraoli. Michel had his cavalry handy; the ground, too, was unfavorable for rapid flight. In a pursuit which covered twelve miles, the rebels then suffered severely. Rao Sahib, however, escaped. The English lost five officers and twenty men in killed and wounded.

Rao Sahib rejoined Tantia at Lalatpur, and again the two held counsel as to the future. The country north of the Narbada seemed about to close on them. The circle was gradually lessening, and in a few days they would be in the folds of the destroyer. They saw this clearly, saw that their only chance was to break through the circle and march to the south, putting the enemy, if possible, on a false scent. This was the difficult part of the programme, but they laid their plans to attempt it.

It is impossible to withhold admiration from the of pertinacity with which this scheme was carried out. Leaving Lalatpur, Tantia and the Rao, whose design was to escape southwards, marched to Kajuria, with the intention of recrossing the Betwah near that place and turning thence southward. But the fort being guarded by Colonel Liddell, Tantia turned north-eastward, and made for Lal Bahat. There he halted to rest his men. The following day, moving direct southwards, he penetrated into the Jaklon jungles, still to the east of the Betwah. He halted one day at Jaklon, and the next at Itaia. There he heard that the English army was on his track, so he at once broke up and pushed on towards Khorai.

Whilst he is making that march I must return to General Michel. From the field of Sindwaho that general had marched to Lalatpur, keeping always to the westward of Tantia with the view of baulking the intention he believed he might entertain of breaking through to the south. On reaching Lalatpur, however, a messenger from Brigadier Smith reached him with the information that Tantia had been met marching southwards, and had probably gained the west side of the general. No time was to be lost. Michel, sending off an express to warn Parke, and pressing southwards by forced marches came upon Tantia by a cross road just as that chief was approaching the village of Khorai. Instantly the battle joined. The British cavalry separated one wing of the
rebels’ force from the other. Whilst the British forces were engaged in annihilating the left wing, the right, with which were Tantia and Rio Sahib, favored by the jungle, managed to escape westward. Not that the left wing fought to save their comrades; they had fled in the direction from which they had advanced, and the whole of Michel’s force had pounced upon them, leaving the other wing to escape. Tantia and Rio Sahib, in fact, purchased their retreat with the sacrifice of one-half of their followers.\footnote{114}

This happened on the 25th of October. Tantia pushed on to Rajgarh, molested on his way, four miles from Bagrod, by Colonel Charles Becher, one of the most gallant officers of the Indian army, who, at the head of a newly-raised regiment,\footnote{115} did not hesitate to attack his whole force. Becher inflicted considerable loss (upwards of forty men killed), but Tantia pressed on, and proceeding via Rajgarh, crossed the Narbada into the Nagpur territory at a point about forty miles above Hoshangabad.

Thus in the dying agony of the mutiny was accomplished a movement which, carried out twelve months earlier, would have produced an effect fatal for the time to British supremacy; a movement which would have roused the whole of the western presidency, have kindled revolt in the dominions of the Nizam, and have, in its working, penetrated to southern India. It was the movement to prevent which Lord Elphinstone had adopted the policy of aggressive defence till then so successful, which Durand had exerted all his energies, had used entreaties of the most urgent character with the Government of India, had stretched to the utmost the powers entrusted to him, to hinder. And now it was accomplished! The nephew of the man recognized by the Marathas as the lawful heir of the last reigning Peshwa was on Maratha soil with an army!

I have said that had that event occurred but fifteen months previously, British authority in western India would, for the time, have succumbed. As it was, the event happening in October 1858, when the sparks of the mutiny in every other part of India, Oudh excepted, had been extinguished, and when, even in Oudh, they were being surely trampled out; as it was, the event caused alarm of no ordinary character to the Governments of Bombay and Madras. Although Lord Elphinstone had shown, to a remarkable degree, a true appreciation of the character of the rebellion and of the manner in which it should in Bombay. be met, even he could not view without grave concern the arrival of Tantia Topi and Rao Sahib in the country of the Bhonslas, that country the annexation of which but a few years previously had moved the Maratha heart to its core. He could not but remember that a large proportion of the population of the Bombay presidency was Maratha, and he could not foresee — who, indeed, could foresee? — the effect which might be produced on the easily kindled minds of a

\footnote{\textsuperscript{114} Tantia writes of this action: “The English force came up in the morning and our army became separated, I accompanied the Rao Sahib,” &c. Not a word about the sacrifice of the wing.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{115} Now one of the regiments Central Indian horse.}
susceptible people by the presence amongst them of the representative of the man whom many amongst them regarded as their rightful ruler.

Nor could Lord Harris, who, throughout the trying times of 1857-58, had shown himself prompt to meet every difficulty, listen with an indifferent ear to the tidings that the Maratha leader had crossed the Narbada. True it was that the Madras Presidency was separated from the country now chosen by Tantia as his campaigning ground by the vast territories of the Nizam. True it was that the Nizarn, guided by his able and far-seeing minister Salar Jang, had displayed to the British a loyalty not to be exceeded. But the times were peculiar. The population of the Nizam's territories was to a very considerable extent Hindu. Instances had occurred before, as in the case of Sindia, of a people revolting against their sovereign when that sovereign acted in the teeth of the national feeling. It was impossible not to fear lest the army of Tantia should rouse to arms the entire Maratha population, and that the spectacle of a people in arms against the foreigner might act with irresistible force on the people of the Dekhan.

Fortunately, these fears were not realized. Six years' experience of British rule had produced a remarkable effect upon the people of the central provinces. Whatever might be the feelings of the landowners, of the courtiers, and of those Brahmans who, by means of their influence in a court where Brahmanical influence was supreme, were able to live a life of luxury, of intrigue, and of pleasure without having recourse to industry and toil, this at least is certain, that the peasantry had no desire to recur to their old masters. In this respect the central provinces presented a remarkable contrast to Oudh and Bandalkhand. With all its faults, the people of this part of India preferred the substantial justice of the rule of their alien lords. It is, indeed, a remarkable fact that whilst, in the dominions of Sindia and in the principalities governed by Rajput princes, Tantia and his followers enjoyed the sympathy of the villagers, and always obtained from them, without pressure and without payment, supplies in abundance, in the Maratha country beyond the Narbada the peasantry regarded them as pests in whose face the door was to be closed and the gates were to be barred, who were to receive no supplies without payment, and, if it could be managed without injury to themselves, no supplies at all.

To return to the story. Tantia, crossing the Narbada, forty miles above Hoshangabad, proceeded via Fathpur to Multai in the direction of Nagpur, but learning that a British force from that place had anticipated him, he turned sharp westward, hoping to penetrate to the country southward by an unguarded pass in the hills. He found this impossible, for Brigadier Hill of the Haidarabad contingent was watching at Mailghat and Asirgarh; further westward, Sir Hugh Rose had made preparations to prevent Tantia from crossing into Khandesh, and, further westward still, General Roberts was bringing up troops to bar Gujrat against him. Nothing could have been more tantalizing, for south of the Tapti river, from the banks of which he was separated only by the narrow Sitpara, range lay the country to which Nana Sahib laid claim as his
rightful inheritance. Across this, under the circumstances, Tantia dared not venture. Shut out, then, from further progress west or south, Tantia made a turn north-westwards into Holkar's possessions, south of the Narbada, hoping to recross the Narbada unperceived and to penetrate thence into the territory of the Gaikwar. On the 19th of November he reached Kargun, a decayed town in Nimar. Here was stationed a detachment of Holkar's troops, consisting of two troops of cavalry, a company of infantry, and two guns. These Tantia forced to joined him, and then pushed on westward. On the 23rd he crossed near Than, the great high road from Bombay to Agra, just as it was being traversed by carts laden with mercantile stores for the use of the English. Plundering these, taking with him the natives who had been escorting the carts, and destroying the telegraph wires, he pursued his course, feeling confident of success if only he could reach the Narbada before the English, whom he believed he had outmaneuvered, should molest him.

But fortune did not favor him. Michel, indeed, after defeating Tanta at Khorai, had pushed on in pursuit, though not on the same track, and, with his cavalry, had reached Hoshangabad on the 7th of November. There he joined Parke, whom he had previously ordered to meet him. Leaving Parke at Hoshangabad, left without Michel crossed the Narbada and found himself in the wild country about Baitul, with no accurate maps, no information of his own regarding the movements of the rebels, and with no prospect of obtaining any from the local authorities. Left thus to the resources of his own intelligence, Michel came to the conclusion that the roads to the south and due west would certainly be barred to Tantia, and that although there was little prospect of his attempting to recross the Narbada, yet, that it would not be wise on his part to move too far from that river. Impressed with this idea, he and takes ordered Parke to cross the Narbada at Hoshangabad, to march in a direction south-west by west, and take up a position at Charwah, a town forming the angle nearest the Narbada of a triangle of which Mailghat and A'sirgarh, both occupied by British troops, formed the other angles. In that direction, though more slowly, he moved himself.

Whilst the general was making these preparations south of the Narbada, the British authorities at Mau, to the north of it, were receiving disquieting rumors regarding the continued and persistent movements of Tantia westward. Dreading lest that chief should get possession of the grand trunk road, intercept supplies, and destroy the telegraph wire, Sir Robert Hamilton and Brigadier Edwards, who commanded at Mau, deemed it advisable, before Tantia had pillaged the carts in the manner already related, to post two small infantry detachments to watch the fords above Akbarpur. A day or two later, when intelligence was received that the westerly movement was being prolonged, Major Sutherland, who commanded one of these detachments, consisting of a hundred men of the 92nd Highlanders and a hundred of the 4th Bombay rifles, received instructions to cross the river at Akbarpur and keep clear the grand trunk

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116 Blackwood's Magazine, August 1860.
road. Sutherland obeyed his orders, and passing through Than—the village already spoken of—seventeen miles from Akbarpur, proceeded to Jilwana, thirteen miles further on, nearer to Bombay. There he was when, on the afternoon of the 23rd of November, Tantia and his troops passed through Than, plundered the carts and cut the telegraph wires, as already described.

Tantia having taken the precaution to carry off with him all the men accompanying the carts, Sutherland remained for some hours ignorant of this occurrence. He had been reinforced on the morning of the 23rd by fifty Europeans, sent on camels from Mau. The evening of that day, the report regarding the plundering reached him. The next morning Sutherland, taking with him one hundred and twenty Europeans and eighty natives, riding alternately on camels, proceeded to Than, and inspected the damage done. Learning there that the rebels had taken a westerly direction, he followed hastily and came in sight of them as they were passing through the town of Rajpur, nearly midway between Thaan and the Narbada. Pushing on, his men in advance still riding camels, disregarding the enemy's stragglers and the quantities of abandoned baggage and baggage-animals, Sutherland, in half an hour, had approached near enough to force a battle. He ordered, then, his men to dismount; but the delay thus caused gave Tantia an opportunity, of which he availed himself, to retire. Before Sutherland could set out in pursuit, he had the satisfaction of being joined by his rear-guard—the men who had not been mounted, and who, in their desire for combat, had marched at a great pace. Keeping the whole of his force dismounted, Sutherland resumed the pursuit, and after marching two miles came up with the rebels, formed in order of battle on a rocky ridge, thickly wooded, with their two guns, the guns of Holkar found at Kargun, pointing down the road. Tantia had with him from three to four thousand men. Sutherland had just two hundred. After a little skirmishing, the smaller number charged the larger. Dashing up the road under a shower of grape, they captured the guns, Lieutenant Humfries, adjutant of the 92nd, receiving a sword-cut from their commandant, who was killed at his post. The rebel infantry then fled. The casualties on both sides were trifling. Sutherland encamped on the ground he had gained.

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117 "The road for eight miles was strewed with articles, taken by the rebels the previous day from some merchants' carts on the main road; several carts had been brought on and abandoned when the bullocks got tired. The soldiers filled their water-bottles with port or sherry, of which there was enough to have stocked a large cellar, but not a man got intoxicated. A cart-load of books had been opened by the rebels during a halt—the contents were torn up and strewed in a circle, with a Walker's Pronouncing Dictionary left intact in the middle."—Blackwood, August 1860.

118 Regarding this action, Tantia writes (after referring to the capture of the carts): "We then left the high road and proceeded westward The next day we were surprised by the English force, and leaving our two guns, we fled and reached the Narbada."
The presence of the two guns with Tantia's force had necessitated that slow march over rough ground which had allowed Sutherland to overtake him. Now that the guns were lost his men were able to display that capacity for rapid marching in which the natives of India are unsurpassed, I might almost say unequalled, by any troops in the world. So quickly did they cover the ground that when at sunset the following day Sutherland reached the banks of the Narbada, he beheld the rebel force comfortably encamped on the opposite bank. Between him and their camp flowed the waters of the Narbada, at that point five hundred yards broad, its banks high and difficult. To cross it in the face of an enemy twenty times his strength would have been an impossibility even for the troops he commanded.

That Tantia had been able to cross the Narbada can only be accounted for by the fact that he had marched the previous afternoon, and the whole of the night, and had thus had at least twelve hours' start of his pursuers. It was well for him that he had that start. When he reached the left bank of the Narbada Tantia had beheld on the bank opposite a party of a hundred sowars under an officer. Under other circumstances the sight of these men might have made him hesitate. But he knew that Sutherland was behind him. He, therefore, plunged boldly in. The sowars then took flight.

At midnight Tantia, having plundered a village called Chickla, broke up his camp on the Narbada, and marched in the direction of Barodah. It was his last chance, but it was a great one could he but arrive before the English. Barodah was the seat of a Maratha dynasty, and it was known that a large party at the court sympathized deeply with Nana Sahib. There were in the city only one company of Europeans and two native regiments, besides the troops of the Gaikwar, who were almost sure to join the rebels. Full of the hope raised by the prospects before him, Tantia pushed on rapidly, marching from the banks of the Narbada, thirty-four miles straight on end. He halted at Rajpura, took three thousand nine hundred rupees and three horses from the chief of that place, and marched the next day for Chota Udaipur, only fifty miles from Barodah and connected with it by a road. Could he arrive at and leave that unmolested his future, he thought, would be assured.

But his pursuers were too many. I left General Michel and Brigadier Parke, in the second week of November, at Charwah, south of the Narbada, confident that Tantia's progress to the south was barred, and that he would endeavor to seek some means of recrossing into Malwa. Some days elapsed before an accurate account of his movements reached Michel. There was not a moment's hesitation as to the course to be followed. Michel recrossed the Narbada at the Barwani ford, and marching himself on Mau, dispatched Parke with a flying column of cavalry, mounted infantry, and two guns, with orders to conduct the pursuit with the utmost speed that was possible.

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119 So states Tantia himself, and I have usually found his statements corroborated by other writers. But I have been unable to ascertain who were these troopers or who was the officer. Probably he was a native officer.
Parke carried out these instructions to the letter. Marching, in nine days, two hundred and forty-one miles, for the last twenty of which he was forced to thread his way through a dense jungle, he came up with the rebels on the morning of the 1st of December, at Chota Udaipur, just an hour or two after they had reached that place. Considering the climate, the nature of the country, and the other difficulties of the route, this march must be considered as rivaling any of which history makes record.

The force commanded by Parke consisted of two 9-pounder guns Bombay artillery, fifty men 8th hussars, fifty of the 2nd Bombay cavalry, a party of the Maratha horse under Kerr—which, after having disarmed the southern Maratha, country, had been sent from the west to join Michel—Moore's Aden horse, one hundred of the 72nd Highlanders, mounted on camels, and one hundred and twenty-five Gujrati irregular horse. For the last twenty miles before reaching Chota Udaipur, this force had, as I have stated, threaded its way through a dense jungle, skillfully piloted by Moore with his Aden horse. On emerging from the jungle Moore perceived the rebels. He instantly surprised their outlying picket. The ground beyond the jungle was covered with large trees, brushwood, and tents still standing,¹²⁰ and was so broken as to be very difficult for cavalry and artillery. As Parke's troops debouched on to it, he deployed his force, placing some of the 8th hussars, of the Maratha horse, and the Aden horse on his right; the rest of the Maratha horse, under Kerr, on his left, the 72nd Highlanders flanking the two guns in his centre; the remainder of the cavalry in the rear. His whole front scarcely covered two hundred yards. The rebels, meanwhile, roused to action, had formed up about six hundred yards distant. They numbered three thousand five hundred men and outflanked the British force on both sides. Tantia first endeavored to turn the British left, but Kerr, changing his front, charged with great impetuosity, and driving the rebels from the field, pursued them for a considerable distance, laying sixty of them low. A similar attempt on the British right was met with equal success by the cavalry stationed there, Bannerman, of the southern Maratha, horse, greatly distinguishing himself and killing four men with his own hands. In the pursuit a standard of the 5th Bengal irregulars, borne by the rebels, was captured. Whilst the wings were thus engaged, the two British guns had kept up a heavy fire from the centre. But it was not long needed. With the repulse of the flanking attacks the action terminated. A pursuit along the whole line then followed.

This engagement was fatal to Tantia's hopes regarding Barodah. Leaving his route to the westward he fled northwards into the jungles of Banswara, the southernmost principality of Rajputana. These jungles, extremely dense in their character, are inhabited principally by Bhils, a wild and uncivilized race, much given to plunder. Hemmed in on the south by the Narbada, now for ever abandoned, on the west by Gujrat, now completely guarded by General Roberts, and on the north and east by

¹²⁰ Tantia admits that he was surprised on this occasion.
difficult ranges which separate it from Udaipur and Sirohi, and the passes across which are few and difficult, Tantia might have been excused if he had despaired of escape. But he did not despair. Rao Sahib was now his only companion, the nawab of Banda having in November taken advantage of the royal proclamation to surrender. But these two men were, in this hour of supreme danger, as cool, as bold, as fertile in resource, as at any previous period of their careers.

And yet the British commanders had done their utmost to hem him in. They really believed that at last they had him. The troops of Roberts's division were echeloned along the roads and paths and passes leading from Banswara to the west. On that side escape was impossible. A force detached from Nimach under Major Rocke guarded the passes to the north and north-west. Another column sent from Mau, under Colonel Benson, commanded at the moment by Colonel Somerset, watched the passes leading eastward and southeastward whilst Tantia was cut off from the south by his recent pursuers, greatly strengthened by flying detachments from Burhanpur and from Khandesh. To add to his difficulties the Bhil inhabitants of the jungles of Banswara, far from aiding him, followed his track as the vulture follows the wounded hare, anxious for the moment when she shall lie down and succumb.

But, undaunted, Tantia pressed deeper into the jungles. On reaching Deogarh Bari he found that but a small portion of his force was with him. He halted there for two days, to allow his men to reunite. This result having been obtained, he, on the 10th of December, entered Banswara. Here he halted a day, his men plundering sixteen or seventeen camel-loads of cloth from Ahmadabad. He probably would have halted here longer but that information reached him that Colonel Somerset's brigade was closing up from Ratlam. Disturbed by this information, he marched in a nearly north-westerly direction to Salumbar, an isolated fort belonging to the rana of Udaipur, encircled by hills, in the heart of the A'ravalli range. It was a strong position, commanding the approaches to Udaipur. Here Tantia obtained some supplies, of which he was greatly in need, and set off the following day in the hope of surprising Udaipur. But the British had received information of his movements, and Major Rocke's column had taken up a position at Bhansra, whence it would be easy for him to cover Udaipur or to fall on Tantia as he emerged from the northern passes. Discovering this obstacle before he had committed himself too far, Tantia turned sharply to the north-east and took up a position at the village of Bhilwara, in the densest part of the jungle. Here, it is said, Tantia and his followers debated the advisability of surrendering. But the intelligence which reached them during their deliberations that Man Singh was at hand, and that Prince Firoz Shah was advancing to their assistance, induced them to persevere in their resistance, to give one more chance to Fortune.

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121 To be hereafter referred to.

122 Not the town of the same name on the road between Nimach and Nasirabad.
Tantia halted two days at Bhilwara and then made for Partabgarh, the capital of the raja of the state of that name. His probable line of route had been well divined by the English general. But he, too, had received information of Firoz Shah's movements, and it was necessary to arrange to meet him also. For this purpose, Somerset had been dispatched with a column to A'gar, Rocke had been moved to take his place at Partabgarh, whilst Parke, plunging into the jungles from the westward, was rapidly following on the track of the fugitives.

It thus happened that when, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 25th of December, Tantia and his followers emerged from the jungles close to Partabgarh, he found himself face to face with Major Rocke. That officer, not having a sufficient number of men at his disposal to close the three passes, had taken up a position about two miles from the jungles, whence he could march to any point at which the rebels might threaten to debouch, provided he had any information of their movements. On this occasion he had no such information. His force, too, was, as I have said, small, consisting only of two hundred infantry, two guns, and a handful of native cavalry. He had no chance, however, of assuming the offensive. Tantia marched straight at him, and kept him engaged for two hours, a sufficient time to enable his elephants and baggage to clear the pass. Seeing this result gained, Tantia, who had thus, in spite of his many foes, escaped from the trap, marched in the direction of Mandisor, and halted for the night within six miles of that place. Thence he marched very rapidly—in three days—to Zirapur, a hundred miles east-south-east of Nimach, thus returning to the part of the country almost directly south of Gwalior.

But the English were at his heels. Benson, who had resumed command of the Mau column, had received excellent information regarding Tantia's movements from Captain Hutchinson, one of the assistants to Sir Robert Hamilton. He pushed on after Tantia, then, marching thirty-five miles a day, caught him up at Zirapur the very day he had arrived there. Tantia, completely surprised, fled without fighting, leaving six of his elephants behind him, and pushed northwards to Barod. Here another surprise followed him. Somerset had reached Zirapar the morning after Tantia had left it. He had two horse-artillery guns with him. Taking fresh horses from the ammunition wagons, he attached them to Benson's two guns. With these four guns, and the ammunition contained in the limber, Somerset started at once, and marching seventy miles in forty-eight hours, came upon Tantia at Barod. After an action fought in the usual Tantia Topi style, the rebels fled to Nahargarh in the Kota territory. Here Tantia was fired at by the Kiladar. Moving out of range, he halted for the night. Rao Sahib then sent a messenger to summon Man Singh, who had appointed to meet him at this place. On Man Singh's arrival the rebels moved to Paron, the rebels fled to Nahargarh in the Kota territory. Here Tantia was fired at by the Kiladar. Moving out of range, he halted for the night. Rao Sahib then sent a messenger to summon Man Singh, who had appointed to meet him at this place. On Man Singh's arrival the rebels moved to Paron, where they halted two days. They then pushed northwards towards Indragarh. On
reaching the banks of the Chambal, Man Singh, for some unexplained reason, left them. On the 13th of January they reached Indragarh, where Firoz Shah, with his bodyguard and the 12th irregulars, met them. To ascertain how this had been possible, I must return to the movements of General Napier and the Central Indian force.

I left General Napier just after he and his lieutenants had, at the end of September, expelled Man Singh from the Gwalior territory. His detached parties still continued to operate in the districts to the west and south-west of Gwalior, bordering on Rajputana, and the work which those parties accomplished was of a most useful character. In this manner passed the months of October and November, but in December Gwalior was invaded by a new enemy.

The pseudo-prince, Firoz Shah, already mentioned in these pages, had, after his expulsion from Mandisor by Durand in November 1857, proceeded with his followers to Rohilkhand to try conclusions with the British in that quarter. Expelled from Rohilkhand by Lord Clyde, he entered Oudh and cast in his lot with the irreconcilables who, to the last, refused submission to the paramount power. It was only when the native cause was absolutely lost in that province that Firoz Shah, reading the glowing accounts of his achievements which Tantia Topi regularly transmitted from the Chambal and the Narbada, determined to march to the assistance of one join Tantia whom he could not but consider as a worthy ally. At the time that he arrived at this resolution he was at a place called Bisuah, not far from Sitapur. Marching rapidly from that place, he crossed the Ganges on the 7th of December, cut the telegraph along the grand trunk road, and spread the report that he was about to proceed north-westwards. Instead of that he took the road to Itawa, baffled a gallant attempt made by Mr. Hume and Captain Doyle—who lost his life—to stop him, out-marched a column led by Brigadier Herbert from Kanhpur to pursue him, crossed the Jamna on the 9th, and moved off in the direction of Jhansi. He marched with such speed that on the 17th he had arrived in the vicinity of Ranod, a large town fifty miles north-east of Gunah. It was here he encountered his first check.

General, now become Sir Robert, Napier had received timely intimation regarding the course pursued by Firoz Shah, and he had sent out detachments to watch the roads which that chieftain would probably follow. On the morning of the 12th of December he received from the commander of one of these, Captain McMahon, 14th light dragoons, located near the confluence of the Jamna, Chambal, and Sindh rivers, information to the effect that the rebels had passed into the Lohar district of Kachwazar. Believing, from this, that their course would be up the jungles of the Sindh river, Napier marched at 2 o'clock that day with a lightly-equipped force,\(^{123}\) intending to proceed to Dabra on the

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\(^{123}\) Two Bombay light field-battery guns, Captain G. G. Brown; one hundred and fifty men 14th light dragoons, Major Prettjohn; one hundred men 2nd Gwaliar Maratha horse, Captain Smith; one hundred and seventeen men 71st Highlanders, Major Rich; fifty men 25th Bombay native infantry, Lieutenant Forbes; forty camels, Gwaliar Camel corps, Captain Templer.
Jhansi road, thence, according to the information he might receive, to intercept the enemy.

Napier halted that evening at A'ntri. At 2 o'clock the following morning, however, he was roused by an express message from the political agent at Gwalior, Charters Macpherson, to the effect that information he had received led him to believe that the rebels would pass by Gohad, north of Gwalior. Instead, then, of pushing on to Dabra, Napier halted till the post should arrive with letters containing the grounds for the belief expressed by Macpherson. He did well not to act upon it without due caution, for at half-past 10 o'clock the tahsildir of A'ntri came to him to state that he had just ridden in from Dabra, and had seen there the smoke of the staging bungalow which the rebels were then burning, went and that they were taking a south-westerly direction. The express from Gwalior had just come in time to baffle the accurate conceptions of Napier's brain, for had it not arrived, he would have caught them at the very spot he had selected.

There was nothing for it now but to march southwards. Leaving A'ntri, then, immediately, Napier proceeded with great rapidity in that direction. At Bitaor, which he reached on the 14th he learned the rebels were only nine miles in front of him. Indeed, at this place the Gwalior Maratha horse, for the first time under fire, came in contact with the rear-guard of the enemy and greatly distinguished themselves.

Napier continued the pursuit through Narwar, and leaving there the greater portion of the infantry and all the artillery, who could not keep up with him, took with him only thirty-eight men of the 71st Highlanders on camels, all his cavalry, including twenty-five of the Balandshahr horse he found halted at Narwar, and proceeding with the utmost speed, reached Ranod on the morning of the 17th before the rebels had arrived there. His divination that they would make their way through the jungles of the Sindh river had proved to be perfectly accurate.

Firoz Shah, indeed, had preferred the more circuitous and difficult road through the jungles to the easier but more open route followed by Napier. Naturally he wished to make his way unseen, and thus to effect, with an unbeaten force, the contemplated junction with Tantia Topi. As it was, he had marched on a line almost parallel to that followed by the English leader, and it was only the temptation to leave the jungle cover to sack Randd which had saved him from an attack the previous day. But Napier had now reached Ranod before him, and the sacking of the place was likely to be more difficult than he had anticipated. Full, however, of confidence, and utterly ignorant of the arrival of the English, Firoz Shah marched on that eventful morning against Rancid, guided by a zamindar of the locality, his army forming an irregular mass extended in a front of nearly a mile.
Napier had scarcely time to form up the 14th light dragoons, when the rebels were within a few yards of him. The Gwalior Maratha horse had been impeded in crossing a deep ravine by the riding-camels, and were a little behind. The force actually engaged consisted of one hundred and thirty-three 14th light dragoons under Major Prettijohn, sixty of the Maratha horse under Captain F. H. Smith, and thirty-eight of the 71st Highlanders under Captain Smith, mounted on camels, and guided by Captain Templer.

As soon as the rebels had arrived within charging distance, Prettijohn and his hundred and thirty-three light dragoons dashed into their midst. The blow completely doubled them up. Though individuals amongst them fought bravely, the mass made no stand whatever. Their one thought seemed to be to try and escape. They were in full flight before the Maratha horse could come upon the scene, in time only to participate in the pursuit. That pursuit was continued for seven miles, the rebels losing six elephants, several horses and ponies, and many arms. They left one hundred and fifty dead bodies on the ground before Ranod, including those of some native officers of the 12th irregulars, the murderers of the gallant Holmes. Prettijohn having been severely wounded before the pursuit began, the command of the dragoons devolved on Captain Need, and that officer estimated the loss of the rebels in the pursuit at three hundred. On the British side the wounded amounted to sixteen; one of these died subsequently of his wounds.

Firoz Shah led the fugitives in the direction of Chandairi. Learning, however, that one British force had moved towards Ranod from Jhansi, and another from Lallatpur to Chandairi, he suddenly turned westward, passed Isaogarh and Puchar, and made for the jungles of A'roni. Passing near Rampur, between Gunah and Sironj, he came suddenly upon forty men of the 1st Bombay lancers, under Lieutenant Stack, escorting clothing and remounts to Brigadier Smith. The rebels had captured the clothing of the detachment and one trooper when Stack gallantly brought up the rest of his men, and, skirmishing with the rebels, carried the remainder of his charge to Gunah. The rebels then pushed on to A'roni. Meanwhile, Captain W. Rice, 25th Bombay native infantry, a noted tiger-slayer, had been ordered with a small column from Gunah to intercept their retreat. At Barod, on the 22nd of December, he learned from a horse-dealer, who had been robbed by them, that the rebels were encamped near the village of Sarpur, eleven miles distant. Leaving his camp standing under charge of forty-two men, Rice set off that night, and out marching the guns with his infantry, surprised the enemy at 11 P.M. The surprise was so complete that the rebels made no resistance, but ran off at

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124 Under Brigadier Ainslie.

125 Under Colonel Liddell.

126 Two 9-pounders, ninety Royal Engineers, fifty-five 86th foot, one hundred and fifty 25th native infantry, one hundred and forty Meade’s horse.
once, leaving a hundred horses, several camels, many arms, and much clothing. From this point Firoz Shah made the best of his way, unmolested, to Rajgarh, hoping to meet there Tantia Topi. He lingered there for a few days waiting for his ally, but learning that Brigadier Smith was on his track, he made for Indragarh, where, on the 9th of January, he effected the junction in the manner already related.

I left Brigadier Somerset at Barod, having, after his march of seventy miles in forty-eight hours, driven Tantia from that place. Brigadier Smith, who had been posted at Sironj, had, after Napier had driven Firoz Shah southwards, moved in pursuit of him from that place and had been near Barod when Somerset beat Tantia there. He was now moving on Indragarh in pursuit of Firoz Shah. General Michel was, at this time—early in January 1859—at Chapra, ten or twelve miles due north of Barod. Thence he directed Colonel Becher to join him with all the cavalry under his command. He had previously ordered Brigadier Honner, commanding the Nasirabad brigade, to march in a north-easterly direction towards Indragarh, watching whilst he did so the fords between that place and Kotah. To complete the investment of the rebels, Brigadier Showers, moving with a light column from Agra, had taken up a position at Klishalgarh, northeast of the Bangs river.

Escape now seemed absolutely impossible. Hemmed in by Napier on the north and northeast, Showers on the north-west, Somerset on the east, Smith on the south-east, Michel and Benson on the south, and Honner on the south-west and west, how was it possible for the man who had so long defied pursuit to break through the net closing around him? It did, in very deed, seem impossible. It will be seen, nevertheless, that the resources of the rebel leader were not yet entirely exhausted.

Tantia had joined Firoz Shah at Indragarh on the 13th of January. But Indragarh was no safe resting-place. He had sure information that two English columns were marching on it. Strange it was, however, that whilst he received the fullest details regarding the movements of the various columns which had so long pursued him, and of Napier's troops, he had heard not a word of Showers's movement. Believing, then, that a way of escape in a north-westerly direction lay before him, he made a forced march to Dewassa, a large fortified town about midway between Jaipur and Bharatpur.

Showers heard of Tantia's arrival at Dewassa as soon as the speed of his scouts could convey the news. A similar message was conveyed, over a longer distance, to Honner. Both brigadiers set out immediately. But Showers; starting from Kushalgarh and having the shorter road to traverse, arrived first. Showers entered the town on the morning of the 16th, just as Tantia, Rao Sahib, and Firoz Shah were holding a council of war. How they escaped was a miracle. They were completely surprised. "The English force surprised us there," writes Tantia in his journal. About three hundred of his followers were killed or disabled, the remainder fled.
Whither? Every pass seemed closed to them. But the English columns from the south-west closing too rapidly on Dewassa, had just left one opening—the opening which, turning as it were the Jaipur territory, led into Marwar. Of this Tantia and his followers availed themselves, and marched with all the speed of which they were capable towards the city which gives its name to the principality. Passing by Alwar, they turned westwards, and reached Sikar on the 21st. They to Sikar, were encamped there that night when Holmes, who had been sent from Nasirabad with a small party of the 83rd and the 12th Bombay native infantry and four guns, fell upon him, after marching fifty-four miles through a sandy country in twenty-four hours. The surprise was complete. The rebels abandoned horses, camels, and even, arms, and fled in the utmost confusion. A few days later six hundred of them surrendered to the raja of Bikanir.

This defeat inaugurated the break-up of Tantia's army. On that very day Firoz Shah and the 12th irregulars separated from him. Since his wanderings in the Banswara jungles, Tantia had been on very bad terms with Rao Sahib, and the day after the defeat their quarrel came to an issue. "I told him," writes Tantia, "that I could flee no longer, and that whenever I saw an opportunity for leaving him, I would do so." Some Thakurs related to Man Singh had joined Tantia that morning, and with them Tantia left the force to proceed in the direction of Paron, having as followers only "two pandits to cook his food, and one sais\(^{127}\) (groom), two horses, and a pony." In the Paron jungle Tantia met raja Man Singh. "Why did you leave your force?" asked the raja, "you have not acted right in so doing." Tantia replied, "I was tired of running away, and I will remain with you whether I have done right or wrong." In fact, after the long chase, he was beaten.

Meanwhile, Rao Sahib, still with some three or four thousand followers, pushed first westwards, then to the south, and reached Koshani, west of Ajmir, and about eighty miles east of Jodhpur, on the 10th of February. But the avenger was on his track. Honner, who had arrived too late for the rebels at Dewassa, had, after some inevitable delay, discovered their track. He set out in pursuit on the 6th, and, marching very rapidly, reached Koshani on the morning of the 10th, having accomplished one hundred and forty-five miles in four days. Finding Rao Sahib there, he attacked and defeated him, killing about two hundred of his followers. Rao Sahib fled southwards to the Chatterbuj pass and reached it on the 15th. Somerset, coming from the east, arrived within a few miles of it the same day. Unfortunately, no one with him knew the country, and many precious hours were spent in reconnoitering, hours which the Rao utilized in threading the pass. Finding, however, that the British were still close to him, the Rao turned down to the Banswara jungles, closely pursued. Finding the passes leading to the south and east closed, the Rao turned to the north-east and passed by Partabgarh, where Tantia had encountered Major Rocke only a few weeks before. As he fled before Somerset, who followed closely on his track, there occurred a great

\(^{127}\) "The grooms," adds Tantia, "left me and ran off after coming two stages."
The diminution of his followers. Like Tantia, these were "tired of running away." The majority of them fell out of the line during the retreat, threw away their arms, and quietly took the road to their homes. Some of them, Muhammadans from Kanhpur and Bareli, about two hundred in number, gave themselves up. The chiefs and the other irreconcilables made their way to the Sironj jungles, where, sometimes disguised as mendicants, sometimes acting as marauders, they tried to obtain food from the villagers. Their organized opposition to the British Government had disappeared.

Of the chiefs of this long campaign, five still remained in whose fate the reader is naturally interested. These five were Rao SShib, Firoz Shah, Man Singh, and A’jhit Singh, and last and greatest of all, the leading spirit of the drama, the Maratha Tantia Topi. Of Rao Sahib I can relate nothing. He disappeared and was never heard of after. Firoz Shah was equally successful in eluding the vigilance of his pursuers, and was never heard of afterwards. But it was not so with the others. Their case constitutes in itself an episode.

The Parton jungles, in which Tantia Topi and Man Singh were hiding, constituted a portion of the large family estates of Narwar, of which Sindia had unjustly deprived the latter. Here they were safe, safe absolutely, so long as each should remain true to the other, for no mere retainer of Man Singh would betray his master or his master's friend. The clear and acute intellect of Sir Robert Napier had recognized this fact the moment he received the report that the two chiefs in question had separated themselves from their army and taken refuge in the jungles. He had at once felt certain that to capture Tantia Topi the preliminary step was to gain Man Singh. No star of lesser magnitude would suffice. Now, there were strong grounds for believing that it might be possible to gain Man Singh. He was a chief of ancient lineage, of lofty birth, born to great possessions. To avenge himself on Sindia for confiscating a portion of those possessions, he had lost everything except the affection of his dependants, and the ground on which he slept; he had imperiled his head. Thenceforward, so long as he remained unreconciled to his liege lord, there was no prospect in the present, no hope in the future. On such a man, driven to desperation, become from a feudal lord an outcast, what might not be the effect of an offer of free and absolute pardon, with the prospect of intercession with Sindia for the restoration of some portion of his property?

Impressed with this idea Napier resolved to try the experiment. It happened that on the 27th of February Sir Robert had directed Meade, of Meade's horse, who then commanded a detachment\(^{128}\) at Bijraon to proceed to Sirsimao, to dislodge thence any party of rebels in the vicinity, to keep open his communications with Gunah, and, in conjunction with Major Little's force at Pirawant, to clear the roads to Amroa, Agar, Thinnah, Rajgarh, and Sipri. Napier further instructed him to attack Man Singh and Militia Topi, then wandering in the jungles, whenever opportunity should offer.

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\(^{128}\) One hundred men 3rd Bombay Europeans, one hundred men 9th Bombay native infantry, one hundred men 24th Bombay native infantry, fifty men Meade's horse.
Meade reached Sirsimao on the 3rd of March, found the place deserted, opened a communication that evening with Little, and, in cooperation with him, was engaged from the 5th to the 8th of March in clearing a roadway up the rugged and densely-wooded pass. But, before leaving Sirsimio, Meade had ascertained that the old thakur who held that village, Niraiyan Singh by name, was connected with Man Singh and possessed much influence in the neighborhood. On the morning of the 8th this man and his followers came to a village some four or five miles distant from the pass up which the English troops were working, and showed an evident desire to communicate with Meade. Meade, feeling the great importance of obtaining the submission of so influential a personage, proceeded to the village, reassured the old man, who was at first nervous and alarmed, by his tact and kind manner, and induced him to return to Sirsimio with his followers. He saw the thakur again that evening at the village, and drew from him a promise to bring the dewan or confidential agent of Man Singh to him within two or three days, and to do all in his power to induce Man Singh himself to surrender.

The old man kept his word. On the 11th Meade had a long interview with the dewan. Through him he offered to Man Singh the conditions he was empowered to offer—a guarantee of life and subsistence. He further requested the dewan to find out the raja's family and household, to invite them to come to his camp, to promise them, should they comply, to do everything in his power for their comfort, to assure them that they should not be molested by the officials of the Gwaliar's darbar or by anyone else. With the dewan he likewise sent one letter addressed to the family, reiterating his invitation and his promise, and another addressed to Raja Man Singh himself, inviting him to surrender. He impressed, moreover, upon the dewan the primary necessity of bringing in the ladies first, feeling sure that the raja would follow.

It is at this point of the story that the action of Sir Robert Napier comes in. That officer, acquainted with Meade's proceedings in the matter just described, and fully approving of them, had become naturally impatient when day followed day and no result issued from a beginning so promising. He waited a week after the interview with the dewan, and when, at the expiration of that time, no tidings had been received regarding the rams or the raja he determined to put greater pressure upon the latter. He wrote, then, on the 18th of March to Meade, directing him to leave his road-work, as "it is of great importance that the pressure upon Man Singh should not be relaxed, till he comes in. Your letter of the 11th inst. gave hopes of certain parts of Man Singh's family coming in, but as your letter of the 13th makes no allusion to the subject the brigadier-general concludes that the proposals have not been renewed."129

129 From Assistant Adjutant-General to Captain Meade, dated 18th March 1859.
Sir Robert added that, notwithstanding that Meade had no information on the subject, he had grounds for believing that Man Singh had frequently been in the vicinity of the British force; that he had frequented places called Garla, Hatri, Bhirwan, and Mahudra; that he had been supplied with provisions from the last-named place. He accordingly directed Meade to move on Agar, and to make a road up the Mushairi pass through the jungles from that place by Garla and Hatri to Mahudra; and at the same time to exercise pressure upon the dewan at Sirsimao by threatening to quarter his force there.

In conformity with these instructions Meade marched to the Mushairi pass. He found the people in that part of the country extremely hostile to the British. Not a man would give him information. His surprise was great, then, when, on the 25th of March, the raja's dewan and his own confidential servant conducted into camp the ladies of the raja's household and their attendants, some seventy persons. Meade received them kindly, and sent them on to one of the raja's villages near Sipri. His servant likewise informed him that he had seen Man Singh four times, and that he had expressed his intention to give himself up in two or three days—a statement which was confirmed by the dewan.

Meade continued his march to Mahudra, sending a party of horse in front of him with the raja's dewin and a munshi, whom he instructed to open at once a communication with Man Singh. On the 31st he received, at Mahudra, the raja's final offer to surrender on certain conditions. To some of these Meade declined to agree. Finally he induced him to come in on the following conditions:-1st, that he should be met at some distance from the camp by a native of position—a ceremony the omission of which is an insult; 2nd, that he should not be made over to the Gwaliar darbar, but should remain in the English camp; 3rdly, that after staying two or three days in camp he should be allowed to proceed to his home at Maori near Sipri, whither the females of his family had gone, to reequip himself in a manner befitting his rank. On the 2nd of April Man Singh entered the British camp.

Tantia Topi was still at large. But Tantia without Man Singh, Man Singh reconciled to his enemies, was assailable. Now had arrived the time to play upon the more selfish instincts of the raja. He had life, and security for his life. But what was life to a born feudal chieftain without consideration, without esteem, without position? What was life to a vassal lord of Sindia, disowned and hated by his sovereign? The first feeling of satisfaction at escape from death passed, and life to such a man in such a position would become a burden. But could not the position be ameliorated? Yes—a signal service—a deed for which men would be grateful—that would remove the still remaining obstacles to a return to his position among the nobles of his country.

On feelings such as these Meade worked with tact and skill. In many conversations which he had with the raja during the 2nd and 3rd of April he urged him to perform some service which should entitle him to the consideration. His reasoning had so much
effect that when, at 11 o'clock on the night of the second day, the 3rd, information reached Meade that the uncle of Man Singh, A'jhit Singh, already mentioned in these pages, lay, with a band of men, fifteen miles distant, in the jungle, Man Singh volunteered to accompany the force of one hundred and fifty men at the head of which Meade immediately started. The little force reached, at daybreak, the place where A'jhit Singh had been marked down, only to discover that he and his band had moved off during the night. Meade pushed on in search of him some seven miles further, to a place where the jungle was so dense that cavalry were useless. A'jhit Singh and his men were actually in this jungle, but before Meade could 'surround them they became aware of the presence of enemies, and succeeded in getting away.\footnote{A'jhit Singh and his band were so terrified by their narrow escape, that they marched seventy or eighty miles on end, not halting till they joined the other rebels near Sironj.}

No one was more mortified than Man Singh. A'jhit Singh was his uncle; A'jhit Singh had been his comrade on the battle-field, his abettor in his revolt against Sindia, and although, in his fury at Man Singh's apostasy, as he regarded it, in surrendering to the English, he had threatened to take his life, yet he stood to Man Singh in a relation than which there can scarcely be a closer between man and man—friend, comrade, uncle, and yet Man Singh grieved bitterly that this man had not been captured by his enemies. It was a first step in moral debasement, a prelude to one still lower!

During the three days which followed, close observation satisfied Meade that Tantia Topi was in the Parton jungles, and working daily on Man Singh's longing desire for restoration to his former position\footnote{"I have done all I could by kind and encouraging counsel to urge him to establish, by so signal an act of service" (the betrayal of Tantia Topi), "his claim to the consideration of Government, promised him by Sir R. Hamilton in his telegram of the 27th ultimo."—Major Meade to Sir R. Napier, the 8th of April 1859. Sir R. Hamilton's telegram was to the effect that if Man Singh surrendered his life would be spared, and his claims would receive consideration.} he persuaded him to acknowledge that he knew where Tantia was. From this moment he had made up his mind to betray him. His only anxiety now was lest Tantia should slip through his fingers. At that very time, to his knowledge, Tantia was debating whether or not he should rejoin Firoz Shah. Tantia had even sent his emissaries to Meade's camp to consult him on the subject. Were Tantia to go the chance would be lost. No thought of old comradeship, of the ties of honour, weighed with him for a moment. He would at once betray him, if—Yes,—if he could himself recover his position. That was his one thought. "In the course of this forenoon" (the 7th of April), wrote Meade, "I learnt from Pribhu Lal that he thought Man Singh would do as I wished, but that he was desirous of having Sir R. Hamilton's general assurance of consideration for such a service reduced to some specific promise, and that his ambition was to have Shahabad, Paori, or some other portion of the ancient raj of
Narwar, guaranteed to him in the event of his efforts to apprehend Tanta Topi being successful."

It was quite out of Meade's power to make any such promise; he could only assure him that he "might rely on any claim he might establish being faithfully considered by Government." Unable to extract more, Man Singh clutched at the prospect which this vague promise offered, and consented to betray his friend.

Then came Meade's difficulty. To seize such as Tantia Topi, great caution was required. Tantia had many spies in the British camp, and to have sent a European on such a duty would have been sufficient to warn the victim. Eventually Meade decided to send a party of the 9th Bombay native infantry on the service, under an intelligent native officer. The orders he gave them were simply to obey the directions of Man Singh, and to apprehend any suspicious characters he might point out. The name of Tantia Topi was not mentioned, and the men had no idea of the actual duty on which they were proceeding.

Whilst Meade was thus negotiating with Man Singh, Tantia Topi had lain quiet in the Paron jungles. Shortly after his arrival there, and some days before Man Singh had surrendered, Tantia had, with the approval of that raja, sent to obtain information regarding the position of his old comrades. The reply brought to him was that to the number of eight or nine thousand men they were in the Sironj jungles that Rao Sahib had left them, but that Firoz Shah, the Ambapani nawab, and Imam Ali, Wurdi major of the 5th irregulars, were there. The last-named also sent him a letter begging Tantia to join them. It was on the receipt of this letter that, on the 5th of April, Tantia sent to consult Man Singh as to the course he should adopt. Tantia was well aware that Man Singh had surrendered, yet he trusted him implicitly. He had placed himself quite in his power, and had chosen his actual hiding place on the recommendation of the retainer to whose care Man Singh had consigned him with these words: "Stop wherever this man takes you!"

Tantia's message Man Singh replied that he would come in three days to see him, and that then they would decide on the action to be taken. Man Singh more than kept his word. At midnight on the third day, the 7th of April, he came to the hiding place - followed at a distance by the Bombay sepoys. Tantia was asleep. Asleep he was seized, roughly awakened, and conveyed to Meade's camp. He arrived there by sunrise on the morning of the 8th.

Meade marched him into Sipri and tried him by court-martial. He was charged with having been in rebellion and having waged war against the British Government between June 1857 and December 1858, in certain specified instances. No other charge was brought against him.
His defence was simple and straightforward; it ran thus: "I only obeyed, in all things that I did, my master's orders, i.e. the Nana's orders, up to the capture of Kalpi; and afterwards, those of Rio Sahib. I have nothing to state except that I have had nothing to do with the murder of any European men, women, or children; neither had I, at any time, given orders for anyone to be hanged."

The defence displayed the existence of a feeling very common among the Marathas. To many of these men the descendant of the Peshwa was their real lord, they knew no other. Tantia Topi was born and bred in the household of Baji Rio, who had been Peshwa of the Marathas. From his earliest childhood he had been taught to regard the adopted son of Baji Rao, Nana Sahib, as his master, his liege lord, whose every order he was bound to obey. Of the English he knew nothing, except they were foreigners who had robbed his earliest master of the country he had inherited, and his son of the pension guaranteed to his first master in lieu of his ancestral dominions. To them he was bound by no ties. The English Government, by leaving the heir of the Peshwas on the world, had forced that heir to be a conspirator and had compelled all his dependants to be free-lances.

Notwithstanding this reasoning, which was not put before the court, and which probably did not present itself to the minds of any of its members, Tantia Topi was sentenced to be hanged. The sentence was carried into effect at Sipri on the 18th of April.

Public opinion at the time ratified the justice of the sentence, but it may, I think, be doubted whether posterity will confirm that verdict. Tantia Topi was no born servant of the English rule. At the time of his birth—about the year 1812—his master was the independent ruler of a large portion of western India. He was under no obligation to serve faithfully and truly the race which had robbed his master. When that master, unbound equally by any tie to the English, saw the opportunity of recovering the territories of the Peshwa, Tantia Topi, who was his musihib, his companion, obeyed his orders and followed his fortunes. He declared that he committed no murder. He was not charged with committing any. He, a retainer of the ex-Peshwa's family, was charged with fighting against the English. On that charge alone he was convicted and hanged. Surely, under the circumstances of the case, the punishment was greater than the offence. The clansman had obeyed his lord, and had fought with fair weapons.

Posterity has condemned Napoleon for causing Hofer to be shot. There is considerable analogy between the cases of Hofer and Tantia Topi. Neither was born under the rule of the nation against which he fought. In both cases the race to which each belonged was subjugated by a foreign race. In both cases the insurrection of the subdued race was produced by causes exterior to its own immediate interests. In both cases the two men cited rose to be the representatives of the nationality to which each belonged. In both—Hofer in the one, Tantia Topi in the other — they resisted the dominant race in a
manner which necessitated the calling forth extraordinary exertions. In both cases the leader was a hero to his own countrymen. The one, the European, is still a hero to the world. The other, the Maratha—well—who knows that in the nooks and corners of the valleys of the Chambal, the Narbada and the Parbati, his name, too, is not often mentioned with respect and affection?

One word, before we dismiss him, regarding his character as a general. For nearly nine months, from his defeat at Jaora Alipur by Sir Robert Napier, to his capture by an officer serving under that general, Tantia Topi had baffled all the efforts of the British. During that period he had more than once or twice made the tour of Rajputana and Malwa, two countries possessing jointly an area of one hundred and sixty-one thousand seven hundred square miles, had crossed the Narbada, and had threatened the more vulnerable parts of western India. The qualities he had displayed would have been admirable, had he combined with them the capacity of the general and the daring of the aggressive soldier. His marches were wonderful; he had a good eye for selecting a position, and he had a marvelous faculty for localities. But when that has been said, everything has been said. Unable to detect the weak points of his adversaries, he never took advantage of their mistakes or their too great daring; he never exposed himself in action, and he was the first to leave the field. On many occasions a judicious use of his cavalry, always superior in numbers, would have so crippled the English that further pursuit by them would have been impossible. With a little more insight and a little more daring he could, whilst retreating before them, have harassed the flanks and the rear of his pursuers, have captured their baggage, and cut up their camp-followers. But he never attempted anything of the sort. Provided he could escape from one place to harass them in another, with the chance of striking at Indur, at Barodah, at Jodhpur, or at Jaipur, a blow similar to that which he had struck successfully at Gwalar, he was satisfied.

Then, again, the fact that the enemy marching against him were English sufficed, no matter how small their numbers, to scare him. A striking proof of this occurred when Major Sutherland attacked him with two hundred men, three-fifths of whom were Highlanders. Tantia had a strong position, two guns, and three to four thousand men. Had the natives been well led, their numbers must have prevailed. But fighting was repugnant to Tantia. He did not understand it. He was a guerilla leader, content to fire at his enemy and then to run away. For the lives of his followers he cared nothing.

Too much praise, on the other hand, can scarcely be awarded to the English generals and officers who conducted the pursuit. Sir Robert Napier, first defeating Tantia, drove him into Rajputana, and then shut him out from the north. Roberts, then in Rajputana, and later, Michel, in Rajputana and Malwa, pursued him in a circle, bounded on the south by the Nizam's territory or by Khandesh, and on the west by Gujrat. His attempts to break the rim of that circle were baffled by General Hill, by Sir Hugh Rose, and by General Roberts. Finally, all but surrounded as the circle became smaller, he broke away
to the north and penetrated once more into the territories guarded by Sir Robert Napier. The English officers pursued him showed, on more than one occasion, that they could march as quickly as he could. Witness the remarkable performances of Brigadier Parke, two hundred and forty miles in nine days; of Brigadier Somerset, two hundred and thirty miles in nine days, and, again, seventy miles in forty-eight hours; of Holmes, fifty-four miles through a sandy desert in little more than twenty-four hours; and of Honner, a hundred and forty-five miles in four days. Becher's daring, too, in assailing Tantia's whole army with a newly-raised regiment of troopers, and driving it before him, was a glorious act, vying with Sutherland's attack above referred to.

But these acts, daring as they were, do not stand out markedly from the achievements of other officers engaged in this pursuit. Where all did nobly it is impossible to draw a contrast. The historian, however, is bound to call attention to the skilful strategy which gave to the pursued no rest, which cut them off from the great towns, and which forced them to seek the jungles as their hiding-place. This result General Michel accomplished in Rajputana and Malwa, by distributing his forces in lightly equipped columns at salient points in those two divisions, with orders to pursue the rebels without intermission. It has been calculated that the whole distance they were pursued between the 20th of June 1858 and the 1st of March 1859 exceeded three thousand miles; that Michel himself marched one thousand seven hundred and Parke two thousand. There can be no doubt that this system, thoroughly well carried out, was the cause of the break-up of the rebel army. When Honner beat it at Koshani on the 10th of February, and the pursuit was taken up at once by a fresh force under Somerset, the campaign was virtually over. The rebels lost heart, abandoned their standards, and crept to their homes. It will be understood that these rapid pursuits were made without tents. These followed in the rear under charge of a small guard. They did not often come up for days, during which time the troops had to bivouac under trees.

To return. Tranquility was restored. With the surrender of Man Singh the rebellion collapsed in central India. So long as he was at large and hostile, the entire population held aloof from the British. The rebels could always find security in jungles in which they could not be tracked. The sense they had of security was so great, that at one time Tantia Topi and Man Singh remained for days within five miles of the English army, then searching for them, their position known to the natives, not one of whom would betray them. But with the surrender of Man Singh an entire change was inaugurated. The people of central India surrendered with him.

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132 Blackwood's Magazine, August 1860.

133 Captain Flower's troop 8th hussars was with Parke the whole time.
BOOK XVI.

CHAPTER II.

THE capture of Man Singh and Tantia Topi produced all over western and southern India an effect similar to that realized by the pacification of Oudh in the North-Western Provinces. The mutiny was now stamped out. The daring of the soldier had to give place to the sagacity and breadth of view of the statesman.

Some months before the final blow had been struck, when the rebels had lost every stronghold and been driven to take refuge in the wooded hills and the dense jungles which abound alike on the northern frontier of Oudh and in central India, Her Majesty the Queen had deemed it advisable to issue a proclamation to her Indian subjects, a message of mercy to those who still continued to resist, of promise to all. Before referring more particularly to this proclamation, it will be advisable to refer to some of the events which rendered its issue at the end of 1858 particularly advisable.

The titular sovereign of India, the King of Dehli, had been brought to trial in the Privy Council Chamber of the palace, the Diwan-i-Khas, on the 27th of January 1858. Four charges were brought against him. The first accused him, when a pensioner of the British Government of Delhi encouraging, aiding, and abetting the sepoys in the crimes of mutiny and rebellion against the State; the second, encouraging, aiding, and abetting his own son and other inhabitants of Dehli and the North-West Provinces of India, to rebel and wage war against the State; the third, of having proclaimed himself reigning king and sovereign of India, and of assembling forces at Dehli, and of encouraging others to wage war against the British Government; the fourth, of having, on the 16th of May, feloniously caused, or of having been accessory to, the death of forty-nine people of European and mixed European descent, and of having subsequently abetted others in murdering European officers and other English subjects. After a trial conducted with great patience, and which extended over forty days, the king was found guilty of the main points in the charges, and sentenced to be transported for life. Eventually he was taken to Pegu, where he ended his days in peace.

Meanwhile it had been necessary in England to find an escape-goat for all the blood which had required been shed in crushing the mutiny—an event, which, though it seemed at first to give a shock to the prestige of England, had been the means of displaying a power greater and more concentrated than that with which the world had credited her. If India had at that time been under the rule of the Crown, the natural escape-goat would have been the Ministry of the day. As it was, the blow fell upon the
grand old Company which had nursed the early conquests on the eastern coast of Hindustan until they had developed into the most magnificent empire subject to an alien race which the world has ever seen.

The East India Company had not deserved its fate. Its rule had been better and purer, more adapted to the circumstances of the great dependency than would have been possible had its acts and orders been subject to the fluctuations of party feeling. True, it had committed some faults; but it is a remarkable fact, especially in later years, that it had been driven into the commission of those faults by the Ministry of the day. This remark especially applies to the "crime," so to speak, of the mutiny. I call it a crime, because the Court of Directors were summoned before the bar of public opinion to answer for it, and were condemned upon it. Now, if, as I believe, the mutiny was due in a great measure to the acts of the Government of Lord Dalhousie, to the denial of the right to adopt, to the shock to public morality caused by the annexation of Oudh and especially by the manner in which that annexation was carried out, then, the Government of England was equally guilty with the Court of Directors, for it was that Government which more than sanctioned the annexation and the antecedent acts to which I have referred. But in times of excitement justice almost always sleeps. The escape-goat was of the very kind which suited the public humor. He was old-fashioned, pursy, and defenseless. Against him every interest was arrayed. The Ministry, which wanted his patronage; the outsider, who saw an opening to the covenanted' services; the doctrinaire, on whose mind the idea of a double government grated harshly; these and other classes combined to cast stones at the escape-goat. The great Company was unable to withstand the pressure. It fell, but it fell not without regret and an honored name. On the 2nd of August 1858 the Queen signed the act which transferred its functions to the Crown.

No sooner had this act been accomplished than it devolved upon the First Minister of the Crown, the late Earl of Derby, to draw up for submission to the Queen a proclamation, forthwith to be issued by Her Majesty in Council, in which should be set forth the principles on which the government of India should, for the future, be conducted. The circumstances which followed the preparation of the first draft of the proclamation by Lord Derby have been given to the world on the highest authority, in a work which has brought home to every Englishman and every Englishwoman the enormous loss sustained by the country in the premature death of the illustrious prince whose noble life it so touchingly and so gracefully records. There were expressions in that draft which seemed to Her Majesty and to Prince Albert, in one case to invert, in another to express feebly, the meaning they were anxious to convey. In the memorandum with which the objections to these points were conveyed to Lord Derby, Her Majesty expressed in noble language the sentiments by which she was animated towards the great people of whom she was about to become the Empress, Empress in

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134 Life of the Prince Consort, vol. iv. page 284.
reality, though not then actually in name. "The Queen would be glad," continued the memorandum, after referring to the objections taken to the original draft of the proclamation, "if Lord Derby would write it himself in his excellent language, bearing in mind that it is a female sovereign who speaks to more than a hundred millions of Eastern people on assuming the direct government over them, and, after a bloody war, giving them pledges which her future reign is to redeem, and explaining the principles of her government. Such a document should breathe feelings of generosity, benevolence, and religious toleration, and point out the privileges which the Indians will receive in being placed on an equality with the subjects of the British Crown, and the prosperity following in the train of civilization."

Before the memorandum containing these noble words had reached Lord Derby, that minister, warned by a telegram from Lord Malmesbury, then in attendance on the Queen, that Her Majesty was not satisfied with the proclamation, had turned his attention to the draft, and discovering in it instinctively the faults which had been noticed by the Queen and Prince Albert, had re-cast it. In its amended form it met every objection, and corresponded entirely to the wishes of the august Lady in whose name it was to be issued to the people of India.

The proclamation, as finally approved by Her Majesty, ran as follows:—

"Victoria, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the Colonies and Dependencies thereof in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Australasia, Queen, Defender of the Faith.

"Whereas, for divers weighty reasons, we have resolved, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in Parliament assembled, to take upon ourselves the government of the territories in India, heretofore administered in trust for us by the Honorable East India Company:

"Now, therefore, we do by these presents notify and declare that, by the advice and consent aforesaid, we have taken upon ourselves the said government, and we hereby call upon all our subjects within the said territories to be faithful and to bear true allegiance to us, our heirs and successors, and to submit themselves to the authority of those whom we may hereafter from time to time see fit to appoint to administer the government of our said territories, in our name and on our behalf.

"And we, reposing especial trust and confidence in the loyalty, ability, and judgment of our right trusty and well-beloved cousin and councilor, Charles John Viscount Canning, do hereby constitute and appoint him, the said Viscount Canning, to be our First Viceroy and Governor-General in and over our said territories, and to administer the government thereof in our name, and generally to act in our name and on our behalf,
subject to such orders and regulations as he shall, from time to time, receive from us through one of our principal Secretaries of State.

"And we do hereby confirm in their several offices, civil and military, all persons now employed in the service of the Honorable East India Company, subject to our future pleasure, and to such laws and regulations as may hereafter be enacted.

"We hereby announce to the native Princes of India that all treaties and engagements made with them by or under the authority of the Honorable East India Company are by us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained; and we look for the like observance on their part.

"We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honor of native princes as our own, and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government.

"We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects; and those obligations, by the blessing of Almighty God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fulfill.

"Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our Royal will and pleasure that none be in anywise favored, none molested or disquieted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects, on pain of our highest displeasure.

"And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified, by their education, ability, and integrity, duly to discharge.

"We know and respect the feelings of attachment with which the natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors, and we desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith, subject to the equitable demands of the State; and we will that, generally, in framing and administering the law, due regard be paid to the ancient rights, usages, and customs of India.
"We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been brought upon India by the acts of ambitious men, who have deceived their countrymen by false reports, and led them into open rebellion. Our power has been shown by the suppression of that rebellion in the field; we desire to show our mercy by pardoning the offences of those who have been thus misled, but who desire to return to the path of duty.

"Already in one province, with a view to stop the further effusion of blood, and to hasten the pacification of our Indian dominions, our Viceroy and Governor-General has held out the expectation of pardon, on certain terms, to the great majority of those who, in the late unhappy disturbances, have been guilty of offences against our Government, and has declared the punishment which will be inflicted on those whose crimes place them beyond the reach of forgiveness. We approve and confirm the said act of our Viceroy and Governor-General, and do further announce and proclaim as follows:—

"Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and except those who have been or shall be convicted of having directly taken part in the murder of British subjects.

"With regard to such, the demands of justice forbid the exercise of mercy.

"To those who have willingly given asylum to murderers, knowing them to be such, or who may have acted as leaders or instigators in revolt, their lives alone can be guaranteed; but in appointing the penalty due to such persons, full consideration will be given to the circumstances under which they have been induced to throw off their allegiance, and large indulgence will be shown to those whose crimes may appear to have originated in a too credulous acceptance of the false reports circulated by designing men.

"To all others in arms against the Government we hereby promise unconditional pardon, amnesty, and oblivion of all offences against ourselves, our crown and dignity, on their return to their homes and peaceful pursuits.

"It is our Royal pleasure that these terms of grace and amnesty should be extended to all those who comply with their conditions before the first day of January next.

"When, by the blessing of Providence, internal tranquility shall be restored, it is our earnest desire to stimulate the peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and improvement, and to administer its Government for the benefit of all our subjects resident therein. In their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward. And may the God of all power grant unto us, and to those in authority under us, strength to carry out these our wishes for the good of our people."
On the 1st of November 1858 this noble proclamation was published to the princes and people of India. At Calcutta, at Madras, at Bombay, at Lahor, at Agra, at Allahabad, at Dehli, at Rangun, at Lakhnnao, at Maisur, at Karachi, at Nagpur, and at every civil and military station in India it was publicly read on that day with every accompaniment of ceremonial splendor which could give importance to the occasion in the eyes of the natives. Translated into all the languages and many of the dialects of India, it was, at the same time, transmitted to all the native princes, and was distributed by thousands for the edification of those of lower rank and position. The first Viceroy of India used all the means in his power to acquaint the native princes and people that, transferred to the suzerainty and rule of the Queen, they might rely upon the strict observance of all engagements entered into with them by the Company; that her Majesty desired no extension of her dominions, but would respect the rights, the honor, and the dignity of the princes of her empire; that while their religion would not be interfered with, the ancient rights, customs, and usages of India would be maintained; that neither caste nor creed should be a bar to employment in her service. Lord Canning took every care, at the same time, that the rebels still in arms should have cognizance of the full and gracious terms offered them, terms which practically restored life and security to all those who had not taken part in the murder of British subjects.

The proclamation was received by all classes throughout India with the deepest enthusiasm. The princes and landowners especially regarded it as a charter which would render their possessions secure, and their rights—more especially the right, so precious to them, of adoption—absolutely inviolate. The people in general welcomed November. it as the document which closed up the wounds of the mutiny, which declared, in effect, that bygones were to be bygones, and that thenceforward there should be one Queen and one people. Many of the rebels still in arms—all, in fact, by rebels. except those absolutely irreconcilable—took advantage of its provisions to lay down their arms and to submit to its easy conditions. In the great towns of India, natives of every religion creed, the Hindus, the Muhammadans, the Parsis, met in numbers to draw up loyal addresses expressive of their deep sense of the beneficent feelings which had prompted the proclamation, of their gratitude for its contents, and of their loyalty to the person of the illustrious Lady to whose rule they had been transferred.

With the issue of the proclamation the story of the mutiny should fitly close. But those who have accompanied me so far will have seen that in Oudh and in central India the work of warfare was prolonged for six months after its promulgation. In this there is, however, only a seeming misplacement. In the jungles on the Oudh frontier and of central India there survived for that period men who were more marauders than soldiers—men whose continued rebellion was but remotely connected with the original cause of the mutiny, who had offended too deeply to hope for forgiveness. In one notable instance, indeed, that of Man Singh, the quarrel was in no sense a consequence of the mutiny. It was a quarrel between a noble and his feudal lord. Yet it was that
quarrel, not the mutiny, nor any fact connected with the mutiny, which kept the dominions of Sindia in continual disturbance for more than six months. When Man Singh surrendered, those disturbances ceased.

As far as related, then, to the actual mutineers, with but a few exceptions to the sepoys, and to all the landowners in British territories, the proclamation of the Queen was, in very deed, the end and the beginning—the end of a conflict which had deluged the country with blood, the beginning of an era full of hope, alike for the loyal and the misguided, for the prince and the peasant, for the owner and for the cultivator, for every class and for every creed.
BOOK XVII.

CHAPTER I.

The record of military events has necessarily almost monopolized the pages of a work the object of which was to deal with the rise, the progress, and the suppression of a mutiny. I use the word mutiny advisedly, for although, as I shall show in a subsequent chapter, the disturbances of 1857 were primarily excited by men who were not soldiers, yet, had the native army remained faithful, these men would have been powerless for much evil. When, however, they succeeded in inducing the native army to revolt, the mutiny became the great factor in the disturbance. It was mainly the mutiny of the sepoys which demanded all the attention of the English. And as mutiny, both as regards the acts of its fomenters and in those who strive to subdue it, is the form of contest which of all others provokes the worst passions of mankind, the story of the rise, progress, and suppression of this particular uprising has necessarily dealt almost entirely with marches and battles, with deeds of treachery and the punishment they call forth, with the clang of arms and the bustle of the camp. I am well aware that even in this particular subject many details of great interest, but not affecting the main issue at stake, have been omitted. Still more am I conscious that the civil districts and the heroic exertions of the officers who administered, have not in many cases received the attention which those exertions demanded. It is not easy to provide a perfect remedy for this perhaps unavoidable omission. To illustrate, however, the difficulties the civil officers encountered and the heroic way in which they met them, I propose to devote this chapter to a brief consideration of the events which occurred in five important civil districts, each with a character of its own, and to ask the reader to form his own opinion regarding the manner in which the members of the Civil Service of India, placed in circumstances of exceptional difficulty and danger, performed their duty to their country.

The first district I take is that of Bijnor. Bijnor is a district in Rohilkhand, containing an area of one thousand eight hundred and eighty-two square miles, and a population of nearly seven hundred thousand souls. It is bounded on the north-east by the hill district of Gahrwal; on the east and south-east by Moradabad; on the west by Mirath, by Mozaffarnagar, and by Saharanpur. In 1857 the magistrate and collector of this district was Mr. A. Shakespear but at the station of Bijnor, which gave its name to the district, were likewise Mrs. Shakespear; the joint magistrate, Mr. G. Palmer; the civil surgeon, Dr. Knight, and Mrs. Knight; Mr. Robert Currie, C.S., on his way to the hills; Mr. Lemaistre, the head clerk; Mrs. Lemaistre and three children; Mr. Johnson, a clerk; Mr. Murphy, a clerk; Mrs. Murphy and four children; and Mr. Cawood.
Though Bijnor was but forty miles distant from Mirath, the news of the terrible events there of the 10th of May did not reach Mr. Shakespear till the 13th, and then only through natives. That officer at once endeavored to ascertain the real facts of the case by communicating with Mirath. But the whole country was up. The hereditary instincts of a marauding section of the population, extremely prolific in those parts, known as the Gujars, had been thoroughly roused, and their appetite for plunder had been whetted by the rivalry of the convicts escaped from the Mirath jail, who, spreading over the country, stopped and plundered everyone, not excepting the meanest traveler. It seems probable, also, that they stopped the communications near Mirath, for it is a curious fact that the horsemen sent by Shakespear to that station on the 13th of May, took the first intelligence of the mutiny of the 10th to the police station of Baisuna, which was on the high road between Mirath and Bijnor.

The indiscriminate plunder of which I have spoken attained in a few days so alarming a proportion, that Shakespear found it was necessary for the retention of British authority to take stringent measures to repress it. He accordingly called on the principal landowners of the district to afford him all the aid in their power, at the same time that he sent a notice to all native soldiers on leave at their homes to come to the station and give their services to the State. Both these appeals were responded to fairly well. The chaodris of Haldaor and Tajpur responded on the 23rd, and a few non-commissioned officers and men, chiefly belonging to the irregular cavalry, came on a few days later. At the same time the police was considerably strengthened. But events were marching too fast even for these precautionary measures. On the 19th of May the jail at Moradabad was broken open, and the worst prisoners connected with the Bijnor district were released. The freedom of these men added enormously to the insecurity of life and property in the neighborhood. To add to the general danger, three hundred of the sappers and miners who had mutinied at Rurki entered the Bijnor district and entered into negotiations with Mahmad Khan, nawab of Najibabad, with the view, as it was then suspected, and subsequently transpired, to making an attack on the chief station. Eventually, however, these mutineers preferred to proceed to Moradabad, plundering on their road the town of Naghina. On the very day, however, the 21st, on which they entered that town, the prisoners broke out of the jail in Bijnor itself. Mr. Shakespear hurried to the spot followed by some horsemen, and succeeded in stopping further egress, some of the prisoners falling under the fire of his followers. Whilst thus engaged, he dispatched the joint magistrate, Mr. G. Palmer, to pursue the fugitives. The result would in all probability have been satisfactory but for the accidental refuge afforded to the malefactors by a sand-bank in the river, on which they had collected. To

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135 A chaodri is the head man of a village.

136 Being short of ammunition, they hoped at Moradabad to obtain the cooperation of the 29th native infantry, but, instead of cooperation, that regiment robbed them of their spoil.
secure them here foot-soldiers were necessary, and before these could arrive night had set in. Under cover of darkness, two hundred and fifteen of them managed to escape.  

It was evident to Mr. Shakespear that the love of liberty had far less prompted this outbreak than a lust for plunder, for the news of the disordered state of the districts had penetrated even within the jail. Under his charge, in the treasury, within a short distance of the jail, were the moneys belonging to Government, the collections of the district, amounting to a considerable sum. In a station, the capital of a surging district, where the number of the Europeans could be counted on the fingers, this treasury could no longer be considered safe from the greed of the disorganized rabble. It certainly could not be defended against a determined attack. Under these circumstances the happy thought occurred to Shakespear to throw all the coin, except the small amount necessary for current expenses, into a well, the mouth of which could be defended from the roof of the treasury building. He carried out this measure. The result showed his prescience. Even the most covetous felt that the abstraction of the rupees had become a service fraught with certain death to those who should be foremost in the attempt.

The precaution had not been taken one hour too soon. That very evening Mahmud Khan, the nawab of whom I have already spoken, arrived with a number of empty carts, and announced his intention to carry off the money to Najibabad. Even he quailed before the prospect of extracting it from the well. Yet the station seemed at the mercy of this man and his Pathan followers, evidently unsettled and dangerous, disappointed, too, in their hopes regarding the rupees. The two days that followed were very critical. On the third day, fortunately, the retainers of the Hindu zamindars arrived, and having in the interval raised some horse and taken measures for the protection of the station, Shakespear felt able to think of offensive measures. He was further confirmed in this view by the arrival, on the 28th, of fourteen sowars, nearly all leave men, under the command of a rassaldar of the Gwaliar contingent, followed by twenty-five sowars of the new Moradabad levy, and forty sepoys of the 29th native infantry—a regiment which, though mistrusted, had not then mutinied.

Shakespear's first act was to send Mr. Palmer, with the 29th sepoys and thirty sowars to coerce a large body of marauders near Mandawar, a large and wealthy town which they were threatening. Palmer struck the rebels most successfully, and quieted the district. The next person to deal with was the nawab. This man, baffled in his hopes regarding the rupees, had returned, on the 23rd, with his carts still empty, to Najibabad. A week later, however, he returned, uninvited, accompanied by upwards of two hundred stalwart Pathans, armed with matchlocks. His demeanor showed that he meant mischief, but that he was prepared to wait for the opportune moment. To get rid of him was difficult yet most necessary. Shakespear attempted the task, and after some trouble,

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137 Seven had been killed, and one hundred and twenty-six, of whom twelve were a wounded, were recaptured.
persuaded the nawab to move to a little distance to settle some Mewati marauders, hoping, during his absence, to be able to do much to restore confidence.

These hopes were doomed to be disappointed. The mutiny at Bare11 on the 31st of May produced effects which were felt all over Rohil-khand. Shakespear had heard rumors of the event on the 1st, but rumors in those days were common. He received authentic information only on the 3rd. The danger was indeed imminent. The Nawab's Pathans were close at hand, and it was but too clear that the forty men of the 29th native infantry would follow the example set them by their brethren at Bare11. But in this conjuncture Shakespear displayed both judgment and decision. He at once recalled Palmer, under whose orders the men of the 29th native infantry were serving, and on their arrival dispatched them instantly, before they could communicate with anyone, to rejoin their head-quarters.

At this time a party of the 4th irregulars, commanded by Lieutenant Gough, arrived from Mirath with a string of camels to carry off a portion of the Government money at Shake-spear's disposal. The roads were unsafe; a long string of camels carrying coin could not be guarded efficiently by nineteen men, and everyone in the district was aware of the purpose for which the camels had arrived. Again did Shake-spear display his judgment. For camels he substituted elephants. He loaded these animals with fifty thousand rupees, and Gough was thus enabled, by making a forced march, to accomplish his journey in safety at the same time that he relieved Bijnor of that which most tempted the miscreants of the period.

But darker times were approaching. The revolt at Buell had, as I have said, produced a ferment all over Rohilkhand. From the 2nd of June communications between English authorities elsewhere and Bijnor ceased. That place was cut off from the outer world.

Affairs were in this darkened condition when Mahmud Khan, nawab of Najibabad, suddenly returned from the district. That return was occasioned solely by a report which had reached him that Shakespear was about to make over the remainder of the money under his charge to the loyal Hindu chaodris. Mahmud Khan arrived evidently resolved to take strong measures. To men of his class and country, placed in the extraordinary position in which they found themselves in 1857, the proverb, ce n'est que le premier pas qui collie, is specially applicable. Accustomed from their earliest childhood to respect British authority, habit had become a second nature, and it was not without a very extraordinary effort that they were able to break through the iron bar by which it bound them. But that bar once broken, there remained no extreme of villainy of which they would not be capable. The memory of the old bond, indeed, incited them to extreme measures. They felt, when they had committed themselves, that a return to the former condition was impossible; that thenceforth their safety required the death of those against whom they had lifted their hands. Shakespear was thoroughly cognizant of this feeling. He deemed it, therefore, of the utmost importance to soothe the nawab,
to persuade him not to take a step which would be irrevocable, which would commit him to murder. Fortunately he had at his hand an instrument for the purpose—a Muhammadan official of proved loyalty and trust named Saiyid Ahmad Khan. This man, sent by Shakespear to the nawab, succeeded, by dint of smooth words and assurances, in inducing him to remain still on the further bank of the Rubicon. He continued, however, in a dogged and perverse humor, and declined to go and see Mr. Shakespear.

That evening, the 7th of June, news reached the station of the assumption of authority by the rebel Khan Bahadur Khan, and of the murders committed at Bareli and Moradabad. It was now clear that a sentence of death had been pronounced against every European, every Christian in Rohilkhand.

Under these circumstances, the pressing character of which was increased by the rumor that the detachment of the 29th native infantry was on its way to Bijnor, there remained no hope of saving the station. Mr. Shakespear determined, then, as a first measure of precaution, to place the ladies in safety by escorting them to a point beyond the province. But such an operation could not be undertaken without the consent of the nawab. With the nawab, then, Shakespear entered into an accommodation, by virtue of which that nobleman agreed to take charge of the district during the ten days for which Shakespear and his companions proposed to absent themselves. The nawab was not authorized to collect revenue, but as he would have to meet heavy charges, the money in the treasury was placed at his disposal, and he was required to keep a regular account of its expenditure. In common with almost every other Englishman in India, Shakespear believed that Dehli would fall as soon as the English force appeared before it, and that, within the ten days he had covenanted for, he would be able to return with a sufficient force to put down all disturbance.

He and his companions—those whose names have been already given, had intended to start early on the morning of the 8th for Rarki, forty-three miles distant, and, marching all night, to reach it the same evening. The party, was, how-ever, so much delayed in crossing the Ganges, that they were obliged to make for Mozaffarnagar instead. Here doubts arose regarding the fidelity of the escort. The travelers, then, after resting one day, pushed on for Rurki, escorted by twelve troopers of the 4th irregulars, a detachment of which regiment was stationed at Mozaffarnagar.138 Here they arrived on the night of the 11th of June.

It now became Shakespear's great object to return to his district. He made numberless efforts to organize a small party of Gurkhas or Europeans or other men who could be depended upon to effect this object. But Dehli had not fallen, and every soldier was required to aid to contribute to its fall. Not a man, then, could be procured.

138 This detachment rose a few days later and murdered the adjutant, Lieutenant Smith.
Meanwhile Mahmud Khan was carrying all before him at Bijnor. His first act was to proclaim himself ruler of the district under the king of Dehli. He next fished up the remainder of the money from the well, and sent it to his own house at Najibabad. Then, having stopped the posts, placed guards at the ferries, and increased his forces as much as possible, he dispatched a confidential servant to Dehli to endeavor to obtain authority from the king to hold the district in his name. He proceeded at the same time to alter the weights and measures, substituting for those of the Company others of a different character, bearing the imperial stamp of Dehli.

The cause which, perhaps, more than any other contributed to the downfall of the Moghol dynasty was the system of persecution for religion, inaugurated by Aurangzaib. It is remarkable that, whenever and wherever the Muhammadans in India obtained supremacy during the period of the mutiny they showed the same inclination. The nawab was no exception. He had scarcely consolidated, as he thought, his usurped authority than he began to use it against the Hindus, leaguing himself with that object with co-religionists without birth and without character, and whose cooperation under other circumstances he would have spurned. His first operations were successful. Umrao Singh, chaodri of Sherkot, was compelled to flee the country with the loss of a great part of his property. This success was, however, fatal. It impelled the Hindu village chiefs, who had hitherto stood aloof from each other, to combine. An opportunity soon offered which enabled them to make their combination felt.

To carry on his plans against the Hindus the nawab had weakened his own forces at Bijnor, where he himself remained. Taking advantage of this circumstance, the younger of the chaodris of Haldur, combining with the chaodris of Bijnor, suddenly attacked the nawab on the morning of the 6th of August and drove him in precipitous flight to Najibabad. The immediate result was not altogether satisfactory. It is true that the town was saved; but the public and private property outside it fell into the hands of the rabble, who had hitherto stood aloof from each other, to combine. An opportunity soon offered which enabled them to make their combination felt.\textsuperscript{139}

Before the events of the 6th of August could be made known to Mr. Shakespear, that gentleman, satisfied that the nawab was not to be trusted, had resolved to cancel the written authority he had given him to administer the district. He wrote a letter to that effect on the 7th, and by the same opportunity directed the chaodris to consider themselves responsible for their respective properties and the quiet of the district. But when, a little later, information of the events of the 6th reached him, he saw that more decisive measures were required. It happened that there were on the spot two Muhammadan gentlemen of conspicuous loyalty—Muhammad Rahmat Khan the

\textsuperscript{139} A type of the proceedings which would certainly take place all over India if the protecting hand of England were to be withdrawn.
deputy collector, and Saiyid Ahmad Khan, already referred to. Shakespear then directed these gentlemen to assume charge of the district. They obeyed his orders, assumed the office on the 16th of August, and devoted to it the loyal zeal and true-hearted decision by which their conduct had been always characterized.

But every day now saw a fresh complication. The quarrel between the Muhammadans and the Hindus became so embittered that the nawab sounded the religious war-cry of the former, and, at the head of an infuriated band, marched to the vicinity of Bijnor on the 23rd. He first burned and plundered a Jat village, and then marched on Bijnor. There were no defenders. The Hindus had gone to Naghina to oppose there an anticipated attack from another party of Muhammadans. Under these circumstances the two loyal officials above cited deemed it advisable to retire to Haldar. Meanwhile the Muhammadans had taken and sacked Naghina. They then advanced on Haldur, defeated the Hindus who moved from that place to meet them, and were only prevented from destroying it by the outbreak of fires in all directions, which hindered their advance. Bijnor, however, fell into their hands. The two loyal Government officials fled across the river, and one or two of the Hindu chaodris quitted the district which no longer offered them a safe habitation.

From this time the district was a prey to civil war between the members of the opposite faiths, each alternately gaining some advantage. Some attempts were made at reconciliation, but neither party had sufficiently felt its inferiority to the other. At length, on the 18th of September, the Hindus experienced a decisive defeat, and another attempt was made to induce them to submit to Mahmad Khan and his followers. Nothing, however, could tempt the younger chaodris to place themselves in the power of the Muhammadans, and towards the end of the month they escaped across the Ganges to Mirath.

Just about this time a wanton massacre of un-offending Hindus confirmed the supremacy of the Muhammadans. But as always has happened in such cases—as, till the race greatly changes, always will happen—no sooner was their supremacy uncontested than disputes broke out amongst themselves. Finally, these disputes were arranged by the conferring on the nawab the chief authority, with an allowance of twelve thousand rupees a month, having under him Marah Khan, a noted bad character, his own eldest son, and his nephew. The two first were to contribute two-thirds, the last one-third, of his salary. This arrangement lasted till the 22nd of February 1858.

The Muhammadans now became so strong that notorious freebooters from neighboring districts gathered to their party; they even attracted three princes of the imperial family of Dell 1 They then began to make successful raids across the border, and to burn and plunder at their will. They did this on several occasions in December 1857 and January 1858. On the 5th of the latter month they crossed the Ganges with a large force and two
guns, burned the station of Miranpur, proclaimed the nawab, and retreated before the British troops could intercept them. Two days later they carried out the same programme at Kankhal and Hardwar. On the 9th, emboldened by their success, they again crossed the Ganges—this time only to repent their audacity, for they had the misfortune to fall in with a party sent from Rurki under Captain H. Boisragon. This affair, which redounded greatly to that officer’s credit, merits special notice.

As soon as the news regarding the three raids into British territory, just referred to, reached Rurki, the officer commanding at that place, Captain Read, directed Lieutenant T. Boisragon, commanding at Manghur, to proceed of once with his detachment towards Maiapar. Lieutenant Boisragon received this order at 8 o'clock on the evening of the 8th of January. He set out at once, and marching across a country, very indifferent for guns, reached Maiapir at 9 o'clock the next morning. There he was joined by his brother Captain H. Boisragon, the district staff officer, accompanied by Captain H. Drummond, B.E., Lieutenant Thomason, B.E., Mr. Melville, B.C.S., and a few sowars. Captain Boisragon at once took command.

Accompanied by the gentlemen named and three or four sowars, Captain Boisragon proceeded down the bank of the river in search of the enemy. After a ride of between two and three miles he came suddenly upon their camp, pitched within a few feet of the water, opposite to the ford of Anjon, a distance of about three miles in a direct line from Khankal. Owing to inequalities in the ground, Boisragon could not gain a clear view of the position, but he ascertained that they numbered certainly five hundred, and that they had at least one gun. Boisragon and his party then fell back leisurely on their camp, to wait till the movement of the rebels should be more pronounced.

His patience was not long tried. The following afternoon, about 2 o'clock, Boisragon received information that the rebels were crossing the river in force, and that a great number had established themselves to the south of Khankal, which they were about to enter. Leaving a small party to protect his camp and watch the ford, Boisragon marched with the rest of the detachment to Khankal, entered it from the north side, traversed the main street, and went out from the south gate, just in time to prevent the entrance of the rebels. Detaching his few mounted men (sixteen men 1st Panjab cavalry) to cover his flanks, Boisragon, with his small force, advanced to cut off the rebels from the town of Jowalapur, in which he had reason to believe they had many sympathizers. Posting the guns between that town and a large building, he sent the Gurkahs on the extreme right, under Lieutenant Boisragon, to attack their left flank, whilst the Sikhs, who were next the guns, should charge their front. The attack was irresistible. One of the rebel leaders fell by the hand of Lieutenant Boisragon; their rank and file were thrown back on the river, and sought refuge either in the stream or by flight along its banks. In their

140 Consisting of fifty Gurkahs, fifty Sikhs, and two 6-pounder guns under Lieut. St. George, B.A.

141 Eight Europeans, thirty Gurkahs, thirty Sikhs, and two guns.
flight they were followed by the cavalry and considerably cut up. Captain Boisragon ascertained that they numbered about a thousand and that they had two guns. This little affair was the more important as it was the first decisive blow struck at the rebellion so long rampant in Rohilkhand.

To return to Bijnor. The effect of Boisragon's victory was immediately felt in that district. No people traverse more quickly than the natives of India the space between exalted elation and bitter despondency. To conciliate the small landowners, the nawab's nephew at once announced that all rent-free holdings resumed under British rule would be released; but this helped him but little, and the declension of the fortunes of the usurpers was followed by a renewal of their quarrels. Some bitter disputes terminated in a new agreement, in virtue of which the nawab's monthly salary was reduced to eight thousand rupees; his eldest son was declared his heir-apparent; his nephew was nominated as his representative; two other Muhammadans were promoted to be generals, and assignments of lands were made to provide for their salaries; a third was appointed to be commander-in-chief; stipends were set apart for all the members of the nawab's family, and an engagement was taken from the nephew that he would not aspire to the succession, or interfere in any way with the claims of the eldest son on his father's death.

This tinsel fabric was shattered at the very first push. Even whilst it had been building there was being prepared at Rurki a British force whose very appearance in Rohilkhand would be sufficient to shake it to its very foundations. On the 17th of April that force, accompanied by Mr. Shakespear and others crossed the Ganges near the head of the Ganges canal, and in five days effectually cleared the Bijnor district in the manner described in the second volume of this history.

From the date of the crossing of the avenging force into the Bijnor district, Mr. Shakespear resumed his duties as the representative of the Government. His responsibilities were extremely onerous. He was the only officer of the column who had any acquaintance with the country, so that matters connected with the department of the Quartermaster-General were mainly dependent upon his opinion and advice, and, added to this, it devolved upon him to decide the measures which should be taken for the punishment of offenders and for the restoration of order. In a sketch such as this is, it is impossible to render full justice to all that Mr. Shakespear in a very brief period was able to accomplish. The principle upon which he acted was to mark in an effective manner the displeasure of the Government, whilst opening to all, except to actual murderers, a way of reconciliation and pardon. Thus—even before the fight at Naghina—to leave a lasting symbol of the sentiments entertained by the British Government regarding the nawab, the hall of audience at Najibabad was destroyed; the district was at the same time dominated by the occupation of the fort of Pattargarh in the vicinity. These acts accomplished, Mr. Shakespear fixed his headquarters at Najibabad, reestablished the collectorships and police posts in the districts, and
endeavored, by conciliatory measures, to induce the rebel Muhammadans, who had not been engaged in any distinct crime in connection with the rebellion, to return to their peaceful avocations. His measures were so far successful that his police were able, even at that early period, to enter the jungles and capture without opposition some relatives of the nawab. When, after Naghina, he returned, escorted only by the loyal Hindu and accompanying the guns captured at that fight, to Bijnor, he ascertained that the population were returning to their normal avocations; that traffic was being reopened, and that the collection of rebels in the jungles was rapidly diminishing. Mr. Shakespear subsequently visited every part of his district, and by his firm, conciliatory, and judicious measures, speedily removed the very last remnant of discontent. As he, at the beginning of the disturbances, had clung to his district longer than any other officer in Rohilkhand, so on their subsidence he was able to bring back the normal routine earlier than was found practicable in the other districts of the same province.  

The "energy and sound judgment " displayed by Mr. Shakespear were noticed by the cordial approval of Lord Canning. With other civil officers, likewise, he was thanked for his services as a volunteer with the Rurki force; but there the public acknowledgments ended: In the circumstances in which he was placed, no one could have accomplished more than Mr. Shakespear. It must have been trying for him to notice, when the honors were apportioned, that others who had done less were substantially rewarded.

Dehra Dun is another typical district which seems to deserve special mention. In the beginning of May1857, this district consisted of a valley measuring about sixty miles by fifteen, partly forest and partly tea-plantations, a hill-tract of less extent, and a sanitarium and convalescent depot, containing invalids, women, and children, to the number of about two thousand. It was bounded on the north by native states, on the west by native states, on the south by the district of Saharanpur, on the east by the district of Bijnor. The chief civil authority was the superintendent, Mr. H. G. Keene, his assistant being Mr. J. C. Robertson. The garrison consisted of the Sirmur regiment of Gurkahs under the command of Major Charles Reid. The Trigonometrical Survey had its head-quarters there under Colonel Scott Waugh of the Bengal Engineers. There was a small establishment under the American Presbyterian Board of Missions. There were also some old officers of the retired list resident at Dehra, and a very few rich natives, the most prominent of whom was a political detenu, the raja, Lal Sinh, formerly regent of the Panjáb.

When the news of the Mirath outbreak reached Mr. Keene—which was on the 16th of May—he was in the heart of the hill subdivision, engaged in a survey preliminary to the settlement of the land revenue. The tracts were being swept by epidemic cholera, and there was considerable difficulty in moving the camp. He came in, however, as quickly as he could, met on the way with further alarms. On arriving at Dehra he found that  

142 The nawab Mahmud Khan was sentenced to be transported for life. His property was forfeited to the State.
Reid's Gurkahs had marched to join the main body of troops about to move from Mirath upon Dehli. A depot of eighty men constituted the total force left with him to maintain order. He accordingly lost no time in raising recruits to guard the passes by which his district could be entered from the plains. Raja Lal Sinh also placed some of his armed retainers at Mr. Keene's disposal. In a few days news arrived of the fall of Bijnor, brought in by the civil officer of that district. Saharanpur still held out under Mr. R. Spankie. The tract to the westward, under the Sirmur raja, was fairly peaceful. The hill tracts to the north were quiescent, except in the British subdivisions already mentioned, where petty outrages occurred which could not just then be punished.

Having made such provisions as appeared proper for his outward defenses, the superintendent turned his attention to the maintenance of internal order. For this purpose he appointed the mess-house of the absent Gurkah officers as a rendezvous in case of alarm, and enrolled a number of European volunteers whose names he replaced upon a roster, and with whose aid the town of Dehra and its environs were patrolled every night at unfixed hours. By this device it was calculated that the native police would be kept on the alert by their ignorance of the exact hour when they might be visited. The success was complete, no post having been found deserted, no beat unkept, during the whole time of trouble.

Matters were in a state of tension, but all remained quiet—with the exception of one or two fires, probably accidental—till the middle of June. Then, one evening, a runner came in from the Sirmur territory, bringing news that four hundred infantry and two hundred cavalry from the Jalandhar brigade were in full march upon the district. The messenger brought these tidings in a note from a British officer, and they were strictly true. The contents of the treasury were at once sent up to Masuri (the hill sanitarium) with a note to the officer commanding the convalescent depot, requesting his aid. The next day was occupied with preparing carriage and provisions, for the men of the Gurkah depot were to be marched out on elephants and the invalids on horseback. That evening the force started, about A force one hundred and fifty men in all, and marched thirty-six miles during the sultry June night. In the morning they arrived at Badshah Bagh the outer end of the Timli pass, and found that their prey had escaped them. Like snakes in the grass, the sepoys had slipped away during the hours necessarily given to preparation. The force could not go farther out of the district without draining it of its administrators and defenders; and the rebels had to be left to such obstacles as they might encounter in other districts.

This was the most serious military occurrence that took place, with one exception, to be hereafter noticed. It had no important results. Still, it was well planned, showing spirit in all concerned. The enemy were well armed and equipped, and the cavalry superbly

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143 Mr. R. Forrest, of the Canal Department, the Rev. D. Herron, American Missionary, and some sick officers from Masuri, accompanied Mr. Keene, as also did his assistant.
mounted on stud-bred horses. With a motley force, of which only a small portion was British, and that composed of convalescents, the task of bringing them to book, though a serious one, would probably have succeeded but for circumstances which no one could control or avoid.

The next trouble that arose was from the lawless state of the Saharanpur district. Mr. Spankie kept such order as the times admitted. His coadjutor, Mr. H. D. Robertson, was actively engaged in scouring the district for the same purpose. But their efforts were much paralyzed by the protracted defence and prolonged attack going on at Dehli; and marauders of the old type who had given so much trouble in Shore's days, thirty years before, began to appear. One gang of those men came across the border and drove off a herd of cattle after killing the herdsman. They were pursued and arrested, brought to trial, condemned, and hanged within less than three weeks from the commission of their crime. The example proved sufficient; the forays ceased.

The difficulty which next supervened was as to food and money, neither of which are sufficiently produced in the valley, even in common times. Now, when agriculture was almost suspended by war's alarms, when the roads were almost entirely closed for traffic by the disturbed state of the country, the difficulties may well have appeared almost insurmountable. And the population never was so large. The wives and families of officers in the field thronged to the hills, followed by flocks of servants; and the officers—unable to do anything else with their pay—drew it chiefly in the form of orders upon the treasuries of places where their wives were harboring. Of these the most frequented was that of Dehra, where a run consequently occurred to meet which the resources of the Panjab were laid under requisition. John Lawrence and Donald Macleod, the strong rulers of that province, sent in several supplies, which were loyally escorted to Dehra, by the yeomanry of the Thin to whom Mr. Keene entrusted the duty. On one occasion, Mr. Spankie sent a small sum from Saharanpur, to fetch which the Rev. J. Woodside, an American missionary, and Mr. R. Currie, a young civilian, went over and brought the cash safely through one of the most disturbed parts of the Saharanpur district.

These resources proving insufficient Mr. Keene—adopting a suggestion made to him by Captain Tennant, of the Engineers—determined to issue paper money on his own responsibility. He, therefore, prepared forms of acknowledgment for sums running from one rupee to fifty (which he marked with a crest press to prevent forgery). He then registered these in his treasury office, and issued them under his own signature in part payment of the drafts that were presented; so much paper and the balance in cash.144

Food was also procured through local merchants, and by these expedients the troubles of the time, though they could not be neutralized, were reduced to a minimum. The

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144 Vide extract from Accountant to Government, quoted in Letters on Indian Administration, 1867 (p. 2).
result was that of all those tender beings confided to the superintendent's care, not one hair of the head of any suffered wrong. The cattle-lifting above mentioned was the only damage that property sustained in the Dan up to the fall of Dehli. After that date, when a military officer had been sent to take charge, the Dan was once invaded at its extreme corner; but the invasion was repulsed with considerable loss by a party from Rurki before the Thin force could come to the spot.

Of an entirely different character to the fore-going were the proceedings of Mr. R. H. W. Dunlop, magistrate and collector of Mirath. Mr. Dunlop was travelling in the Himalaya mountains when the mutiny broke out. He heard of that event at the village of Naggar near the source of the Bias river on the 31st of May. He at once pushed for the plains, passed through the Simla sanitarium, the inhabitants of which he found "either in the hot or cold fit of panic," and reached Ambala on the 9th and Karnal on the 10th of June. At the latter place he received a letter from his commissioner, Mr. Greathed, who was with the English army before Dehli, in reply to one from himself asking for active employment, summoning him to the camp. It was just after the action of Badli-ki-sarai had been fought—an action considered by everyone as a precursor to the immediate storming of the imperial city. As Dunlop and Speke rode across that plain, still strewn with the bodies of the dead sepoys, the only anxiety they felt was the anxiety lest they might arrive too late for the great event, to attempt which, in fact, the army had still to undergo three months' toil, fighting, and privations.

On the very day of his arrival in camp, Dunlop was ordered was informed by the commissioner that the gentleman who had acted for him at Mirath was dead, and that as it was of great importance that someone possessing local experience should take charge of that district, it was incumbent upon him to proceed thither at once, and that, owing to the scarcity of cavalry, he must find his way without an escort. Dunlop started that night on a hired horse, accompanied by one mounted orderly belonging to his district who happened to be in camp, and rode straight for Bhagpat on the Jamna.

Having travelled three consecutive days and nights Dunlop was overcome with fatigue when he reached Bhagpat. Received with apparent cordiality by the two senior native officials of that place, he threw himself down and slept. When he awoke he found himself surrounded by natives; learned that the Muhammadans were ripe for rebellion, and that the country was becoming every day more dangerous. He devoted a portion of the night that followed to write a report of all that he had heard, accompanied by suggestions from himself to the commissioner, and the following afternoon rode for Mirath which he reached the same night.

145 His companion was Speke of the 65th native infantry, brother of the African traveler. Speke was a few months later mortally wounded at the storming of Dehli. He was a gallant soldier and a noble-hearted man. His dying words were: "Thy ways are not our ways, but they are just and true."

146 There were four orderlies in camp, but one only could be spared.
Dunlop at once took charge of his duties. Under ordinary circumstances they would not have been very different from those devolving upon civilians in other large military stations held throughout the period of the mutiny by British troops. But the circumstances of Mirath were not ordinary. Only forty miles from Dehli, and surrounded by districts in which mutiny was rampant, it constituted, in June 1857, the one spot on the grand trunk road running from Allahabad to the north-west which might serve as an effective rallying-point for loyal natives. Dunlop had early experience of this truth. The morning of the day or the second day after he had taken charge nine Sikh horsemen, without arms, rode to his house to report their arrival to him as district officer. They represented themselves as belonging to the detachment of the 1st Oudh cavalry which had murdered Fletcher Hayes and two other Englishmen, and had then ridden for Dehli. They had declined to accompany their mutinous comrades, had surrendered their arms to Mr. Watson, magistrate of Aligarh, and had then ridden to Mirath, there to proffer their services to the British authorities. Dunlop was only too glad to engage them.

Passing over an expedition into the neighboring district, in which Dunlop served as a volunteer, I come to that part of his conduct which gives a special mark to his proceedings as district officer, and of which the incident regarding the enrolment of the nine Sikh horsemen may be considered as the foundation-stone.

Dunlop had not only found the civil treasury of Mirath almost empty, but that means of replenishing it were wanting. He had no men at his disposal to aid in collecting revenue in the district. Military aid could not be counted upon; whilst the native bankers and merchants of the city, under the circumstances of the time, positively refused to advance a loan to the Government. In this crisis Dunlop, availing himself of the ready cooperation offered by the brigade-major, Colonel Whish, resolved to organize a volunteer troop of European civil and other officers then refugees at Mirath.

The corps was speedily organized. Major Williams, superintendent of police, was nominated commanding officer, Captain Charles D'Oyly\textsuperscript{147} as second in command, and Lieutenant Tyrwhitt\textsuperscript{148} as adjutant. Volunteers flocked in, and so actively were the drilling, mounting, and arming proceeded with that within three days one troop, composed of Englishmen, Eurasians, and a few Sikhs, was fit for duty. The uniform chosen was a suit of dust-colored cloth called khaki, and this cloth gave the name of the Khaki Risala to the corps.

The Khaki Risala began its career as a regiment by proceeding, towards the end of June, to attack some villages only five miles from Mirath, which the Gujars had occupied.

\textsuperscript{147} Now Major-General Sir D'Oyly, Bart.

\textsuperscript{148} Now Major-General Tyrwhitt.
Accompanied by two guns and a few of the Carabineers, they drove out the Gujars, burned three of the villages, killed several Gujars, and took forty of them prisoners. From the date of this successful attack the revenue collections in the district began. At first the task was not easy, but other expeditions followed that just recorded, and it was found that every fresh expedition increased the facility of realizing the revenue.\textsuperscript{149}

It may be interesting to record some of these expeditions.

On the 8th of July news of the burning of Begamabad, an important village about twelve miles distant on the road to Dehli, reached Mirath. The atrocity had been committed by a large body of Gujars, and had been accompanied by circumstances of singular atrocity, the victims being a number of loyal men of the Jat tribe who had bound themselves together to resist Gujar incursions. On this occasion, greatly outnumbered and despairing of success, the Jats had made a feeble resistance, and had succumbed. Within a few hours of the news reaching Mirath, Dunlop set off, accompanied by the Khaki Risala, fifteen of his armed retainers, twenty armed native Christians, and two mountain-guns, manned by native artillerymen. Pushing on with vigor, this column reached the ruins of Begamabad by grey dawn of the morning of the day following the commission of the atrocity. The fires were still shouldering, the walls were blackened, the flooring in many places was dug up, and a few miserable fugitives were seen wandering here and there in the fields. The village of Sikri, two miles distant, was known to be the head-quarters of the Gujars. Thither the Khaki Risala proceeded, and before the alarm could be raised surrounded it. The Gujars defended themselves with great obstinacy, and five hours elapsed before the victory was gained. But when gained it was complete.

One of the most enterprising and daring of the Gujar leaders was Sah Mall, zamindar of Bajrul, a man who had conquered, and who had since maintained, a kind of semi-independence in the town of Barauth, capital of the district of the same name in the Mirath division, but in close proximity to Dehli. From this district and from Bajrul, Sah Mall had been for some time in the habit of sallying to carry fire and the sword into the neighboring villages. The proximity of Barauth to Dehli seemed to promise him immunity from assault. Not so, however, thought Dunlop. This gentleman, angered at the ruthless destruction wrought by this brigand and his followers upon an unoffending people, sketched a plan for attacking the southern village of the Barauth district by a rapid advance of the Khaki Risala and of such assistance as the general would afford him from Wrath. He laid his plan before the general, and obtained his assent to its execution. Dunlop knew well that considerable danger would attend the attempt, as forces would certainly be sent after him from Dehli; but he trusted to the

\textsuperscript{149} "Every fresh expedition added to the facility of realizing our revenue, and in a few months, amidst the wreck and disorganization of surrounding districts, the entire government had been collected, with a rapidity and completeness hitherto unprecedented."—\textit{Service and Adventure with the Khakee Resalah}; a book upon which that portion of this chapter relating to that Resala is mainly based.
rapidity of his movements, to the increasing distance from Dehli, as he should approach Sah Mall's stronghold of Bajrul, and to the prestige inseparable from audacity.

Towards the end of July the expedition, composed of two mountain-guns, fifty men of the Risala, forty men 60th Rifles, two sergeants, and twenty armed bandsmen, and twenty-seven armed native retainers, marched to the village of Dalhaora, on the Hurdan, little more than twenty miles from Dehli. There they heard heavy firing in the direction of Deolah, seven miles distant. The chaodri of Deolah, who was with the British force, was dispatched at once to learn the cause of the firing. He returned during the night with information that Sah Mall and his friends were lying at the Muhammadan village of Basaod, with the intention of attacking Deolah the next day. Early next morning the small British party marched on Basaod. Their approach was, sufficient. Sah Mall and his followers evacuated the place, leaving large supplies in it. Basaod, long used as a store-house for the rebels, was burned; the prisoners taken were shot. The force then marched for Barauth. No revenue had been collected from this subdivision since the commencement of the mutiny. In fact, the civil establishments had been driven out in May, and the country had been more or less over-run by the rebels. Dunlop now devised and carried Dunlop's out a daring plan to remedy the evil. Whilst the force marched away along the course of the east Jamna canal he, taking with him a tahsildar and two mounted orderlies, visited all the villages on the left bank, moving parallel with the force, collecting sheep and supplies for the force as he went along, and trusting to his prestige as district officer for immunity from attack.

The experiment was at first most successful. From the first two villages, indeed, the inhabitants had fled, and Dunlop's care was to send out to reassure the zamindars. The third village, Bichpuri, was a Gujar village, the inhabitants of which had taken a leading part in plunder and destruction. Dunlop, nevertheless, entered it; and here his prestige served him, for, he records, "numbers of armed men were leaving it as I arrived." In the four villages next visited his reception was not unfriendly; the inhabitants "appeared glad to see the tahsildar." From each he carried off one or two of the principal landowners as security for the Government revenue. The people of the next village, Barka, were known to be friendly. To his surprise, then, on arriving before it, Dunlop found the gates closed and the people swarming from their houses. A whisper from one of them sufficed to give the information that they were expecting an attack from Sah Mall.

Dunlop stayed for a few minutes, endeavoring to calm the fears of the villagers, when a tremendous noise of shouting and bellowing from a neighboring village convinced him that they were well founded. In a few seconds Ss h Mall, at the head of two thousand men, came in sight. Very soon their matchlock-balls were flying amongst the small party, only one of whom was an Englishman. Dunlop would willingly have faced

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150 A native collector of revenue. The party was three days later joined by a native officer.
them—but cui bono? One or two hundred Englishmen might, as they did in the pursuit of Tantia Topi, face, and even successfully attack, four or five thousand. But one man against two thousand! The odds were too great. Dunlop and his five companions unwillingly fell back, leaving the fifteen landowners and twelve sheep he had collected, unguarded, as a prey to the rebels.

But the danger was not over. A horseman, armed with a matchlock and drawn sword—subsequently ascertained to be Bagda, nephew to Sah Mall—rode at Dunlop. Under ordinary circumstances the combat would probably have been short. But Dunlop was riding that morning, for the first time, a horse which had an insane dread of fire-arms. His position would have been ludicrous but for its danger. "The animal," he writes, "proceeded to the charge alternately tripping along sideways, or waltzing round on its hind legs, springing clear off the ground at every discharge of my revolver." Ultimately, however, Dunlop succeeded in depriving Bagda of his thumb and in mortally wounding his charger. He then rode after his friends, leaving his pith helmet, which had fallen off in the fight, as a trophy on the field.

Dunlop now made, with his small escort, for Barauth. There he found that the column had had that morning an engagement with, and had put to flight, a body of rebels who were then being pursued. The cavalry had scarcely returned from the pursuit, when Sah Mall led the men who had chased the small party in the morning to the attack. But it was Dunlop's turn now. The rebels, their flanks turned, soon broke and fled.

This affair proved to be most important. In the pursuit Still Mall was overtaken and killed by a young volunteer, by name Tonnochy, assisted by a native trooper. His head, stuck on a pole, materially influenced the decision of a third attack, which the remainder of the rebels, unaware of Sah Mall's death, ventured to deliver the same afternoon. It was repulsed with ease. I should not omit to add that in the second fight of the day Dunlop's lost helmet was recovered.

The effect of Sah Mall's death was shown by the freedom with which the native dealers at once brought grain and other supplies into the British camp. That evening, too, the officers and men of the force enjoyed the gratification of encamping in and around a bungalow which Sah Mall had set apart for himself as a hall of justice.

From Barauth the little column marched for Sirdhana, famous as the residence of Bagam Samru. Here Dunlop made arrangements for the payment by the neighboring villages of arrears of rent. But one village, Akalpura, was refractory. This village belonged to one Narpat Singh, a notorious rebel. Under his auspices, then, the men of

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Footnote 151: In this affair, and indeed throughout the campaign of the Khaki Risala, a young civilian made himself particularly distinguished for his coolness in danger and his courage in the field. This was Mr. A. C. Lyall, now Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, as remarkable for his ability now as he was for the sterner qualities in those troublous days.
the place sent back Dunlop's messengers with the inquiry, "Who is the district officer
and who is the tahsildar that they should demand revenue from Akalpura? "and
threatened the messengers with death should they return on a similar errand. In
consequence of this message, it was deemed advisable to pay the refractory villages a
visit. The Khakis, then, started before daybreak, reached Akalpura before the alarm had
been sounded, surrounded and stormed it, Narpat Singh being among the slain. This
prompt and successful action produced a marvelous effect on the turbulent spirits in
the neighborhood. The force then returned to Sirdhana.

An act of justice such as the natives of India would thoroughly appreciate was
performed about this time. There were two villages in the Rajput portion of the Mirath
division, known as Solana and Dhaolana. The inhabitants of both were Rajputs. The
native official of the district was a Muhammadan, Torab Ali, loyal to the British. As the
district, however, was in close proximity to Muhammadan districts which had rebelled,
the inhabitants of Dhaolana, thinking to earn the praise of the court of Dehli, declared
against the English, attacked the police station, and took prisoner Torab Ali. Upon this
the people of Solana, loyal to the English, attacked Dhaolana and released Torab Ali.
The Dhaolna men, knowing they had sinned beyond forgiveness, incited other villages
to revolt. Whereupon Dunlop visited the district with the little column, defeated the
rebels, and gave their lands over to the loyal people of Solana.

Shortly after this, the 21st of July, the little column, somewhat strengthened, proceeded
to Hauppar, thence to defeat the rebels at Galaoti—an achievement gallantly and
successfully performed.

An expedition on the 18th of September to Morwana was so far successful, that the
report of its approach was sufficient to scare the rebels. It was followed by one of
greater importance—to drive some rebels from Bhowan, eighteen miles beyond
Mozaffarnagar—a place whence they had repulsed the district officer and a strong
force. Dunlop's force, joined at Mozaffarnagar by that previously repulsed, was
successful on this as it had been on every other occasion.

With the fall of Dehli the necessity for such detached expeditions in the Mirath division
practically ceased. The army, released from the labors of the siege, proceeded, as we
have seen, to free the country in all directions. It is impossible to exaggerate the services
which in the interval had been rendered by the little band of volunteers, of whom Mr.
Dunlop was the original organizer, the constant companion. Who were these
volunteers? The best answer to that query is that given in the work in which their deeds
are recorded, and which tells in eloquent language of the results they accomplished.

"Few of those," wrote Mr. Dunlop at the time, "who so gallantly volunteered for a life of
peril and adventure in lieu of patient anticipation while awaiting the issue of the
struggle at Dehli, bad any military experience to assist them, and their drill had to be
commenced; but they possessed the hereditary courage of their race; they could all ride; many of them were sportsmen, some of them crack shots and admirable swordsmen. Made of such material, is it to be wondered at that they traversed the most distracted portions of the district in the height of the revolt; that they fearlessly faced, with the support of two little mountain-train guns, manned by native artillery-men of doubtful loyalty, forty native najibs, and forty of the rifle regiment, the assembled hordes of one of the most enterprising leaders this rebellion has produced, and, with little or no loss to themselves, routed and destroyed in hundreds the same class of men as those whose unbridled villainy produced such mischief in the station on the night following the outbreak; that, maddened by the insults and massacres inflicted on their own relations, on their own brothers and sisters, they executed, if let loose on a rebel village, a vengeance which made it a terror and a fear to the country around? "It is impossible to show more clearly how it was that, in the most critical times of the mutiny, the Mirath division was prevented from falling a prey to the rebels.

I turn now to Allahabad—a name familiar to the readers of this history. The situation of Allahabad had many things common with that of Mirath. It was an important military station held throughout by the British, yet surrounded by districts and divisions in full revolt. Immediately to the north lay Oudh, to the north-east the districts of Azamgarh and Gorukhpur, to the west and south Bandalkhand. At the confluence of two great rivers, it was a most important strategical point, especially during the rainy season, when it formed the river terminus for the steamers from Calcutta. The military events occurring at Allahabad have been related in these volumes, but the heavy duties which devolved upon the members of the civil service have been but incidentally referred to. Yet those duties were of a nature to tax all the energies even of men accustomed, as are the members of the Indian Civil Service, to give themselves, heart and soul, to their country.

When the mutiny broke out, the Commissioner of the Allahabad division was Mr. C. Chester; the magistrate was Mr. M. H. Court, a glorious specimen of an Englishman, a good sportsman, a generous friend, and one whose hospitality was famous even in India. The news of the mutiny at Mirath reached Allahabad on the 12th of May; on the evening of the 5th of June the 6th regiment native infantry mutinied. That mutiny was the signal for a general revolt. That very night the rabble of the city, the whole of the native police, joined in the outbreak; the jail released its prisoners, two thousand in number, and the inhabitants of several adjoining villages, men renowned for lawlessness and plunder, sprang forth, and the work of incendiarism, riot, and plunder commenced.152 The Europeans and Eurasians, men, women, and children, all who could escape the fury of the revolters, had, meanwhile, taken refuge in the fort, where they remained beleaguered till the 11th of June.

152 "A District during the Rebellion "— Calcutta Review. This article forms one of many about to be published in a separate volume by its accomplished author, M. R. N. Cust, C.S.
How, on the afternoon of the 11th of June, the gallant Neill relieved the anxieties of the garrison, has formed a portion of the military history of the mutiny. It will suffice here to state that from the date of his arrival Allahabad formed the base of military operations undertaken against Kanhpur, the most eastern part of Oudh, and the Azamgarh districts. My subject now relates solely to the civil officers and their duties.

No sooner had Neill restored the British power in the fortress and the city, than the European residents returned to the smoking ruin of their houses. In the city it was comparatively easy to restore matters to the condition antecedent to the mutiny. From the date of the 11th of June, Allahabad itself was never in danger. European troops were constantly arriving and passing through, and the inhabitants of the city were thoroughly aware that any other course but submission to the law would bring upon them sure and swift destruction. But in the districts the case was quite different.

The effect of the junction of the streams of the Ganges and Jamna just below Allahabad has been to form three great natural divisions of land. These divisions contain more than one thousand villages and towns, and a population of nearly a million. Now in the centre division, that between the left bank of the Jamna and the right bank of the Ganges, no vestige of police remained. The villagers had everywhere commenced the career of plunder, and led on probably by some notorious criminal escaped from jail, had "commenced reprisals on their neighbors, paid out old scores, removed old boundary-marks, and ejected purchasers of land." In this division disorder was rampant; Europeans were hunted down, the telegraph posts were torn up, the iron sockets converted into rude cannon, and the wire into slugs.

In the division on the right bank of the Jamna a far different order prevailed. There one or two large proprietors exercised great influence, and they were wise enough to see that their interests were bound up in the maintenance of the dominant power which had ever afforded them protection. They therefore at once offered to undertake the protection of their own villages if the Government would give them a subsidy. The Government complied, and the result was that in this division order was maintained. In due course, when the magistrate was able to re-introduce his own police. But not the less was he thankful to those who, when he was powerless, had taken the initiative to maintain order.

From the third division, again, on the left bank of the Ganges, British authority had disappeared. The vicinity to Oudh, now in full revolt, had proved fatal to that authority.

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153 Cust, who enters into much fuller details than I have space for.

154 Mr. Cust well says:—"This opens out another and a serious question whether our established policy of cutting off the heads of all the tallest poppies, and leaving nothing betwixt the Imperial Government and the cultivating owners of the soil, is a wise one."
The neighboring districts of Janpur, of Azimgarh, and of Gorakhpur, had fallen into the hands of rebels, to be recovered only by the sword.

To maintain order in the first and third of these divisions, very considerable powers of life and death were given by the Government to the commissioner, the judge, the magistrate, the deputy magistrate, and the assistant magistrate; and so great was the panic at Calcutta, that, as if this had not been sufficient, similar powers were conferred upon two private individuals and the civil surgeon. No doubt some examples were required. Most certainly they were given. "Zealously," writes Mr. Cust, "did the three volunteers use their new powers, and in the short time which elapsed before their recall, one of the private individuals had sentenced sixty, the second sixty-four, and the civil surgeon fifty-four, to the gallows. No record remains of the crime or the evidence, but we gather that one man was hung for having a bag of new copper coin in his possession, presumed to have been plundered from the treasury, or, most probably, abandoned by the mutinous sepoys, who were surfeited with silver. More than a month after our power had been restored in the city, we find fifteen sentenced one day and twenty-eight the next, for rebellion and robbing the treasury; but it does not appear that they were sepoys. Thirteen were hung another day for a similar offence. Six were hung for plying a ferry for the convenience of the rebels." It is a relief, after the perusal of this disgraceful record, to find Mr. Cust declaring that "the investigations of the officers of Government, men trained to the consideration of evidence, and conscious of the necessity of supporting the character, as well as vindicating the authority, of the Government, were more deliberate." They had, indeed, need to be so; but the question occurs, how it was that the same Government which refused to disarm the sepoys at Dana, and thus imperiled the safety of Calcutta, delayed the advance of Havelock, and caused an enormous amount of slaughter, should have complacently invested the three untrained gentlemen referred to with the terrible powers of life and death!

To return. In addition to power over life, the magistrate was entrusted with authority to confiscate property, real and personal. In the hands of Mr. Court this authority was used with judgment and discretion. Mercy was tempered by judgment. But, nevertheless, the amount of property which changed hands was considerable. Some men had died, their relatives were not forthcoming; some had absconded; some had openly joined the rebels. But there is reason to believe that in every instance justice was meted out with a hand more inclined to leniency than to its opposite.

It devolved upon Mr. Court likewise, in his capacity of collector of revenue, to furnish money and collect it. I cannot do better than transcribe the graphic account given by Mr. Cust of the manner in which these duties were performed.

"All this time the executive officer of the district was not idle in his duties of collector. Money poured in by every steamer from Calcutta and poured out like water, leaving the tale of unadjusted items to be told in tens of thousands of pounds. There was
constant payment of sums for saving European life or distinguished bravery, for it was then no light service for a native to stand by an Englishman, as he was liable to attack by the rebels for so doing. The terrorism of the rebels is scarcely appreciated by us to its full extent. There were compensations for losses or for wounds, or advances made to starving Christians or faithful natives, driven with only the clothes on their backs from out-stations. There were rewards to be paid for the arrest of notorious rebels and criminals escaped from gaol; spies and messengers to be paid handsomely for their services generally, by dipping their hands into a bag of silver, and securing as much as they could grasp; advances to be made to officers engaged in raising regiments of low-caste men; and reward for the restoration of Government horses, cattle, and stores. State-prisoners had to be maintained. Supplies of cash had to be furnished to every advancing column, or placed at the disposal of the commissariat and the ordnance department. No wonder that in these hasty remittances the tale of rupees ran short, that boxes of treasure were found violated, and, in one instance, a box of five hundred pounds was found missing. In the general moral debasement, we cannot be surprised that the European sentry was not always trustworthy. In the treasure chamber also was stowed away the plunder belonging to the army, the spoil of captured cities, valued at hundreds of thousands of pounds, and fastened down in beer-barrels until the end of the war. Among these spoils were the crown jewels of sovereigns, the gold plate of princes, earrings, and nose-rings, and jewels of women, ornamented daggers and diamond necklaces, all the pomp and wealth of oriental monarchs, wrung from a plundered and oppressed people, and now captured by the English army.

"At the same time the collector had to look after the revenue of those parts of the district in which his orders were respected. He had to suspend collections from such villages as had been plundered, burned, or deserted. He had to determine where he should remit and where enforce the demand; as it is a grave moral question how far a government is justified in demanding the payment of taxes, when it has notoriously failed in its duty of protection, owing to no fault of the people. No sooner was the danger past than red tape raised its head again, and a gentleman, sitting in comfort and ease at Calcutta, reminded the excited collector of unattended-to forms and discontinued returns. With hundreds of boxes of stationery and stamps in his charge, directed to districts in the hands of the rebels, the collector, without a pen or sheet of paper belonging to him, dared not use the consignment of his neighbor without special authority. As he returned to his half-ruined home from his morning-duty of hanging rebels, flogging rioters, and blowing up temples, he found letters from the Head of the Finance Department, reminding him that he was personally responsible for every rupee missing in a treasury guarded by European soldiers in a fort three miles off. On his table he found notes from an officer with the force of Jang Bahadur, requesting a daily supply of a hundred he-goats for the hungry Gurkah; from the post master, requesting him to hunt for a missing mail-cart; from the commanding officer, requesting him to close the grog-shops; from a cavalry-commandant to know whose grass was to be cut, and where a farrier was to be found; from the pension-paymaster requesting him to attend a
committee on the confiscation of pensions. Telegraphic messages up and down were tumbling in all day long, sometimes announcing a victory, sometimes heralding a traveler, for, in addition to his other duties, he had to keep a "Red Lion" tavern for strangers, examine the passport of every native traveler, and ascertain the contents of every native letter.

"Thus passed six months away, and if some gray hairs had shown themselves in his beard (for since his razors were plundered, he had remained perforce unshorn), if his heart sometimes palpitated from over-excitement, and his liver sometimes troubled him, no wonder. If his temper was somewhat soured, if he hated the natives with a deep hate, if he talked too lightly of cutting the thread of human life, and scoring the backs of poor devils, no wonder. He had had much to bear, and the rebellion had fallen heavily on his estate, his family, and his health. He was mentioned in no dispatches; the thanks of Government reached him not; and, when he saw that the tide had turned, and that the country was saved, he hurried to England, on the chance of quiet restoring tone to his body, and change of scene bringing back equanimity to his mind."

The concluding portion of the description appears to me to be somewhat overdrawn. No; though he had lost many friends, probably some relations, though he had worked hardly under difficulties, and had earned the thanks and the honors which he did not receive, the magistrate and collector harbored no hatred against the natives. I shall never forget the last exhortation of one of those noble servants of the East India Company, a man who had served many years at that very Allahabad, on my return to India in 1858; they were words of exhortation to be kind, to be mindful of the many excellent qualities possessed by the natives of India. And that man was, I believe, a type of his class.

I pass on now to Gorakhpur.

The district called, after the chief town within its borders, Gorakhpur, is bounded on the north by Nipal; on the east and south-east by the district of Saran; - on the south by Azamgarh; on the south-west and west by the kingdom of Oudh. It includes an area of seven thousand three hundred and forty-six square miles, and possessed in 1857 a population somewhat exceeding three millions.

In 1857 the judge of Gorakhpur was Mr. William Wynyard, already mentioned in these pages; the magistrate and collector was Mr. Paterson; the joint magistrate was Mr. Bird. In such times as those of 1857 the lead taken was never dependent on the rank of the officer. Sometimes, as at Patna, the senior officer directed affairs; at others, as at Banaras, the second in rank came prominently to the front. At Gorakhpur Mr. Wynyard at once took the reins in his hands.
Mr. Wynyard joined to great activity of body and a love of field-sports, a cultivated mind and a thorough acquaintance with native character. The station of Gorakhpur being off the main line of postal communication, Wynyard did not hear of the events of the 10th of May till a week later, the 17th. It happened that Mr. Paterson, the magistrate, was just on the point of quitting the station on leave of absence, for which he had applied and which had been granted. In the presence of the crisis then impending, and which he saw could not fail to bear with particular severity upon a place so near the Oudh frontier as was Gorakhpur, Wynyard took it upon himself to delay Paterson's departure. I mention this fact not because in itself it was of great importance, but because it produced from the commissioner of the division a reply which indicated a belief common to almost all the high officials in India. Mr. Tucker thanked Wynyard for his action in having delayed Mr. Paterson's departure "till he has heard of the annihilation of the rebels." It was evidently not thought that the delay would be long!

The troops of Gorakhpur consisted of two companies 17th regiment native infantry and a small detachment 12th irregular cavalry. The head-quarters of the former were at Azamgarh, of the latter at Sigaoli. Very few days after the news reached him of the mutiny, Wynyard received information that the 17th native infantry could not be depended upon. The 12th irregulars bore then a good character, and their commanding officer, Major Holmes, whose name was a household word in the army, was known to trust them implicitly. But, even granting that they were loyal, their numbers were few, and Wynyard felt that it would be necessary for him to look elsewhere for sure support. Happily, at this conjuncture, the commissioner, Mr. Tucker, placed Wynyard in civil charge of the district, warning him that trouble might be on him at any moment, that Banaras was shaky, recommending him to act boldly and on his own judgment, and giving him authority to assume any amount of responsibility, civil or military. The way thus made plain to him, Wynyard proceeded to act. He enlisted recruits for the jail and other local guards; he caused similar enlistments to be made in the districts; he wrote to the well-affected native landowners and to the European planters, authorizing them to enlist well-affected natives for the Government service; he appointed a place of rendezvous in case of attack; and he dispatched one hundred and twenty-five of the 17th native infantry and a detachment, thirty-four men, of the 12th irregulars to Banaras in charge of treasure. This still left him burdened with one hundred and twenty sepoys and sixty sowars.

From that day forth for a long time to follow every post brought bad tidings from outside. One day it was the mutiny at Firozpur, the next the outbreak at Lakhnau, then those at Nimach and Nasirabad. But the news received on the 5th of June was still more ominous for Gorakhpur. It told of the mutiny at A'zamgarh of the 17th native infantry, a detachment of which regiment was, as we have seen, on duty at Gorakhpur.
That detachment was commanded by Captain Steel, an excellent officer. He at once paraded his men, Paterson having disposed the cavalry and local levies so as to attack them if they should mutiny. Steel then addressed them, apparently with effect. They displayed no outward sign of discontent. But this apparent loyalty lasted only for the day. The very next morning Steel endeavored to march the sepoys to A'zamgarh, but they refused to obey his orders, and one of them, whom the rest were evidently disposed to follow, was heard to declare that the money in the treasury should not leave the station without a fight.

The day following, the 7th of June, the prisoners attempted to break out from the jail, but they were baffled by the jail-guard, energetically led by Mr. Bird the joint magistrate and Mr. Desmazures an indigo-planter. Eight of the prisoners were killed in the attempt, and ten or twelve were wounded. That night the sepoys, apparently, resolved to join their comrades. They seized empty carts, and with these marched, armed, the following morning, towards the treasury. Their purpose was evident. They had determined to go, but not without the money. In this crisis Steel and Wynyard, who, from the verandah of the former's bungalow, saw them approaching, came to meet and harangued them. Their arguments were effective, for the sepoys returned to their lines. Still business was at a standstill. Everyone felt that one day, sooner or later, the trial would come. There seemed no means of averting it.

Next morning, however, Wynyard received from Major, now Major-General the Honorable Sir Henry, Ramsay, the British resident at the court of Khatmandu, a letter, in which he promised to send him two hundred Gurkahs from Palpa, just across the border. This was cheering news. With the aid of that number of trustworthy troops, it seemed possible still to maintain the district.

But the following day showed that events were marching too fast for the Gurkahs. I have already told how, towards the end of May, Wynyard had sent money to A'zamgarh escorted by one hundred and twenty-five of the 17th native infantry and thirty-four men of the 12th irregulars. On the morning of the 11th the irregulars returned, telling how, after leaving A'zamgarh, the sepoys had mutinied and had seized the money; how the Ghazipur district was in revolt, and how the loyalty of Bahar depended upon the power of the commissioner of Patna to maintain order in that turbulent city.

Nevertheless Wynyard did not lose heart. Trusting to the 12th irregulars, whose loyalty had, up to that time, been proof against seduction, he sent detachments to A'zamgarh, to Basti, and to other parts of the district, under his own officers or European residents, to restore order. And he succeeded. He proclaimed martial law in the district, suspended the ordinary forms of trial, and showed a zeal, an energy, and a resolution which had an extremely deterring effect upon the disaffected. They argued that no man would act with such boldness unless he had resources of which they knew nothing.
And yet, all this time, Wynyard had not only no resources, but his superior officer was doing his best to deprive him of those whose timely arrival would still have saved the district. Mr. Tucker, the commissioner of Banaras, wrote at this crisis to tell him that no troops could be spared from that city. This was true, and was probably anticipated. But what was not anticipated, what in its result was fatal to many European lives, was the fact that at the same time Mr. Tucker was exerting all his efforts to prevent the arrival of the Gurkahs, whose number was now swollen to three thousand, in British territory. To accept the aid of Jang Bahadur was, in Mr. Tucker's opinion, an evil; but surely it was a lesser evil than that involved in the occupation of British territory by rebels! Yet that was, as the result proved, the only alternative.

On the 17th and on the 19th fugitives from Oudh arrived in Gorakhpur. On the 20th Wynyard sent off all the ladies in the station—the wives of the clerks, who at the last moment refused to leave, excepted—to Banaras under an escort of twenty-five men of the 12th irregulars, seventy men belonging to the raja of Banares, and accompanied by six officers and a sergeant who had escaped from Oudh. This party reached Janpur in safety; but the districts were swarming with rebels; all the landowners were up. Some of these stopped the party near Janpur and diverted their course to Ghazipur.

On the 28th the two hundred Gurkahs originally promised by Ramsay arrived from Palpa. It must have been a satisfaction to Wynyard thus to have saved for seven weeks a district on the borders of revolted Oudh, contiguous to other districts in which the torch of mutiny had been lighted, and whose landowners had followed with light hearts the example set them by the sepoys. If, in the presence of adverse circumstances which he saw rising around him, Wynyard could not feel very sanguine as to the immediate future, at least he had grounds for hope. It needed but a decisive blow struck at some rebel centre to pacify the district, and it always seemed possible that any day might bring the good news.

It was encouraging to Wynyard at such a crisis that he should feel that his conduct had been approved not only by his local superior, but by the Governor-General. Mr. Tucker, just at this time, wrote him a letter fully approving of his arrangements and of the manner in which he had carried them out, and on the 28th of June Lord Canning sent him an autograph letter expressive of his gratitude for the excellent service which, in conjunction with Mr. Paterson, Mr. Wynyard had rendered at Gorakhpur, and concluding with a hope that he might be still able to hold his ground; "if not," wrote Lord Canning, "have no scruple as to retiring in time. You have long ago saved your honor."

It was known on the 25th of July that more Gurkahs were approaching. The districts, however, were greatly disturbed. During the preceding three weeks many untoward events had happened. The slaughter of Kanhpur had become known; the mutinies at
Gwaliar and Bareli; the Azamgarh district had been the scene of warfare, marked by the splendid gallantry of the daring Venables. The only counterbalancing news was that of the victories obtained by Havelock over the rebels and of his arrival at Kahnpur. But Wynyard still kept his hold on the district; the Nipal army was near, and having accomplished so much Wynyard was still hopeful that he might accomplish more.

But on the 28th of July the fatal news of the mutiny of the 12th irregulars at Sigaoli, of the murder of Holmes and his noble wife, and of the doctor, and the intelligence that the regiment was marching on Gorakhpur reached him. Instantly he sent off an express to the first division of Gurkahs to push on. They pushed on and arrived that evening.

The arrival of the Gurkahs produced a double effect. It saved the lives of the Europeans, but it necessitated the evacuation of Gorakhpur. How this was so is capable of easy explanation. The Garkahs were under orders to march, by way of Azamgarh, for Allahabad. At that time Azamgarh had again fallen into the hands of the rebels. The officer commanding the Gurkahs, Colonel Pahlwan Singh, declined to leave a detachment at Gorakhpur, or in any way to divide his forces. Information had been received from English sources that the 12th irregulars, red with the blood of their own officers, were marching on Gorakhpur. For the few English officials to remain there after the Gurkahs should have left it, and to meet alone the 12th irregulars, accompanied by all the rabble of the districts, seemed indeed to be madness utterly wanting in method.

Two or three days were left for Wynyard and his colleagues to consider the course to be adopted. These days were well employed. On the 1st of August the men of the detachment 17th native infantry were peaceably disarmed. The few men of the 12th irregulars were less successfully dealt with. These men gave up their arms, it is true, to their own commandant, Risaldar Muhammad Bakhsh; but they had scarcely done so when some of them made a rush at the arms, recovered them, mounted their horses, and galloped off. They were pursued by their own comrades under Captain Warren; six of them were killed, one was wounded and died of his wounds. The eighty-three loyal men remained staunch to the end.155

The news which arrived two days later of the defeat of Captain Dunbar's detachment near Arah, and the receipt the following day of a letter containing Mr. Tucker's approval of a retirement upon Azamgarh and Janpur, decided Mr. Wynyard and the other gentlemen of the district to accompany the Gurkahs. The district was no longer tenable. "Have no scruple," Lord Canning had written, "in retiring in time—you have long ago saved your honor." Mr. Wynyard and his companions then, on the 31st of

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155 These men did good service in the mutiny, and marched with Havelock and Outram to the relief of Lakhnao. The Risaldar, Muhammad Bakhsh, was made extra Aide-de-camp to the Governor-General.
August, made over charge of the district to the loyal landowners and rode that evening into the Gurkha camp.

One, and one only, remained behind. This was the assistant magistrate, Mr. Bird. Mr. Bird was a great sportsman, affected the society of natives, and believed he could trust them. He, therefore, declined to accompany his countrymen. He soon had reason to repent it. Gorakhpur, after the departure of the Gurkhas, was contested for by the zamindars of the neighborhood, and Muhammad Husen, calling himself the Nazim, from Oudh. Eventually the latter took possession of the place. But before this happened one of the zamindars, the raja of Gopalpur, entered the town and released the prisoners. One of these, a man whom Bird himself had committed for forgery, forced his way into the presence of his old committing officer, and seated himself on the table. The native guards declined to remove him. Bird then wrote to his European comrades for assistance, but it could not be given. The Gurkah commandant declined to send a man. After four or five days of stirring adventure, going about with his life in his hand, he eventually escaped into the jungle. Muhammad Husen, who had by that time occupied Gorakhpur, offered a reward of five thousand rupees for his head, and whilst he dispatched two hundred men to cut him off, sent as many more on his track. But Bird, a sportsman who knew thoroughly the bye-ways of the jungle, succeeded in baffling both and in reaching Betiah in the Champaran district, eighty-two miles from Gorakhpur, in safety.

Meanwhile the Gurkah force, accompanied by Wynyard and his comrades, marched towards Azamgarh. On the 20th of August they repulsed a spirited attack made upon their camp by the rebels at Gagha. On the 21st the force crossed the Ghaghra river and marched without further interruption on Azamgarh, which was reached on the 27th. Mr. Wynyard was then nominated chief civil officer of the Azamgarh district. How that district was fought for and maintained has been told in a previous volume.

The state of Gorakhpur immediately upon the departure of the English officials fully justified that departure. In few parts of India did the districts become more infested with men thirsting for European blood than in the districts bordering on Oudh. To have maintained Gorakhpur for three months without assistance, in the presence of disaffected sepoys, and surrounded by turbulent landowners, was a feat worthy of the highest praise—a feat which testified to the courage, the tact, the judgment of those by whom it was accomplished, and which redounded greatly to their honor. But, notwithstanding Lord Canning's emphatic declaration in this respect, notwithstanding the services subsequently rendered, Mr. Wynyard and his companions were not admitted within the favored circle of official approbation. The more necessary is it, then, that admiration should be accorded to them by their countrymen.

Here I must pause. The history of the other civil districts of India during the crisis of 1857-58 would present the same tale of gallantry, of devotion, of energy, of zeal, as has
the history of those I have recorded. The circumstances, it is true, were not precisely similar in all. Not only did the incidents vary, but the localities, the distances from one important central point, the temper of the people, the amount of aid to be counted upon, varied also. But in one respect there was a striking similarity. In every case the English officials, members of the Indian Civil Service, untrained to arms as they were, displayed the characteristics of the island home of their birth—the cool courage, the firm resolution, the devotion to duty, well becoming the descendants of the men who had made an empire on which the sun never sets, and which their children now found themselves called upon, under the most dangerous and difficult circumstances, to maintain. How well they performed that duty these pages have shown. Not in this chapter only; for the names of John Lawrence of the Panjab, of William Tayler who saved Patna, and, conjointly with Vincent Eyre, Calcutta; of Frederic Gubbins, who saved Banaras; of Seton-Karr, who saved the southern Maratha country; of Montgomery, of Barnes, of George Ricketts, of Ross Mangles, and of many others—stand out in a manner which will cause them to live forever in the memory of those who love cool and calm heroism, who value true and noble action more than the tinsel decoration which so often rewards subservience and self-seeking.
BOOK XVII.

CHAPTER II.

IN another part of this history I have recorded the gallantry of a young midshipman of the Indian navy, Arthur Mayo—a gallantry which was rewarded by the bestowal of the Victoria Cross. This display of courage and conduct was emulated by very many of the profession to which Mayo belonged, and I feel it is only due to the members of a service which no longer exists, but whose bright and brilliant deeds form an important part of the story of English adventure and English rule in India, to devote a short chapter to the more prominent of those services.

The gallant service of Lieutenant Lewis, Mr. Mayo, and their comrades at Dhaka, has been already related. It has been truly remarked\(^{156}\) that "if the Indian naval detachment had been repulsed in their attack on the mutineers' position, and had been obliged to retreat, a general massacre would probably have ensued, for in their rear lay the city of Dhaka with a large fanatical Muhammadan population in a very excited state." The gallantry of the sailors was thus mainly instrumental in saving eastern Bengal from pillage and slaughter.

The same officers, accompanied by others, took a very leading part in an expedition against the Abor hillmen in February 1859. This operation, though occurring before the mutiny had been finally crushed in central India and in Oudh, cannot properly be brought within the range of its events. I refer to it here only to mention that the officers who were prominent at the Dhaka affair in 1857 were again well to the front on this occasion, and, with Lieutenant Davies, I.N., were most favorably mentioned by the military officer commanding.

In the Jagdispur jungles, Lieutenant Carew, I.N., rendered excellent service. I have related how, on the 23rd of April 1858, Captain Le Grand of the 35th foot had been defeated in those jungles by Kunwar Singh with the loss of two guns; how this disaster had thrown the district once more into disorder; how the safety of Arah was threatened, and how a panic had reigned at Chapra. I have recorded, also, how for the time the arrangements made assured the safety of these stations, and that a few days later Sir E. Lugard and Colonel Corfield had beaten the rebels continuously. In these contests Lieutenant Carew, serving under Corfield, took a prominent part. Carew, after making several most earnest re-quests, had been allowed to serve in that part of the country in command of a battery which he had formed himself. His battery was supplied with two

\(^{156}\) Low's History of the Indian Navy.
9-pounders and two 5½ inch mortars, and was manned by one hundred and ten sailors. Serving under him were two midshipmen, Brownlow and Cotgrave. In Corfield's action with the rebels on the 11th of May at Hetampur, Carew's battery took a very prominent part. They worked their guns admirably. \(^{157}\) And yet that very day they had marched fourteen miles, and before they had time to take a meal had to march against the rebels under a sun which struck dead seven men of the 6th regiment marching with them. Though the Indian navy sailors were more acclimatized than their brethren of the royal army, yet even they lost three of their comrades that very day from the effect of exposure. The same cause compelled, a little later, Carew to resign his command to Mr. Midshipman Cotgrave.

Lieutenant, afterwards Commander, Batt did splendid service in the same district. Batt had distinguished himself by his activity in the Ganges between Allahabad and Kanhpur, in July and August 1857, by shelling the rebels out of their position in the fort of Kali Kanki. Subsequently he commanded at Baksar where he repaired the fort, made gun-carriages, and trained his men. Later on, in the autumn of 1858, he assisted in the measures taken to drive the followers of Kanwar Singh from the jungles of Jagdispur, being always to the front. On one of the many occasions in which he was in action, an officer serving under him, Acting-Master George Chicken, gained the Victoria Cross. The force to which Chicken was attached was engaged with and had driven back the rebels near Piru on the 4th of September 1858. In the pursuit Chicken suddenly came alone upon a group of twenty preparing to rally and open fire on their scattered pursuers. He at once charged them. Surrounded on all sides, Chicken fought most desperately and killed five of the rebels. He would, however, have succumbed had not four native troopers arrived in the nick of time to his rescue. He escaped with a severe wound.

In the western Bihar division, Lieutenant Duval, Midshipmen Wray and Scamp, and later Lieutenant Barron, rendered good service after the mutiny of the sepoys at Danapur had introduced disorder there, In the repression of the mutinies in Chutia Nagpar, Captain Burbank of the Bengal Marine and Lieutenant Windus, I.N., and the marine, seamen under them, were most efficient and useful. The latter received the special thanks of the Government, and it is clear that he was a man who was equally at home when at work in the field and when engaged in organizing arrangements for that work. There was nothing he could not turn his hand to. Captain Burbank's services with Mr. Yule in pursuit of the Dhaka. rebels have been already recorded.

On the western coast the services of the Indian navy in the suppression of the mutiny were in-valuable. "In the months of July and August," writes Mr. Low, "though in the height of the south-west monsoon, the Berenice, Lieutenant Chitty, and the Victoria, \(^{157}\) Corfield's despatch.
Lieutenant Sweny, were engaged carrying troops from Bombay to Karachi, and landing them on that open and storm-beaten coast, sixteen miles below Jargarh near Ratnaghar, and at Goa .... These officers made several voyages with troops, including portions of the 33rd and 86th regiments and the 2nd Bombay Europeans. The services of Griffith Jenkins have been previously referred to in connection with the dispatch by Lord Elphinstone to the Cape and to the Mauritius for reinforcements, but it is due to that gallant sailor to add that he possessed all the qualifications necessary to ensure the success of a delicate negotiation, and that Sir George Grey and Governor Higginson alike expressed their sense of the admirable manner in which he discharged his duties. Captain Jenkins had the gratification of receiving from the highest quarter an official acknowledgment of his services. "I have been commanded," wrote Sir C. Wood to him from the India Office, "to convey to you the gracious approbation of Her Majesty of your conduct during that critical period."

With regret I confine myself to this short notice of the services of the officers of the Indian navy. Those officers knew well, when in Bengal they gave their fullest energies to a service which was not properly their own, that they were serving under the cold shade of officialism, that though the brows of their brethren in the army might be crowned with laurels, their modest deeds would remain comparatively unnoticed. Knowing this, they yet vied with the bravest in daring, with the most zealous in energy and devotion, and when the mutiny came to an end they had the satisfaction of knowing that they had deserved well of their country. They had little more. Besides the war medal, which the detachments engaged with the rebels received in common with the army, and two Victoria Crosses gained by personal velour, not a decoration was bestowed upon any one of them. Shortly after the mutiny the noble service with which they had been connected was abolished, the survivors were pensioned, and nothing remained but the consolation of heroes—the conviction of duty performed, of honor unsullied, of great services rendered to their country!

With one episode, slight though it may be as compared with others recorded in this history, yet reflecting, in the story of one officer, the conduct of many placed in circumstances not altogether dissimilar, this chapter will fitly conclude.

When the mutiny broke out at Wrath on the 10th of May 1857 two companies of the 53rd native infantry, then at Kanhpur, were on detached command duty at Orai, on the right bank of the Jamna, about eighty miles from Kanhpur. The officers commanding these companies were Captain Alexander and Lieutenant Tomkinson. The native regiments stationed at Kanhpur surpassed all the other regiments of the native army in the cruelties and barbarities they perpetrated; but the men of the detachment at Orai,
free from the contamination produced apparently by the close vicinity to the wronged province of Oudh, displayed a spirit far more amenable to reason. Everything remained quiet at Orai till the end of May. On the 3rd of June, however, the deputy commissioner of that station received orders to send to Gwaliar the money he had in the treasure-chest. The sepoys, on hearing of this order, evinced a great inclination to dispute it. However, they did not do so, and on the 4th Tomkinson started for Gwaliar with the treasure and a detachment of his men. Leaving him for a moment, I may mention that on the 6th of June the regiments at Kanhpur mutinied. When this news reached the men stationed at Orai, they provided Captain and Mrs. Alexander with a camel, and recommended them to make the best of their way to Agra, which they eventually succeeded in doing.

Meanwhile Tomkinson and his men arrived safely with the treasure, on the 12th of June, in the vicinity of Gwaliar. At that time the troops at Gwaliar were very shaky; it was known that Tomkinson's regiment had mutinied at Kanhpur; fear and distrust were in every man's mind. Major C. Macpherson, then, the political agent at Gwaliar, on hearing of Tomkinson's approach, sent out a party to relieve him of the treasure, but at the same time forbade him to enter Gwaliar, and directed him to proceed to Agra. Tomkinson would have obeyed had it been possible, but meanwhile Mr. Colvin had been communicated with at Agra, and Mr. Colvin, as distrustful as Macpherson, had telegraphed that no native troops were to proceed thither.

Left to himself, Tomkinson stayed with his men until the state of the country forced them into action. They made no attempt on his life; on the contrary, they expressed on parting with him the greatest regret that they were forced to take the line they were about to follow.

Left alone, it would seem that the villagers, intent on plunder, deprived him of his horse and his gun, and it would have gone hard with him but for the kindness of a native. Hungry and destitute, having nothing but the clothes on his back, he was seen by a Muhammadan villager wandering in the fields in apparent distress. The poor man took him to his home in the village of Amain, concealed him there till the month of October. A man of substance in the village supplied him with clothes and paid for his food. Tomkinson apparently chafed under this life, and longed for active work; but the country around him was in revolt. He persuaded his host on one occasion to take a letter into Kanhpur, but the news that met the poor man on the way so frightened him that he destroyed the letter. At length, towards the end of October, an opportunity of rendering service to his country seemed to offer. Information reached the village that a body of rebels, with a large quantity of ammunition, was about to pass in its vicinity. If he could only explode the ammunition, Tomkinson thought, he would perform an act which would paralyze their movements. He resolved to attempt to explode it. Accordingly, on the 23rd of October, he crept out, reached the rebel camp, and made the effort. He was, however, discovered and killed.
I hope that a story which paints the devotion to duty of an Englishman, and the kindness and fidelity of a Muhammadan, may be considered a fitting close to this somewhat desultory chapter.
BOOK XVIII.

CONCLUDING CHAPTER.

EVEN before the last embers of the mutiny had been trampled out, the question which had from the first puzzled every man, from the Governor-General in Council to the subaltern in his modest bungalow, the question as to the original cause of the mutiny, became the burning question of the day. It was a question which required a complete and accurate reply, because prompt reorganization was necessary, and to carry out a complete scheme of reorganization a knowledge of the circumstances which had caused the collapse of the system to be reorganized was indispensable.

On this question the opinion of no man was looked forward to with so much eagerness, so much anxiety, and, I may add, with so much curiosity, as the opinion of the great Indian official whose daring and unselfish policy had made possible the storming of Dehli. It was very natural that this should be so. Few men had associated more with the natives than Sir John Lawrence; few men had more thoroughly pierced to the core the national character, and few men possessed a more complete power of mental analysis. People, for the most part, did not stop to remember that, with all his gifts, Sir John Lawrence had ever been the partisan of a school—a school opposed to the tenure of land by great families; that he had favored Lord Dalhousie's policy of annexation; and that although he was thoroughly acquainted with the feelings of the agricultural class, he contemned those of the large proprietors, and that he knew little of the sepoys. Furthermore, and especially, that he possessed no personal knowledge of Oudh and of its people.

It will readily be believed, then, that when the opinion of Sir John Lawrence was published it gave absolute satisfaction to the many, none at all to the thinking few. After an exhaustive argument, Sir John Lawrence arrived at the conclusion that the mutiny was due to the greased cartridges, and to the greased cartridges only. The public applauded a result so beautiful in its simplicity, so easy of comprehension. It chimed so entirely with the ideas of men who never take the trouble to think for themselves, that by the masses, which are mainly composed of such men, it was promptly and thankfully accepted. With them it remains still the unanswerable reason for the mutiny of the Indian army. They did not stop to consider that to declare that the greased cartridges caused the mutiny was in all respects similar to the declaration of a man who if asked what causes a gun to discharge, should reply—the powder. True it is that the powder, when exploded, forces out the bullet: but who ignites the powder? That the greased cartridges were the lever used to excite the sepoys is incontestable; they were
explosive substances. But, though explosive, they had been perfectly harmless had the minds of the sepoys not been prepared to act upon them in the same manner that the percussion-cap acts upon gunpowder. It should never be forgotten that the greased cartridges were not the only instrument employed to create discontent in 1856-7. Before a greased cartridge had been issued the chapatties had been circulated by thousands in many rural districts. The chapatty was, it is true, a weapon far less perfect than the greased cartridge. It was, nevertheless, sufficiently adapted to the comprehensions of the class to whom it was addressed—the class given to agriculture. To minds, simple, impressionable, suspicious, prompt to receive ideas, the chapatty acted as a warning of an impending calamity. A Hindoo can conceive nothing more dreadful than a violation of his caste and his religion. The conclusion was a foregone one. The receipt of the chapatties foreshadowed a great attempt to be made to upset the national religion.

Though we might even grant, then, for the sake of argument, that the greased cartridges were not in themselves harmless, yet the chapatties certainly were so. But it was these harmless chapatties which stirred up the rural populations, especially those in Oudh and in Bandalkhand, to participate in the rebellion. What becomes, then, of Sir John Lawrence's conclusion? It simply vanishes. The greased cartridges became dangerous only when used by others as a means to an end. Before the plans of the leaders of the revolt were ripe the cartridges and the chapatties were nothing more than gunpowder stored in a magazine. When the opportune moment arrived, when the minds of the sepoys and the agricultural classes had been instructed to receive any ideas, however absurd, then the cartridges and the chapatties were rammed into them, and were exploded.

But what was it that made the minds of the sepoys, what was it that made the minds of the agricultural classes prone to conceive suspicions alike regarding the greased cartridges and the chapatties? The answers to these two questions will bring us to the real cause of the mutiny. Sir John Lawrence's conclusions were not pushed to their legitimate issue. He named only one of the means. I must go back to the cause.

The real cause of the mutiny may be expressed in a condensed form in two words:—bad faith. It was bad faith to our sepoys which made their minds prone to suspicion; it was our policy of annexation, of refusing to Hindu chiefs the permission to adopt—with them a necessary religious rite—of suddenly bringing a whole people under the operation of complex rules to which they were unaccustomed, as in Oudh, in the Sugar and Narbada territory, and in Bandalkhand, and our breaches of customs more sacred to the natives than laws, which roused the large landowners and the rural population against the British rule.

The bad faith towards the sepoys goes back so far as the period immediately succeeding the first Afghan war. In that war the sepoys had behaved splendidly; they had fought well, they had suffered privations without a murmur, they had borne with cheerfulness
absence from their country and their families, in a cause which was only theirs because it was the cause of their foreign masters. I recollect well meeting in 1844 at Allahabad a political officer whose conduct during his mission at Herat can never be mentioned without admiration—the late d'Arcy Todd. Speaking to me of the difficulties of his position at Herat, d'Arcy Todd stated that but for the zeal, the energy, and the fidelity of the few sepoys who were with him he could not have stayed at Herat; he added, "When properly treated the Bengal sepoy will go anywhere and do anything." Well, these men returned from Afghanistan. Immediately afterwards we annexed Sindh. The Bengal sepoys were sent to garrison a country then notoriously unhealthy. How were they treated? The time-honored rule which provided that they should receive a fixed extra food allowance on proceeding to certain localities was rescinded, in one instance after the men had reached one of the indicated localities, in another instance when the regiment was in full march to it. Is it to be wondered at that the men grumbled and then actually refused to march? They committed no violence. They simply said, "You are guilty of bad faith; we contracted to enter your service and to perform all the duties entrusted to us on certain conditions, of which the payment to us of food allowance under certain circumstances was one. We have fulfilled our share of the contract, and now you refuse to fulfill your share. We decline to work until you fulfill it." In equity the sepoys were right; but the Government, instead of soothing them, acted in a high-handed manner: disbanded one regiment and severely punished the men of another.

This conduct produced a very bad effect on the Indian army. It was felt in every regiment that the word of the Government could no longer be depended upon. Nevertheless no open indignation was manifested. The Satlaj campaign ensued, and again the sepoys fought well. The annexation of the Panjab followed. Then succeeded a long period of quiescence—a period during which seeds, sown some time before, took root, sprang up, and blossomed into regulations fraught with danger to the discipline of the Indian army.

The natives of India serve a master well when once he has shown himself capable of wielding of authority. But should that authority slacken or, worse still, should they find out that the Government they serve has placed at their disposal the means not only of shaking but even of upsetting it, then the nominal master wielding it ceases to be their real master; the substance of his power vanishes; the shadow only remains. The occurrences in the Indian army during the several years immediately preceding 1857 completely illustrate this assertion. In former days, in the time of Lake, in the time of Hastings, and even later, the commanding officer of a native regiment was supreme in all matters of discipline. Responsible immediately to his divisional commander, he could promote, he could reduce, he could punish. But as time passed on, men were appointed to the general staff of the Indian army whose visions became clouded and whose brains became turned by the air of the new regions to which they had been transferred. Forgetting their own regimental experience, not caring to know that the routine system which suits a British regiment formed of men taught to obey the law, no
matter by whom administered, is not applicable to a regiment composed of Asiatics bred to obey the man in whose hands they see authority centered and him only, these men began, step by step, to introduce the British system into the native army. It would take too long to tell how gradually the real power of the commanding officer was undermined; how the sepoy was, by degrees, taught to look upon him, not as a superior who must be obeyed, but as a very fallible mortal, peculiarly liable to err, and against whose lightest exercise of authority he had the right to appeal to the one central power, the Commander-in-Chief. Suffice it to say that this process of sapping the powers of the commanding officer was carried to so great an extent that immediately prior to the mutiny the sepoys had lost all respect for the authority he only nominally wielded. Nor had the sepoy imbibed for the Commander-in-Chief the feeling which he had ceased to entertain towards his commanding officer. To him the Commander-in-Chief was but a name; he was a lay figure, living in the clouds of the Himalayas, rarely, often never, seen, but whose interposition enabled him to defy his own colonel and to set discipline at nought! The extent to which this interposition was exercised before the mutiny was dangerous in the extreme.

It succeeded before 1857 in weakening the influence of all the regimental officers, and in undermining the discipline of the army. I have said that the refusal of the Government of India in 1843 to act up to their contract with regard to the sepoys sent to occupy Sindh, had been felt throughout the Indian army. Immediately subsequent to that event, the process of undermining the powers of commanding officers had made swift progress. When, then, in 1852, the Government most unadvisedly again attempted another breach of contract, the sepoys, demoralized by the process I have alluded to, were even more inclined to resent it.

The breach of contract referred to occurred in this manner. With the exception of six or seven regiments, the sepoys of the Bengal army are enlisted for service in India only; they were never to be required to cross the sea. But with the view of supplying the necessities of the state in Arakan and the Tenasserim provinces, six or seven regiments had been specially raised for general service, and these regiments were invariably sent across the sea whenever their services were there required. Lord Dalhousie, however, who had ridden roughshod over so many native customs, considered that he might set aside this one also. Accordingly, when, during the Burmese war, he wanted to send an additional regiment to Burma, instead of dispatching a general service regiment or of inviting a regiment to volunteer, he ordered a regiment stationed at Barrakpur to proceed thither. The men of the regiment refused to go. "You ask us," they said, "to embark upon a service for which we have not enlisted, and which many of us regard as imperiling our caste. We will not do it." Lord Dalhousie was forced to submit. He was very angry, but there was no help for it.

But the result on the minds of the sepoys was most disastrous. For the first time in the history of India the orders of the Governor-General had been successfully resisted. It
was little to the purpose to argue that the Governor-General had exceeded his powers: the blow to the discipline of the native army was not the less deadly.

The minds of the sepoys were under the influence of this blow, and by the insane action of the head-quarter staff they were becoming more and more released from the bands of discipline towards their own officers, when the annexation of Oudh took place. How this affected them I shall state as briefly as possible.

A very large proportion of the army of the Bengal presidency, and a smaller proportion of the army of the Bombay presidency were recruited from the kingdom of Oudh. It is scarcely too much to affirm that there was not a single agricultural family in that country which was not represented by at least one of its members in the Indian army. Service in that army, in fact, offered no inconsiderable advantages to the subjects of the king of Oudh. It made them clients of the paramount power. Every sepyo was, so to speak, represented at the court of Lakhnao by the British resident. His commanding officer was authorized to frank any petition he might present addressed to the resident, and the fact that the resident had received such petition ensured substantial justice to the claims of the petitioner at the hands of the court of Lakhnao. Everyone familiar with the workings of a native court will at once recognize the value at which service in the Indian army was rated by the natives of Oudh. By accepting such service they obtained an all-powerful advocate at their sovereign's court.

The nawabs and kings of Oudh had from the time of Warren Hastings shown a loyalty to the British Government not to be surpassed. During the Afghan disasters, the Gwalior campaign, the battles on the Satlaj and in the Panjab, Oudh had been the milch-cow of the suzerain power.

She had lent that power money, she had given her best sons as soldiers, she had done all that she could do to maintain unimpaired the relations between the prince independent only in his own country and the paramount overlord.

"But," exclaimed the advocates for annexations he had "misgoverned." Misgovernment is a relative term. There can be no question but that in the English sense of the term there had been no good government in Oudh. But a kind of administrative system had, nevertheless, prevailed which induced the sepoys, after the term of their service under the British flag had expired, to settle in their native country. More than that, after the natives of Oudh had had one year's experience of British government as administered by Mr. Coverley Jackson and Mr. Martin Gubbins, they, one and all, evinced a strong preference for the native government which had been superseded.

It is necessary to take all these circumstances into consideration when one analyses the effect which the annexation of Oudh produced upon the sepoys of the Bengal army. In my belief that annexation gave them the greatest shock they had felt since the
occurrences, already adverted to, of 1843. It was the last and the most fatal blow to their belief in British honesty. It made them ready to become the tools of any adventurer.

It was not only that they be held in that annexation a lowering of their own position as men represented at their sovereign's court by a British resident, though that was a blow under which the Indian army yet reels. They beheld in that act, and in the manner in which it was carried out, a deliberate infringement of promises they had ever looked upon as sacred, a repayment for the good services of nearly a century such as even the most abandoned amongst their own princes would have hesitated to enforce.

These are not statements made at random. It devolved upon the officer of the Commissariat Department of the Kanhpur division to supply carriage and provisions for the force which, under Outram, crossed the Ganges into Oudh at the end of 1855. Over that officer's house and office, which were in the same compound, was a sepoy guard—a sergeant's party. Contrary to custom and to departmental instructions, no written orders were given to that officer for the requisitions. The expedition was to be a secret, he was told, and he must obey verbal orders. But, in spite of this mystery, the destination of the force became known before it set out to every sepoy in the cantonment, to every native in the town. The effect was alarming. The natives had no doubt whatever as to the real meaning of the demonstration. For the first time in the memory of man an English regiment was about to march on Lakhnao, and an English regiment would march on Lakhnao with but one object. The agitation of the sepoys of the guard was a circumstance never to be forgotten. They were with great difficulty controlled, and the subordinates of the Commissariat Department assured their officer that a similar feeling was manifesting itself in every regiment in the place. The officer made no secret of these manifestations. He reported them in the proper quarter. He communicated them even to one of the officials, a man of remarkable gifts, who had accepted a high post in Oudh; but his warnings found no more credence than did the warnings of Cassandra. They were remembered afterwards. The annexation of Oudh, keeping in view the way in which it was carried out, was, in very deed, the act which finally broke the trust of the sepoys in their English masters. The perpetration of that deed prepared their minds to receive and to believe any matter, however absurd in itself, which might betoken English perfidy. How their minds were played upon I shall show presently. Meanwhile it is necessary that I should indicate how it was that the landowners and agricultural classes of India became impressed with the bad faith of their rulers.

The internal annexation policy inaugurated by the Lord Dalhousie was, in many instances, based upon his refusal to recognize a right which the Hindus hold as an essential part of their religion—the right to adopt an heir on the failure of children lawfully begotten. In the early part of this volume I have spoken of the disaffection, the terror, the hatred of the English which this policy produced in the southern Maratha country. Carrying out this principle Lord Dalhousie had annexed the territory of the
Bhonslas, he had annexed the state of Jhansi, he had endeavored to annex the state of Karauli, and had only been prevented by the interference of the Home Government on a threatened motion in the House of Commons. Still he continued to hold the principle in terrorem over the heads of the princes and chiefs of India, and the fact that such a principle was held in esteem by the paramount power, and might, on the occurrence of death without natural heirs, be applied, produced, it is not too much to say, "a terror" in the minds of the Hindu princes throughout India.

But in another and a far more guiltless manner the Government had sown the seeds of hatred in the minds of the representatives of great families whose ancestors they had deprived of their dominions. Two instances of the action of this policy will occur at once to the reader—Nana Sahib and the Rao of Kirwi. Nana Sahib was indubitably the lawful representative, according to Hindu law, of the last of the Peshwas. When, in June 1818 Baji Rao surrendered to Sir John Malcolm, the Court of Directors considered that a life annuity of eighty thousand pounds was more than an adequate compensation for the loss of an empire. Baji Rajo lived in the enjoyment of this pension nearly thirty-five years. When he died, in January 1853, Lord Dalhousie refused either to recognize his adopted son or to continue the pension.

According to European ideas this ruling was perfectly just. It strictly carried out the agreement made by Sir John Malcolm in 1818. But it was, nevertheless, totally repugnant to the ideas and opposed to the customs of the races of Hindustan. With them it was a point of honor to recognize in the son, whether begotten or adopted, the successor to the titles of his father. Whether the English recognized him or not, Nana Sahib was still Peshwa in the eyes of every true Maratha. The refusal to recognize him and the stoppage of the pension forced the heir of the Peshwa to conspire. It can easily be conceived how readily such a man, occupying a fortified palace close to the Oudh frontier, would hail and encourage the discontent which the—in the minds of the natives—nefarious annexation of Oudh could not fail to produce.

The story of the Rao of Kirwi is similar in character and in application.

159 I recollect well when I was at Banaras in 1851-52, the Governor-General's agent, Major Stewart, a man of great culture and information, told me that there was living then, in extreme poverty, in the Mirzapur jungles, near Banaras, a man recognized by the natives as the lineal descendant of Chit Singh, raja of Bananas, expelled by Warren Hastings in 1781, and that to that day the natives salaamed to him and treated him with the respect due to the raja.

160 I may be permitted to note here another instance in which the British Government has applied the same unjust principle. When in 1845 and 1848-49 England waged war with the Sikhs, the King of Lahor was a minor, under the tutelage of his mother, and in no respects responsible for the occurrences which in either instance led to the war. Yet in 1849, although his irresponsibility was officially admitted, he was treated as though he was in all respects the guilty party. The British annexed his kingdom and gave him in exchange a life pension. The matter has only to be seriously examined for the injustice to become apparent. Most of the nobles of the Panjab, who secretly fomented the wars of 1845 and 1848, were secured in the possession of their estates, and their position, under English rule, has become trebly secure. But Maharaja Dhulip Singh, who was a mere child, innocent of intrigue, was
We see, then, how many of the princes and the chiefs of India in possession, and all the chiefs not in possession, were predisposed to view with at least indifference any troubles which might assail their British over-lord. Incidents like that of the raja of Dilheri came at uncertain intervals to add to the general mistrust. Such incidents affected alike chieftain and retainer, noble and peasant, for in many parts of the country the latter considered their interests as bound up with those of the former.

It was when the minds of all were thus distrustful that the annexation of Oudh—of Oudh which had ever been faithful, always true and loyal—came to startle them still more. It is just within the bounds of possibility that if the system introduced by the English into Oudh had been administered in a conciliatory manner the result might have been similar to that which was produced in a few years in the central provinces. But the Englishmen to whom the administration of the newly annexed province was entrusted were men with fixed ideas, which they rode to death; the slaves of a system which they carried out without regard to the feelings and previous habits of those with whose lands and property they were dealing. In less than twelve months the result was disaffection and dismay. The new settlement made the men of Oudh rebels at heart.

With Oudh thus disaffected, the chiefs and the territorial interest doubting and trembling, with the sepoys alienated and mistrustful, there needed but one other element to produce insurrection. The country, the army, the newly-annexed province were alike ready for the machinations of conspirators.

The conspirators, too, were ready. Who all those conspirators were may never certainly be known. Most of them died and made no sign. It is, however, a fact beyond question that the Moulvi of Faizabad—the man who was killed at Powain—was one of them. I have already given a sketch of the previous career of this man. I have shown how, after the annexation of Oudh, he travelled all over the north-west provinces on a mission which was a mystery to the Europeans; how he was suspected even then of conspiring. Abundant proofs were subsequently obtained that a conspiracy had been formed by some influential people in Oudh in the interval between the annexation and the outbreak of the mutiny. Of this conspiracy the Moulvi was undoubtedly a leader. It had its ramifications all over India—certainly at A'gra, where the Moulvi stayed some time, and almost certainly at Dehli, at Mirath, at Patna, and at Calcutta, where the ex-king of Oudh and a large following were residing.

For some time there was one thing wanting to the conspirators—the means, the instrument—with which to kindle to action the great body of their countrymen. Especially were they at a loss how to devise a scheme by which the minds of the sepoys awarded in exchange for his kingdom and its princely revenues a life annuity only — an annuity which will expire with his life. Yet his children are the children of one who was once King of Lahor! Can we wonder that treatment of this sort sinks deep into the hearts of the natives?
serving throughout the Bengal Presidency should be simultaneously affected. They were in this perplexity when they heard of the new cartridge—a cartridge smeared with animal fat and which they were told was to be bitten.

It was easy for them to make this discovery. Their spies were everywhere. The cartridges were openly manufactured at Damdam. Eagerly looking out for a novelty to be introduced from Europe into the native army, they were the most likely men of all to hit upon the greased cartridge. They had no sooner found it than they felt they had the weapon required. Instantly the chapatties were distributed by thousands to the rural population, whilst means were employed to disseminate in every military station in Bengal the information regarding the cartridge.

To tell a body of Hindus already suspicious of their foreign master that they would be required to bite a cartridge smeared with the fat of their sacred animal, and to tell Muhammadans that they would be required to bite a cartridge smeared with the fat of an animal whose flesh was forbidden to them, was tantamount to tell them that their foreign master intended to make them break with their religion. Certainly that result was produced. When the new cartridges were issued suspicion and calumny had done their work. The sepoys even believed that cartridges made of paper had been feloniously tampered with; and, when they were issued to them, they broke into revolt.

In this lesser sense, then, and in this only, did the cartridges produce the mutiny. They were the instrument used by conspirators; and those conspirators were successful in their use of the instrument only because, in the manner I have endeavored to point out, the minds of the sepoys and of certain sections of the population had been prepared to believe every act testifying to bad faith on the part of their foreign masters.

I have said that the mistrust of the British faith had, towards the year 1857, become as great in the minds of the princes and chiefs and landowners of India as in the minds of the sepoys. There were, however, a few exceptions, and, when the country rose, those exceptions saved us. I will briefly refer to the most prominent amongst them.

In four great provinces of our empire—in Oudh, in Rohilkhand, in Bandalkhand, and in the Sagar and Narbada territory—the great bulk of the people rose against British rule. In western Bihar, using that geographical expression as inclusive of the districts subordinate to the Commissioner of Patna, in many districts of the Allahabad division, in the A'gra division, and in many parts of the Mirath division, the risings of the people and the sepoys were almost simultaneous in point of time. Had the revolt been universal, had the chiefs, the people, and the sepoys risen at one and the same moment, India could not have been held. Fortunately for British interests, the great prince who occupied the most important position in India, and whose action, had he risen, would have been felt to the extremities of western India, was, throughout the crisis, loyal to his
suzerain. Throughout the period between the 12th of May and the 1st of September 1857 Sindia held the fate of India in his hands.

In another volume I have described very briefly how it was that in an unexampled crisis in the fortunes of the people with whom his ancestors had contended for empire, Sindia did remain loyal. I have shown that the loyalty did not proceed from affection towards the English. His minister and confidant, Dinkar Rao, had no love for our nation. Sindia's people were, almost to a man, against us. Yet Dinkar Rao used all his great influence in favor of a loyal policy, and his representations, backed by the solid arguments of the able representative of the British power at the court of Sindia, Major Charters Macpherson, prevailed over national sentiment, the solicitations of other courtiers, and the boisterous demonstrations of the people. The importance of the result to English interests cannot be over-estimated. Sindia's loyalty alone made possible Havelock's march on, and the retention of, Kanhpur. It acted at the same time on the rebels like a wedge which pierces the centre of an army, dividing the wings, and preventing concentrated action. Nor, when, after the back of rebellion had been broken, Sindia's army revolted against himself, was the effect much lessened. Sindia's great influence was still used for the English.

In considering Sindia's loyalty in connection with the risings of others—of all, or almost all, the rajas and talukdars of Oudh, of the chiefs in Bandalkhand, in the Sagar and Narbada territory, in the southern Maratha country, and in western Bihar—it is impossible to shut our eyes to the fact that there had been a marked difference in the behavior of the British Government towards Sindia on the one side, and towards the rajas and landowners of the countries mentioned on the other. Under circumstances of a peculiarly tempting character, Lord Ellenborough had behaved with the greatest generosity and forbearance towards Sindia in 1844. The Government had kept faith with him ever since. The reader of this volume will see that towards the rajas and landowners of the other provinces mentioned the British Government had shown neither generosity nor forbearance. In some instances they had not even kept faith. It is scarcely necessary to point the moral.

It is, indeed, a very remarkable fact, and one which the rulers of India at the present moment would do well to bear in mind that in the several provinces and districts traversed by our troops in 1857-8-9, the behavior of the people corresponded to the character of our rule. Thus, in the Central Provinces, to which the regulation system had never penetrated, the people were loyal and contented, and refused all aid to Tantia Topi. In the Sagar and Narbada territories, in Oudh and in the districts bordering on that province, in the A'gra division—in all of which the British hand had been heavy, and the British acts opposed to the national sentiment—the people showed a spirit of opposition, a resolution to fight to the last, and in many cases a detestation of their masters, such as no one would before have credited. Cases similar to that of the raja of
Dilheri referred to in the earlier part of this volume, had sown far and wide the seed of disaffection and revolt.

If these facts are, as I believe them to be, correct, we have not to go far to seek the conclusion. The mutiny of the army and the insurrection in the provinces I have named were the natural consequences of an attempt to govern a great Eastern empire according to pure Western ideas.

The civilization, over-refined though it might be, of thousands of years was ridiculed by the rougher race which, scorning sentiment, regarded utilitarianism as its foundation-stone. The governing members of that race failed to recognize the great truth upon which their forefathers had built their Indian empire, that the Western race can gain the confidence of the Eastern only when it scrupulously respects the long-cherished customs of the latter, and impresses upon it the conviction that its word is better than its bond. This is just the conviction which, during the thirty years immediately antecedent to 1856, the majority of the Hindus and Muhammadans of India had been gradually losing, and which in 1857 they had lost.

If Lord Canning had had any idea in the early part of 1857 that the isolated outbreaks which then disturbed the general serenity were part of an organized plot, he would, I believe, have at once taken measures to meet the difficulty. Not that, at any time in 1857, he could have prevented a mutiny, but he could easily have made better arrangements to meet one. I am far, however, from imputing any blame to Lord Canning in this respect. He had but recently arrived in India. His predecessor, when making over to him charge of the empire, had expressed his conviction that never had the country been in so satisfactory condition. All the time the ground was undermined, the train was being laid, the miners were at work. But how was Lord Canning to know this? He inherited Lord Dalhousie's councilors. They were as satisfied, and as ignorant of the real state of the country, as was Lord Dalhousie. Lord Dalhousie had quitted India in a blaze of glory; and the new Governor-General, unused to the currents of Indian thought, could for some months only steer the vessel by the advice of the officers who had helped to bring to Lord Dalhousie a renown far-reaching and seemingly well-deserved.

But, in fact, upon no men did the news of the mutiny descend with so startling a surprise as upon the councilors of Lord Canning. They could not comprehend it. Weeks and weeks elapsed before they could bring themselves to believe that it was anything more than a fortuitous explosion at various points, each having no concert and no connection with the other. The Home Secretary's assurances that the apprehensions expressed regarding its nature were "a passing and groundless panic," that "there is every hope that in a few days tranquility will be restored throughout the presidency," testify to the ideas that filled the minds of these men. The admission at least is due to them that they were honest—they believed what they said. But those sayings betrayed a
complete ignorance of the country and of the situation. This ignorance, this blindness to
the fact that it was more even than a mutiny of the Bengal army, and not merely a series
of isolated revolts, with which they had to cope, was illustrated in a thousand ways, but
in none more strongly than in the refusal to disarm regiments which were known to be
mutinous. The consequences of this refusal were most serious. In the case of the
regiments at Danapur, the reader will have seen that it brought revolt into western
Bihar, added enormously to the dangers of Havelock, and even imperiled Calcutta.

How great Lord Canning really was, how small were his councilors, was shown when,
having completely shaken off their influence, he stood alone and unshackled at
Allahabad in the early part of 1858. A different man was he then from the Lord Canning
of April and May 1857. His nature then displayed itself in its real nobility. His grasp of
affairs, at Calcutta apparently so small, excited at Allahabad the admiration of all who
came in contact with him. He showed a truer insight into the military position than the
Commander-in-Chief himself. It was entirely owing to Lord Canning's insistence that
the campaign in Rohilkhand followed close upon the capture of Lakhnao. Sir Cohn
Campbell would have postponed it. But Lord Canning was too convinced of the danger
of allowing a province to continue to flaunt rebellion, unchecked, in the face of the
Government to permit the delay. He insisted with all the determination of a man whose
resolution, based on the logic of facts, was not to be shaken. It was Lord Canning at
Allahabad who gave his fullest support to Sir Hugh Rose, and to the generals engaged
against Tantia Topi; and if, in one respect, to which I have adverted, his judgment was
faulty, his companion in error was the Commander-in-Chief, and the error was a
solitary one.

Nor is lesser praise due to him for the measures inaugurated at Allahabad to heal the
wounds caused—he must have seen—in a great measure by the mistakes of his
predecessors. His Oudh proclamation, despite of the apparently harsh terms which it
contained, was intended as a message of mercy, and, in its application, was a message
of mercy. It gave every landowner in Oudh a title better, safer, more valid than the title
he had lost. It ensured mercy to all except to those who by their crimes had forfeited all
right to it. interpreted as Lord Canning meant it to be interpreted, by one of the ablest
administrators in India, it became the charter upon which the position now occupied by
the people of Oudh has been built up and secured.

Never was the real greatness of Lord Canning's character more completely displayed
than when the galling strictures of Lord Ellenborough's dispatch were published to the
world. At the moment the insult, the breach of etiquette, were lost sight of in the fear
lest the condemnation of his policy proceeding from so high a quarter should afford
encouragement to the rebels or weaken the attachment of the native tributaries. As soon
as he ascertained that the dispatch had not produced that result he was calm. He could
not help seeing that it was designedly impertinent, that it was intended to provoke him
to resign. Conscious of the rectitude of his motives and of the soundness of his views,
he laughed at the pettiness of the display. In his calm and statesmanlike answer, he sought neither revenge nor triumph. But both soon came to him. The news that Lord Ellenborough had been hoisted with his own petard, the receipt of Lord Derby’s almost imploring letter not to resign, followed the insulting missive with a rapidity almost startling.

Towards the men who served under him, Lord Canning displayed generosity, kindness, and forbearance. He knew that in many departments he had been badly served, yet he would rather bear the burden himself than dismiss the incapable minister. But so low did he rate the abilities of the men about him, that when he had resolved to appoint Mr. Edmonstone Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, he cast his eyes far from the men surrounding him to select a successor to that official. He had actually resolved to offer the post to Herbert Edwardes when the publication by that officer of a letter, violently polemical, caused him to reconsider his resolve. For the moment he was cast back upon the clique about him, but finally he made an admirable choice in Durand.

Judging Lord Canning’s conduct after his arrival at Allahabad, it is difficult to find a fault in it. He was then the lofty-minded English gentleman, the trained and skilful statesman. Every day made it more clear that the mistakes of the Calcutta period, mistakes which have been fully recorded in these volumes, were due to the inexperience of a generous nature guided by men whom he had been told to look upon as masters of the situation, but who were in fact hopelessly ignorant and incapable. That Lord Canning came to know this himself was evidenced by the generosity he displayed, after the mutiny had been quelled, to those who had ventured to express very boldly their disagreement with his policy of 1857.

But if Lord Canning was to be admired from the time of his arrival at Allahabad, Lord Elphinstone deserves the fullest meed of praise that can be accorded to him from the very first. Lord Elphinstone possessed this advantage over Lord Canning—he had previous experience in India that had given him a thorough knowledge of the country and the people. When the mutiny broke out at Mirath he saw it as it really was; he saw that it was no isolated outbreak, no local discontent, but part and parcel of an organized rebellion which had its main roots, indeed, in the North-West Provinces, but the development of which, especially in the direction of Bombay, was certain, unless it could be promptly stopped. The Bombay Presidency, in fact, with an army partly recruited from Oudh, and composed mainly of a conglomeration of Maratha states, was in a peculiar degree, susceptible. Lord Elphinstone understood the situation at once. He dealt with it in a manner possible only to a statesman of high and lofty courage, of a clear intellect and of far-seeing views. The idea of waiting for the mutiny within his own borders, if, indeed, it ever occurred to him, came only to be promptly rejetted. To mass the greatest number of men on the decisive point of the scene of action—that Napoleonic motto became at once his principle. For that purpose he denuded his own presidency, highly sensitive as
it was, of European troops, and dispatched them as fast as he could force them to move
to the threatened points outside of it. He, too, like Lord Canning, had colleagues in his
government, but here again his previous experience saved him from the mistakes which
marred Lord Canning's administration during the first seven months of the mutiny.
Knowing his counselors thoroughly, he listened to them with courtesy—but he acted on
his own convictions. To the men who were the instruments of his policy he gave the
most complete and generous confidence. How large was his trust when he once gave it
Mr. Forjett is a living evidence. Mr. Frere in Sindh, Mr. Seton-Karr and afterwards
Colonel Le G. Jacob in the southern Maratha country, Mr. John Rose in Satarah, and
Colonel Malcolm, are instances of a similar import. When, in spite of all his measures to
keep the mutiny from Bombay by a policy of offensive defence, the poison crept in and
infected the regiments of the regular army in the southern Maratha, country, how
vigorous, how decided is his policy! We see here none of the hesitation, of the half-
heartedness, the halting between two extremes, which enabled the mutinous regiments
of Dinapur to disturb all the plans of the Government and to imperil the safety of the
empire. Promptly, without an hour's delay, Lord Elphinstone sent for the fittest man at
his disposal and told him to go to Kolhapur and at all costs quell the mutiny. Le Grand
Jacob went and disarmed the rebellious sepoys. How Lord Elphinstone was
occasionally thwarted by men not immediately under his orders has been shown in the
ease of Woodburn. But his firmness was proof even against opposition of this
description, and, after some vexatious delay, he carried out his policy.

Only those who have enjoyed the privilege of reading his voluminous correspondence
during 1857-58 can form an idea of the remarkable perspicacity which characterized
Lord Elphinstone's views on every point connected with the stirring events of those
years. The strong and the weak points of a case, the true policy to be pursued, the
proper time for putting it in action, when to withhold the blow, when to strike, the
reasons for withholding or for striking, are laid down in clear and vigorous language in
his letters. Reading them after the event, it seems marvelous how a man standing alone
should have judged so clearly, so truly. Many of the military movements which tended
to the pacification of the country had their first inspiration from Lord Elphinstone, and
the smallest of the tardy tributes that can be paid him is this—that no man in India
contributed so much as he contributed to check the mutiny at its outset; no man
contributed more to dominate it after it had risen to its greatest height.

In the glory of the victory, amid the bestowal of well-merited rewards for military
services, the great deserts of Lord Elphinstone received but small notice from the public.
But it is a remarkable fact that after the death of Sir Henry Lawrence he was nominated
by three successive secretaries of state—by Mr. Vernon Smith, by Lord Ellenborough,
and by Lord Stanley—to be successor to Lord Canning in the event of a vacancy
occurring in the office of Governor-General. It now becomes the duty of the historian to
place him on the lofty pedestal to whirl" his great services and his pure and noble
character entitle him.
The southern presidency was never invaded by the mutinous spirit. But not the less is a large share of credit due to its governor, Lord Harris. The responsibility which weighed upon this nobleman was very great indeed. The immunity of Madras depended upon the loyalty of the Nizam, and, at the outset, the Nizam had much to apprehend from his own people. It was in the height of the crisis that Lord Harris denuded his own presidency to send troops to Haidarabad, and it cannot be doubted but that their opportune arrival tended greatly to the pacification of the Nizam's dominions. The formation of the Kampti column, of Whitlock's force, of the brigade which fought under Carthew at Kanhpur, the dispatch to Bengal of the regiments which kept open the grand trunk road in western Bihar and who afterwards cooperated against Kunwar Singh, of the troops who rendered good service in Chutia Nagpur, testify to the energy, the foresight, the devotion of the Governor of Madras. He used all the resources of his presidency to crush outside the rebellion which never penetrated within his own borders.

Of other actors in the rise, progress, and suppression of the rebellion I have written in the body of this history, not always, perhaps, in as full detail as their splendid services demanded, but, I hope, in full proportion to the scope and requirements of the work entrusted to me. It may be that some incidents have escaped me. I shall regret much should such prove to be so, for my chief anxiety has been to render full justice to every man. This, at least, I may say, that, however ineffectively the history of the Indian mutiny may at any time be told, the character of our countrymen must be seen to emerge from the terrible ordeal of 1857-58 in a form that would gratify the most exacting people. We are, fortunately, as a nation, accustomed to success in the field, but on no occasion in our history has the nerve and fibre of our troops, or the fortitude and manliness of our countrymen of all ranks, been more conspicuous—often in the face of death itself, or under circumstances which would have seemed to justify despair. But with life they never despaired. They endured all that had to be endured, with a patience and cheerfulness never to be surpassed, and sought victory when it was possible with a determination before which the strongest opposition had to yield. And in all this they were sustained and animated by our countrywomen, who, in positions and under trials to which few gentle-nurtured women have been subjected, showed all the noblest and most loveable aspects of a woman's character. The history of the Indian mutiny is, in fact, a record of the display of all the qualities for which Englishmen have been famous—of the qualities which enabled the inhabitants of a small island in the Atlantic to accumulate the noblest and largest empire in the world, and which, so long as they remain unimpaired in their descendants, will maintain it.
APPENDIX A.

Reference to Volume II.

The Services of the Artillery during the Street-fighting at Dehli.

WHEN the third column entered the city through the Kashmir gate, it was followed by Major Scott's light field battery (No. 14). Heavy fighting was going on in the streets. Two guns, under Lieutenant M. M. FitzGerald, were at once sent to Ahmad Ali Khan's house on the right of the College gardens, to support the 60th regiment, which was soon after joined by the 52nd. Two guns, under Lieutenant Minto Elliot, joined the Biluchis and 61st regiment in the College gardens, where Lieutenant Elliot was soon dangerously wounded. The remaining two guns, under Lieutenant Aislabie, joined Nicholson's column just as it had been compelled to retire to the Kabul gate, and assisted in all the subsequent fighting of that column until the capture of the Lithor gate. FitzGerald's and Elliot's guns were more or less actively engaged in all the street-fighting that took place on the left and centre, including the capture of the magazine and bank. The losses of the battery in men and horses were considerable, but not greater than were to be expected when maneuvering in narrow streets under constant musketry-fire from the houses. They remained in the city, horses in harness, without relief until late on the 17th of September, when they were sent back to Ludlow Castle very used up. A detachment of the gunners, under Lieutenant Aislabie, was retained in the College gardens until the 20th of September. The, manned some heavy mortars and howitzers there, and shelled the palace and the bridge of boats.

The 5th troop 1st brigade (native) Bengal horse artillery was the only battery of native artillery which remained faithful to us when it had the chance of mutinying. It was quartered at Jalandhar when the mutiny occurred there. Lieutenant Benny then marched it to Dehli. On the 9th of July, after the fanatic attack by the rebel cavalry on the right of our camp, it was thought advisable to take away its guns and horses as a precautionary measure. The native officers and men begged to be allowed to prove their loyalty, and were placed in charge of the mortar battery on the ridge, which they manned and worked without relief until the end of the siege.

On the 14th of September Lieutenant Benny took some of these native gunners into the city with him. They carried by hand a couple of 12-pounder mortars, and were usefully employed in shelling the houses and streets in front of our attack. Lieutenant Benny himself earned the Victoria Cross for gallant conduct at the attack on the magazine, and the loyalty of his troop was a striking proof of his personal influence. When the city had fallen, guns and horses were restored to him, and the 5th troop 1st brigade did gallant service in the Rohilkhand campaign.
APPENDIX B.

Reference to Volume II.

I REGRET that, in describing somewhat in detail the stimulating effect on the provision of means for the equipment and progress of the army produced by the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell in Calcutta in August 1857, I should have seemed to undervalue the services of a most distinguished officer, Major, now General, Orfeur Cavenagh. I take the earliest opportunity of endeavoring to supply the omission. The Government of India had not under its orders in Calcutta an officer more deserving, or who rendered in that city such excellent service as did Major Cavenagh. In the early stages of the mutiny, and before the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell, it was Major Orfeur Cavenagh who, as town and fort-major of Fort William, had officially represented to the Government the necessity for being prepared to receive the expected reinforcements. He had suggested that he should be allowed an assistant who should superintend all disembarkations, render any assistance to commanding officers on their arrival, and have under his charge a staff of servants to be kept complete and allotted to troops on their arrival. As usual, Cavenagh's suggestions were negatived, though permission was given him to entertain the servants should he consider it necessary to do so. On this permission he acted, and, throughout the mutiny, under his own superintendence, he kept up a body of native servants. Eventually a disembarkation officer was appointed, not, however, as assistant to the town-major. To enable this officer to carry out his duties successfully, Cavenagh directed his own subordinates to recognize him and afford him every aid as though he were his assistant.
APPENDIX C.

Reference to Vol. II.

"He ordered on this duty a company of the 90th foot, under Captain Wolseley, and a picket of the 53rd, sixty strong, under Captain Hopkins, Major Barnston's battalion of detachments, under Captain Guise of the 90th, and some of the 4th Panjab rifles, under Lieutenant Powlett.

"The feat of arms devolving upon these men to attempt was no light one. The Mess-house, a building of considerable size, was surrounded by a loop-holed mud wall, covermg a ditch about twelve feet broad, scarped with masonry. The ditch was traversed by drawbridges, but whether these were up or not was unknown to the storming party.

"I must deal first with Hopkins. Leading his men at the double across the intervening space, exposed to a hot fire from the neighboring buildings, that most daring officer reached the mud wall of which I have spoken, dashed over it, crossed the drawbridge, fortunately left down, and entered the Mess-house. Shortly after Hopkins had thus gained the place, Roberts of the Artillery—now Sir Frederic Roberts of Afghan celebrity—galloped up, handed him a Union Jack and requested him to hoist it on one of the turrets. Followed by one of his men, Hopkins ran to the top of the roof, and giving three cheers, planted the Union Jack on the summit. The cheers were responded to by a shout from the men, but the flag had not been up ten minutes before a round shot cut it and sent it down into the garden. Again did Hopkins plant it and again was it knocked down. He wished to hoist it again, but an order from the Commander-in-Chief arrived forbidding its further display. Whilst searching for the flagstaff in the garden Hopkins met Sir Colin and, after a brief colloquy, was at once placed in command of the Mess-house by the Chief of the Staff. He never left it till relieved the following afternoon by Captain Rolleston, 84th regiment. Wolseley, on his side, assaulting the place from a different point, had attacked the houses on the right of the building, whilst Irby, with a company of the supports, attempted to clear those on the left. Both attacks were successful, and the rebels, driven out, fled in panic to the Moti Mahal.\footnote{\footnotetext{"About 5 P.M., when it was considered that men might be sent to storm it " (the Mess-house), " it was taken by a company of the 90th under Captain Wolseley and a picket of H.M.'s 63rd under Captain Hopkins, supported by Major Barnston's battalion of detachments under Captain Guise H.M.'s 90th, and some of the Panjab infantry under Lieutenant Powlett. The Mess-house was carried with a rash." —Sir Colin Campbell's Dispatch.}}
APPENDIX D.

Reference to Volume II.

THE statement made by me in the first edition of the second volume regarding the part taken by Brigadier Napier in the plan for the attack on Lakhnao having been taken objection to, I drew attention in the second edition to the official papers on the subject extracted from Volume X. of Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers. I now attach extract from a letter, dated the 4th of February 1858, addressed by Brigadier Napier to Sir Colin Campbell containing his proposals for the attack—all of which were accepted and carried out.

"MY DEAR SIR COLIN,

"I am afraid you will be disappointed at not receiving the projects, but our people have been bringing a considerable amount of intelligence to fill up our plans, which have tempted me to enter into details. I may, however, briefly state that, notwithstanding the enemy has made a good many defenses and thrown up a ditch and rampart round the north side of the Kaisar Bagh, and has endeavored to cut away all the passages across the canal, I do not apprehend any great difficulty.

"I would propose to encamp the force sufficiently far behind the Dilkusha to be out of fire; to establish a bridge on the Gumti to pass over artillery and cavalry, to cut off the enemy's supplies, and to deter them from bringing out guns on the north side of the river to annoy us.

"To cross the canal in the first instance at Banks's house, under cover of our artillery, and to place guns in position to bear on the mass of buildings which flank the European infantry barracks, the hospital, the Begam's house, and the Hazratganj—the places which rendered the European barracks so barely tenable—and to take that mass of buildings with the barracks.

"This position takes in flank all the defenses of the north side of the Kaisar Bagh, and from them we may penetrate gradually to the Kaisar Bagh with the aid of the sapper and gunpowder, at the same time that we will occupy your old ground between the Kaisar Bagh and the Gumti, to have positions for our artillery of all kinds to play on the Kaisar Bagh and its surrounding buildings. We shall, during this time, be steadily penetrating through the buildings on the left of the European barracks, making irresistible progress until we reach the Kaisar Bagh."
"Until we take that place we shall have as little street-fighting as is possible, and I hardly expect they will await an assault. But if they should do so, and defend the remainder of the city, we must advance, under cover of our mortars, until we occupy the bridges, which will certainly clear off the remainder, or they will starve.

"Jallalabad will be our depot, and when we have got the enemy's guns driven off, we may bring our park up to the Dilkusha.

"I should have chosen your old passage across the canal but the enemy have cut a new one across the neck of a loop, and have put guns behind it, so that, as far as the intelligence guides us, Banks's house will be easier."
APPENDIX E.

Reference to Volume II.

ON the subject of the panic in Calcutta of the 3rd of March 1858, the following particulars have been furnished me by General Orfeur Cavenagh:—"On the 2nd of March, about 6 P.M., I received a note from General Ramsay stating that he had received information that arms had been collected in the suburbs of Calcutta for the purpose of being distributed amongst the men of the Reserve guard, on their march down to the fort, to enable them to make an attack on the European residents. The general begged me to be on the alert, and to cause a search to be made for the arms. Mr. Dorin was then President of the Council, and I rode over to his house and showed him the note. He requested me to instruct the civil authorities to make the requisite search for the arms, and to quietly intimate to commanding officers, including Turnbull, who commanded the volunteers, that it was possible that the services of the troops might be required, so that they might be ready to turn out if necessary. No orders were given for any pickets to be posted, nor was the garrison guard under arms. It was late before I returned to the fort, as I had to ride over to A'lipur to see F__, who was the magistrate by whom orders for the search had to be made. Only a few muskets were discovered. This was the real cause of the alarm to which you refer. I was rather surprised at hearing of the excitement that had taken place in Calcutta."
APPENDIX F.

Translation of ninth,. Topi's Voluntary Deposition or Statement taken in Camp Mushairi on the 10th of April 1859, in presence of Major Meade, commanding Field Force.

MY name is Tantia Topi; my father's name is Pandurang, inhabitant of Jola-Pargannah, Patoda-Zillah, Nagar. I am a resident of Bithur. I am about forty-five years of age, in the service of Nana Sahib in the grade of companion or aide-de-camp.

In the month of May 1857 the collector of Kanhpur sent a note of the following purport to the Nina Sahib at Bithur, viz. that he begged him (the Nana) to forward his wife and children to England. The Nana consented to do so, and four days afterwards the collector wrote to him to bring his troops and guns with him from Bithur (to Kanhpur). I went with the Nina and about one hundred sepoys and three hundred matchlock men and two guns to the collector's house at Kanhpur. The collector was then in the entrenchment, and not in his house. He sent us word to remain, and we stopped at his house during the night. The collector came in the morning and told the Nina to occupy his own house, which was in Kinhpar. We accordingly did so; we remained there four days, and the gentleman said it was fortunate we had come to his aid, as the sepoys had become disobedient, and that he would apply to the general in our behalf. He did so, and the general wrote to A'gra, whence a reply came that arrangements would be made for the pay of our men. Two days afterwards the three regiments of infantry and the 2nd light cavalry surrounded us and imprisoned the Nana and myself in the Treasury, and plundered the magazine and Treasury of everything they contained, leaving nothing in either. Of the treasure the sepoys made over two lakhs and eleven thousand rupees to the Nana, keeping their own sentries over it. The Nina was also under charge of these sentries, and the sepoys who were with us also joined the rebels. After this the whole army marched from that place and the rebels took the Nina Sahib and myself and all our attendants along with them, and said, "Come along to Dehli." Having gone three coss from Kanhpur, the Nina Sahib said that, as the day was far spent, it was better to halt there then, and to march on the following day. They agreed to this and halted. In the morning the whole army told him (the Nana) to go with them towards Dehli. The Nana refused, and the army then said, "Come with us to Kanhpur, and fight there." The Nana objected to this; but they would not attend to him, and. so, taking him with them as a prisoner, they went towards Kanhpur, and fighting commenced there. The fighting continued for twenty-four days, and on the twenty-fourth day the general raised the flag of peace, and the fighting ceased. The Nana got a female who had been captured before to write a note to General Wheeler to this effect, that the sepoys would not obey his orders, and that, if he wished, he (the Nana) would get boats and convey him and
those with him in the entrenchment, as far as Allahabad. An answer came from the general that he approved of this arrangement, and the same evening the general sent the Nina something over one lakh of rupees, and authorized him to keep the amount. The following day I went and got ready forty boats, and having caused all the gentlemen, ladies, and children to get into the boats, I started them off to Allahabad. In the meanwhile the whole army, artillery included, having got ready, arrived at the river Ganges. The sepoys jumped into the water and commenced a massacre of all the men, women, and children, and set the boats on fire. They destroyed thirty-nine boats. One, however, escaped as far as Kola Hanker, but was caught and brought back to Kanhpur, and all on board of it destroyed. Four days after this the Nina said he was going to Bithur to keep the anniversary of his mother's death; they (the sepoys) allowed him to go, and some of them also accompanied him. Having kept the anniversary, they brought him back to Kanhpur, and they took for their pay the money they had first made over to the Nana's charge, and made arrangements to fight against Hussan Fathpur, where they heard some Europeans had arrived from Allahabad, and they told the Nana to accompany them there. The Nana refused. I and the Nana remained at Kanhpur, and sent Joala Parsad, his (the Nana's) agent, along with them to Fathpur. Having arrived there and been defeated, they retreated to Kanhpur, and the aforesaid European force pressed them the whole way to Kanhpur, when there was a battle for about two hours, and the rebel army was again defeated, and ran away from Kanhpur. Under these circumstances the Nana and I fled to Bithur, arriving there at midnight, and the rebel army followed us. The next morning the Nana, taking some cash, &c. with him, went to Fathpur. The rebel army followed, and looted the place. The Nana, Bala Sahib, Rao Sahib, and myself, with all our wives, crossed the Ganges in boats, and arrived at Fathpur in the Lakhnao territory, and put up with the chaodri Bhopal Singh. Some days passed, when the 42nd native infantry arrived at Sheorajpur, and wrote to the Nana to send them someone to take them to him. I went and told them that the Nana had sent for them. In the meanwhile the English army arrived, and the said 42nd regiment native infantry went to Bithur and fought there. I accompanied the said regiment, and having been defeated, we fled from Bithur and crossed the Ganges, and came to the Nana. Some days after, I received orders from the Nina to go to Gwaliar, and to bring back with me to fight the English such of the contingent as were at Morar. According to his order, I went to Morar and brought back the contingent with me to Kalpi. The Nina had sent his brother, the Bala Sahib, to Kalpi, and according to his order, I went with the army to fight against Kanhpur, leaving a small force and magazine at Kalpi. Having arrived at Kanhpur, there was a battle which lasted eleven days. After eleven days the rebel army was defeated, and we all ran away. The next day after this we fought at Sheorijpur, and there also having been defeated, we ran away, having with us fifteen guns (including one horse-artillery gun). I and the Bala Sahib and the Rao Sahib, who had been sent by the Nina to Kanhpur, all crossed the Ganges at Nana Mau-ki-Ghat. We remained at a place called Kheyra, for the night. I got orders from the Rho Sahib to go and take charge of the small force and magazine left at Kalpi, in obedience to which I went there. After my arrival at Kalpi, I received orders from the
Nina to go and attack Chirkari, and that the Rao Sahib should be sent after me. Accordingly I, with nine hundred sepoys, two hundred cavalry, and four guns, went to Chirkari and fighting commenced. Four days afterwards the Rao Sahib came to Kalpi. I fought at Chirkari for eleven days, and took it. I took twenty-four guns and three lakhs of rupees from the raja. The rajas of Banpur and Shahgarh, and Dewan Despat and Daolat Singh, the Kuchwaya Kharwala, and a great gathering of people joined me there at this time. I received a note from the queen of Jhansi to the effect that she was waging war with the Europeans, and begging me to come to her aid. I reported the news to the Rao Sahib at Kilpi. The Rao came to Jaipur, and gave me permission to go to the assistance of the queen of Jhansi. Accordingly I went to Jhansi, and halted at Burma agar. There raja Man Singh came and joined me. The next day, about a mile from Jhansi, the whole of our army had a fight with the English army. At this time we had twenty-two thousand men and twenty-eight guns. In this battle we were defeated. A part of the rebel army, with four or five guns, fled to Kalpi, and I went to the same place, via Bhandheri and Kunch, with two hundred sepoys. The queen of Jhansi arrived there the same evening as myself, and begged the Rao Sahib to give her an army that she might go and fight. The following morning the Rao Sahib ordered a parade of all the troops, and told me to accompany the queen to battle. Accordingly I, with a force, accompanied the queen, and there was a battle at Kunch which lasted till noon. We were again defeated, and fled, and I fled to "Chirki," which is about four miles from Jalaur, and where my parents were. The queen of Jhansi and the force which fled with her arrived at Kalpi. The Rao had a battle afterwards at Kalpi and was defeated, and he and his whole army arrived at Gopalpur. I also left Chirkee, and joined him at Gopalpur; we all marched thence towards Gwalar. We had one day's fight with Maharaja Sindia, and defeated him. Three days afterwards all Sindia's army joined the Rao Sahib, and having procured from the Gwaliar treasury, through Amarchand Batia (the maharaja's treasurer), the requisite funds, pay was distributed to the army. Ram Rao Govind was also with us. Some days afterwards the English army arrived at Gwaliar from Kalpi, and a force also came from Sirpur. Fighting again took place, and continued for four or five days, during which the Jhansi rani was killed. Ram Rao Govind had her corpse burnt, and we were all defeated and fled, taking twenty-five guns with us. We reached Jaora Alipur and remained there during the night. The next morning we were attacked, and fought for an hour and a half. We fired five shots, and the English army fired four shots, and we then ran off, leaving all our guns. We crossed the Chambal, and reached Tank via Sirimuthia. The nawab of Tank fought with us, and we took four guns from him. With these guns we proceeded to Bhilwara via Mandipur and Indragarh. We were there attacked by the English force, and I fled during the night, accompanied. by my army and guns. At that time I had eight or nine thousand men and four guns with me. We all proceeded to a village called Kotra (about four miles from Nathdwarra) and halted there for one night. The next morning we moved towards Patan, and after proceeding about one mile, the English army arrived, and an action took place. We left our four guns and fled, reaching Patan as fugitives. (The nawab of Banda, who had come with us from Kalpi, and the nawab of Kumona, who had joined us at Indurki,
were both with us.) On our arrival at Patan fighting commenced between us and the raja of that place; we conquered, and got possession of all the raja's guns and magazines, and surrounded his palace, in which he was. The next day I went and told the raja to give some money to pay the expenses of my army. He said he could give five lakhs of rupees, but not more. I returned, and told the Rao Sahib this. The next day the Rao Sahib sent for the raja and demanded twenty-five lakhs from him. The raja declared he could not give more than five lakhs; but, after some discussion, it was settled that he should pay fifteen lakhs. The raja said he would go to his palace and send this sum. He went accordingly, and sent two and a quarter lakhs in cash, and promised that the rest should follow. By the next day he had paid up five lakhs.

Imam Ali, Wurdi-major 5th irregular cavalry, ill-treated the raja very much, and the latter fled during the night. We remained there five days, and issued three months' pay to our troops at the rate of thirty rupees each sowar, and twelve rupees to each foot-soldier per mensem.

We then marched for Sironj, taking eighteen guns with us. On reaching Rijgarh the English army came up and attacked us. We left our guns and fled, and reached Sironj via Nija Killa. We halted at Sironj eight days, and having taken four guns from the Tank nawab's agent at Sironj, we proceeded thence to I'sioghar. On arrival there we demanded supplies; but the I'sioghar people would not give them. We therefore attacked I'sioghar, and plundered it. The following day we halted, and the Rao Sahib told me to go to Chandairi, and that he would come round by Tal Bahat. I accordingly went to Chandairi, and the Rao Sahib came to Lallatpur from (or by) Tal Bahat. On my reaching Chandairi, four shots were first fired on us from the fort, which we attacked and fought with Sindia's agent. After three days we marched from Chandairi towards Mangauli, taking with us eleven guns, viz. seven which we had brought from I'sioghar and the four we had got from Sironj. On our march to Mangrauli, we met the English army. Shots were fired for a short time, when we left all our guns and fled. (Of the eleven guns five were with me and six with the Rao Sahib. I lost my five in this fight, but the Rao kept his six.)

(Nora.—It would appear that the Rao was not in this action.)

I reached Jaklom, and the next day went to Sulantpur, where the Rao Sahib also arrived. After three days the English force arrived, and the Rao Sahib took his army to Jaklom (about five miles from Lallatpur), and some firing took place there. I was not present in this fight. The Rao Sahib returned to Lallatpur, and the following day proceeded to Kajuria (ten miles from Sulantpur) and halted there. The next day the English army came up just as we were going to march, and an action commenced which lasted an hour and a half. We then left all our guns and fled, and reached Tal Bahat. We halted there, and the following day went to Jaklom, and thence to a village called Itaia, twelve miles distant, where we stopped. We there heard that the English army was coming to
surprise us, and marched at night. The English force came up in the morning, and our army became separated. I accompanied the Rao Sahib, and we proceeded, via Rajghar, and crossed the Narbada, and got to Kaogaon Battle via Kandula. The troops who were with us burned the Government thanna and bungalow at Kandula. The Rao Sahib forbade their doing so, but they would not obey him. This was about four months ago. At Kaogaon Battle there were some of Holkar's troops—one hundred and forty sowars, one company of infantry, and two guns. These we forced to join us, and took them with us when we marched the following day towards Gujrat, crossing the high road where the telegraph-wire ran. The sepoys broke the wire and plundered seven hackeries which were on the road proceeding with Government property towards Gwalior, and seized the *chuprassis* and *chaukidars* who were with the hackeries, and took them with them. Some of the *chaukidars* belonging to the *chauki* were hanged by them. We there left the high road and proceeded westward. The next day we were surprised by the English force, and leaving our two guns, we fled, and reached the Nanbada. An officer, with one hundred men, was on the opposite bank. Our force commenced to cross, and this officer and party of sowars ran off. We plundered a village there called Chikla, and marched thence at midnight. After proceeding thirty-four miles, we halted at Rajpura. The next day we took three thousand nine hundred rupees and three horses from the raja of that place, and from it went on to Chota Udaipur. The following day the English force surprised us; some of them were killed, and some of ours. From Chota Udaipur we went on to Deogarh Bari, and our army became separated. There was jungle at that place, and I halted there for two days. Our troops having been collected again, we started, and went to Banswara. Our men plundered there sixteen or seventeen camel-loads of cloth (some of Ahmadabad) belonging to a mahajan which they found there. We thence went to Salomar, and I called on Kaisar Singh, agent for the Udaipur raja, to furnish us with supplies. He sent us some, and the following day we again started with the intention of going to Udaipur. However, *en route* we received tidings of the English force, and retraced our steps to Bhilwara. We remained there two days and then proceeded to Partabgarh, where we fought for two hours with a body of English troops which had come from Nimach. About 8 o'clock P.M. we ran off, and proceeded about six miles to the east of Mandisor and halted there. We then went on to Zirapur, making three stages *en route*. An English force surprised us there, and we were again surprised by another force at Chapra Barod. We fled thence to Nahargarh, the agent of the Kotah raja, at which place nine shots were fired at us from guns. We moved out of range, and halted there during the night; and the Rao Sahib sent Risaldar Nannu Khan to call raja Man Singh. The raja came and accompanied us—*i.e.* the Rao Sahib, myself, and our force—to a place about two miles from Paron, where we halted. We remained there two days, and on the third went on to a place about eight miles beyond Kilwarri, whose name I do not remember. Raja Man Singh accompanied us as far as a river which we crossed *en route*, and then left us. We made two stages thence to Indurgarh; and Firoz Shah with the Khas Risala (bodyguard) and 12th irregulars met us there. The next day we went on, making two stages to Dewas, which is fourteen miles from Jaipur. The English force surprised us there; some men on both sides were killed, and flying thence
towards Marwar, we reached a village about thirty koss from Marwar, whose name I do not remember. At 4 o'clock that night we were surprised by the English force, and the 12th irregular cavalry separated from the Rao Sahib's army. The next day Thakur Narayan Singh, A'jhit Singh, uncle of raja Man Singh, and Thakur Ganga Singh joined us at that place (? to which the Rao's army had fled). They were coming in this (the Paron) direction. I had been quarrelling with the Rao Sahib all the way from Deogarh Biri, and told him I could flee no longer, and that whenever I saw an opportunity for doing so, I should leave him. The opportunity for doing so here offered, and I left him and accompanied the (three) above-named parties in this (the Paron) direction. When I left the Rao Sahib he had about six thousand men with him. But three men (two Pandits to cook my food and one sais) and three horses and one tattu accompanied me. The names of the two pandits were Ram, Rao and Nariyan. The sais's name was Gobind, but he left me and ran off after coming two stages. We reached the Paron jungle and met raja Man Singh. A'jhit Singh took leave of raja Man Singh, and went to his home. Nariyan Singh and I remained with raja Man Singh. The raja said, "Why did you leave your force? You have not acted right in so doing." I replied that I was tired of running away, and that I would remain with him whether I had done right or wrong. I heard after this that the Rao Sahib's army had gone to Patan, and thence towards Sironj. I told raja Man Singh I would send a man to get intelligence of them, and he approved of my doing so. I sent accordingly, and got information that the Rao Sahib was not there; but Imam Ali, Wurdi-major, Firoz Shah, and the Ambapini-wala Nawab, Adil Muhammad, were there with eight or nine thousand men. Imam Ali, Wurdi-major of the 5th irregular cavalry, wrote to me to come and join them. I had lost my master's (the Nines) seal, and had another made up at Paron.

When I heard, as above, from the Wardi-major, I sent a man to raja Man Singh, who was at Mahudia in Major Meade's camp (he had then been there three days), to inform him that I had received a note of this purport, and to ask him if I should go or remain. Raja Man Singh had consulted me before giving himself up to Major Meade, and had left one of his men with me, saying, "Stop wherever this man takes you." Raja Man Singh replied to my message that he would come in three days to see me, and we should then settle what to do.

He came accordingly on the third day, at night, and spoke a great deal to me, and told me that he had met Major Meade, and that his disposition was good. When I asked him what he advised—whether I should go or remain—he said he would reply in the morning. I then went to sleep, and during the night some sepoys of the Government came and seized me, and took me to Major Meade's camp.

Signature of Tantia Topi, 
Agent of the Nana Sahib.
Question by Major Meade.—Have you made this statement of your own free will and without compulsion; and has any promise been made, or hope held out, to you to induce you to give it?

Answer.—I have, of my own free will, caused this statement to be written; and no one has forced me to do so, or held out hope or promise of any sort to induce me to do so.

Signature of Tantia Topi,

Signature of Witnesses. Agent of the Nana Sahib.
(Signed) Ganga-prasad Manshi, Meade's horse.
Rubhulal-Naibo Kamasdor of Sipri.

The above deposition or statement was made by the prisoner Tantia Topi in my presence on the 10th of April 1859, at Camp Mushairi, of his own voluntary act and without compulsion of any sort, or promise made, or hope held out to him as an inducement to make it.

(Signed) R. J. MEADE, Major,
Commanding Field Force.

Certified that the above is a true and correct translation of the original deposition or confession of Tantia Topi appended hereto.

(Signed) J. J. M. GIBBON, Lieutenant,
Adjutant Meade's horse. (True copy.)
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END OF VOLUME III